limitations on the governmental use of social science in the united states

Limitations on the Governmental Use of Social Science in the United States

B E V E R L Y R U S S E L L A N D A R N O L D S H O R E

MANY American social scientists believe that policies could be better devised by government and more effectively carried out if greater use were made of the knowledge and methods of the various social sciences. I Some are also aware that the social sciences hav not produced knowledge which is adequate to permit pressing social problems to be resolved. Those social scientists who are aware of their shortcomings attribute them to the fragmented, disjointed, insignificant character of much research, inadequacies of both data and techniques of research, the stress which academic social scientists lay on basic, in contrast with applied, research, and the difficulty of studying widely ramified social problems within the separate frameworks of the social science disciplines? Other social scientists ascribe the failure to government and politics, which they describe as disorderly, inefficient, unsystematic and indifferent to rational thought and analysis? Both classes of critics presume that social science ought to have an impact on social policy. At the very least, the critics believe, the information and interpretations which social scientists are capable of producing about the kinds of events with which policies must deal should receive respectful attention from those who make the policies.

It is not only the deficiencies of the descriptions, analyses and interpretations offered by social scientists which restrict the influence which such works have in the making and execution of policies. The deficiencies do not explain all the failures of the social sciences. The characteristics of politicians and of political institutions and traditions also limit the

1 See, for example, Crawford, Elisabeth T., "The Sociology of the Social Sciences ", Current Sociology, XIX, 2 (1971); Lompe, Klaus, "The Role of the Social Scientist in the Process of Policy-Making ", Sodal Science ln[ormation, VII, 6 (December 1968), pp. 159-176 ; Merton, Robert and Devereux, Edward, Jr., "Practical Problems and the Uses of Social Science ", Transaction, I, 5 (July 1964), pp. 18-21; Etzioni, Amitai, "Policy Re- search ", The American Sociologist, VI, supplementary issue (June 1971), pp. 8-12; Ranney, Austin (ed.), Political Science and Publ& Policy (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968); Price, Don K., The Scientific Estate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Schuessler, Carl and Demerath, Nicholas, Social Policy and Sociology (New York: Academic Press, 1975).

2 See, for example, Orlans, Harold, " Making Social Research More Useful to Govern- ment ", Social Science Information, VII, 6 (December 1968), pp. 151-158; Schorr, Alvin, Explorations in Social Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Truman, David, "The Social Sciences and Public Policies", Science, CLX, 3827 (3 May, 1968), pp. 508-512; Pye, Lucian, "Description, Analysis, and Sensir to Change ", in Ranney, A. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 239-260; Williams, Walter, Social Policy Research and Analysis (New York : American Elsevier, 1971); Myrdal, Gunnar, " The Social Sciences and their Impact on Society ", in Stein, Herman (ed.), Social Theory and Social Invention (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1968), pp. 145-163.

3 For an explicit statement of this position, see Dror, Yehezkel, Ventures in Policy Sciences (New York : American Elsevier, 1971), pp. 157 ft.

476 Beverly Russell and Arnold Shore

extent to. which such information and interpretation as social science can offer enter into the making of policies.

Politicians and civil servants, in setting the goals of policy, decide the boundaries of governmental action, and they make decisions about the allocation of resources. Social scientists may provide the makers of policy with information and interpretations about the situations with which they deal and the consequences o~ particular actions for those si~tuations; they also recommend policies, presumably on the basis of their expertise as social scientists, but final decisions on whether and how to take this knowledge and recommendations into account are made by politicians and civil servants, not by social scientists. ~

In order to understand the response of the federal government to the accounts, interpretations and proposals offered by social scientists, we must look closely at the procedures by which policy is made, to determine just at which points government does use social research in its attempts to promulgate and carry out its policies. These procedures are part of the political reality which many social scientists have often disregarded while praising the applicability of their work.

The Uses of Social Science

By the uses of social science we mean the incorporation, by the various branches of the federal government--more specifically by the Congress, the office of the President and the civil service--into judgements as to which actions should be taken to achieve certain desired conditions, of descriptions, causal interpretations and proposals offered by social scientists. The interpretations--what are sometimes called "theories ", "perspectives" and "approaches"--are often invoked by both social scientists and governmental interlocutors in recommendations of policies which are intended to bring about changes or to prevent them; social science information and the techniques of obtaining such information are often drawn upon. The former are illustrated by the "'theories" of poverty and of criminality which influenced the federal government to deal with "pover ty" through the legislation of the 1960s which embodied those ideas? Another important illustration is the use made of research on the influence of the ethnic composition of school classes on the achieve- ment of pupils in justification for the "busing " of school children. Examples of the second, more descriptive and sometimes more technical kind of information such as social scientists use and gather, are the development and continuing use by the Army of aptitude and intelligence

Alvin M. Weinberg discusses issues which go beyond science and are dealt with by the .ordinary political process in " Science and Trans-Science ", Minerva, X, 2 (April 1972), pp. 209-222.

5 For the social science approaches to poverty especially important in the " war on poverty " legislation, see Graham, Elinor, " T h e Politics of Poverty ", in Seligman, Ben B. (ed.), Pover ty as a Public Issue (New York : Free Press, 1965), pp. 234-250.

l_Jmitations on Governmental Use of Social Science 477

tests and the collection of data carried out by the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Department of Commerce.

Most social scientists would agree that government has accepted without question the more descriptive kind of social science, and it has made wide use of the characteristic methods of the social sciences, such as statistical analysis, sampling, censuses, questionnaires and surveys? Increasing numbers of social scientists are employed in executive departments, and agencies 7--notably the Office of Education and the National Institute of Mental Health--also make contracts with social scientists outside the government for the collection and analysis of such information.

When social scientists complain of the government's failure to make sufficient use of the social sciences, they are referring primarily to the first type of social science, which is more theoretical and more fundamental, and to the recommendations which social scientists think are based on their fundamental theoretical understanding. It is these theories and interpretations which social scientists would like to have shape the politicians' conception of the situations which are involved in social problems and to guide the politicians' construction of a "solut ion" of the problems. Some of this occurs. Many social science interpretations are at least brought to the attention of legislators and administrators. Still, the incorporation o.f knowledge or understanding obtained through the social sciences into comprehensive programmes aimed to have an effect on society occurs only under special circumstances.

The Institutions of the Federal Government and their Use o[ Social Science

The Congress: The process by which American federal government decides on policies is constrained by the constitutional doctrine of separa- tion of powers; the federal system which leaves substantial powers to state and local governments; decentralised, non-ideological political parties; and the social traditions of the various regions in a diversified society. The outcome is a dispersal of authority and power among numerous politicians, territorial institutions and political groups; as a result, power can be exercised through coalitions. The coalitions which are characteristic of all politics, and not least of American politics, are nowhere more evident than in the United States Congress. Each centre of power in the legislature is responsive to the demands or putative desires of different

8 Ellis, William W., et al., The Federal Government in Behavioral Science: Fields, Methods, and Funds (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1964), pp. 9-10.

r Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, National Research Council, The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government (Washington, D.C. : National Academy of Sciences, 1968), p. 46. For more recent figures see the Current Federal Work]orce Data redes published by the Civil Service Commission.

478 Beverty Russell and Arnold Shore

segments of the population; The enactment of a law by the United States Congress is usually a product of political compromises among numerous actively interested groups.

The United States Congress has traditionally served the "interests" of the various economic, ethnic, religious and other groups, often over- lapping with each other, which make up the active political population of each state and congressional district. Although the President's con- stituency is national, he needs the cooperation of Congress and the civil service to have his programme passed and carried out. Proposed policies must satisfy the requirement of political feasibility; policies must be formulated with an eye toward assembling by coalescence a majority in both houses of Congress so that legislation will be passed. In the face of strong demands to the contrary from their own more active constituents, legislators will rarely follow the leadership of their party even where it coincides with the President's programme. Legislators examine proposed policies in the light of their political consequences, as they see them. They a s k : who will be affected, who will be helped, who will be hurt? And how will it affect the support which the affected persons and groups in their constituencies will give them? It is in the light of their answers to such questions that legislators decide to support a measure or to oppose it.

The votes of legislators on the bills which come before them are functions of their desire to be re-elected. A legislator, even if he studied the report of a social scientist about the benefits and costs of a particular legislative proposal, would not act on the basis of the implications of the Social scientist's report if these were to contradict the desires and expec- tations of the constituents who could weaken his political support in the future. Innovations which are recommended by social scientists or which seem to be implied by the results of their research are often resisted by groups who. take exception to the factual, scientific studies on which the policies are a!ieged~ to. be based. Since the political feasibility of any existing policy has already been demonstrated, the advantages lie with already existing policies and against new ones? Furthermore the social consequences i n the long run of various alternative policies have a lesser bearing on political feasibility t h a n the immediate effects which any particular policy might have on the legislator's constituents? Congress approaChES proposals for extensive social change very cautiously, and it is likely to give little respect t o t h e theories and the given empirical accounts which social scientists might adduce in connection with a recom- me~aafibn for far-reaching and remote effects. . . . . .

i s :Keefe, :William J,, PartieS, Politks and Public .Policy in Amer (New York : Holt t Rili:6hi~rt ar/tt Winston, 1972), p. 129. " , ,

9 'Poisby, Nelson, Congress and the Presidency, 2n d ed. ~ (Eng!ewood Cliffs,, N,J;i P r e n . rice Hall, 1971), p. 67; and Huitt, Ralph K], "Polit ical Feasibility ", in Ranney, A. (ed.), op. cir., pp. 273-274.

Limitations on Governmental Use of Social Science 479

Interpretations of ostensible facts and theories drawn from social science can be adduced by experts to justify the political goals and the favoured policies of various members of Congress in hearings o{ congressional committees. I~ Through such hearings, social scientists come into contact with those who make policy. Social scientists are sometimes called to testify about those complicated features of a proposed policy which actually require academic expertise or for which political support can be gained by the appearance of approval by academic experts. Social scientists are in fact rarely called to testify at congressional hearings simply to provide the interpretations and information which they possess in their capacity as experts. They are called to confirm the assertions made by politicians who have already made up their minds about what a current state of affairs is and what factual Consequences will flow from particular policies, and to confer the prestige of their presumed expertise on these positions in order to gain the assent of other legislators and the public.

The Child Development Act of 1971 was one example of proposed legislation which received much publicity in connection with the supporting testimony of social scientists. It was, in fact, vetoed by President Nixon. Senator Mondale was chairman of the Subcommittee on Children and Youth which aimed, among other things, " t o identify and seek changes in arbitrary policies that place hardships on families with children; to develop policies that provide alternative ways of strengthen- ing families; and to determine how we can provide the options and choices that families need to do their best job ,,.11 Witnesses were chosen so that their " expe r t " testimony would confirm many of the ostensibly factual assertions already adopted by Senator Mondale in support of the policy he was espousing. This placed the social scientists who testified as "scientists" in the same position as those individuals who represented "pressure-groups" and who declared ~ei r interest.

All the social scientists presented interpretations which were consistent with the position of the chairman of the subcommittee. Professor Edward Zigler, of the department of psychology of Yale University and former director of the Office of Child Development, said there was a need for a national policy; this had already been said by Senator Mondale. Professor Zigler was not sanguine about the ability of social scientists to assess the effectiveness of programmes, but he did not let these doubts qualify his recommendationsJ ~ Dr. Margaret Mead testified on the need for "family impact statements ", another of Senator Mondale's pro-

10 See, for example, Clark, Inn D., "Expe r t Advice in the Controversy about Supersonic Transport in the Unilext States ", Minerva, XII, 4 (October 1974), pp. 422; 426-428.

11 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Children and Youth of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Examination o[ the Influence that Governmental Policies Have on American Families (Washington~ D.C;: U.S. Government Printing Otficc, 1973), p. 2.

1~ Ibid., p. 80. ' . . . . . . .


posals. 13 Professor Uric Bronfenbrenner, social psychologist, of Cornell University, also endorsed the proposal for "family impact assessments" contained in the proposed legislation. These expert witnesses had clearly been summoned to justify Senator Mondale's bill; they had been invited because it was thought their prestige as "scientific experts" would win support for the bill. There is no evidence that they were invited because it was thought that their knowledge as scientific experts would introduce a sound basis for considering the prospective success of the proposed legislation. What is being used in such situations is the social scientist, not social science.

The use of social scientists to justify opposite sides in the controversy over supersonic transport has been shown quite conclusively. Senator Percy, who opposed the supersonic transport, obtained the signatures of economists who disapproved of the supersonic transport, while Senator Magnuson, who, favoured it, obtained the support of economists who approved of it. The names of these economists were used by each senator to justify his own views on the supersonic transport, which had been arrived at without the aid of the "experts ".~ The manipulation of social scientists and the exploitation of their prestige as academic experts before congressional committees is not a monopoly of congressmen. The President can also do it for his own political ends. A case in point is provided by the hearings on the "War on Poverty" programme which led to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. In the eyes of one observer, the hearings "were carefully engineered and overwhelmed by a well-organised administrative lobby". TM The witnesses were over- whelmingly favourable to the bill. Professor Walter Heller, then chairman of the Council for Economic Advisors, was one such witness. He testified that a programme which would do no more than redistribute income would not be acceptable, " . . . because it would leave the roots of poverty untouched and deal only with its symptoms ,,.1~

Professor HeUer and the draftsmen and sponsors of the Economic Opportunity Act conceived of po.verty as an exception in an otherwise affluent society, existing only in "pockets ". This view implied that the causes of poverty were characteristics o.f the individual or those produced by his special, "ghet to" sub-culture. It was criticised by some social Scientists for ignoring the complexities of unemployment and the struc- tural characteristics of the economy which result in a given distribution of income and wealth. These criticisms implied a preference for policies which would deal with income redistribution directly, rather than policies

i s I b id . , p. 125. x~ Clark, I. D., op . cit . , pp. 416-432. 15 Graham, Elinor, "Pover ty and the LegisLative Process ", in Seligman, B. (ed.), op .

cit . , p. 258. 1~ Hearings befoxe the Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program, Committee on

Education and Labor, Linked States House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 10440 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 26.

Limitations o n Governmental Use o f Social Science 481

which sought to eliminate poverty by changing the attitudes, motivation and culture of the poorY This conflict of views among social scientists was disregarded in the hearings on the Economic Opportunity Act; no counter-witnesses were called to testify on this point of contention. The three academic witnesses who did testify against the proposed legislation "failed to offer constructive alternatives ", dealing as they did with definitional problems, the need for research, and the concept of a welfare stateY

In an effort to improve the availability to Congress of the knowledge which the social sciences have acquired, the Congressional Research Ser- vice has been organised. It was formerly the Legislative Reference Ser- vice; it was reorganised under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 when it changed its name and was charged with conducting research bearing on proposed legislation if requested to do so, organising reviews of the accomplishments of past legislative activities, helping to review and set agenda for congressional committees, providing information for congressional staffs, and supplying names of expert witnesses for issues before congressional committees. ~9

The Service employs about 400 research workers, many of them with advanced training in the social sciences. They are organised into such divisions as economics, educational and public welfare, environmental policy and science policy research; they produce studies and congressional documents, contribute to the hearings, provide assistance for the analysis of legislative proposals and conduct seminars. The reports of the Con- gressional Research Service list many specific studies undertaken, including studies of wage and price controls, urban transit, national health insurance, annotated bibliographies, studies of education, and so forth. To provide a sense of the kind of research carried out, we quote the description of a major study of educational finance from a detailed report to Congress in 1974:

School Finance. Another mulfidivisional project was undertaken for the Sub- committee on Education of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Eleven background papers, tentatively planned for l~ublication as a committee print or Senate document, were prepared by ten researchers from four divisions to assist the subcommittee's consideration of a programme of financial aid for public and non-public schools. The Education and Public Welfare Division was responsible for overall coordination of the project and liaison with subcommittee staff.. Analysts of the Division prepared studies on equality of

a7 See essays by Elinor Graham, S. M. Miller and Martin Reid in Seligman, B. B. (ed.), op. tit.

is Levitan, Sar A , The Great Society's Poor Law: A New Approach to Poverty (Balti- more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 40.

19 Title III o f the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 ' , Jfedesignated the Legislative Reference Service the Congressional Research Service, redefining its duties to assist Con- gressional committees by providing research and analytical services, records, documents and other information and data, including memoranda on proposed legislation; and expanding its staff resources ". Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XXVI (1970), 91st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 450-451.


educational opportunity, the relationship between expenditures and education quality, urban and rural schools and their special needs, current state finance programmes and recent reforms, and the federal interest in non-public schools. Papers on the tax structures supporting education and possibilities for their reform and on the potential tax yields at various governmental levels were contributed by the Economics Division. The American Law Division studied the legal challenges levelled at current school financing arrangements and their implications for the Federal Government. The Government and General Research Division concentrated on the structure of the governance of education and possibilities for change, in addition to analysing alternative federal grant programmes. An additional aspect of the study--the establishment of a data base and model design for the use in analysing federal aid-to-education proposals--was contracted out 'by the service. ~~

The Congressional Research Service keeps track of research in the social sciences and other fields o~ interest to it by examining some 4,000 periodicals, many of them social science publications, and entering them into a "Bibliographic Data Base ". This bibliography, combined with close inspectio~ of legislative actions, is used to provide the basis for technical and descriptive reports to Congress and to provide a background of information and interpretation on issues which Congresisonal committees are intended to consider. For hearings and pending legislation, the Congressional Research Service provides memoranda on the purposes and effects of legislation; these often include the results of social science research, as in the case of housing studies which the Congressional Research Service provided for reports of the subcommitteeY

The Service would like to initiate more research of its own and to address wider questions, making use of survey research information, in addition to responding to requests from Congress for specific information and expert consultation. ~ While it attempts to widen its role in setting the agenda which should govern the discussion of policies, analysing alternative policies, and pointing out the implications of particular formulations, it is fair to say that Congress, ever concerned with political realities, prefers to confine the Service to the role of a provider of information. It is clear that Congress is willing to support social science research on the topics in which it is interested. How seriously it takes its results is another m,atter.

The Presidency: Social scientists' views of the relevance of social science research to the promulgation of policy do not always correspond with the legislators' ideas about what they have to take into account in formulating a policy. Since Congress is not organised to seek, and does

20 Congressional Research Support and Information Services, " A Compendium of Materials ", compiled by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, May 3, 1974 (Washington, D,C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

21 Annual Report of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for Fiscal Year 1971 (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 21.

~2 As explained by the director of the Congressional Research Service, Lester S. Jayson, in a statement before the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations, 16 May, 1974 (mimeographed), pp. 7-11.

Limitations on 'Governmental Use of Social Science 483

not by its traditions aim to find, comprehensive solutions to national problems, social scientists seeking to promote sweeping changes in policy or comprehensive legislative programmes often look to the White House as a sponsor.

Presidents ~ in recent administrations have been usually more receptive than congressmen to proposals for large-scale programmes in domestic policy, such as those entailed in the idea of the "great society ". Presi- dents have often found it electorally useful to promise new domestic policies in their electoral campaigns; once elected, they have been expected to present a comprehensive domestic programme to Congress and to the electorate. A President has to achieve something substantial in a short period. Two years after his election, the progress of the Presi- dent's domestic programme is an issue which affects his party's success in the mid-term elections. One year later, the next presidential campaign is under way and the President, if he is to be re-elected, must have a record of accomplishments to present to the voters. The passage of a comprehensive body of legislation is a visible accomplishment which the President can offer as evidence that he is worthy of re-electi0n.

Presidents are often receptive to suggestions for social policies which will purportedly lead to broad or comprehensive changes. Nonetheless, domestic social policy usually receives much less of the President's time and attention than do issues of foreign and economic policy. Thus, Presidents who would otherwise be ready to call on the help of social scientists in planning domestic social policy often make use of special organisational arrangements. In recent times, Presidents have sometimes delegated authority to important members of their staff who as a result exercise much influence over decisions concerning domestic policy. These staff-members may help to bring social scientists and their ideas to the attention of the President.

A notable example of this role in liaison was Mr. William Moyers' organisation of the 14 task forces which produced much of the legislation of President Johnson's programme of the "great society ". Mr. Moyers joined President Johnson's staff immediately after President Kennedy's assassination in 1963. President Johnson expected to win the 1964 election by a large margin, and he wished to have a new legislative programme ready to present in 1965. The intention behind the formation of the task forces was to assemble leading experts in the social sciences in order to concentrate their minds on specific problems, such as unemployment and urban decay, and to make their recommendations the basis of the President's legislative programme.

The 14 task forces began to meet at the. end of June 1964. Each was composed of 12 to i5 meinbers, of whom half were governmental officials and half camr the universities. On 15 "November, 1964, they made their reports to Mr. Moyers, who then presented their ideas to cabinet officers and the experts~of the Bureau Of the "BUdget. : : i "~


Mr. Moyers then:

set up a second system of task forces, made up of cabinet members, assistant secretaries, and Budget Bureau experts. These groups met for a series of sessions in Moyers' office to decide which ideas in the task force proposals had substantive merit, and, beyond that, were politically feas ib le . . . . Given the decisions made and priorities set in these meetings, officials could begin to shape the final recommendations that would be presented to the President. 23

Finally, President Johnson's intimate knowledge of the members of Congress led to additional revisions of the legislation recommended by the task forces which were necessary to obtain congressional approval. Among the proposals of the task forces were legislation for supplementary educational centres, planning for the special schools in slums, health measures, rent supplements, the "model cities" programme, mprove- ments in the anti-poverty programme, the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and legislation to reduce the pollution of air and water.

It is difficult to calculate the precise influence of social science knowledge on the task forces and the resulting legislation. One indication of the significance of academic social scientists is offered by the former special assistant to President Johnson, Mr. Joseph Califano, who has recently been appointed Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa- tion and Welfare by President Carter. He said that the advice he received from academics led him to include three-year-olds in the "Head Start" programme and to propose the Child Health Act. 2' He did not say whether he was persuaded by the social science evidence which they presented, or by their general theories, or by the air of conviction with which they espoused their moral beliefs about the value of education.

Mr. Moyers' own contribution was his creation of the o rganisational pattem of the task force. He brought together members of the academic profession in Eastern universities with civil servants in discussions, the resultant ideas of which came before the President. Mr. Moyers' task forces were clearly one instance in which social scientists participated irt the making of policy close to the President. The participation of social scientists is not, however, the same thing as the use of social science.

Another instance of the infrequent participation of social scientists, which also took a special organisational form, was President Franklin Roosevelt's "brains trust ". This was a group consisting of Professors Raymond Moley, Rexford G. Tugwell and Adolf A. Berle--all of Columbia University. It was formed early in 1932 by Judge Samuel Rosenman, counsel to the then Governor Roosevelt, and D. Basil O'Connor, the Governor's former law pal'~er.

The purpose of the "brains trust" was to instruct the candidate Roosevelt on the interpretations and information available to social

23 Anderson, Patrick, The President's Men (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 332-333. 24 Ibid., p. 369.


scientists bearing on the problems raised by the depression and to come to conclusions about policies to be pursued once he became President. Mr. Tugwell in particular wanted Roosevelt to use the campaign as a forum for educating the American people in the economic philosophy of Simon N. Patten, who had been his teacher at the University of Pennsylvania. Patten had argued that the industrial revolution, by increasing the productivity of each worker, had made it possible, through expanding national wealth, to raise the living standards of the poor without lowering the living standards of the rich. 2~ In practice, this theory led to the idea that the government should actively stimulate economic recovery not by cutting governmental expenditures in order to balance the budget, but by creating opportunities for employment, thus restoring the purchasing power of the mass of the population. Industry, once revived, would then generate enough wealth to balance the budget.

Tugwell felt that the Roosevelt campaign should present these new ecoiaomic ideas to. the public as an alternative to Hoover's outmoded views. But Roosevelt brought him up sharply, Mr. Tugwell recalls, by a trenchant political observation:

Roosevelt's comment was tha,t the theory I was being so eloquent about was one that most of the people he knew would reject . . . . He said that I didn't understand about educating people; a campaign was not a dialogue or a programme of adult education. It was a fight for office, and he meant a fight. A President, he repeated, could educate in the interest of his programme, but a candidate had to accept people's prejudices and turn them to good use. 26

Some of the "brains trust 's" economic ideas were later expressed, as in the National Industrial Recovery Act, which introduced a great deal of governmental intervention throughout the economy. Because traditional economic policy seemed to be discredited by the experience of the depression, President Roosevelt was receptive to proposals from social scientists for new policies of great scope.

President Hoover had also sought the advice of social scientists in a rather different way. In 1929, he agreed to the appointment of some of the leading social scientists of the country to the President's Research Committee on Social Trends. 27 Recent Social Trends, the report of the committee, included analyses of nearly every aspect of American life. Presented to President Hoover in the fall of 1932, it came too late to be of use in his presidential plans, but it did set a pattern of the presenta- tion by academic social scientists of comprehensive factual surveys and

25 Patten, Simon N., The New Basis of Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1907). A new edition, edited and with an introduction by Daniel M. Fox, was published by Harvard Univorsity Press, in 1968.

36 Tugwe/1, Rexford G. and Cronin, Thomas, The Presidency Reappraised (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 409-410.

2r The Committee included Wesley C. Mitchell, chairman; Charles E. Merriam, vice- chairman; Shelby M. Harrison, secretary-treasurer; WiUiam F. Ogburn, director of resenrch; and Howard W. Odum, Alice Hamilton and Edward Eyre Hunt.


recommendations for policy to the executive branch of the federal government. Recent Social Trends diffused to a wider public certain views about the shape and direction o.f American society, but the extent to which any of its particular observations, or the recommendations which its main authors contributed from their own ethical and political beliefs, directly influenced legislation or administration remains un- certain.

It was, however, not forgotten. President Eisenhower, for example, referred specifically to Recent Social Trends in 1959, in announcing in his address on the State of the Union that he "wanted to set up a similar study to examine the changing American scene and to establish national goals for the 1960s that would be feasible as well as inspira- tional ,,as Nevertheless, of the 11 members of the Commission on National Goals, only one, Dr. Clark Kerr, was a social scientist. However, for its report Goals for Americans, the Commission requested essays of 14 leading authorities, six of whom were academic social scientists. The "' appointment of the Commission, and the publication and wide distribution of its report . . . indicated the increasing desire to utilise social science for policy formulation even though this attempt was not parti- cularly successful ,,.59

The Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration o.f Justice appointed in 1969, the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence of the same year, the Commission on Obscenity and Porno- graphy of 1970, and the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future of 1972, also drew on social scientists. The reports contained a mixture of research in accordance with generally prevailing standards, conclusions from theories which were often tendentious and expressions of moral and political judgement, as well as many recommendations. The recommendations of the commissions were often ignored, left without action or even explicitly rejected by the President and other politicians. Nonetheless, presidentially appointed commissions do offer a channel through which the scientific results, the theories and the political and moral preferences of social scientists, can be brought before the makers of policy and the interested public.

The Federal Civil Service

Virtually every department in the executive branch of the federal government makes some use of enumerative information of the type traditionally gathered by social scientists and governmental statisticians and by the use o f some of the technique s characteristic of the social sciences at present:

as Archibald, Kathleen, " Federal Interest and Investment in Social Science': ~, a staff s tudy for the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee of the Committee on Govern~ merit, Operations, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st Session, The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs, (Washington, D,C,; U,S. Government Pr int ing Office, 1967),part I, pp,.334-335~ : " ::. : : :7~ ,- ~ . . : : ~ " . . . ~ 9 , l b i d , , p ~ 335 .

L i m i t a t i o n s o n G o v e r n m e n t a l U s e o f S o c i a l S c i e n c e 487

[The United States] government has traditionally used science to help it meet its operating needs--needs that were originally confined to such matters as counting the population, making weapons, mapping new territory and survey- ing the coastline. As the definition of .the proper function of government broadened, it supported work in a wider variety of areas--public health, agriculture, and labour, among others. But always, the emphasis has been on the development and application of "practical knowledge ,,?0

Examples of these uses of the kind of data and techniques now associated with the social sciences date back to the first census in 1790. I t is only in the more recent past, however, that these uses of the types of data and techniques in question have become numerous. During the depression of 1929, for example, the Department of Agriculture became a centre of research in social science, and its Division of Program Surveys introduced the use of the sample survey of opinions by government. ~1 Throughout the 1930s, rural sociologists and agricultural economists were very influential in agricultural policy. 3~ In 1930, Congressman Victor Christgau of Minnesota, himself an agricultural economist, introduced legislation for rural planning and a "domest ic a l lo tment" p rogramme-- a device to provide farmers with financial incentives to reduce production, thereby raising farm prices. This policy was shaped by Professor M. L. Wilson of Montana State College, who advised Roosevelt on agricultural planning during the campaign of 1932 and afterwards. Professors like Wilson from agricultural colleges provided the technical knowledge and the recommendations which the Roosevelt administration used to prepare a federal agricultural programme. They sat in meetings with heads of the American Farm Bureau Federation, and participated in drafting such laws as the AgricuRural Adjustment Act of 1933 and the Farm Security Act of 1937. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the Department of Agriculture coordinated the planning efforts of farmers and some social scientists with the aim of combining practical experience and expert knowledge. One division, directed by Professor Rensis Likert, a social psychologist, conducted surveys on the attitudes of farmers. 3a

The Second World War provided an impetus for greatly expanding the employment of social scientists in government. Fields in which research was done within the government included: soldiers' attitudes and morale; estimates of resources and of requirements for war production; techniques of selection of personnel in the armed forces and in the Office of Strategic Services; the analysis of press and radio broadcasts by social

3o Otfice of Science and Technology, Reply to a Request for Information from an Interim Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, "The Situation of the Social Sciences in the U.S.", The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic P r o g r a m s . . . part I, p. 129.

31 Alpert, Harry, "The Government's Growing Recognition of Social Science ", The Use o[ Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs . . . part I, pp. 220-221.

32 Kirkendall, Richard S., Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1966).

as Ibid., pp. 123, 184-185; and Friedel, Frank, F D R : Launching the New Deal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 83-101.

.488 Beverly Russell and Arnold Shore

scientists in the Office of War Information and the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service; the analysis of German propaganda; the survey by social scientists of war bond purchases; the study of the public response to governmental information. Interpretations of Japanese "national character" by anthropologists in the Office of War Information were conducted under governmental auspices. After the war, government con- tinued to support both descriptive and analytical research in the social sciences. The Office of Naval Research supported social psychological

�9 research on personnel and training, morale and organisational structure? ~ The Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Agricultural Estimates Division collect data on wages, employment and commodity prices. The National Institute of Mental Health conducts psychological research through its Laboratory of Socio-Environmental Studies; the Office o.f Economic Opportunity supported the development of new statistical series by the Census Bureau to describe more accurately the characteristics of the "poor ".~ In addition, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Education, the National Institute of Mental Health, and many other governmental agencies let contracts and make grants to social scientists outside government to perform research on their behalf. What is done with the results of this research is not the same as the provision of support for social science. It is likely that nothing is done with most of them. Indeed, sometimes the call for a "thorough study" of a problem is actually a governmental device to delay action or to allay criticism of inaction.

Using Social Science an:d Employing Social Scientists

The pragmatic and selective use of social science methods and ideas eharacterises the permanent civil service. But in addition to the permanent civil service, there is the "alternative civil service" in the White House itself which is controlled by the President and his staff. 36 The White House staff are unlikely to be interested in the scientific knowledge which social scientists might be able to produce. Charged with furthering the President's general policies, his staff is more likely to use social scientists when they Support--and the social sciences when they confirm wthe factual assumptions of the President's policies.

The influence of the White House staff has increased steadily since the administration of Franklin Roosevelt and it has done so in competition with the highest ranking civil servants. Conflict is frequent in the relation- ships between presidential staff and under- and assistant-secretaries and chiefs of :bureaux of the civil service. The permanent civil service, although eonstitutionally within the executive branch, can be as much in opposition to the President as Congress. This large administrative

z~ Ibid., p. 221. 35 Ibid., p. 239. za See, for example, Anderson, P., op. cir.; and Cronin, Thomas and Greenberg,

Sanford, The Presidential Advisory System (New York : Harper and Row, 1969).

Limitations Oni: Go verrtmental.Use of Social Science ~489

machine is much less flexible and less easily dominated by the President than is the White House staff. For one thing, while the White House staff :serves entirely at the President's pleasure, civil servants below the highest o r "pol i t ica l" levels cannot be dismissed by the President. This makes the civil service relatively autonomous; and it permits it to have policies rOf its own which may be contrary to those of the President and those of Congress. Its members sometimes have close alliances with some congressmen and lobbyists while acting independently of the President's policies; they may also have close alliances with the staffs of congressmen. Presi- dentiaUy appointed members of the Cabinet who are subject to approval ~f the Senate tend to become too dependent on the permanent civil :servants in their departments t o serve as effective representatives of the presidential interest. Presidents, therefore, usually have limited confidence in the compliance of the civil service with their policies and instructions.

The management of a bureaucracy comprising perhaps thousands of careerists will be, at best, nominal; the agency heads will inevitably outmanoeuvre a politician-secretary. Presidential orders transmitted through such channels become more mysteriously changed to suit the bureaucracy's preferences. Policies persist from one Administration to another remarkably unchanged. Resistance to change is also reinforced by the alliances between bureaucrats and the appropriate congressmen. Altogether, it requires a most sophisticated and ,determined President to effect any changes at all. ~z

Because of the difficulties of the presidential staff in the White House in controlling the permanent higher civil service, Presidents have sometimes sought to circumvent it in order to realise their policies. The most common ways to. do this are to establish new agencies, or to transfer activities to the executive office of the President. 3~ When new agencies are created wi~tMn the executive office of the President, they are likely to be more effective; they are also more likely to bring academic social scientists into advisory or administrative positions. Social scientists who .are appointed to t h e executive office may participate in the drafting of legislation, serve as liaison-officers with parts of the permanent civil service, and present new ideas from academic social science to the President and his assistants. An example of a social scientist who worked

.in these capacities was Mr. Douglass Cater, an acaderrfi'c political scientist and journalist who became President Johnson's special assistant for health and educational programmes in 1964. He began as White House liaison- officer with the task force in health and education. He helped shape 40 ~health and education bills which were enacted by :Congress in 1965-66, including those dealing with medical care for the aged, elementary and secondary education, and research on heart disease, cancer and stroke.

;He was a liaison-officer with the Office of Education and the Public

3z Tugwell, Rexford G., " On Bringing Presidents to Heel ", TugweU, R. and Cronin, T., .op. cir., p. 290.

as Pressman, Jeffrey and Wfldavsky, Aaron, Implementation (Berkeley: University of ,California Press, 1973), pp. 128-132.


Health Service, as well as supervisor of health and education programmes throughout the government? ~

This technique of administrative improvisation was devised by Presi- dent Franklin Roosevelt, and it frees the Presidera from dependence on the permanent civil service. In such situations, there is likely to be less interest in social science as either a body of knowledge or a collection of techniques and more interest in social scientists if they are forceful as personalities and artful in the ways of go~,ernment. If they have ideas derived from social science, that is all right---Jbut it is not indispensable.

The expansion of the federal government during the administration of President Roosevelt into areas traditionally left to individuals, private charity, or local government was precipitated by the economic depression. This increased federal intervention was inspired and supported by early twentieth-century sociologists and economists such as Lester Ward, Richard Ely, Thorstein Veblen and Simon Patten, all o~ whom argued that governmental action based upon scientific knowledge should direct the evolutionary process and promote the general welfare. This intellectual tradition influenced the Progressive political movement, which was strong in the second decade of the twentieth century. 4~ Rexford Tugwell and Harry Hopkins, and Cabinet members such as Frances Perkins, Harold Ickes and Henry Wallace had been sympathetic to the earlier Progressive movement and had been schooled in an intellectual tradition of hostility to "social Darwinism" and "laissez-faire ,,.~1

The early years of President Johnson's administration also saw the creation of new agencies to carry out the programme created by the Economic Opportunity Act and later anti-poverty legislation. The new Office of Economic Opportunity was supposed to enable the President to cut across departmental barriers to coordinate the numerous programmes required by the Economic Opportunity Act. The policy of the Economic Opportunity Act in dealing with "pover ty" has been described as "need- based" and "service-oriented" because social services, rather than direct income payments, were to be given to the poor. 42 This attitude towards poverty had some affinity with views which had gained currency in the social sciences, such as cultural explanations of conduct which were applied to the "culture of poverty ", and the "opporttmity" theory of delinquency. 4~

The "Head Start" programme for the pre-school education of children from "culturally deprived families" was inspired by the research of

89 Anderson, P., op. cit., pp. 386-387. a0 Hofstadter, Richard, The Progressive Movement (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-

Hall, 1963). 41 Macmahon, Arthur W., Millet, John D. and Ogden, Gladys, The Administration of

Federal W o r k Relief, published fo.r the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council (Chicago : Public Administration Service, 1941).

4z Graham, Elinor, " The Politics of Poverty ", in Seligman, B. B. (ed.), op. clt., p. 234. 4a Miller, S. M. and Riessman, Frank, Social Class and Social Policy (New York: Basic

Books, 1968), chaps. 1--4.


developmental psychologists and educators. In general, new departments or agencies which are intended by the President to do things which the distrusted civil service cannot be counted on to do have been more receptive to the current beliefs of social scientists. This is partly because they recruit a new group into governmental service and partly because having a "mission ", they attract persons with a "sense of mission ". Certain currenls of belief which have spread among academic social scientists in recent years inclined those who were immersed in them towards governmental service of this sort. But the intellectual equipment which they have brought with them has been more of a moral and political orientation than a body of empirical knowledge, or a collection of research techniques, or a set of theories.

The Present Position

We have seen that social science is used by government quite often and in a variety of ways. It is often commissioned and then disregarded, but not because its results are uncongenial to the interests of particular groups inside and ontside the government. It is disregarded because there is no confidence that it has anything of importance to say in comparison with other contenders for attention and deference. It is often commissioned and actually used to delineate more precisely the field in which action is to be taken; social science techniques, i.e., techniques which have been characteristic of social science, are often used for description of the particular field of action at a given place and a given time. Social scientists seem to be very much used in the making of decisions about ,policy as providers of presumably scientific evidence which is then used to support and defend one political preference vis-h-vis another. Social scientists are invited to serve as "exper t " witnesses before congressional ~committees; what they present there might be the results of their own research or their own political preferences which they assert as though :they were the result of their scientific work. It is often unclear whether the social scientist is testifying as an "exper t " or is merely another political propagandist.

Social scientists are not likely to be heeded when they propose drasti- ~ca!ly different policies from those currently accepted and when they ~claim that these policies will bear fruit in the long run primarily. They are also likely t o be disregarded if the cognitive substance of their analysis is not in accord with the views currently espoused by powerful

groups as part of their programmes. This is because political competition and contention are more likely to impose policies which enjoy a broad ,consensus, which promise results in the .proximate future and which do not depart widely from recent, and current legislation. "Low feasibility must be attached to whatever is genuinely new or innovative, especially

:,if it can be successfully labeled as such, and more especially if i t rubs


an ideological nerve. What is most feasible is what is purely incremental, or can be made to appear so." 44 Politicians are more likely to find a majority to support a small change in policy than a large one because they have less to explain and justify and thus do not have to rely on extraordinary powers of persuasion to overcome the resistance of the public. They are generally not interested in social scientists who propose or who endorse policies which would bring about extensive changes, or who present analyses, scientific or unscientific, which can be invoked to justify policies widely at variance with what is currently acceptable.

Social scientists who, quite apart from the persuasiveness of their presumably scientific knowledge, wish to promote schemes for comprehensive and deep changes while not becoming revolutionaries, have had the best chances of success when they have become associated with presidential committees and commissions, presidential advisors and sec- tions of the executive office of the President. Their general opinions are likely to be more attended to than their particular pieces of scientific research. General opinions which are not based on scientific research have as much chance of acceptance as ,those which are. Pro,fesor Milton Friedman's theory of money is one of the relatively rare instances of the latter. There are many more instances o.f the former.

There are many social scientists who are very interested in promoting policies for large-scale, comprehensive new programmes, which involve the redistribution of income, pronounced changes in the treatment of ethnic groups, in the distfi'bution o.f wealth and .the care of health and the upbringing of children. The social scientists who propose them purport to be drawing conclusions strictly from the results of social research, as though one need pay attention only to social science in the making of p,olicy. 45 They introduce their own moral and political values as if these logically follow from the results of their empirical research. Their proposals are often impracticable because they require the coordination of many different agencies and several levels of government which are recalcitrant to such coordination. ~ Their moral and political values often encounter resistance from politicians and administrators who are sceptical of their scientific evidence and who suspect them o.f being propagandists. The "use of social science" most preferred by social

�9 scientists is one which would give political power to social scientists, and the ends which they recommend are the least likely to be accepted by persons who are professional politicians and civil servants. If social scientists wish to promote the acceptance of the results of their research and of their interpretations, quite apart from achieving success as

44 Huitt, Ralph K., " Political Feasibility ", in Rannoy, A. (ed.), op. cir., pp. 273-274. ~5 An example of this approach is provided in Sehuessler, C. and Demerath, N., op. cir.,

which consists of a number of attempts to determine, through Iogical extrapolation alone, the implications for policy of research studies.

4s Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A., op. cir .

Limitations o n Governmental Use of Social Science !493

propagandists within the government, they ought, given the limited opportunities inherent in the organisation of the traditional branches of the federal government and the wider opportunities which are available in special or new agencies, to be more realistic about their capacities and their limitations. Several changes of perspective would be helpful.

First, social scientists should recognise the practical limitations to rapid social change and the political constraints which limit the freedom of politicians and civil servants. Political feasibility is a major determinant of whether a proposed innovation in policy is transformed into governmental action. The concerns and ambitions of public officials and the demands of various parts of the electorate determine political feasibility. The scientific evidence offered by social scientists in support of their recommendations for new policies does not carry much weight in a politician's calculations about political feasibility. Social scientists' preferences for particular policies for "solving" social problems are never going to replace the politicians' criteria of desirability which include feasibility. Social scientists may endorse policies which their theories lead them to believe will best serve the public interest in the long run, but these policies, if adopted, will adversely affect some groups in the short run. Although social scientists view the objections of these groups as "' obstructionist ", those objections will not be disregarded by politicians. Elected officials must define problems of policy in ways which take account of the immediate consequences of government actions on all concerned groups. Their decisions must bear in mind short-term political feasibility as well as long-term objectives. 4~

Social scientists tend not to be very familiar with the substantive details of particular subject-matters with which policies deal. Congressmen and civil servants have had years to specialise in various fields of domestic policy and some of them acquire a very intimate, even if not "scientific ", knowledge of these subjects. If social scientists are to carry weight with them, they must also acquire similarly detailed information about the field in which they are doing research and in which they wish to influence policy. Before inventing new policies, social scientists should inform themselves of the history of governmental interest and legislative activity in a particular field: It is wrong to carry ou.t research on any topic without review of lhe relevant literature. It is no less wrong to attempt to influence the decisions of well-informed persons without knowing what they know about the subjects about which decisions are to be made. Social

47 We believe this is as it should be; not all social scientists would agree with us, however. For example, in a discussion of evaluation research at the 1971 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Professor Peter Rossi stated: " There's something wrong with social science and the federal government . . . . We never get a chance to define the problem. The problems; even the social scientists themselves, are defined by the reign- ing politicians": see Knezo, Genevieve J., Program Evaluation: Emerging Issues of Possible Legislative Concern Relating to the Conduct and Use of Evaluation in the Congress and the Executive Branch (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Research Service, November 1974), p. 15.


scientists should learn to think about the costs and other constraints ort any policy which they propose. They should also be more modest about the scientific value of their research and they should also be reserved, instead of claiming that their political preferences carry the authority of scientifically discovered truth.

Even if social scientists adopt a more realistic view of their role in the making of policy and produce more realistic and more truthful research, these changes will not guarantee the widespread use of social science in the making of decisions. The differences in personality, education, political experience and outlook of Presidents and other officials will determine the kinds of persons they appoint to high positions, depend on for advice about domestic problems, and turn to for information. Of recent Presi- dents, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relied rather heavily on scholars and academics, while President Eisenhower's major advisers were largely businessmen; President Truman's were mainly politicians, and President Nixon's had considerable experience in advertising and public relations.

Even if a President were persuaded by social scientists' proposals for particular policies such as large-scale reforms, his success in realising his programme would depend in large part on his relationship with Congress. The extent of the control possessed by the President's party in Congress determines whether or not the President can obtain the political support necessary to enact a comprehensive programme. This is entirely apart from his readiness to listen to what social scientists tell him about their knowledge and what they desire.

Governments might be more willing to pay attention to social science and to social scientists in a severe crisis. If problems arise which so obviously demand a solution beyond hitherto usual methods, many persons at varous levels of government begin a search. Problems such as rapidly rising unemployment, or urban riots, create the belief that " there must be a solution ". It is by no. means certain that social science will be able to provide the knowledge needed to do these necessary things, but social scientists are simply more likely to be turned to for advice in such situations because more conventional ideas seem to be unproductive.

These acute social crises are untypical. Only the early years of the administrations of Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson saw intensive governmental efforts to initiate comprehensive programmes of reform. These situations stand out in the minds of social scientists and they lead them to overestimate their powers. "s The roles available to social scientists and social science are generally much less heroic; they

4s The influence of social science on New Deal programmes actually began well before the election of Roosevelt, with the reforms proposed by the Progressive movement. Many programmes such as social security insurance, assistance to agriculture, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Tennessee Valley Authority, were not invented from scratch. They appeared in the Progressive Party platforms of 1912 and 1924. Although politically unacceptable then, these reforms were incorporated into the New Deal when the economic crisis drastically changed public attitudes. See MacKay, Kenneth, The Progres- sive Movement of 1924 (New York : Columbia University Press, 1947), pp. 243-264.


are much more likely to be confined to narrow technical tasks, to serving as allegedly "expe r t " witnesses and as members of advisory commissions. They can also become regular civil servants but then they would be administrators and not social scientists, still, if their social science knowledge amounts to anything, it might be more effective in that role than in what they can accomplish through scientific research or as "' expert" propagandists for particular policies. Those academic social scientists, who are not a few, who ,wish to promote the acceptance of sweeping programmes of social reform, may find unattractive the role of a :specialised supplier of scientific knowledge in a detailed form to p01i- ucians and civil servants. If they are more ambitious, they should give thought to the limitations on their capacity for influence.

limitations on the governmental use of social science in the united states

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