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CHAPTER II

CURRENT SITUATION OF ARMS TRADE

CHINESE EMERGING TRENDS

1. Chinese Growth. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute (SIPRI), Beijing In the 2010201! time "eriod rose to #ecome the $orld%s third

largest $ea"ons e&"orter, narro$l' edging out erman' and rance *rom the to" three.

+he e&"anding sco"e o* hina%s arms e&"orts o-er the last decadeandahal* is

illustrated #' the *ollo$ing gra"h.1

$0

$500,000,000

$1,000,000,000

$1,500,000,000

$2,000,000,000

$2,500,000,000

1 Ggg

http://www.sipri.org/http://www.sipri.org/http://www.sipri.org/http://www.sipri.org/


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2. In the 200/200 "eriod, hina $as onl' the $orld%s ninthlargest e&"orter o* militar'

hard$are. rom 2000 to 201!, the total -alue o* its arms e&"orts more than tri"led and

the countr' has e&"orted at least 1 #illion $orth o* arms e-er' 'ear since 200.

Although hina%s e&"orts declined in 201! *rom the 'ear #e*ore, Beijing%s arms industr'

is still in a #roader u"$ard trend. +his ca"ture o* international sales is due to Beijing%s

geo"olitical am#itions, a $illingness to do #usiness outside their traditional markets to

sell arms to nations that other countries ma' not *eel com*orta#le dealing $ith. 3es"ite

this tremendous gro$th, hina%s still onl' accounts *or /4 to the glo#al arms trade. +he

5S and Russia, in the 2010201! time "eriod, $ere res"onsi#le *or 614 and 24 o*

$orld$ide arms e&"orts, res"ecti-el'. hinese arms makers are increasingl' attending

glo#al arms *airs to sho$case their $ea"ons, including "artici"ating at the Ide&

e&hi#ition in A#u 3ha#i in 201/. 7ere the hinese marketed a range o* $ea"ons

including the ad-anced 320002 air and missile de*ense s'stem, designed to shoot

do$n aircra*t at a range o* u" to 12/ kilometers, and the 8ing 9oong armed drone. A

com#ination o* securit', "olitical and economic dri-ers moti-ate hina:s e&"orts. hina

is targeting resourcerich states in the ho"e o* securing access to energ' and ra$

materials

2 nnn


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6. Pakistan, Bangladesh and ;'anmar 6 accounted *or t$othirds o* hina:s e&"orts.

<

A*rica has #ecome a ke' market, $ith the cliental o* a#out 1< countries on the A*rican

continent.. Se-eral states in Asia ha-e re"orted im"orting small arms *rom hina, $ith

Pakistan and Bangladesh the most "rominent reci"ients, #oth o* direct deli-eries as $ell

as licensed "roduction arrangements and technolog' trans*ers.

SMALL ARMS

!. 3uring the ;ao era!, hina:s arms e&"orts consisted mostl' o* cost*ree militar' aid

to ommunist or socialist states and nonstate actors o""osed to the 5SA and the

So-iet 5nion. =&am"les o* state reci"ients included Al#ania, the Re"u#lic o* the ongo,

>orth ?orea, Pakistan, Sierra 9eone, Sudan, +an@ania, iet >am and aire (no$ the

3R). 3uring the 1A:S =FPER+S E S;A99 AR;S A>3 9I7+ 8=APE>S G ;ark Bromle',;athieu 3uchHtel And Paul 7oltom


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omtrade and 5>REA data, Bangladesh, am#odia, Indonesia, ;ala'sia, Pakistan,

the Phili""ines, +hailand and iet >am im"orted S;A99 AR;S *rom hina in the "eriod

200D10. Pakistan is a major reci"ient o* hinese major con-entional arms and has

re"orted to 5> omtrade on militar' small arms im"orts. 8hile Bangladesh has

re"orted its small arms im"orts *rom hina to 5>REA. ;'anmar has maintained

strong de*ense ties $ith hina and it can #e assumed that hina remains an im"ortant

su""lier o* arms. Sri 9anka is a signi*icant im"orter o* arms *rom hina. +hese su""lies

continued throughout Sri 9anka:s con*lict $ith the 9i#eration +igers o* +amil =elam

(9++=).

Control Regimes

/. Ene o* the most signi*icant de-elo"ments o-er the "ast 20 'ears has #een hina:s

e-ol-ing attitude to$ards the -arious multilateral e&"ort control regimes, including the

>uclear Su""liers rou" (>S), the Australian rou", the ;issile +echnolog' ontrol

Regime (;+R) and the 8assenaar / Arrangement on =&"ort ontrols *or on-entional

Arms and 3ual5se oods and +echnologies. 8hen hina joined the >S in 200! it

marked hina:s *irst accession to an e&"ort

5 SIPRI Polic' Pa"er 6< Ecto#er 2016 7I>A:S =FPER+S E S;A99 AR;S A>3 9I7+ 8=APE>S G ;ark Bromle',;athieu 3uchHtel And Paul 7oltom "g 1/


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control regime $hose o#ligations do not deri-e directl' *rom treat' commitments. orth ?orea

and Saudi Ara#ia in -arious ca"acities. It is di**icult to rule out the "ossi#ilit' that hina

continues to aid these states. hina:s "ro-ision o* #allistic missile technolog' to these

states is o* s"eci*ic concern. hina is alread' re"orted to ha-e e&"orted missile

com"onents and technolog' to some o* them. I* this is true, then hina is -iolating its

"ledge to adhere to the original 1


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con*iguration o* "o$erL or the K"ro"ensit' o* things,L shi com"els hinese decision

makers to$ard Ktaking actions that make sense in light o* the "redominant tendencies at

an' gi-en moment.L It translates, among other things, into a Cs'nchronic: a""roach to

hina:s international conduct. hinese decisionmakers seek to e&"loit all the a-aila#le

11

o""ortunities that ser-e to #ene*it hina:s national interest, e-en though the' ma'

inde"endentl' a""ear to #e at odds $ith each other.

PAKISTAN

. Pakistan has #een hina:s most note$orth' #ene*iciar' o* $ea"ons and militar'

technolog'. Islama#ad is at least a minor all' o* the 5nited States, and thus

con-entional arms sold to Pakistan should "ose little threat. 7o$e-er, the constant

trans*er o* BR> technolog' and related deli-er' s'stems make this relationshi" o*

"articular concern to the 5nited States. hina has traded to Pakistan +'"e/ tanks,

+'"e/61 armored "ersonnel carriers, missile #oats,P jet *ighters, and ;11 missiles

among other s'stems.21 hina has also deli-ered Pakistan $ith *acilities to "roduce an

arra' o* con-entional s'stems including jet trainers, the +'"e tank, the 7M< antitank

missile, and the 7>/A "orta#le sur*acetoair missile.22 urther, hina has #een keen

to earn the $rath o* the 5nited States to hel" Pakistan:s missile B "rograms

e-en though the *iscal re$ard is restricted.

ar' ;ilhollin, testimon' #e*ore the Senate Intelligence ommittee, Se"tem#er 1


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o-em#er 12 hina trans*erred ;11 shortrange #allistic

missile com"onents to Pakistan, and in August 16 hina shi""ed su""lementar' kits

related to the ;11 missiles. Intelligence re"orts leaked to the media sho$s that hina

had also su""lied missile "arts to Pakistan in 1/.2 Pakistan is de-elo"ing the

hauri, a 1/00 km range #allistic missile, most likel' $ith hinese su""ort. hina ma'

also ha-e "ro-ided designs and tools to Pakistan *or manu*acturing ;11 missile

com"onents and "erha"s the $hole missile. Pakistan 10 $as a "rinci"al all' *or hina

during the old 8ar, re"resenting a shield against So-iet enlargement in A*ghanistan

and a relia#le ri-al o* ;osco$. +he t$o countries ha-e $orked together $ith the 5nited

States to arm the A*ghan mujahedin to a-ert So-iet e&"ansion. As the So-iet threat is

gone, the greatest strategic #ene*it to #oth countries is to counter#alance Indian militar'

" Bill ert@, KBeijing louts >ukeSales Ban,L 8ashington +imes, Ecto#er ,1.

10 ?an, hina:s om"liance $ith International Arms ontrol Agreements, ". 6.


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"o$er. Both hina and Pakistan ha-e *ought $ars $ith India. +he 1< Indian nuclear

tests has, increased Beijing:s shared strategic concerns $ith Islama#ad. hina:s arms

sales and militar' coo"eration in general has increased Beijing:s militar' le-erage o-er

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>e$ 3elhi. B' rein*orcing Pakistan:s militar' ca"a#ilities11, hina *orces India to de-ote

more resources to its #order $ith Pakistan and less to its #order $ith hina. +ies $ith

Pakistan enhance Beijing:s strategic and "olitical reach. ?arachi is a regular re*ueling

"oint *or hinese aircra*t *l'ing to =uro"e, A*rica, and the ;iddle =ast as $ell.

. +he details o* arms im"orted #' Pakistan *rom china are attached at A""endi& A.

10. En the other hand, Pakistan also has close ties $ith the ;uslim mo-ements in

A*ghanistan, a "ossi#le dra$#ack in hina:s relationshi" $ith Pakistan. Pakistan has

*unded, armed, and organi@ed the +ali#an, the leading *action in A*ghanistan. +he

+ali#an, in turn, ha-e undou#tedl' aided ;uslim radicals o"erating in hina itsel*,

including 5ighur re#els and other -iolent grou"s in Finjiang. Sur"risingl', these ties ha-e

so *ar not a**ected Pakistan:s close ties to hina. ontinued A*ghan aid to acti-ists in

hina, ho$e-er, could a**ect Beijing:s relations $ith Islama#ad. Islama#ad, *or its "art,

increasingl' needs Beijing as a strategic all'. 8estern "o$ers, "articularl' the 5nited

States, ha-e mo-ed a$a' themsel-es *rom Pakistan #ecause o* its nuclear "rogram.

Ether countries, such as Russia, ma' #e hesitant to e&"ose lucrati-e ties $ith India in

11 R. Me**re' Smith, Khina 9inked to Pakistani ;issile PlantG Secret Project ouldRene$ Sanctions Issue,L 8ashington Post , August 2/, 1, ". A1.


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order to e&"and relations $ith Pakistan. +hus, hina is the onl' major arms su""lier

$illing to $ork $ith Islama#ad consistentl'.

11. >uclear Proli*eration. ollo$ing 'ears o* e"isodic re"orts, in Se"tem#er 2010

16

hina announced its intention to sell t$o additional "lutonium"roducing hea-' $ater

reactors to Pakistan. or se-eral 'ears, Pakistan:s nuclear "rogram has #een a source

o* concern *or the international communit', due to the countr':s "ast "artici"ation in

illegal "roli*eration and the insistent terrorist -iolence and insta#ilit' a**licting Pakistan.

+he nuclear deal $ith hina *urther adds com"licating *actor into the state o*

Islama#ad:s nuclear "rogram. It seems clear that hina:s moti-ations in undertaking the

deal relate less to the likel' im"act on Islama#ad:s nuclear "rogram, and more to

Beijing:s regional eNuili#rium o* "o$er and strategic sta#ilit' resol-es. 12. 12 At "resent,

Pakistan has #et$een 0 and 100 nuclear $ea"ons, and is steadil' increasing its

nuclear $ea"ons "rogram through ne$er installations at *acilities such as the ?husha#

com"le&. +he ?husha# com"le& contains a !0 to /0 ;8 hea-' $ater "lutonium

"roduction reactor, as $ell as t$o other hea-' $ater reactors under creation. +he

construction o* these reactors and the e&"ansion o* *acilities suggest that Islama#ad is

12 Ro#ert =. ;ullins, K+he 3'namics o* hinese ;issile Proli*eration,L +he Paci*ic Re-ie$,ol. o. 1, 1/, ". 1!2


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directing on re*ining its nuclear $ea"ons arsenal. Pakistan is also e&"anding its deli-er'

s'stems through regular tests o* its

nuclearca"a#le #allistic missiles, including $ith the introduction o* a ne$, short

range missile in 2011 called >asr. Islama#ad is also re"eatedl' testing its nuclear

ca"a#le cruise missiles, es"eciall' the Ba#ur.

16. +he 2010 Agreement. hina has a long "ast o* "ro-iding nuclear and missile

1!

related assistance to Pakistan, including $ea"onsgrade uranium and $arhead

designs, $ith the #ulk o* its assistance occurring in the 1


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reactors to Pakistan. Beijing also listed the items it $as committed to e&"ort to

Islama#ad under the original agreement. +he >S issue is crucial since under the

grou":s rules, nuclear *uel, reactors, and technolog' cannot #e su""lied to countries,

such as Pakistan, $ho do not im"lement *ullsco"e sa*eguards. or the t$o ne$

1/

reactors *or the hashma com"le&, the hina >ational >uclear or"oration (>>)

$ill su""l' a *i*th nuclear reactor to Pakistan $ith a 18 ca"acit'. But there is no

indication that this reactor deal, $hich "resuma#l' $ill not #e "art o* the hashma

com"le&, $as a""ro-ed #' or e-en #rought #e*ore the >S .+he Pakistani "osition

is that the deal does not -iolate its non"roli*eration reNuirements, #ecause it is not

connected to the militar' side o* its nuclear "rogram.

1!. ;oti-ations Behind the 3eal. +he SinoPakistani deal should #e seen in the

conte&t o* other strategic de-elo"ments, such as the Indo5.S. nuclear agreement

and the increasingl' close de*ense coo"eration ties #et$een >e$ 3elhi and

8ashington. Since the Indo5.S. nuclear agreement $as o**iciall' announced in Mul'

200/, Islama#ad has "eriodicall' asked *or a similar nuclear agreement *or itsel*, one

that $ould allo$ it to engage in nuclear commerce $ith all o* the su""liers. +he

central argument "ut *or$ard #' Islama#ad to justi*' a nuclear coo"eration

agreement is its "ressing need *or more sources o* energ', and a need to "re-ent a


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strategic im#alance in South Asia. 7o$e-er, these calls came onl' a*ter the Indo

5.S. nuclear agreement $as announced, making it likel' that Pakistan:s demands

$ere actuall' a res"onse to the Indo5.S. nuclear agreement. Islama#ad has also

stated that the "ro"osed reactors at hashma are crucial to its e**orts to generate

S e&em"tion *or Pakistan, this deal

is limited in its sco"e. It is, there*ore, an attem"t to restore some sem#lance o*

#alance o* "o$er in South Asia and assuage a ke' all'. Beijing might also #e

concerned a#out e&"anding ties #et$een >e$ 3elhi and 8ashington and India:s

Nuest *or a higher glo#al role and status. +hus, the need to #alance India:s ties not

just $ith the 5nited States #ut also $ith other Asian "o$ers like Ma"an is likel' to

ha-e #een a *actor #ehind the deal $ith Pakistan. B' allo$ing Islama#ad to rein*orce

its strategic ties $ith Beijing at a time o* added 5.S. "ressure on Pakistan to act


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*orce*ull' and decisi-el' against all terrorist and insurgent grou"s o"erating *rom its

territor', hina seeks to check Indian and American geostrategic "ositioning in the

region. Indeed, o"inion sur-e's in Pakistan sho$ that hina is -ie$ed as a longterm

all' .Additionall', Beijing is also seeking to #e an im"ortant "la'er in international

nuclear commerce, and the deals $ith Pakistan hel" demonstrate its increasing role

1

in this regard. >e-ertheless, hina seems to ha-e "ursued the SinoPakistani deal

$ith caution.

Sri lanka

1/. A sea change is occurring in Sri 9anka:s strategic orientation. Recent de-elo"ments

suggest that Sri 9anka is #ecoming hina:s ne$ #est *riend and securit' "artner in the

eastern Indian Ecean. +his $ould re"resent a major change in Sri 9anka:s *oreign "olic' and

could ha-e signi*icant conseNuences *or regional securit'. +he -isit o* a Qhinese su#marine

and announcement o* a ne$ hinese#uilt "ort in olom#o in Se"tem#er, *ollo$ed #'

another -isit in earl' >o-em#er "oint to the changing d'namics in the region.. +hese are no

ordinar' na-al -isitsG their nature, *reNuenc' and timing are e&traordinar'. +he *irst occurred

during state -isits #' Ma"anese Prime ;inister A#e and hinese President Fi Min"ing. laims

#' Beijing that its nuclear"o$ered attack su#marine is on de"lo'ment against Somali

"irates are risi#le. 3es"ite olom#o:s initial attem"ts at secrec', the -isits seem to #e a

deli#erate signal #' hina that it intends to maintain a su#marine "resence in the Indian


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Ecean and that Sri 9anka $ill "la' an im"ortant role in that strateg'. hina trans*ormed into

one o* the im"ortant *actors in IndiaSri 9anka relations o-er multi"le *ields. +he intensit' o*

relations #et$een Beijing and olom#o has increased immensel' in the recent 'ears. hina

ma' soon o-ertake India as Sri 9anka:s largest trading "artner.Q+he current situation ena#les

Sri 9anka to #e in a "osition to juggle India and hina. Sri lanka seems to #e closer

1<

to Beijing, $hich has Kno strings attachedL, at least o-ertl', to an' o* the "rojects im"lemented or

aid granted. Since 10 china has #ecome the largest arms su""lier to Sri lanka es"eciall' in

the $ake o* india:s re*usal *or the su""l' o* $ea"ons *or her *ight in the =lam $ar. +he

im"ortance o* hinese arms sale during the 5S arms em#argo in 200 has #een a major

#inding *actor in the arms trade.

1. In 11, during insurrection in e'lon, hina "ro-ided much needed arms and

ammunitions and undou#tedl' had #een the most constant and sincere *riend o* Sri

9anka.2An anal'sis o* SIPRI:s data *or arms e&"orted to Sri 9anka #' hina re-eals a

su#stantial increase in $ea"ons *lo$ in 200


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'ears later 1!, the uang@hou re*ueled in olom#o on its $a' to Pakistan in ;arch 200.

9ess than a 'ear later, the hinese 8en@hou $arshi" "aid a "ort call to olom#o in

Manuar' 2010 *or three da's #e*ore returning to the ul* o* Aden and Somali coast *or

"atrol duties. In the $ar $ith the +amil +igers 1/, +he 5S 6 million aid on ammunition

and ordinance is considered to ha-e ti""ed the $ar in the *a-our o* the Sri

lankan arm'. +he hengdu interce"tor aircra*t su""lied #' china during the "eriod

1

has also #een signi*icant *or de-elo"ment o* the 9ankan air *orce. 3uring C=elam 8ar

I:, hina generousl' su""lied reNuisite arms and ammunition to Sri 9ankan troo"s to

de*eat the 9++=. hina "ro-ided Mian *ighter jets, antiaircra*t guns, +'"e


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1. +hese *etched hina remarka#le good $ill *rom the Sri 9ankan go-ernment and the

Sinhalese in general. En the other hand, India insisted on "ro-iding onl' Knonlethal

$ea"onsL to olom#o during the $ar.

NEPAL

1


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too. +he >e"alese #order has #een the "assage to a ha-en *or smugglers, $ho ha-e

#een a#le to smuggle drugs and arms to India $ithout hindrance. =-idence indicate that

hina is not onl' courting the >e"alese ;aoists, #ut also rendering "olitical as $ell

material su""ort to the Indian ;aoists $hose ultimate aim is to o-erthro$ the

"arliamentar' democrac' through an armed struggle

1. De/en&e Ties $etween Chin n" Ne#l. )3In 200/, hina su""lied more arms

21

to ?ing 'anendraT including the sale o* 8 //1 APs 1. In the same 'ear >e"al

su""orted the inclusion o* hina into SAAR irres"ecti-e o* the *act that India had

e&"ressed its reser-ations. In Se"tem#er 200e"alese de*ense

minister Ram Bahadur +ha"a as an o#ser-er to the militar' e&ercise C8arrior 200e"al during a -isit.

hina is currentl' $orking on the reconstruction o* the hina>e"al high$a' $hich is

16 hina:s e&"anding *oot"rints in >e"al. 3r Satish ?umar, Assistant "ro*essor ;;7

college ;eerut.

1 SIPRI arms trans*er data#ase.www.si#ri.org4rmstre


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e&"ected to #e com"leted #' the end o* the 'ear 2011. Built at a cost o* o-er 100

million1e"al in ;arch 2011

and the higheste-er militar' aid $as e&tended #' hina to >e"al o* 5S1.< million. It

includes medical eNui"ment *or the ;ilitar' 7os"ital in ?athmandu, engineering

eNui"ment including hea-' construction -ehicles, and logistics *or rescue o"erations. In

201216 hina #oosted its annual grant assistance to >e"al more than *i-e*old to R;B

e"al has #een recei-ing R;B 1/0 million annuall' as grant assistance *rom the

northern neigh#or. +he increased amount has #een recei-ed under =conomic and

+echnical oo"eration.

22

,ANGLADESH

20. Bangladesh hina #ilateral relationshi" has its *oothold right through the

historical records o* t$o thousand 'ears. Q=-er since the esta#lishment o* the *ormal

di"lomatic relationshi" in Ecto#er 1/, Bangladesh and hina continued to #e

closer *riends and de-elo"ment allies. Roughl' *ort' 'ears ago, #oth the countries

had their o$n share o* di**erences, and relations #et$een hina and Bangladesh

$ere not as "ros"ering as the' are toda'. 8hen Bangladesh gained its

inde"endence in 11, the' had much stronger ties $ith India, $hich ultimatel' did

not

1! $$$.china .aiddata .orgO"rojectsO6!61

http://www.china/http://www.china/


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allo$ Bangladesh to esta#lish close ties $ith hina. +oda' their relationshi" is o*ten

termed as Ctrusted *riendshi": 1or Call $eather *riendshi":. =**ecti-e #ilateral

coo"eration #et$een Bangladesh and hina has #een accom"lished in a num#er o*

sectors, including "olitics, econom', militar' and culture. E-er the 'ears, the' ha-e

signed Nuite a lot o* #ilateral treaties, "acts, and memoranda o* understandings on

mutual economic engagement, cultural sharing, in*rastructure de-elo"ment,

educational e&change and militar' su""ort. ;utual tradeo** #ased on shared

interests has largel' added to kee" Bangladesh hina #ilateral relations

maintaina#le o-er time.

21. In terms o* militar' coo"eration #et$een Bangladesh and hina, Bangladesh

has #een im"orting arms and ammunitions *rom hina on a -er' large scale. All

militar' "ersonnel in Bangladesh, $hether in the Arm', >a-' or Air orce generall'

look to$ards hina *or im"ort o* arms or *or militar' guidance. In 2012, Bangladesh

26

#ecame the second largest market *or hinese arms e&"orts #ehind Pakistan. Both

the nations are also in-ol-ed in joint militar' e&ercise 20"rograms through the

3e*ence oo"eration signed in 2001, $hich allo$s highranking Bangladesh militar'

"ro*essionals to -isit hina in order to learn the strategies and techniNues used #'

the hinese Peo"le:s 9i#eration Arm' (P9A). In 2010, the Bangladesh o-ernment

1" >oor ;ohammad Sarker GPeace securit' re-ie$, ol 201!.

20 3r Moth' Bhattacharia D institute o* hineese Studies 201!.


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announced a militar' moderni@ation "lan, through $hich the' $ill #e im"orting t$o

;ingclass su#marines *rom hina *or the cost o* 206.6 million. +he su#marines

are likel' to arri-e #' the 'ear 201, $hile the training o* the Bangladeshi sailors $ill

#e conducted #' hina.

22. 5nder the regime o* President iaur Rahman, Bangladesh and hina came -er'

close in strategic coo"eration. +he leaders o* the t$o armed *orces ha-e e&changed

-isits *reNuentl', $hich ha-e contri#uted to the continuous de-elo"ment o* *riendshi"

and coo"eration #et$een the t$o armed *orces. So *ar, Bangladesh has entered into

a long term de*ense agreement $ith hina. +he main areas o* coo"eration in this

sector ha-e #een the su""l' o* armaments, militar' hard$are and s"ecial

eNui"ment. +he "arties $ould coo"erate in sa*eguarding, technical ser-icing and

moderni@ation o* the a#o-e. +here had also #een coo"eration in licensing the

"roduction o* militar' hard$are, training o* technical "ersonnel and e&change o*

rele-ant intelligence and data. hina has #een a major su""lier o* de*ense materials

to Bangladesh. +he Bangladesh Arm' has #een eNui""ed $ith hinese tanks, its

2!

na-' has hinese *rigates and missile #oats and the Bangladesh Air orce *lies

hinese *ighter jets, such as 1 B *ighter "lanes. In 2002, hina and

Bangladesh signed a K3e*ense oo"eration AgreementL21 $hich co-ers militar'

training and de*ense "roduction. It $as the *irst such agreement signed #'

Bangladesh $ith an' countr'. 7o$e-er, hina donated "olice eNui"ment to

21 >a@mul Ashra*, K3haka Beijing deal no threat to India,L ul* >e$s, 3ecem#er 2,2002.


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Bangladesh as a "art o* the coo"erati-e e&ertion #et$een the ;inistr' o* 7ome

A**airs o* Bangladesh and the ;inistr' o* Pu#lic Securit' o* hina in 200. 3uring

Bangladesh ;inister o* State *or 7ome A**air:s -isit to hina, #oth countries agreed

to strengthen #ilateral la$ en*orcement coo"eration. In addition, hina and

Bangladesh ha-e #een considering an ad-anced mutual colla#oration *or the

additional accom"animent o* their indi-idual contri#utions to 5> Peacekee"ing

;issions. Bangladesh remains as a stakeholder in the: Small ;ulti mission Satellite:

#eing de-elo"ed #' hina >ational S"ace Administration. +$o countries also agreed

to coo"erate in de-elo"ing nuclear energ' *or "eace*ul "ur"oses, es"eciall' to meet

u" the rising demand *or "o$er in Bangladesh.

CHAPTER III

ANAL5SIS OF THE PRO,LEM


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26.+he im"act o* hinese arms "roli*eration in the South Asian region has resulted

in three di**erent grou"s o* regional states and is, there*ore, "ercei-ed di**erentl' #'

these three discrete clusters o* states. +he *irst grou" $elcomes the gro$th o*

hina%s o-erall "o$er and ha-e close, *riendl' ties $ith hina .+hese nations areG

(a) Pakistan.(#) Bangladesh(c) ;'anmar (d) Sri 9anka.

2!. +hese countries currentl' #ank on hina as a stead*ast all' in their e**ort to

de-elo" the "olitical s"ace and as a source *or a secure and more a**orda#le su""l'

o* militar' hard$are and technolog' in the su#continent. hina is looked u"on as a

#alancing *orce and a #enign state $hose "o$er and so-ereign role enhances their

securit' #' counter #alancing other major "la'ers such as India, 5nited States or

2/

Russia. +hese nations do not ha-e an' territorial dis"utes $ith china and are not

"rimaril' threatened #' its militar' might.

2 +he second grou" o* states includes the nations under the direct in*luence o*

a #elligerent hina. +hese landlocked states areG

(a) >e"al

(#) Bhutan


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2/. +hese nations are not de"endent on hina *or essential su""lies or trade

outlets. +he' ha-e #ased their "olicies, econom', and securit' around India. Beijing

"ursued to o"en u" arms e&"orts to >e"al in the late 1


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a**airs and su""ort *or insurgents. 7o$e-er, relations #egan to im"ro-e a*ter the

militar' sei@ed the "o$er in 1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vijay_(1961)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Northeast_Indiahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite-Maoist_insurgencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siachen_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Blue_Starhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Vijay_(1961)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Northeast_Indiahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite-Maoist_insurgencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siachen_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Blue_Star


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(i&). 1(c) Srilanka.

(i). 11 MP Insurrection (Sri 9anka)

2<

(ii).1e"al. 1 J 200 >e"al i-il 8ar.

(e) Bangladesh.(i) 11 Bangladesh 9i#eration 8ar (ii) 16 hittagong 7ill +racts Insurgenc'(iii) 2001 IndianBangladeshi Border on*lict(i-) 200 Bangladeshi Political risis

(*) Pakistan.(i) 1! IndoPakistani 8ar

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pawanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_Maldives_coup_d'%C3%A9tathttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmirhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino%E2%80%93Soviet_border_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Paracel_Islandshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1987_Sino-Indian_skirmishhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1971_JVP_Insurrection_(Sri_Lanka)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Civil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chittagong_Hill_Tracts_Insurgencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Indian-Bangladeshi_border_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006%E2%80%932008_Bangladeshi_political_crisishttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1947https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pawanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_Maldives_coup_d'%C3%A9tathttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmirhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino%E2%80%93Soviet_border_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Paracel_Islandshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1987_Sino-Indian_skirmishhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1971_JVP_Insurrection_(Sri_Lanka)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sri_Lankan_Civil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chittagong_Hill_Tracts_Insurgencyhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Indian-Bangladeshi_border_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006%E2%80%932008_Bangladeshi_political_crisishttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1947


26/37

(ii) 1/ IndoPakistani 8ar (iii) 11 IndoPakistani 8ar (i-)1

(-ii) 1 Pakistani cou" d%Utat(-iii) 200! 8ar in 8a@iristan Balochistan con*lict(i&)200 Pakistani state o* emergenc'

2

2. De&resing Con2entionl 6rs. +he a#o-e data suggest that the

con-entional con*licts are on a decline in the south Asian region. +here has #een no

major $ars that an #e attri#uted to hinese arms "roli*eration. 7o$e-er there has

#een a major shi*t to$ards noncon-entional *orm o* con*lict.

Chinese Tren"

60. +he care*ul stud' o* hinese e&"orts o* militar' hard$are and *inancial aids

re*lect a distinct trend o* su""l'ing militar' hard$are to states in the near -icinit' o*

India O nations ha-ing direct in*luence on India as com"ared to the other countries

$here the *ocus has #een more on economic aid as $ell as ca"acit' #uilding. er'

limited Nuantities o* militar' eNui"ment ha-e #een su""lied to the -arious A*rican

countries. Another distinct *act that emerges is the co-ert su""ort to -arious

insurgent O terrorist grou"s o"erating in and around India.

Im#ro2e" Reltions 6ith Sttes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siachen_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Pakistani_coup_d'%C3%A9tathttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Waziristanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siachen_conflicthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Pakistani_coup_d'%C3%A9tathttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Waziristanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_conflict


27/37

61. hina has #een on a dri-e to im"ro-e its relations $ith all nations in the region

as it has #een alread' #rought out .his has increased the "otential markets *or sale

60

o* hinese arms #oth co-ertl' and o-ertl'. +he ado"tion o* Pakistan as an all

$eather alle' has *urther com"licated the securit' situation in the region.it thus can

#e #elie-ed that the militar' aid and "roli*eration o* hinese hard$are in the region

is thus #e'ond the economical interest o* hina and is an attem"t to counter#alance

an emerging India.

E&onomi& Enggements

62. +here has #een a stead' rise in the economic in-ol-ement o* nations in the

region. Some o* the as"ects o* #ilateral trade are as underG

(a) hina:s non*inancial in-estment in India as on 3ec 201! stands at 5S 2!6

million $hereas the Indian In-estment in hina is a""ro&imatel' 5S 0./!

#illion.


28/37

(#) +he #ilateral trade #et$een India and Pakistan has im"ro-ed to 2.

#illion in as against 1.6 #illion in 201112 and 2.6 #illion in 201011.

61

(c) IndoSri 9ankan trade rose 12


29/37

"osed #' su#strate militant e&tremism has risen in reaction to #oth the *orce o* u"

gradation *ollo$ed #' man' states as $ell as the "olitical in*luence o* radical

Islam. +his rise in nonstate actors too has "ro-ided a *ertile market *or second grade

hinese $ea"ons and a cost e**ecti-e method to tie do$n a large arm'.

62

S0mmr%

6/. +he -arious anal'ses can #e summari@ed as underG

(a) +he "roli*eration o* militar' hard$are has increased the militar' ca"a#ilit' o*

states in the south Asian region. 7o$e-er, third *ourth generation technolog'

and dual use technolog' are still restricted.

(#) +he "roli*eration o* arms has #een selecti-e and *ocus has #een along theIndian neigh#orhood.(c) Pakistan has #een ele-ated to an all$eather alle' amongst all other nations and

enjo's s"ecial "ri-ilege in terms o* accesses to modern hard$are, technologies

and nuclear science.(d) Along $ith the state actors there has #e a e&"losion o* -arious nonstate actors

$ho also enjo' hinese hard$are *or -arious o"erations.(e) As against the common #elie* emanating *rom arms "roli*eration, no major $ars

ha-e #een *ought es"eciall' "ost 1


30/37

(*) hina has im"ro-ed its relationshi" $ith most o* the regional states, "ro-iding

66

aids in terms o* material , $ea"ons trade.(g) +here has #een tremendous gro$th in #ilateral trade and all states to a "oint are

interde"endent on the other states.(h) ;ilitar' gro$th es"eciall' #et$een India, hina Pakistan has #een note$orth'

and reasons *or these nations to mo-e to$ards an arms race cannot #e ruled

out. +his also has led to higher deterrence le-els in the region.


31/37

CHAPTER 7

IMPLICATION FOR INDIA AND 6A5 AHEAD

6. hina:s chie* clients o* militar' hard$are in the "ast ha-e #een Iran,

;'anmar, and Pakistan. +his is likel' to remain true *or the "redicta#le *uture as $ell.

Although these countries are su**ering *rom economic stagnation and are not likel' to

intensi*' arms "urchases dramaticall', increase in armor' cannot #e ruled out

com"letel'. hina ma' continue its assistance to Pakistan:s nuclear $ea"ons

"rogram #ut is unlikel' to directl' assist the nuclear $ea"ons "rograms o* an' other

state. It ma' do so indirectl' #' "ro-iding aid to ci-ilian research and nuclear "o$er

"rograms. +he missile technolog' that hina has trans*erred to Pakistan is another

serious concern. +he ;series o* missiles re"resent a Nualitati-e im"ro-ement o-er

the Scud missiles common in in-entories o* other countries in the region.

6. ertain signi*icant *indings a#out hina:s arms "roli*eration can #e dra$n out..

+he claim that hina:s arms trans*ers are moti-ated "rimaril' #' the desire to

generate e&"ort earnings is incorrect. In *act, -irtuall' all o* hina:s arms trans*ers

are at least "artiall' dri-en #' *oreign "olic' concerns and returns *rom arms sales


32/37

6/

are o* less im"ortance to Beijing. urther, hina:s central go-ernment has a major

role in arms e&"ort. hina:s $ea"ons e&"ort s'stem is in *act Nuite centrali@ed, $ith

the most com"le& trans*ers o* com"rehensi-e s'stems reNuiring the a""ro-al o*

a mem#er o* the entral ;ilitar' ommission. Also, hina:s adherence to

international non"roli*eration standards is in *act increasing. hina has joined se-eral

international non"roli*eration regimes since 12, including the >onProli*eration

+reat', hemical 8ea"ons on-ention, and angger ommittee. hina is likel' to

remain resistant to the idea o* re*raining *rom trans*ers o* certain t'"es and some

transactions $ill ine-ita#l' occur.

Im#li&tions

6


33/37

(c) +he -arious alliances #et$een nations $ill change the *orce #alance during

$ar $hich $ill a**ect all doctrines and method o* $ar *ighting.(d) +he threat *rom terrorist out*its $ith s"eci*ic re*erence to their access to

$ea"ons as $ell as the Nuestiona#le securit' o* nuclear $ea"ons $ith

countries like Pakistan can mani*est in a scenario o* intelligence -acuum. +his

$ould entail least reaction time and an alltime readiness state *or o$n *orces.(e) +he counter#alancing *orce o* economic integration $ith all regional "la'ers

through -arious *orums $ould entail interde"endence and #etter sta#ilit' in

the region.

6% Ahe"

6. +here is certainl' a need to "roacti-el' engage the increasing threat *rom

arms "roli*eration $hich has increased the threat "erce"tion *or India. +he *ollo$ing

measures ma' #e taken G

(a) N0&ler Proli/ertion. +he *ocus should #e to "re-ent "roli*eration o*

>B and missile s'stems, "articularl' technolog' trans*er to an' other

nation.(#) Glo$l Allin&es. Alliances *or contingenc' situations need to #e

6

*orged. +his $ould ser-e as a major deterrence and con*idence #uilding

measure in th south Asian region.(c) Militr% Deterren&e . 3eterrence remains onl' u" to a "oint o* a#solute

su"remac'. Situation can ra"idl' change $ith the ad-ent and a-aila#ilit' o*


34/37

ne$er technologies. +here is thus a need to constantl' u"grade on militar'

"o$er.(d) Intelligen&e. +errorism is the onl' threat that could mani*est $ith @ero

$arning. 7ence there is a need to moderni@e our intelligence gathering

s'stem.(e) Se&0rit% in"e8. Although it has led to #etter securit' inde& o* the south

Asian region, there e&ist the threats *rom nonstate actors $hich remain an

intangi#le *actor. 7ence "roli*eration ma' ha-e in *act increased the securit'

threat *rom terrorists.

6<

Con&l0sion

!0. hina:s arms sales $ill make the o-erall *uture securit' en-ironment more

dangerous. Although Beijing:s #eha-ior is im"ro-ing, continued "ressure is

necessar' to minimi@e hina:s most dangerous sales o* arms. Particularl' those to

rogue regimes. hina has #een, and can #e, in*luenced #' 5.S. "ressure, although

some le-el o* sales is likel' to continue. +hus, india must hedge against the

likelihood o* sales, de-elo"ing o**sets in concert $ith allies to minimi@e danger as

also e-ol-e res"onse mechanisms *or ra"id reaction *or un con-entional threats.


35/37

,I,LOGRAPH5

1.2.

6. SIPRI +rends in International Arms +rans*ers, 201!!. SIPRI Polic' Pa"er 6< Ecto#er 2016 7I>A:S =FPER+S E S;A99 AR;S

A>3 9I7+ 8=APE>S G ;ark Bromle', ;athieu 3uchHtel And Paul 7oltom/. SIPRI Polic' Pa"er 6< Ecto#er 2016 7I>A:S =FPER+S E S;A99 AR;S

A>3 9I7+ 8=APE>S G ;ark Bromle', ;athieu 3uchHtel And Paul 7oltom "g

1/. 5nco-ering hina%s 7idden Agenda on >uclear Proli*eration D IS> =+7 urich.

. ar' ;ilhollin, testimon' #e*ore the Senate Intelligence ommittee, Se"tem#er

1


36/37

e"al. 3r Satish ?umar, Assistant "ro*essor

;;7 college ;eerut.

1.SIPRI arms trans*er data#ase.$$$.si"ri.orgOarmstrae

1


37/37

20.3r Moth' Bhattacharia D institute o* hineese Studies 201!.21.>a@mul Ashra*, K3haka Beijing deal no threat to India,L ul* >e$s, 3ecem#er 2,

200222.hina and its Peri"heries Beijing and IndiaSri 9anka Relations (IPS Issue #rie*

, > ;anoharan)61 Aug 1/.

main bibilography

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