Due Process Clause [Compiled Case Digest]

Due Process Clause [Compiled Case Digest]Page1

1.VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO [GR L-29646, 10 NOV 1978] Facts: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without first securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968. The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the City of Manila without the requisite mayors permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the ordinance, and (2) judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the preliminary injunction is made permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI. Issue: Whether the Ordinance, requiring aliens - however economically situated - to secure working permits from the City of Manila at a uniform fee of P50, is reasonable. Held: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive. Villegas V Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho G.R. No. L-29646 | 1978-11-10Subject: Equal Protection, Uniformity of Taxation, Undue Delegation of Legislative PowerFacts:Ordinance No. 6537, passed by the City of Manila, prohibits aliens from being employed, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00, unless exempted under the Ordinance.Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to restrain the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6637 and to declare the same null and void. The CFI Judge granted the petition.Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No.6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.Held:Uniformity of Taxation1.The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character, thesecond part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious thatthe purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.Equal Protection2.The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent,part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.Undue Delegation of Legislative Power3.Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.4.Where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.Due Process5.The ordinance violates the due process rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.6.While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.7.The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.2.Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)J. FernandoFacts:Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twiceevery 24 hours.There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?Held: No. Judgment reversed.Ratio:"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."3. Rubi, et. al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [GR 14078, 7 March 1919]

Facts: On 1 February 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution 25 creating a reservation / permanent settlement for Mangyans (Mangyanes) in an 800-hectare public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake, and resolving that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on the reservation provided that said homestead applications be previously recommended by the provincial governor. On 21 February 1917, the Secretary of Interior approved Resolution 25. On 4 December 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order 2 which directed all Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than 31 December 1917, and penalizing any Mangyan who refused to comply with the order with imprisonment of not exceeding 60 days, in accordance with section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are prosecuted in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos, was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro by virtue of the provisions of Articles 2145 and 2759 of Act 2711, for having run away from the reservation. Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro applied for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province.Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of the Manguianes liberty, either on their confinement in reservations and/or imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative CodeHeld: None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. The meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law. Due process of law" means simply that "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation. The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. Herein, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. There exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Rubi and the other Manguianes are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.4. G.R. NO. 86899-903 MAY 15, 1989173 SCRA 409 - DELOSO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which preventivelysuspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal cases) from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding. Deloso was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint withthe Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) for issuing to certain Daniel Ferrer a tractor purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by the latter, thereby, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan.Deloso was, then, elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

ISSUEWhether or not the petitioner be suspended indefinitely.

HELDIt would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term. The Court rules that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension limited to only ninety (90) days after which Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales.5.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.1. TANADA V. TUVERA (RESOLUTION)G.R. No. L-63915 | 1986-12-29Subject: Due Process, Publication requirementFacts: Petitioners demand the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.In an earlier decision, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of presidential issuances which are of general application.Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.Held:Publication requirement1. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides:"ART.2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided xxx."2. Theclause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.3. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.4. The term"laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application.4.1. Allstatutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.4.2. Covered by this rule arepresidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powerswhenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.4.3. Administrative rules and regulationsmust also be publishedif their purpose is to enforce or implement existing lawpursuant also to a valid delegation.4.4. Thecharter of a citymust be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.4.5. Allpresidential decreesmust be published, including even,say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.4.6. Thecirculars issued by the Monetary Boardmust be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Actwhich that body is supposed to enforce4.7. Municipal ordinances must also be published although they are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.5. Examples of issuances that needNOTbe published5.1. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public.5.2. Letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.5.3. Instructions issued by the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption5.4. Rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms6. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.6.1. The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance7. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere (i.e. newspaper of general circulation), as a requirement for their effectivity.Due Process8. Omission of the publication requirement would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public of knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all.2. WEBB VS DE LEON (1995)G.R. No. 121234 | 1995-08-23Subject: Probable Cause, Warrant of Arrest, Due Process, Discovery Procedure is available during Preliminary Investigation stage, Discharge of State Witness, Right to Fair Trial (Prejudicial Publicity)Facts:On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila.

Held:

Probable Cause

1. The court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing certainty of guilt.

2.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect to issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants.It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But each requires a showing of probabilities as tosomewhat different facts and circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other.

3. Insearch cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence: (a) that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and (b) that the items will be found in the place to be searched.

4. Inarrest casesthere must be probable cause (a) that a crime has been committed and (b) that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that persons control.Warrant of Arrest

5. The Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case lawrepudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

6. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that upon filing of information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused.

7. The court also rejects petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

8. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. The recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners.

9. Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determinepersonally the probability, not the certaintyof guilt of an accused. In doing so,judges do not conduct ade novohearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They justpersonally reviewthe initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported bysubstantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours.Due Process

10. The records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.

11. Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993which allows the filing of an Information in court after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.

Discovery Procedure is available during Preliminary Investigation stage

12. Failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property.

13. Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused.

14. The object of a preliminary investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Discharge of State Witness

15. The power of the court to discharge a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 is a part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Under this provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.

16. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Jessica Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection Program) enacted on April 24, 1991.

17. Alfaro qualified under Section 10 of said law which provides:

Sec. 10.State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;

(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude

Right to Fair Trial; Prejudicial Publicity

19. The pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.

20. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be an allegation and proof that thejudges have beenunduly influenced, not simply that theymight be, by the barrage of publicity.

21. In the case at bar, nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.3.PEOPLE VS. MAYOR SANCHEZ (1999)G.R. No. 121039-45Subject:

Declarations on the Witness Stand can best be Evaluated by the Trial Judge; The Credibility of Centeno and Malabanan as Witnesses was Established during Trial; The Defense of Alibi offered by all the Appellants is Demolished by Positive Identification; Discrepancies between Sworn Statements do not Necessarily Discredit Witnesses; Discrepancies in Testimonies refer to Trivial Details and do not affect the Case; The Absence of Extensive Abrasions on the Vaginal Wall does not rule out Rape; The Publicity Given to the Case did not Impair Appelants Right to a Fair Trial; To Warrant a Finding of Prejudicial Publicity, there must be Actual Prejudice

Facts:

In 1993, the country was shocked with the happening of the Allan Gomez Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay incident. The case drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace. The accused charged were Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George Medialdea, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit. Then Pasig Regional Trial Court Judge Harriet Demetriou found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts.

The prosecution's version of the events on that horrible night was based mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, members of appellant Sanchez' security team. They were co-conspirators turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen and Allan, but denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed.

The accused went before the Supreme Court to appeal. The pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants' arguments was the issue of witnesses Centeno and Malabanan's credibility, whose open-court narrations served as principal basis for the trial court's rendition of a guilty verdict.

Held:

Declarations on the Witness Stand can best be Evaluated by the Trial Judge

1. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. (People vs. Tacipit)

The Credibility of Centeno and Malabanan as Witnesses was Established during Trial

2. Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial until its very conclusion expressed her satisfaction with the way witnesses' Centeno and Malabanan survived the "hot seat" with flying colors, so to speak.

3. The judges impressions of the star witnesses for the State bind the Supreme Court, for the Court accords great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.

4. Once the prosecution witnesses are afforded full faith and credit, the defense's version necessarily stands discredited.(People vs. Calegan)

The Defense of Alibi offered by all the Appellants is Demolished by Positive Identification

5. All the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi. They argued that they were at their respective homes on the night of the rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan confirmed the presence of all the appellants and their respective participation.

6. Positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, as we have consistently held, demolishes the alibi. (People vs. Tabaco)

7. Except for the Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea, the other appellants failed to present corroborating testimonial evidence to buttress their respective alibis.

8. Thedefense of alibi is inherently weak especially when wanting in material corroboration. Categorical declarations of witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the crime are more credible than the uncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused.

9. Alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relatives. (People vs. Danao)

Discrepancies between Sworn Statements do not Necessarily Discredit Witnesses

10. In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally harp on the contradictions in four (4) Sworn Statements executed by Centeno.

11.Discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses.

12.Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinatedin importance to open court declarations because the former areoften executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narratingin full the incident which has transpired.

13. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits.

Discrepancies in Testimonies refer to Trivial Details and do not affect the Case

14. It may be conceded that there are inconsistencies in Centeno's testimony, but they refer to trivial details which do not, in actuality, touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime committed.

15. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight testimony.

16. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed.

The Absence of Extensive Abrasions on the Vaginal Wall does not rule out Rape

17. Prosecution witness Dr. Villaseor, medico-legal officer, ruled out the possibility of any consented sexual intercourse on the part of Eileen. Appellants belittle the conclusion and advances the view of their expert witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion who testified to the effect that there can be no multiple rape if there is only one laceration on Eileen's hymen as testified to by Dr. Villaseor.

18. The Court dismissed the argument and ruled thatthe absence of extensive abrasions or contusions on the vaginal wall does not rule out rape because the slightest penetrations enough.

The Publicity Given to the Case did not Impair Appelants Right to a Fair Trial

19. The Supreme Court cannot sustain appellants claim that they were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.

20. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials.The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.

21. Responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials butguards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

To Warrant a Finding of Prejudicial Publicity, there must be Actual Prejudice

22. Thetest of actual prejudice must be used to know the presence of prejudicial publicity.There must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. (Martelino vs. Alejandro)

4. FELICIDAD ANZALDO VS JACOBO CLAVEDue Process Administrative Due ProcessDr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.ISSUE:Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

5.PEOPLE V. MEDENILLA [GR 131638-39, 26 MARCH 2001]

Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to the arrest are conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, for the purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during the trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262) found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.

Held: A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. The Court have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.=============================================================

6. IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 126995, OCTOBER 6, 1998Purisima, J.Facts:1.On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation (PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years;2.On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez;3.After petitioners husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan;4.After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;5.Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;6.On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario;7.On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;8.On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;9.Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:a.as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; andb.the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.Held:The petitioner is hereby acquitted.1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeed very low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as clarificatory questions. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme Court.

(NOTE: The vote was 9-5 for Acquittal. CJ Narvasa, Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Panganiban voted for conviction while Justice Vitug was the only Justice who voted for the return of the case to the Sandiganbayan to allow the corrections of the perceived irregularities in the proceedings below.)c.DBP VS. CA, January 29, 1999d.MATUGUINA VS. CA, 263 SCRA 490e.PEOPLE VS. CA, 262 SCRA 452f.JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

Due ProcessImelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1stDivision of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.ISSUE:Whether or not due process has been observed.HELD:The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

7.EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION VS. CALDERONGR.No.156168December 14, 2004FACTSJose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification.Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought.ISSUEWhether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.RULINGInjury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.8.SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYANCONSOLIDATED CASES JANUARY 28, 2003G.R. NO. 148468, G.R. NO. 148769, G.R. NO. 149116

FACTS:

Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This foundation was established to help provide educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from various institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson. However, on the latter part of 2000,Chavit accused then President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient.The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable cause, thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan.

The accused, herein petitioner took alllegal remedy to bailbut consequently due to numerous petitions andmotion to quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned. Petitioner also prayed forissuance of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his petition for bail;

WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended information duringpendency of his petition to bail; and

WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

A.Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless, the court takes cognizance and held thatarraignment is not a prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for bail.

B.The court finds no inconsistency between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion to quash.Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for insufficiency of its facts in posits law.This tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each other.

C.In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by the court even when the person is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar, there is no showing of any basis for the issuance of the writ.The general rule is that the writ does not apply when the person alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by competent court; more so, petitioner is under detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.

The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The petition for habeas corpus and bail was DISMISSED.

9.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. HON. LANTION AND MARK JIMENEZ G.R. NO. 139465, OCTOBER 17, 2000overturning 322 SCRA 160 (Jan. 18, 2000)

By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US extradition request. The Secetary of Justice denied that request.

ISSUE: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?

HELD:Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request. Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable.Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations. When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. HON. LANTIONFacts:On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution.He likens an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the mentioned decision.Issue:Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition processHeld:No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during theevaluation stageof the extradition process.An extradition proceeding issui generis.It isnot a criminal proceedingwhich will call into operationallthe rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.As held by the US Supreme Court inUnited States v. Galanis:An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. The concept of due process is flexible for not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings.Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due.Stated otherwise,a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous loss.As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditeesufficient opportunityto meet the evidence against himonce the petition is filed in court.The timefor the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extraditionis merely movedto the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition.The extraditees right to know ismomentarily withheld during the evaluation stageof the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by prematureinformation of the basis of the request for his extradition.No less compellingat that stageof the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations.Needless to state, this balance of interests isnot a static but a moving balancewhich can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play.In sum, we rule that thetemporary holdon private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is asoft restrainton his right to due process which will not deprive him offundamental fairnessshould he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States.There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.10.GOVERNMENT OF THE USA V. HON. PURGANANGR. NO. 148571SEPT. 24 2002Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069

ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail

iii.Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not asimportant as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whethera) they are sufficient in form and substanceb) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Lawc) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as wellas Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring ofinternational crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trustin the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie cased) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligationsunder the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver theaccused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused werewilling to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; andb) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially ExecutiveExtradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.11. CENTRAL BANK VS. CA220 SCRA 536

FACTS: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans extended by Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP), totaling approximately P300 million (the paid-in capital of PBP amounting only to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they were extended, without collateral, to certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. Subsequently and during the same year, several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in PBP and resulted in continuous over-drawings on the banks demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching to P 143.955 million. Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector, the Monetary Board (MB), placed PBP under conservatorship.PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings owned by Producers Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the subsequent mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral for the banks overdraft obligation but which was not approved due to disagreements between the parties. Since no other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate and swelled to a staggering P1.023 billion.Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution instructing Central Bank management to advise the bank that the conservatorship may be lifted if PBP complies with certain conditions.Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the resolutions issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith. Respondent Judge issued a temporary restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB resolutions were arbitrarily issued. CB filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the said orders. Hence this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB resolutions as arbitrary.HELD: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the amended complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock.12. TAN VS. BARRIOS [GRS 85481-82, 18 OCTOBER 1990]Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11 October 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William Tan (@ Go Bon Ho), Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @ Taowie) and Vicente Tan (@ Go Bon Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata, @ Go Bon Hoc], Ang Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun, Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping], Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@ Marcing, @ Dodong], Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49, for the killing on 25 August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court. All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975. Almost daily trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10 June 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976. On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule. On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez issued Department Order 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself. Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case MC- 1-67 including those who had already died. Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases, within 5 days from receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7 November 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among others.Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy. Held: The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et. al. and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by the Supreme Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court. Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against Tan, et. al. would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so."13. MEJIA VS. PAMARAN [GRS L-56741-42, 15 APRIL 1988]Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Felician