MAKING ENERGY POLICY:

TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Peter Z. Grossman Clarence Efroymson Professor of Economics College of Business Butler University Indianapolis, IN, USA Lorna A. Greening Research Fellow Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN, USA

Please do not quote or cite without the permissions of the authors.

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MAKING ENERGY POLICY: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Peter Z. Grossman

Lorna A. Greening

1. Introduction

How can we best understand, as well as predict, the path of national energy policies in the face of a

changing political and technological environments, and in varied institutional settings? The policy

process literature encompasses many theories and models that can be used to analyze national energy

policymaking. But which ones are appropriate? Often more than one theory or model can be utilized to

explain a given policy. So, for example, multiple streams (MS) theory was used to explain the different

policy trajectories of the two energy crisis periods of the 1970s (Kingdon 1984) but the same events also

elicited Jones’s (1974) ‘speculative augmentation’ model and Ahrari’s (1987) ‘ambivalent majoritarian’

model. But would the Ahrari model be relevant in explaining the birth and development of the German

Energiewende? Possibly not. Jacobsson and Lauber (2005) chose the theory called the Advocacy

Coalition Framework (ACF) to explore the processes that led to the changes in German energy policy.

ACF, which emphasizes processes of policy learning and coalition formation, has also been used to

elucidate nuclear power policies in Sweden (Nohrstedt 2005, 2008). However, Nohrstedt argued that

the theory did not give a completely convincing answer. The inception of Corporate Average Fuel

Economy (CAFE) standards in the U.S. has been modeled as an example of Punctuated Equilibrium (PE)

(Dunn 2006), whereby policy in the background, subject to at most incremental change, is suddenly

thrust into visibility to politicians or decision-makers as well as the general public. Or put a bit

differently, when an issue ‘catches fire’ it can lead to a much more significant change, even a radical

change in policy (True, et al. 2007).

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Often the reason for different theories is that the same event raises many questions—questions

that differ in fundamental ways. For example, in Grossman (2015) several of these theories are brought

to bear very generally in interpreting the inception and development in the US of the Comprehensive

Energy Policy Act of 1992. It is noted that an immediate ‘crisis’ atmosphere induced demands for some

sort of legislative solution to America’s energy dilemma, expressed at the time of high gasoline prices in

the wake of the first Gulf War. More specifically, legislative activity began in the fall of 1990 and some

radical ideas were proposed. But with the fall of oil prices subsequently, the process was reduced to

wrangling mostly over incremental policy changes and in the final analysis the process seemed as MS

theory might have put it “a solution in search of a problem” (Kingdon 1984).

But such analysis presupposes a question such as: when and why does a crisis sometimes succeed

and other times fail to radically change policy? Other questions were certainly possible. How much did

public opinion matter in the policy process? What outside interests were most effective in influencing

the policy makers? The policy tried to support developments of new technologies and new market

structures. What mechanisms were put in place for these developments and were they successful? One

could even ask a more general question such as, what policy or set of policies could lead to innovation in

energy technology? Assuming that groups of legislators represented specific coalitions—e.g. fossil fuels,

environmental protection, etc.—what events if any have led to changing alliances, and reconstitution of

these alliances, both internal to the legislature and to their associations with interest groups? Who

benefitted from the incremental changes of the final bill in the US in 1992 and how did the beneficiaries

influence the process? Were there any changes in the core beliefs of identifiable interest groups? What

if any were the unintended consequences of the policy? And so on. Probably no one theory could easily

answer all of these questions. And even where there would seem to be some reason to use one theory

over another, that does not mean that it will elucidate best all aspects of a policy’s design,

implementation, evaluation or alteration through time. There are, as Ostrom (2005, 6-7) notes, “[An]

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extremely large number of components… [in] an action situation… [that make it] too complex to be

modeled as a simple game...” For those looking to analyze such situations, “The challenge…is to know

enough about the structure of the situation to select the appropriate assumptions about human

behavior that fit the type of situation under analysis…I view scientific explanation as requiring just

enough variables to enable one to explain, understand and predict outcomes in relevant settings.”

Toward that end, Ostrom developed ‘conceptual maps’ for policy analysis that are open-ended

descriptive pictures of actions, participants, outcomes and other relevant factors. The maps, or

frameworks, are ‘nested’ in that they encompass a large number of variables but permit a selection

from those representing the assumptions and simplifications of various theories and models, which

necessarily require a reduction in complexity for analysis. “[T]he elements contained in the framework

help analysts generate the questions” that would be used to test theories and models. Such a

framework permits not only a comparison of theories but can “improve the theoretical foundation for

research in policy analysis” (Ostrom 2011, 7).

This paper is an attempt to provide such a framework specifically with respect to energy policy.

Toward the goal, we have adapted the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework of Elinor

Ostrom (Ostrom 2005). The attraction of the IAD is that it provides a structure to describe the events,

the participants, and the process (the action ‘arena’ of Ostrom) of energy policymaking without

imposing the inevitable restrictions of a model. So for example, in Ahrari’s ‘ambivalent majoritarian’

model, the action surrounds an issue—an energy ‘crisis’—in which the legislators beset by both a sense

of crisis and limited information about its long-term extent and effects, form an uneasy, temporary

coalition. Many of the participants do not believe in the proposed legislative action but support it

anyway as a way of attempting to address it. Thus Ahrari restricts the variables that represent the

pathway to the policy decision that has already occurred. The variable selection is limited: there are no

interest groups lobbying for pet causes; the energy bureaucracy is not a factor; recent history is an

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important variable, but earlier decisions are not consequential in the model. Even the media is

peripheral to the process. Legislators do face constituents and so are influenced by electoral concerns.

Normal coalitions among legislators are presumably disrupted, but the nature of preexisting coalitions is

not explored. In other words, the model is constrained by the choice of variables. It is certainly possible

to imagine alternative choices even if the outcome itself cannot be changed (although the longer term

outcome was quite different from the one Ahrari sought to analyze).

As we will discuss, energy ‘events’ do not necessarily lead to the same policy outcomes across

time, geographical borders and institutional settings. As we will show, however, by comparing both

processes and outcomes through various models and theories, we can gather insights into the broader

process of policy design, implementation and effectiveness. As Ostrom has put it, “Frameworks identify

the elements and general relationships among [the]elements that one needs to consider for institutional

analysis and they organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry. They provide a general set of variables

that can be used to analyze all types of institutional arrangements. Frameworks provide a

metatheoretical language that can be used to compare theories. They attempt to identify the universal

elements that any theory relevant to the same kind of phenomena needs to include” (Ostrom, 2011, 8).

This paper is organized as follows: In the next section we elucidate an Energy Policy Framework

(EPF), adapted from Ostrom’s IAD framework to fit more specifically an analysis of energy policy. In the

third section we apply the EPF to the issue of nuclear power. This will illustrate how and why different

policy outcomes ensue in different countries. That is, the same events—the accidents at Three-Mile

Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima—have not led to uniform policy responses, even in countries close

both geographically and culturally. These variations can be captured in the EPF framework and theories

about the development of policy and the policy process can be compared. A discussion of further

application of this framework concludes.

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2. The Energy Policy Framework (EPF)

2.1 Meta rules and resource endowments

Figure 1 shows a modified IAD. To the left are crucial exogenous variables. First, energy policy

will hinge at least in part on domestic natural resource endowments. So for example, France chose a

large-scale nuclear power program in the 1970s because, as was said at the time, France had “no

coal…no oil…no gas…no choice.” Venezuela, an oil exporter, has an economic system highly dependent

on oil export revenues; when these fell in the 1980s and again in the 2010s, the economy was left in

shambles. Norway, on the other hand, an oil and gas exporter developed a policy of building a national

trust and a diversified economy from natural resource revenues so that price volatility in energy does

not have a great impact on national budgets or economic performance.

Second, policy will be conditioned on, and reflect, basic institutional constraints. Rules are key:

on what foundation is policy made? Here we use the definition of institutions from Douglass North

(1990, 3). Institutions are “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” There are

formal rules: including meta-rules such as constitutions, but also all laws governing exchange,

contracting, interpersonal behavior, energy extraction and use. Underlying any given law, there is the

rule of law or its absence. In much of the world today and in most of human history there has not been

the rule of law but the law of rulers who were above the law. Thus policy related to energy (or anything

else) can be determined by the whim of the ruler or the decision of a Party Central Committee. Of

course in most industrial societies, the rule of law generally prevails. So for example, Congress cannot

pass a law to give itself judicial power (except as concerns impeachment of and removal from office of

those acting contrary to the rule of law, a power given to Congress by the US Constitution). It is

constrained to by the meta-rules to make decisions in certain defined realms.

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Figure 1. Basic Components of the Energy Policy Framework Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2005, 15) As North points out (and as Ostrom 1990 has extensively documented), societies—even those

that respect the rule of law generally—do not rely only on a formal legal system. Formal law may hold

less sway than social/cultural norms of behavior as well as informal contracting and traditional/religious

social categories—all of which North terms ‘informal institutions’. Thus, in California, Shasta County

ranchers do not rely on the local or state authorities to adjudicate disputes among them (Ellickson 1991)

and Maine lobstermen police their commonly controlled harbor areas. Property rights in many countries

are ill-defined and in fact energy assets have been seized in countries around the world. What is

considered bribery in the industrialized world may be simply a cost of doing business elsewhere, or a

necessary component of an exchange system that emphasizes a gesture by the client to curry favor with

a patron. Thus, rents from energy extraction may be distributed to those who provide support to the

ruling elite, as well as to the elite themselves (North et al. 2009). This of course would suggest that

formal law might lead to energy policy as a matter of record, but the actual implementation and

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enforcement would owe more to informal mechanisms than statute law. A still greater departure from

the rule-of-law is the predatory state where any private resources are at risk of expropriation.

2.2 The [Policy] Action Arena

Figure 1, the Action Arena, termed here as the ‘Policy Arena’ depicts a simplified form of the

interaction of events/information/interests with the various policy actors. At some point the interaction,

as the Figure shows, an outcome (a policy or set of policies) is achieved, which is filtered back to the

exogenous variables (it is a law and thus a formal institution) and becomes an element in subsequent

policy actions and interactions.

An expanded action situation and its relationship to outcomes, actions and actors is depicted in

Figure 2. Here, modified again from Ostrom’s original, a key is information flows. Information provides

data input into the policy process but just as important as the information itself is who controls it. This

has been longstanding question in US energy policy. For many years, information about fossil fuel

reserves and other factors related to energy was proprietary, owned/controlled by energy companies

(Blair 1978; Yergin 1991; Grossman 2013). When shortages arose in the early 1970s, politicians and

other political actors such as consumerist Ralph Nader claimed that oil and gas companies were

deliberately withholding supplies to force prices higher. They disputed the facts presented by the

industry, and claimed that control of information meant the ability to manipulate energy markets. At

that time, there was less concern over electricity production because it was heavily regulated and had

been for decades by various branches of government—local state and federal—and so information

about supply and demand was thought to be completely politicized or objectively accurate (depending

on the ideology of the observer). On the whole the importance of, and control over, information has

been a vital issue in US energy policy. It inevitably informs forecasts on which billions of dollars

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depend—forecasts that over the years have been remarkable for their inaccuracies, regardless of who

made them (Grossman 2013).

Figure 2. Internal Structure Policy Arena of Energy Policy Framework Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2005, 33)

Empirical analysis

Implicit models of the actors

Observed interactions/outcomes

Evaluative criteria

Theoretical analysis

Theory

Predictions

Evaluative criteria

ACTORS

assigned to

assigned to

POSITIONS

ACTIONS

INFORMATIONabout

CONTROLover

Linked toPOTENTIALOUTCOMES

NET COSTSAND BENEFITS

assigned to

Linked to

External Variables

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In the EPF various actors and actions can be specified: legislative actors and coalitions of

legislators, administrative/bureaucratic officials, interest groups and individual policy entrepreneurs

(rent seekers); unorganized voter groups who suddenly see a stake in a policy issue; beneficiaries of

previous policies as well as those who lost due to previous policies and seek a change in policy to

reverse the cost/benefit calculus. Exogenous events both macro and micro impact policy decisions. For

example, in 2007, in the US, spikes in the price of oil, and subsequent price increases in gasoline

impelled many individuals to contact their legislators. Lobbying groups lined up with coalitions of

legislators either to advocate for some alternative to gasoline—at that time, primarily ethanol—or to

demand greater efforts at oil and gas exploration including the opening of various federal lands thought

to contain large quantities of oil and gas. The legislative coalition that had supported ethanol expansion

for years (mainly legislators from farm states) now used these events to demand a vast ethanol

expansion as a solution to both the high price and foreign domination of oil market. Farm lobbies and

some environmentalist groups joined this coalition. The latter argued that ethanol would be carbon

neutral: corn would use CO2 to grow and burning it would simply return the CO2 to the atmosphere.

This was disputed by many scientists, but environmentalists and supporters in Congress clung to the

beneficent interpretation of ethanol and argued that, in any case, burning oil was a much worse

alternative. The bipartisan Congressional ‘Peak Oil’ coalition also endorsed ethanol expansion because

of national security—that is, the need for an alternative fuel when US oil ‘ran out’ and thus making

America entirely dependent on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for fuel.

There was also a legacy attached to the policy proposal in that ethanol had been a significant

component of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Indeed, the interest in ethanol went back to the 1970s

when President Carter sought to promote ‘gasohol’, a blend of a relatively small amount of alcohol,

distilled from corn, and gasoline. In 2005, ethanol production was expanded and codified as the

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which had required the blending of an increasing amount ethanol,

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reaching 7.5 billion gallons annually by 2012. But in 2007, the RFS was greatly increased so that by 2022

36 billion gallons of ethanol (about 20 percent of all transportation fuel) would be blended at various

strengths from 10 percent ethanol-90 percent gasoline (E10) to 85 percent ethanol blends, (E85). In

choosing ethanol, proponents noted that there was an ongoing producing industry and a bureaucracy in

place that only would need to be expanded. The technology seemed to be well established. And the

existence of an ethanol bureaucracy provided another element of the new law’s support; proposed

expansion of a bureaucracy provides a strong incentive for the bureaucrats to lend their support

(Niskanen 1971).

In reality, to be fully implemented, the 2007 policy change required technological breakthroughs

and here is where rent-seeking, policy entrepreneurs played an important part. Ethanol developers and

their backers claimed such a breakthrough was only five or so years away, a case that had swayed

President George W. Bush who asserted a near-term breakthrough in a State of the Union speech.

Ultimately, with oil prices remaining high and public anger rising, there was a bipartisan, multi-

organizational push for passage of the 2007 legislation late in the year, and a willingness to accept as a

matter of expedience the promise of a breakthrough (as well as, one might suppose, faith in

technology)—regardless of its actual feasibility.

2.3 Actors

Figure 2 shows the major ‘actors’ in the energy policy realm and action arena. Note that

information flows both from and to the actors (as well as to the policy arena itself, Fig. 1) both from

exogenous sources and from the ongoing appraisals of policy proposals. In the end, a workable policy

(that is, one that could pass in Congress) might be developed. Note that in Figure 2, the cost and

benefits would be assigned by policy analysts to ‘potential outcomes’. But there are two points to make

here relative to energy policy: in the case of the 2007 RFS expansion, policy entrepreneurs did not have

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facts so much as forecasts—forecasts to which benefits could be assigned on a number of margins

(environmental, national security, and so on) that were often pure speculation but that could be shown

without much evidence to far outweigh the costs. This policy was adopted probably more as a perceived

need to do something (Grossman 2012) or, perhaps more to the point, where (as Eyestone 1978 put it)

the crisis loomed too large in the body politic, so that policymakers could not fail to act.

Before passage of the 2007 RFS policy change, a policy analyst asked to evaluate the proposal

might have first begun with an effort to understand the ‘implicit’ models on which the proposed change

was based. The need to “Do something?” The wish by legislators to show voters a superior commitment

to relieve their discomfort through ‘Speculative augmentation’? Was there an ‘ambivalent majoritarian’

coalition put together because of the sense of crisis and urgency that was building? Or perhaps the

implicit model was something else again—and very likely there were multiple models that motivated

supporters of the change.

The analyst would also have noted the interactions and between whom. Presumably, this would

include a wish on the part of policy actors to join a winning coalition, or at least a popular one.

Alternatively, some might have abjured because of an ideological predisposition or a negative

association of with the ideology of the dominant group. Ideology and core belief systems of individuals

and groups though often discounted in economic analysis, cannot be easily dismissed in policy analysis.

This emerges from an acceptance of the limits of rational calculation; actors are typically assumed to be

boundedly rational (Simon 1972) thus relying on ideology, heuristics or social norms, that is, North’s

informal institutions, in making decisions (North 1990). Some may have joined the coalition simply

because repeated energy crises meant abandoning previous beliefs; in other words, the heuristics that

guided them had stopped working. Of course in enacting the expanded RFS policy leads to changes in

the ongoing learning processes that may modify and affect subsequent actions, subsequent choices and

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organization of the actors; or put simply, the ethanol mandate becomes a datum in the continuing

process of energy policymaking.

As Hoppe et al. (2016) argue there are two basic research questions with respect to policy

analysis: is one doing analysis ‘for policy’ that is, the predictive models and cost-benefit analysis to

advocate for or against a policy change? Or is this an analysis ‘of policy’, which is more typically where

the academic policy analyst sits and will be our interest here.

For the policy analyst, with respect to the 2007 expansion of RFS, there were a number of

questions that could have been addressed, with various theories/models brought to bear to provide the

best ‘answer’, including the most robust predictions of the outcome of this policy as well as any related

future policies. For example, take the question: why did the augmented RFS command so much

support? Punctuated Equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 2009) theory would ask: what issue came to

prominence (perhaps looking at media studies, polling results) and why? The price of oil/gasoline would

have fit that category.

The analyst might then further ask what solutions to the problem were at least potentially

available, and available rapidly? Ethanol was a technical fix that was said to be at hand. PE would also

predict that as soon as the prominence of gasoline prices diminished, energy policy would revert to

incremental changes—which arguably is what happened. Even though the law has remained on the

books, once it became clear that the breakthroughs in ethanol production were not happening and the

price of oil fell dramatically there has been declining support for meeting the letter of the 2007 statute.1

A different question such as: by whom was the 2007 policy designed and for what objective,

might well be better treated with a different theoretical model, such ACF. This theory would look at the

1 Also fits the model of the ‘issue-attention cycle’ Downs (1972).

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core beliefs of various coalitions, how ‘policy subsystems’ (those groups actively concerned with an

issue) were affected by new information (i.e. the price of gasoline), how this was processed and how this

in turn led to one or more of these subsystems achieving their objectives. One question for ACF would

be the characterization of rising gasoline prices. Was this actually a ‘shock’ that caused the dominant

coalition to change, that is either reform their core beliefs or lose their position as the dominant

coalition? Or was it more an incremental shift whereby a pro-ethanol coalition was able to extend its

reach having learned how to achieve its objectives over the previous years? One prediction from ACF in

this regard might be that absent a major external factor or policy learning on the part of an anti-ethanol

coalition, the pro-ethanol coalition would persist in maintaining its hold over RFS policy. Note that this

theory and this question entail different assumptions from those inherent in the PE discussion above.

Both are ways of limiting complexity and ambiguity which is inherent in major energy policy analysis, but

which hamper a clear and concise analytic result.

To illustrate how the same event might be interpreted by different policymaking theories, a

more expansive analysis focusing on nuclear power policymaking in three different countries follows

below. These analyses utilize the basic framework of Figures 1 and 2, and limits analytic theories to four:

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Punctuated Equilibrium (PE), Multiple Streams (MS), and Social

Construction and Policy Design (SCPD) theory. These analyses are meant only to show the possibilities

and are not meant as full-scale treatments of nuclear power policy.

3. Nuclear Power Policy

To explore the Energy Policy Framework further, we look at the way in which nuclear power

policy developed in three countries: Germany, France and Japan. One reason for choosing these

countries is that they are all developed countries, have all built nuclear power plants, and have reacted

to changes in perception of nuclear power especially with respect to three power plant accidents: Three-

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Mile Island in the US; Chernobyl in the Soviet Union (Belarus); and Fukushima, Japan, and they have

reacted to other shocks such as the great oil price spike of 1973-4. Although these three countries are all

representative democracies, their nuclear power programs have followed different paths. Yet early on

there was far more similarity. They had active nuclear power development programs from the 1950s to

at least the 1980s and had constructed increasing amounts of nuclear-based electric power. In recent

decades, however, their paths diverged; in the 2010s, Germany and along with three other European

countries—Belgium, Spain and Switzerland—announced plans to completely eliminate nuclear power.

Japan, in the aftermath of the nuclear accident at Fukushima, announced that it, too, would eliminate

nuclear power but then with a change in the ruling party, Japan backed away from its pledge of a

complete nuclear phase out by the 2030s.2 In the meantime, France, while it is reducing its reliance on

nuclear power in favor of more renewable electricity, still expects that in 2025, nuclear generation will

still provide 50 percent of the country’s electricity. It is instructive to explore a particular example of

energy policy across different cultural and historical borders using the Energy Policy Framework,

explained in the previous section.

3.1 Germany

3.1.1 Institutional environment; domestic resources

German formal institutions were established under the German constitution, the Basic Law of

the Federal Republic of Germany, implemented as of May 1949. Most decisions related to energy are

promulgated by the federal government and state (länder) parliamentary regimes. Nuclear power was

promoted and developed under the 1959 Atomic Energy Act. Germany is also subject to EU law although

2 Japan shut down all of its reactors and conducted ‘stress tests’ to assure safety in the event of a restart. Restarts began in 2015 and an estimated 35 reactors will be back on line by 2020. Several older units are slated for decommissioning.

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as we shall indicate, German law with respect to energy has not followed the rest of European Union.

Arguably, it is the other way around; the EU has followed Germany’s heavy emphasis on renewables,

solar and especially wind.3 Wind currently produces the fifth most electric power of all energy resources,

a figure that has been rising for three decades.

Germany also has significant domestic energy resources of coal, which in fact still provides over

40 percent of Germany’s electric power. It has a limited amount of natural gas though estimates of shale

gas are as high as 70 trillion cubic feet, which would be sufficient to satisfy demand for approximately 30

years at current rates of consumption. But fracking is opposed by many groups in Germany, mainly

citizens’ groups but also German brewers and church groups. To date, only one test well has been

drilled.

3.1.2 Actors

The energy policy actors in Germany include the two major parties—the Christian Democratic

Union (CDU)4 and Social Democrats (SDP). A smaller but important actor in nuclear policymaking is the

Green Party, which was formed and gained strength through a growing environmental consciousness

(ideology) among Germans and on its opposition to nuclear power. Environmental groups in the 1970s

took on a distinctly anti-nuclear position, engaging in demonstrations against proposed power plants as

well as in response to the presence on German soil of nuclear weapons and the means of delivery. At

the same time, the general public widely supported nuclear power (polls consistently showed a

significant major in favor) partly in response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo against the US and the

3 Germany has a number of locations on-shore and off for wind generated electric power, and solar has been extensively deployed. Germany, however, is actually ill-suited geographically for solar power, and German solar has a capacity factor of less than 10 percent. 4 The CDU has a Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union, and the two parties work essentially as one in the German parliament. Until recently another party, Free Democratic Party, typically was a coalition partner with CDU/CSU governments. But in 2013, the FDP failed to gain enough votes to maintain seats in parliament and the party has since been disbanded.

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Netherlands and the subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil. The electric power industry,

unsurprisingly, was an important actor and staunch supporter of nuclear power as well

The Three-Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident in the US had repercussions in Europe and led to

some increase anti-nuclear sentiment in, most notably, Sweden (Nohrstedt 2005), but while it

galvanized anti-nuclear groups in Germany, there was little change among policymakers or the attitude

of the general public with respect to nuclear power after TMI.

3.1.3 Shocks, policies, policy outcomes

This changed with the accident at Chernobyl, which appeared to directly threaten the health of

the German public (though no ill effects appear to have resulted). Control of information about the

accident, crucial in its early hours, was lost because of confusing pronouncements from the pronuclear

CDU government as well as by industry supporters (Renn 1990). Because of this, supporters of nuclear

power were unable to frame the discussion to their ends, which in turn meant that the anti-nuclear

greens made headway in framing the way information on the accident was presented. The support for

nuclear power among the public fell by about 50 percent.

Because of the Chernobyl accident, the SPD, which had supported nuclear power, reversed

course and became nuclear opponents—making a clear difference with the CDU. The CDU was,

however, the national governing party, but the SPD held sway in several of länder. Consequently, the

SPD states refused to collaborate on issuance of licenses for new nuclear plants (Renn and Marshall

2016). In reality this opposition was often symbolic since federal law trumped rules of individual states.

So pronuclear forces still held the upper hand in that respect, but with public support following the SPD

and the Greens the pronuclear coalition was unlikely to maintain its dominant position.

A report issued at about the same time as the Chernobyl accident added to the debate. The

report expressed alarm over climate change—alarm that also swayed German public opinion. An

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alliance between anti-nuclear greens and anti-coal non-governmental green groups that supported

renewables to fight climate change was formed. It was somewhat ironic that nuclear power held a

negative place among those seeking to fight climate change as it –like renewables—did not produce any

greenhouse gases. But the strength of the renewables coalition led the ruling CDU to adopt policies

supporting renewables. Still, the government remained largely pro-nuclear and a new nuclear power

plant was commissioned in 1989. It proved, however, to be the last.

Thus the issue pitted anti-nuclear coalitions (SPD, Greens, pro-renewable lobbies) against

industry and to a large extent the CDU as well as several of the ministries that oversaw the nuclear and

electric power industries. The pronuclear coalition managed to stave off a wholesale rejection of nuclear

power until 1998. In that year an SPD-Green coalition government was formed at the national level, the

first time the Greens were in a position of authority able to alter longstanding national law. By 2002, an

agreement was reached essentially to phase out nuclear power by limiting the years of operation for

working reactors to 32.5 Several years later, a new CDU-dominated government began to back away

from the promised phase out. But then in 2011 the nuclear accident at Fukushima in Japan further

depressed public support for nuclear power. Facing widespread public disapproval and looming länder

elections, the CDU government returned to the SPD-Green plan. Several older reactors were shuttered

immediately and the rest were slated for early decommissioning.

3.1.4 Analysis

German energy policy generally, though focused mainly on renewables policy, the Energiewende

has been analyzed using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Grossman

2015). The arrangement of groups and the changes in these arrangements lends itself to ACF analysis. A

5 The law was complex and set also a lifetime amount of power generated—an amount that could be transferred from one reactor to another effectively extending the lifetime potential beyond 32 years (Renn and Marshall 2016).

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dominant pronuclear coalition gradually was replaced by an antinuclear one. This occurred because of

‘external perturbations’ shocks, and shifts in the policy subsystems. The dominant coalition was

replaced by what had been a minority coalition. Policy learning, a key feature of ACF, can be said over

time to have affected the core beliefs of the CDU and as a result they abandoned their longstanding

pronuclear position.

But could Multiple Streams, Punctuated Equilibrium, and Social Construction also be brought to

bear—though would these theories provide a more complete analysis of the resultant changes in policy?

Consider briefly PE: There were two notable shocks or ‘punctuations’ that brought nuclear

power policy to the forefront of public and media attention, as well as the political agenda. The first was

the accident at Chernobyl. This event, which seemed to directly threaten Germans with highly

radioactive fallout, galvanized public opinion against nuclear power, gave a heightened respectability to

the Greens, and pushed the SPD into the antinuclear coalition.

Although the specific concern about Chernobyl fallout dissipated, the event essentially ended

the construction of new nuclear power facilities in Germany. After 1989 no more plants were built (and

Chernobyl type reactors in the former East Germany were shut down after German reunification in

1990).

The Chernobyl shock also shifted political power, giving the Greens—at first a fringe party—a

much greater standing and brought them to power soon after into several state governments. And in

1998 the SPD/Green coalition government at the federal level initiated in 2002 a law that was to phase

out of all nuclear power plants. But the effort though sweeping was to be applied incrementally and

proved reversible when the CDU returned to power later in the decade.

A second shock, another accident, another punctuation, again pushed the question of nuclear

power to the top of the agenda and a CDU government reversed course and embraced the policy that

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had previously belonged only to the SPD-Green antinuclear coalition. Now the public overwhelmingly

backed ending nuclear power in Germany, (public polling suggested that fewer than one in ten Germans

still supported nuclear power), and a majority of policymakers switched to an anti-nuclear position. The

debate after more than 30 years appears to be at an end.

Of course, we have only sketched an analysis based on ACF and PE. From the standpoint of

policy-analysis, the question for an analyst, does PE theory do a better job of explaining changes in

German nuclear policy better than ACF (or MS or SCF)?

3.2 France

France is, of course, notable for the extent and durability of its nuclear program. At present,

nuclear power provides about three-quarters of France’s electricity; it also sells nuclear-generated

power to neighboring countries. Nuclear power began soon after World War II although the first

reactors were intended for military use—to create plutonium for France’s independent nuclear arsenal.

But by the early 1960s the emphasis was on hydrogen weapons and the atomic research and

development switched to the power sector.

3.2.1 Institutional environment; domestic resources

Among all of the world’s leading democratic, industrialized countries since World War II, France

has perhaps had the least stable formal institutional structure. The Fourth Republic, created after

Liberation at the end of the war, embraced a new constitution that gave most political power to a

fragmented parliament. The constitution and indeed the Fourth Republic were replaced in 1968, when

France, wracked by turmoil of various kinds, brought Charles de Gaulle back into power as president of

the Fifth Republic. The new Republic had a new Constitution, which gave far more authority to the

president. Indeed, the president, though elected by the people of France, has the power to reject any

legislation from parliament and compel a reopening of debate. There is no veto-override provision. Over

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the past 50 years, the presidency has alternated between the center-right parties and the moderate left.

The current president is from the latter party.

France has limited natural resources. Though highly industrialized, much of the nation’s energy

resources have had to be imported. There are some coal mines, though the seams are deep

underground and the last mine was closed more than a decade ago. There is also a limited supply of

natural gas but search for new supplies is unlikely, especially if it involves fracking, which France has

banned. In fact, the country is estimated to have about 180 trillion cubic feet of shale gas that cannot

now, by law, be extracted. The country does have some uranium deposits and there is more uranium in

Francophone parts of the world, which were French colonies when it began its nuclear program. France

reprocesses nuclear fuel so that it has a continuous domestic supply of plutonium-based nuclear fuel.

According to France's energy transition law, signed in August 2015, renewable energy sources

are to be increased to 23 percent in 2020 and 32 percent in 2030. As of 2014, renewable energy sources

provided just under 20 percent of France’s electricity. More than half was from hydro; wind and solar

together provided less than five percent. To reach the levels required in the new law, the number of

French wind farms is expected to double and solar installations triple.

3.2.2 Actors

While parliament’s role was diminished, as Hatch (1986) notes, in addition to a strong president,

the state bureaucracy is an integral part of the policy process. Energy policy generally, and most

particularly nuclear policy, was put in the hands of technocrats, what has been called the ‘nucleoracy’

(Teräväinen et al. 2011). Nuclear technocrats apparently have had significant independent authority

apart from the French parliament and other areas of government. Energy policymaking has largely been

in the hands of “high officials of the government and the administration and managers of public

enterprises” (Hatch 1986, 152) and within government mainly, through the Ministry of Employment and

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Economy (Teräväinen et al. 2011). The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) coordinates nuclear

energy policy, and along with the Nuclear Policy Council, created in 2008 by presidential executive

order. The dominant (mainly government owned) enterprises are the Electricitie de France (EDF), which

operates all of the nation’s electricity system including its 58 nuclear power plants, and Areva, the

company that develops and builds French reactors.6 They, along with the large civil engineering and

construction firms, are the leading French nuclear stakeholders.

Opposition developed in France as in Germany with the appearance of a Green party (Les Verts),

but unlike Germany the Greens never gained a foothold in any ruling national government (though they

did gain a few parliamentary seats). Protests were held at nuclear power sites but even Chernobyl,

though it was said to have lessened ‘public trust’ in nuclear power, did not at any point produce a strong

enough backlash to change the basic policy.7 The one victory for the Greens was to gain the support of

the ruling (at the time) Socialist government for the abandonment of France’s ‘Superphénix’ fast

breeder reactor program. But parliament basically reaffirmed nuclear power policy in 1999.

Still, opposition led to a government policy decision to create a National Commission on Public

Debate (CNDP) to get public feedback on the nuclear waste question and the deployment of a next

generation of nuclear reactors, the EPR (European Pressurized Water Reactor). The national discussion

took place in 2005-6 but was criticized since it had no actual, direct effect on nuclear policy. In fact,

consideration of any real policy change was postponed until the period 2015-2020 when many of

France’s nuclear plants would need to be replaced or updated. In summary, the ‘nucleocracy’, the

6 Areva is a firm created through mergers in 2001, with “a presence in every part of the nuclear fuel cycle” (World Nuclear Association 2016). 7 French officials claimed the radiation cloud from Chernobyl conveniently “stopped at the country’s border” (Teräväinen et al. 2011).

22

nuclear industry, the Greens, and various governmental units and officials as well as the general public

are the actors in the Policy Space of the Energy Policy Framework.

3.2.3 Shocks, policies, policy outcomes

The key event affecting policy was the oil crisis of 1973-4. This event, which led to a major

increase in the price of oil as well as a concern over energy security, galvanized the ‘nucleocracy’ and

also gained widespread support from government officials and the general public for an expanded

nuclear effort. The argument about French energy security resonated with the general public. By 1980,

the share of nuclear power in France’s electric power mix had grown from 4 percent to 24 percent, and

continued growing for years thereafter. The outcome, a vast nuclear power system, seems to have been

basically stable—at least since the early 1970s. In the meantime, the French nuclear industry expanded

considerably, making France one of the leading exporters of nuclear power technology

In 2005, a new energy law reaffirmed the important role of nuclear power in France’s energy

mix, and advocated the development of a new generation of reactors, particularly a European

Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR). But France was also confronted by European Union policy which

heavily favored renewables. In 2012 the new Socialist President, François Hollande, agreed to cut the

share of nuclear power (despite the fact that it is largely CO2 free) to 50 percent by 2025. This became

law in 2014 with passage of the Energy Transition to Green Growth legislation. Of course, by implication

nuclear power will still be the dominant form of electric power generation for years to come—a fact

emphasized by an extension (by 20 years) of the service life of the most recently constructed nuclear

power plants. Older units, however, were scheduled for decommissioning. This was acceptable to the

majority of the 40 public and private stakeholders, which included NGOs, consumer groups, banks, local

authorities, and trade unions—studied by Mathy et al. (2015).

23

3.2.4 Analysis

One might view the process of French nuclear power policy through the Punctuated Equilibrium

theory. A stable system was disturbed in 1973, the issue ‘caught fire’ (True et al. 2007) and a radical

policy change occurred, a major commitment to nuclear power. Though there have been protests,

oppositional parties, and highly publicized accidents outside of France, there was very little change in

policy for the better part of 40 years.

One could argue, as PE does, that from the early 1970s on, nuclear policy—absent a new

punctuation—was path dependent. As Jones and Baumgartner (2005, 49) point out, “Once a path is

chosen, it tends to be chosen. Moving off the path can be difficult.” All the more so, it might be argued,

which such a large infrastructure was in place and seemingly functioning well. To the extent there was

policy change thereafter, it was incremental—as PE would expect.

Of course, path dependency and subsequent stability are also features of Social Construction

and Policy Design theory. In that case one would need to look at the groups that were advantaged by

the French nuclear power program and the extent to which subsequent policy remained in their favor.

While it would seem that a stable equilibrium was self-sustaining, Social Construction would argue that

it was likely the result of pushback against those seeking to gain a share or takeover entirely the

advantaged group’s benefits. “When burdens are imposed on advantaged groups, the power resources

and positive constructions of such groups are more likely to produce counter-mobilization, resistance to

implementation, legal challenges, and other defenses not typically available [to disadvantaged groups]”

(Ingram et al 2007, 112).

Again these are merely sketches of how the framework could be employed to compare the

explanatory power of different theories of the policy process.

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3.3 Japan

In the 1950s, Japan began a program of nuclear power development that continued more or less

without interruption for the next 50 years. An earthquake and tsunami, that killed approximately 19,000

people, also destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant leading to a meltdown of the nuclear

cores of the three reactors and a rethinking of Japan’s nuclear policies.

3.3.1 Institutional environment; domestic resources

Japan has had perhaps the most stable government of all the countries in this brief survey.

Based on a constitution written it seems at least in part by the American occupation authorities after

World War II, Japan is a constitutional monarchy, with the Emperor, the ceremonial head of state, and a

bi-cameral legislature, in which the countries laws are made.

Japan is even less endowed with energy resources than France. In the 1950s, more than half of

its electricity was from hydropower. Oil, coal, natural gas, uranium—all were essentially imported.

However, with reprocessing, a country can maintain some supplies of nuclear fuel without requiring

access to the world market in uranium ore or in enriched uranium suitable directly for fuel. Thus after

hydropower (of which there were few sites available in the 1950s for expansion) nuclear power was the

closest thing to a domestic resource.8

Government began funding nuclear power research in 1954 and passed The Atomic Energy Basic

Law in 1955; Japan’s

Atomic Energy Commission was established the following year. The atomic energy law was to

be based on principles of democracy and a promise of transparency in the establishment of nuclear

8 There is research at present in Japan on the development of methane hydrates thought to be, potentially, the largest natural gas resource in the world, but at present its use is neither technically feasible nor economically viable.

25

facilities. The goal was the promotion of nuclear energy for electricity (World Nuclear Association 2016).

A later law, the 2002 Energy Policy Law (also called the Basic Act on Energy Policy) emphasized energy

security and efficiency, and that in general there would be a diminished role in the future for fossil

fuels—but not nuclear power.

3.3.2 Actors

For about 50 years, one party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated government and

ministries and much of the bureaucracy was essentially an extension of the LDP. The LDP was also the

head of a very strong, pronuclear coalition. This included the very powerful Ministry of International

Trade and Industry (MITI), which in 2001 became the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).

The coalition also encompassed the government’s Science and Technology Agency, power companies,

industrial organizations, business groups, banks, local governments, and academic experts. “All of these

actors shared the view that nuclear power appeared to be the only viable technology that would enable

the reconstruction of Japan and supply sufficient electricity to meet increased production and economic

growth—which would ultimately result in a better life for the general population” (Watanabe 2016, 9).9

The pronuclear coalition became known as the ‘nuclear power village’ (Fam et al. 2014; Watanabe

2016).

Some local citizens living in the vicinity of nuclear plants did voice concerns over safety, but local

officials regarded new nuclear power plants as an opportunity for local and regional economic

development. The oil crisis was particularly important for Japan’s nuclear industry since over half of the

electricity produced in Japan at that time came from oil-fired generating systems. The oil crisis enhanced

9 However, while the benefits were touted, according to Watanabe (2016), risks were ignored.

26

the pronuclear coalition’s position, and there was a growing share of nuclear power starting in the mid-

1970s.

Of course, not all segments of the population were in the pronuclear coalition. There were some

clearly antinuclear groups, mainly the weak Socialist Party and some labor organizations allied with it. A

large Confederation of Japanese Unions was against any military use of nuclear technology but voiced

conditional support for power development. There was effectively no significant opposition to the

pronuclear power forces in the country.

A noteworthy change in the list of policy actors occurred in 2009 when the Democratic Party of

Japan (DPJ) won control of both houses of the Japanese parliament—ousting the LDP for the first time.

The DPJ was a strange amalgam of opposition groups whose primary goal was to have a genuine two-

party system in Japan. Their victory in 2009 seemed to indicate that they had succeeded. While they

campaigned on a reform platform, it was mainly to reduce the perceived power of the bureaucracy

while enhancing that of elected officials (Lipscy and Scheiner 2012). They did not advocate elimination

of even a serious reduction in nuclear power. Although they were not in the core of the pronuclear

coalition, they were effectively part of it. In fact, in 2010, the DPJ enacted the Basic Act on Global

Warming Countermeasures, which entailed actions to boost renewables and tax emissions, but the act

also included maintenance of much of Japan’s nuclear power. Another act authored by the DPJ called for

an additional 14 new nuclear power plants by 2030 to significantly reduce CO2 emissions (Kuramochi

2015).

3.3.3 Shocks, policies, policy outcomes

Unlike several European countries, the accidents at Three Mile Island in the US and the far more

disastrous accident at Chernobyl had no major impact on Japanese policy or on the preeminent position

27

of the pronuclear coalition. This distancing of Japan’s attitude to nuclear power from that of the rest of

the world was maintained despite some lesser accidents at Japanese facilities in the 1990s.

Fukushima, however, was a shock that changed the thinking among the DPJ leadership. In

accord with public opinion,10 the government, first, shut down all nuclear power plants in the country to

test them for safety, and, second, announced a phase out of nuclear power by the end of the 2030s.

Absent a calamity like Fukushima, the DPJ could not have overcome the pronuclear coalition but

because of the disaster it seemed that the DPJ would have a chance to translate their altered beliefs into

policy. But the LDP did not renounce its pronuclear position, maintaining that nuclear power was still

needed in Japan.

In a new election campaign in 2012, the DPJ ran at least in part on reducing reliance on nuclear

power and its eventual phase out. But the DPJ lost and the LDP returned to power. It quickly became

evident that the Fukushima accident had not destroyed the pronuclear coalition. Indeed, a new Basic

Act on Energy Policy in 2014 reiterated the longstanding goals of energy policy: energy security,

environmental protection, and energy efficiency. This time, in a nod toward public opinion, ‘safety’ was

added to the goals of policy. But not only were existing plants to be restarted once they had undergone

safety reviews, there was at least a suggestion that new plants might be built in the future—especially

since coal-fired power plants seemed to be the choice by power companies to replace shuttered nuclear

plants, thus raising Japan’s CO2 emissions.

10 In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, public opinion was 70 percent for ending Japan’s reliance on nuclear power (Fam et al. 2014).

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3.3.4 Analysis

While PE might seem the obvious choice given that attempts at policy change did occur after a

shock, the policy changes that had been articulated did not survive the DPJ’s election defeat. In fact, it

ended only a year or so after it had been promulgated.

Still, Social Construction and Policy Design might also be a fruitful analytic approach. The past

policy designs had clearly conferred benefits on an important coalition from the political, economic,

social and even academic realms. The coalition controlled the definition of the problem—energy

security—and established the policies to enhance the benefits to the nuclear coalition. The burdens

were much more diffuse—they fell on electric ratepayers notably—who also accepted for the most part

the rationale for ongoing nuclear expansion. There was widespread institutional and cultural support,

and the coalition maintained a remarkable amount of political and economic power.

Respect for the government and its technocrats on this policy question seemed to be an

accepted social norm, even though individuals in society were largely kept out of the decision processes.

Until Fukushima, it was said, all nuclear decision-making had been “carried out behind closed doors”

(Watanabe 2016, 17). Given that the DPJ government itself engaged in polling public opinion, it seemed

to reflect a major shift in the way policy would be designed and carried out in the future. A few groups

including some corporate executives and the Buddhist Party endorsed the ‘zero’ nuclear option.

But the return of LDP (while noting the emergence of safety as a key issue), meant a return of

the pronuclear coalition and little change in the distribution of benefits and burdens from what had

been previously. There was little change in the definition of the problem that nuclear would solve and

logic of why a continued reliance on nuclear power was necessary. The outcome did include incremental

changes, but no radical realignment of coalitions or policies.

29

Of course, one might use a different theory. Multiple Streams (MS) for example would look at

whether the window of opportunity for policy change opened, and why it seemed for a time that the

fundamental streams—problem, politics, and policy—could be connected by policy entrepreneurs. That

it was not could be explained by looking at the actions of various policy entrepreneurs to explain why,

despite the obvious concern that Fukushima had created, at most only incremental policy change could

actually be attained.

4. Conclusion

The EPF can be put to a number of uses including a comparison between countries using one

theory or another to see where the explanatory power might lie. To refer to MS again, why/by whom in

Germany did the streams get coupled and the phase out of nuclear power become policy? How/why did

similar events and information fail to make similar inroads in France or even in Japan? It is extraordinary

on its face that a disaster in Japan affected nuclear power policy more in Germany than it did in Japan

itself. How is that to be explained?11

Yet the framework, EPF, allows for a description of the actors, the institutions, the

resources (or lack thereof) as well as previous outcomes and policy choices in order to apply various

models and theories. It may be the case that a couple of different ones will be needed to get a full

picture of the issues and the comparisons. As Watanabe notes (2016, 3) “in the real political world,

several factors of policy change…are observed simultaneously.” The EPF is a place where these various

changes can be noted, compared and analyzed, we believe, providing a valuable tool for the study of

energy policy generally.

11 An effort at explanation can be found in Wittneben (2012) in which she gives five reasons including ‘perceived cultural proximity’, meaning that the Germans see the Japanese as a reflection of themselves in fact even ’better Germans’ than the Germans themselves. This could be for analytic purposes a claim described among informal institutions in the EPF.

30

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