l,teaning l{ithout Intention:L€ssons frorn Divination

John W. Du Bois

1 Speech Act Theory and Ritual Speech

To speak o f respons ib i l i t y necessar i l y b r ings ou t , i fonly indirect ly and covert ly , our concept ions of the natureo f ac t i on and o f ac to r - - as we I I as o f ce r ta in .aux i l i a ryno t ions , wh ich fo r rnany w i l l i nc lude in ten t ion . r Thus , anactor wi l l be judged responsible or not responsible for anac t ion , depend ing , pe rhaps , on h i s o r he r i n ten t ion . Inthe domain of speech, the theory which puts i tsel f forwardin th is connect ion is that of speech acts, as developed inthe we l - I - known work o f Aus t in (L962) , Sear le (1959) , andothers. From the outset many scholars saw in th is theoryan opportuni ty to shi f t at tent ion f rom language as anabstract system or descr ipt ive device toward speaking as anac t ion in the soc ia l wor1d , an ac t ion fo r wh ich an ac to r( the speaker) was responsible. Given commonplaceconcept ions of act ion and responsibi l i ty , i t is notsurpr is ing that soon enough the not ion of the actorrsintent ion had taken up a prominent p lace in the theory.fn ten t i -on , though i t appears i nc iden ta l l y i n Aus t in rs work ,f i rs t took on i ts cr i t ical ro le in speech act theorythrough the work of Gr ice (1957) as adapted and developedb y S t r a w s o n ( L 9 6 4 ) a n d S e a r l e ( 1 9 6 9 ) .

Among the many who began to rnake inrnediate applicationof the new performat ive theory, students of r i tuaL wereespec ia l . l y keen . Th is i s no acc iden t , pe rhaps , g i ven tha tthe f i rs t two ut terances which Aust in selected toi l lustrate h is theory were drawn from the r i tuals ofmar r iage and sh ip -ch r i s ten ing (Aus t in 1 -962 :5 ) . One rn igh thave thought that speech act theory had been developed withthe theoret ical needs of ethnographers of r i tual speakingin mind, to judge by their ready adopt ion of i t . Tanbiahinvoked Aus t in rs ca tegor ies to conc lude tha t

r i t ua l ac ts and nag ica l r i t es a re o f ther i l l ocu t ionary r o r rpe r fo rmat i ve t so r t , wh ich s i rnp lyby v i r tue of being enacted (under the appropr iatecondi t ions) achieve a change of state, or do somethingre f fec t i ve (e .9 . an ins ta l l a t i on ce remony undergone byt h e c a n d i d a t e m a k e s h i m a r c h i e f r ) . ( T a n b i a h I 9 7 3 2 2 2 L )

fPrA Papers in Pragmatics 1, No.2 (L987), 8O-I22

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Studies of r i tual speech (or of r i tual in general) whichrdere inf luenced by speech act theory inc lude those ofF i n n e g a n ( 1 9 6 9 ) , R a v e n h i l l ( L 9 7 2 ) , T a n b i a h ( 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 8 1 ) ,F o s t e r ( L 9 7 4 ) , R a p p a p o r t ( L 9 7 4 , L 9 7 6 ) , M a r t i n i c h ( L 9 7 5 ) ,c i l l ( L 9 7 7 ) , W i t h e r s p o o n ( L 9 7 7 : 3 4 ) , A h e r n ( L 9 7 9 ) , I s a m b e r t( 1 9 7 9 ) , W h e e l o c k ( L 9 8 2 ) , a n d A u n e ( n . d . ) , a m o n g o t h e r s .

But the extent to which the fuI I d inensions of speechact theory were drawn on, or even taken account of , var iedconsiderably. Some scholars, in making use of the impl ic i tI icense provided by the theory to e laborate l is ts ortaxonornies of indigenously Iabeled (or unlabeled) speechacts, e i ther lef t the rest of the standard Sear lean speechact theory i rnpl ic i t in their appl icat ion of i t , orperfunctor i ly repeated those elements which they saw nore.ason not to endorse. Among the foundational assumptionsof Sear le 's theory which solnet imes came into p lay by th isroute was that of intention, the intention which wassupposed necessary to undergird the speech act -- and nowthe r i tual act . For exarnple, Wheelock concludes thatritual speech acts are rrthose speech acts whose intentionis to create and al low the part ic ipat ion in a known andrepea tab le s i tua t ion r ' (Whee lock l -982 :59 t i t a l i c i za t i onreversed). In th is as in many such cases of the invocat ionof speech act theory, the use of the word rr intent ionrr seemsalmost inc idental . Of ten enough i t could easi ly have beenfactored out through a paraphrase (for example bysubst i tut ing the word ' r funct ionrr) wi thout los ing whateverreal ins ights had been gained in the appl icat ion of speechact theory. Nevertheless, even when intent ion was notexpl ic i t ly nent ioned, i t was of ten i rnpl ic i t in the re l ianceon the concept of the responsi .b le speech actor , a ro lewhich is natural ly hard to avoid i f one is using speech acttheory.

fn the present paper I wi l l chal lenge the v iew thatintent ion is a cr i ter ion of meaningful language use. Whi lethe t radi t ional appeal to the intent ions of a responsiblespeech actor may seem reasonable or at least harmless, Iwi I I suggest that i t actual ly l imi ts our understanding ofIanguage use. Not only is i t incorrect to set upintent ional i ty as a cr i ter ion of l inguist ic communicat ionor of meaningful language use -- pace Gr ice, Sear le, andothers - - but in certa in types of language use, I wi l lpropose, the point is precisely to create meaning wi thoutintent ion. Producing neaning independent ly of theintent ions of a responsible speech actor is actual ly thenot ivat inq goal of much of t radi t ional r i tual procedure,

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including r i tual speech. There are speci f ic semiot icmechanisms which make intent ionless meaning at ta inable, andthese are especia l ly prominent and weII developed in r i tualspeech va r ie t i es . Fo r th i s reason , the p resen t c r i t i que o fintent ional i ty wi l l focus on the cateqory of r i tual speech,espec ia l l y as emp loyed in r i t ua l s o f d i v ina t ion int rad i t i ona l soc ie t i es . The cho ice o f a re la t i ve l yfo rma l i zed speech ca tegory i s s ign i f i can t , s ince i t sd i s t i nc t i ve fo rma l p roper t i es and spec ia l i zed cond i t i ons o fp roduc t ion cons t i t u te , I w i l l p ropose , c ruc ia l componen tso f the semio t i c mechan ism fo r i n ten t ion less mean ing .

In the fo l l ow ing sec t ion I w i l l ou t l i ne b r ie f l y theplace of intent ion in the exist ing theory of speech acts(Sec t ion 2 ) . I t hen recap i tu la te a po ten t c r i t i gue tha thas al ready been launched against intent ional i ty , which canbe te rmed the an t i -pe rsona l i s t c r i t i que (Sec t ion 3 ) .Fol lowing a look at how intent ions have fared in l i terarytheory (Sec t ion 4 ) , I examine one scho la r ' s c la im fo rin ten t iona l i t y i n r i t ua l speech (Sec t ion 5 ) . I t hen takeup several case studies of the use of language ind iv ina t ion (Sec t ion 5 ) . Based on these s tud ies , I t henexamine the phenomenon of apersonal i ty , through whichmeanings produced are regarded as lacking a personalor ig in, and as not depending on a responsible speech actor(Sec t ion 7 ) . I t hen cons ide r the soc ia l f unc t ion o fi n ten t ion less mean ing (Sec t ion 8 ) . F ina l l y , I t ake ano the rIook at the inpl icat ions of the div inatory mode of meaningproduct ion for intent ional i ty and speech act theory( S e c t i o n s ) .

2 Intention as the Basis of Ling:uistic lleaning

The speaker rs vo l i t i on , o r someth ing l i ke i t , has beenaround for a long t ime as an ingredient of l inguist icmeaning. Sapir used the involuntar iness of inart iculatecr ies (as of pain or surpr ise) to exclude thern f rom thedomain of language, put t ing thern on a par wi th c louds aspor ten ts o f ra in (Sap i r 1 -921- :5 ) . I n ten t ion took on i t scurrent centra l ro le for meaning in the theory ofI tneaning-nnr ' ( r rnon-natural rneaningrr) put forward by Gr ice( L 9 5 7 ) ( s e e a l s o G r i c e L 9 5 8 , L 9 6 9 , W e t t e r s t r b n 1 9 7 7 ) . I f aspeaker A produces an ut terance x, according to Gr ice, t t tA

meant-nn something by xt is ( roughly) equivalent to rA

intended the ut terance of x to produce some ef fect in anaud ience by means o f a recoqn i t i on o f th i s i n ten t ion ' r l(L9572442) . Even the mean ing o f exp ress ions (as opposed to

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utterances of them) is thought to be grounded somehow inintent ions, though here Gr ice evinces some doubts. r r rx

rneant something' is ( roughly) equivalent to rSomebody

mean t -nn someth i -ng by X" t (L957 ' .442) . Even in the case o fa red t ra f f i c l i gh t i nd i ca t ing tha t t ra f f i c shou ld s top ,Gr ice says tentat ively, r r there seems to be some sort ofre fe rence to somebody ts i n ten t ions " (L957 :442) .

Sear le, though he made i rnportant modi f icat ions toGricers r rmeaning-nnrr theory, cont inued to g ive centra ls ta tus to i n ten t ions (c f . Sear le 1983) . Upon pos ing thequest ion, r rWhat is the di f ference between regarding anobject as an instance of l inguist ic cornnunicat ion and notso regarding i t?r f , Sear le observed that

When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper tobe an instance of l inguist ic communicat ion, as amessage, one of the th ings f must assume is that thenoise or mark was produced by a being or beings moreor less l ike rnysel f and produced wi th certa in k inds ofintent ions. I f f regard the noise or a rnark as anatural phenomenon like the wind in the trees or astain on the paper, I exclude i t f rom the c lass ofI inguist ic communicat ion, even though the noise ormark may be indistinguishable from spoken or writtenw o r d s . ( S e a r l e 1 9 6 9 : 1 6 - L 7 )

I t is instruct ive that Sear le should select , as achal lenging case, a d isenbodied and decontextual ized markor sound, cut of f f rom any obvious connect ion wi th anintending actor . But even here, according to Sear le, i f noactor is imnediately present we must postulate one, inorder to be able to interpret the phenomenon as aI inguist ic comrnunicat ion at a l l . Gr ice and Sear le are bothcommit ted to the v iew that l inguist ic communicat ion(e f fec t i ve l y , l i ngu is t i c mean ing in use ) i s a lways pa r t o fan act , so that the disernbodied word (or proposi t ion) doesnot in i tsel f mean, in the sense of comrnunicat ing.zAccording to Sear le, r fThe uni t of I ing"uist ic communicat ionis not , as has general ly been supposed, the symbol , word,or sentence, but rather the product ion or issuance of thesymboJ- or word or sentence in the performance of the speechac t ' r (1969 :16 ) . Th is s ta temen t , couched as i t i s i n te r rnsof r r l inguist ic cornmunicat ionrr , is sornewhat d i f f icul t tochal lenge in i ts own terms, because of the presupposi t ionswhich r ide along wi th the word rrcommunicat ionrr , g iven i tsder ivat ion f rorn the act ive verb rrcommunicater t . But we wi l lhave reason to quest ion i ts adeguacy for the more general

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theory of language in use. Whi le many would assume that atheory of language use is equivalent to a theory ofl inguist ic communicat ion, we wi l l be looking into somephenomena which suggest that th is assumpt ion isunwarranted. Given the usual assurnpt ions which accompanythe word, communicat ion presupposes communicators.However , on ce r ta in k inds o f occas ions in soc ia l l i f e ,l i ngu is t i c ma te r ia l s rnay be r rusedr r w i thou t necessar i l yconst i tut ing speech act ions, and wi thout necessar i ly beingthe products of responsible speech actors. Thesigni f icance of a category of language use which is notl i ngu is t i c commun ica t ion w i l l be deve loped be low.

I t is wel l to recal l that Gr ice f rom the outset d idaLlow for one k ind of meaning wi thout intent ion, namelyr rna tu ra l " mean ing . The Eng l i sh word r rmeans t r can be used insentences l ike rrThose spots rneant measlesrr , where aninterpreter can observe the fact that someone has spots,and draw signi f icant conclusions. Yet of course there isno quest ion of invoking intent ional i ty here; thus, the verbrr to meanrr is predicable of subjects qui te incapable ofintending anything. Though Grice guickly enough set asidesuch cases as not const i tut ing rrmeaning-nnt t , we may wonderwhether the polysemy of the Engl ish verb rr to meanrr shouldaler t us to some signi f icant commonal i ty . Thatdiscr iminable rrs ignalsrr as t r foundrr phenomena in nature orcuLture should be said to mean something is perhaps notw i thou t s ign i f i cance .

I t is worth rnark ing at the outset the dist inct ionbetween two k inds or levels of semant ic phenomena that goby the name frmeaningrr . L inguists in the t radi t ional moldwere usua l l y sa t i s f i ed to cons ide r mean ing as fu l l yencompassed wi th in the domain of the language system( lanque) , t ha t i s , i n d i c t i ona ry mean ing and p ropos i t i ona l(system-sentence) rneaning. But wi th increasing a$rarenessof pragrnat ic issues in the last several decades,addj- t ional levels of meaning have been recognized aspresent in pragrnat ical ly grounded language use -- inc ludingwha t has been ca l l ed r r speaker rs mean ing r r . I t shou ld beobvious that i f the sense of I 'meaningrt is restr ic ted to thel-anguage system, there exists no substant ive issueregarding rrmeaning wi thout intent ion ' r - - s ince intent ionwas never in the f i rs t p lace posi ted as a component of thelanguage system per se. OnIy in the donain of Ianquage usehas intent ion ever been at issue, and only here does theposs ib i l i t y o f i n ten t ion less mean ing become in te res t ing .

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It is of course wi th in th is lat ter realrn of meaning thatthe issue is pursued here.

3 The Anti-Personalist Critique

Al though the at t ract ive perforrnat ive theory ( Iaterspeech act theory) was soon widely ernbraced, i t was notIong before qualrns about i ts Trojan horse aspects began toar ise. Anthropological l inguists (and their acrost ics ib l ings the l inguist ic anthropologists) began to guest ionwhether the posi ted f rarnework of speech act types and ro leswas intr ins ic to human speech, and whether i t wasapp l i cab le un ive rsa l l y to eve ry cu l tu re . S i l ve rs te inargued that even the ro le of r rspeakerrr , being indexical lyc rea ted by the ins tance o f speak ing (e .9 . o f t he word " I , ' ) ,partakes of a r r theory of the types of ro les in types ofeven ts soc ia l l y recogn ized in a soc ie ty " (L977242) , atheory necessar i ly belonging to socia l anthropology.Rosaldo, who apt ly qual i f ied speech act theory as . rat onceny insp i ra t i on and my bu t t r r (L982 :2O3) , emphas ized tha tboth the taxonomy of speech acts and the socia l pr incip lesunder ly ing them must be subject to open-end.ed ethnographicinvest igat ion in each new cul ture. Where Sear le took theperformat ive verbs of Engl ish to be guides to "sornethingl i ke a un ive rsa l l awr r (Rosa ldo L982 :229) , i n fac t acul turers assumpt ions about how language works are l ikelyto ref lect local fo lk theor ies of human agency andpersonhood (Rosa ldo L98222O3, S i l ve rs te in 1979) .

Students of Austronesian languages have beenespec ia l l y c r i t i ca l o f t he in f l uence o f pe rsona l i s ttheor ies of act ion on theor ies of language use. Accordingto Rosaldo, Western l inguist ic phi losophy overemphasizesthe psychological state of the speaker, whi le g iv inginadegua te a t ten t ion to the soc ia l sphere (L9gZz2Z7-8 ) .Acguaintance wi th other cul tures can counter th ispa roch ia l i s rn . The I l ongo ts o f t he Ph i l l i p ines ' r l ack rou r rinterest in considerat ions l ike s incer i ty and t ruth; theirl ives l -ead them to concentrate, instead, on socia l bondsand in te rac t i ve mean ings ' r (Rosa ldo 1982 2222 ; c f . a l so B rown1 9 8 4 : 5 5 6 , f n . 8 ) . D u r a n t i s a y s o f S a m o a n s t h a t t h e yrrpract ice interpretat ion as a way of publ ic ly contro l l ingsocia l re lat ionships rather than as a way of f igur ing outwha t a g i ven pe rson tmean t to say t r r . Samoan in te rp re ta t i oni s a coopera t i ve , i f h ie ra rch ica l , ach ievement (Duran t iL98422) . Espec ia l l y i n fo rma l d i scourse l i ke tha t used inoratory and r i tual , responsibi l i ty for speech may refer

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to a genera l i zed ro le ra the r( c f . I r v i n e l - 9 7 9 ) .

than an indiv idual personal i ty

According to Rosaldo, speech act theor ists take speechacts to be accompl ishments of autonomous selves, whoseac t ions a re re la t i ve l y uncons t ra ined by the i r soc ia lreLa t ionsh ips . Speech ac t theory fa i l s i nso fa r as r r i t

construes act ion independent of i ts ref lex ive status bothas consequence and cause of human socia l formstr (Rosaldo1982 :204) . Duran t i , add ress ing p r ina r i l y the re la t i ve l yfornal oratory of the Samoan fono meet ing, st resses thatthe Western ideology of meaning based on the intent ions ofan autonomous actor is not matched among the Samoans: rrthe

Samoan ideology and pract ice of doing th ings wi th wordscannot be explained on the basis of the not ion oft intent ional meaning I r r (1984:2) . Instead, conseqluences are

what matters: the Samoan speaker has to deal wi th thecircumstances that h is words br ing about. The Samoanspeaker ' rcannot h ide behind his a l leged intent ions. InS a m o a n , o n e c a n n o t s a y t I d i d n r t n e a n i t f i l ( l - 9 8 4 : 3 ) .

Western and Samoan ideologies of meaning are fur thercontrasted in the character of their caregiver-chi ldinteract ions, as ochsr research shows. When a young chi ldhas said something uninte l l ig ib le, American whi te n iddleclass caregivers express a guess at what rneaning the chi ldintendedi Samoan caregivers nornal ly do not . The Americancaregivers I l inguist ic interact ions conform to r ra cul turaltheory of cornmunicat ion in which speakersr personalintent ions are cr i t ical to the interpretat ion of anut terance or act ionrr - - a fo lk theory which grounds theph i losoph ica l t heo r ies e labora ted by Sear le , Gr i ce , andothers. Again, Ochs concludes that

The ernphasis on personal intent ions in Anglo societyand scholarship is t ied to a cul tural ideology inwh ich pe rsons a re v iewed as ind iv idua ls , i . e . coheren tpersonal i t ies, who have contro l over and areresponsible for their ut terances and act ions (OchsL 9 8 4 : 3 3 8 )

Th is i nd i v idua l i z ing o r pe rsona l i s t v iew o f speak ing andm e a n i n g , d e c r i e d b y V o l o s h i n o v ( 1 9 3 0 ) , H o l q u i s t ( 1 9 8 3 ) , a n dothers, appears deeply ingrained in t radi t ional speech acttheory, so that i t is not a t r iv ia l problem for the theoryto accornmodate non-personal is t language use, should such amove be at tempted.

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The ant i -personal is t cr i t igue, as persuasively mountedby Durant i , ochs, Rosaldo, and others, dernonstrates thecul ture-boundness of the intent ional i ty cr i ter ion throughspeci f ic ethnoqraphic evidence. Since intent ion counts asa genuine factor of interpret ive procedure in some cul turesmore than in others, intent ional i ty-dependent theor ies arenot equal ly adeguate to aI I cul tures. Whi le a theory whichelucidates a s ingle cul ture (e.9. whi te rn iddle-c lassAnglo-American) is certa in ly something of value, c lear ly amore general theory of meaning in language use cannot h i tchi ts wagon to the intent ions of autonomous actors.

4 Intention in Literature?

l , lh i l -e the focus of th is paper is on oral d iscourse, i twi I I be useful to look at what has been said aboutintent ional i ty in wr i t ten discourse, s ince l i teraryschoLars have long exper ience of the di f f icul t iessurrounding th is matter . In their ef for ts to provide ageneral f rarnework for the interpretat ion and cr i t ic ism ofworks of l i terature, some l i terary scholars haveenterta ined v iews of the book as an object iv ized ent i ty .This ra ises the quest ion of whether and in what sensein ten t ions ( i . e . au tho r ia l ) nay l i e beh ind the work , aproblem which has remained consistent ly controvers ia l inI i terary theory.

Some l i terary theor ists have concerned themselvesgreat ly wi th what the author r r intendedtr in wr i t ing aparticular poem or novel , or with what the author rrmeantrrwhi le others have sharply chal lenged the usefulness tocr i t ic ism and interpretat ion of th is l ine of inquiry. Intheir famous thesis at tacking the rr intent ional fa l lacyr t ,Wimsatt and Beardsley argued that cr i t ical judg:ment= 6t ' .l i terary work cannot proper ly be based on the authorrsintent ion, s ince [ the meaning of a work resides wi th in thework; no judgment of intent ion has re levancy unlesscorroborated by the work i tsel f , in which case i t issupere roga to ry t r (Beards ley and Winsa t t 1942 [1953) :232 ; c f .W insa t t and Beards ley L946) . S ta I lman concurs , re i te ra t i ngthe object ive character of the l i terary work: i lonce thework is produced, i t possesses object ive status -- i tex ists independent ly of the author and of h is declaredin ten t ion ' r (S ta l lman 1 -97 4 : 399 ) .

But the idea that the rneaning of a l i terary robjectr lmust be referred to the personal ef f icacy of an author, who

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in ef fect p lays the ro le of a sort of speech actor , doesnot d ie easi ly , and has never real ly d isappeared f rom thetheoret ical scene. Hirsch chal lenges Wirnsat t andBeardsley 's cr i t igue of intent ion by invoking, somewhatincongruously, Saussurers d ist inct ion between langue andparole (as though th is l /ere sornehow given as an exhaust iveand universal ly appl icable taxonomy of semiot icon to log ies ) . Accord ing to H i rsch , r r s ince on ly i nd i v idua lsut ter paroles, a parole of the speech comrnuni ty is anonexistent , or what the Germans cal l an Unding. " Hirschinsists that l rA text can represent only the parole of aspeaker or author, which is another vray of saying thatmean ing requ i res a meaner " (H i r sch 1960 [197L ] :1189) . Morerecent ly, the debate has been rekindled wi th Knapp andMichae ls ' c la im, i n te r rns echo ing Sear le rs , t ha t fo r asentence to be recognizable as a sentence rrwe must a l readyhave posi ted a speaker and hence an intent ionrr (Knapp andMichaels 19822726). Language wi thout intent ion is notreal ly language at a l l , but only resembles i t . Hirschhimsel f set as a key task of l i terary interpretat ion rr the

imaginat ive reconstruct ion of the speaking subject t r (Hirsch1950 lL97L l :1 -1 -93 ) , bu t cau t ioned tha t th i s r r speak ing

subject" was not equivalent to the histor ical person of theauthor, but rather represented just that part of the authorwhich def ined the verbal neaning of the work. L ikewise,some scholars who have endorsed the cr i ter ion of intent ionnevertheless stress that it is not to be equated with I 'thepr ior psychological state of a deceased authorrr (Dowl ing1983 :788) , bu t w i th wha t i s fo rma l l y de f ined by andrecognized in the work, as a sort of abstracted intent ionat tached to the abstracted ro le of speaker or author. (Seea lso Foucau l t on the r rau tho r - func t ion r t , 1977r 125 . )Fonnal is t I i terary theor ies can accomnodate th is i f theyreconceive the literary work in dramatic terms ascontain ing i ts own rr intefnal speakerrr , r t in ternal audiencer le t c . ( n o w l i n g 1 9 8 3 : 7 8 8 ) . 3 R i c o e u r a t t a c h e d g r e a timportance to the "d issociat ion of the verbal meaning ofthe text and the mental intent ion" of the author (RicoeurL97 I2534) , bu t rna in ta ined tha t th i s d i ssoc ia t i on wasl im i ted to wr i t i ng , wh ich was ob jec t i f i ed i n ways tha tspeech was not . Olson, amongt the few to recognize theimportance of the funct ion of textual author i ty ( in thesense o f va l - i da t ion ) , ma in ta ins tha t wr i t i ng , i nso fa r as i tt tprovides a means of separat ing a speaker/wr i ter f romI text I r r , tends to encourage rr the di f ferent iat ion ofintent ion (what was meant) f rom the expression (what wassaid) and an emphasis on the lat ter f r . Nevertheless, hes t i l l wan ts to ho ld on to the au tho r ' s i n ten t iona l i t y ,

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observing of school textbooks that they are rrattempts toconstruct staternents in which the literal rneaning is anadequate ref lect ion of the speakerfs intent ionrr (Olson1"980 :190) . Th is equ iva lence o f l i t e ra l mean ing andintent ion is supposed to contr ibute to their constancy ofmeaning across contexts. Again, intent ional i ty is reta inedalmost as a matter of course, whi le the potent ia l int r ins icfunct ion of intent ionless rneaning per se is over looked-

we may ask where the literary debate fits into theschema of speech act theory (cf . Ohmann L97L, Prat t L977,198L , e tc . ) . Some app l i ca t i ons o f speech ac t theory tol i terature have paral le led those di rected toward r i tualspeech in their e laborat ion of new types of i l locut ionaryacts, whi le leaving many of the basic assumpt ions of thetheory intact . A specia l domain of l i terary i l locut ion isposi ted, wi th in which cateqor ies of l i terary i l locut ionaryacts (perhaps paral le l ing t radi t ional genre dist inct ions)are dist inguished. Sear le has responded to such at ternptswi th skept ic ism, consider ing and re ject ing the v iew that arrwr i ter of novels is not performing the i l locut ionary actof making an assert i -on but the i l locut ionary act of te l l inga s to ry o r wr i t i ng a nove l r r (Sear le L979 :63 ) . Ra the r thancountenance a whole new domain of l i terary i l locut ion,Sear le invokes a not ion of pretended act , a status whichcan apply to the ordinary establ ished l is t of speech acts.He concludes that r r the author of a work of f ic t ion pretendsto perform a ser ies of i l locut ionary acts, normal ly of theasser t i ve t ype ' r (Sear le L979 :65 i c f . a l so Ohmann t -9Z l_ ) . I fwe work our hray back from the literary text to therrpretendrr i l locut ionary acts which br ing i t in to existence,perhaps we shoul-d expect that their performer would. be asort of r rpretendrr speech actor , that is , the author who isimpl ic i t ly reconstruct ib le in the i l locut ionary acts as(pretendingly) performed. Though sear le does not draw th isconclusion, the resurt ing abstract rore wourd not be unl ikeH i rsch rs speak ing sub jec t , Dow l ing ' s j . n te rna l_ au tho r , o rthe French discourse schorarsr author- funct ion or suiet deI r6nonc ia t i on . In any case , Sear le i s no t ready to g i ve upany of the standard components of the speech act model asi t s tands, but only a l lows for two statuses of acts, realand pretended. Meaning in l i terary works st i l l der ivesfrom speech acts performed by speech actors, i f only in anake-be l i eve wor ld .a

Li terary scholars as wel l as l inguists andphi losophers have returned again and again, consciously ornot , to the dictum fonnulatea Uy Hirsci : ,meaning t"qrr i . "=

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a meanerrr . Though l i terary scholars have been among thef i rst to recognize that intent ional i ty is an issue to bedebated rather than accepted wi thout quest ion, much of th iscr i t ical debate has been animated, in the end, by thepract ical considerat ion of whether i t is cr icket or not forthe crit ic to go rummaging about in the psyche of theauthor (whether a real or abstract one) in order to makeinterpretat ions. This emphasis is not so useful to therest of us who are concerned wi th interpretat ion andmeaning. I t tends to obscure a more fundamental butJ-argely ignored quest ion, whose s igni f icance dwarfs that ofthe usual terms of the intent ional i ty debate. I f we stopassuming that we are deal ing wi th a contrast of twoacademic posi t ions, one or the other of which must go downin defeat , we may come to recognize that we are in factfacinq a contrast of two actual phenornena. I f i t shouldturn out that there exists both rneaning with intention andmeaning wi thout intent ion, we can star t to ask: why twosuch contrasting types of neaning?

Below I hope to suggest why meaning without intentionexists, and to make c lear that i t is nei ther an anomaly nora given. I t cer ta in ly is not something to be incur iouslyaccepted as a fact of semiot ic l i fe; rather, i t representsa specia l type of language use that is act ively promotedfor its own sake, due to the unique sociocultural functionstha t i t a lone can fu l f i l l .

5 Intention in Ritual Speech?

Turning to r i tual speech, we must ask: Is i tin tent ional? I ronical ly , whi le r i tual ut terances of acerta in type (marry ing, chr istening) have been favor i teperformative exarnples among speech act theorists, it isprecisely in th is domain that a few anthropologists andsociocul tural l inguists, even those most sympathet ic tospeech act theory, have begun to guestion the speech acttheor i s t ' s re l i ance on in ten t iona l i t y . I n [ t rance

speak ing r r , as Becker (L979 ' .232 f ) has po in ted ou t , t heut terer of the shi f ter pronoun I is r rspeaking involuntar i lyor nonintent ional lyrr - - and thus, paradoxical ly , in anothersense is not r rspeaking' r , i f we understand by th is act ing asa responsible speech actor . In convent ional r i tuals l ikemarr iage, as Tambiah (L981-2L27) observed, the sacramentremains val id even i f one is being forced to rnarry forhavinq made oners partner pregnant, or i f the ceremony isperforrned by a drunken and irnmoral priest -- as long as

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appropr iate condi t ions such as the ordain ing of the pr iesthave been ne t ( c f . W ie rzb icka 1985 :500) . On a con t inuum o fbehavior types, formal ized r i tual would be c loser to theconvent ionaL end than to the intent ional end. Yet , whi leTarnbiah raises some questions about applying theintent ional i ty cr i ter ion to r i tual , he neverthel-essfundamental ly accepts the phi losophersr concept ion of theperformat ive act . He even toys wi th the possib i l i ty ofreta in ing intent ional i ty , through at t r ibut ing to the r i tualactors a set of convent ional ized and cul tural ly def inedintent ions. Appl icat ion of the word I ' in tent ionrr to suchconvent ional ized at t i tudes would seem to beg the guest ion,however. And the concept of speech act i tsel f , inpresupposing the speech actor , tends to invoke the nodel ofthe actor that is most ready to hand in Western thought:the individual as autonornous causer, the ttauthorrr of his orhe r own ac t ions .

6 The Lang'uage of Divination

Perhaps the most d i rect i l lustrat ion of how meaningcan exist in the absence of intent ion occurs in thelanguage o f d i v ina t ion . Th is i s espec ia l l y so inrnechanical d iv inat ion, as opposed to r rnental t r d iv inat ion,where the div iner may speak in lhe ro le of a medium, of tenin an insp i red o r t rance s ta te .s V iewed l i t e ra l l y ,d iv inat ion is a process for obtain ing inforrnat ion which is( typical ly) unavai lable by ordinary means, that is , whichcannot be gotten by the usual techniques of indigenouspract ical episternology, such as seeing, hear ing, being to ldby another person -- the cornmonplace categories ofev iden t ia l cod ing sys tems (Cha fe and N icho ls 198G) . V iewedin i ts socia l aspect , however, d iv inat ion is not so much ameans of obtain ing infonnat ion as a means of establ ishingsocia l facts, facts which command a consensus and can forrnthe basis for legi t i rnate, recogtnized socia l act ion.Nevertheless, the cr is is which leads to d iv inat iontypical ly presents i tsel f in episternological terms: ani l lness l ingers inexpl icably, game cannot be found, cropsfai l unaccountably, a venture is enter ta ined whose outcornej-s uncerta in. Ordinary evidence is unavai lable to supportp ropos i t i ons abou t the case , such as , nSo-and-so (o rsuch-and-such) is responsible for th is s i tuat ion. r ' In theabsence of such evidence, help is sought in secur ing (orsoc ia l l y es tab l i sh inq ) the fac ts o f t he s i tua t ion a t i ssue ,as wel l as in deterrn in ing what is to be done about i t inthe way of r i tual or other act . In mechanical d iv inat ion

9 2

the meanings arrived at are determined by something otherthan a vol i t ional , hunan act . Since the oracle cannot in ad i rec t sense voca l i ze , i t may be le f t t o the d i v ine r (o rthe pet i t ioner) to carry out the ut ter ing of the words.But which words are selected, and which meanings, are inpr incip le beyond the ut tererrs contro l . To show th is, Inov/ examine three cases of the use of language ind iv ina t ion .

6.1- Sixteen Cowrie Divination (Yoruba)

For the s ixteen cowrie d iv inat ion of the Yoruba ofNiger ia, a d iv iner shakes a f lat basket contain ing s ixteensmal l cowrie shel ls . The nurnber of shel ls that come outfac ing mou th up ( i . e . f rom ze ro to s i x teen) de f ines a namedf igure, which has several d iv inat ion verses associated wi thi t . These verses are then reci ted by the div iner insequence, unt i l the c l ient f inds the one that isappropr iate to h is case. (or , addi t ional cowrie throws canbe used to select fur ther among the verses.) For exarnple,i f s ix of the s ixteen cowries come face up, th is def inesthe f igure cal led Qbara, for which the f i rs t d iv inat ionverse would then be reci ted as fo l lows:

K ' A k 6 ' I C k o t 6 d r a j 6 ;K r A y r O d A d 6 r 1 6 d r o 1 6 ;K t A r r a s o t u n t u n r l A d r o m o A m 6 d t nD A f r O l O b A r AT i n l t o k o A l o r 0 o d 0 n .

N lb i t 'A gb6 dA AqbdqbA nOfAL | 6 r i - A te .

I rwe should bui ld a storehouse for money in advanceirWe should make a verandah for riches in advanceirWe should buy new clothes for next yearts chi ld inadvance I

Cast for ObaraWhen he was going to h is year-round farm.o r i sha says tha t he says , 'A b less ing o f money ;He says , rA b less ing o f ch i l d ren , I

Where we cast Six EldersO n t h e t r a y . r r ( B a s c o m l - 9 8 0 : 4 9 4 - 5 )

This verse cont inues for another 101 l ines, and there areeighteen more verses corresponding to the div inat ion resul t

9 J

of s ix cowries. A di f ferent number of cowries facing upwi l l select a d i f ferent set of d iv inat ion verses. Forexample, i f f ive cowries come face up, the f igure is cal ledOse, and the f i rs t verse begins

A s r e r i n i a r r i a g a d a ;A s ' a a a d a j a r r i e r i n ;A se tg i oko md wO okOD A f r O s 6T i f i l o to ro 'wA c rbogbo l r6wO O l6d0nar6 .

rr rThe i ron that wi l l spoi l the swordirThe sword that wi l l cut the i ron;'The t ree in the farm that can swim l ike a canoelCast for OsheWhen he was going to ask for a l l dest in ies f romOlodumare r r (Bascom l -980 : 388-9 )

The language ernployed for divinatory utterances isdist inct ive. The texts are reci ted in short verses, andcontain a l legedly archaic words and formulas, whosemeanings are in some cases unknown even to their reciter( in th is case, a d iv iner knowledgeable enough to reci te forBascom more than l -o,0oo l ines of d iv inat ion verse f ronmemory). The verses are of ten highly f iqurat ive,appear ing, to the outs ider at least , as opaquelymetaphor i ca l i n p laces : " the t ree . . . t ha t can sw im l i ke acanoerr . Some port ions are paral le l is t ic : r rWe should x a yfor z in advancert , i terated thr ice; " the p that wi l l /cangt t , thr ice; etc. The verses incorporate a great deal ofostentatiously marked quotation: rrOrisha says that he says. . . r r . These guo ta t i ons a re genera l l y asc r ibed to ny thf igures and dei t ies, or to d iv inat ions perforrned for theseindiv iduals in nyth t imes: r rCast for Oshe / When he wasgoing to ask for a l l dest in ies f rom Olodumarerf . Themythical instance of d iv inat ion acts as a t rprecedentrr forthe current d iv inat ion. As such, i t const i tutes a case ofspeech role doubling within a represented duplex speechevent, a phenomenon which I have described for ritualspeech e l sewhere (Du Bo is l -986 :32L) . A11 o f these fea tu resare such as to locate the or ig ins of the speech in adistant p lace and t i rne, and to emphasize i ts separat ion notonly from everyday life in the present moment, but from thediv inerrs own ordinary mode of speech, as expressed in theordinary persona which he or she presents outs ide thediv inat ion context , in the ro le of neighbor, etc. (Du Bois1 9 8 6 ) .

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If we ask about intent ional i ty here, i t should beclear that these ut terances are outs ide the contro l oftheir ut terer in two respects. Fi rst , they aretradi t ional ly speci f ied texts, memorized f rom the oralteachings of a senior d iv iner over the long years of studyrequired to master such a large corpus of d iv inat ion texts.Second, the verse that the div iner ut ters on a part icularoccasion is speci f ied by the aleatory mechanism of thecowrie toss, whose resul- t is qui te out of the contro l ofthe div iner. AJ-though the c l ient selects among the severalverses presented the one which he or she considers re levantto the case, what is re levant for our purposes is that thediv inerrs reci tat ion is governed by an aleatory mechanism.

Sirn i lar features also characterLze the other majorYoruba o rac le , t he I fa d i v ina t ion (Bascom 1969) , t hough i t stechnigues are rather nore complex.

6.2 Poison Oracle (Azande)

Among the Azande of the Sudan, the most revered andau tho r i ta t i ve o f a l l o rac les i s benge , the po ison o rac le .The poison, der ived f rorn a certa in creeper by r i tual lyspeci f ied processes, is administered to chickens keptspeci f ical ly for d iv inat ion purposes. Great care is takento ensure that the oracle is operat ing proper ly, that is ,that i t k i l1s some fowls and lets others l ive. Evans-Pr i tchard assured hi rnsel f , af ter much c lose observat ion andpart ic ipat ion in actual d iv inat ions, that the outcome isnot manipulated. Af ter the chicken has been forced toswal low some of the poison, the quest ioner addresses thepoison oracle ins ide the fowl for as long as f ive minutes,i f the fowl l ives so long, expla in ing the background of thematter he has come to consul t about, and re i terat ing thequest ion so as to be c lear ly understood. fn th is speech,presented in a sty le specia l to oracle-quest ioning, he wi l lincorporate a speci f ic proposi t ion whose t ruth he l inksverbal ly to the death of the fowl , and an opposi teproposi t ion whose t ruth he l inks to the surv ival of thefowl. For example, a man who wished to marry a certa inhroman sought to f ind out i f h is project would go wel l , ori f the hroman would die should he marry her. Uponadminister ing the oracle poison to the chicken he addressedthe o rac le as fo l l ows :

Poison oracle, that woman, s ince I intend to marryher, she is rny wi fe? We wi l l rnake a hornestead

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together? We shal l count the years together? Poisonorac le l i s ten , k i l l t he fow l . I t i s no t so , m ine i sthe wear iness of p ierc ing boi ls - - a man pierces aboi l and can eat nothing -- such is the af fa i r of that\.roman. I rnust do without her and may not rnarry her,poison oracle l is ten and spare the fowl .

The addresser cont inues, f rarning again the pair of opposedproposi t ions, and again l ink ing then to the death orsurv ival of the fowl :

I t i s no t so , po ison o rac le , re fuse to be dece ived ;you are marry ing her to rne, she is t ru ly ny wi fe. Iw i l l p ra i se th i s ve rd i c t o f you rs , po ison o rac le ,about that af fa i r of my wi fe. Stra ight be yourut terance l ike Zakir i , I ike Moragbbndi . Poison oraclek i I I t he fow l . I t i s no t t rue , po ison o rac le , she i snot rny wife; although you are as fierce as Gbudwe ifyou see that that woman wi l l not be rny wi fe, poisonorac le spare the fow l . (Evans -Pr i t cha rd L937 :298)

(The quest ioner goes on in th is vein. ) Because of the waythe quest ioner has l inked proposi t ions and oracularoutcomes here, the fowlrs death wi l l be interpreted asneaning that the marr iage wi l l go wel l , whi le i ts su:rr ivalwi l l mean that the woman would die i f he marr ies her. Thespeech enployed to address the poison oracle must beadaptable in order to frame the question currently at hand,so that i t cannot consist ent i re ly of t radi t ional lyspeci f ied text . But i t does have dist inct ive sty l is t iccharacter is t ics. The address to the oraclecharac te r i s t i ca l l y e rnp loys a ' r spec ia l ph raseo logy f r andincorporates " t radi t ional refra ins, p ieces of imagery,compl iments to the oracle, vrays of formulat ing a quest ionrr ,e tc . , usua l l y i nc lud ing many t tana log ies andcircumlocut ionsrr (Evans-Pr i tchard L937 2297-99), such asI'making a hornestead togetherrr and rrcounting the yearsrr formarry ing happi ly . Speakers f rom myth t imes (e.9. Zakir iand Moragbdndi , ancient Zande k ings) are invoked as modelsfor the current d iv inat ion.

In Evans-Pr i tchard 's t ranslat ion of the Zandeor ig ina l ,S the re a re c lauses wh ich a re p resen ted asquest ions, some which look l ike assert ions, and some whichare given in the form of a condi t ional ( i f x is t rue, doy ) . (O f cou rse a cond i t i ona l i n te rp re ta t i on may beinpl ic i t even in p laces where Evans-Pr i tchard has notexp ressed an r i f r . ) Cons ide red in i l l ocu t ionary te rms ,

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these ut terances of the oracle quest ioner present a cur iousaspect . Assert ions, we are to1d, have speakers wi thintent ions behind them, as responsible speech actors. Butto maintain that the guest ionerrs ut terances here arebacked by his intent ion would be to ascr ibe mani festcontradict ion to h i rn and incoherence to h is ut terance.Taken at face value, the oracle texts would look almostl ike text-book cases of the contradict ion that phi losophersand l inguists l ike to c i te as not coherent ly ut terable by asingle sent ient being. Moreover, the proposi t ions refer tostates of af fa i rs of which the speaker is patent lyignorant , and of which he publ ic ly recognizes hi rnsel f to beignorant .

But such an evaluat ion is c lear ly not warranted byindigenous axioms of interpretat ion. We can only ask inwhat sense the ut terer is | tsayingrr these sentences at a l l .Clear ly, in ut ter ing these proposi t ions (whether they aretaken as assert ions or condi t ionals) the pet i t ioner leavesopen the guestion of their truth, and so cannot be said toprovide them with any speci f ic i l locut ionary force. Thedecis ion as to which of the ut tered proposi t ions is t rue isrendered by an event outs ide his contro l , the death orsurv ival of the fowl . This holds t rue even i f sone of theproposi t ions are v iewed as condi t ionals, s ince part ic ipantstake the div inatory s ignal (death: I i fe) as provid ing thetruth value for the (perhaps or ig inal ly condi t ional)proposi t ion.

But is it fair to speech act theory to perceive speechact status in a binary signal that in effect counts as nomore than 6 r tygst t or r rnorr? Actua1ly, speech act theoryitself has long recognized that even a sirnple yes-or-noresponse can, in the appropriate context, conmit a speakerto a full-f ledged speech act -- one that in another contextwould be perfonned using a fu l l sentence, such as theassert ion rrYes, I am going to the moviesrr (cf . SearLeL969 :L9 ) . Thus the b ina ry charac te r o f t h i s and o the rdiv inatory responses is not in i tsel f a h indrance toappl icat ion of speech act theory.

The problern der ives not f rom the s inpl ic i ty of thebinary s ignal , but f rom the rnani fest absence of personalintent ion. In ef fect the div inatory s ignal anaphor ical lyincorporates the l inked proposi t ion or ig inal ly ut tered bythe div iner, but now provides i t wi th a pragmat ic backing-- of a sort usual ly thought to reguire an intending speechactor - - which is both rnechanical and aleatory.

Ii

I

6.3 synbol-spinning (Sisala)

Among the Sisala of Northern chana, a d iv inat ionsession begins wi th the div iner opening a bag f rom which hetakes out several ritual instruments. He then utters aninvocat ion of gods and ancestors in a d ist inct ive tone ofvoice, whi le s lowly shaking a ceremonial rat t l -e:

God! What have I cal led? Savai [an ancestor ] is thegod. Which gods should I cal l? I should cal l Jevahaand Forkorbawie. They should cal l Gominabaah andNavr i j e . They shou ld ca I I Sa I fuo and Ja I Io . Ja I Ioshould ask Janawia, the eldest r iver , and he sbouldask Dajare. Dajare is the eldest farm, and he shouldask grandfather, who wi l l ask God. (MendonsaL982 z LZL)

(The div iner cont inues. ) For the div inat ion proper thespecia l is t removes, one by one, each of a set of synbol icf igures contained in h is d iv in ing bag, each of which has aspeci f ic meaning associated wi th i t . The div iner suspendsthe syrnbolic figure by two strings that are attached to it,rubs the str ings together in h is palms to make the objectspin round, and watches to see where i t points. The twoknots in the str ing are said to be reyesrr , and i f these endup point ing to the c l ient , th is indicates that the s lnnbolis potent ia l ly pert inent to h is case. Symbols which rr lookrr

away from the client when spun are set aside as irrelevant.(Further d iv inat ion using another technique may be used toselect amonl t the objects p icked out by th is procedure, aswel l as to choose between pairs of opposed proposi t ionsframed by the c l ient , etc. ) In one Seance, among theslanbols picked out by the spinning technique were thefo l l ow ing (Mendonsa L9822L24) z

a notched piece of gourd wi th two protrusions,carry ing the t radi t ional s igni f icat ion, I 'You knew thetruth but spoke in two di f ferent waysrr ( that is , "youl i ed r r ) ;

a dr ied black f ru i t f rom the bubinqa t ree, s igni fy ingI ' I t wi l l be a black (bad) th ing i f you cont inuerr i

a s ingle cowrie shel l , s igni fy ing ' rYou made a prorniseto a shr ine and asked i t for some th ings, but now youhave forgot ten your promise.r l

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These words are ut tered by the div iner to the c l ient , inaccordance wi th whichever f igures have pointed to thecl ient . The div inerrs statements are thus selected by thesymbol-spinning, an aleatory process which puts the resul t- - at least apparent ly - - outs ide the contro l of thed i v i n e r .

Again, i f we consider th is speech event f rom ani l locut ionary standpoint , we must f ind ourselves re luctantto ascr ibe to the div iner the responsibi l i ty of a speechac to r exe r t i ng ' vo l i t i ona l con t ro l ove r a se r ies o fassert ions. Proposi t ions are indeed being ut tered, butapparent ly wi thout support of , or dependence on, personalin ten t ion .

Sorne readers may remain skeptical even whenethnographers present evidence that a d iv inatory s ignal isouts ide the div inerrs contro l . But the real issue heremust be kept s ight of : not contro l , but the indigenouspercept ion of contro l of the div inatory process. Membersof d iv in ing cul tures typical ly bel ieve that a legi t imatediv inat ion produces a def in i te s ignal by means other thanthrough personal vol i t ional contro l . Div inatory devicesare of ten selected, i t appears, precisely because they canprovide the appearance (at least) of such independence.The significance for pragmatic theory comes when thediv inerrs cr ient construes as meaningfur an ut terance whichhe or she bel ieves is not backed by personal intent ion.

For the present these three cases wi l l be suf f ic ientto g ive an idea of how language is used in d iv inat ion.T Iturn now to problems of interpretation.

7 Apersonality

What matter whors speaking, soneone said,what matter whors speaking.

- - S . B e c k e t t ( L 9 7 4 : 1 - 6 )

Speech act theory, confronted with the aleatorymechanism's apparent intent ion-suppression funct ion, n ighthope to rescue the cr i ter ion of intent ional i ty by recourseto an i rnagined intender behind the oracle. Surely, onemust reason, i f oracle-users bel ieve they have receivedneaningful informat ion about their present af fa i rs f rorn an

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oracle, they at least must assume that th is informat ion wascommunicated by soneone, by some speaker or addresser --perhaps a dei ty, spi r i t , or other such anthropornorphicf igure. This deeply ingrained react ion on our part ,ref lect ing the strength of the personal is t ideology ofIanguage use, was exper ienced al ready by Evans-Pr i tchard,when he would try to present to his countrynren the Azandeview of the poison oracle:

I have described to many people in England the facts[about how the Azande enploy oracles] and they havebeen, in the main, incredulous or contemptuous. Intheir questions to me they have sought to explain awayZande behaviour by rat ional iz ing i t , that is to say,by interpreting it in terms of our culture. Theyassume that Azande attribute a personality to theoracle, a mind that judges as men judge, but wi thh i g h e r p r e s c i e n c e ( L 9 3 7 : 3 1 3 )

I f we could bel ieve that the Azande personi fy their poisonoracle, perhaps we could then comprehend their faith in it:r rGiven a mind the Zande oracle is not much more di f f icul tto understand than the Delphic Oracle.r r But ,Evans-Pr i tchard insists, I ' they do not personi fy i t . " Whi leit night seem to us that they must take the oracles to bepersonal beings, s ince they do address them direct ly , th isquestion appears absurd when framed within the Zandelanguage. The poison oracle

is not aI ive, i t does not breathe or move about. I tis a thing. Azande have no theory about it; they donot know why it works, but only that it does work.

Oracles work, novr as always, s imply because that is theirnature (Evans-Pr i tchard L937 :320) .

The Azande are not alone in their reluctance to seek apersonal or personified source for the meanings derivedfrom div inat ion. In h is analysis of d iv inat ion among theTiv, Bohannon evinces some frustration in his attenpt toapply a r rcommunicat ion model t r (a Jakobsonian var iantreceived from Sebeok L964) that assumes, along withmessage, code, referent , and channel , the existence of anaddresser and an addressee. He cal ls d iv inat ion rra sort ofguas i - commun ica t ion r r (1975 :L5L) a t f i r s t , bu t has doub ts .

To cal l the r interact ionr between the div iner and hisoracle a rguasi-cornmunicat ionr because div iners l ike

KOson cock their heads and r l is tent may be tointerpret the Tiv point of v iew a l i t t le tooI i t e r a l l y . ( B o h a n n o n 1 9 7 5 : L 5 6 )

Divination might better be compared to the use of anart i f ic ia l extension of the senses, l ike a Geiger counter.fn any case, the rraddresser[ that the connunicat ion modelasks for cannot be val idated in nat ive terms: r r the Tiv donot and wi l l not speculate about the nature of any th ing,person, or force that rsendsr the messagerr (BohannonL9752 l -66 ) . As w i th the Azande , the re fusa l t o pe rson i f ygenuinely confounds our at tempts to apply e i ther a speechact model or a Jakobson-Hymes type communication model,g iven their ins istence on speech actors or addressers.

Some tradi t ions, on the other handr hdy postulate amore personal figure behind the divination, though this naybe l i t t le more than a sort of r rsupervisorrr , or a source ofundi f ferent iated por. rer or epistenological ef f icacy. Thediv inat ion procedure nay have a dei ty or set of dei t iesassociated wi th i t ; for example, the Quich6 Maya div inerinvokes a long l is t of dei t ies and other porrers in order toensure that a seance goes wel l (Bunzel 1952i cf . Tedlock1982) , as do the I x i l Maya d i v ine r (Co lby and Co lby1981 :278 f f ) , t he S isa la d i v ine r (Mendonsa L982 : I2L ) , andmany others. But most of these dei t ies are apparent ly notspeci f ic to d iv inat ion, and would be invoked in performingother k inds of r i tual or magic as wel l . Further, there isno indicat ion that any one of the l is t is thought of as theactual speaker of the div inatory message.

In contrast , in the I fa d iv inat ion of the Yoruba, acloser re lat ionship is indicated: I fa is the name not onlyof the div inat ion process, and of a najor Yoruba cu1t , butalso of the dei ty r r responsiblerr for d iv inat ion. Before thef i rst d iv inat ion of the day, the div iner invokes f fa t f to

make sure that Ifa supervises the divination and sees thatthe correct f igure is selectedrf (Bascorn 1959 237) . Bascommaintains that the div inatory mechanisrn is designed toenable recept ion of a nessage rrwhich I fa wishes the c l ientto rece ive r r (1969 :3O) . Bu t superv i s ing i s no t speak ing .There remains some question whether the Yoruba would tendto th ink in terms of ascr ib ing the character of a speechactor responsible for intent ions underty ing the speci f icdiv inat ion rrmessagetr produced on a part icular occasion, toa dei ty speaker addressing the div iner and c l ient - -however much we night th ink such conclusions rat ional lynecessary. Certa in ly, many of the t radi t ional I fa

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div inat ion texts expl ic i t ly present some statements asquotat ions f rom I fa: for one example among many, in thefourth divination verse for the figure Oveku ocrbe( c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o p a l n n u t t h r o w s 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 i L , L , T , 1 ) ,a demand fo r a sac r i f i ce i s a t t r i bu ted to I f a : I f a n i k ie n i - k a n r u - ( e ) b o n i t o r i o v e t i a n i e n i i d i l e r e r l f a s a y ssomeone should make a sacr i f ice because of a t i t le that isto be taken in h i s l i neager (Bascom 1"959 :232-3 ) , e t c . Bu tthere are several points to take into considerat ion here.First , these are f ixed t radi t ional texts, so that theclient knows that this same text may have been uttered theday before to someone else. Second, the di rectness ofcontact is mi t igated by the fact that a s igni f icant port iono f mos t o f t he I fa d i v ina t ion ve rses cons is t s i n acruotation of utterances rnade by some nyth-tirne diviner -- ahero or dei ty - - to another rnyth- t i rne personage. This iswhat I have spoken of as a duplex speech event (Du Bois1986 :32L) i i n th i s t ype , a p r io r (pos tu la ted ) speech even tis presented as a precedent to the present d iv inat ion. Inth is context , there is of ten an anbigui ty as to whether theat t r ibut ion of saying refers to a present saying or to theor ig inal nyth- t i rne saying. This anbigui ty is anything butaccidental , of course, and night be expected to be act ivelycu l t i va ted . Th i rd , t he words r r l f a says . . . i l o f tenal ternate, seerningly interchangeably, wi th the indef in i tea t t r i bu t ion I ' t hey say . . . " (e .q . Bascom 1969 :233) . Four th ,w e n e e d t o r e c a l l E n g l i s h u s a g e s l i k e " t h e l a b e l s a y s . . . r r ,r rwha t tha t k ind o f behav io r says abou t you i s . . . r r , r r t hose

s p o t s m e a n . . . t t , t t S c o r p i o r i s i n g m e a n s . . . t t , e t c . , i nevaluat ing statements contain ing verbs of saying ormeaning. Final ly , even i f an ethnographerrs quest ions wereto prompt staternents about dei t ies as speakers ofd iv inat ion messages, we may st i l I need to d ist inguish anysecondary rat ional izat ions f rom deep-seated, basic modes ofinterpretat ive behavior wi th respect to d iv inat ionmechanisms.

I t is important to recal l that rnagic, in some views atleast , coerces rather than entreats act ion f rom gods andpowers. As Mauss points out , the demons which are invokedin de rnon iaca l r i t es r ta re no t f ree agen ts " ( l -950 :105) .Thus, even where speaking is indicated i t may not bevol i t ional speaking, that is , speech in which choice exists-- for example, the choice between te l l ing the t ruth orIy ing. One somet imes hears as an explanat ion for thefai lure of an oracular d iv inat ion that the correct quest ionhad not been made suf f ic ient ly c lear to the oracle, or thatwi tchcraf t sonehow inter fered wi th the div inat ion

LO2

procedure, but not that an oracular r rspeakerrr chose to l ie .Whi le the Yoruba may be recognized, g iven Bascomrsmater ia ls, as one case where a group does postulate are la t i ve l y pe rson i f i ed - - i f no t necessar i l y f ree -w i l l ed - -I 'speakerrr for the f ixed div inat ion texts g iven bytradi t ion, i t seems that in most d iv inat ion t radi t ions, dnyassociated dei t ies or powers are at most patrons orsupervisors of the div inat ion procedure. And in mostcul tures, apparent ly , there is no sacred personal i ty l inkedspec i f i ca l l y to d i v ina t ion .

To draw a paral le l f rorn a western context , a sc ient is twho supervises a medical laboratory night have an importantfunct ion in ensur ing that aI I equipment works and thattests are appropr iate ly carr ied out by laboratorypersonnel ; yet we would not as a resul t take th issupervisor to be the author of the diagnost ic r rmessagesrr

indicated by the chemical react ions in the tests.d I f werecal l Bohann0nts compar ison of Tiv d iv inat ion to a Geigercounter, we may be on the right track toward understandingthe place of a supervis ing dei ty for d iv inat ion.

Mauss , i n h i s d i scuss ion o f the p lace o f r r sp i r i t

beings" in a general theory of magic, concluded that suchf5-gures were never in thernselves suf f ic ient to account forthe bel iefs about magic (a category which, in Maussr usage,would encompass div inat ion). He ernphasized that even wheresuch spirits were invoked by native theory, there wasalways sornething lef t over unexplained:

The idea of spir i t beings is not a suf f ic ientrepresentation of anonymous general forces which arethe basis of a magic ianrs pohrer, the strength behindhis words and act ions, the pohter of h is looks andintent ions, spel ls and death. the idea of spir i ts

cannot expla in e i ther the existence of the r i tualor i ts specia l features -- sympathet ic act ions,magica} substances, r i tual prescr ipt ions, pr ivateIanguages , e tc .

Even in a demoniacal r i te, Mauss says, " the idea of spir i tsis necessar i ly accompanied by an impersonal not ion ofe f f i cac ious power r ' (Mauss 1950 :105) . Un fo r tuna te l y , Maussof fered no concept ion of a posi t ive funct ion for theimpersonal power, but saw in i t only the residual funct ion.But in l ight of the foregoing, ! '/e can now see howimpersonal i ty is of ten sought for i ts own sake. Even wherea div inat ion supervisor or nyth- t ime precedent-speaker is

r03

invoked, in most systems of d iv inat ion, i t is impersonal i tywhich the s ignal-generat ing procedure serves to establ ishand reinforce. L ike the Azande and the Tiv, most groups donot personify their oracles, and have no theory about anytrspeakerrr or r raddresserrr for the oracular r rmessagesrr . Theoracle is s imply a th ing, a rnyst ical tool perhaps, but theyare content to leave i t at that . We need to recognize thatrnembers of many t radi t ional societ ies are wi l l ing toconstrue the s ignals that d iv inat ion presents to them asmeaningful wi thout postulat ing any hidden speech actor .Meaning is val idated otherwise, through the apersonalsemio t i c mechan ism o f d i v ina t ion (Du Bo is , f o r thco rn ing a ) .

8 Functions of Intentionless I'leaning

The guest ion of what funct ion the div inatory processhas can be ra ised on several levels, f ron a f i rs t -orderfunction where we rnight speak of random generation ofdist inct ive s ignals, to h igher-order funct ions where wemight speak of such th ings as socia l integrat ion. Whi lethe highest levels of funct ioning are largely beyond thescope of an inquiry into the workings of the div inatorymode of rneaning product ion, we do need to consider somernid- Ievel funct ions i f we are to understand whvintent ionless meaning should be so widely sought af ter .

On one level , d iv inat ion establ ishes ' r factsrr wi thoutrecourse to ordinary evidence, which facts may become thebasis of a course of act ion undertaken by an indiv idual ora group. Often a div inatory c l ient faces severala l ternat ive courses of act ion whose relat ive mer i ts cannotread i l y be de te rm ined (e .9 . to bu i l d a house on th i s s i t eor that , when ei ther seems sui table; to go on a journey orstay horne, etc. ) . What human source could assure one thati f l f o r tune w i l l no t be fa l l one in a house bu i l t on th i ss i te? In such c i rcunstances, dDy wel l -def ined course ofact ion may serve as wel l as the next , even i f determinedaleator i ly , so long as i t can be conf ident ly and resolute lyfo l lowed. r rEven tossing a coin can end indecis ion and leadt o p o s i t i v e a c t i o n r r ( B a s c o m 1 9 5 9 : 7 0 ) . B u t t h i s i s l i k e l yto be ef fect ive only when i t is possib le to bel ieve thatthe resul t is more s igni f icant than is mere rrchancerr . Tobase a large undertaking one what one bel ieves to be an"accidentrr would certa in ly reguire a cur ious cast of mind;th is is not the cast which is found among the users ofd iv inat ion. Bascom points out that

when decis ions are lef t to d iv ine guidance rather thanchance, the indiv idual has far greater assurance thathe is fo l lor . r ing the correct course of act ion. He canproceed wi th greater conf idence; and, accordingly, insome cases he probably has a greater chance ofs u c c e s s . ( B a s c o m 1 - 9 6 9 : 7 0 )

But Bascomrs t rd iv ine guidancert is c lear ly not necessaryfor d iv inat ion; the more basic reguirement is s inply theef fect ive operat ion of the aleatory mechanism, which givesdef in i te infonnat ion wi thout dependence on a (necessar i lyinef fectual) human source.

From the perspective of the group, facts need tobecome not only r rknowntt but socia l ly legi t i rnated. This isespecia l ly t rue for facts that bear on re lat ions bet l teenindiv iduals, or which involve concerted act ion by thegroup. In the face of cr is is the locat ion of socia lresponsibi l i ty for decis ion-making can become anembarrassment, which is preferably t ransferred todiv inat ionrs apersonal mechanisn. Arnong the Tiv, d ist rustof author i tar ian ro les makes i t d i f f icul t for one person toimpose a decis ion i f that person has to be s ingled out asresponsible for i t . Div inat ion means that no one wi l l haveto be the personal source of decis ion.

Without the divining apparatus, the Tiv rnode of groupdecis ion naking could not be ut i l ized so ef fect ively-- someone would have to take the authoritarianposi t ion of rd ictat ingt the answer. Somet imesinf luent ia l e lders can and do merely t teI I r theirjuniors what akombo [roughly, supernatural forces] areinvolved and occasionally even what relationships areto be t repairedr. But such author i tar ianism is bothra re and d i s tas te fu l t o T i v . (Bohannan L975 :L66)

Rather than taking on the role of speech actor, one candefer to the apersonal divinatory source. And impersonallyauthoritative decisions can more readily attract consensus,by virtue of the fact that they cannot be attacked asproceeding from some interested person or faction. As Parkobserves,

div inatory procedure, whether robject iver in qual i tyor rnerely inter-subjective, constitutes a techniquefor establishing an effective consensus upon a ratherpa r t i cu la r p ro jec t . (Park L9672240)

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It does this by the suppression of personal agency andhence responsibi l i ty :

i t is the pecul iar property of the div inerrs ro le thathe is able, in the publ ic conscience, to renove theagency and responsibi l i ty for a decis ion f rom theactor h i rnsel f , cast inq i t upon the heavens where i tl ies beyond cavi l and beyond reproach. (ParkL967 2236)

In referr ing responsibi l i ty to r r the heavensrr , Park wiselydraws on one of the more vague and irnpersonal metaphorsthat Engl ish makes avai lable to h i rn; but we should notexpect to read into th is anything beyond those heavens, inthe way of d iv ine personages.

Div inat ion addresses not only act ion and fact butemot ion as weII . Div inat ion has psychological funct ionsbeyond the nore apparent epistemological and socio logicalones. The c l ient is of ten led to delve into thoughts andfeelings of deep concerni and the structure of syrmbolicmater ia ls and potent ia l explanat ions which are of fered upby the cul ture is l ikely to point in d i rect ions l inked wi themot ion. Some div inat ion procedures, whi le speci fy ing aset of t radi t ional texts, Ieave i t to the indiv idual todecide on which one is re levant to h is or her case. ThusRibeiro nrainta ins that I fa d iv inat ion is a sort ofproject ive technigue l ike the Rorschach Test , s ince rr i ts

interpretat ion depends on the c l ientrs mot ivat ions ando the r psycho log ica l f ac to rs r r (R ibe i ro L956 :18 -19 , c i t ed inBascom L969 :69 ) . The p r ies tess o f an A f ro -Braz i l i an cu l tin fact considered the Rorschach Test a divinatorytechnigue and even reguested that Ribeiro rrlook Ifarr forher. Bascon also recognizes a project ive value for I fad i v i n a t i o n ( l - 9 5 9 : 5 9 ) . O f t e n t h e c o n s u l t e r i s l e d t oformulate concerns and fears, whether verbal ly or rnental ly .This interpret ive act iv i ty is carr ied out in apsychological ly protected environment, s ince the consul teris not responsible for backing the var ious proposi t ionswith any part icular i l locut ionary force: the proposi t ionsare rrenter ta inedrr rather than asserted. fn th is respectthe enter ta ined proposi t ions resemble the psychoanalyst ' rscategory of r rpr imary processrr language, character ized byFenichel as (arnong other th ings) t r lacking in anyiden t i f i ca t i on o f l i ngu is t i c mood ( i . e . , no iden t i f i ca t i ono f i nd i ca t i ve , sub junc t i ve , op ta t i ve , e tc . ) r r (Ba tesonL 9 7 2 2 1 3 9 ) .

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Divinat ion has psychological and interpersonalcontr ibut ions to make f rom the group perspect ive as weII .Tu rne r was to ld by an Ndembu tha t a f f l i c t i on (e .9 . d i sease ,misfor tune) which leads to d iv inat ion and r i tual

is good because the r i tual to remove i t br ings tol iqht and so dispels the guarrels and grudges in thesoc ia l g roup . I f t hese go on fo r l ong , i t i s sa id ,people may resort to sorcery or wi tchcraf t and star tk i l l i nq one ano the r .

The r i tual and i ts associated div inat ion thus act as aprophylact ic against wi tchcraf t in the socia l group (TurnerL975 :245 ; c f . a l so Bea t t i e L967 223L t Mendonsa 1 -982 :9 ) .Div inat ion in i ts d iagnost ic ro le of ten mandates theperfornance of redressive r i tual involv ing pert inent groupmembers, and by th is route a resolut ion of interpersonalconf l ic ts may be at ta ined. In such a div inator i ly enjo inedr i te, we may note in passing, the r i tual ut terances wi l lultirnately have been activated and backed up by theirnpersonal rnechanism of d iv inat ion.

The t ruth-discover ing capaci ty of d iv inat ion gives thediv iner specia l access to otherwise pr ivate domains wi th inthe group. The Tiv d iv iner can ask his c l ients for anyinformat ion he needs to carry out h is work -- about k in 'sheal th, grudges, pol i t ical personages, etc. - - inc ludinginformation that would ordinarily be closely guarded andmight otherwise remain unaired. The pet i t ioners readi lyanswer these guest ions, saying rr the oracle cannot teI I youthe t ruth i f you f . ie to i t r r (Bohannan L9752L52) .Simi lar ly , Herskovi ts notes that the Dahomean div inat ioncontext dernands conplete frankness between the diviner andconsul ters, wi th the resul t that the div iner r r is able toget at the facts in a given case to an extent which anordinary adviser would f ind inpossib lerr (Herskovi ts1 9 3 8 : f I , 2 L 6 , c i t e d i n B a s c o r n L 9 6 9 : 6 8 ) . R e t e l - L a u r e n t i n(1969) ernphasizes that the Nzakara rubbing-board and poisonoracles, wi th their vaunted infa l l ib i l i ty , funct ion as anef fect ive | t t ruth serumrr in court cases. In sum, discourseunder compulsion to honesty can of itself serve irnportantpsychological and socio logical funct ions, even where i tspart ic ipants t reat the discussion as merely anci l lary tosecur ing the div inatory response.

But there is room for variation across cultures in thehigher- level funct ions which div inat ion may serve. Forexample, the Yoruba re ject on pr incip le the f rank approach

L U I

that characterizes the probing divinatory investigations ofmany other groups. I t is preferable that the div iner noteven know the nature of the c l ientrs problern, lest hei l t t r i s t t r I f a i n seek ing to p lease (Bascom 1969 :68 ) . As aresul t , I i t t le in the way of reveal ing dia logue is l ike1yto take place dur ing the select ion of the t radi t ionaldivinatory text. This may be linked to the prominence ofthe f ixed text , part icular ly in the in i t ia l s tage of theI fa session, which is especia l ly sui table for theessent ia l ly project ive funct ion which Ribeiro and Bascomhave posi ted for the indiv idualrs process of text select ionand interpretat ion. In contrast , d iv inat ion systems whichconcentrate on secur ing speci f ic new informat ion v iaspontaneous proposi t ions (e.9. about which neighborrs angeri s caus ing one 's ch i l d rs s i ckness , e tc . ) may tend tocorrelate wi th a commitment to f rank discussion.v

In surnmary, what remains constant through aII of thesefunctions is the thread of reliance on apersonalauthoritative meaning. Apersonality is achieved throughthe suppression of personal vol i t ion. Personal author i tyis replaced by an authority which derives fron convergingd iv ina to ry s igna ls (Du Bo is 1986 :33L-2 ; fo r thcoming , a ) , assupported by the symbol ic ef fects of other formal aspectsof r i tual . The pr i rnary funct ion of the aleatory is , as wehave seen, to suppress intent ion; but th is takes place inan at t i tudinal context which nevertheless al lo l rs meaningfutinterpretat ion of the resul ts as author i tat ive val idat ionsof appl icable meanings. In conjunct ion wi th other aspectsof d iv inat ion, the suppression of intent ion endows thediv inat ion resul t wi th sel f -suf f ic ient apersonal author i ty .The resul ts can then be put to a var iety of uses in socia land psychological l i fe. Div inat ion can produce def in i teinforrnat ion which al lows the indiv idual to resolveuncerta inty; in the process i t can also probe intosensi t ive socia l and psycholoqical areas, br inging personaland interpersonal conf l ic ts to l ight . I t can producesocial facts without Ieaning on the frail reed of hurnanw i l I , and so can va l i da te concer ted ac t ion in cond i t i onswhere uncerta inty and vaci l la t ion rn ight otherwise haved is in teg ra t i ve e f fec ts .

To say that the language of d iv inat ion lacksintent ional i ty is not to say that i t is wi thout funct ion.I t is i ronic, no doubt, that the very intent ionlessness ofa process should al low i t to serve i ts character is t icfunction. That devices for generating random outcornesshould f igure in a process s i ia to be funct ional , or

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end-directed, may seem pecul iar . Yet th is is notunparal le led among semiot ic phenomena. fn the bio logicalwor ld, in the f ie ld of populat ion genet ics, the randorrrecornbinat ion of genes is recognized as producing thegenet ic var iat ion which fuels adapt ive evolut ion, whichI ikewise is end-directed f ron a certa in perspect ive (MayrL982248-49) . Bo th gene t i c p rocesses and d i v ina to ryprocesses are of course semiot ic in character , insofar asthey form components of cybernetic systems.

9 Intention and the Speech Act Reconsidered

It is tirne to assess the consequences for speech acttheory of the status of intention in the language ofdivination. Intention has come under attack from severald i rect ions recent ly ; here I have sought to re inforce theant i -personal is t cr i t ique wi th a new argument against theappeal to intent ion. Ant i -personal is t scholars such asDurant i , Ochs, and Rosaldo have shown that for certa innon-Western societ ies intent ion is re lat ively uninportantfor the socia l interpret ive process of constru ing meaning,in both everyday language use and in forrnal oratory. Thisstands in contrast to the s i tuat ion in var iet ies of Engl ishcloser to home (e.9. whi te rn iddle-c lass Anglo-American), asenshr ined in the Western personal is t theor ies of languageuse. But Durant i indicates a possib i l i ty that even inSamoan, in certain kinds of everyday langruage use,intent ion night get taken into considerat ion (Durant i1984 :L7 ) . And , however a t tenua ted the fo rce o f thespeaker 's intent ions nay be in most Samoan cases, i t isimportant to recognize that the speakerrs responsibi l i tvc lear ly remains -- wi th th is d i f ference, that the Sanoanspeakerrs responsibi l i ty is not for the intent ion behindthe words, but for the consequences of the words (Duranti1984 :3 ) . I n con t ras t , i n the case o f d i v ina t ion , wha t wehave is speech for which in pr incip le there is no speakerresponsible - - nei ther for personal intent ions behind thewords, nor for the words themselves, nor for theirconseguences. To account for the actual interpretiveor ientat ion employed by rnost users of d iv inat ion, we s i rnplycannot posi t a responsible speech actor , not even in tbesense of an indiv idual who bears personal responsibi l i tyonly for the consequences of words. This is of course noaccident , s ince i t is precisely the absence of humanresponsibi l i ty for e i ther intent ions or consequences thatis character is t ical ly sought af ter .

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In l ight of the cr i t ic isms now being di rected againsta theory that so recently was widely embraced by studentsof language use, i t is worthwhi le to look back and see whati t was that speech act theory in i t ia l ly had to of fer , andwhere it went wronlt. RecaII that Rosaldo accounted speechact theory not only the butt of her crit igue, but herinspirat ion as wel l . In i ts t ime, what the performat ivetheory promised was an escape f rom the prevai l ing ideal is tmodel of pure form, abstracted away from the livinq worldof act ion. This use theory of fered a f ramework that couldtake language out of the Platonic world of ideal structureassumed by many structural is ts, especia l ly generat ives t ruc tu ra l i s t s , and p lace i t i n the wor ld o f soc ia l l i f e ,which encompasses notably socia l act ion. In depart ing f romtheor ies of r r ru les act ing on formstt (of thernselves, i tseemed), the new focus on act ion and intent ion promised toal ign wel l wi th the reemerging interest in funct ion inlanguage. In departing from views that treated meaning andrr the wor ldrr as belonging to separate spheres, corre latedonly by processes wi th names l ike rrnappingrr or

"ver i f icat ionrr , the new theory appeared revolut ionary inplacing rneaning and lanquage in the same world withpersons, goals, intent ions, and act ions. Now words couldhave real consequences. Sornething was said, and somethinghappened as a resul t : the facts of the wor ld t tere changed.To commit onesel f to a v iew that rneaning was necessar i lyl inked to act ion was to forceful ly make a place not onlyfor actors but for their goals and contexts. fn theseterms, speech act theory real ly d id open new avenues ofresearch and theory to socio l inguists, ethnographers ofspeaking, and anthropologists. ru

The movement was a success to such an extent that noinforrned l inguist or phi losopher would now ser iouslypropose returning to a theory of meaning which could nottake context into account. Clear1y, any adequate theory ofmeaning must inc lude wi th in i t an ef fect ive t reatment ofthe pragmat ic anchor ing of ut terances, that is , of theirconnect ion to context . (Anong other th ings, wi thout th is,the inf luence of fe l - ic i ty condi t ion sat is fact ion onut terance interpretat ion could not be accounted for . ) Andone aspect of the context to which pragmatic anchoring rnaycrucia l ly make reference is the intent ion of the speaker.As scholars such as Gr ice, Strawson, Sear le, and Clark havepersuasively argued, i t is necessary - - on at least someoccasions, in sorne cul tures -- to make reference to thespeaker rs (nan i fes t ) i n ten t ions i f one i s to succeed inapprehending the hearerrs process of cornput ing meaning. I f

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a hearer knows wi th what intent ions a speaker saidsomething (a long wi th what he or she said) , th is aspect ofcontext may be crucia l ly taken into account in arr iv ing atthe instant iated meaning. To know only the l inguist ic formuttered, a long wi th i ts gramrnat ical ly associated systemmeaning, is to have access only to a l imi ted port ion of thesemant i c p rocess .

one of the problems which arose, however, was that thebasic features of the speech act model were taken forgranted as necessary for any k ind of language use. Thefact that presumedly foundat ional components l ike theintent ional i ty of the responsible speech actor agreed wi ththe rrcommon senserr of Western folk theory about actiontended to prevent recogni t ion of the fu l l range of ways inwhich lanquage can be used. Even those who kept proposingmore and more ne$/ speech act types within the existingtheory were doing so in an atternpt to break out of theIimiting assurnption that the one key function of languageis to refer-and-predicate about states of af fa i rs in thewor ld - - to r rcommunicate infonnat ionrr or to t rembody

thought" , according to oners preferred var iant . Inreject ing these l i rn i tat ions, they sought to adequatelyrecognize the wide divers i ty of language use types. Butthe fu l l scope of d ivers i ty could not be adequatelyenvis ioned as long as the founding assurnpt ions of thestrongly personalist performative theory went unguestioned.

I f in apply ing a ready-made theory of speech acts, weexpected to find speech actors and intentionality at thebasis of the meanings which indigenous users der ive f romtheir d iv inatory procedures, we would fa i l to apprehend thelesson which div inat ion has to teach us. To at ta in anadeguate theory of use of rneaning, we wi l l have to acceptthat in socia l l i fe there is need for more than one k ind ofi t . Certa in ly for rnuch of language use i t is important torecognize that addressers and addressees are involved. Andi t is adni t tedly val id to interpret some phenomena insocia l l i fe as act ions which are dependent on actors (ofmore or less autonornous character) , whose intent ions may betaken into account as demanded by the local canons ofinterpretat ion. But even in the wor ld of socia l act ion,there exist other types of phenomena which may need to beinterpreted as not dependent on actors. An instance ofneaningful language use -- for which no speech actor isresponsible - - can have val id i ty as a construct in a modelof socia l l i fe i f the societyrs part ic ipants or ient towardi t as such. In speaking of language use divorced f rom

111

responsible actors we are in no danger of reverting to astate where hypothesized language structure becomes a purerrobjectrr of study divorced f rom act ion; theor ies oflanguage use have taken us too far to allow for a return tosuch a condition of naivetA. But the time has perhapsarrived when we can safely accept that not all phenomena inthe socia l and l inguist ic wor ld need to be act ions, and notal l meaningful uses of words need to be interpreted asengendered by intentional, or even responsible, speechac to rs .

In the end, the uses of language are much more diversethan is envis ioned in any exist ing model of languagte use,whether of speech-act or ethnography-of-speaking type, Ifin some of i ts uses speech has addressers andintent ional i ty , why should there not be other uses where i thas neither? When such categories are raised to the statusof f ixed components in a model seeking to def ine al l use ofIanguaqe, a heur ist ic becomes a stra ight- jacket . Cul tureabounds in systems where all changes that can be conceivedhave been rung. We should not be surprised to find a typeof language use without actors or addressers, whereintent ional i ty not only is not present to authorLzemeaningful ut terances, but is act ively suppressed.

I t nay be objected that in d iv inat ion vre are deal ingwith an obscure and specia l ized case -- which rnoreover isscarcely visible among the well-educated segTments oftechnological ly advanced societ ies. Intent ional i ty , i tmight be proposed, is irnportant enough a factor in hunanbehavior that i t ought not to be discarded l ight ly . On thewhole, a theory of language which keeps to theintent ional i ty cr i ter ion is adequate, perhaps more so thanone which discards it. But it would be wrong to concludethis. I t is t rue that in d iv inat ion I have chosen fori l lustrat ion a somewhat exot ic type of language use -- butonly because div inat ion chal lenges most d i rect ly thel imi tat ions of exist ing assunpt ions. But d iv inat ion is byno means unique as a representat ive of intent ionlessmeaning. Mater ia ls ranging f rom calendr ical ceremonials toordinary proverbs show the same pr incip les in operat ion (DuBo is , f o r thcon ing b ) . Nor i s i n ten t ion less mean ingrestr ic ted to t rpr i rn i t iver t or Hexot ic t r cul tures; i t isprorninent in aI I cul tures includin l t our own, i f not a lwaysin t ransparent ly recognizable forms. r r

Most importantly, a theory which holds tointent ional i ty as a f ixed cr i ter ion of meaningful language

r1,2

use is inadequate for the s imple reason that i t is tooimpoverished to account for the range of observedI inguist ic phenomena. Speech act theory has nadeintent ional i ty out to be a constant when in fact i t is avar iable. Intent ional i ty is indeed a centra l concern ofmost human beings -- so much so that on occasion they payi t the high compl i rnent of d i rect ing great resources to i tssuppression. A theory of language should recognize th is,and beyond th is, e lucidate i t . In th is paper I have t r iedto show that meaningful language use can occur without anyreference to intent ions, or even to responsible speechactors. In certa in k inds of fonnal speech l ike that ofd iv inatory r i tual , great pains are taken to act ivelysuppress personal intent ional i ty , whi le ensur ing that theinstant iated meaningfulness of the ut terance is reta ined.One lesson f rom div inat ion, then, is that theor ies ofmeaning (such as those incorporated in speech act theory)can no longer re ly on intent ion as a f ixed component ofmeaningfulness. Intent ion is not a speech event constant .Once we see th is, ne are inrnediately in a bet ter posi t ionto assess what i t is that intent ion genuinely doescontr ibute, whenever i t is ver i f iably present in theneaning process.

NOTES

L. Ear l ier vers ions of th is paper were presented in asession on I 'Responsibi l i ty and Evidence in oral Discoursei lat the 82nd Annual Meeting of the Arnerican AnthropologicalAssociat ion in Chicago, November 1-8, l -983, and in col loquiaat UCLA and UC Santa Barbara in May 1986. f thank thepart ic ipants at those neet ings for their s t imulat ingcomments. The research as presented here was supported inpart by a UCI"A Career Development Award, and by a UCLAAcadernic Senate Research Grant , which I gratefu l lyacknowledge. For their conments on several issuesaddressed in the present paper, I thank Sandro Durant i ,Jane Hi l l - , Joel Kuipers, PauI Schachter , Sandra Thompson,and El izabeth Weber.

2. However, in deal ing wi th guotat ion, Sear le a l lows for aspecial status for the guoted proposition, from which thespeaker has distanced hi rnsel f or herset f in re levant ways,an issue which I t reat e lsewhere (Du Bois, for thcorning b) .

3. As we shal1 see, much of r i tual speech makes suchrr internalr r speech event ro les qui te overt , in represent ingthe dup lex speech even t (Du Bo is l -985 :321) .

4. Postulat ion of a specia l i l locut ionary act ofd iv inat ion would natural ly be heir to the weaknesses whichSear1e pinpointed in c la ins for specia l l i terary acts.Instead, the very appl icabi f i ty of the not ion speech rractr lto d iv inat ion wi I I be cal led into quest ion below.

5. For a d ist inct ion between mechanical and mentald i v i n a t i o n , s e e R e y n o l d s ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 - L 8 ) , M e n d o n s a ( 1 - 9 8 2 : l - t - 9 ) ;c f . a l so Rose (1 -91 - l - ) . Pa rk c l -ass i f i es d i v ina t ionprocedures as mechanical , r i tual , or emot ive (parkL967:244) ; but a separate category of r i tual d iv inat ionseems of doubtfu l va1ue, s ince i t appears that mechanicaland emot ive div inat ion are also in general r i tual .

Trance div inat ion, I ike mechanical d iv inat ion, a lsoincorporates intentionless rneaning. But to demonstrateth is would require a d i f ferent l ine of argrurnent , whichl in i tat ions of space preclude my developing here.

6. Al though Evans-Pr i tchard or ig inal ly recorded th is inthe Zande language, he publ ished i t only in t ranslat ion.

LL4

7. Many readers wi I I be acquainted wi th lore surroundingthe farnous Delphic oracle, and may recaI l some of theextraordinar i ly c la i rvoyant prophecies, so cunninglyambiguous, which are prominent in both Greek history andI i terature. I t is necessary to state, however, that inreal i ty most of the more impressive prophecies were neveractual ly ut tered by the oracle, but were s i rnply f ic t ionalor legendary; th is has been met iculously dernonstrated byFon ten rose ( l -978) . The so r t o f o rac le tha t rdas genu ine lypronounced at Delphi would be, for example ( in response toa quest ion f rom Xenophon as to what god he should sacr i f iceand pray to in order to assure success for h is journey anda sa fe re tu rn ) , t ha t he shou ld sac r i f i ce to Zeus Bas i l eus(c f . Fon ten rose 19782248) . The h i s to r i ca l l y genu ineDelphic ut terances are much less exot ic , and more l ikethose of some Afr ican and Amerindian oracles, than are theDelphic prophecies of legend and l i terature.

8. The aptness of the exper imental analogy for d iv inat ionwas a l ready recogn ized by Evans -Pr i t cha rd (L937) .

9. Moore (L957) has put forward or ig inal v iews on thefunct ion of the aleatory in d iv inat ion which di f fer f romthose adopted here. Moore argues that the introduct ion ofrandomness into human behavior through divination can,under certa in c i rcurnstances, have a posi t ive surv ivalvalue, and that th is is what is accompl ished by therandomness-generating device in Naskapi scapulimancy(shoulder-blade div inat ion) and perhaps in other d iv inatorytechniques as wel l . But Park (L967) points out that an oddcrack in the heated shoulder b lade would not lead i ts usersto set of f in an obviously unproduct ive di rect ion on i tsaccount; th is oracle was not ent i re ly random in i tsbehavioral ef fects. Rather, the value of i ts chancemechanism lay in i ts impart ia l i ty , which al lowed i t to g ivedecis ions of an author i ty that was not personal in or ig in.Whi le Moore is ent i re ly correct in st ressing thenonintent ional aspect of d iv inat ion, h is conclusion thatits function is to introduce randomness into human behavioris at most part ia l ly correct .

10. Though some of what was now at t ract ing at tent ion hadalso been extractable, at least in ernbryonic form, frorn thes e n i n a l w o r k o f M a l i n o w s k i ( 1 9 3 5 ) .

1L. And, Iest we conclude that the div inatory rnode isgui te a l ien to modern societ ies, i t should be noted thatseveral of i ts key features surv ive today: not only in

115

actual d iv inat ions l ike the f lower petal -pul l ing that

accompanies the chi ldrs refra in, t tshe loves me, she loves

me nol . . . r r , but a lso in secular ized forms of aesthet ic and

play behavior, fron garnbling to the enjolnnent of rnystery

narrat i -ves.

1 r 6

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