loc.gov digest upto drilon

DIGEST of LOCAL GOVERNMENT Cases By TEP ABRENICA

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WARNING!!!! These are all based on my pure understanding of the case. It is still better to read the full-text. AND, beware of WRONG grammarSSSSSS! :D thank you! Hope these help. :D

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR. 169752; 25 September 2007)

DOCTRINE:

A Certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public corporation.

Criterion to Determine if a corporation is a Public or Private: Totality of the Relation of the Corporation to the State – if the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that is considered PUBLIC otherwise, it is PRIVATE.

FACTS:

Philippine Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animal (Phil. Society) was incorporated by Act. No. 1285 BY the Philippine Commission – its PRIMARY purpose is to secure the protections and welfare of animals, which redounds to the public good.

It was chartered to ENFORCE laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or protection of animals and to DO and PERFORM all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

It has the power to APPREHEND (arrest) violators of animal welfare law and to SHARE ½ of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

C.A. 148, revoked the power to arrest or apprehend violators to and

to retain a portion of the fines collected for the violations. And Subsequently by the E.O 63 of President Quezon.

COA visited the Phil. Society to conduct an audit survey to the

Corporations revenue and receipts and expenditures.

Phil. Society refused on the ground that it was a private entity not under the COA jurisdiction, on the ff. grounds:

a. It was deprived of its POWER to ARREST and retention of fines collected.

b. During the time it was incorporated there was no Corporation Code or any other general law for it to be incorporated.

COA insisted there authority on Phil. Society, and such is a GOCC

due to the ff: grounds: a. Phil. Society has a PUBLIC Purpose b. It was created through a government charter.

ISSUES: W/N Phil. Society is an agency of the government that may be

subject to COA’s Audit. HELD: Phil. Society is NOT an agency of the government BUT a PRIVATE CORPORATION. Due to the FOLLOWING grounds:

(1) The Phil. Society has NO more power to apprehend or arrest violators to cruelty to animals due to E.0 63

(2) The Phil. Society is NOT subject to control and supervision by any agency of the State.

(3) Employees of Phil. Society are registered and covered by the SSS and not GSIS

(4) Even though Phil. Society is vested with public purpose, such does not make the entity a public corporation. - The determining criterion if a corporation is public or

private if the corporation created by the State was for the State’s agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying its governmental functions, if such a public corporation, if NOT, it is private corporation. (called Totality of the Relation of the Corporation to the State)

- The PHIL. SOCIETY is a QUASI-PUBLIC Corporation, which are private corporation rendering public service. – it is a specie of a private corporation.


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PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) PEACE PANEL ON

ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (G.R. 183591;; 14 October 2008)

DOCTRINE:

MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international concept of association -- ―associate state‖ arrangement is used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way of full independence.

The Philippine Constitution does not recognize any state in its jurisdiction other than the Philippines State NOR it provides for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine Territory for independence. – the ―associate state‖ goes beyond granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government.

FACTS:

GRP and MILF scheduled a signing of MOA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

MOA-AD signing did not materialize because the Court upon motion of the petitioners issued a TRO from signing.

Various Petition was filed to the Court alleging the MOA-AD

unconstitutional, allowing to such signing will entail Amendments to the Philippine Constitution.

Overview of MOA-AD

It recognizes the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region and IPRA (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act)

It is divided into 4 parts, namely: (1) Concepts and Principles; (2) Territory; (3) Resources and (4) Governance (1) Concepts and Principles (2)

- the people of Mindanao are called ―Bangsamoro‖

- ―Bangsamoro People” are the native or original inhabitants of MIndano and its adjacent islands including Palawan and Sulu

- Bangsamoro People are the FIRST NATION – with

defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treatioes of amity and independence

- ―Bangsamoro Homeland” – ownership is vested

exclusively in Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation

- Bangsamoro have the RIGHT of SELF-GOVERNANCE

rooted in Ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their SULTANATES.

- ―BAngsamoro Judicial Entity” (BJE) – grants

jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsomor.

(3) Territory - land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, alluvial, aerial and atmospheric space domain embracing Mindanao, Sulu – Palawan geographic regions. - BJE has jurisdiction over the geographic are of ARMM (

Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Nort, Marawi, Sulu, Tawi-tawi and Basilan) and the Palawan

- BJE has jurisdiction over all natural resources within its territorial and internal waters 15 km from coastline of BJE Area.

- BJE has JOINT jurisdiction with the Central Government

(RP) of authority and management over all natural resources

(4) Resources - BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and

trade relation with foreign countries and have the option to establish trade missions in those countries.

- External defense duty and obligation are on the RP and it is the RP’s obligation to ensure necessary steps BJE’s participation in international meetings and events.

- BJE has the CONTROL within its terriotorial jurisdiction,

the right or exploring, producing and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil, fuel, mineral oil and natural gas. --- in such case, RP can only assume control over such ONLY in national emergency UPON agreement with the BJE.

(5) Governance - COMPREHENSIVE COMPACT to be made to embody

the details for the effective enforcement and mechanism and modalities for actual implementation of MOA_AD.

MOA-AD described the relationship of RP and BJE as ASSOCIATIVE (having a shared authority and responsibility)

- Where it provides that ―provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments

MOA-AD structure of government is based on Executive, Legislative, Judicial and Adminstrative Institution, such powers and functions to be defined in Comprehensive Compact.

ISSUE: W/N MOA-AD is CONSTITUTIONAL HELD: MOA-AD is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the power granted to BJE exceed to those power granted to ANY local government under the Constitution and present laws. RATIO: (the only thing connected to Local Gov.)

MOA-AD characterized the relationship of the Central Government and BJE as ASSOCIATIVE – having a shared responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions

In international law, ASSOCIATION is formed when 2 states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links, One state the ASSOCIATE STATE delegates certain responsibilities to the PRINCIPAL STATE, while maintaining status as 1 state. --- This arrangement is used as a TRANSITIONAL DEVICE of former colonies on their way of full independence.

MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the CONCEPT of ASSOCIATION in international law --- that clearly VEST in the BJE the STATUS of an ―Associate State‖… the following provisions are:

i. BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries


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ii. Commitment of RP to ensure the BJE’s participation in meetings and events in ASEAN and specialized UN agencies

iii. Continuing responsibility of the RP over external defense iv. BJE’s Right to participate in Philippine Official missions

bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protections and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands of their ancestral domain

The CONCEPT of ASSOCIATION is NOT recognized under the CONSTITUTION. -- the constitution, recognized that the local or regional governemt and the Autonomous regions, are political subdivisions created within the framework of the Constitution and the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. --- concept of association is a preparation for independence or an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status.

BJE is a STATE more powerful than the ARMM, because it has a permanent population, defined territory, a government and have a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

MOA-AD is in conflict to the Constitution, signing of such would amend the constitution.

- Under Art. 10, Sec. 20, ORGANIC act of ARMM is vested with

legislative power over like administrative organization, creation of sources revenues, ancestral domain and natural resources and the Like.

Such Constitutional provision DOES not grant ARMM to freely on its own to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with FOREIGN COUNTRIES – because under the Constitution such is POWER is vested ONLY to the PRESIDENT.

In MOA-AD, it empowered BJE to freely enter into economic and trade relations to other foreign countries.

BASCO vs. PAGCOR (G.R. 91649 May 14, 1991)

DOCTRINE:

Congress has the power of control over local governments, if the Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions.

The power of local government to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchise, license, permits was withdrawn P.D. 771, NOT is vested exclusively on the National Government

Local governments can only be a intra-sovereign subdivision of 1 sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government can only mean measure of decentralization of the function of government.

FACTS: Basco, Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City of Manila

filed a petition seeking to annul the Charter of PAGCOR because it is contrary to morals, public policy and order.

Basco alleged that the Charter of PAGCOR P.D. 1869, constituted a waiver of the right of City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees --- that is violative of the principle of local autonomy.

PD. 1869 contained an exemption clause, exempting PAGCOR, as a

franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether local or National.

ISSUE: W/ PD.1869 is VIOLATIVE of Principle of Local Autonomy HELD: NO, PD. 1869 exemption to local or national tax is not violative of the principle of local autonomy. (1) City of Manila, as a municipal corporation has NO inherent right to

impose tax.

- Power to tax is inherently vested to the legislative branch – who has the power to delegate such power to another government entity or instrumentality.

- City of Manila is subject to control by the Congress, and if Congress can grant the city of Manila power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or take back the power.

(2) The POWER of City of Manila to IMPOSE license fees on gambling had been revoked by P.D> 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.

Therefore, ONLY the National Government has the power to issue license or permits for the operation of gambling. SINCE, the imposition of license fees where withdrawn, local government have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.


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LINA, JR. vs. PANO ( GR 129093 August 30, 2001)

DOCTRINE:

Local autonomy cannot be used by the local government to enact Ordinances that go against the enacted law of the Congress.

Municipal Governments are merely AGENTS of the National government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by the Congress – Ordinances by LGU should not contravene an existing statue enacted by the Congress

FACTS:

Calvento agent of PCSO will install LOTTO terminal in San Pedro Laguna ASKED Mayor Cataquiz for Mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet.

Mayor denied the request, based on the ORDINANCE it issued, objecting the game of LOTTO in the place of Laguna.

The ORDINANCE stated that all kinds of gambling are prohibited in their province, Laguna.

Calvento filed a complaint of declaratory relief, praying that the court order the mayor to refrain from implementing its Ordinance and requiring the mayor to grant him mayor’s permit for the operation of lotto.

RTC ordered the Mayor to refrain from implementing the ordinance. Calvento filed an Appeal. Thus, filing the case.

Petitioner (Mayor) assailed that: (1) the ORDINANCE is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial

Government of Laguna – as their valid exercise of their police power as vested to them by the Local Government Code.

(2) Also he maintained that the LOTTO operation is illegal because no prior consultation and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of LGC Sec. 2(c).

Respondent (Calvento) argued that the (1) questioned ORDINANCE curtail the power of the state, since it

was the NATIONAL LEGISLATURE who declared the LOTTO as LEGAL and PERMITTED its operation around the country, through PCSO, in which the legislature granted the franchise to operate the lotto.

(2) The LGC Sec.2 (c) (requiring prior consultation and approval) is NOT mandatory, because such is ONLY a declaration of policy and not self-executing of the LGC.

ISSUE: (1) W/N Ordinance is VALID (2)W/N Prior consultation and approval by the concerned LGU is needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given LGU.

HELD: (1) The Ordinance is VALID, for such is a part of their LOCAL

AUTONOMY to air its view which may be contrary to that of the national government. HOWEVER, such LOCAL autonomy DOES not MEAN that the local government may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by the Congress. The GAME of LOTTO is duly authorized by the National government through RA1169 (PCSO) which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries.

(2) NO, LGU Sec. 2(c) – prior consultation and approval by LGU, is ONLY applicable to the national programs and/or projectes which are to be implemented in a particular local community. LOTTO is not a program nor a project, but of a charitable institution.

LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN

(GR. 80391 February 28, 1989)

DOCTRINE:

ARMM are subject to the jurisdiction of our National Court. ARMM exercise the autonomy as decentralization of administration

and NOT autonomy as decentralization of power.

FACTS

Limbona as the Speaker of the Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Aseembly), sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Alimbuyao that there will be NO session of the Assembly due to the committee hearing of Congress, in which Limbona was invited for the consultation and dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions 10 & 12.

The Assembly in defiance HELD its session in which it declared the SEAT of SPEAKER vacant.

Limbon filed a petition for injunction praying that declaring the Assmebly session as Null and Void.

Pending Action, the Assembly submitted a Resolution in court, expelling Limbona from the Membership because of the following grounds:

(1) Limbona usurps the power of Assembly by paying Abdula who

is considered resigned salaries and emoluments.

(2) Limbona withdraw amount of cash from the Assembly resulting

to the non-payment of salaries and emoluments to themembers

(3) LImbona filed a case against some members of the Assembly to

the S.C. which should had been resolved within the confines of

the Assembly

Upon submission of the Resolution, the Assembly submitted the Petition had become moot and academic/.

*** In this case, the MAIN issue is W/N there was a valid removal of LImbona as the Speaker of the Assembly by the Assembly held in session with a quorum. *** however, the COURT, issued on whether such Assembly is under the jurisdiction of the Court to be able to establish its authority to decide the case. – in such this is the thing related to the Loc. Gov. ISSUE: W/N ARMM is subject to the jurisdiction of the National Court HELD: YES, ARMM is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, even they exercise local autonomy much greater that the autonomy given to the LGUs.

(1) ARMM exercises the autonomy as decentralization of administration and NOT autonomy as decentralization of power because: a. Under PD 1618, the President shall have the power of

general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.

b. ARMM Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services.


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THUS! We assume jurisdiction of the case.

DISOMANGCOP vs. DATUMANONG (GR. 149848;; November 25, 2004)

DOCTRINE:

Organic acts enjoys the affirmation by a plebiscite, thus, it more than an ordinary statutes, HENCE, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute.

FACTS:

RA 6734 (Organic Act) was enacted and signed into law after ensuing a plebiscite pursuant to the Constitutional Mandate of the creation of Autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. (Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi2x)

RA 6734, contained elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government.

In line with RA 6734, Pres. Aquino issued E.O426 – transferring the CONTROL and SUPERVISOIN of DPWH to ARRMM, including its functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, budget and liabilities (in the year 1990)

After 9 years (1999), DPWH Sec. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 creating DPWH Marawi Sub District Engineering Office – who has the jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities in MArawi City and Province of Lanao Del Sur.

In 2001, Pres. Estrada, signed RA. 8999 - An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the 1st District of the Province of Lanao Del Sur and Marawi City and Appropriating Funds Thereof.

RA 9054 was enacted AMENDING RA 6734 and was ratified by a plebiscite containing the same Regional Government powers and jurisdiction and reserved areas of powers and jurisdiction for the National Government.

Disomangcop and Dimalotang as Officer-In-Charge and District Engineer of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao Del Sur, FILED a PETITION to DPWH Sec. Datumanong to SEEK REVOCATION of Dept. Order 119 and TO implement RA 8999. – NO action was made.

Disomangcop and Dimalotang seek relief to the court alleging:

i. D.O 119 violates the constitutional autonomy of ARMM –for it tasked the MArawi Sub-District Engineering Officer with functions that have already been devolved to DPWH-ARMM in Lanao Del Sur.

ii. RA 8999, was not subjected to prior consultation and public hearing with the DPWH-ARMM and diminished the power of ARMM of local autonomy by depriving it the power and control over public works and infrastructure.

Datumanong argued that RA 8999 did not diminish the power of ARMM, such is constitutional.

ISSUE: W/ N RA 8999 is constitutional that amend the Organic Act HELD:

NO! RA 8999 NEVER became operative thus, cannot amend the Organic Act. –BECAUSE,

it failed to undergo the PLEBSCITE REQUIREMENT.

- RA 6734 (Organic Act) enjoy the affirmation by a plebiscite, it is more than an ordinary statute AND a deemed part of regional autonomy scheme. HENCE, the provisions cannot be amended by an ordinary statute like RA 8999 If RA 8999 seeks to AMEND the RA 6734, it should had been submitted to a Plebsicite – in this case, it had not been submitted.

- Also, the Organic Act is anchored on the 1987 Constitution, by providing for the grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the autonomous region.

RA 8999 was REPEALED and SUPERSEDED by the enactment of RA 9054

- RA 9054 was a statute later dated and the legislature HAD a

clear INTENTION of granting the power of regional urban and rural planning to the ARMM HOWEVER, RA 8999 ventures into establishing the National Government’s jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao Del Sur THUS! it is patently inconsistent with RA 9054

RA 8999 contravenes DECENTRALIZATION – local

autonomy of the ARMM – as granted by the Constitution, the regional autonomy – it transferred to the National Government for administrative autonomy for development and appropriation of funds. - The aim of the constitution, is to extend to the autonomous

people the RIGHT of SELF-DETERMINATION (refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the autonomous people’s uniqueness and grant self-expression and self-construction.)

- S.C upheld the doctrine in Cordillera Board vs. COA (1990) – that the ARMM enjoys the greater power of autonomy than the LGU – ARMM enjoys the power of DEVOLUTION – political decentralization – allowing Self-Government.

In pursuance thereto, RA 9054, gave ARMM the power to

decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure projects.

However, RA 8999, clearly curtails the power and control of

public works and infrastructure in ARRM and gave the control back to the National Government.

In the Case of D.O 119, -- it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because, it violates the provision of E.O. 426, granting to the ARMM the power, responsibility, liabilities and control of DPWH in the regions it covered.


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BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. CA

(GR. 138819 September 29, 2004)

DOCTRINE:

Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the Local Government Code (general welfare clause) must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and consistent with the laws or policy of the State.

LGU cannot enact an Ordinance or Resolution in violation of a general law.

Municipal authorities cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.

Absence of Constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchise.

FACTS:

Batangas Sangguniang Panglungsod (Sangguniang) issued a Resolution granting CATV a permit to construct, intstall and operate in Batangas City , it PROVIDED, that any increase in rates shall be subjected to the approval of the Sangguniang

CATV increased its subscription rates from 88 to 180 per month.

Mayor wrote a letter to CATV threatening that if CATV does not secure the approval of the Sangguniang for the increase in rate, it will cancel the permit to conduct business.

CATV filed an Petition in RTC alleging that Sangguniang has NO

authority to regulate the subscriber rated charged by the CATV operates BECAUSE pursuant to EO 205, National Telecommunication Commission(NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operaiotn in the Philippines.

RTC ruled in favor of CATV –

CA reversed on the ground that NTC’s authority does not preclude the Sangguniang from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under the LGC vested power to the Sangguniang. Hence, petition of CATV.

ISSUES: W/N the LGU can regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction. HELD: NO! CATV industry is under the regulatory power of the NTC, a national

government.

- PD 1512 – terminated all franchises, permits, or certificates for the operation of the CATV System previously granted by local governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the national government.

- EO-546 – was issued by P. Marcos, to form NTC with a functions :

i. Issue certificate of Public convenience for the operation of the communication utilities and services…. And television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities.

ii. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operations of particular operator of public service communications; and

iii. DETERMINE and PRESCRIBE charges or rates

pertinent to operate such public utility

- EO 436 – issued by P.Ramos, prescribing policies and guidelines to govern CATV operaition and restated the NTC’s regulatory power over CATV operations.

However, CATV is still under the regulatory power of the LGU. But matters of concern in the case, it is NTC.

- There is NO dispute that Sangguniang is empowered by the LGC to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of LGC.

- LGU can regulate CATV in pursuant to general welfare clause – only on matters of Physical realities of constructing CATV System –the use of public streets, right of way, the founding of structures and the parceling of larger regions

Resolution issued by the LGU, usurps a power exclusively vestred in the NTC—the fixing of subscriber rates. *** see doctrine to elaborate.

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.


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DADOLE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (GR. 125350 December 3, 2002)

DOCTRINE:

The Supervisory power of the President is different from the power of control exercised by Congress

The political subdivision are SUBJECTED to the PRESIDENT SUPERVISION only, not control, as long as the political subdivisions ACTS exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers.

FACTS: (1) Mandaue City issued an ORDINANCE increasing the received

monthly allowance of RTC and MTC Judges to P 1260 each (1991)

(2) 1994, Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued CIRCULAR stating:

- The Amount of additional allowances to be given to national government employees and officials assigned in their locality shall not exceed P1K and in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities.

(3) Acting on the Circular, Mandaue City AUDITOR issued notices of disallowance to the RTC Judges (to the petitioner) on the basis of the circular that the allowance given EXCEEDS the amount allowed in the circular.

(4) The Auditor reduced the allowance to 1K and asked the petitioners to reimburse the received excess amount.

(5) Petitoin filed a PROTEST to the City Auditor and forwarded it to

COA on the ground that City Ordinance prevail over the DBM Circular.

- The Circular is VOID as it infringe on the LOCAL AUTONOMY of Mandaue city by dictating a uniform amount for the LGU to disburse as additional allowance to judges stationed

- The ORDINANCE was ALLOWED in the Local Gov’t Code. --- LGU are allowed to provided additional allowances and other benefits tot judges, prosecutors and etc.. WHEN Finances of the city government allows.

(6) COA decided that the DBM Circular prevail over the Ordinance,

BECAUSE…

i. DBM was created through Administrative order of the President pursuant to the Local government Cod

ii. DBM has responsibilities to specify RATES of PAY to the local government positions and to GRANT allowances and additional forms of compensation to the local government employees.

(7) Petitoiner Appealed in SC.

(8) Solicitor General opinioned in favor to the Petitioners stating that:

a. DBM only enjoys the power to review and determine whether the disbursement of funds were made in accordance of the LGU ordinance

b. COA has ONLY auditorial visitorial power over LGU

(9) COA argued that the grant of Local Autonomy is subject to the Control of the Congress and it is for the President through DBM to check whether these legislative limitations are beign followed by the LGU. - The Local Gov’t Code imposes a LIMIT to the disbursement of

additional allowances and other benefits for judges and etc.. in the phrase ―subject to the condition that the finances of the city govenrmen should allow the same”

- THUS, DBM, is merely enforcing the condition of the law when it SET a UNIFORM MAXIMUM amount for the additional allowances that the city government can release to judges.

ISSUES: W/NJ DBM Circular is VOID for going beyond the supervisory

power of the President HELD: YES! DBM Circular is VOID because it goes beyond the supervisory power of the President. Pursuant to the Constitutional provision, the PRESIDENT is only

vested with SUPERVISORIAL POWER over the LGUs. Supervision- means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. IF the subordinate officer FAIL or NEGLECT to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step to make them perform their duties.

The President can ONLY interfere in the affairs and activities of a

LGUs if he or she finds that the LGU has acted contrary to law.

HENCE, President or any of his alter ego CANNOT interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned LGU acted within the parameters of the law and the constitution.

Any directive by the President or his alter ego going beyond the supervisory power, violates the PRINCIPLE of LOCAL AUTONOMY and separation of powers of the executive and legislative department in governing LGUs.

Legislative department is given the POWER of CONTROL over LGUS.

(CONTROL – means the power of the officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter)

DBM Circular limiting the additional allowance to be given by a LGU

is VOID. DBM over stepped its power of supervision over LGU by IMPOSING a PROHIBITION that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement.

Local Government Code, grants the LGU authority to grant

additional allowances if their financial standing allows them so.


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PIMENTEL , Jr. vs. AGUIRRE (GR. 132988 July 19, 2000)

DOCTRINE:

LGUs enjoys FISCAL AUTONOMY – means, LGUs have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, and their power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.

The national government can interfere to the LGUs Fiscal autonomoy, through the PRESIDENT power of formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and program. HOWEVER, such power is SUBJECTED to ―consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sector and local government unit‖ – the President cannot do unilaterally.

FACTS: (1) 1997, President issued AO 372 stating:

a. LGU for the Fiscal year 1998 WILL reduce its total

expenditures by at least 20% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal service items; and

b. 10% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for LGU shall be

WITHHELD pending assessment of Developmen Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.

(2) 1998, President Estrada signed AO 43, amending AO 372, decreasing the amount to 5% of IRA to be withheld.

(3) Petitioner filed a case in S.C. arguing the following:

a. In issuing the AO 372, the President violates the principle of

local autonomy, through exercising power of control rather

than the power of supervision.

- Because. AO 372, COMMANDS the LGU to reduce its

expenditures for at least 20% of authorized regular

appropriation. And withholding 10%/5% of the IRA.

b. AO 372 and 43, withholding 10%/5% of IRA is contrary to the

Constitution providing for automatic release to the LGUs from

the national internal revenue.

(4) Solicitor General opinioned that AO 327 DOES NOT VIOLATE the

power of supervision because, AO was issued to alleviate the economic difficulties brought about the peso devaluation. ALSO, it does not violate the local autonomy because it DIRECTS the LGUs to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures.

ISSUES: W/N AO 372 is a valid exercise of President’s power of general supervision over LGUs.

HELD: LGUs are granted with FISCAL AUTONOMY where the LGUs has the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government and power to allocate their resources in accordance with their priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets and to work within the constraints thereof. HOWEVER, such fiscal autonomy is subject to the President’s general power of supervision, by ensuring that the LGUs fiscal programs are consistent with the national goals.

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo

(GR. 152774 May 27, 2004)

DOCTRINE: It is clear in the constitution that LGUs, in receiving its just share to

the national taxes, they DO are NOT REQUIRED to perform any act to receive the just share.

The Automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and promote local autonomy.

FACTS: (1) General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001 were

enacted and was implemented.

(2) Under the GAAs, it created a program LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF)

(3) Under the GAAs law,

a. an amount of Php 96,780,000.00 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes

b. Php 5 Billion shall be earmarked for the LGSEF for the funding requirements of projects and activities arising from the full and efficient implementation of devolved functions and services of LGUs, SHALL be RELEASED to the LGUs, SUBJECT to the implementing rules and regulations prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution.

(4) Oversight Committee passed the following resolution and was

approved by the President.

i. Adoption of the allocation scheme

ii. Set aside 20% of the LGSEF for local affirmative action projects and other priority initiatives for LGUs institutional and capability building n accordance to the Oversight committee Implementing Guidelines.

(5) Oversight Committee formulated the GUIDELINES

- LGUs were REQUIRED to identify the projects eligible for

funding under the LGSEF and submit the project proposals and

other documentary requirements to the DILG for appraisal.

- The Project proposals that passed the DILG’s appraisal would then be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. UPON approval, the Oversight committee would then serve notice to DBM for the preparation of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the LGUs

(6) Petitioner filed in S.C. assailing the unconstitutionality of the GAAs

relating to LGSEF and the Oversight Committee Resolutions - The GAAs and Resolution IMPOSED CONDITIONS for the

release of the IRA to the LGUs. Thus, contrary to the principle of local autonomy

- It contravenes the Constitution mandate that the share of the LGUs to the national taxes shall be automatically released to them.

(7) Respondents contends that the GAAs and Resolution are not

unconstitutional

- Constitution allows the Congress to determine what is the

JUST SHARE of the LGUs to the national taxes.


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ISSUES: W/N GAAs and Resolutions violates the Constitutional precept of local autonomy

HELD: YES! GAAs and Resolution violates local autonomy It is clear in the constitution that LGUs, in receiving its just share to the national taxes, they DO are NOT REQUIRED to perform any act to receive the just share. Under Art. 10 Sec. 6, it specifically stated ―LGUs, just share as determined by law, national taxes shall be automatically released to them‖ In the GAAs and Resolution, it is clear that a portion of the IRA to be released is SUBJECTED to the implementing rules and regulations prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution. Hence, The LGSEF cannot be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committee PRIOR APPROVAL, and such approval can only be gained if the LGUs complied with the guidelines promulgated by the Oversight Committee

The ENTIRE process makes the RELEASE NOT AUTOMATIC.

Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the lGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution. The assailed provisions constitute a ‖WITHHOLDING‖ of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the 5 billion pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations prescribed by the Oversight Committee. The Assailed provisions in GAAs and Resolution effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs.

ACCORD vs. ZAMORA

(GR. 144256 June 8, 2005)

DOCTRINE: Legislative and executive are mandated by the Constitution to

ensure that just share of LGUs in the National Revenue are automatically released.

FACTS: (1) General Appropriations Act of 2000 was signed and enacted by Pres.

Estrada.

(2) GAA of 2000 stated the following:

a. Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for LGUs amount to Php 111, 788,000.00.

b. Under ―INPROGRAMMED FUND‖ title – amount of P10Billion apart from P111,7888,999.00. shall be USED to FUND IRA which shall be RELEASED ONLY when the original revenue target submitted by the President to Congress can be realized, based on a quarterly assessments to be conducted by certain Committees which the GAA specifically states.

(3) Petitions were filed in the S.C. questioning the constitutionality of the above portions of the GAA of 2000, ON the GROUNDs: a. VIOLATION of LOCAL AUTONOMY by:

i. Unlawfully REDUCING by Php10B the IRA due to the

LGUs; ii. Unlawfully WITHHOLDING the release of such amount

by placing the same under ―unprogrammed funds‖

Hence, they violate the constitutional mandate that LGUs just share in national taxes shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED.

b. UNDUE DELEGATION of Legislative Power to the Secretaries

of DBM, National Treasurer and COA

(4) Respondents argued that the constitutional provision of automatic release, is ONLY addressed to the EXECUTIVE. Hence, the LEGISLATIVE is NOT prevented to impose conditions upon the release of the IRA. In doing so, the President cannot unilaterally withhold the release BUT with a STATUTE by the Legislative, such withholding is plausible.

ISSUES: (1) W/N reducing IRA due to the LGUs by 10B and withholding the

release of such is a violation of Local Autonomy.

(2) W/N the legislative through a statute WITHHOLD the automatic release of IRA of the LGUs.

HELD: (1) YES! Reducing the IRA to 10B and withholding the release

is a VIOLATION of Local Autonomy Automatic release implies that the just share of the LGUs should be released as a matter of a course. EXCEPT, (as provided by the LGC) id the National Internal revenye collections for the current fiscal year is LESS than 40% of the collections of the preceding 3rd fiscal year.


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GAA of 2000 mandates otherwise, it provided for a withholding for the IRA release until the original revenue target given by the President is to be achieved. NOTABLY the fiscal year in which GAA of 2000 precedes does not fall under the exception.

(2) NO! the legislative cannot withhold the IRA, as the constitution mandate it should be automatically be released. Under the constitutional provision, 3 THINGS it mandates: 1. LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the national taxes 2. The JUST SHARE shall be determined by LAW; and 3. Just share shall be AUTOMATICALLY released to the LGUs

Hence, ONLY the JUST SHARE of LGUs can be CONTROLLED by the Legislative, due to the ―as determined by law‖ clause stated in the provision.

The RELEASE of the National Taxes is not qualified under such clause, thus, CONGRESS is NOT authorized to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.

Legislative and executive are mandated by the Constitution to ensure that just share of LGUs in the National Revenue are automatically released.

KIDA vs SENATE

(GR. 196271 October 18, 2011)

FACTS: (1) RA 10153 (Synchronization of the Election in ARMM with the

National and Local Elections and for other purposes) was enacted resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the Country.

(2) COMELEC stopped its preparation for the ARMM elections to May2013.

(3) Petitioners filed a petition in SC questioning the constitutionality of

the RA 1053 on of the grounds:

a. RA 10153 grants to the President the POWER to APPOINT Officer-in-Charges(OICs) to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. It is UNCONSITITONAL –because, it power to appoint gives the President power of CONTROL over the ARMM, which is a violation of the principle of local autonomy, that the President only have a GENERA L SUPERVISION over autonomous Regions (Art. 10 Sec. 16 of 1987 Phil. Constitution)

ISSUE: W/N the grant to the President the Power to appoint OICs is an exercise of control over the ARMM, and such is violative of the Constitutional mandate that the President only have the GENERAL SUPERVISION over Autonomous. HELD: NO, the grant of power to appoint OICs to the President by RA 10153, is CONSTITUTIONAL. It does not give the President power of control over the ARMM. The POWER to APPOINT is ESSENTIALLY EXECUTIVE in

NATURE. Under the Constitution, Art. 7 Sec. 16, it specifically states that ― xxx He shall also APPOINT all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, and those whom he was authorized by law to appoint‖

HENCE, the assailed provisions of RA 10153 is CLEAR CONSTITUTIONALLY based. The President’s authority to appoint OICS emanates from RA 10153, it falls under the government officials that the President can appoint based on the constitution.

The APPOINTMENT of OICs does not show power of control but only an interim measure responding to the adjustments for the synchronization of election.

Synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process of the ARMM, the appointment is under a situation of necessity, the adoption is an exercise by the congress of its inherent police power of the State.

***HOWEVER, petitiotners filed a MOTION for RECONSIDERATION

February 28, 2011) RESOLUTION to MOTION for RECONSIDERATION

S.C. RESOLVED: The APPOINT of the PRESIDENT for ARMM OICs is CONSTITUTIONAL

Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law (RA 10153), it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second


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sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President's appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

The grant of power to appoint is not tantamount to power of control and is not violative of the grant of the constitution to the President power of supervision over ARMM.

power of supervision is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law." VS. power of control "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."

In RA 10135, the power to appoint DOES NOT include the POWER to REMOVE. In the wordings of RA 10153, Sec. 3, it stated that once the President has appointed the OICs (Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly) – the OICs appointed will remain in office UNTIL they are replaced by the DULY elected officials in May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision grants to the President the power to remove or recall his appointment .

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure

The CONGRESS enacted the law, to synchronize the ARMM with the national and local elections. To do this, it had to postpone the ARMM elections. In postponing the election, the ARMM will have a PROBLAM on HOW to PROVIDE the ARMM with governance in the intervening period. There are 3 ways:

a. allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (Hold-Over)

b. call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or

c. President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms.

The first 2 options are unconstitutional. First one is Violation of Art. 10 Sec. 8 -- extension of term is to be made, ELECTION is still needed. And the Second option --- the COMELEC has NO power to ORDER special election. THUS, Leaving us to consider the last available option – the lesser evil principle

RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in the ARMM, as well as the community's choice of leaders. The adoption of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook)

SEMA vs. COMELEC (GR. 177597 July 16, 2008)

DOCTRINE: A province cannot be created without a legislative district. Because

under the Constitution, once a city reaches a population of 250,000, the city automatically become entitled to 1 representative (Art. 6 Sec. 5(3)). Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district

FACTS: (1) Pursuan to RA 9054 Sec .6 Sec. 19, ARMM Regional Assembly (

ARMM’s legislature), enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201 (MMA 201) CREATING the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composing the 1st district of Maguindano.

(2) Voters of Maguindanao RATIFIED MMA 201 in a plebiscite. (3) Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City requested COMELEC to

clarify the status of Cotabato City, in view of the conversion of the 1st district of Maguindanao as Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

(4) COMELEC issued a Resolution stating that Cotabato City with Provinces of Shariff Kabunsuan as PART of the 1st district of Maguindanao (status quo) BECAUSE, there is still pending appropriate enactment of such to Congress.

(5) In 2007, COMELEC in preparation of election, issued a Resolution naming Maguindanao has Shariff Kabunsuan Province WITH Cotabato City.

(6) SEMA filed a petition in court claimed:

i. to Nullify the Comelec Resolution in not maintaining Shariff Kabunsuan Province is a legislative district of Maguindanao. AND

ii. Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to 1 legislative representative in Congress pursuant to MMA 201.

(7) In S.C. issued a resolution requiring the parties to COMMENT on the issue:

―whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is entitled to 1 representative in the House of Rep. without a need of a national law creating a legislative district‖

(8) SEMA commented: AFFIRMS,

a. when a province is created by statute, the corresponding

respresentative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute – not by apportionment by operation of the Constitution without reapportionment

b. RA 9054 Art. 6 Sec. 19, is a valud delegation of the Congress to

the ARMM of the power to create provinces

(9) COMELEC commented: a. Under art. 6 Sec. 5(3) of Consti., every new province created by

the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to 1 representative in the HOR even in the absence of a national law;

b. HOWEVER, RA 9054 delegation of creation of provinces is

unconstitutional it contravenes Art 10 Sec 6 and 10 of Constitution and the power to create provinces is withheld from the Autonomous Regions under Art. 10 Sec. 20 of the Constitution.


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(10) Dilangalen commented: NEGATIVE, because:

a. Province under Art. 6 Sec. 5(3) is CREATED by an act of

Congress

b. RA 9054, Art. 6 Sec. 3 withheld from the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national

elections, which ENCOMPASSES the apportionment of

legislative district in every province, Reg. Assembly create will

lead to the disproportionate representative of the ARMM in the

HOR, as they can create provinces without regards to the

requirements in LGC Sec. 461. – it is violative of the

constitution and equal protection clause.

ISSUE(S): W/N RA 9054 Art. 6 Sec. 19 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces is CONSTITUTIONAL HELD: RA 9054 Art. 6 Sec. 19 delegating to ARMM Regional Assembly the power to UNCONSTITIONAL

- It is contrary to Art. 6 Sec. 51 and Art. 10 Sec. 202 of the

Constitution

- ONLY CONGRESS can create provinces and cities because, IT ALSO creates of legislative district, in which the power is ONLY vested to the Congress.

The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.

1 Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. 2 Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.

The ARMM Regional Assembly CANNOT enact a law creating a national office because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only WITHIN its territorial jurisdiction as Provided by the constitution, AND nothing in the provision authorizes the ARMM to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC (GR. 176951 November 18, 2008)

FACTS: (1) 11th Congress, was not able to ACT on 24 Bills for municipalities

converting into a cities. – During this time the income requirement is 20M. *** Also, the 11th Congress was not able to act on the 24 Bills because this was the time when an IMPEACHMENT trial was conducted against President Estrada and the EDSA II Revolution.

(2) 12th Congress enacted RA 9009 amending the LGC, increasing the annual income requirement for municipality to city to 100M.

(3) 13th Congress, enacted the Cityhood Law and became a law due to lapse of time, bearing no President’s signature.

(4) Cityhood Law directed the COMELEC to hold plebiscite to determine whether the VOTERS in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

(5) Petitioner filed a petition in S.C. alleging CITYHOOD LAW is UNCONSTITUTIONAl because of the ff. grounds:

a. Violation of Art. 10 Sec. 103 of the Constitution, such

respondent municipalities DID not complied with the criteria

stated in the LGC.

b. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

c. Wholesale conversion of the municipalities into cities will

reduce the share of existing cities in the IRA because more

cities will share the same amount of IRA.

ISSUE(S): (1) W/N Cityhood Law VIOLATES Art. 10 Sec. 10, in creating Cities, it

does not comply with the Criteria stated in LGC., such unconstitutional

(2) W/N Cityhood violates equal protection clause. HELD: (1) YES! Cityhood is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because of the ff.

grounds: a. 100M income requirement in RA 9009, is to be applied

PROSPECTIVELY, thus it affects the 16 Cityhood bills unpassed as a law from 2001. - RA 9009, amended the LGC income requirement in

creating a city to 100M.

- RA 9009, DOES not provided for any EXEMPTIONS from the increased income requirement.

3 Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.


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- RA 9009, was passed, enacted and became a law prior to the Cityhood law, such, the municipalities seeking conversion into a city, is BOUND by the amendment.

b. The Constituion requires the CONGRESS to prescribe ALL

criteria for the creation of a city in the LGC, and such the Congress, cannot write criteria in a different law. - The Constitution, requires the Congress to stipulate in the

LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation and conversion of a city, (as clearly stated in the law, see footnote)

- Strict construction, Congress can only prescribe the criteria in the LGC and NOT to any other law.

- Such rules is intended to INSURE the creation of cities

and other political unity must follow the same unifomd, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC.

- Any derogation or deviation from the criteria violates the

Constitution under Art. 10 Sec. 10

HENCE, CITYHOOD LAW providing for an exemption to the LGC Sec. 456, is violation of the constitution, BECAUSE such exemption is NOT written in the LGC nor in RA 9009, amending the LGC.

c. It violates Art. 10 Sec. 6,4 it prevents a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to LGUs - Since CITYHOOD law provides for a criteria that is not

uniform and discriminatory, there can be an unjust and unfair distribution of national taxes to the LGUs.

- The criteria of income, population and land, ARE material in determining the JUST SHARE of LGUs.

(2) YES! Cityhood VIOLATES equal protection clause

- Even if the Cityhood law exemptions are written in the LGC, it

is still UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it violates equal protection clause.

HOW?

The exemption in the Cityhood law has NO CLASSIFICATION

STANDARDS or GUIDELINES differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.

The exemption will be BASED only on the fact that 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted

Such is NOT a VALID Classificaiton.

Elements of Valid Classification:

a. Substantial Distinction

b. Germane purpose of the law

c. Not limited to existing conditions only

d. Applies equally to all members of the same class

For a valid classification, there must be a substantial distinction, related to a government objective AND not LIMITED to existing conditions ONLY and applicable to all similarly situated.

4 Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

RESOLUTION (December 21 ,2009)

S.C held: Cityhood law is CONSTITUTIONAL

The power to Create political subdivisions or LGUs is ESSENTIALLY legislative in character – thus, Congress can BY LAW, create, divide, merge or abolish or alter provinces, city or municipality. HENCE, Art. 10 sec. 10, MEANS that ONLY the CONGRESS and no other branch of government can CREATE the political subdivision Pursuant to such, the CONGRESS can enact an amendatory law, imposing criteria of viability, SUCH need not be EMBODIED only in the LGC but it can be through any law. The previous decision that ONLY in LGC can the Congress establish a criteria for the creation of a city – is ABSURD and Illogcial. If such is the stance, RA 9009 amending the LGC, would in itself be unconstitutional. --- because of such belief that ONLY in LGC can be embodied the criteria

It is the CLEAR intent of the CONGRESS to exempt the respondent municipalities from the amended income requirement in RA 9009. (The Spirit of the law controls than its letter)

- RA 9009 was enacted to reduce the ability of a municipality to

become a city such increase of income requirement.

- However, in the course of Congress deliberation of RA 9009’s House Bill, it was clearly narrated by the Congressmen that the citybills pending are exempted from the amended income requirement.

ALSO, the Congress has a clear intent to exempt the respondent municipalities because of their enactment of Cityhood Law after RA 9009.

There is NO violation of equal protection clause. In fact, there is a VALID ground for CLASSIFICATION. CITYHOOD law, is valid, - The EXEMPTION of respondent municipalities from 100M

income requirement is MEANT TO REDUCE the INEQUALITY occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. – the Exemption was designed to insure fairness and justice would be accorded to the respondent municipalities

- Passged of RA 9009, put the respondent municipalities in an UNFAIR situation.

When RA 9009 became a law, prior to such enactment, the Municipalities were able to QUALIFY as a CITY HOOD APPLICANT, but due to extraneous circumstances, (impeachment of ERAP and Edsa RevolutioN) the BILLS for their conversion remained unacted upon by the Congress.


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RESOLUTION (August 24 ,2010)

S.C held: Cityhood law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Same basis of unconstitutionality on the Ground of CRITERIA in the LGC

Violated the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE The mere pendency of the Cityhood bill in 11th Congress is NOT related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Municipalities with pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipaliites that did not have pending cityhood bills.

- Pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress

limits the EXEMPTION to a SPECIFIC CONDITION existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. --- this is a CLEAR violation of a VALID CLASSIFICATION requirement, because such must not be limited to an EXISITING CONDITION ONLY.

RESOLUTION (February 15 ,2011)

S.C held: Cityhood law is CONSTITUTIONAL CITYHOOD Law, provides for the CLEAR INTENT of the

CONGRESS that the respondent municipalities are not covered by the amended income requirement imposed by RA9009. - The respondent municipalities was able to PROVE that they are

VIABLE and CAPABLE to become a component cities of their respective provinces.

Enactment of Cityhood law is a an EXERCISE by CONGRESS of

its legislative power granted by the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. - LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making prowers.

HENCE, the Congress has the power to alter or modify it --- such what Congress did in enacting RA 9009. – AND the same power Cityhood Law was enacted.

Congress in exempting the respondent municipality UPHOLD the very intent and thrust of the LGC, enhancing the countryside development and autonomy, as making them engines for economic growth.

Cityhood law is does not violate EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

- There is a VALID SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION based on the PURPOSE of LGC.

The Substantial distinction LIES in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective cities.

Congress, in enacting Cityhood law RECOGNIZED this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial region – the main thrust of LGC.

Regarding to the allegation that granting Cityhood laws would give an unfair distribution of JUST SHARE to IRA. – is UNTENABLE – because the IRA is not included in the computation of the income requirement to qualify for the criteria – the exempted municipalities are able to show viability and capability ON their own capacity. Thus it would not in any way affect the LGUs just share in IRA.

IN SUM: RA 9009 amended LGC and Cityhood Law amended RA 9009, by putting and exemption to the higher income requirement.

NAVARRO vs. ERMITA

(GR. 180050 February 10, 2010)

FACTS: (1) NSO conducted a census in 2000, the population of Dinagat Island,

part of Surigao Del Norte, was 106, 951 population.

(2) Provincial Governemnt of Surigao Del Norte conducted a SPECIAL census with assistance of NSO District Census Coordinator – it yielded to 371, 576 population

(3) NSO did not CERTIFY the result of the special census – However, Gov. Barbers of Surigao Del Norte issued a PROCLAMATION No. 01 declaring the SPECIAL CENSUS as the OFFICIAL for Dinagat Island.

(4) A HOUSE BILL made to create PROVINCE of DINAGAT ISLAND submitting the following to be eligible for the criteria:

a. Special Census showing 371, 576 population b. Certified by Bureau of Local Government Finance of Annual

Average income of 82,696, 433.23 (P82M+) c. Certified land area of the province is 802.12 sq. km.

(5) House Bill was made into a law, RA 9355 signed by Pres. Arroyo.

(6) Plebscite was held in the Province of Surigao Del Norte and was able

to get an affirmative votes.

(7) Province of DInagt Island began its corporate existence, when provincial officers took oath after being elected.

(8) PETITONER filed a petition alleging INVALIDITY of RA 9355:

a. Creation of Province of DInagat Island is INVALID because it

FAILED to comply with the POPULATION and LAND AREA

requirement prescribed in the LGC.

**** POPULATION – the NSO did not certify to the SPECIAL census

made. Therefore on to be considered as valid census is the NSO

census of population of only 106,951

*** LAND AREA requirments:

The Implement Rules and Regulation of LGC (IRR-

LGC) states

―the land area requirement SHALL not apply where the

proposed province is composed of 1 or more islands‖

The IRR-LGC is in conflict with the LGC of land are requirement.

THUS, Congress erroneously applied such and allowed Dinagat

Island to be a province because it failed to achieve the land area

requirement of 2,000 sq.km.

(9) Respondent CONTEND that there was a valid creation: a. Income Requirment is P82M+ with certification from Bureau

of Local Government Finance b. Certification from LMB, that the land area is 802,12sq,km,

AND it is composed of islands, THUS it is exempt from the required land area of 2K sq.km.


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c. Special Census showing 371, 576. Although not certified by NSO but it was made with the aid of representative of NSO

ISSUE(S): W/N RA 9355 complied with the Constitution and LGC requirement to be a province. HELD: RA 9355, Creating Dinagat Island Province is

UNCONSTITUTIONAL Because it FAILED to COMPLY with CRITERIA5 prescribed in the LGC, specifically LAND AREA and POPULATION requirements.

Land Area Requirement

IRR-LGC provision of exemption to land area requirement of

2k sq.km is when the province is composed of island – is NULL and VOID Because, Nowhere in the LGC grants such exemption. The Only exemption in the LGC is when the land area requirement is NEED not be complied when there is ALREADY a compliance with the population requirement . Under the Constitution, criteria for creation and if any exemption is SHOULD be written in the LGC, however, IRR-LGC provision of the exemption hereof is not in the LGC.

In the case, Province of Dinagat Island cannot claim exemption under the IRR-LGC, because such is NULL and VOID. Hence, Province of Dinagat Island failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2K sq.km.

Population Requirement

Under LGC, population should be certified by the NSO. Therefore, it is the NSO official Census should be the population to be used for the compliance.

5 Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-recurring income.

In the case, the NSO Certified population count is ONLY 106, 951 – it does not comply with the requirement of at least 250,000 inhabitants.

The Province of Dinagat Island submitted the SPECIAL

CENSUS population yielding 371,000 population, HOWEVER, such cannot be used because of LACK of CERTIFICATION of NSO. Although NSO representative aided to the Special Census and NO objection was made by the NSO to the Special census conducted, STILL such cannot be deemed CERTIFIED to comply with the LGC criteria for population requirement.

NAVARRO vs. ERMITA: (RESOLUTION May 12, 2010)

S.C. HELD: RA 9355 Creating Province of Dinagat Island

UNCONSTITUTIONAL because such failed to comply with the criteria provided by the LGC, specifically the land area and population requirement

Land Area requirements

S.C. cited Sec.7 and Sec. 461 of LGC, and elaborated on 2 requirements:

(1) The LAND AREA must be contiguous and (2) Must be sufficient to provide for basic services and facilities to

meet the requirement of the populace.

Exception (Sec. 462) (1) Territory NEED not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more

islands; or (2) Separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute

to the income of the province. The exemptions PERTAINS ONLY to the requirement of territorial contiguity. Such can only be removed when the province comprises 2 or more islands or separated by a chartered city.

It is Clear in the law, NO exemption is granted to that

when a province is composed of 2 or more islands is exempted from the land are requirements, in the case 2K sq.km.

NAVARRO vs. ERMITA: (RESOLUTION April 12, 2011)

S.C. HELD: RA 9355 Creating Province of Dinagat Island

CONSTITUTIONAL Movant intervenor, had 3 main arguments for the Constitutionality of the RA 9355: (1) RA 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Sec. 461 of LGC

(2) Exemption from territorial contiguity when the intended province

consists 2 or more islands, ALSO, included exemption from the application of the minimum land are requirement

(3) Operative fact doctrine is applicable COMELEC issued Resolution 8790 staing:

― If the decision becomes final and executory after the election, The Province of Idnagat island will revert to its previous status AS PART of the 1st Legislative district of Surigao Del Norte

HENCE, re-opening of the case for Reconsideration

**** DECISION: CONSTITUTIONALITY


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The Primodial criterion in the creation of LGUs is ECONOMIC VIABILITY. BASED on the LGC declaration policy, to provided LGUs genuine and meaningful local autonomy, comtiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective LGUs should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. a. It is explicit to the Congress deliberation of the LGCode.

In the previous decision, creation of province must comply with the land requirement on the other hand creation of component cities and municipalities if composed of 2 or more islands is EXEMPT from the minimum land criterion USCH decision gives a PREFERENTIAL OPTION, that would defeat the basic policy of the LGU and a violation of the equal protection clause. It is accepted that LAND AREA is an indicator of VIABILITY of LGU is NOT CONCLUSIVE in showing that Dinagat Island cannot become a province. IN fact, Dinagat Island, is VIABLE to be province. At the time of its creation it has 4x more than the minimum annual average income requirement (20M x 4). The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.

THUS, RA 9355, is constitutional for the Province of Dinagat Island is

exempted to comply with the minimum Land requirement because it is composed of 2 or more islands. The province is viable to provide for its basic services even without it complying with the land area requirement.

MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE

(GR. 133064 september 16, 1999)

FACTS: (1) Santiago isabela was made into an independent COMPONENT City

pursuan to RA 7720 and was RATIFIED through a Plebiscite by the people of Santiago.

(2) Congress passed RA 8528 changing the status of Isabela from Independent Component City into a COMPONENT CITY of Isabela without ratification from the inhabitants thereof.

(3) Miranda filed a petition assailing the Constitutionality of RA 8528,

on the grounds: a. RA 85282 needs to RATIFIED by the people in proper

plebiscite.

(4) Respondent and Solicitor General both stated that, RA 8528 is constitutional because: a. R 8528 need NOT be ratified because is MERELY

RECLASSIFIED Santiago City from an independent Component city INTO a Component City.

b. There is NO creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration to Require a ratification through a plebiscite.

ISSUE(S): (1) W/N RA 8528 is constitutional, valid when it failed to submit for

ratification through a plebiscite. a. W/N the reclassification of Santiago City from independent

component city into a component city REQUIRES the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite.

HELD: RA. 8528 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the law needs to be ratified by the people of Santiago City though a plebiscite. Under the law, creation, division , merger, abolition or substantial alteration of LGUs INVOLVE MATERIAL CHANGE in the political and economic rights of the LGUs which directly affects the people of therein, THUS! The CONSITUTION requires the APPROVAL of the PEOPLE in the political unit directly affected through a plebiscite. In the case, RA 8528 it provided for a RECLASSIFICATION of the Santiago city from an independent component city into a component city. The RECLASSIFATION— of the City HAVE a MATERIAL CHANGE in the political and economic rights of the Santiago City and will directly affect its people. The following are the SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE that will occur in the reclassification:

i. City mayor will be replaced under the administration and supervision of the Governor.

ii. Resolutions and Ordinances of the City Council of Santiago City will be REVIEWED by the Provincial Board of Isabela.

iii. Taxes will be collected by the City and will have to be shared with the Province of Isabela.

HENCE, RA 8528 Reclassification of Santiago City provides for a material change in the political and economic right of the Santiago City tht directly affects the people of Santiago city, SUCH needs to be ratified by the people through a plebiscite. RA 8528 is deemed Unconstitutional.

SAMSON vs. AGUIRRE

(G.R.133076 September 22, 1999)

DOCTRINE:

DOF and NSO’s Representatives OFFICIAL STATEMENTS would serve the purpose as CERTIFICATION compliance for the creation of a city.

FACTS:

(1) RA 8535 was passed and signed by Pres. Ramos creating the

NOvaliches City

(2) Samson, a councillor of the 1st district of Quezon City, seeks the aid

of the S.C to enjoin

a. COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City

and

b. DBM from disbursing the funds for the plebiscite

(3) Samson filed the petition alleging the UNCONSTITUTATIONALITY

of RA 8535 in the ff. grounds:

a. RA 8535 FAILED to conform to the criteria established by the

LGC, to the requirements of income, population and land area

- There was NO certification was presented for the income,

population and land area to the congress during the

deliberations.

b. There is NO certification attesting to the fact the the Mother

LGU Quezon City would not be adversely affected by the

creation of the Novaliches City.


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(4) Respondent commented that petitioner has the burden of proof to

overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all legal

requirements under the LGC.

ISSUE(S):

W/N there was proper CERTIFICATION given by the DOF, NSO, LMB

and DENR for the criteria compliance requirement for the creation of

Novaliches to be a City.

HELD:

YES! There was proper Certification given by DOF, NS, LMB and DENR for the criteria compliance requirement for the creation

In the deliberation for the passage of RA 8535, REPRESENTATIVES from DOF, NSO, LBM and DENR were present and testified to the average annual income, population and land area of Novaliches. DOF : estimated average annual income is P 26, 952, 128.26 NSO: estimated the population around 347, 310.

There is NO need to comply with the Land area requirement, pursuant to the LGC, in creating a city, comply with requirement of INCOME and POPULATION/LAND AREA.

Here, the SC held , the representatives OFFICIAL STATEMENTS would serve the purpose as CERTIFICATION compliance for the creation of a city.

ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA, Jr.

(G.R.118303, January 31, 1996)

DOCTRINE:

IRA is to be included in the computation of the Average Annual

Income of a Municipality seeking conversion into a Independent

Component City BECAUSE IRA constitute income which the LGU

rely upon as the source of their funds.

FACTS:

(1) RA 7720, the act creating the Municipality of Santiago into an

independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago.

(2) Petitioner Alvarez filed a petition alleging the constitutionality of RA

7720 on the ground: It failed to the INCOME requirement of 20M.

(3) Petitioner alleges that Bureau of Local Government Finance

(bureau) was erroneous in including the IRAs for the computation of

the annual average income of the Santiago.

(4) Petitioner avers that IRA are NOT ACTUALLY income but transfers

and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they

fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors (like

population, land and equal sharing)

(5) Since, IRAs is not included to the computation of the average annual

income, the AVERAGE Annual income of Santiago did not reach the

minimum amount requirement for compliance.

*** Average Annual Income WITHOUT IRAs = 13, 109, 560.47

*** Average Annual Income WITH IRAs= 26, 219. 120.84

ISSUE: W/N the IRA is to be included in the computation of the average

annual income of a municipality.

HELD:

YES! IRA is to be included in the computation of the Average

Annual Income of a Municipality seeking conversion into a

Independent Component City

Under the LGC Sec. 306(i), INCOME is defined as ―to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU‖

LGC Sec. 450(c) provides ― average annual income shall include the

income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special, funds, trasnfers and non-recurring income‖

IRA is one of the items that accrue to the general fund of the LGU and are used to finance its operations and used to estimate budget preparation. HENCE, IRA constitute income which the LGU rely upon as the source of their funds. THEREFORE, DOF is correct in INCLUDING the IRAs in computing the Average Annual Income of a LGUs.

- And correct in defining the ANNUAL INCOME in DOF Order No. 35-93 :

ANNUAL INCOME – revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of Local Government Fund including the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other shares provide in the Code BUT exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as national aid, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets and similar others.

In SUM, IRA is included in the Average Annual Income computation. Thus, Novaliches City complied with the criteria income requirement of having average annual income to be more than P20M.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC

(189793. April 7, 2010)

FACTS:

(1) RA 9716 created a NEW legislative district for the Province of

Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing 1st and 2nd legislative

districts of the province.

(2) Petitioner filed a petition alleging the constitutionality of the RA

9716 on the following grounds:

a. The reapportionment is in violation of the constitutional

requirement of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district

- The proposed additional legislative district will only have

a population of 176,383, less than the required.

(3) Respondent through the Sol.Gen. commented that the constitution

mandate that the 250,000 minimum population requirement is for

the creation of a legislative district in a City and NOT for province,

for the Province are entitled to 1 legislative district without

population requirement for such entitlement.

ISSUE(S):

(1) W/N Art. 6 Sec. 5(3) fixes a minimum population that must

compose a legislative district of a City or a Province


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(2) W/N RA 9716 is a valid law

HELD:

(1) Art. 6 .Sec. 5(3) fixes a minimum population requirement to

compose a legislative district of a CITY But NOT for a PROVINCE. A

province is entitled to 1 legislative district without ANY population

requirement.

- It is a plain and clear distinction in the law that to ENTITLE a

CITY to a legislative district, it must be able to comply to the

population requirement

- For the PROVINCE, it is automatically entitled to a legislative

district without a population requirement

On the other hand, LGC Sec. 462, requisites for creation a province

provided for a population requirement HOWEVER, it is clear in the

law, that such population requirement is an ALTERNATIVE

ADDITION to the indispensable income requirement.

In MARIANO CASE, it held that a CITY is entitled to an

ADDIITONAL legislative district as long as it complied with the

minimum population requirement BUT need not to have increase its

population.

IN the CASE at hand, such same doctrine should be applied. No

increase population requirement if there is an ADDITIONAL

DISTRICT in a province to be entitled to additional legislative

district.

(2) RA 9716 is CONSTITUTIONAL

As in discussion in Number (1), RA 9716 is constitutional, no

population requirement is to be made to comply for a NEWLY

ADDED PROVINCE to comply.

MARIANO, Jr. vs. COMELEC

(G.R.118577. March 7, 1995)

DOCTRINE:

A City is required to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be

entitled to a representative, AND it does not have to increase its

population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional

district

FACTS:

(1) RA 7854, was passed declaring Makati City as Highly Urbanized

City.

(2) Petitioners filed a petition assailing Unconstitutionality of RA 7854

based on the following grounds:

a. It DOES not PROPERLY identify the territorial jurisdiction of

Makati by metes and bounds with technical description as

prescribed by Art. 10 Sec. 10 of Constitution and Sec. 7 & 450 of

LGC

b. It INCREASED the legislative district of Makati only through a

SPECIAL law, violation of constitution for it required a general

reapportionment law to be passed by Congress.

c. The CREATION of another legislative district in Makati does

not comply with the population requirement of at least

250,000 as prescribed by Constitution

ISSUE: W/N RA 7854 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL on the following

grounds:

a. It did not IDENTIFY the territorial jurisdiction of Makati by

metes and bounds with technical description.

b. It INCREASED the legislative district of Makati only through a

SPECIALL

c. CREATION of another legislative district of Makati failed to

comply with the population requirement under the

Constitution.

HELD: NO! RA 7854 is CONSTITUTIONAL.

a. RA 7854 did not clearly stated in metes and bounds with technical

description the territorial jurisdiction HOWEVER, the law is

CONSTITUTIONAL as long as the territorial jurisdiction of a CITY

may be REASONABLY ASCERTAINED.

- Sec. 2 of R78546 DOES not CAUSE confusion as to its

boundaries. It did not change nor add, subtract, divide or

multiply established land area of Makati.

- Deliberation of Congress reveals a LEGITIMATE REASON why

they did not defined with particularity by metes and bounds

with technical description --- it was due to the pending

territorial dispute between Makati and Taguig over Fort

Bonifacio – the Congress recognized that in stating with

particularity the land area, it will close the dispute in the case

pending, it will over step to the co-equal power of the Court.

- Given the REASON of CONGRESS, making the description as a

condition sine qua non for RA 7854 validity would defeat the

purpose of the LGC – to empower LGUs and to give them

rightful due, to make them more responsive to the needs of

their constituents and serves a vital cog in national

development .

b. RA 7854, is Constitutional, reapportionment of a legislative district

MAY be MADE through a SPECIAL LAW.

- The Constitution DID not PRECLUDE the Congress from

increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a

general reapportionment law.

- In holding that ONLY through a general reapportionament law

can reapportionment be made will create an inequitable

situation where a new city or province created by Congress will

be DENIED legislative representation for an indeterminate

period of time. It will deprive the people of a new city or

province a particle of their sovereignty.

6 “ xxxx which shall comprise the PRESENT territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the NE by Pasig river and beyond by the city of Mandaluyoing and Municipality of Pasig on the SE by the Municipalities of Pateros and Taguig;on SW by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig and on the NW by the City of Manila. “


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c. RA 7854, is CONSTITUTIONAL even granting the Makati City

another legislative district and a legislative district representation

only having a population of 450,000

- Art. 6 Sec. 5 (3) provides ―xxx Each city with a population

of at least 250,000 or each province shall have at least 1

representive."

- Although Makati city only have 450,000 population, it

MAY STILL be granted an ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE

DISTRICT since it met the minimum population

requirement of 250,000.

CAWALIG Jr. vs. COMELEC

(G.R.146319. October 26, 2001)

FACTS:

(1) RA 8806 created the City of Sorsogon and was validly ratified

through a plebiscite by the people of Municipality of Bacon and

Sorsogon.

(2) Petitioners filed a petition alleging the constitutionality of the RA

8806 on the ff. grounds:

a. Plebscite was conducted beyond the 120 days period from the

approval of RA 8806, a clear violation of Sec. 54

b. It merged 2 municipalities, violating LGC Sec. 450(a) that only

requires a municipality or a cluster of barangays to be

converted into a component city.

c. It violates the 1-title-1-subject rule of a LAW, for is have 2

subject, 1 creation of Sorsogon City and the other abolition of

the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

ISSUE(S):

(1) W/N RA 8806 is constitutional in merging 2 Municipalities, namely

Bacon and Sorsogon into 1 component city.

(2) W/N RA 8806 contravene 1-title-1-subject bill

(3) W/N RA8806 ratification through a plebiscite is valid.

HELD:

(1) RA 8806 is CONSTITUTIONAL in merging 2 Municipalities

(Bacon and Sorsogon) into a component City.

- Sec 450 (a) of LGC7, is a MODE of Creating a City. Hence,

in creating a component city, it could be through a

municipality or a cluster of barangays.

- In Art. 10 Sec. 10 of COnstituion, it allows merger of LGUs

to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in

accordance with the criteria in the LGC. HENCE, LGUs

can be MERGERED into a 1 LGunit. PROVIDED, such

must not reduce the income, population or land area of

the LGU concerned (LGC Sec. 8)

7 Section 450. Requisites for Creation.(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

In the case, merging Bacon and Sorosogon Municipalities into a

component Sorosogon City is VALID as long as such does not reduce

income, population or land area of the Province of Sorsogon is

concerned.

(2) RA 8806 DOES not contravene 1-title-1-subject bill

RA 8806 is has NO 2 Subject but only 1 Subject and it is the creation

of City of Sorsogon.

The Abolition/Cessation Bacon and Sorsogon Municipalities are but

logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. It is a

necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created.

(3) RA 8806 was validly ratified through a plebiscite

The Ratification through a plebiscite of RA 8806 was valid and was

done within the prescribed period mandated by the Law (within 120

days from the approval)

Under the LGC Sec. 10 the plebiscite requirement shall be done by

the COMELEC within 120 days from the EFFECTIVITY of the law

unless a different date was stated.

Hence, it is clear the plebiscite should be made within 120 days from

the effectivity of the law.

It is a settled rule that a law is deemed effective after it complied to

the last day of its publication requirement – meaning the last day of

publication is the day of its effectivity.

In the case, RA 8806 was approved Aug. 16, 2000, and its last day of

publication was Aug. 25, 2000. The Plebscite happened on Sept. 1,

2000. Thus, there was a clear indication that the plebiscite

requirement was done within 120 days from the effecitivity of the

law.


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TAN vs. COMELEC

(GR. L-73155.July 11, 1986)

FACTS:

(1) BP Blg. 885, created the Province of Negros del Norte.

(2) Petitioner filed a case alleging unconstitutionality on the following

grounds: (Art. 11 Sec. 3 of 1973 Constitution8)

a. It did not complied to the land area requirement of 3,500

sqkm. Because the Province will only have 2, 856.56 sq.km.

b. It limits the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns which

comprise the NEW province, it excludes the other town that

would be affected to creation.

(3) RESPONDENTS assails constitutionality:

a. It complied with the land area requirement of it is 4, 019.95

sqkm.

ISSUE(S):

(1) W/N BP Blg. 885 is unconstitutional because it limits the

plebiscite to be exercise by the cities and town comprising the

ONLY the new province

(2) W/N BP Blg. 885, is unconstitutional because it failed to

comply with the land area requirement

HELD: Both UNCONSTITUTIONAL

(1)

It is Clear in the law, that When a PROVINCE, is created, divided or

merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, it is

REQUIRED that an APPROVAL of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in

the unit or units affected be obtained.

In the case, it is clear that the boundaries of the existing province of

Negros Occidental would be altered by the division of the created new

province of Negros Del Norte.

In forming the new province, 3 cities and 8 municipalities will be

subtracted from Negros Occidental and it will result to a approximatrely

2,7684.40 sqkm. Removal, such, Negros Occidental boundaries and land

area will be substantially altered. SUCH, they are the units affected to

such creation.

in doing so, it is unconstitutional to BP. Blg. 885, to exclude other

municipalities of Negros Occidental not to vote in the plebiscite. It is a

clear violation of the constitution. What is involved is a division, a

separation and is substantial alteration of boundary.

(2)

Sec. 197 of LGC speaks of territory of the province to be created and

requires a territory of at least 3,500sqkm. S.C. held that the TERRITORY

here pertains ONLY to LAND MASS or LAND AREA and excludes water.

In the case, it is impossible for the New Province Negros Del Norte to

have a land are of 4,019.95 sqkm. Based on the account of government

8 “ NO province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered EXCEPT in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the cotes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.”

statistics 2,856 sqkm. Is the relative total area of the cities and

municipalities that will constitute the province of Negros Del Norte.

HENCE, BP Blg. 885 is unconstitional for it failed to comply with the land

area requirement in creating a province.


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II. GENERAL PRINCIPLE CASES

DELA CRUZ vs. PARAS (G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983)

DOCTRINE:

Police power is granted to the LGUs in general terms (under the General Welfare Clause)

Ordinances by virtue of Police power is valid UNLESS it contravenes fundamental law of the Philippines, Act of Legislature, against public policy or unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

FACTS:

Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan ISSUED an ORDINANCE no. 84 ―Prohibiting Issuance of‖: a. Permit and License to Business Operator of Night Clubs,

Cabarets and Dance Halls within the jurisdiction

b. Employment License/Permit to any professional, hosts and hospitality girls, and professional dancer in any of the prohibited establishments.

c. ANY license. Permit issued shall be REVOKED after 30 days

winding up of the business upon effectivity of the Ordinance

Such Ordinance was enacted because such prohibited acts are decadence to morality and have adverse effect in the Community.

2 petitions were filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction in CFI on the ground it is NULL and VOID because:

a. Municipality ha NO authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling

b. Violative of Petitioner’s right to DUE PROCESS and the EQUAL PROTECTION clause, as the license previously given was withdrawn without judicial hearing.

c. NO power to license and regulate is vested to the municipality, pursuant to P.D. 189 amended by P.D. 259 – such power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses (including night clubs) has been transferred to DOT.

Municipality countered: a. It is authorized by law to REGULATE and PROHIBIT the

establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs.

b. It is NOT violative right to due process and equal protection clause BECAUSE… property rights are subordinate to public interests

c. PD 189 as amended by PD 259, DID not deprive Municipal

council of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs. CFI uphold the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84.

- ORDINANCE 84 is a valid exercise of the Municipality of

it POLICE POWER because of the innuendos of sexual titillation it provide.

ISSUE(s): W/N Ordinance 84 is Constitutional.

HELD: it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Reliance on POLICE power insufficient to justify constitutionality of enactment of an ordinance. - Rule: POLICE power is granted to LGUs in GENERAL

TERMS9, any ordinance enacted under such is VALID (note: LGC applied here is the OLD BP 337 , before 1991) Except: Ordinance is VOID, when it contravenes:

i. the fundamental law of the Philippines ii. Act of Legislature iii. Against Public policy or unreasonable, oppressive

partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

HENCE!!! As a RULE: Ordinances passed by virtue of General Welfare

clause MUST be REASONABLE, CONSONANT with the general powers and purpose of the corporation and NOT inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

Ordinance is OVERBREADTH – it should not mandated an absolute

prohibition but only a reasonable restrictions --- a. there was an invasion of personal and property rights

- There are individuals who patronize those night clubs that

are of legal in purpose and property investments were

made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.

b. BP 337, LGC(1983) under sec. 149 – which only grants

POWERS to the LGUs to only REGULATE establishment

and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performance,

circuses and other forms of entertainment

- It is clear that the Municipality CANNOT prohibit the

operation but can only regulate.

In the case, the ordinance compel the petitioners to close their

establishments is tantamount to termination of business and

their employees would undergo a period of deprivation – such

is invasion of property right.

9 General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.


22


BINAY vs. DOMINGO (G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991)

DOCTRINE:

Police power of the LGU is BROAD but should NOT exceed the duty

to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,

comfort and convenience – it extends to all the great public needs

and include all legislation and of its every function.

FACTS: Makati approved Resolution 60, providing for Burial Assistance

Program of 500 to a bereaved family who has gross family income not exceeding 2K per month. And, was approved by Metro Manila Commission.

Resolution 60 was referred to COA for auditing, and COA disapproved – disallowing in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof.

Mayor Binay filed a letter for reconsideration to COA. COA ruled that:

- There is no connection or relation between the Burial

Assistance Program and the Makati inhabitant public safety,

general welfare and etc…

- The Resolution made should be for the BENEFIT of the whole, if not the majority of the inhabitant of Makati and NOT for the benefit of ONLY a few individuals. It does not serve as a PUBLIC purpose. Government fund must be used for a public purpose.

Mayor Binay through the Municipal Council issued another Resolution (Resolution 243) reaffirming Resolution 60 – COA stayed to its decision to Resolution 60.

Mayor filed a Special civil action of Certiorari praying COA’s decision be declared NULL and VOID.

Mayor Binay contends that: The Resolutions are within the principle of police power and parens patriae

ISSUE(S):

W/N Resolution No. 60 and Resolution 243 (Burial Assistance Program) of Makati is a VALID exercise of police power under the general welfare clause

HELD: Resolution 60 and 243 is a VALID exercise of police power

under the general welfare clause.

LGUs exercise there police power under the general welfare clause10

in the Local Government Code(OLD).

10 They are clothe with authority to ENACT ordinances and issue regulations as NECESSARY to carry out and discharge responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants and insure the protection of property. AND every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to

COA is erroneous in redefining Police power ―exercise to public

safety, general welfare etc..‖ because police power is NOT capable of

exact definition, and purposely veiled in general terms to underscore

it all comprehensiveness – to meet the exigencies of times.

Police power of the LGU is BROAD but should NOT exceed the duty

to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,

comfort and convenience – it extends to all the great public needs

and include all legislation and of its every function.

COA is erroneous in stating that Public purpose should benefit all or majority and once it is for a limited number of person it deems to be for a public purpose --- because public purpose is for a SOCIAL welfare legislation to provide adequate social services, promotion of general welfare social justice and human dignity and respect of human rights.

Resolution 60 and 243 is a continuing program of the government towards SOCIAL JUSTICE

- The care for the poor is generally recognized as a pubic

duty. There is no equal protection clause violation in classifying paupers because different groups may receive varying treatment.

The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism. The death of a family member is painful experience, but it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.

promote health and dafety, enhance prosperity, improve morals and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein


23


TANO vs. SOCRATES

(G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997)

DOCTRINE:

Ordinances prohibiting certain marine resources to be caught, sell

and traded and imposing penalty in violation to such, is a VALID

exercise of police power of LGUs under general welfare clause – to

protect the environment and to preserve the right of the inhabitants

for a balanced and healthful ecology.

FACTS:

Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan enacted ORDINANCE 15-92 , prohibiting shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto prinsesa city from Jan 1 of 1993 – 1998, except see bass, cat fish, mudfish and milk fish fries.

Acting Mayor Lucero issued OFFICE ORDER no. 23 to implement Ordinance 15 – 92 – giving authority for the mayor’s office to CHECK or INSPECT cargoes being shipped out at any Puerto Princesa City port and wharf within its jurisdiction

Sangguniang Panglungsod issued another ORDINANCE no. 3 series of 1993 – prohibiting catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms.

All issued ordinances provides for a PENAL CLAUSE to any person caught violating the ordinance, to be penalized for a fine and/or imprisonment

In implementing the Ordinances, Sangguniang Panlalawuigan and

other respondents, DEPRIVED all fishermen, Airline Shippers Association of Palawan, and Marine Merchants of the whole province of Palawan and City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and performance of their lawful occupation and trade.

Tano et.al were criminally charged of MCTC in pursuant to the Ordinances implement.

Petitioners’ filed directly a PETITION on the S.C on the following grounds: a. They were DEPRIVE of due process of law, livelihood and

unduly restriction of practice of their trade.

b. The MAYOR had ABSOLUTE authority whether or not to issue

a Mayor’s permit because the ordinances did not regulate nor

give condition which the permit can be issued.

c. Prohibition was made WITHOUT any DISTINCTION on

whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing

method.

d. The ordinance took away the right of the FISHERMEN to earn

their livelihood in lawful ways.

Respondent CONTENDS that: a. The ordinance is a VALID EXERCISE of their POLICE POWER

under the GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE of LGC Sec. 16. - It gave them power and authority to protect the

environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

b. LGC11 Sec. 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi) – the Province has the right and responsibility to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells within its territory remain healthy for future generation.

c. The Prohibition is LIMITED only to 5 years, to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow damage to regenerate

d. Also, the ORDINANCE ONLY prohibited certain FISHES, it is

not an ABSOLUTE prohibition to fish and trade.

e. There is NO violation of due process of law because public hearing were conducted before the Ordinances were enacted.

f. There is no violation of Equal protection clause because:

i. There is a Substantial distinction between fishermen who

catches live fish with the intention of selling it live and a fishermen who catches live with no intention of selling it live

ii. It is applied EQUALLY to all those belonging to one class. ISSUE (s): W/N the ORDINANCES are CONSTITUTIONAL HELD: YES! Constitutional, the ordinances does not suffer from any

infirmity both under the Constitution and LGC. A. It abides by the CONSTITUTION.

(a) The ordinances are MEANT to protect and conserve the marine

resources of the Province for the continued enjoyment guaranteed for the present and future generation. - Art. 12 Sec. 2: the state has the Duty to protect the nation’s

marine wealth - Art. 13 Sec. 7: the state shall protect, conserve and develop

communal marine and fishing resources

It was alleged that the Ordinance does not protect the marginalized fishermen…

(b) The petitioners are not marginal fishermen to have a grant of

preferential right of subsistence as provided in the Constitution Art. 13 Sec. 7. Under the LGC Sec. 131 (p) – Marginal fishermen as individual engaged in subsistence fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter, or exchange of marine product produced by himself and his immediate family

(c) PREFERENTIAL RIGHT grant to marginal fishermen are NOT

ABSOLUTE. – under the Constitution communal use of marine and fishing resources is also bound to STATE protection and conservation. Such development, utilization and exploration is subject to full control and supervision IMPLYING the STATE can impose restrictions to its utilization, development and exploration if it is deemed necessary. - The state has the duty to protect and advance the right fo

the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythms and harmony of nature. --- such right

11 (under Sangguniang Bayan, Panglungsod and Panlalawigan) Protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance


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carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

B. It is in accordance to the LOCAL GOVENRMENT CODE The ordinance is VALID (1) due to the police power granted to LGUs under GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE and (2) Principle of Decentralization of DEVOLUTION of POWER. (1) GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE (sec. 16) gives flesh and blood

to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In pursuant to such…

i. the LGC further provide for the LGUs power to GRANT

fishery privileges in municipal waters and to IMPOSE rentals, fees, charges or penalty thereof (Sec. 149)

ii. Sangguniang bayan, panglalawigan anf panglungosd are directed to enact ordinances for the genereal welfare of there province and its inhabitants TO protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for act which endanger the environment and other activities that result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.

(2) LGC recognized the Decentralization is DEVOLUTION of power, meaning refers to the act of which the National Government confers powers and authority to the LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities. - One of the DEVOLVED power to LGUs is the POWER to

ENFORCE FISHERY LAWS – which allows the LGUs to establish CLOSED SEASON for fishing if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes.

The ORDINANCEs objective and purpose is to:

(a) To establish a ―CLOSED SEASON‖ for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of 5 years; and

(b) To protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

SUCH objective and purpose are within the devolved power given to LGU in enforcing Fishery Laws and falls within the General welfare clause to protect the environment and impose penalties for acts endangering the environment.


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WHITE LIGHT CORP. et.al vs. CITY OF MANILA (G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009)

DOCTRINE:

the ORDINANCE is unconstitutional, it is not a valid exercise of police power (general welfare clause) it CURTAILS the LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES that short time admission and wash up rate can provide.

FACTS: City Mayor of Manila LIM issued ORDINANCE 774: prohibiting

short-time admission rates and wash-up schemes in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

Ordinance 774 was enacted to protect the best interest, health, and welfare and the morality of its inhabitants in general and the youth.

Malate Tourist Development Corp. (MTDC) filed a Complaint in RTC for Declaratory relief praying that the Ordinance be declared INVALID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL claiming as owner of Victoria Court in Malate, under its Charter, it was authorized to admit customers on a short time basis and to charge customers wash up rate for stays of only 3 hours.

White Light Corp., Titanium Corp. and Sta.Mesa tourist and

Development Corp, filed a motion for intervention on that ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in Manila.

a. It VIOLATES the right of PRIVACY and FREEDOM of

movement and EQUAL PROTECTION rights of the patrons of the establishments.

b. INVALID exercise of police power c. It is an UNREASONABLE and OPPRESSIVE interference in

their business.

City of Manila alleges that it is a VALID and LEGITIMATE exercise of police power conferred to it under the LGC under the General welfare Clause.

RTC rendered it decisions stating that:

The ORDINANCE is NULL and VOID, because it STRIKES at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed guarded by the Constitution – to encourage private enterprise and incentive to need investment and right to operate economic enterprises. AND, the illicit relationships it sought to dissuade cannot be consummated by simply paying for a 12 hour stay.

C.A. ruled that the ORDINANCE is a VALID a. VALID exercise of police power as conferred to the City by LGC

(sec. 458(4)(iv) and to the Manila Charter.

- to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension, houses, lodging, houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.

ALSO, it is a VALID exercise of police power, because the Ordinance has a LAWFUL OBJECT obtained through a LAWFUL METHOD. - Lawful objective: to curb immoral activities and to prevent

its adverse effect of the establishments to the inhabitants.

- Lawful method: since the establishments are still allowed to operate.

b. It did not VIOLATE the right of privacy or the freedom of

movement – it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stay

ISSUE(S): w/n the ORDINANCE is Constitutional HELD: NO! the Ordinance is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, it failed to comply

with the TEST of a VALID ordinance.

Test of a Valid Ordinance: (1) Must be WITHIN the Corporate powers of the LGU to enact

and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law. (2) Must NOT contravene the Constitution or any Statute (3) Must NOT be UNFAIR or OPPRESSIVE (4) Must NOT be partial or discriminatory (5) Must NOT prohibit but may regulate trade; (6) Must be GENERAL and CONSISTENT with public policy (7) Must NOT be UNREASONABLE.

It is NOT a VALID exercise of Police power as conferred by LGC under the General Welfare Clause. – the ORDINANCE failed to comply to TEST of Validity of exercise of Police power – was it made in accordance to DUE PROCESS -- (1) procedural process and (2) Substantive process such guarantees prevention of arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.

The ORDINANCE clearly curtail the RIGHT to LIBERTY of citizens to be free from arbitrary restraints or servitude and the right to enjoy the faculties which he has been endowed subject only to restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. – the ORDINANCE curtailed the LEGITIMATE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR among consenting married or consenting single adults which is constitutional protected – the right to liberty compels the respect to individual whose claim to privacy and intereference demands respect. In short, the ORDINANCE also CURTAILS the LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES that short time admission and wash up rate can provide. The Ordinance FAILED to provide valid interference with private

right is reasonably necessary for public interest. And such interference was through a reasonable means for its accomplishment. SUCH is tantamount to ARBITRARY INTRUSION of Private right. – Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by legitimate demand of public interest or welfare. - The ordinance failed to make distinction between places

frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate action. Thus it prevents the legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of.

State recognizes RIGHT to LIBERTY as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. It is the individual who determines what is moral or immoral to make its choices


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MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. CA

(G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006)

DOCTRINE: As A RULE: (Sec. 193) LGC withdrew tax exemption to ALL

persons, natural and juridical including GOCCs

Except: UNLESS, otherwise provided by the LGC. LGC under Sec. 133 provided for the exception, wherein are locally TAX exempt: , notably National Government, agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs are included in the list. NOTE: under Sec. 133, power to LEVY the property is also prohibited.

Exception –to the –exception : When the property of the National government, agencies, instrumentality and LGUs beneficial use has been granted for consideration to a taxable person. [sec. 234(a)]

FACTS:

E.O. 903 as amended by E.O. 909 and 298 is the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) charter, granting them as the official operator of NAIA, administering the land, improvements and equipment.

Pursuant to the E.O. 600 hectares of land was transferred to the name of MIAA, provided NO portion shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.

LGC was enacted withdrawing all tax exemption granted to all

persons (natural and juridical)

In accordance to LGC, Paranaque City imposed Real Estate Tax to MIAA for its Airport land and Buildings.

MIAA refused to pay the tax imposed on the belief that they are tax exempt pursuant to their Charter, under Sec. 21 thereof.

Office of Government Corp. Council (OGCC) opined that LGC withdrew the exemption granted to MIAA

MIAA paid partial of the tax amount, in effect, the City issued a Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency for 1992 -2001 – and eventually issued Notice of Levy and Warrant of Levy on the Airport lands and buildings.

MIAA filed a petition for prohibition and injunction to CA. CA dismissed the case on the ground that MIAA failed to file the petition within the 60 day period.

Petitioner filed a Petition to S.C. , in effect, issued a TRO immediately effective for the public auction for the subject property

However, TRO was received by the CITY 3 hours after the conclusion of the Auction Sale. To cure, S.C. issued an order making the TRO a nunc pro tunc TRO (―now for then‖ – having a retroactivity effect)

MIAA alleges the ff:

a. The Charter transferred the title of the land and buildings in

the Name of the MIAA

b. They do NOT claim OWNESHIP to the land and buildings

because the real owner is the Republic of the Philippines.

c. The property are for the PUBLIC USE and SERVICE, in such,

inalienable and are not subject to real estate tax by the LGU

d. The Charter Tax exempts MIAA from payment of real estate

tax.

Also, insist that LGC Sec. 234 exempt them so, because Airport

lands and buildings are owned by the Republic – the

government cannot tax themselves.

City alleges: a. LGC Sec. 193, expressly WITHDREW the tax exemption

privileges of ―government-owned and controlled corporation‖ b. International Airport is not among the exception enumerated

in Sec. 193 of LGC. ISSUE(S):

W/N MIAA is tax exempt for Real Estate tax imposed by the City of Paranaque HELD:

YES! MIAA is tax exempt for the Real Estate Tax imposed by the city of Paranaque BUT is tax liable to the portion leased to a taxable person.

MIAA is a Government INSTRUMENTALITY and NOT a GOCC.

MIAA is not a GOCC. For an entity to be GOCC it must be established as either stock or non –corporation giving service for the public. However, in the case, MIAA is neither a Stock nor a non-stock.

- It is NOT a STOCK corporation -- There is NO capital

divided into shares, no stockholders or voting shares. because it is not In the MIAA charter, ANY capital incurred it must be given to ANY government agency to be determined by DBM and COA.

- It is NOT a NON-STOCK corporation – There is no members and has NO income to be distributed In the MIAA charter, ANY income gathered is to be REMITTED to the National treasury. And MIA is not organized as a charitable, religious, educational, profession, cultural, recreational and etc.. to be considered a non-stock.

MIAA is a government INSTRUMENTALITY to operate the NAIA that is for public use and service.

MIAA’s property are devoted for Public use and service, such is a

PUBLIC DOMINION and owned by the State such is clearly tax exempt under LGC Sec. 234 (a), stating ― real property owned by the Republic or any of its political subdivisions EXCEPT when the beneficial use has been granted for consideration or otherwise to a taxable person.

Notably also, since the property are of public dominion it cannot be alienated without the express authority of the Republic. Thus, such


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properties cannot be levied by the City of Paranaque under any circumstances.

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY

(MCIAA) vs. MARCOS (G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996)

FACTS:

RA 6958 created Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of Mactan International Airport and other airport established.

Sec. 14 of RA 6958, granted MCIAA tax exemption from payment of realty taxes.

1994, Cebu City demanded payment of Realty taxes to MCIA insisting that:

- MCIAA is a GOCC performing proprietary functions whose tax

exemption privilege has been withdrawn by LGC under Sec. 193

and 234.

MCIAA objected and asserted that, it is tax exempt due to: a. It’s RA 6958 grant realty tax exempt. b. It is an instrumentality, which under LGC Sec. 133 is tax

exempt

City issued a warrant of levy against the property of MCIAA.

MCIAA was compelled to pay under Protest and filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with RTC contending:

a. Taxing power of LGUs do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees

of any kind on an instrumentality of the National government

b. MCIAA is a GOCC but it is of equal footing as government

agency or instrumentality of the National Government by the

very nature of its powers and functions.

RTC dismissed the Petition on the ground that MCIAA is NOT tax exempt because RA 6958 granting such privilege is REPEALED by the LGC when it was enacted, WITHDRAWING such privilege.

Appeal filed directly to S.C.

ISSUE(s): W/N MCIAA is liable to PAY Real Property tax to Cebu City HELD: YES! MCIAA is liable to Pay real property tax to Cebu City.

Enactment of LGC in effect REPEALED RA 6958. MCIAA’s charter RA 6958, clearly provided for realty tax exemptions BUT when LGC was enacted, under the LGC sec. 133 and Sec. 234, stating WITHDRAWAL of real property tax exemption granted to natural or juridical persons including GOCC. In the Case, MCIAA is NO doubt a GOCC, thus, real property tax exemption is deemed withdrawn.

MCIAA CANNOT invoke the Sec. 133 (o) that taxing power of the LGU cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on National Government, agencies or instrumentalities and LGUs. Because… MCIAA admittedly declared that is a GOCC, therefor it is NOT an instrumentality of the

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

(G.R. No. 162015 March 6, 2006)

FACTS:

RA 3259, provided for Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) as the legislative franchise holder to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting.

RA 3259 contained tax liability of Bayantel to Real Property Tax (RPT) on lands and building and personal property exclusive of the franchise.

LGC was enacted and took effect containing: a. a grant to LGUs to levy taxes and

b. withdraw any tax exemption granted to all persons,

juridical or natural.

Then, RA 7633 was enacted re-instating Bayantel’s original franchise of tax liability to pay RPT to its property for exclusive use of the franchise. (1992)

(1993) Quezon City enacted City Ordinance 93, establishing Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC) imposing:

a. Real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City b. Withdrawal of all exemption from RPT under Sec. 234 of LGC. c. General Withdrawal of tax exemption privilege to all persons

including GOCCs

RA 7925, ―Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines‖ – granted all the privileges, favor exemptions, advantage or immunity render existing telecommunication franchise.

Bayantel wrote the City Assessor to exclude its real properties in the City’s list of taxable real properties pursuant to RA 7925.

Because such properties are actually, directly and exclusively used by Bayantel in pursuit of their franchise, under RA 7925, such is RPT exempt. What are taxable are the property used exclusively of its franchise.

City Assessor Denied, Hence, Bayantel appealed with the Local Board of Assessment Appeal (LBAA) and did not pay for the RPT.

QC treasurer sent Notices of Delinquency to pay RPT for P43M+ and issued a warrant of levy against Bayantel’s properties.

Bayantel filed with RTC a Petition for Prohibition and application of TRO – which RTC granted the TRO.

RTC decision: Bayantel is tax exempt pursuant of its franchise under Sec. 11 of RA 7633

QC filed an appeal directly in SC under pure question of law contending that:

a. Tax exemption of Bayantel’s under its Original Franchise

RA 3259, had been withdrawn by LGC and was not

restored by subsequent enactment of RA 7633.

b. Tax exemption was also WITHDRAWN through the

enactment of City Ordinance 93, QCRC

c. The grant given of tax exemption under RA 3259 and 7633

are Vague.


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ISSUE(S):

W/N Bayantel’s real properties in Q.C. are RPT exempt under its legislative franchise HELD: Bayantel’s real property are that are actually, directly and exclusively used in pursuit of its franchise are TAX exempt while real properties that are used exclusively of its franchise are taxable.

- Sec. 11 of RA 7633, as reinstatement tax provision in RA 3259 states:

― The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings, and personal property, EXCLUSIVE of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. x x x x‖

- Such provisions CONSTRUED consists of 2 KINDS of

PROPERTIES held by Bayantel: a. Actually, Directly and Exclusively used in its radio or

telecommunication business; and

b. Properties not used as such but properties Exclusive of the franchise.

HENCE, under the said provision, it is INFERRED by S.C. that the legislative intent was to make Bayantel liable to pay RPT on the properties exclusive of the franchise but are not used actually, directly and exclusively in its radio or telecommunication business. S.C> further stated that: LGU has the power to tax and impose and remove exemptions, However, such power is still subject to Congress guidelines and limitations because the power to tax is still primarily vested in the Congress.

- When LGC was enacted, it amended RA 3259 by directing withdrawal of any tax exemption given to all person natural or juridical including GOCCs. Subsequently, the Congress enacted RA 7633, reinstating exactly the tax exemption provision.

- Hence, it RA 7633 as the subsequent legislation is an express and real intention of the Congress to remove from LGC’s delegated taxing power, all of the franchises’ Bayantel properties actually, directly and exclusively used in pursuit of its franchise. BUT, properties exclusively of its franchise but are not used as stated, is under the LGC’s delegated taxing power.

QCRC cannot prevail over the legislative intent under RA 7633 granting tax exemption to Bayantel from RPT of it real property actually, directly and exclusively used in pursuit of its franchise.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.

(G.R. No. 162015 March 6, 2006)

FACTS:

4 Oil companies and a taxpayer, pursuant to LGC Sec. 18712, brought the question of constitutionality and legality of the tax ordinance 7794 of City of Manial entitled Manila Revenue Code.

Petitioner contends that Manila Revenue Code is NULL and VOID for it failed to comply with the prescribed procedure in enacting Tax Ordinance and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

Sec. of Justice (Drilon) issued a Resolution, stating that the Tax Ordinance 7794 is NULL and VOID for it failed to comply with the prescribed procedure in enacting tax ordinances.

City of Manila filed a Petition for Certiorari in RTC.

RTC Decision:

(1) Revoke Sec. of Justice Resolution and sustain the Ordinance

7794, that it complied with the procedural requirement

(2) It declared LGC Sec. 187, UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it

gave Sec. of Justice the power to control over LGUs, such is

violative of the local autonomy.

Sec. of Justice appeald in S.C. Contending the ff: a. Sec. 187 of LGC is constitutional b. Procedural requirement of the tax ordinance enacted was not

observed in enacting Ordinance 7794 ISSUE(s) (1) W/N Sec. 187 is Constitutional (2) W/N Ordinance 7794 creating Manila Revenue Code is VALID HELD: (1) Sec. 187 is CONSTITUTIONAL, it only authorizes Sec. of Justice

the POWER of SUPERVISION and not the power of control.

Control Supervision Officer in control, LAYS down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.

Officer in Supervision, merely SEES to it that the rules are followed, but he himself DOES NOT lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. IF the rules are not observed he may

12 Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax, Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.


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order the work be done or re-done but ONLY to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe on his own for the doing of an act. He has no judgment on the matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

Sec. 187, merely AUTHORIZES Sec. of Justice to REVIEW only the Constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance, if warranted, revoke the Ordinance, alters or modifies or set aside BUT not he is not permitted to substitute his own judgment and to declare in his own opinion that the ordinance is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Such power is merely SUPERVISORY. In the Case, Drilon did set aside the MRC but he did not replace it with his own version of what the MRC should be. He did not pronounce the Ordinance is unise or unreasonable as a basis of its annulment. What Drilon did was to declare the Ordinance VOID due to failure to comply with the procedural requirement for its enactment. All he did was to determine whether the City performed their procedural requirement as prescribe. (2) Ordinance 7794 creating Manila Revenue Code is VALID, it

complied with procedural requirement. a. Notices of the Public Hearing were sent to the interested

parties.

b. Notices were published in 2 newspaper of general circulation for consecutive weeks as mandated by the LGC.

loc.gov digest upto drilon

Documents