march 16

21
34. SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V. SEBASTIAN, EULOGIO G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE, MANOLO C. ZABALJAUREGUI, DIONISIO TENORIO, EDWIN P. RELLORES, LUIS B. NATIVIDAD, MYRNA PETINGCO, FELICIANO TOLENTINO, RODOLFO A. AMANTE, JR., CIPRIANO C. BELLO, RONALDO T. ESPINO, EFREN GALAN, AND JUN CARMELITO SANTOS, VERSUS COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 164302-03 | 2007-01-24 CALLEJO, SR., J.: FACTS: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued. On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a “Notice of Strike” with the NCMB. The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Company’s premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget. On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a “Petition to Declare Strike Illegal”. ISSUE: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal. RULING: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that “the fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.” Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute . As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion. The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the company’s premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the company’s operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. Petition denied. 35. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, J G.R. No. L-25291 | 1971-01-30 CASTRO, J: FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail. Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions. Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three cases involved “slight physical injuries” against

Upload: karen-abella

Post on 29-Sep-2015

19 views

Category:

Documents


6 download

DESCRIPTION

bkbbsjjd

TRANSCRIPT

34. SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V. SEBASTIAN, EULOGIO G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE, MANOLO C. ZABALJAUREGUI, DIONISIO TENORIO, EDWIN P. RELLORES, LUIS B. NATIVIDAD, MYRNA PETINGCO, FELICIANO TOLENTINO, RODOLFO A. AMANTE, JR., CIPRIANO C. BELLO, RONALDO T. ESPINO, EFREN GALAN, AND JUN CARMELITO SANTOS, VERSUS COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., RESPONDENT.G.R. No. 164302-03 | 2007-01-24 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal.

ISSUE: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

RULING: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.Petition denied.

35.THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners, vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JG.R. No. L-25291 | 1971-01-30CASTRO, J:

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies). Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Unions proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions. Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscals office and by the courts. These three cases involved slight physical injuries against one striker and light coercion against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958. However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscals Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscals office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscals office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents, without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP

HELD: YES

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees bargaining representative.Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employers molestation. Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable cots, free coffee and occasional movies, overtime pay for work performed in excess of eight hours, and arrangements for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.

Ito lang po yung mga picketing: Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations; respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions; respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers; respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies buildings.

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them.

36.ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL P. ASUNCION, ABUNDIO IBASCO, ANTONIO MAGSIPOC, CARLOS VILLARANTE and BIENVENIDO RAMIREZ, respondents.G.R. Nos. 81852-53 | 1993-03-05MELO, J p:

FACTS: There was a wage order that caused a wage distortion within the company. Union then proposed to the mgt. that the wage distortion be corrected by implementing a 25php wage increase, which it later lowered to 15php. The Company, however, only effected a 7php wage increase. The union considered the mgt.s move as the company ignoring their demands. As a result, the union decided to work only for 8 hours per day, against the company practice for 5 years of having the workers work 10 to 14-hour work shifts. This caused the company, SMC losses, due to diminished productivity, prompting it to file a complaint with the NLRC seeking the declaration of the said unions activity (strike/slowdown) as illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not said slowdown/strike is illegal

RULING: It is illegal, on several grounds.

The Court concedes the workers right to self organization and to concerted activities in exercise of that right. The Court also pointed out that common examples are strike/temporary stoppage of work, and picketing. However, the Court also points out that such right is not absolute and may be limited by law. In this case, the Court pointed out that:

The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor. These joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue.

37.Solidbank vs. Gamier, G. R. No. 159460, November 15, 2010 (Mass Leave)

Facts: Petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement to cover the remaining two years thereof. Negotiations commenced on but seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the declared a deadlock on and filed a Notice of Strike. During the collective bargaining negotiations, some Union members staged a series of mass actions. In view of the impending actual strike, then Secretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of theLabor Code, as amended. The assumption order dated directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation. Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members decided to protest the same by holding a rally infront of the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their motion for reconsideration of the Order. Thus, majority of employees, including the individual respondents, joined the mass leave and protest action at the Department of Labor and Employment office while the banks provincial branches in , , and Naga followed suit and boycotted regular work. The union members also picketed the banks Head Office in Binondo and Paseo de Roxas branch.

As a result of the employees concerted actions, Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed. On the same day, then President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum addressed to all employees calling their absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE office as an illegal act, and reminding them that they have put their jobs at risk as they will be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for participating in the union-instigated concerted action.The employees work abandonment/boycott lasted for three days.

On the third day of the concerted work boycott, istan issued another memorandum, declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work provided these employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in this illegal act. Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistans directive, which included herein respondents Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Ophelia C. De Guzman. For their failure to return to work, the said 199 employees were each issued a show-cause memo directing them to submit a written explanation within twenty-four hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal strike in defiance of the Assumption Order of the Secretary of Labor resulting to grave and irreparable damage to the Bank, and placing them under preventive suspension. The herein 129 individual respondents were among the 199 employees who were terminated for their participation in the three-day work boycott and protest action.

Respondents Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Caizares, Jr. dismissed the complaints of Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman. It was held that their participation in the illegal strike violated the Secretary of Labors return to work order upon the latters assumption of the labor dispute and after directing the parties to execute their new CBA. NLRC 2nd Division reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Flores. The Second Division ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees on infront of the Office of the Secretary of Labor was not a legitimate exercise of the employees freedom of speech and assembly. Such was a strike as defined under Article 212 (o) of theLabor Code, as amended, which does not distinguish as to whom the action of the employees is directed against, nor the place/location where the concerted action of the employees took place. Complainants Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman did not report for work and picketed the DOLE premises on ; they continuously refused to report back to work until when they were issued a Notice of Termination. It was stressed that the mass action of the bank employees was an incident of a labor dispute, and hence the concerted work abandonment was a prohibited activity contemplated under Article 264 (a) of theLabor Code, as amended, upon assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor.

Issue: Whether the action taken by the bank employees constituted a mass leave

Ruling: No. Article 212 of theLabor Code, as amended, defines strike asanytemporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.The term strike shall comprise not onlyconcerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns,mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities.Thus, the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the CA patently erred in concluding that the concerted mass actions staged by respondents cannot be considered a strike but a legitimate exercise of the respondents right to express their dissatisfaction with the Secretarys resolution of the economic issues in the deadlocked CBA negotiations with petitioners. It must be stressed that the concerted action of the respondents was not limited to the protest rally infront of the DOLE Office on . Respondent had also picketed the Head Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch. About 712 employees, including those in the provincial branches, boycotted and absented themselves from work in a concerted fashion for three continuous days that virtually paralyzed the employers banking operations. Considering that these mass actions stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption of jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an impending strike, there is no doubt that the concerted work abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.

38.NUWHRAIN Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 166295, November 11, 2008 (Constructive Strike)

Facts: The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a five star service establishment owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. located in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto and Esperanza V. Alvez are impleaded in their official capacities as the Hotel's General Manager and Director of Human Resources, respectively. The Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike Vote was conducted by the Union on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike. The Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotel's basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards.In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants. The Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine Union officers and sixty-one members; and suspended eighty-one employees for 30 days, forty-eight employees for 15 days, four employees for 10 days, and three employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises.

Issue: Whether the Union conducted an illegal strike.

Ruling: Yes. The Unions violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings. The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of the Hotel with full heads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something is amiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and members deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by the fact that after coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had their heads shaved or their hair cropped at the Union office in the Hotels basement. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed and calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Unions proposals.In view of the Unions collaborative effort to violate the Hotels Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the Hotel to choose between allowing its inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of its reputation, or to refuse them work, even if it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in either way would disrupt the operations of the Hotel. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage to the Hotels finances or its reputation. Thus, we hold that the Unions concerted violation of the Hotels Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotels operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike.

39.CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 114521, November 27, 1998 (Effect of Non-compliance with pre-conditions)

Facts: Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. Postmix Workers union (hereinafter referred to as the "union") is the certified sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all regular office and sales employees of CCBPI Postmix Division (hereinafter referred to as the "company"). With the impending expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the parties on June 30, 1986, a series of negotiations were held for the possible renewal thereof. Since the negotiations failed to produce any agreement, the union filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on March 9, 1987. Acting thereon, the DOLE summoned the parties for conciliation hearings to resolve the bargaining deadlock. Still unable to reach a common ground, the union conducted a strike vote the result of which clearly showed the members' sentiments in favor of waging a strike. The company filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal, alleging that the union staged a strike without observing the mandatory seven-day strike ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code and that the strike was done in bad faith, considering that the union did not exhaust the conciliation period. The strike, which lasted for about five months, ended with the signing of the renewed CBAbetween the union and the company on November 27, 1987. The CBA includes the Memorandum of Agreementdrawn by the parties and the Amendments to Memorandum of Agreement. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisiondismissing the Petition to Declare Strike Illegal for lack of merit, ruling that there was substantial compliance with the mandatory seven-day strike ban, the union having struck on the sixth day from the submission of the results of the strike vote to the NLRC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issue: Whether the strike declared by the union was illegal for failure to comply with the mandatory seven-day strike ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code.

Ruling: We do not agree with the Labor Arbiter's opinion that a deficiency of one-day from the mandatory seven-day strike ban is not a fatal defect, as to render the strike illegal. We do not share the view that the union should be considered to have substantially complied with the strike requirements under the law.It bears stressing that the strike requirements under Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory requisites, without which, the strike will be considered illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report as mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. Verily, substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice. Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is required.

40.TMPCWA vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 158786 and 158789, October 19, 2007 (When is a strike illegal)

Facts: In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary.Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyotas appeal.In relation to Toyotas appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But despite this, many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned their work.

This resulted to another rally within Toyotas premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.

In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June 2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets.

Issue: Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal.

Ruling: Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227 employees were terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said that the strike conducted before the BLR is beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union argues that the strike is actually a protest directed against the government and is covered by their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The SC disagreed with this argument because the Union failed to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was biased against them. Further, if this were the kind of protest they were claiming, they should have secured a rally permit. Further still, this case involves a labor dispute. The employees may shroud their strike as mere demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are temporary work stoppages.

The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute are illegal for they violated the return-to-work order.

The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

41.TMPCWA Supra (case No. 40)

42.Sukhotai Cuisine and Restaurant vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 150437, July 17, 2006 (Waiver of Illegality of Strike)

Facts: The majority of the employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a union which affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter. Private respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on the ground of unfair labor practice, and particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. In a conciliation conference, the representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. On the following day, Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB personnel, and the results of the vote were submitted to the NCMB. The petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the strike. Duing the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the petitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. In view of this termination, private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Private respondent Jose Lanorias, a union member, was relieved from his post, and his employment as cook, terminated. Subsequently, respondent Billy Bacus, the union vice-president, conferred with Ernesto Garcia and protested Lanorias's dismissal. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a "wildcat strike." Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest, according to the respondents, was converted into a "sit-down strike and transformed to actual strike. etitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, seeking to declare the strike illegal, and to declare respondents, who participated in the commission of illegal acts, to have lost their employment status. Having arrived at no amicable settlement, the parties submitted their position papers, together with supporting documents, affidavits of witnesses, and photographs, in compliance with the orders of the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision and declared that private respondents have staged an illegal strike, and the employment of union officers and all individual respondents are deemed validly terminated in accordance with law.

Issue: Whether the strike staged by private respondents are legal

Ruling: No. This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.Indeed it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes.Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike.And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.

For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal.

43.Phimco Industries, Inc. V. Phimco Industries Labor Association Brion, J.: Gr 170830 Aug. 11, 2010

Facts: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the production of matches. The respondent is a duly organized bargaining representative of petitioners daily wage workers. When the last CBA was about to expire, the parties negotiated for its renewal but ended deadlock. The respondent filed a notice of strike before the NCMB. Later, respondent union staged a strike and blocked the ingress and egress of the non-striking employees which paralyzed the operation of the petitioner. The petitioner contended that the strike was illegal by preventing the ingress and egress of the petitioners compound, thereby paralyzing the operation of the petitioner. The respondent contended that it was only a moving picket and, therefore, valid.Issue: Whether the strike is valid?Held: No. To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute, which work stopped may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the company compound. While the strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the company struck against; protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises and the fact that the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it from taint of illegality if the picket blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.44.Escario V. NLRCBersamin, J.: Gr 160302 Sept. 27,2010Facts: Petitioners were among the regular employees and a union member of the private respondent, a corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling of foodseasoning.at8:30 a.m.of March 13, 1993, all officer and some members of the union walked out of private respondents premises and proceeded to Barangay to show support for Canete, a union officer, charged with oral defamation by several corporations personnel. As a result of the walkout, the union officers were preventively suspended. The union filed a notice of strike and claimed that the private respondent was guilty of union busting. The private respondent dismissed the petitioners and charged them for Unfair Labor Practice for violating the CBA and abandonment of work by participating in an illegal strike.Issue: Whether the dismissal or the petitioners is illegal?Held: Yes. On the consequence of an illegal strike, the provision distinguished between union officer and union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status, but a union member who is merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is benignly treated. Part of the explanation for the benign consideration for the union members is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file employees who are misled into supporting illegal strike.45.Visayas Community Medical Center V. Erma YballeVillarama, JR,. J.: Gr 196156 Jan 15, 2014Facts: Respondents were hired as nurses and midwives by petitioner. The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining agent representative of the petitioners employees. The parties had an existing CBA and it was about to expire. The union proposed to renew their CBA, but ended in deadlock. Later, several union members marched around the petitioners premises. Petitioner sent several notices requiring them to explain their side but they did not comply. Some of the employees were terminated due to an illegal strike. Respondent contended that they did not lost their employment when they joined the strike.Issue: Whether the contention of the respondent is meritotious?Held: Yes. The law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A member merely participating in an illegal strike may not e terminated from employment. It is only when he commits Illegal acts during a strike. That he may be declared to have lost employment status. In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in na illegal strikeor participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment.46.Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa V. Secretary of LaborBrion, J.: Gr 167401 July 5, 2010Facts: The petitioner and private respondent had a CBA and is about to expire. The union submitted proposals for its negotiation but it reached deadlock that lead to filing a notice of strike. The company filed a notice of lockout for Unfair Labor Practice due to alleged unions work slowdown. The union went on strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directed all striking workers to return-to-work and the company was directed to accept them back to work. The petitioner claimed that the respondent violated the return-to-work ordered by the Secretary of Labor when some of the union officers were dismissed. The union officers filed a petition to cite the company in contempt and the reinstatement order be issued, but the Secretary of Labor resolved issues regarding bargaining deadlock only.Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor abuse his discretion in not resolving the issue of the validity of the dismissal of the union officers?Held: Yes. Article 263 (g) is an extraordinary and preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation. A strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This grant in not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have proceeded the strike or lockout. As the term assume jurisdiction, the dispute out of the strike or lockout.47.International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. V. Secretary of LaborRegalado, J.:Gr 92981Jan. 9, 1992Facts: Petitioner is engaged in manufacturing of drugs and pharmaceuticals, and being a company belong to an industry indispensable to national interest. Prior to expiration of CBA between the petitioner and the private respondent, the latter submitted to the company its economic demands, but still it reached a deadlock. The union filed a notice of strike, but eventually conducted a strike that completely paralyzed the petitioners operation. The case was filed before the L.A. However, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an order directing the parties to return to status quo before the work stoppage. The petitioner contended that the Secretarys order is null and void since it order the cessation of all proceeding before the L.A.Issue: Whether the order of the Secretary of Labor is correct?Held: Yes. The Secretary of Labor was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom including cases over which the L.A. has exclusive jurisdiction.By virtue of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor has been conferred jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the L.A. There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective

48.EDEN GLADYS ABARIA VS NLRC

Facts: Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI), presently known as the Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC). is owned by the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and Rev. Gregorio P. Iyoy is the Hospital Administrator. The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. On December 6, 1995, the union expressed desire to renew the CBA. Atty. Alforque, NFLs Regional Director suspended union membership of some for serious violation of the Constitution and By-Laws. On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union members. The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit within 48 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike, and placed them under immediate preventive suspension. Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a temporary stoppage of work, explaining only reiterating their demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively.

Union officers were ordered to appear for investigation in connection with the illegal strike wherein they reportedly uttered slanderous and scurrilous words against the officers of the hospital, threatening other workers and forcing them to join the strike. Said union officers, however, invoked the grievance procedure provided in the CBA With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the NLRC to which a TRO was issued. Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated employees. The complaints for ULP were dismissed. Executive Labor Arbiter Belarmino found no basis for the charge of unfair labor practice and declared the strike and picketing activities illegal having been conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a legitimate labor organization. The termination of union leaders Nava, Alsado, Baez, Bongcaras, Canen, Gerona and Remocaldo were upheld as valid but MCCHI was directed to grant separation pay equivalent to one-half month for every year of service NLRC denied complainants motion for reconsideration. CA reversed the assailed decision. In G.R. No. 187778, petitioners Nava, et al. prayed that the CA decision be set aside and a new judgment be entered by this Court (1) declaring private respondents guilty of unfair labor practice and union busting; (2) directing private respondents to cease and desist from further committing unfair labor practices against the petitioners; (3) imposing upon MCCH the proposed CBA or, in the alternative, directing the hospital and its officers to bargain with the local union; (4) declaring private respondents guilty of unlawfully suspending and illegally dismissing the individual petitioners-employees; (5) directing private respondents to reinstate petitioners-employees to their former positions, or their equivalent, without loss of seniority rights with full backwages and benefits until reinstatement; and (6) ordering private respondents to pay the petitioners moral damages, exemplary damages, legal interests, and attorneys fees

ISSUE: whether MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice;

HELD: MCCHI not guilty of unfair labor practice Art. 248 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer *t+o violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by the Code. The applicable provision in this case is Art. 253 which provides: ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.

When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had not registered as a labor organization, having submitted only its charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL.[37] Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242, specifically:

(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining; (b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;

Aside from the registration requirement, it is only the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit which is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining, as provided in Art. 255.[38] NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or designated by the majority of the rank-and-file hospital employees to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the NFL, as evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994. While it is true that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from the national federation, NAMA-MCCH-NFL has not done so as there was no any effort on its part to comply with the legal requisites for a valid disaffiliation during the freedom period[39] or the last 60 days of the last year of the CBA, through a majority vote in a secret balloting in accordance with Art. 241 (d).[40] Nava and her group simply demanded that MCCHI directly negotiate with the local union which has not even registered as one.

NAMA-MCCH-NFL at the time of submission of said proposals was not a duly registered labor organization, hence it cannot legally represent MCCHIs rank-and-file employees for purposes of collective bargaining. Hence, even assuming that NAMA-MCCH-NFL had validly disaffiliated from its mother union, NFL, it still did not possess the legal personality to enter into CBA negotiations. A local union which is not independently registered cannot, upon disaffiliation from the federation, exercise the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations; thus, it cannot file a petition for certification election Not being a legitimate labor organization nor the certified exclusive bargaining representative of MCCHIs rank- and-file employees, NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot demand from MCCHI the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.[45] Hence, MCCHIs refusal to bargain then with NAMA-MCCH-NFL cannot be considered an unfair labor practice to justify the staging of the strike

49.YSS EMPLOYEES UNION- PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS LABORATORIES INC. FACTS: In order to arrest escalating business losses, YSS Laboratories, a domestic corporation engaged in Pharmaceutical business implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by the company. Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of YSSEU, a duly registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of YSS. Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU decided to hold a valid strike. A number of conciliation proceedings were made by the NCMB-NCR but still the dispute was not resolved. This prompted the Sectary of Labor to intervene. Finding that the labor dispute was inimical to the national interest, it certifies the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and issued two orders: first, directing all striking workers to return to work and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike; second, that the nine retrenched employees be included in the return to work order. Aggrieved, YSS Laboratories filed a petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals in which the latter reversed the orders of the Secretary of Labor and granted the petition of YSS Laboratories. The appellate court found that YSS Laboratories validly carried out its retrenchment program, which effectively severed the concerned employees employment with the company. Hence, YSSEU comes to this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the retrenched employees should be excluded from the coverage of the return-to-work- order. HELD:The Orders of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Said provision reads:

Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.x x x x(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. It should be noted that the primary reason why the strike was conducted in the first place was to protest the implementation of the retrenchment program, which clearly discriminated against union officers and members. YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same, said the Supreme Court. Hence, the petition is granted. The orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby reinstated.

50.JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, vs. JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Jackbilt Industries, Inc. temporarily stop its business because of the adverse effect of Asian economic crisis, and compelled most of its employees to go on leave for six months.

Because its collective bargaining agreement with petitioner was expiring during the period of the shutdown, respondent Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU protested the temporary shutdown and its officers and members picketed petitioners main gates and deliberately prevented persons and vehicles from going into and out of the compound.

Upon petition by the petitioner, NLRC issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondents to refrain from preventing access to petitioners property, however, respondent union violated the order. Thus, petitioner dismissed the concerned officers and members and barred them from entering its premises.

Respondent then filed complaints for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages, unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and attorneys fees, and refusal to bargain on behalf of its officers and members against petitioner and its corporate officers.

In a decision, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However, because petitioner did not file a petition to declare the strike illegal before terminating respondents officers and employees, it was found guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner then assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals, whereby, the appellate court dismissed the petition but modified the decision of the NLRC.

Petitioner was therefore guilty of unfair labor practice and, consequently, was ordered to pay respondents officers and employees backwages.

Thus, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a petition with the labor arbiter to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua non for the valid termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of such strike.

RULING: The Court finds merit with the assertion of the Petitioner that the filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was unnecessary since the NLRC had already found that respondent committed illegal acts in the course of the strike.

The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.

Consequently, the Court also uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondents officers and employees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

51.Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines vs PAL

FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed on December 9, 1997, a notice of strike against respondent PAL with the DOLE, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Upon PALs petition and considering that its continued operation is impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute per Order dated December 23, 1997. In a subsequent Order, he DOLE Secretary reiterated the prohibition contained in the December 23, 1997 Order. Despite such reminder to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998. This constrained the DOLE, through then Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order on June 7, 1998. However, it was only on June 26, 1998 when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as shown in a logbook signed by each of them. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order. ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. ALPAP contended that its counsel received a copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their non-compliance therewith until June 26, 1998. It thus prayed that PAL be ordered to accept unconditionally all officers and members of ALPAP without any loss of pay and seniority and to pay whatever salaries and benefits due them pursuant to existing contracts of employment. pending before the DOLE Secretary since the controversy presented in the lockout case is an offshoot of the labor dispute over which the DOLE Secretary has assumed jurisdiction and because the factual allegations in both cases are interrelated. the NLRC sustained the consolidation of the illegal lockout case with the strike case, opining that the DOLE Secretary has the authority to resolve all incidents attendant to his return-to-work order. DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, it declared the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of its officers and members who participated in the strike in defiance of the June 7, 1998 return-to-work order.

Issue: Whether the dismissal of the employee is valid?

Ruling: A review of the records reveals that in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz: their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook[43] with the heading Return To Work Compliance/ Returnees bears their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them. In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution. ALPAP harps on the inequity of PALs termination of its officers and members considering that some of them were on leave or were abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely barred from returning to their work which excused them for not complying immediately with the return-to-work order. Again, a scrutiny of the records of the case discloses that these allegations were raised at a very late stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that the returning pilots termination was legal. Interestingly, these defenses were not raised and discussed when the case was still pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA or even before this Court. We agree with the position taken by Sto. Tomas and Imson that from the time the return-to-work order was issued until this Court rendered its April 10, 2002 resolution dismissing ALPAPs petition, no ALPAP member has claimed that he was unable to comply with the return-to-work directive because he was either on leave, abroad or unable to report for some reason. These defenses were raised in ALPAPs twin motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306 reached finality in its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling. It has been held that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings.[44] ALPAP was given all the opportunities to present its evidence and arguments. It cannot now complain that it was denied due process

52.Jalie Olisa Et. Al and Malayang Samahan ng mga mangagawa sa Balanced Food vs Danilo Escario

Facts: All the officers and some 200 members of the Union walked out of companys premises and proceeded to the barangay office to show support for Juanito Canete, an officer of the Union charged with oral defamation by Aurora Manor, the companys personnel manager, and Yolanda Fabella, Manors secretary. It appears that the proceedings in the barangay resulted in a settlement, and the officers and members of the Union all returned to work thereafter.

As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union because of the walkout incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a month.

PINA filed a complaint for ULP and damages. LA ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout constituting ULP; and that all the Unions officers, except Canete, had thereby lost their employment.

Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the constructive dismissal of its officers. The Union held a strike vote (June 9), at which a majority of 190 members of the Union voted to strike. The strike was held in the afternoon of June 15, 1993.

NLRC issued a TRO enjoining the Unions officers and members to cease and desist from barricading and obstructing the entrance to and exit from PINAs premises, to refrain from committing any and all forms of violence, and to remove all forms of obstructions such as streamers, placards, or human barricade.LA held the strike to be illegal. NLRC affirmed but it further rules that there was no abandonment.

The union claimed that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not awarding backwages pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, and in not declaring their strike as a good faith strike.

Issue: WON petitioners are illegally dismissed?

Ruling: The situation of the petitioners calls for the application of third paragraph of Article 264(a) and not Art. 279.

Art. 264- Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is: (a) unlawful lockout; and (b) participation in an illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article 264(a) authorizes the award of full backwages only when the termination of employment is a consequence of an unlawful lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision distinguishes between a union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status, but a union member who is merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the explanation for the benign consideration for the union member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who are misled into supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed illegal acts during the period of the illegal strikes.

The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be illegal. The NLRC ordered their reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-file workers whom the Unions officers had misled into joining the illegal strike. They were not unjustly dismissed from work. Based on the text and intent of the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor Code, therefore, it is plain that Article 264(a) is the applicable one.

53.ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) VS. NLRC ET. AL. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION) G.R. NO. 91980 JUNE 27, 1991

FACTS: IBM representing 4500 employees of SMC working at various plants, offices and warehouses in NCR presented to the company a demand for correction of the significant distortion in the workers wages pursuant to the Wage Rationalization Act. Demand unheeded by company hence the union members refused to render overtime services until the distortion has been corrected by SMC. It appears that the employees working hours/schedule has been freely observed by the employees for the past 5 years and due to the abandonment of the longstanding schedule of work and reversion to the eight-hour shift substantial losses were incurred by SMC.

SMC filed a complaint with arbitration branch ofNLRCthen before theNLRCfor the latter to declare the strike illegal. Unions contention: workers refusal to work beyond 8 hours was a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct distortion. SMC: The coordinated reduction by the Unions members of the work time in order to compel SMC to yield to the demand was an illegal and unprotected activity. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is illegal?

RULING: YES. (Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes- the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout- the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor. It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract.) just an FYI! Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The provision states that:xxx the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration Furthermore, Section 16, Chapter I of the implementing rules of said law declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout."

Moreover, the workers concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force is a slowdown, an inherently illegal activity even in the absence of a no strike clause because while the employees continue to work and remain at their positions and accept their wages, they at the same time select part of the work they care to perform at their own volition or in their own terms.54.FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION VS. MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR G.R. No. 106316, 272 SCRA 124 (MAY 5, 1997)

FACTS: Petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co, Inc is a public utility while respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Fil Transit-National Federation of Labor is the labor union of Fil Transit employees. The union filed a notice of strike with the BLR for ULP against petitioner. The parties failed to reach an agreement so that the union went on strike. Consequently, several workers were dismissed. The union filed another notice of strike alleging ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members, coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights to self-organization. Conciliation conferences were held but the union again went on strike. The MOLE ordered the striking workers to return to work. Only 66 employees were accepted by petitioner conditioned on the submission of certain requirements. The Secretary of Labor ruled for the legality of the strike and awarded backwages and separation pay to the strikers. Petitioner alleged that no strike vote was obtained, the result thereof was not reported to the MOLE, the strikers engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts, and it complied with the return to work order.

ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal?

RULING: YES. It was not shown in the pleadings that a strike vote was obtained before the declaration of strike. The statement in the same order of the Labor Secretary that a notice of strike had been filed because several conciliation conferences failed due to management's consistent refusal to appear is contrary to evidence because management was duly represented during the conciliation proceedings prior to the strike. Further, the union failed to comply with the required 7-day strike ban. The union was in bad faith when it conducted the strike because instead of attending the conciliation meetings with petitioner, it went on strike. The strike was attended by pervasive and widespread violence such as the hijacking of Fil-Transit buses, barricading of the terminal in Alabang, puncturing of tires, cutting of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts, use of Molotov bombs, and theft of expensive equipment such as fuel injections. The commission of these illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but deliberately employed to intimidate and harass the employer and the public. However, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status.

55.GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL (FORMERLY KNOWN AS SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.), VS. GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (GLOWHRAIN) G.R. NO. 153664. JULY 18, 2003

FACTS: On June 15, 1990, the petitioner and the respondent union entered into and signed a third CBA covering the period of July 10, 1988 to July 9, 1991. On September 27, 1990, the respondent union filed a notice of strike. The matter was referred to the NCMB for resolution.

Meanwhile, on October 16, 1990, Michael Wilson, the petitioners general manager, wrote the Secretary of Labor informing him of the petitioners decision to retrench seventeen less senior employees to lessen the daily financial losses being incurred by the petitioner.The next day, the respondent union, through its president, informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will conduct a strike vote referendum on October 23 and 24, 1990. The members of the respondent union voted to stage a strike. On October 25, 1990, the respondent union informed the DOLE-NCR of the results of the strike vote referendum. On October 31, 1990, the SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout.The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge losses. It terminated the employment of sixty employees and two officers of the respondent union effective December 6, 1990. On November 7, 1990, the respondent union protested the actions of the petitioner invoking Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. The respondent union filed an urgent motion for a reconsideration by the SOLE of the Certification Order dated October 31, 1990. On November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of eighty-six more employees effective December 14, 1990. The remaining employees were also informed that it will close in six months. On November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990.By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on November 16, 1990 another notice of strike because of what it perceived as the petitioners continuing unfair labor practices (ULP). On the same day, at about 12:00 noon, the officers of the respondent union and some members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto.

ISSUE: Was the strike held on November 16, 1990 illegal?

RULING: YES.In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on November 16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law. Police operatives of the Western Police District had to disperse the picketers and take into custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other officers of respondent union, Henry Babay and Dennis Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that since the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October 31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. Despite the SOLE order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16, 1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred the officers of the respondent union from working and had terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, and sent out circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective December 16, 1990, the same were not valid justifications for the respondents to do away with the statutory procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It behooved the respondents to avail themselves of the remedies under the CBA or file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by agreement of the parties, submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that the matter may be subjected to voluntary arbitrary proceedings instead of resorting to an immediate strike.There was no immediate and imperative need for the respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed because the retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990.The respondents claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful strike. Hence, the need for a union to adhere to and comply strictly with the procedural conditions sine qua non provided for by the law in staging a strike.

56.ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES VS NLRC G.R. NO. 120505. MARCH 25, 1999 305 SCRA 219

FACTS: In CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation, the collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA) with which respondent company had a collective bargaining agreement. Their CBA excluded casual employees from membership in the incumbent union. The casual employees who have rendered at least one to six years of service sought regularization of their employment. When their demand was denied, they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent Unions of the Philippines. Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which petition was opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on the contract bar rule.The union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the needed documentation with the DOLE. The union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union perpetrated illegal acts. The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the gate of the company were barricaded and blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting for work. Because of such illegal activities, the respondent company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, which granted a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation and from blocking free ingress and egress to company premises.The respondent company filed a complaint for illegal strike. The petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against respondent company.ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is valid.

RULING: NO.The strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal for the reasons that (1)the strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. (2)And violated the TRO enjoining the union and/or its members from obstructing the company premises and ordering the removal there from of all the barricades.Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.The dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. x x.Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers responsibility is greater than that of the members.An ordinary striking employee can not be terminated by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who participated in the commission of the illegal act must be identified.57.LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. G.R. NO. 95494 SEPTEMBER 7, 1995; 248 SCRA 95

FACTS: Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments are located in Davao City.On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners are all members of the Union.Petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties.

Issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988. After private respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.The NCMB called a conciliation conference. With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents.On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.

ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal?

RULNG: YES.Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:xxx. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.We rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.

We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike. especially the officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to promote their interest.We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.\58. Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Nestl Philippines, Inc.,499 SCRA 521, August 22, 2006

Facts: On 4 April 2001, as the existing CBA was to end on 5 June 2001, UFE-DFA-KMU informed Nestl of their intent to open new Collective Bargaining Negotiation for the year 2001-2004 xxx as early as June 2001.In response thereto, Nestl informed them that it was also preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed ground rules to govern the impending conduct of the CBA negotiations.

On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only), Nestl reiterated its stance that unilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom.

Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective,the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike complaining, in essence, of a bargaining deadlock pertaining to economic issues, i.e., retirement (plan), panel composition, costs and attendance, and CBA. and another Notice of Strike, this time predicated on Nestls alleged unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations.

Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in finding the Secretary of Labor and Employment to have gravely abused her discretion in her pronouncement that the Retirement Plan was not a proper subject to be included in the CBA negotiations between the parties; hence, non-negotiable.

Ruling: In Nestl Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 504 (1991), ironically involving the same parties herein, Court has had the occasion to affirm that a retirement plan is consensual in nature.

In a ruling contrary to Nestls position, the Court, through Madame Justice Grio-Aquino, declared that:The companys [Nestl] contention that its retirement plan is nonnegotiable, is not well-taken. The NLRC correctly observed that the inclusion of the retirement plan in the collective bargaining agreement as part of the package of economic benefits extended by the company to its employees to provide them a measure of financial security after they shall have ceased to be employed in the company, reward their loyalty, boost their morale and efficiency and promote industrial peace, gives a consensual character to the plan so that it may not be terminated or modified at will by either party (citation omitted).

The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e., that the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the plan, does not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations. As a matter of fact, almost all of the benefits that the petitioner has granted to its employees under the CBAsalary increases, rice allowances, midyear bonuses, 13th and 14th month pay, seniority pay, medical and hospitalization plans, health and dental services, vacation, sick & other leaves with payare non-contributory benefits. Since the retirement plan has been an integral part of the CBA since 1972, the Unions demand to increase the benefits due the employees under said plan, is a valid CBA issue. x x xx x x xx x x [