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MANAQUIL v. VILLEGAS (1990) FACTS: - This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS. - It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna. - In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zerna’s estate. - The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth. - It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. - When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator. ISSUES: 1 Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease. 2 Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred. RULING: 1 NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval. Thus, considering that administrator LEONG was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of LEONG, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

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MANAQUIL v. VILLEGAS (1990)

FACTS:

- This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.

- It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna.

-In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zernas estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several lots included in Zernas estate.

-The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.

-It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.

-When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONGs estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zernas estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estates administrator.

ISSUES:

1Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate courts approval regarding the lease.2Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred.

RULING:

1NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.

Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.2NO. There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although VILLEGAS should be suspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving properties of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code, lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession are prohibited fro leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for four months.