managing rice knowledge: the last 100 years er ponce, managing rice knowledge 1 managing rice...

1

ER Ponce, Managing Rice Knowledge 1

Managing Rice Knowledge:The Last 100 Years

An analysis of rice performance & how the Philippine government manages rice programs: 1900-2003

by

Eliseo R. Ponce with the assistance of Orlee Velarde,

Renee Ajayi, & Karina Vinluan

Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS)December 2004

2


This paper analyzes rice performance and rice programs given the socioeconomic & political conditions in three periods: pre-green revolution (1900-1964), green revolution (1965-80), and post green revolution (1981-present). The investigation on the rice programs focuses on the structure and management and the extension and educational strategies employed. This paper does not delve into the economic analysis of rice performance. Ob

jectiv

es &

de

limita

tion:


A country’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency in rice depends on…

It’s ability to manage its human resources and knowledge in the following areas:

Technical: knowledge in the production, processing, and marketing of rice;Managerial: knowledge in the management of rice programs; &Extension & educational: knowledge in the improvement of the capacity of the people in the bureaucracy & the farming communities towards rice self-sufficiency.

Assu

mpt

ions

3


Three major tenets:

Knowledge is basic to people empowerment.People empowerment is essential in harnessing people’s creativity & commitment to attain higher economic productivity and to achieve program sustainability. Knowledge management is the key strategy to people empowerment.

Assu

mpt

ions


Outline:Empowerment and knowledge management: a framework for analysis of rice knowledge

Empowering agriculture bureaucracy Empowering the rice farmers/farming communities

Scope in the analysis of rice knowledge: by administration in three periods i.e., pre-green revolution, green revolution, and post-green revolution

The rice situation given the socio-political, legal & policy environment The rice programs: objectives & methods Structure & management of national rice programs

Synthesis: important lessons

4


What is knowledge?

Understanding, and one gains knowledge through experience, reasoning, intuition, and learning. Individual expands their knowledge when others share their knowledge, and one’s knowledge is combined with the knowledge of others to create new knowledge” (Cong & Pandya, 2003).A fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual

information, expert insight, and grounded intuition that provides an environment and a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experience & information “ (Davenport & Prusak, 1998).

Defin

ition

of t

erm

s


Empowerment: what does it mean?

Empowerment: people“...multidimensional process that helps people gain control of their lives. It is a process that fosters power (i.e., the capacity to implement) in people for use in their own lives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issues they define as important (Page & Czuba, 1999)

Empowerment: organization “… the delegation of authority, accountability, and responsibility to employees for improving the business processes under control (Cirverolo, 2004).

Fram

ewor

k

5


data understanding

information

understanding relations

knowledge

wisdom

understanding patterns

understanding principles

contextindependence

Empowerment track


What is knowledge management (KM)?

KM is a strategy about giving people the ability to take effective and timely action with knowledge by putting it at their fingertips of people (Onge, 2002).KM is a business strategy to treat knowledge as explicit concern of business and making connection between organizational assets & positive business results (Murray & Barclay, 1997)

Fram

ewor

k

6


Work togetherShare experiencesShare knowledgeLearn from each other

ICT Technology

Framework: KM in Agriculture

Structure/People/Culture Process/Programs

Posit

ive

busin

ess r

esul

ts

Farmers & Fisherfolk

LGUs, NGOs, & Private Sector

DA & Attached Agencies

P o l i c y E n v i r o n m e n t

Rice Performance & Programs:

The Pre-green Period(1900-1965)

7

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1900

1903

1906

1909

1912

1915

1918

1921

1924

1927

1930

1933

1936

1939

1942

1945

1948

1951

1954

1957

1960

El Niño

Rice Production (in million mt)

Yield (in mt/ha)

Area Harvested (in million has)

Figure 1.1 Rice Production, Yield and Area Harvested(Pre-Green Revolution, 1900-1965)

Source: Census of AgriculturePhilippine Statistical YearbookFAO Database

Pre-war Period Roxas to Macapagal

2,000

2,200

2,400

2,600

2,800

3,000

3,200

3,400

3,600

3,800

4,000

1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

in '0

00 m

etric

tons

El NiñoRice ProductionProjected Production w/o El Niño

Figure 1.2 Rice Production in Relation to El Niño(Pre-Green Revolution, post-war, 1948-1965)

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Gov’t. Data started from 1950

Quirino Magsaysay Garcia Macapagal

8


Figure 1.3 Volume of Imports and Exports Relative to Total Production and Occurrence of El Niño(Pre-Green Revolution, 1900-1965)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1900

1904

1908

1912

1916

1920

1924

1928

1932

1936

1940

1944

1948

1952

1956

1960

1964

El Niño

Export

Import

Source: Mears, et. al. (1974). Rice Economy of the PhilippinesFAO Database

Pre-War Period Roxas to Macapagal


Selected Rice Indicator by Administration (Pre-Green: Pre-War & Roxas)

105 (-0.25%)116 (H); 87 (L)

131,612 (16.07%)149,343 (H); 120 ,111(L)

1.85 (11.45%)2.02 (H); 1.65 (L)

1.07 (2.88%)1.11 (H); 0.98 (L)

1.98 (11.24%)*2.2 (H); 1.6 (L)

Roxas

113,391334,339 (H); 6,982 (L)

Imports(in mt)

139.72174.76 (H); 54 (L)

1.662.32 (H); 1.04 (L)

1.041.25 (H); 0.46 (L)

1.782.44 (H); 0.5 (L)

Pre-War

Per capita palay(in kg/yr)

Area Harvested(in million ha)

Yield(in mt/ha)

Production(in million mt)

Annual Average

*Relative to previous administration

9


138.29 (7.20%)143 (H); 135 (L)

45,291(-38.61%)77,904 (H); 1(L)

2.69 (17.47%)2.77 (H); 2.65 (L)

1.20 (4.35%)1.21 (H); 1.18 (L)

3.23 (21.89%)3.35 (H); 3.14 (L)

Magsaysay*

73,776 (-44%)145,557 (H); 1(L)

Imports(in mt)

129 (22.86%)143 (H); 116 (L)

Per capita palay

2.29 (23.78%)2.65 (H); 2.03 (L)


1.15 (7.47%)1.18 (H); 1.11 (L)

2.65 (34%)3.14 (H); 2.24 (L)

Quirino*

Yield(in mt/ha)


Annual Average

Rice Performance by Administration(Pre-Green: Quirino & Magsaysay)

*Comparison with previous administration based on annual average.


130.98 (-2.61%)136 (H); 126 (L)

260,444 (159%)559,560 (H); 2 (L)

3.17 (0.63%)3.20 (H); 3.09 (L)

1.23 (9.82%)1.25 (H); 1.16 (L)

3.88 (10.86%)3.99 (H); 3.71 (L)

Macapagal

134.49 (-2.75%)140 (H); 126 (L)

100,575 (122%)230,669 (H); 0 (L)

3.15 (17%)3.33 (H); 3.15 (L)

1.12 (-0.67%)1.21 (H); 1.02 (L)

3.5 (8.36%)3.74 (H); 3.2 (L)

Garcia

Imports(in mt)

Per capita palay


Yield(in mt/ha)


Annual Average

Rice Performance by Administration(Pre-Green: Quirino & Magsaysay)

*Comparison with previous administration based on annual average.

10


Summary of Selected Rice Indicator by Administration (Pre-Green: Pre-War -Macapagal)

134.49

100,575

3.15

1.12

3.5

Garcia

105

131,612

1.85

1.07

1.98

Roxas

134.49

100,575

3.15

1.15

2.65

Quirino

138.29

45,291

2.69

1.20

3.23

Mag-saysay

130.98

260,444

3.17

1.23

3.88

Maca-pagal

113,391Imports(in mt)

139.72

1.66

1.04

1.78

Pre-War

Per capita palay

(in kg/yr)

Area Harvested

(in million ha)

Yield(in mt/ha)


Annual Average



2.00

No data

22

Quirino

2.00

No data

24.7

Magsaysay

2.35

75.02U: 65

R: 80.19(1961)

28

Garcia

3.7

67.08 (-11%)*U: 57.43 (-12%)R: 67.08 (-16%)

(1965)

31.5

Macapagal

2.00

No data

19.2

Roxas

Poverty Incidence (percent)

Population (projected) (million)

Exc. Rate (P:$) (in Peso)

Total


Pre-green: Selected indicators, socio-economic indicators

11


Pre-

gree

n re

volu

tion Pre-War Years (1900-1942)

Socio-Political and Policy EnvironmentPopulation almost doubled in a span of 32 yearsFree trade policy (Payne-Aldrich Act of 1909) of the Americans allowed Philippine products to enter US market except rice, tobacco and sugar.1917: Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR)1923: Agricultural Extension DivisionState of emergency declared in 1935, Commonwealth government allowed to import rice duty free1936: Provincial Extension ServicesJapanese period: rice production significantly decline with no imports allowed


Structure and Management of the National Rice Program1936: Creation of the Rice Commission & National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC); government involvement in rice marketingJapanese period: Rice rationing (NARIC to BIBA to Rice and Corn Administration)

Rice ProgramsNARIC (1936): ensure price stability; procure palay from farmers and sell it at just price; importing rice duty free during declared emergency

Pre-

gree

n re

volu

tion

12


Socio-political and Policy Environment1946-1957 (Roxas to Magsaysay)

Period of reconstruction and rehabilitation“Full independence” was granted; inauguration of the Third RepublicLow production resulting from wartime dislocations and continued social unrest1945: Department of Agriculture and Commerce (DAC)1946: Agrarian Commission; to oversee the problem of agrarian unrest1946: R.A. 34 or the Rice Share Tenancy Act; as an answer to agrarian unrest1947: DAC renamed DANR1948: Rice shortage was suspected; Rice Emergency Board was created1954: Agricultural Tenancy Commission was created1954: Launched the Cooperative Rice and Corn Improvement Program (CRCIP)

Pre-

gree

n re

volu

tion

Early Post War Years to Macapagal (1946-1965)


1957-1961 (Garcia)RA 2084 (1958): Rice and Corn Production Act, Declared as national policy the attainment of self-sufficiency in rice and corn at the earliest possible time RA 2207 (1959): An Act Prohibiting the Importation of Rice and Corn RA 3018 (1960): RA 3018 (1960): An Act Limiting the Right to Engage in the Rice and Corn Industry to Citizens of the Philippines; Rice and Corn Board (RICOB) was created. Non-Filipino citizens were banned from participating in the rice and corn industry

1961-1965 (Macapagal)RA 3452 (1962): Abolished NARIC; created Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) and placed under the Office of the President1963; Bureau of Agricultural Economics & National Irrigation AdministrationRA 3844 (1963): Renamed BAEx to Agricultural Productivity Commission and placed under the Office of the PresidentPr

e-gr

een

revo

lutio

n

13


Rice ProgramsNARIC reduced retail prices of rice by purchasing at floor prices and distribute rice to maintain ceiling pricesRice Economic Board was set up in 1953, making the rice industry the first commodity sector to have an integrated national planningUP College of Agriculture & BPI role (1954): select, breed new varieties, conducting tests and providing foundation seed of superior varieties for increase and distribution; NARIC buys the certified seed of the farmer and sells this to other provinces without producersUPCA took a leading role in the educational phase of the Certified Seed Program through participation in seed schools.Pr

e-gr

een

revo

lutio

n


The rice and corn production program (1958) of Rice and Corn Coordinating Council covered the following phases:

Research and experimentation of seed varieties for both rice and cornProduction and distribution of registered and certified seedsProcurement and distribution of certified fertilizers and soil conditionersControl of plant pests and plant animal diseasesPublic agricultural information, including demonstration farmsPurchase of modern rice and corn processing mills.

Barrio Development Program on Rice and Corn (1963) under the Rice and Corn Production Program

Focusing on rural communitiesLimiting Agricultural Extension Officers’ coverage only to irrigated area

Pre-

gree

n re

volu

tion

14


Structure & Management of the National Rice Program1936: NARIC under OP1944: BIBA1944: RCA under OP1945: Reestablished NARIC under OP1950: Price Stabilization Corporation: 1951: Reestablished NARIC 1953?: Rice Economic Board1960: Rice and Corn Board1962: Rice and Corn Administration

Pre-

gree

n re

volu

tion


The Green Period(1965-1981)

15

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

El NiñoRice Production (in million mt)Yield (in mt/ha)Area Harvested (in million has)Irrigated Area (in million has)

Figure 2.1 Rice Production, Yield, Area Harvested, & Irrigated Area (Green Revolution, 1965-1981)

Source: Philippine Statistical YearbookFAO Database

Marcos (Pre-Martial Law) Marcos (Martial Law Period)

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979

in '0

00 m

t

El NiñoRice ProductionRice Production w/o El Niño

Figure 2.2 Rice Production in Relation to El Niño and Growth in Irrigated Area (Green Revolution, 1965-1981)

Source: For El Niño: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Gov’t. Data started from 1950

Marcos I Marcos II

16


Figure 2.3 Volume of Imports and Exports Relative to Total Production and Occurrence of El Niño (Green Revolution, 1965-1981)

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

El NiñoImportExport

Source: FAO Database

Marcos I Marcos II


Figure 2.4 Percentage of Varieties Used for Production (Green Revolution, 1965-1981)

Source: Bureau of Agricultural StatisticsData started from 1970

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Traditional VarietyModern Variety

Marcos I Marcos II

17


Green revolution: Selected Rice Indicators

116 (-17%)

115,010 (1.4%)

710,000 (1961)

1.2 (-28%)

1.6

1.08 (3.8%)

2.23 (25.28%)

Post-war/Pre-Green

143.3 (9.2%)164 (H); 110 (L)

118,000 (-38%).45M (H); 0 (L)

1.1M (37.5%)1.3M (H); 0.9M (L)

3.4 (6.25%)3.6 (H); 3.1 (L)

2.45 (36%)2.3 (H); 1.5 (L)

1.8 (29%)2.3 (H); 1.4 (L)

6.3M (40%)7.9 (H): 4.4 (L)

Marcos 2(% Change)*

138 (19%)

147,539 (28%)

961,706 (35%)

3.3 (175%)

2.20 (37.5%)

1.67 (55%)

5.6 (151%)

Green (%Change from

Pre-Green)

130.6 (-.29%)143 (H); 122 (L)

190,000 (-27%).56M (H); 0 (L)

0.8M0.86M (H); 0.73 (L)

3.2 (.95%)3.3 (H); 3.1 (L)

1.8 (12.5%)2.09 (H); 1.52 (L)

1.4 (14%)1.7 (H); 1.2 (L)

4.5M (16%)5.3 (H); 3.9 (L)

Marcos 1(% Change)*

Imports (mt)

Yield (mt/ha)

Yield (irrigated) (mt/ha)

Per Capita Palay (kg/yr)

Area Harvested (million ha)

Irrigated Area (in million has)

Production (million mt)

Annual Average



2.44

67.08% U: 57.43%R: 71.15%

(1965)

31.56

Post-war/Pre-Green

7.25 (-59%)

49.2 (-20%)U: 37.8 (-26%)R: 56.4 (-15%)

(1985)

49.2 (31%)

Marcos 2% Change*

6.15 (-152%)

49.2 (-27%)U: 37.8 (-34%)R: 56.4 (-21%)

(1985)

49.2 (55.9%)

Green (%Change from Pre-Green)

4.57 (-23%)

61.63U: 51.32R: 66.08(1971)

37.6 (19%)

Marcos 1% Change*



Exchange Rate (P:$)

Total


Green: Selected Socio-economic Indicators

18


Gree

n re

volu

tion

Pre-Martial to Martial Years (1965-1981)

Socio-Political & Policy EnvironmentDecentralization Act of 1967: empowered LGUs to undertake its field agricultural extension work

1969: Marcos used “Rice and Roads” as his campaign slogan

Masagana 99 launched under Martial Law shortly after declaration of land reform & warned: He would wield all the powers available under “constitutional authoritarianism” to prevent any obstruction to the success of the project.

Martial Law entailed reorganization of DA bureaucracy: BAEx now under DA; previously under Office of the President


SimilarityBoth rice programs aimed to increase rice production and

usage of HYVs.

Differences:While previous rice programs sought to generally

increase rice yields, M99 specifically aimed to increase average yields of paddy to about 99 cavans per hectare

Unlike previous rice programs, M99 articulated its aim to intensify agri services in each of the provinces covered

Objectives

FeaturesComponents

Rice ProgramsRice Self-Sufficiency Program (1966-1970)

Masagana 99 (1973-1986)

19


Similarity:Both programs promoted a more active private

sector participation in rice production

Difference:Pre-M99, credit was dispensed in a traditional

manner: bank required collateral, but M99 had a revolutionary credit system: non-collateral, low-interest loans & a supervised credit system (farmers grouped into “seldas”)

Credit

FeaturesComponents


Differences:During M99, lower-priced fertilizer was distributed to the

rice sector through the supervised credit system.

Pre-M99, fertilizer was available to farmers through production loans or were supplied through local multinational subsidiaries.

Unlike previous programs, the government subsidized fertilizers to rice farmers during M99, thereby reducing prices by 21%.

Fertilizer

Both programs urged farmers to use high yielding varieties of rice

Seeds

FeaturesComponents

20


Differences:Rice distribution and procurement before M99 was

handled by the Rice and Corn Authority (RCA). During M99, the National Grains Authority (NGA) took over the functions of the RCA and RICOB.

In 1981, NGA became National Food Authority (NFA): had both regulatory and proprietary functions

Marketing & Price Stabilization

FeaturesComponents


Similarities:Both rice programs aimed to increase irrigated area.

Both offered facility loan, industrial loan, agricultural loan to farmers

Differences:M99 was characterized by the massive mechanization

that occurred during that period: 4-wheel tractor with extension wheels; imported tillers; mini-tractor with rotavators; reaper; commercial thresher; flatbed dryer; rubber roll

Infrastructure(Postharvest, Irrigation, Mechanization)

FeaturesComponents

21


Similarities:Both programs promoted the use of HYVs

The nature & components of the extension delivery system of both programs were essentially the same.

Differences:M99 implemented extension services more intensively.

(Example: increased number of rice technicians, massive broadcasting campaign, distribution of M99 brochures)

Technology, Extension, Communication & Training

FeaturesComponents


Structure and Management of the National Rice ProgramRice & Corn Study Committee (1965): appointed by Marcos; headed by Dioscoro Umali, UPCA Dean Umali’s earlier analysis on the basic causes of low rice production

lack of irrigation water ineffective communication of technical info to farmers use of poor seed unavailability & high cost of fertilizerlack of production incentives unrealistic prices and market policies lack of dedicated public servants lack of effective coordination of agencies engaged in promoting the rice industry lack of civic conscience and national disciplineGr

een

revo

lutio

n

22


Rice Self-Sufficiency Program (1966-1970)Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council (RCPCC)

Handle overall program implementationAdopted integrated approach to rice self-sufficiency: mobilized government and private agenciesChair and Coordinator of RCPCC: Secretary of AgricultureAction officer of RCPCC: Rafael Salas, Exec. Sec. Of MarcosMay 1969: RCPCC changed to NFAC

Rice and Corn Administration (RCA)Oversees rice and corn productionSupervises rice and corn supply and distribution Provincial Supervisor: estimates the cereal situation in the area and project its rice and corn requirements

Gree

n re

volu

tion


Gree

n re

volu

tion

Masagana 99 rice programNational Food & Agriculture Council (NFAC)

Implemented M99Chair: Secretary of AgricultureComposed of 31 government and private agenciesEO 754 (1981): NFAC empowered to integrate and supervise food production programs, including technology transfer & training of agri extension workers.

National Grains Authority (NGA)Handled rice procurement & distributionPlaced under the DA and renamed NFA (1981)

23


The Post-green Period(1981-2002)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

El NiñoRice Production (in million mt)Rice Yield (in mt/ha)Area Harvested (in million has)Irrigated Area (in million has)

Figure 3.1 Rice Production, Yield and Area Harvested (Post Green Revolution, 1981-2002)

Source: Philippine Statistical YearbookFAO DatabaseGAA

Marcos III Aquino Ramos Estrada-Arroyo

Ave. rice appropriation as % to total DA budget

29.9% (1.3 billion) 38% (4.3 billion) 27% (5 billion)

24

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

12,000

13,000

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

in '0

00 m

etric

tons

El NiñoRice ProductionProjected Production w/o El Niño

Figure 3.2 Rice Production in Relation to El Niño(Post Green Revolution, 1981-2002)

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Gov’t. Data started from 1950



Figure 3.3 Volume of Imports and Exports Relative to Total Production and Occurrence of El Niño (Post Green Revolution, 1981-2002)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

El NiñoImportExport



25


Figure 3.4 Percentage of Varieties Used for Production (Post Green Revolution, 1981-2002)

Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Traditional VarietyModern Variety



Post Green: Rice Performance by Administration

259.3 (-1.8%) 166.4(H); 143.5(L)

263.07 (84%)293.8(H); 229.1(L)


129,982(6.8%)

121,657.7(-13.7%)

Rice Imports(MT)

1.5 (10%)1.5 (H); 1.6 (L)

1.4 (25.7%)1.5 (H) ;1.3 (L)


3.4 (2.1)3.5 (H); 3.2(L)

3.3 (-5.5%)3.5 (H); 3.1 (L)


2.5 (6.7%)2.9 (H); 6.2(L)

3.0 (22.5%) 3.2 (H); 2.9(L)

Yield Irrigated (mt/ha)

2.7 (9.2%) 2.9(H); 2.6(L)

2.5 (38.9%) 2.3 (H),2.7(L)

Yield (mt/ha)

9.2 (11.9%)9.7 (H); 8.5 (L)

8.2 (30.7%)*9.2 (H); 7.3 (L)

Production (in million mt)

AquinoMarcos IIIAnnual Average


26


154290.2 (9.4%)

314.7 (H); 280.3 (L)265.2 (2.1%)

298(H); 234.6(L)Per Capita Palay

(kg/yr)

435,9621.2 M

(84.7%)1.2 M (H), 0.6(L)

638,617(391.3%)

2.4 M(H), 0.6(L)

Rice Imports(MT)

1.55 (0%)(constant)

3.9 (8.8%)4.0 (H); 3.2 (L)

3.1 (4%)3.7(H); 3.1(L)

3.0 (7%) 3.3 (H); 2.7(L)

11.8(16.7%)13.3 (H); 8.6 (L)

Estrada-Arroyo

1.5

3.53

3.26

2.77

9.8 M

Post Green

3.6 (5.5%)3.9 (H); 3.2 (L)

Area Harvested (in million has)

1.55 (1.9%)(constant)


2.8 (2.5%)3.4 (H); 26(L)

Yield Irrigated(mt/ha)

2.8 (4.0%)2.9(H); 2.7(L)

Yield (mt/ha)

10.1 (10%)11.3 (H), 8.6 (L)

Production (in million mt)

RamosAnnual Average

Post Green: Post Green: Percent Change of Selected Rice Indicators by Administration


Post-Green: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators by Administration

45.33(-57.7%)

40.05(-24.62%)

23.07(-66.3%)

13.87(-19.2%)Exchange

Rate

39.5U: 24.4R: 54(2000)

36.9U: 21.6R: 50.7(1997)

45.2U: 35.4R: 55(1991)

49.2U: 37.8R: 56.4(1985)


80.04(2002)

73.18(1998)

63.86(1992)

55.55(1986)


Estrada-ArroyoRamosAquinoMarcos IIIAnnual

Average

27


Summary of Changes in Selected Rice Indicator by Administration (Post-Green: Marcos II to Arroyo)

9.4%

0.0%

4.0%

7.0%

16.7%

Estrada-Arroyo

84.0%

25.7%

-5.5%

38.9%

30.7%

Marcos III

10.0%

2.0%

6.7%

9.2%

11.9%

Aquino

2.10%

1.9%

5.5%

4.0%

10.0%

Ramos

154(12%)

1.5(56%)

3.5(0.07%)

2.8(69%)

9.8(75%)

Post-green

0.96Imports

(in M mt)

138

3.3

1.7

5.6

Green

Per capita palay

(in kg/yr)

Area Harvested(in M ha)

Yield(in mt/ha)

Production( in M mt)

Annual Average



Summary of Changes in Selected Socio-economics Indicator Marcos III to Arroyo)

-57.7%

7%U: 13%R: 6%

9.4%

Estrada-Arroyo

-19.2%

-20%U: -26%R: -15%

12.9%

Marcos III

-66.3%

-8%U: -6%R: -2%

15.0%

Aquino

-24.6%

-18%U: -39%R: -8%

14.6%

Ramos

25.8

-36%U: -52%R: -18%

80.04 M(2002)

Post-green

6.15

-27%U: -34%R: -21%(1985)

49.2 M(1981)

Green

Exc. Rate (P:$)


Population (projected)

(million)


28


Socio-Political & Policy EnvironmentPolitical turmoil during the last term of Marcos led to his ouster, Pres. Aquino seated as the next presidentAquino revised the Phil Constitution and reorganized the government bureaucracy, including DA from MAF ( EO 116) Ramos followed Aquino. Relative stability and highest economic growth (92-97), Asian financial crisis, 1997Estrada-Arroyo followed, DA characterized by political instability due to frequent changes in the leadership (secretaries) 1997, Passage of AFMA (RA 3485), goal: modernization of agriculture. Varietal improvement, hybrid rice breedingSec. Angara, principal author of AFMA, became DA sec (1999-2001) – was given a chance to put the goal of AFMA into realization

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion

Post Martial Law to Arroyo Years (1981-2002)


Rice Programs*: Objectives and Methods(*Excludes Marcos III)

LBP, Quedancor were primary sources of credit of all programs

Credit

All programs from Aquino-Ramos aimed at increasing rice productions; Estrada &

Arroyo added reducing poverty incidence, ensuring sustainability of natural resources, and enhancing people empowerment

Objectives

FeaturesComponents

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion

29


All programs conducted buffer stocking of seeds

Differences: Aquino had a fertilizer exchange scheme, in which farmers get a free bag of fertilizer per 3 bags of palay delivered to NFARamos: Focused on seed testing and

continued Seed testing, certificationEstrada: Promoted Binhian sa Lalawigan

where farmers could avail seeds and other inputs

Seeds

FeaturesComponentsPo

st G

reen

revo

lutio

n


Similarity: The past 3 administrations promoted Balanced Fertilizer Strategy:

-Pres. Proclamation No. 1071 –structure the existing practices into location and crop specific balanced fertilizer recommendations, -incorporate the use of organic and inorganic fertilizers

Aquino admin. received fertilizer grants from Netherlands & Canadian gov’ts, US $ 17 M aside fro the fertilizer subsidies

Arroyo gave subsidies not exceeding P500.00

Ramos: expanded credit for better fertilizer access

FertilizerFeaturesComponents

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion

30


FeaturesComponents

Similarity: All programs prioritized procurement of rice-harvest in program areas

Aquino: Included importation (6,000 T) – as part of the program

Estrada & Arroyo: Rolling stores were set-up nationwide to provide cheaper rice

Marketing

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion


All programs aimed to construct and rehabilitate irrigation systems, farm to market road, post-harvest facilities

Arroyo allowed to conduct cloud-seeding as permited

Unlike other programs, Aquino admin received a support from JICA which offer equipment at lower prices.

Irrigation, Post-Harvest & Mechanization

FeaturesComponents

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion

31


FeaturesComponents

Similarities: Info dissemination made through print and broadcast media

Farmer field Schools/ Demo farms were set upATI still responsible for training farmers, technicians & LGU representativesUse of IPM practices, HYV and recommended 12 steps in rice production were highly encouraged

Varietal improvement were made in Estrada & Arroyo programs

Technology, Extension, Comm. & Training

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion


Structure and Management Rice Programs

RPEPTask Force headed by DA Usec for Regional Operations operationalize, formulate program guidelines, oversee program implementation and act on problemsProvincial Agricultural Officer – responsible for the implementation in the provinceNational Coordinating Committee - composed of representatives from the government and the private sectors; chaired by the Secretary of Agriculture; sets the program policies and coordinates the implementation

RAPNational Rice Action Task Force – over-all supervision and coordination of the rice program

Gintong AniLGUs – establishment of a network among farmer’s’ groups and cooperatives, can undertake buffer stocking of seeds/riceInter-Agency Committee on Rice and Corn – centrally-manage on a macro-level a rice production/supply database, monitor regularly price behavior & trends

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion

32


Maka-Masa Rice ProgramLGUs were empowered to produce their own food requirement

Ginintuang Masaganang AniOne national, 15 regional, 77 provincial management committees organized plans, programs, and policies formulated at the national and regional levelssocial mobilization – conducted; management info system –designed and strengthened for monitoring; post-evaluation –conducted by an external group

Post

Gre

en re

volu

tion

In summary . . .Whathave we learned during the last 100 years?

33


154 (12%)

435,962 (195%)

1.5 (56%)

3.53 (.07%)

3.26 (48%)

2.77 (69%)

9.8 (75%)

Post-Green(% Change)*

141

246,017

1.21(starting 1961)

3.18

2.65 (starting 1960)

1.91

6.36

Last 100 Years

(Average)

1.67 (55%)1.08 (3.8%)1.04Yield (mt/ha)

3.3 (175%)1.2 (-28%)1.66Area Harvested (ha)961,706 (35%)

710,000 (starting 1961)N/A

Irrigated Area (in million ha)

147,539 (28%)

115,010 (1.4%)113,391Imports (mt)

138 (19%)

2.2 (37.5%)

5.6 (151%)

Green(% Change)*

116 (-17%)

1.6

2.23 (25.28%)

Pre-Green(% Change)*

139.72

N/A

1.78

Pre-War




Average Per Year

Rice Performance by Periods the Last 100 Years

*Relative to previous period


166.44

1.2

1.55

4,046

3.68

3.28

13.27

2002

66.31 (1902)

.145 (1900)

.69 (1961)

593 (1902)

2.06 (1970)

.83 (1902)

0.49 (1902)

Base Year

151%

727%

125%

582%

79%

295%

2608%

% Change

100.132

1.05

.86

3,453

1.62

2.45

12.78

Difference

Yield (mt/ha)

Area Harvested (in thousand ha)

Irrigated Area (in million ha)

Imports (in million mt)




Annual

Rice Performance the Last 100 Years

34


0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

in '0

00 m

t

Pre-Green Revolution

Green

Revolutio

n

Post Gree

n

Revolutio

n

Figure 4 Changes in Rice Production within Each Period

Computed based on the exponential growth between the beginning and end of a period

810

4,072

7,911

13,270


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

in m

t/ha

Figure 5 Changes in Rice Yield within Each Period


Green

Revolutio

n

Post Green

Revolution


0.68

1.25

2.20

3.28

35


0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

in '0

00 h

as

Figure 6 Changes in Area Harvested within Each Period


Green

RevolutionPost Green

Revolution


1,192

3,1093,419

4,046


0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

in '0

00 h

as

Figure 7 Changes in Irrigated Area within Each Period

Green Revolution

Post Green Revolution


690

740

1,269

1,550

36


0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

in '0

00 h

as

Figure 8 Changes in the Yield of Irrigated Area within Each Period

Green Revolution



2.06

2.89

3.68


79.7(1035%)

79.7(63%)

49(55%)

31.5(85.3%)

17

Population at the end of the period (projected)In million

39.5U: 24.4R: 54(2000)

26.63 (333%)

Post-Green% (Change)*

58.06%(1961)

12.58(1945)

Last 100 Years

(Average)

49.2 (-27%)U: 37.8 (-34%)R: 56.4 (-21%)

(1985)

67.08% U: 57.43%R: 71.15%

(1965)

No dataPoverty Incidence

6.15 (152%)

Green(% Change)*

2.44

Pre-Green(% Change)*

n/a

Pre-War

Exchange Rate (Peso/$)

Average Per Year

*Relative to previous period

37


51.60

39.5%U: 24.4%R: 54%(2000)

79.7

2002

2.00 (1945)

75.05%U: 65%

R: 80.19%(1961)

7.02 (1900)

Base Year

-248%

-36%U: -52%R: -18%

1035%

% Change

49.60

-22U: -27R: -12

72.68

Difference


Exchange Rate (Peso/$)

Population (projected) (in million)

Annual

The Last 100 Years


Figure 9 Rice Production in Relation to Typhoons and El Niño,1948-2002

10

15

20

25

30

35

1948

1952

1956

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

Num

ber o

f Tro

pica

l Cyc

lone

s

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

12,000

13,000

in '0

00 m

etric

tons

El NiñoTropical CyclonesRice Production

Source: FAO DatabasePAGASANational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Gov’t. Data started from 1950

38


DA Organizational Chart


Rice Program Allocation for Extension, Education, Training and Information Services

5%6%1221 (H); 5 (L)15%56

124 (H); 24 (L)Arroyo

(2000-2004)

10%14%41 63 (H); 22 (L)39%142

216 (H); 99 (L)Estrada

(1998-2000)

6.7%5%1947 (H); 9 (L)25%90

183 (H); 2 (L) Ramos

(1993-1997)

% to Total

Average Annual

Allocation(In million)

% to Total

Average Annual

Allocation(In million)

E + I% to Total Budget

Information Services (I)Extension (E)

Administration

39


Phil. Universities & DA Secretaries

1 yr & 6 mos.754Others2 yrs & 3 mos.1084Ateneo

5 yrs2404UP

Average Length of Service

Total Length of Service

No. of Secretaries

University

3 yrs & 3 mos782Economics

2 yrs & 6 mos301Commerce

7 yrs & 2 mos1722Pol Sci & Philo

1 yr & 5 mos684Bachelor of Laws

1 yr & 8 mos. 201Bus. Mgt

1 yr & 6 mos553Vet Med & Agronomy

Ave. Length of ServiceTotal Length of Service

No. of Secretaries

Courses

BS Courses & DA Secretaries


Figure 10 Rice Imports in Relation to Election, 1946-2002

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

1946

1949

1952

1955

1958

1961

1964

1967

1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

% o

f im

ports

to to

tal p

rodu

ctio

n

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14in

mill

ion

mt

Presidential Election

Local Election

Imports

Rice Production

Source: Bureau of Agricultural StatisticsCOMELEC

40

In summary . . .Whathave we learned about KM in rice during the last 100 years?


Are we managing our rice knowledge well?

Managerial: knowledge in the management of rice farms for profit & rice programs towards sustainable growth: NVMExtension & educational: knowledge in the improvement of the capacity of the people in the bureaucracy & the farming communities towards rice self-sufficiency: NVM Technical: knowledge in the sustainable production & processing rice in a small-farm, mixed/multiple commodity system: NVM

100 y

ears

late

r

NVM: not very much

41


After 100 years. .Administration & management of rice programs: still ad hoc, unstable, & personality-oriented, no accountability. Extension & educational capacity of the agriculture bureaucracy has deteriorated (NAFC, ATI, AMAS, etc). Technical knowledge in the production, processing, and marketing of rice

Agri. Technicians? Poor & deteriorating Farmers? After GR, slow growthW

hat i

s the

evid

ence

?


Socio-political context:

The country’s long history of importation seems to create a national feeling of rice insecurity . Politicians has seized this phenomenon as an opportunity to achieve political gains. The political leadership has used WTO/AFMA “safety nets” for political ends. Rice legislations and programs have continually focused on control, market intervention, & ad-hoc structural elaboration leading to greater politicization of rice programs.Lack of accountability & transparency in the rice programs appears as a function of the continuing weakness of the oversight responsibilities of the legislature. COCOFAM has failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities.

Why

hav

e we n

ot ?

42


Organizational structure & culture 1:

The special structural, ad hoc arrangements that characterize the implementation of the rice program over the last 100 years show:

A tacit recognition of the continuing institutional weakness ofthe agriculture bureaucracy;The propensity of the government to achieve immediate gains at the sacrifice of long-term project sustainability;The lack of political will to pursue reforms in governance as a foundation for long-term program effectiveness & sustainability.

By bypassing the DA’s systems and procedure (e.g., NAFC) the government has failed to correct historical structural and management weakness of the DA proper and, in the process, institutionalized the structural defects of the system.

Why

hav

e we n

ot?



The special arrangements (aberration) in the implementation of the rice programs have spelled over to other areas leading to:

Creation of other key commodity (livestock, HVCC, etc.) programs under similar special arrangements; Appointments of ad hoc project directors that are not organic tothe DA & without any project accountability ; & Concentration of project funds in the office of the secretary leading to increased politicization of national DA programs.

The rice program has also developed a supply driven & interventionist, paternalistic DA culture that resisted changedespite a changes in the social & economic realities of the country (decentralization & WTO).

Why

hav

e we n

ot?

43



The special treatment given to rice, besides creating personality-oriented management system, has exacerbated the distortion in the investment of the DA. There is no clear rationale on the investment priority either across programs or within a given program. The high subjectivity in the allocation of resources are reflected in the variability of budget across or within programs from year to year. W

hy h

ave w

e not

?


Programs & processes 1:

Production programs have continued to focus on self-sufficiency objectives (total production) & control (government procurement & marketing) rather than productivity and welfare objectives on the rice producers. This narrow focus may have contributed to the general weakness of the rice industry. From the green revolution period there appears little substantive difference in strategies/methods of rice programs in different administrations. Change has been on labels rather than on substance.

Why

hav

e we n

ot?

44



The lack of real accountability in the rice program, like other national banner programs, leads to:

Lack of culture of respect for data integrity/quality & data-based decision-making; Absence of a culture of third party and objective program evaluation; reliance on self-reporting Absence of reliable benchmarksUse of subjective evaluation for program planning and improvement; Lackadaisical attitude towards the submission of reports; & Undeveloped in-house planning & evaluation capacity.

Why

hav

e we n

ot?



Rice programs, being centrally driven, has become an impediment to :

Harnessing the power of decentralization to bring about stronger local government and private sector participation; Harnessing people power to bring about a more vigorous farmer-participation and grater program sustainability; &Developing the entrepreneurial spirit among rice farmers.

Government rice program has failed to learn from experience that dole outs develops mendicancy.

Why

hav

e we n

ot?

45


However despite the weakness in the KM . . .

The PG trend in rice yield and total production seems unaffected by changes in rice programs, the cost, and the way these programs are managed. This could mean that the country’s PG communication system allows the regular flow of technology and information to and from the rice farming communities despite the weakness in the agriculture. bureaucracy.But rice farming is more than yield and total production. It is making a living.

100 y

ears

late

r


What did the country miss? some hypotheses . . .

Rice farmingAchieve higher productivity & profitability of rice farms Development of a more sustainable of rice-based farming system

Rice programHigher returns in investmentRational allocation of resources across instruments

Agriculture bureaucracy: more professional, stronger, & stable

Knowledge assets: higher retention rate & learning resource Leaner, transparent, simpler, and more client responsive

100 y

ears

late

r

46

In summary . . .How do we compare with other countries?


Rice Yield (in metric tons per hectare)

1.24(37.80%)

2.55(122.8%)

0.56(30.02%)

1.22(55.04%)

Change

4.54

4.63

2.45

3.43

2003

Post Green RevolutionGreen RevolutionCountry

Change19801965

3.29

2.08

1.89

2.21

7.3

1.94

1.78

1.31

1.52(85.95%)

1.38(7.13%)

1.07(6.03%)

0.9(68.75%)

Thailand

Indonesia

Vietnam

Philippines

47


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003

in m

t/ha

PhilippinesThailandVietnamIndonesia

Figure 11 Changes in Rice Yield Across Selected Countries



Green Revolution


Rice Area Harvested (in million hectare)

2.47(27.45%)

1.84(33.02%)

1.8(19.56%)

0.63(18.35%)

Change

11.5

7.45

11

4.09

2003


Change19801965

9.0

5.6

9.2

3.5

7.3

4.8

6.3

3.1

1.68(22.9%)

0.77(16.04%)

2.93(46.73%)

0.35(11.26%)

Thailand

Indonesia

Vietnam

Philippines

48


0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003

in m

illio

n ha


Figure 12 Changes in Area Harvested Across Selected Counrties



Green Revolution


0.51(11.95%)

1.3(76.47%)

1.94(64.41%)

0.33(27.15%)

Change

4.3

3

4.96

1.55

2002


Change19801965

4.3

1.7

3.01

1.22

3.9

1

1.77

0.73

0.4(10.28%)

0.7(70%)

1.25(70.53%)

0.48(66.99%)

Thailand

Indonesia

Vietnam

Philippines

Rice Irrigated Area, (in million hectare)

49


0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000

in '0

00 h

aPhilippinesThailandVietnamIndonesia

Figure 13 Changes in Irrigated Area Across Selected Counrties


Green Revolution


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001

In M

t/Ha

PhilippinesIndonesiaMalaysiaThailandViet Nam

Figure 14 Rice Yield of Selected Neighboring Countries


50


Rice Production (in million metric tons)

22.4(75.63%)

22.87(196.36%)

9.63(55.46%)

6.38(83.5%)

Change

52

34.5

27

14

2003


Change19801965

29.6

11.6

17.4

7.6

12.9

9.37

11.2

4.07

16.7(128.53%)

2.28(24.31%)

6.2(55.57%)

3.57(87.75%)

Thailand

Indonesia

Vietnam

Philippines


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003

in m

illio

n m

t


Figure 15 Changes in Rice Production Across Selected Countries


Post Green RevolutionGreen

Revolution

51

Recommendations . . .Four Key Outcomes & Four Propositions


Objectives for reform in KM: 4 key outcomes

1. Accelerated growth in rice productivity at par with either Vietnam or Indonesia;

2. Increased impact of growth on rice on poverty alleviation;

3. Empowered rice farming communities & agriculture bureaucracy;

4. Increased profitability & sustainabilityof rice farming

52


Areas for reform in KM, 4 propositions (1-2):

1. Managerial or empowering the bureaucracy reforms: this involves basic reforms in the governance of the agriculture bureaucracy towards a more professional and stable agriculture bureaucracy of a highly decentralized system;

2. Extension & educational investment reforms:this reform focuses on budget reforms of the rice program to give emphasis education and extension and other productivity enhancing instruments that are public in character;


Areas for reform in KM, 4 propositions (3-4):3. Technical reforms: this focuses on

substantive reforms on the knowledge emphasis of extension i.e., management for profit of a sustainable diversified rice-based farming system.

4. Target reforms: focus on total farm productivity and total farm households.

managing rice knowledge: the last 100 years er ponce, managing rice knowledge 1 managing rice...

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