master of military studies · executive summary title: an analysis ofthe special landing force...

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:An Analysis of the Special Landing Force during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1969

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE\ OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:Major Edward T. Nevgloski, Sr., USMC

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...Executive Summary

Title: An Analysis of the Special Landing Force during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1969

Author: Major Edward Thomas Nevgloski, Sr., USMC

Thesis: Amphibious operations, particularly those of the Special Landing Force (SLF),contributed significantly to the United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam's(USMACV) operational mobility and flexibility by providing timely striking power ashore andfrom the sea, all of which are essential characteristics of naval campaigns in support of groundoperations.

Discussion: From 1965 to 1969, the United States Marine Corps contributed to the overallstrategy ashore in South Vietnam by using amphibious operations conducted by the SLF.Formed around an infantry battalion landing team, a composite helicopter squadron, and navalsurface assault craft, the SLF complemented large unit operations ashore as an exploitation forceor as the operational reserve prepositioned on amphibious ready group (ARG) shipping. Insupport of daily operations ashore, the SLF conducted amphibious assaults and raids targetingVietcong infiltration routes and buildup of enemy stockpiles in South Vietnam, and denied theestablishment of permanent coastal safe havens. Whether supporting conventional orpacification operations, the flexibility and mobility of the SLF ensured operational commanderspossessed a viable option to exploit success in a time-comp¥titive environment typical of theVietnam War. Although the concept had its benefits, it was not without problems as amphibiousdoctrine, command relationships, and operational employment debates often undermined thesuccess of the SLF.

Conclusion: The amphibious capability provided by the United States Marine Corps' SLFreduced the Vietcong's control over the South Vietnamese coastal population, prevented theNorth Vietnamese Army from exploiting tactical success, and disrupted the North VietnameseArmy and Vietcong's freedom of action in South Vietnam.

11

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THEINDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE

VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE O:R. AN¥:OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD

INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANYPART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

111

Table of Contents

PagesEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ; .ii

DISCLAIMER .iii

PREFACE · iv

LIST OF MAPS, DIAGRAMS, AND GRAPHS vi

INTRODUCTIONU.S. Marines in Vietnam 1The Special Landing Force 1

OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPSCoastal Geography and the Popull:l.tion , 3The SLF Mission 4Command Relationships 6

1965: EARLY OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENTSQui Nhon , ; 8First Contact: Operation STARLIGHT ; 10Operations DAGGER THRUST and HARVEST MOON 11

1966: LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS AND THE SECOND FRONTAn Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam 13Favorable Results ; 14The Enemy's New Face 16

1967: NEUTRALIZING THE VIETCONG AND FIGHTING THE NVAAttacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity 20A Second SLF , 22

1968: HIGH OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONSExtended Operations Ashore 24Status Quo 26

1969: RETURN TO THE SEA AND OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENTSDeja vu : ; 27 .Varying Opinions .' 29

CONCLUSION 30

NOTES

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

-<I

I-I

-i

Preface

An Analysis ofthe Employment ofthe Special Landing Force during the Vietnam War

from 1965 to 1969, based on previously classified documents prepared by the III Marine

Amphibious Force and the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, describes the purpose,

utility, and history of the Special Landing Force and, in many ways, amphibious operations

during the height of the Vietnam War. Official unit command chronologies, combat after-action

reports, personal interviews, and post-operational synopsis stored at the Library of the Marine

Corps' Historical Archives and Special Collections Section serve as the framework for this

study.

Amphibious operations are the backbone of the Marine Corps' contribution to the

security of United States' interests overseas, and, in a large part, the American way of war. As a

maritime nation, the United States must possess a force capable of conducting offensive

operations from the sea and in support of an operational campaign (design). The Marine Corps

has been that force since the early 20th Century, from the first advance base force exercise on

Culebra in 1902 to the Inchon landing in 1950. Even before Inchon, skeptics labeled amphibious

operations and the Navy-Marine Corps team as tools of the past, insignificant in the post-World

War II nuclear age. Had it not been for several Navy and Marine Corps veterans of amphibious

landings in World War II and Korea,the early United States military commitment in South

Vietnam would have added to this skepticism.

SLF operations during the Vietnam War gave new life to an already proven concept. The

advent of helicopters and vertical envelopment maneuver changed the art of amphibious warfare

and enhanced its effectiveness and utility for the next generation of warfare. In the conventional

arena SLF operations epitomized the art of mobility and the element of surprise in military

IV

operations, enabling commanders to employ mass against time sensitive requirements. In

support of pacification operations, the SLF provided commanders with an enduring presence,

something North Vietnamese forces could neither predict nor defend against. Ifnothing else,

SLF operations provided the Navy and Marine Corps with a glimpse of what future naval

campaigns might entail, particularly in a destabilized post-Cold War era.

The process of researching, collecting, evaluating, and writing this paper has been both a

personally satisfying experience and professionally rewarding endeavor. I am sincerely indebted

to my wife, Autumn; son, Edward Jr.; and dogs, Hoosier and Hanna, fortheir patience, support,

and understanding. Without them, completion of this project would not have been possible. I am

also indebted to Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Ret), President, Marine Corps

University; Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, USMC (Ret), President, Marine Corps

University Foundation; and Dr. Mark A. Moyar, Dr. John W. Gordon, Colonel, USMCR (Ret),

.and Lieutenant Colonel James H. Davis, USMC (Ret) of Marine Corps Command and Staff

College for their service, counsel, and advice. I also appreciate the assistance of the Library of

the Marine Corps' Historical Archives and Special Collections Section, whose patience and

professional knowledge played a significant role in my education as a researcher and writer.

Most of all, I am forever grateful to my cousin and posthumous Navy Cross recipient, Lance

Corporal Edward S. Day. Killed in action on August 26, 1968,in one of the many intense large

unit operations supported by the SLF in the northern Quang Tri Province, he epitomized the

determination and sacrifice that we can only hope to understand.

v

List of Maps, Diagrams, and Graphs

Figure 1: Map of Vietcong and NVA ICTZ Infiltration Network and Base Areas 3

Figure 2: Map of Vietcong and NVA battalions in the ICTZ, 1965. 5

Figure 3: Typical Pacific Command Relationships, 1965-1969 7

Figure 4: Typical Vietcong Movement Patterns, 1965 10

Figure 5: Operation STARLIGHT, 1965 11

Figure 6: Map of Vietcong and NVA battalions in the ICTZ, 1966 14

Figure 7: Population Increase in III MAF Area of Operations, 1965-1966 15

Figure 8: III MAF Offensive and Counterinsurgency Operations, 1965-1966 15

Figure 9: Vietcong and NVA Second Front in the ICTZ, 1966 17

Figure 10: Operations HASTINGS/DECKHOUSE II, 1966 - Enemy Plan of Action · 18

Figure 11: Operations HASTINGSIDECKHOUSE II, 1966 - SLF and III MAF Counterattack .19

Figure 12: Neutralization Operations against Enemy Base Areas, 1967 21

Figure 13: Map of Vietcong and NVA battalions in the ICTZ, 1967 23

Figure 14: NVA Order of Battle in the Quang Tri Province, 1968 25

Figure 15: Pacification Status in the ICTZ, 1969 28

Figure 16: Map of Persian Gulf and Iranian Coast : 32

Note: The length of this study, excluding imbedded figures, is 20 pages of text.

VI

INTRODUCTION

U.S. Marines in Vietnam

Following the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade's (9th MEB) amphibious landing near

Da Nang, South Vietnam, in March 1965, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces,

Pacific (CGFMFPac) Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, and his naval counterpart, the

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), outlined the advantages of an amphibious

capability to support USMACV's operations against North Vietnam. All three commands

acknowledged the benefits of a force dedicated for amphibious raids, assaults, and service as a

floating reserve. By 1969, the Special Landing Force (SLF) had conducted more than sixty-two

amphibious landings and numerous amphibious-related operations against Vietcong and North

- Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in South Vietnam.! Amphibious operations, particularly those

of the SLF, contributed significantly to USMACV's operational mobility and flexibility by

providing timely striking power ashore and from the sea, all of which are relevant characteristics

for the planning and execution of present day naval campaigns to support ground operations.

The Special Landing Force

The initial concept for amphibious operations and the employment of the SLF gained

momentum immediately after the Marines landed in South Vietnam. As early as 14 March,

CINCPACFLT and General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, USMACV

(COMUSMACV), circulated the prospects of adding an amphibious component to support

Operation MARKET TIME, a naval surveillance campaign targeting Vietcong infiltration routes

along the South Vietnamese coast? (See Figure 1) The opportunity to enhance existing

amphibious capabilities with a concept that kept Marines and ships together long after MARKET

TIME was of great interest to USMACV and III MAF. The CINCPACFLT contingency task

group, comprised of a task organized Marine air-ground team deployed in the Pacific aboard

2

amphibious ready group (ARG) shipping, seemed to be the most viable option to support

MARKET TIME and follow-on operations requiring an amphibious force. Since 1960, the

Marine Corps and Navy had maintained a combined strategic contingency force that covered the

Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.3 Like their Sixth Fleet counterparts in the Mediterranean,

the contingency task group conducted naval and ground exercises with Asian allies to strengthen

military ties in the Pacific and increase readiness in the volatile region.

Tasked to provide recommendations for amphibious operations in South Vietnam,

Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, Commanding General, 9th MEB identifieOd the SLF as the

best method for exploiting future successes ashore. SLF amphibious operations provide the

greatest amount of flexibility, surprise, and maneuver for light infantry forces. Another benefit

of the task group was its self-sustaining character, which contrasted with many of the ground

based forces that relied on various functional organizations for heavy and medium helicopter lift,

logistics, fire support and medical triage capabilities. Provided that amphibious operations did

not preclude the SLF from performing its primary function as the Pacific contingency task group,

9th MEB received full concurrence from CINCPACFLT and Lieutenant General Krolak to

request the SLF. However,operational and tactical mission considerations, command

relationships, and employment restrictions had to be resolved before committing the SLF to

operations ashore.

3

Map courtesy of the Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

Figure 1: Map of Vietcong and NVA Infiltration Network and Base Areas, 1965-1969

OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Coastal Geography and the Population

The geographic, political, and economic factors consuming South Vietnam in 1965 made

it the ideal environment for the Marine Corps, amphibious operations, and the SLF. The arrival

of 9th MEB was General Westmoreland's first step to counter deeply-entrenched Vietcong

regulars, particularly along the coast of the five provinces of the northern-most tactical zone

4

identified as the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) and the northern province of the II Corps Tactical

Zone (IICTZ). South Vietnam's coast, stretching from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with

North Vietnam to the southern tip of South Vietnam proper, accounted for 600 miles of

agriculturally fertile and heavily populated lowlands.4 (See Figure 2) These littorals made South

Vietnam's coastline a promising target for the Vietcong and the communist peasant uprising

attempting to reunite the two Vietnams. To undermine South Vietnam's democratic government,

the Vietcong targeted the population through intimidation, pacification, and its agricultural base,

which represented the economic wealth of South Vietnam. These populated areas constituted

critical support nodes for the Vietcong and became logistics concentration points to supply

Vietcong, and eventually, NVA operations south of the DMZ.

The SLF Mission

Not initially tasked with operating within these populated areas, or conducting

counterinsurgency operations, the 9th MEB received the first significant change to its mission in

South Vietnam when USMACV directed Marines to "undertake in accordance with RVN [South

Vietnam] I Corps, an intensifying program of offensive operations to fix and destroy the VC

[Vietcong] in the general Da Nang area."s The changing mission also brought about a change in

the 9th MEB's force structure in South Vietnam. Arriving with additional Marines in May, III

Marine Amphibious Force replaced the 9th MEB as the lead operational Marine command and

outlined its operational campaign against more than 2,000 Vietcong positioned near Da Nang, an

enemy roughly half the size of the III MAF.6

NT. 'in~'t1- V¥ 1'\1

LEGEND

Viet (ong battalion

TOTAL

II V( balta lions7 Infcintry4 Support

*Not shown on mop.

Map courtesy ofthe Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

Figure 2: Map of Vietcong Battalions in the ICTZ, 1965

To deny the Vietcong control of the population, agriculture, and economy, the III MAF

Commanding General, Major General Lewis H. Walt, directed operations to pacify the South

Vietnamese population and, if required, defeat Vietcong forces to prevent the Vietcong's

interference with III MAF's overall pacification campaign, keep the Vietcong off balance, and

deny the Vietcong access to the coastal areas in strength.7 As long as they remained in the

5

6

populated areas, Walt assessed the Vietcong as highly vulnerable to SLF amphibious operations

at any time. Aboard ARG shipping, the SLF remained out of Vietcong observation and detection

and could transit South Vietnam's 400-mile stretch of coastline on a given day.8 The Vietcong's

disposition, coupled with the SLF option, provided III MAF with a tailor-made scenario to

demonstrate its flexibility and mobility through a permanent amphibious and striking capability

in South Vietnam.

Command Relationships

The command relationships between the SLF and the Navy's Pacific operational

commands created a contentious environment from the start. Throughout the war~ the SLF

retained an operational and administrative chain of command when not employed in South

Vietnam. When assigned to support operations in South Vietnam, the SLF followed a separate

operational chain of command. (See Figure 3) For example, the SLF and ARG task group

remained subordinate to the Seventh Fleet when exercising contingency requirements, although

the 9th MEB, subordinate to Lieutenant General Krolak, still provided administrative support to

. SLF units. In tum, the Seventh Fleet reported directly to the CINCPACFLT for operational

purposes. When positioned off the coast of South Vietnam, CINCPACFLT retained operational

control of both the SLF and ARG task group until specifically requested by General

Westmoreland. During operations ashore, the SLF came under the operational control of either

Westmoreland or III MAF, dependent upon the mission and operational requirements.9

7

I CINC;PAC

us.:;.:--T---'---------~:~'FLT

*FMFPAC

PROVSERVBN

IIL_

II1---II

TG79.5(SLF)

__T_G_7_9_.4_(_S_L_F)_~~-------~1I,

I I---,,....-- ----J I

III

-IIIIII

.I

FLC

1ST MAW

3D MARDIV

1ST MARDIV

III1-,IIII1--IIIII1-IIIII1...III[I,L_ AMERICAL

DIVISIONI L..- J

II

L__ I CORPSADVISORY GROUP

.....····· • I: I• I: I• I: I• I:- I..: I

IIII

~ J

-'-" OP COMMAND

---- OP CONTROL

COMMAND LESS OP CONTROL

COORDINATION &. COOPERATION

MUTUAL SUPPORT

* INCLUDING FMFPAC FORWARD HQ

- COMMAND

Figure 3: Typical Pacific Command Relationships, 1965-1969

Diagram courtesy of the Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

The SLF command relationships, both convoluted and confusing, ensured the primary

purpose and integrity of the task group remained intact and were in keeping with

CINCPACFLT's directive for the justifiable use of naval forces off South Vietnam. Debates

internal to III MAF and debates between III MAF and USMACV created tension along Navy

8

and Marine Corps lines in terms of the appropriate use of amphibious forces in support of

USMACV operations. Aside from its contingency force requirements, Navy officials were in

favor of employing amphibious forces and the SLF as a floating reserve capable of using the

South China Sea as maneuver space to strike when and where it was most necessary. However,

Lieutenant General Krulak viewed the debate as an issue of responsiveness to both

CINCPACFLT and General Westmoreland's needs. There was also little evidence to support

CINCPACFLT's need for a Pacific contingency force, especially one assigned to a higher

priority than ongoing operations in South Vietnam. The only two occasions warranting the use

of a contingency force were the 1962 communist uprising in Laos and the attempted communist

coup in Indonesia in 1965. I0 The Indonesian coup coincided with the first use of the SLF during

Operation DAGGER THRUST, which fueled CINCPACFLT's insistence on the need for a ready

contingency force. The issue of operational priority, although resolved in 1965, continued to

resurface throughout the next five years of operations.

1965: EARLY OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

Qui Nhon

Major General Walt wasted little time planning for SLF support for large unit operations

in 1965. Walt received even better news when the decision to fill SLF requirements with a

battalion from the Okinawa-based 9th MEB relieved him of supporting the SLF requirement with

a batt'alion deployed to South Vietnam. II Although the change would not take effect for several

months, it enabled Walt to maintain his authorized strength ashore and gain one additional

battalion via the SLF, as long as any request consisted of an appropriate task for the SLF and for

a limited time. III MAF immediately drafted operational plans to ensure the SLF remained off

the coast for use in a variety of roles and operations.

In June 1965, USMACV faced a growing dilemma over the timing and arrival of United

States Army forces and Free World ground forces from South Korea, Australia, and New

Zealand, and adequate security of military installations in South Vietnam, particularly in Qui

Nhon where an increasingly significant Vietcong presence threatened the arrival of USMACV

forces. 12 Qui Nhon was also the location of the Army's main logistics base supporting

operations in the Central Highlands. To reduce the build up of Vietcong forces in the Qui Nhon

region, USMACV tasked III MAF to plan for operations until the Army established enough

combat power in the region.

Eager to put the task group to use, III MAF requested the SLF in advance of a permanent

Marine force at Qui Nhon. Located along the coast southwest ofDa Nang, Qui Nhon contained

a large population base with extensive agricultural potential, making it a favorable target for

Vietcong forces. Like several of the coastal enclaves, the area around Qui Nhon was also a

major base area for the Vietcong and NVA. Alerted to the operations while transiting the South

China Sea from Okinawa, the SLF arrived off the coast of Qui Nhon less than three days later,

conducted a heliborne assault into the highlands overlooking Qui Nhon, and established a

presence inside the populated areas. 13 The timing of the operation could not have come at a

better time,"catching the Vietcong in the process of adjusting forces in the area. The SLF's

unimpeded movement into Qui Nhon facilitated the gathering of intelligence on Vietcong

movement patterns and gave III MAF the opportunity to test several of its pacification

techniques with the local populace. (See Figure 4) After three uneventful days, the SLF

returned to the ARG as the floating reserve for ongoing operations. The Qui Nhon operation,

however uneventful, demonstrated the flexibility and responsiveness ofthe task group, and the

SLF's ability to seize limited amphibious objectives in support of a larger operation.

9

®

MARCH 1965: Elements of regiment conduclingguerrillo @operatron$ in soufhern Quang Tin and northernOuang Ngaipr_ovinces. .

MAY'1965: Moior elements combine ondinorch southward @,into Quang., Ngoi. Splinter elemen1s b.egin offock on Ba _Gia ." ,ARVN oUtposl. Main body proceeds to An Son oreo@

10

JUlY 1965: Main body deports An ,Son. completes reduction of 80 Giiloutpost@on 5 July; begins movement to Van Tuong complex.

AUGUST 1965: As positions are being readied at Van Tuong. regiment isoHocked by Morine forces (Operation STARlITEJ. )osin9 599 soldiers.F,ro'gmenfed elements e,cHltro'fe southeast to Salongan peninsulo.@Remainder withdraw west and north to Tien phuoc region @Three weelc.slater the 'survivors at Batongon o,'e atio'cked by combined Morine/ARVN 'lorc~ (Operation PIRANHA) and lase, 183 soldiers.


Figure 4: Map of Vietcong Movement Patterns, 1965

First Contact: Operation STARLIGHT

Shorter after the Qui Nhon, Major General Walt again requested the SLF to support

Operation STARLIGHT, scheduled for August 1965. STARLIGHT originated as a result of

intelligence reports indicating an increased Vietcong presence and suspected attack on the naval

logistics base at Chu Lai, south ofDa Nang. 14 The goal of the operation was to fix and destroy

the 1st Vietcong Regiment arrayed along the coast, with the SLF serving as Walt's floating

reserve. (See Figure 5) The operation called for several Marine battalions to sweep from north

to south pushing the Vietcong from its positions. If necessary, Walt could use the SLF to trap

Vietcong forces fleeing west. During the first day of STARLIGHT, the SLF landed from ARG

11

shipping undetected, trapping and killing an undetermined number of Vietcong forces in a

combined surface and helibome assault. 15 An essential supporting element in STARLIGHT, the

SLF demonstrated unmatched flexibility and responsiveness throughout the operation. Ashore

less than a week, the SLF returned to the ARG and prepared for their next assignment.


Figure 5: Operation STARLIGHT, 1965

Operations DAGGER THRUST and HARVEST MOON

Rejoining the task group, the SLF finally received the task of supporting the long-awaited

amphibious phase of Operation MARKET TIME. In July, CINCPACFLT approved Operation

DAGGER THRUST as a supporting effort to MARKET TIME. DAGGER THRUST consisted

of a series of amphibious raids on "suspected enemy concentration points" along South

Vietnam's coast that lasted from September to December. 16 The DAGGER THRUST series

netted little in terms of enemy contact. Of the five DAGGER THRUST operations planned for

..

12

and executed, only two involved significant contact with Vietcong forces while the remaining

three ~covered several bunker complexes and weapons caches. 17 The SLF concept, however,

proved to be a valid approach to keeping the Vietcong and NVA guessing as to where the next

landing would take place. Lieutenant General Krulak declared that the DAGGER THRUST

operations "caused VC in the area to move" and that "the full impact of these benefits has not

been realized.,,18 In contrast to earlier SLF operations, DAGGER THRUST capitalized on the

task group's ability to move undetected along the coast, to conduct limited actions ashore, and

the ability to return to the ARG expediently. If necessary, the SLF could immediately reform

and respond to enemy reaction to DAGGER THRUST, or transit the coast en route to the next

objective.

Following six months of amphibious raids along the coast, the SLF came ashore in

support of Operation HARVEST MOON to reduce the remnants of the 1st Vietcong Regiment.

Assigned as the floating reserve, the SLF quickly came ashore two days into the operation as

heavy fighting prompted the ground force commander to solicit the SLF to reinforce a multiple

battalion engagement. As in Operation STARLIGHT, the SLF moved ashore in amphibious

assault craft and helicopters at the most critical time of the operation, blocking Vietcong forces

from using escape routes. Fully committed to the battle vice returning to ships as the floating

reserve, the SLF again proved its worth as a reliable force capable of exploiting ,Success ashore

as it became the decisive element in the defeat of the 1st Vietcong Regiment. 19

As a result of SLF participation in large unit operations and the III MAF pacification

plan, enemy activity in the ICTZ and northern IICTZ increased to ensure control of the populated

areas and then drastically decreased due to significant contact throughout 1965.20 The

composition of North Vietnamese forces also changed to counter the large conventional

-~ 13

operations III MAF employed against the Vietcong. By the end of 1965, intelligence reports

identified an increased NVA presence as a response to significant Vietcong losses in the ICTZ.21

1966: LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS AND THE SECOND FRONT

An Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam

By early 1966, SLF operations were proving to be a resounding success. As the build up

of III MAF and USMACV forces continued, North Vietnam began planning for the next phase of

infiltrations across the DMZ in 1966. Representatives from CINCPACFLT, FMFPac, and

USMACV routinely held joint planning and validation conferences to ensure the appropriate

application of amphibious forces, including the SLF, remained a priority. A conference in May

1966 resulted in the acceptance of the Application ofAmphibious Doctrine in Vietnam which ...

detailed but was not limited to, amphibious force application procedures, command and planning

relationships, and operational responsibilities?2 The conference and published results also

concluded that the changing nature of the enemy rendered the original SLF concept "too narrow

in scope" and in need of thorough review and evaluation?3

Operations STARLIGHT and HARVEST MOON validated the utility of the SLF

throughout 1965 and 1966 and provided excellent examples of how to tailor amphibious

operations to meet the demands of the war. With the infiltration of several NVA divisionsi

throughout the ICTZ, III MAF began planning for SLF support for large unit operations. (See

Figure 6) Supporting pacification operations and raids along the coast would continue through

the next year, but at a lower priority. The effects of this change in mission would influence the

NVA's ability to wage a conventional war near the DMZ, and provide the Vietcong with an

opportunity to return to the contested littorals.

14

. LEGEND

.II· North Vietnomese battalion

~ Viet Cang battalion

TOTAL

30 NVA Barta lions (Includes3 Support Battalionsnot shown) .

18 VC ·Ballolions (Includes5 Support Battalionsnot shown)

*Not shown on map.


Figure 6: Map ofVietcong and NVA Battalions in the ICTZ, 1966

Favorable Results

In the first year of SLF operations, friendly pockets of the South Vietnamese population

in III MAF's area of operation grew from 100,000 to well over 600,000?4 Several factors

contributed to the increase, the first being that the increases in both offensive operations and

pacification programs were gaining support in numerous villages and enclaves through the ICTZ.

Government-sponsored population resettlement programs also afforded the South Vietnamese an

15

opportunity to move to less inhabited areas. III MAF operations to disrupt Vietcong infiltration

and intimidation in the areas villagers refused to vacate included the SLF. Resettlement

programs, coupled with increased enemy activity in the IICTZ, convinced the population to

relocate to more secure and protected areas. With heavy enemy losses in the southern ICTZ in

1965, the population found refuge within the former Vietcong strongholds along the coast. The

increase in population in a particular area brought an increase in enemy activity to counter III

MAF pacification operations and to regain support for the communist uprising and revolution.

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,,000

Graph courtesy of the Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

Figure 7: Population increase in the III MAF Area of Operations

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Graph courtesy ofthe Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

NOV DEC JAN FES MAR APR

1966

Figure 8: III MAF Offensive and Counterinsurgency Operations

16

As with the DAGGER THRUST series, III MAF understood the potential advantages of

using the SLF as the primary force to execute a new series of amphibious operations as part of

the large unit operation concept. A new series of operations entitled DECKHOUSE would

continue the trend of providing a mobile amphibious force to transit the coast in support of large

unit operations throughout three of the four corps tactical zones. DECKHOUSE, which had

much to do with General Westmoreland's displeasure with Major General Walt's insistence on

prioritizing a small unit-based pacification plan over conventional operations, centered on

regiment and division-sized operations against Vietcong and NVA base camps to achieve a

decisive victory similar to Operations STARLIGHT and HARVEST MOON. Although raids

and the floating reserve remained the primary SLF and task group mission, large unit operations

continued to dominate the next three years, predicated on the increasing lethality and size of"

enemy forces. DECKHOUSE reflected a changing enemy, III MAF's execution ofthe war, and

SLF operations in support of the war.

The Enemy's New Face

The Vietcong and NVA, eager to regain lost resources and support in the lICTZ, initiated

two operational adjustments to their planned uprising and revolution to counter III MAF's

presence along the populated coastal areas. Known as the Second Front, this plan compensated

for staggering Vietcong loses in the III MAF's combined counterinsurgency and large unit

operations campaign. (See Figure 9) The initial phase of the Second Front called for the

deployment of several NVA infantry divisions across the DMZ, supported by artillery battalions

firing from positions north of Ben Hai River bordering the DMZ. In anticipation ofIII MAF

confronting these forces, the Vietcong could then reinsert forces into the populated areas of thel

southern ICTZ and northern IICTZ as the Marines moved toward the DMZ.25 Willing to accept

heavy losses in the northern ICTZ to prevent III MAF's interference with Vietcong counter

17

pacification operations around Da NanR and Chu Lai, the Second Front significantly changed the

dynamics of the war as an increased NVA's presence forced the change in the priority ofIII

MAF's mission from a counterinsurgency to conventional war.26 It also demonstrated North

Vietnam's ability to wage a balanced campaign of conventional operations with a popularly

supported insurgency.


Figure 9: Vietcong and NVA Second Front in the ICTZ, 1966

In June 1966, Operation DECKHOUSE brought III MAF back to the Qui Nhon area in

pursuit of the Vietcong forces attempting to re-establish bases of operations in the IICTZ.

Returning to the ICTZ a month later, the first concerted effort made by III MAF to confront the

buildup ofNVA forces near the DMZ came as a supporting effort to the largest operation

18

executed by Marines since arriving in South Vietnam. The purpose of Operation HASTINGS

was to find and destroy several NVA battalions infiltrating the DMZ to prevent further use of the

DMZ to launch attacks into Quang Tri.27 Indirectly supporting HASTINGS, the SLF came

ashore as the main effort to Operation DECKHOUSE II to block NVA escape routes from the

HASTINGS area of operations. (See Figure 11) In September, the SLF executed Operation

DECKHOUSE IV as an adjunct to Operation PRAIRIE, routing NVA forces rebuilding near

Cam Lo. Both operational sequences, complimentary ofthe other, demonstrated the SLF's

ability to conduct independent operations against conventional forces, increasing NVA losses

while steadily reducing the number of enemy initiated attacks against III MAF .28

JJ;iUATHIEN .


Figure 10: Operations HASTINGSIDECKHOUSE II, 1966 - Enemy Plan of Action

19


\1I\

.:':

CASUALTIESNVA USMC·

824 KIA 126 KIA

14 Captured 448 WIA

226 Wpns

.' '-'"

, . 1(;'

Q ·U..k T.t -'"'" ".,') J ..........-\.2). ,"l 1'" ,,_~ lL(\...( .

. ' "','

Figure 11: Operations HASTINGS/DECKHOUSE II, 1966 - SLF and III MAF Counterattack

Toward the end of 1966, the SLF continued planning for large unit operations and

enduring raids along the coast, as the more conventional campaign continued to take a heavy toll

ofNorth Vietnamese forces. Having undergone minor changes to command relationships, re-

establishing amphibious planning and coordination guidelines across the services, and proving its

utility as an independent element or supporting effort in a variety of operations, SLF amphibious

operations remained the topic of heated debate within USMACV and III MAF.29 For some III

MAF leadership, SLF operations did not constitute a return to the amphibious character

commonly found in Marine Corps history as SLF operations were considered "exploitations of

an already existing battle situation", due to the fact that they did not land across heavily defended

beaches.30 Instead, Marines came ashore by helicopter and inserted directly into the battle, or

they were brought ashore by landing craft using sea lanes connected to river estuaries leading

further inland.

20

According to the III MAF Operations Officer, Colonel John R. Chaisson, SLF operations

"by and large were sort of contrived. It was almost a concept looking for a home.,,31 This flawed

assessment does not take into account the flexibility that modem amphibious operations can

provide, particularly since the advent of helicopter technology, which enabled amphibious forces

to launch beyond enemy observation from ship to objective. As SLF operations along the

populated coastline pushed the Vietcong further inland, the ability to conduct helibome

amphibious operations beyond the beach zone became that much more critical to maintain

operational tempo against attacking or fleeing Vietcong and NVA forces.

1967: NEUTRALIZING THE VIETCONG AND FIGHTING THE NVA

Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity

The SLF entered 1967 anticipating the same mobile contingency tasks as the previous

two years. The SLF did just that, carrying out Operation DECKHOUSE V in the IVCTZ and the

Mekong Delta. However, due to the increasing demand for additional Marines in Quang Tri to

confront the NVA, this would be the last SLF operation to be executed outside the ICTZ, much

to the dismay of General Westmoreland.32 As in past SLF operations, the targets were Vietcong

control points and concentration areas along the populated coast. The operation, although

successful in terms of disrupting Vietcong influence in the area, had its share ofproblems, such

as the control of aircraft in support of amphibious operations outside the ICTZ. According to

amphibious doctrine, all aircraft supporting amphibious operations fall under the control of the

naval commander of the amphibious task force. However, the Seventh Air Force, which

controlled all air operations in the Mekong Delta, believed that even during an amphibious

operation, it should retain control. 33 Although General Westmoreland concurred with the Navy

and assigned control of air operations to the ARG, to avoid future problems amphibious

operations thereafter remained inside the ICTZ. Future conferences resolved air control

i,

r

problems and served as a reminder to the Seventh Fleet, USMACV, III MAF, and Seventh Air

Force that continuous coordination between the services was paramount during the planning

phase of amphibious operations, regardless of current standing operating procedures.34

III MAF's focus of effort throughout much of 1967 was the neutralization of Vietcong

and NVA base areas and the attrition of the Vietcong and NVA forces by introducing Marines

into enemy occupied enclaves for significantly longer periods to draw the Vietcong and NVA

into decisive engagements.35 (See Figure 12)

ENEMY KIllED IN BASE .AREANEUTRALlZATION OPERATIONS -1967

Map and graph courtesy of the Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

Figure 12: Neutralization Operations against Vietcong and NVA Base Areas, 1967

21

22

Like SLF targets in 1965 and 1966, these base areas consisted of multi-layered bunker

complexes, which provided command and control and logistical support. Base areas were often

the scene of the more intense battles. Operations similar to DECKHOUSE VI, which succeeded

in killing 201 Vietcong, uncovered 167 fortifications, and more than 20 tons of supplies during

the month of February alone, achieved the desired neutralization of enemy forces and base areas

for a significant period.36 The neutralization effort became a costly problem for enemy forces as

SLF and large unit operations greatly reduced Vietcong presence among the South Vietnamese

people and the NVA's ability to maintain sustained conventional operations far beyond the DMZ

throughout the year.

A Second SLF

One of the more significant changes to the SLF concept came in April of 1967. As a

result of increased large unit operations and the need to provide additional forces in South

Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the creation of a second SLF with the understanding

that both were to be committed "to extended operations in Vietnam.,,37 Lieutenant General Walt

(promoted in June 1966) immediately laid the groundwork for the second SLF, creating habitual

relationships by aligning SLF-A with the 3d Marine Division, which typically operated north of

Hue City to the DMZ, and SLF-B with the 151 Marine Division operating from Hue City to areas

south ofDa Nang.38 The majority of the changes reflected III MAF's reaction to intelligence

reports profiling an alarming NVA buildup north of the DMZ and throughout northern ICTZ.

(See Figure 13) With SLF-A and SLF-B available, III MAF and USMACV increased the

operational tempo by increasing adjunct SLF and large unit operations, thus continuing the trend

of reducing enemy-initiated attacks. 38 In June, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman replaced

Walt. Cushman, a proponent of the SLF program, looked to re-establish the SLF concept and

amphibious operations at the soonest available opportunity.

LEGEND

.. North Vietnamese Army

~ Viel Cong

TOTAL57 NVA Battalions (Includes

15 Support Battalionsnol shown)

19 VC Battalions

'/. Not shown on mop.


Figure 13: Map of Vietcong and NVA Battalions in the ICTZ, 1967

Throughout the second half of 1967, the SLFs routinely completed one operation and

immediately began another without returning to the ARG due to the need to exploit success

against a neutralized enemy force or to reinforce Marines elsewhere. In July, both SLFs landed

to support Operation BUFFALO after Marines uncovered a large NVA force moving across the

DMZ, which eventually led to one of the bloodiest battles of the conflict.39 After two weeks of

23

24

brutal fighting, both SLFs returned to the ARG and prepared for the next phase of sustained

operations ashore near the DMZ. Operation BUFFALO became the norm for the SLF in 1967,

with no change in sight for 1968.

For nearly two years, the SLF served as an essential element in III MAF's pacification

campaign to neutralize the Vietcong's control over the population. On a conventional scale, the

SLF did more than augment or reinforce III MAF units in contact with the NVA. SLF

participation in large unit operations accounted for several ofIII MAF's more decisive actions

against the NVA along the DMZ during this period. The combined III MAF-SLF operational

tempo along the DMZ and throughout the Quang Tri province forced the NVA to increase its

conventional efforts to reduce III MAFs combat power throughout the entire province. Halting

advance elements of several NVA divisions in 1966 and 1967, the SLF inflicted numerous

casualties throughout the highly contested province and disrupted any momentum the NVA and

Vietcong hoped to achieve along the border and on the coast. A critical element of the SLF's

success was its responsiveness, due in part to its air-ground task organization. Whereas III

MAF's land-based infantry battalions and assault-support helicopter squadrons could respond in

kind, the cohesive relationship between the SLF's air-ground components significantly reduced

response time. Positioned aboard ARG shipping, the SLF also retained a greater measure of

surprise.

1968: HIGH OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Extended Operations Ashore

By January 1968, III MAF intelligence reported three NVA divisions operating in central

and western Quang Tri Province or along the DMZ. (See Figure 14) The divisions comprised of

more than thirty infantry and artillery battalions with six support battalions (trucks, engineers,

and communications) to facilitate operations, double the number ofNVA committed to the war

25

less than two years earlier. 40 An increase in the coastal areas, however, did not occur. Like the

previous three years of infiltrations, the NVA shifted infiltration efforts to the rugged interior

mountainous region bordering Laos. Intense engagements along the border and the DMZ

continued to draw the SLF ashore for lengthier periods, reducing the effectiveness of a proven

amphibious capability.

DMZFront He-adqu'Hleu 1

Di .... ision HeadqucrlOu 2-

Regimvntal Hltadquor1on: 8

Jnfcntry Saito-lions 23

Support BaHaJions .5


Figure 14: NVA Order of Battle in the Quang Tri Province, 1968

Following Operation BUFFALO, both SLFs underwent a significant rehabilitation period

as losses to personnel and equipment were high. Activity around the Khe Sanh Valley kept III

MAF busy assessing NVA intentions, although it was clear an attack on the Khe Sanh Combat

Base was imminent. 41 Although SLF-A and SLF-B remained at sea to respond to either Khe

Sanh or any number of flashpoints in Quang Tri, the ongoing redistribution of forces in the

ICTZ, particularly at Khe Sanh and near Cam Lo, brought both SLFs ashore from late January

until mid June.42

26

Extended operations ashore did very little for the development of the SLF concept in

1968. They did, however, highlight a critical shortfall in logistical support for SLF operations.

Exacerbated by a logistics system developed to support the SLF's original mission, committing

both SLFs to combat operations ashore further complicated the situation. Previous to the SLF's

participation in large unit operations, ground and aviation elements provided their own logistical

support when not operating aboard ships or within areas accessible to III MAF logistics bases at

Dong Ha and Chu Lai.43 To resolve the problem, III MAF and CINCPACFLT implemented new

policies pertaining to SLF support. Although new procedures for supporting the SLF were

published by Lieutenant General Walt 1967, III MAF took the necessary action to ensure

compliance.44 According to Walt's order, the SLF "when operating in areas isolated from

established logistics support areas, ground units of the SLF utilize their own resources, with,

stocks reconstituted as practicable from the Force Logistics Command.. .if operations ashore

extend beyond 15 days, support of helicopters will become the responsibility ofCG, III MAF.,,45

Status Quo

With extended operations ashore and subsequent lQgistical support changes, the SLF '

"became part ofIII MAF for the next few months", raising CINCPACFLT's concerns over SLF

reconstitution and employment practices.46 Senior Navy, Army, and Marine officers revisited

the interoperability and operational dilemma of 1965 as both SLFs remained ashore for an

extended time. The Navy, concerned with long-term use of the SLF ashore, insisted that current

employment patterns were greatly reducing CINCPACFLT's ability to strike elsewhere in the

Pacific. Marine counterparts such as Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, Commanding

General, 3d Marine Division, sided against the Navy, stating that it was "better to have two

battalions ashore than two battalions floating around, looking at each other.,,47 Lieutenant

General Cushman emphasized the role of the SLF and directed that the battalions and aviation

27

squadrons assigned to the SLF remain with the ARG as their original intended use was "against

'time sensitive targets" and that the basis for the SLF's employment "be on best III MAF

intelligence estimates.,,48 Near the end of the year, both SLFs returned to the ARG and

commenced a series of small amphibious operations along the coast. Still supporting large

operations ashore, the unresolved issues surrounding the SLF continued into 1969.

1969: RETURN TO THE SEA AND OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENTS

Deja vu

On the ground, 1969 looked to be yet another year of intense fighting and high

operational tempo. III MAF intelligence estimates nearly doubled the strength ofNVA and

Vietcong battalions in the ICTZ from the previous year.49 Pacification estimates weregetting

attention at the highest levels, and for good reason. (See Figure 15) The total population growth

in areas under III MAF control and security tripled while the percentage of the population still

under Vietcong control dropped to less than five percent.50 Within SLF target areas along the

coast, population pacification levels were well over ninety percent secure, an increase since late

1968 when the SLF vacated the coastal areas and participated in months ofoperations along the

DMZ.51 Nonetheless, security levels returned to pre-1968 levels and steadily improved

throughout the remainder of the year with the return of the SLF. At sea, as both SLFs prepared

for limited operations ashore, pacification operations returned to the forefront in spite of an

increased enemy presence along the DMZ.

Lieutenant General Cushman's vision of maximizing all available forces to achieve

complementary effects included the increased use of the SLF. One such operation was

Operation BOLD MARINER, the largest operation in support of III MAF's 1969 combined

combat and pacification campaign and the largest amphibious landing since Inchon in 1950.52

28

L

I

IS?,

IOO~;;;

SO%~E(JlIN

75%

.SO%

100%

JAN

fHr.

DECEMBER TOTALS

POPULATION 998,800SECURE 928,500COH15H.D 28,800VC CONTROL 41.500

JIIN

Total

2,998,200

100%

IAN

DECEMBER TOTALS

POPULATION 684,100SECURE 672,000(()H!t!.TEO 3,lfJOVC CONlROl 9,000

DECEMBER TOTALS

POPULATION 300,100SECURE 287,300CDIiImw 12,800VC CONTROL 0

DECEMBER TOTAlS

POPULATION 644,600SECURE 597,000COImSTED 1Ll,2flOVC CONTROL 37,400

OECEMBER lOTAlS

POPULATION 370,600SECURE 321,100coumWl 1:J.W3VC CONTROl 36,400

I CTZTotals

PopulationPercentage

Map and graphs courtesy of the Archives and Special Collections, Library of the Marine Corps

Figure 15: Pacification Status in the ICTZ, 1969

Under BOLD MARINER, both SLFs came ashore south of Chu Lai in the Quang Ngai Province,

the southern-most province in the ICTZ. BOLD MARINER marked the first significant III MAF

29

presence in the area in over a year, an area with nearly 50,000 South Vietnamese citizens either

under complete control of the Vietcong or nearing submission to the 38th Vietcong Main Force

Regiment. 53

Operation BOLD MARINER, although producing little enemy contact, was the first of

several successive operations in the two remaining Vietcong-dominated provinces of Quang

Ngai and Quang Tin. Aimed at securIng the population base and backfilling gaps during III

MAF's repositioning of forces prior to Tet, the renewed focus on pacification operations came

on the heels of the 3d Marine Division's redeployment to Okinawa. BOLD MARINER also

continued the lengthy operational debate that resurfaced at the end of 1968. However, the SLF

returned to the ARG each time to conduct rehabilitation training at sea or until called back to

support III MAF operations.

Varying Opinions

Midway through 1969, General Creighton W. Abrams, General Westmoreland's

successor, attempted to return the SLF to its original purpose by stressing the importance of the

SLF and ARG as a theater asset, not just an asset used in the III MAF controlled northern

provinces, and that the most judicious use of amphibious capabilities was to make the SLFs

accessible throughout the entire operational area. In contrast, Lieutenant General Herman

Nickerson, Jr., Cushman's replacement, saw little benefit in employing the SLF outside III

MAF's area of operations and insisted the SLF remain ashore vice at sea. In response to

Abrams' request to refine the SLF's employment criteria CINCPACFLT reiterated the

restrictions levied on III MAF and USMACV for the employment and application of the SLF

and reminded both commands of the requirement for the justifiable use of naval forces off the

coast of South Vietnam.

--------~-----------------------------~----

30

Abrams' determination led to increased disagreements between all parties, particularly

,within the Okinawa-based 9th MEB, which provided the infantry battalions and helicopters for

the SLF. Colonel Clyde Hunter, the 9th MEB Operations Officer, believed the SLF "was being

misused" and that subordinate commands were "actually ginning up operations just to get them

ashore and then tie them down to a TAOR, or into some kind of operation, that had no

connection to their mission as an SLF.,,54 In related argument the 9th MEB Chief of Staff,

Colonel John Lowman, Jr. stated that as long as the SLFs remained ashore for extended periods

it was "hard for the Navy to justify the expense of keeping under-utilized amphibious shipping

hanging off the Vietnamese coast." 55 While the Navy maintained its position, III MAF

continued to argue that too much time at sea adversely influenced operations ashore and that any

Marine not operating ashore did not constitute the best utilization of available forces.

The final SLF operation in South Vietnam brought about a significant reduction of

capabilities ashore and in support of the overall operational campaign against North Vietnam. At

the conclusion of Operation DEFIANT STAND in September 1969, the SLF reverted to its

primary role as. a strategic reserve force to reduce the total number of forces operating in

Vietnam. From this point on, only the Joint Chiefs of Staff could approve the use of the SLF

adding, "enemy offensive of major proportions would have to be launched before imminent

reintroduction [of the SLFs into Vietnam] would even be considered.,,56 The SLF remained

prepared for employment ashore by conducting training exercises around the Pacific region and

maintaining a 4-day reaction posture to support COMUSMACV in addition to the standard 7-day

requirement anywhere in the Pacific.57

CONCLUSION

The SLF's amphibious capabilities reduced the Vietcong's control over the coastal

population, prevented the North Vietnamese Army from exploiting tactical success, and

31

disrupted the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong's freedom of action in South Vietnam. In

Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner's article "Amphibious Operations in Vietnam," he asserts

that the Marine Corps viewed employing amphibious operations with contempt due to a "lack of

understanding of amphibious doctrine coupled with impatience over the prosecution of the

war.,,58 Nevertheless, it does not detract from the fact that amphibious operations conducted by

the SLF from 1965 to 1969 complemented III MAF and USMACV naval and ground campaigns

more than originally anticipated. If nothing else, SLF renewed the doctrinal art of amphibious

warfare, yet on a grander scale, its absence would have greatly reduced General Westmoreland's

campaIgn success.

Contrary to the portrayal of the war, SLF helibome and surface assault amphibious

operations played a significant role throughout this period, adding depth and responsiveness:toa

time sensitive environment and against a fluid enemy force. While the services argued the utility

and value of SLF operations throughout the war, they could not refute its contribution to

defeating Vietcong and NVA forces. The focused use of the SLF along the populated coast for

limited and extended periods allowed III MAF to retain the initiative in the heaviest contested

areas. As part of III MAF's pacification campaign the SLF's presence provided enduring

security for the people by augmenting III MAF with a mobile force capable of interdicting

Vietcong forces and supplies on a moment's notice.

In support of combat operations, the SLF provided great tactical flexibility for the

operational commander by generating operational momentum, regardless of the assigned tactical

task, and disrupting enemy freedom of action by keeping Vietcong and NVA forces off balance

throughout the entire area of operations. Lieutenant General Cushman, an avid proponent of the

program commented that the concentrated use of the SLF during this period "added that extra

punch" to reinforce success or tum the tide of a battle.59 In either capacity, the SLF

32

demonstrated its versatility in support of sustained operations ashore. For the better part of 1966

and all of 1967 and 1968, the SLF remained committed to large unit operations while at the same

time maintaining its ability to transition back to pacification operations when necessary. No

other unit can claim the flexibility and versatility demonstrated by the SLF.

In terms of current operational relevance, understanding the operational significance and

capabilities of the SLF is equally as important when planning for potential conflicts. One

example is Iran and its vast border with the Persian Gulf, which would imply that the Navy and

Marine Corps team will playa significant role in any military action in this region.

Map courtesy of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Figure 16: Map of Persian Gulf and Iranian Coast

33

Aside from amphibious landings in support of ground combat operations, possible

scenarios for the SLF against Iran include keeping the sole entry point into the Persian Gulf

open, raids on coastal anti-shipping missile batteries, and seizing Iranian Revolutionary Guard

fast-attack boat stations, which were critical to Iranian naval operations against United States

Navy ships escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf from 1987 to 1988.60 Employment

of the SLF against fast-attack boats stationed at gas and oil platforms and several small coastal

bases on the Iranian mainland or on Farsi Island would negate Iranian freedom of action and

control of vital sea-lanes, particularly through the Straits ofHormuz. Denying Iran this

capability would redu,ce its tactical and operational advantage over United States naval forces.

Regardless of the location and adversary, studying the lessons learned from SLF operations in

South Vietnam could provide the United States' Joint Force Commander with the needed depth

and mobility across a designated area of operations, as well as providing the added flexibility and

striking power to complement the land and naval campaign design and the overall strategy

ashore.

34

Notes

1. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 98.

2. Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1965: The Landing andthe Buildup, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps,1978), 193.

3. LtCol Peter 1. Hilgartner, USMC, "Amphibious Operations in Vietnam," Marine CorpsGazette, January 1969,29.

4. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Application ofAmphibious Doctrine in Vietnam, (1966), 1.

5. Shulimson and Johnson, us. Marines in Vietnam, 1965,27.

6. Ibid., 28.

7. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Application ofAmphibious Doctrine in Vietnam, (Washington,1965),2.

8. John J. Cahill and Jack Shulimson, History ofus. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam,.January-June 1965, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States MarineCorps),4-14.

9. Ibid., 7-17.

10. Robert H. Whitlow, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964: The Advisory & CombatAssistance Era, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps,1988),·88, and Shulimson and Johnson, us. Marines in Vietnam, 1965,200.

11. Jack Shulimson, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War, (Washington, D.C.:History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps, 1982), 300.

12. Shulimson and Johnson, us. Marines in Vietnam, 1965,50-54.

13. Ibid., 53-56.

14. Otto J. Lehrack, The First Battle: Operation Starlight and the Beginning ofthe Blood Debtin Vietnam, (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2004), 51-52.

15. Ibid.

16. Shulimson and Johnson, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, 197.

17. Ibid., 198-203.

18. Ibid., 200.

19. Cahill andShulimson, History ofus. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 4-15.

20. Ibid., 5-25.

21. Shulimson and Johnson, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1965,212.

22. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Application ofAmphibious Doctrine in Vietnam, Annex A-12.

23. Jack Shulimson, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War, (Washington, D.C.:History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps, 1982),303.

24. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, March 1965September 1967, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States MarineCorps), 3-4.

25. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January-June,1966, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps), 5.

26. Ibid.

27. Edward F. Murphy, Semper Fi Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ, Marine CorpsCampaigns, 1965-1975, (New York: Ballentine Books, 1997), 70-77.

28. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January-June,1966,28.

29. Shulimson, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1966,297-299.

30. Ibid., 306.

31. Ibid.

32. Gary 1. Telfar, Lane Rogers and V. Keith Fleming, Jr, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1967:Fighting the North Vietnamese, (History and Museums Division, Headquarters United StatesMarine Corps: Washington, D.C., 1984), 151.

33. Ibid., 152-153.

34. Ibid.

35. Murphy, Semper Fi Vietnam, 87.

36. Telfar, Rogers, and Fleming, Jr, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, 153.

37. Ibid., 150-151.

38. Ibid., 151-181.

35

36

39. Keith W. Nolan, Operation Buffalo: USMC Fightfor the DMZ, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,1991),44.

40. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, JanuaryDec;ember, 1968, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States MarineCorps),98.

41. Lewy, America in Vietnam, 67-68.

42. Jack Shulimson, Leonard Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson, Us. Marines inVietnam, 1968: The Defining Year, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, UnitedStates Marine Corps, 1997),635-636.

43. Telfar, Rogers, and Fleming, Jr, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, 151.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Shulimson, Blasiol, Smith, and Dawson, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1968,635.

47. Ibid., 634.

48. Ibid., 635.

49. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, JanuaryDecember, 1969, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States MarineCorps),5.

50. Ibid., 28.

51. Ibid.

52. Charles R. Smith, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1969: High MobilitY and Standown,(Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps, 1988),300.

53. Lewy, America in Vietnam, 139.

54. Smith, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1969,297.

55. Ibid., 28.

56. Graham A Cosmos and Terrance P. Murray, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-1971:Vietnamization and Redeployment, (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, UnitedStates Marine Corps, 1986),386.

57. Smith, us. Marines in Vietnam, 1969,310.

37

58. Hilgartner, "Amphibious Operations in Vietnam," 28.

59. Shulimson, Blasiol, Smith, and Dawson, US. Marines in Vietnam, 1968,635.

60. David B. Christ, "Joint Special Operations in Support of Earnest Will," Joint ForcesQuarterly Magazine, Autumn/Winter, 2001, 15-21.

J _

38

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources

Cahill, John 1. and Jack Shulimson. History ofus. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam,January-June 1965. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United StatesMarine Corps.

A six-month summary of Marine Corps operations in South Vietnam focusing on theMarine Corps situation and operations, enemy assessments, quantitative assessments onconventional and pacification operations, fire support, Marine Corps aviation, CombinedAction Program, Special Landing Force, and logistics.

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, March 1965-September1967. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps.


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January-June, 1966.Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps.


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January-June, 1967.Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps.


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January-December,1968. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps.


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Operations ofus. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January-December,1969. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps.

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Shulimson, Jack. Us. Marine Corps Operations in the Republic o/Vietnam, July-December1965. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps.


III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Chronology File, 1965, Unit Command ChronologyFile, Archives and Special Collections, Marine Corps Research Center Quantico, VA.

A chronological summary of significant events within the III Marine Amphibious Force.

III Marine Amphibious Force, Command ChronologyFile, 1966, Unit Command ChronologyFile, Archives and Special Collections, Marine Corps Research Center Quantico, VA.

A chronological summary of significant events within the III Marine Amp4ibious Force.



III Marine Amphibious Force Command, Chronology File, 1968, Unit Command ChronologyFile, Archives and Special Collections, Marine Corps Research Center Quantico, VA.

. A chronological summary of significant events within the III Marine Amphibious Force.



Secondary Sources

Cosmos, Graham A. and Terrance P. Murray, Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-1971:Vietnamization and Redeployment. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division,United States Marine Corps, 1986.

The seventh volume in the series of official histories produced by the Marine Corps'History and Museum Division covering the Marine Corps participation in Vietnam from1970-1971. Written in 1986, this volume covers the period in which the III Marine

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Amphibious Force relinquished control of the I Corps Tactical Zone in South Vietnam aspart of it reduction of forces and redeployment to Okinawa and the United States.

Donnelly, Ralph W., Gabrielle M. Neufeld, and Carolyn A. Tyson. A Chronology ofthe UnitedStates Marine Corps, 1947-1964, Volume III Historical Division, Headquarters, UnitedStates Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 1971.

The third volume in the series of organizational chronologies produced by the MarineCorps' History and Museum Division covering significant administrative and operationalevents in the Marine Corps from 1947 to 1964

Krulak, Victor H. First to Fight: An Inside View ofthe Us. Marine Corps. New ed. Annapolis:Naval Institute Press, 1999.

A historical perspective of the Marine Corps' quest for survival, the inception ofamphibious warfare, and the Marine Corps' search for equality as an armed service.

Lehrack, Otto J. The First Battle: Operation Starlight and the Beginning ofthe Blood Debt inVietnam. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2004.

A recount of the first significant action between Marines, including the SLF, andVietcong forces in 1965.

Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

A detailed perspective on American political and military involvement in Vietnam.

Millet, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History ofthe United States Marine Corps. Revised andExpanded ed. New York: Free Press, 1991.

A thorough study of the Marine Corps from the American Revolution to the First PersianGulf War. Based almost exclusively on primary sources, the author covers severaladministrative and operational milestones relating to more than 200 years ofdistinguished military history.

Murphy, Edward F. Semper Fi Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ, Marine Corps Campaigns,1965-1975. New York, Ballentine Books, 1997.

A recount of significant Marine Corps operations and activities covering a decade ofcombat in South Vietnam.

Nolan, Keith William. Operation Buffalo: The USMC Fightfor the DMZ. Novato, CA: PresidioPress, 1991.

A recount of one of the bloodiest battles between Marines, including the SLF, and NVAforces near the DMZ in 1967.

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Neufeld, Gabrielle M. A Chronology ofthe United States Marine Corps, 1965-1969, Volume VIHistorical Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 1971.

The sixth volume in the series of organizational chronologies produced by the MarineCorps' History and Museum Division covering significant administrative and operationalevents in the Marine Corps from 1965 to 1969.

Shulimson, Jack. Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1966: An Expanding War. Washington, D.C.: Historyand Museums Division, United States Marine Corps, 1982.

The third volume in the series of official histories produced by the Marine Corps' Historyand Museum Division covering the Marine Corps participation in Vietnam in 1966.Written in 1982, this volume covers the period in which the III Marine AmphibiousForce's participation in the Vietnam War expanded from a pacification operation againstthe Vietcong to a conventional conflict involving the North Vietnamese Army.

Shulimson, Jack and Charles M. Johnson. Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1965: The Landing and theBuildup. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps,1978.

The second volume in the series of official histories produced by the Marine Corps'History and Museum Division covering the Marine Corps participation in Vietnam in1965. Written in 1978, this volume covers the initial landing of the 9th MarineAmphibious Brigade, the buildup of the III Marine Amphibious Force, and the MarineCorps' first year in the Vietnam War.

Shulimson, Jack, Leonard Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson. US. Marines inVietnam, 1968: The Defining Year. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division,United States Marine Corps, 1997.

The eleventh and final volume in the series of official histories produced by the MarineCorps' History and Museum Division covering the Marine Corps participation inVietnam in 1968. Written in 1997, this volume covers III Marine Amphibious Forceoperations throughout the storied Tet Offensive and USMACV counteroffensive period.

Smith, Charles. Us. Marines in Vietnam, 1969: High Mobility and Standown. Washington,D.C.: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps, 1988.

The fifth volume in the series of official histories produced by the Marine Corps' Historyand Museum Division covering the Marine Corps participation in Vietnam in 1969.Written in 1988, this volume covers the III Marine Amphibious Force transition from adefensive posture following the Tet Offensive to a mobile, offensive force and theredeployment of the 3d Marine Division to Okinawa as part of USMACV's reduction offorces in South Vietnam.

Telfar, Gary 1., Lane Rogers and V. Keith Fleming, Jr. US. Marines in Vietnam, 1967: Fightingthe North Vietnamese. History and Museums Division, Headquarters United StatesMarine Corps: Washington, D.C., 1984.

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