The End of the Cold Year - 25 Years On Cold War History

General Introduction by Michael CoxNo single event after World War II was to generate as much controversy amongst historians as the origins of the Cold War. But it was not until the 1960s that many in the West began to question the hitherto unchallenged notion that the key reason for the conflict was that decidedly expansionist, distinctly totalitarian anti-body known as the Soviet Union. Then something rather extraordinary happened. The old consensus gave way to an altogether different narrative not because of any new archival discovery but quite simply because the world had changed: in part because of Americas increasingly contested intervention into Vietnam; in part because of the growth of a distinct counter-culture in the West; and in part because the old idea of a monolithic and unified communist threat to the great globe itself no longer made much sense. And inevitably, as the world changed, so too did the way that many historians wrote about the Cold War. Indeed, something now defined as revisionism became all the rage, to such a degree that by the end of the 1960s a new generation of critical Americans were insisting that it was not the aggressive ambitions of the USSR which had caused the tensions, but rather those of an altogether more powerful and purposeful United States. In search of new markets to conquer, self-confident in its position of preponderance, and equipped with an ideology of liberal exceptionalism that could countenance no opposition, America it was now argued had not only caused the conflict. It had kept it alive thereafter with a series of provocations all designed to ensure its primacy in the new bipolar world.But nothing in history stays the same forever, and over time the revisionists themselves came under attack during what has now come to be referred to by some writers as the long 1970s. This did not lead to a complete counter-revolution. Few now championed the old line of an ideologically driven USSR seeking world domination. Rather historians now adopted a more balanced - post-revisionist -position that was neither right-wing nor radical but instead measured and moderate.Gone too was the blame game, its place now being taken by an analysis of the Cold War that viewed it less and less as a competition between two missionary superpowers guided by clearly defined master plans, and more as a tragedy or dilemma in which policy-makers on both sides unintentionally fed insecurities on the other.Indeed, as the historical debate shifted, so too did the way in which analysts viewed the meaning of the Cold War. Should we now be viewing it as a dangerous, zero-sum conflict, they asked? Hadnt the Cold War in fact introduced a certain kind of stability to great power relations? And if it had as it seemed have done in the era of superpower dtente and Ostpolitik in the 1970s should we not be thinking of the Cold War in perhaps more benign terms? Many clearly thought so, and a spate of books and articles now began to appear suggesting one of two things: either that the real Cold War with its intense ideological rivalries had, in effect, come to an end; or that we should now regard the Cold War less as something war causing and more as a system that had brought some degree of stability to a once war-prone world. This did not mean the Cold War was entirely without risk. What it did mean though was that the world was less unstable after the war than it had been before it. Certainly, when compared to the extraordinarily conflict-ridden period that had opened up in 1914 and closed in 1945 the Cold War looked to have created a world order in which great power differences could now be managed without resort to war. Two developments put paid to this way of thinking: the election in 1980 of an American president who announced in very Cold War terms that the United States would soon be consigning the USSR into that proverbial dustbin of history; and the emergence of a novel kind of Soviet leader who started to talk quite openly about constructing a new kind of relationship with the capitalist West. The rise of both leaders was of enormous significance of course, for both in their very different ways posed a serious challenge to the normal way of thinking about the Cold War relationship. Nonetheless, the bulk of writers and the overwhelming majority of policy-makers continued to think that the old order would persist. Reagan might have sounded radical and Gorbachev more user-friendly to western ears. But the structures in which both operated were not likely to change any time soon. Nor was there much chance of serious change occurring anyway. The two superpowers may have had their fair share of problems. In fact, a minor industry had arisen in the 1980s predicting the decline of at least one of them (the United States). But neither the US nor the Soviet Union showed serious signs of failing altogether. Bipolarity and the long peace which some claimed the Cold War had produced looked as secure as ever. There is now a voluminous literature about how this apparently secure world collapsed in 1989 and no doubt much more will be written in the future. But at least two things can be said about the end of the Cold War with certainty. One is that hardly anybody of significance saw it coming; and the other is that once it had ended writers once more began to man their various theoretical and political barricades in what turned into yet another deeply divisive debate about the Cold War - though this time not about its meaning but about why it had come to an unexpected end! Thus on one side stood those of a more conservative persuasion who thought that it was the tough policies of Ronald Reagan that had made the decisive difference. Meanwhile, on the other, there was an equally vocal group that maintained Reagans get tough policies had if anything extended the Cold War. Indeed, if one wished to explain 1989 one should look less at the Reagan factor and more at Soviet economic problems and the ways in which these compelled a Soviet retreat. This however did not satisfy the members of at least two other camps: one which pointed to the central role played by at least one very remarkable individual namely Mikhail Gorbachev in bringing about change; and another (later sailing under the banner of constructivism) which assigned an equally special place to ideas in making 1989 possible. Nor did the debate end there. As the archives opened and we were able to look in more detail at the diplomacy of the period, other writers began to look beyond the superpowers, suggesting that it was not so much what was being said or done in Moscow and Washington that shaped the course of history but rather the diplomatic interventions of key European leaders like Mitterrand, Thatcher, and Kohl.Whether or not one sees the end of the Cold War as the result of US pressure, Soviet economic decline, Gorbachevs new thinking, or even the unintended consequence of poorly thought out policies emanating from Moscow, there is little doubting how much academic excitement has been generated by the end of the Cold War. Hopefully this collection of essays will convey some of that excitement. Published in the journal Cold War History over the better part of a decade, together the articles here provide what we think is a fascinating guide to at least some of the key issues. In the first section, four lively pieces by senior academics discuss one of the most controversial of questions: namely, not how did the Cold War end or what caused it to end, but instead who ended the Cold War. Stated bluntly - was it Gorbachev or Reagan? In the second section, articles by two leading historians one Russian, the other Norwegian look at the end of the Cold War and suggest interesting and very different ways of thinking about the forces that led to Gorbachev taking the decisions he did in 1989. Of one thing we can be certain, however. The question as to whether it was Soviet imperial overstretch or Gorbachev that was the critical factor in determining what happened in 1989 will be debated for many years to come.Diplomacy also played a crucial role during 1989 and 1990 and the central importance of diplomacy is brought home in two detailed pieces published in section three of this collection. Finally, in sections four and five we look at the often ignored part played by Europeans in bringing the Cold War in Europe to an end. Indeed, in the fifth and last section, two writers, including myself, attempt to show that triumphalism of any sort - in this case of the American variety has no place in the way historians should be thinking about 1989. The West may have been the winner in 1989. Liberal democracy may have been the outcome. But that is not the same thing as suggesting (as some have done, unfortunately) that only one country in the West helped bring about this transformational change. Europe may have remained dependent on American protection; and the USA can legitimately lay claim to having helped overcome Europes division in 1989. But without the attractive pull of Europe and the active part played by certain key Europeans, the process may have been more drawn out and the outcome less favourable to peace. Europe was very much present at its own recreation in 1989.