lg534 - essay 1 (final draft)
TRANSCRIPT
Whither UN Peacekeeping? What role do regional organisations such
as the OAS or even NATO have in being utilised by the UN in so-
called Hybrid Peace Operations?
Introduction:
“The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in
order ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’
Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the
Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by
which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve” (United Nations;
2000: 1).
Meeting this fundamental requirement presupposes an essential need to foster
and sustain the peace between and within nations. But this is not the sole preserve of the UN
and most continental-based organisations, e.g. the Organisation of American States (OAS),
the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), etc. have in their policy documents overt statements directly supporting or
corroborating the UN’s fundamental foundation principle. 1 Article 2 of the OAS refers
specifically to “its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations”
(Organisation of American States; 1967) and the AU declares as an objective the
encouragement of international cooperation, “taking due account of the Charter of the United
1 The EU, although essentially a trade organization, subscribes to the fundamental UN principal. Article 2 of its treaty tells us: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” and Article 3 proclaims: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples” (Borchardt; 2010: 19). Even NATO which, unlike the other organisations, is a defence alliance, asserts: “NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members … promote democratic values … to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict” while its military objective proclaims: “NATO is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes” (NATO. n.d.).
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Sean Williams MISC 13210161
LG534 – PK/PMOs Essay 1 Rory Finegan
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (African Union; 2000).
Nevertheless, peacekeeping of this nature will always require some measure of enforcement
(or the threat of enforcement) and that is why military personnel rather than civilians are the
main operatives, although this should not necessarily exclude private security personal and
civilians with logistical and other specialist skills from having a role where that is deemed
tactical and prudent.
In spite of the considerable support for its foundation principal, and especially
in the decade and a half following the abrupt end of the Cold War, the UN has repeatedly
been found lacking in fulfilling its fundamental purpose in those areas characterised by ethnic
violence and gross violations of human rights. Because international law provides for action
against human rights abuses (UN; 1945: Preamble), especially initiatives and activities that
address and remove the root causes of humanitarian disasters, even where these involve
hostilities or the threat of hostilities (Holzgrefe & Keohane; 2003: 18), one cannot presume
any parity in the manner or scale of any peacekeeping or peace enforcing operation with a
comparable precedent. But even allowing for contextual, cultural and magnitudinal disparities
between one mission and another, there are circumstances common to all peacekeeping or
peace enforcement missions. All involve cross-border interventions by one state (or a group
of states) in the internal affairs of another, aimed at preventing or ending humanitarian or
human rights violations and may occur with or without the permission of the target state
(Holzgrefe & Keohane; 2003: 18), depending on the type of mission.
Under current international law, the UN Security Council (UNSC) exercises
exclusive authority to sanction (or not to sanction) interventions of this kind and it is also the
sole arbiter over disputes relating to the legitimacy and/or legality of any peacekeeping or
peace enforcing intervention in a sovereign member state. However, there are strong reasons
to support the belief that the UNSC may not be the optimal agency to exercise exclusive
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authority to gather and deploy a peacekeeping force with the means and potency to intervene
successfully in the face of grave sovereign or human rights violations. The record shows, in a
significant number of cases, that it has proved inept and ill-suited to this task. We have seen
recently an example of the UN’s inability to react to Russia’s violation of sovereignty in the
Crimean region of the Ukraine because of the Russian threat of veto, whereas it was possible
for the US and EU, without UNSC approval, to activate sanctions against Russia at
considerably short notice. The purpose of this paper, then, is to present an argument and a
rationale for allowing organisations that are closer to problematic regions greater autonomy
to intervene or, at least, to adopt a more meaningful role alongside UN forces, especially
where nearby human rights abuses or sovereignty issues require an immediate and resolute
response.
Problems Arising from UN-only Interventions:
The UNSC’s ineptitude at mediating intra- and inter-state conflicts and
humanitarian needs is rooted in the prescriptions of the UN Charter itself. The Charter, and
specifically Chapters VI and VII, relies upon an organisational system of action that prohibits
intervention except as an action of last resort (UN; 1945: Chapter 6-7). In these
circumstances, sanctions are generally considered as a laissez-faire alternative to war, because
they do not involve acrimonious disputes about territorial integrity or the violation of state
sovereignty, nor do they require the use of UN troops to enforce decisions. But such actions
are rarely useful in the face of humanitarian need. 2 The persuasive logic, then, is that the UN
Charter’s wording is ambiguous and defaults firstly to recommending non-forceful measures,
and this often results in unfavourable humanitarian outcomes for inhabitants. (Weiss; 2007:
45). My view is that, where appropriate and warranted, it would be more effective if
2 Gordon (1999: 388) mentions that sanctions and embargoes have been shown to have a disproportionate effect on civilians rather than governments, and can have unintended and adverse consequences for civilians, as was the case in the early 1990s during the Yugoslavian wars.
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neighbour states and/or regional organisations were allowed to fast-track intervention
measures, thereby avoiding inevitably lengthy UNSC deliberations about legality, sovereignty
issues and resources.
Even where the UNSC sanctions military action, the convoluted command
structure under which UN forces operate presents serious difficulties and this problem is
unlikely to improve in the near future (Weiss; 1994: 64). Never was the need for a large, robust
and fast acting force more apparent than in the spring of 1994, when Rwanda spiralled into the
most abhorrent form of ethnically motivated genocidal conflict. Hylan reminds us that the
international community failed to react, because the situation in Rwanda
“escalated far too rapidly for international public opinion to get too
aroused in time; the problems started only later. After the world had
stood by and watched as perhaps half a million people were
slaughtered, there was suddenly the feeling that ‘something had to be
done’ about the refugees pouring into Zaire. That the perpetrators of
the genocide heavily manipulated them did not matter in these
circumstances” (Hylan; n.d: 99: note 428).
The shocking images of such large-scale massacre (some say over 800,000 dead) perpetrated
on ethnic Tutsis by Hutu tribesmen, despite information existing up to two years beforehand
that genocide was a probable outcome of the tension, shocked an international community
which failed to act to protect the throngs of people who were either murdered or displaced by
threats of extermination (Melvern; 2000: 4). Resolution 872, establishing the UN Assistance
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) provided for a very limited mandate that excluded both arms
recovery and an instruction to oppose the killing of civilians (UN; 1999: 7). Significantly,
UNAMIR’s commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, was informed by the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) that “the overriding consideration is the need to avoid
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entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated
repercussions” (UN; 1999: 11). These factors were crucial in weakening UNAMIR’s ability to
impact effectively on the events that were unfolding (Stanton; 2004: 221) and, unable to fulfil
its mandate when the killing recommenced, 90% of its force withdrew. One could argue that
UNAMIR’s mandate simply allowed for the preparations for genocide to continue unchecked
and the abandonment of the Tutsi population to its fate. Furthermore, the situations in Rwanda
and Darfur have also brought into focus the UNSC’s credibility in determining which cases are
worthy of intervention. Rwanda, for instance, because it was not of significance to any of the P-
5 members, was repeatedly ignored during the genocide, despite continuous appeals from
Dallaire. Never before was there such a failure of UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement.
The UNSC also dithered as genocide and ethnic cleansing occurred in the
former Yugoslavia and did little to mitigate the civil wars in both Liberia and Somalia, with the
latter having yet to be resolved. We know that, within the international community and the
UNSC, there is a systematic and deliberate avoidance of the use of the word ‘genocide’
(Melvern; 2000: 138) because, once acknowledged, it would engender a legal obligation to act
fast and decisively in accordance with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (United Nations; 1948: Article 1). The UN does acknowledge that “the
reluctance by some states to use the term ‘genocide’ [is] motivated by a lack of will to act”
(United Nations; 1999: 38). However, where this becomes endemic or where self-interest
motivates too literal and too rigid an interpretation of international law, it has the effect of
stultifying response capability and could inevitably lead to the UN reneging on its own Charter
obligations.
When the UNSC finally decided to expand the numbers involved in
UNAMIR in May 1994, the DPKO approached thirty governments with requests for troops and
equipment. However, out of a general malaise but, more likely, cognisant of the bloody US
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intervention in Somalia a few years previously and the kidnapping and subsequent murder of
10 Belgian peacekeepers, not a single offer of troops was received at this critical moment in
time (Sise; 1995: 293). 3 Most notably, sensing the ultimate failure of the venture, none of the
P-5 UNSC members, all of whom had the resources and capabilities to put an abrupt end to the
violence, volunteered its services. By the end of July, only 550 UN troops were on the ground
in Rwanda, and the UN failure to act decisively had shocking consequences that stunned the
international community (Sise; 1995: 284).
The Case for a Regional Approach to Intervention:
In the case of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, regional
organisations have a number of significant advantages when compared to one directly
mandated by the UN. Firstly, being geographically closer to the area of conflict, regional
organisations often have a ‘higher stake’ in preventing and/or ending conflict within their
sphere of influence (MacFarlane & Weiss; 1994: 283). Member states within these areas feel
more acutely the effects of regional conflict, such as population displacement, a downturn in
foreign direct investment and, in general, regional instability. MacFarlane & Weiss explain
that regional organisations have a higher stake in ensuring near-neighbour stability and are
more likely to act promptly and decisively in pursuit of these ends (ibid). They conclude that,
whereas regional interventions have some obvious limitations, they convey humanitarian and
peacekeeping benefits more efficiently and more effectively than non-regional actors.
3 This shocking episode occurred in April 7th 1994 when Hutu militia captured fifteen peacekeepers from UNAMIR. The peacekeepers had been deployed to protect the Prime Minister, Madame Uwilingiyimana. Five Ghanaian peacekeepers were quickly set free. The other ten were Belgians from the Paracommando Brigade, and these were tortured and hacked to death with machetes (Melvern; 2004: 137). Major Bernard Ntuyahaga was eventually convicted of their murder in 2007. In his book, Me Against My Brother, Scott Peterson describes the barbaric details of these murders: “Their Achilles tendons were cut so they couldn't run, and the Belgian soldiers — all of them holding the rank of private — were castrated and died choking on their genitalia” (Peterson; 2000: 292).
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Secondly, regional organisations can offer ‘better’ peacekeeping
intervention than the UN. Whereas some UN interventions, most notably in Somalia, have not
been cognisant of the cultural and societal intricacies pertaining to the target country, regional
actors are more aware of local customs and beliefs. They understand the nature of strife and
ethnic tension in their own immediate area, making them better mediators of local conflicts
(ibid). Busumtwi-Sam explains that many of Africa’s most protracted and deadly conflicts do
not have a single cause but are the result of a multiplicity of issues (2002: 93). Furthermore,
these conflicts also involve a number of exogenous actors, including rival governments,
mercenaries and various militias, all of which have their own agenda. Conflicts may span
across entire regions and involve complex arrangements of actors and roots and, in these
circumstances regional actors are best suited to mediating the nuances and intricacies
involved (ibid). Moreover, regional actors are seldom handicapped by global political
perspectives, and this allows them focus exclusively and more purposefully on the crisis at
hand. In addition, they are less fractured by internal politics (epitomised by the P-5 in UN
debates). As a result, their response comes faster and is better targeted, especially if the
intervention is undertaken by a regional power “with the right mix of knowledge and
capability” (Welsh; 2002: 516).
Since it is the African continent that is most frequently hit by humanitarian
disasters, this particular context deserves further discussion. The African Union (AU),
previously the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), first began to codify a norm of
humanitarian intervention in 1998, under the ‘Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security’, which entitles it to deploy
peacekeeping and/or intervention forces into areas of internal conflicts where these pose
serious threats to peace in the region (ICISS; 2001: 169). Since then it has emerged as the
regional guarantor of African security and, through its Peace and Security Council, it became
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the first regional organization to assert its normative right to intervene in the internal affairs of
member states when the UN is either unwilling or unable to react. Furthermore, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also deserves credit for attempting to solve
humanitarian crises in West Africa, despite shortcomings in the interventions it authorised.
ECOWAS has intervened militarily more than any other regional organization to stop conflict
(Taft & Ladnier; 2006: 17). This was done on foot of a protocol adopted in 1999 which
affirmed ECOWAS’s right to intervene militarily in a member state in response to
humanitarian emergencies that threaten the peace or security of the region (Taft & Ladnier;
2006: 18).
However, while acknowledging the important role of regional initiatives,
Pattinson (2008) warns of the problems facing organisations that undertake humanitarian
missions without UN sanction. While he accepts that many Western states have both the
military and logistical support capability to deploy forces on a scale that are likely to be
effective, he draws attention to how peacekeeping and humanitarian interveners are perceived
and accepted within the zone of need (Pattinson; 2008: 408). History reveals that most
Western penetrations into the global south and Middle East are likely to be faced with a large
level of local resistance. For example, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the US and Western
democracies generally “do not have the credibility in the eyes of the world to carry out
humanitarian intervention” (ibid). Similarly, ex-colonial powers intervening in former
colonies run the risk of being perceived as pursuing colonial self-interest. Pattinson’s point is
convincing in that potential interveners must carefully weigh up whether or not they are likely
to provoke an escalation of a problem by creating more fighters than they disarms. In this
respect, he sees greater merit in using regional organisations but warns that, with the
exception of NATO and the EU, most others, such as the AU and ECOWAS, lack capability
due to shortfalls in military funding and equipment, thus rendering prolonged operations
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difficult (Pattinson; 2008: 409). He considers the EU’s potential as an effective peacekeeping
and humanitarian actor but acknowledges that, currently, it does not have agreed structures to
allow it to rapidly deploy a large force off continent. (ibid) The capacity of NATO to conduct
successful humanitarian operations has been demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and most
recently in Libya. However, since NATO is primarily a defence pact, its motives might
justifiably be perceived as self-interested, thus compromising its efforts to deploy troops in
humanitarian and peacekeeping activities (Pattinson; 2008: 408).
In their analysis of the totally inadequate response to the conflict in Darfur,
Bellamy & Williams (2006) suggest how future peace enforcement and peacekeeping by the
international community might be rendered more effective. They recommend that states
should force the issue by rejecting the primacy of the UNSC when decisions about
intervention are necessary (Bellamy & Williams; 2006: 157). Byers (2005) concurs and
furthers the argument by citing the example of NATO in Kosovo. Although initially lacking
UNSC authorisation, NATO succeeded in acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous authorisation’
post the event when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation represented a grave
threat to international peace and security (Byers: 2005: 40-51). This ‘ambiguous authority’,
sufficed to confer legitimacy on NATO’s forceful intervention which, had it not occurred,
might have resulted in the kind of genocidal atrocities reminiscent of Rwanda in 1994 and in
Srebrenica in 1995. By forcing the issue and by reacting unilaterally, but timely, NATO
restored human security and prevented any further escalation of the suffering, thus enabling
the UN to undertake a peacekeeping and development mission that continues to this day.
The Case for Hybrid Peace Operations:
While rejecting the primacy of the UNSC in favour of regional intervention is
beyond the scope of this essay, the concept of hybrid peace operations is one that is
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gathering momentum in the international playing field. The steady expansion of regional
efforts such as ECOWAS in Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast, the AU in Darfur and
Somalia, as well as the more publicised interventions of NATO in the former Yugoslavia
and Libya provokes questions on the relationship between UN and regional operations. It
cannot go unnoticed that many UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed concurrently
with or immediately following regional missions. As this division of labour becomes
increasingly a fixture in the international response to security and conflict, the question
arises as to how it can be accommodated and managed under the current unwieldy UN
framework or what role should the UN, as the only global and legally recognised
peacekeeping authority, have in collaborating with regional organisations. (Yamashita;
2012: 166). Yamashita conjectures that two dominant frameworks have arisen as a result of
this dual existence within peace support operations, the ‘subcontracting’ and the ‘partnering’
approaches, both of which focus on incorporating regional actions into already existing UN
structures (Yamashita; 2012: 168).
Firstly, ‘sub-contracting’ refers to an arrangement whereby regional
organisations undertake an active role in peace making and peacekeeping responsibilities
and, under international law, such contracting must be authorised, monitored and directed by
the UNSC. The subcontracting model then is a form of global cooperation in which regional
peace operations are, in essence, UN operations delegated to regional organisations. At the
general level, this idea is anchored in the UN’s ultimate authority as the lead, global
organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. To
establish the bona fides of any cooperative effort of this nature, regional organisations are
expected to seek formal authorisation in advance of any action, or at least some sort of
endorsement by the UNSC (Yamashita; 2012: 169). The ‘sub-contracting’ model enables
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obvious considerable advantage and, in particular, it “can bolster the credibility of the UN
with a lesser operational burden” (ibid.).
A prime example of this ‘sub-contracting’ approach is the UN authorised
NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Reacting to both excessive violence by Libyan
government forces on domestic opponents and under pressure from regional entities in the
immediate vicinity, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 authorising ‘all necessary means’ to
quell the bloodshed (UNSC; 2011). Almost immediately, NATO established a no-fly zone
and launched an aerial bombardment on government forces. After seven months, Libyan
opposition forces had conquered the country and ousted (and killed) the former authoritarian
ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. Western media and politicians praised the intervention as a
humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath and assisting in the transition towards
democracy in Libya (Kuperman; 2013: 105). Although open to debate, some experts cite
NATO’s Libyan intervention as an ideal model for implementing a Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) response in the face of imminent humanitarian disaster, justifying the ‘sub-
contracting’ of forces on the grounds that it undoubtedly saved civilian lives and achieved its
goals within a brief time frame. This particular timely success has to be measured against
more recent opportunity in Syria where, in similar circumstances, the R2P rule failed to
engage any regional organisation, resulting in a very different outcome.
In discussing issues of consent and legitimacy, Glanville (2013) offers a
different perspective on the role of regional organisations in peace making intervention. He
proposes less dependence on the sovereign consent of the troubled state and a greater
reliance on consent from the relevant regional organisation when making UNSC decisions
about Chapter VII interventions, particularly where human rights abuses are evident
(Glanville; 2013: 326). In examining the route to the NATO intervention in Libya, Glanville
analyses the rhetoric emanating from organisations such as the League of Arab States
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(LAS), the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the AU, all of which helped
procure the UN resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’ in response to human rights
violations by Libyan government forces. He notes that, in their submissions to the UN, these
organisations demonstrated a deep understanding of the nature of the Libyan conflict, the
need for immediate military action and the necessity in this particular case to transcend legal
issues relating to sovereign consent (Glanville; 2013: 336). Summarising, he concludes that
the UNSC “should be guided by the opinions of relevant regional organisations” and he
notes how, in this instance, “western permanent members pushed this resolution through
once their pragmatic requirement for regional consent had been met” (ibid). This shows that,
even when regional actors lack the necessary military capability and resources to intervene
decisively, they can exercise a crucial influence on events by aiding others to secure timely
authorisation and a strongly-framed mandate for intervention, and on advising on the nature
and appropriate strength of the intervention.
The second approach, ‘partnering’, implies a more horizontal relationship to
‘sub-contracting’ wherein the UN and regional organisations form a network of
peacekeeping partners with interconnected capabilities (Yamashita; 2012: 170).
Institutionally, the convergence of regional and UN peacekeeping is most clearly evident in
the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the first peacekeeping mission that is
formally both a UN and a regional operation. Morphing from its precursor, the solely AU
AMIS mission which was eventually rendered ineffective due to a lack of available troops
and a weak mandate, the formal transition to UNAMID took place on December 21st, 2007,
with the majority of AMIS troops being ‘re-hatted’ as UN peacekeepers (Yamashita; 2012:
502-503). The AU and the UN jointly appoint UNAMID’s top officials and agree on its
composition, and the UN provides the mission’s ‘command and control structures and
backstopping’ as well as its funding (Coleman; 2011: 537). Sub-Saharan African states form
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the bulk of UNAMID troops (71% in May 2011) because the Sudanese government insisted
on a predominantly African presence on its land (UNDPKO; 2011: 12-15). In this way, the
UN has overcome issues of misperception, circumventing the possibility that its mission
might be perceived in terms of a Western penetration into African affairs.
In spite of good, cooperative, working relationships between both partner
organisations, it is not entirely clear whether this hybrid approach is more effective in
realising its mandate than would be the case with a solely UN or regional operation. In late
2008 the UN peacekeeping chief reported that despite some progress, UNAMID had been
‘much too slow in providing real improvements for the ordinary citizens on the ground and
inadequate in resolving the Darfur crisis’ (UNSC; 2008). In April 2009, the head of
UNAMID indicated that while the mission was
“increasingly speaking with authority on the situation on the ground, its
success remained modest. Civilians remained at unacceptable risk of
violence, with millions in displaced camps or as refugees. Meanwhile,
the great wrongs committed during the height of hostilities in 2003 to
2004 went without remedy” (UNSC; 2009).
However, it is true to say that the maintenance of any peace operation in Darfur post-2007
would have been impossible had the organisations not collaborated. The AU and UN
contingents complement each other both politically and logistically. While the UN relies on
the ‘African character’ of UNAMID, so desperately sought by the Sudanese government as a
precondition for authorisation (Mickler; 2013: 502), the AU profits from the additional UN
troops, equipment and command structure, without which the AMIS mission could not have
been sustained However, any definitive evaluation of the efficacy of the ‘partnering’
approach remains to be seen.
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Conclusion:
Having considered both advantages and disadvantages of different models of
peacekeeping and peace making operations, I am impressed by the concept of hybrid peace
operations, adequately convinced that the two approaches discussed by Yamashita cover all
facets of peacekeeping operations. While the ‘sub-contracting’ idea undoubtedly favours
swift and, where necessary, aggressive action in the face of crimes against humanity, the
‘partnering’ approach is better suited to situations where a long term entrenchment of
peacekeeping forces is needed to enforce an uneasy ceasefire or peace agreement. I see
considerable merit in having regional organisations support UN operations, or indeed, in
acting as first responders in the case of immediate need. On the other hand, the hybrid
approach, provided it is flexibly and sensitively constituted and appropriately supported,
offers an interesting prospect for future peacekeeping.
However, when partnering with the UN, as guardian and guarantor of human
rights and international law, regional organisations may be presented with a number of
factors that might limit the efficacy of its mandated mission. Firstly, a peace operation is
only as successful as the cheque that funds it and, since its inception, UN funding is subject
to the financial vagaries of its member states and especially those of its host state, the US.
Secondly, UNSC decisions, even when unanimous, have always been the subject of
controversy because, being sole validator of international security action, its membership is
unrepresentative of UN membership in general. For example, none of its permanent
members come from the Southern Hemisphere and, although this P-5 have a controlling
influence over all its affairs, it is not answerable or accountable to the more representative
General Assembly or the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, its unwieldy structure
is widely perceived to be ineffectual and, because of the predictable and self-serving use of
vetoes, the overall effectiveness of its missions is routinely compromised (Thakur; 2002:
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334). The widely accepted perception that the UNSC is predominantly a forum for rhetoric,
not action, reveals its chief weakness and, lacking sufficient political capital to dissuade
member states from using unilateral force, it suffers from a credibility deficit, leaving
sanctions and the passing of resolutions as its only means of addressing wrongdoing. But, in
the face of human rights violations, civilians in peril can ill afford to wait for sanctions or
resolutions to produce results. Hence, with NATO’s intervention to protect the Kosovo
Muslims and, ironically, the recent Russian ‘reclaiming’ of Crimea in support of the
Russian-speaking population, unilateral action of this kind is often defended as ‘legitimate’
pending a retrospective declaration of legality. 4 As the Crimean situation is still unfolding,
the Kosovo example, with the benefit of hindsight, is easier to explain. Initially lacking
UNSC authorisation, NATO’s intervention succeeded in acquiring a somewhat ‘ambiguous
authorisation’ post the event when the UNSC belatedly accepted that the situation
represented a grave threat to international peace and security (Byers: 2005: 40-51).
This ‘ambiguous authority’, sufficed to confer legitimacy on NATO’s peace
making intervention which, had it not occurred, might have added to the international
communities growing list of humanitarian failures. By forcing the issue and by reacting
unilaterally, but timely, NATO restored human security and peace. In the case of Rwanda, all
international legal requirements were secured in advance and the response was both late and
inadequate with an appalling and horrific outcome. If there is any lesson to be learned from
both experiences, it is that the better outcome is achieved when, as in the case of the NATO
intervention in Kosovo, ‘legitimacy’ has primacy over ‘legality’. But, as is evident from the
currently unfolding Crimean situation, there are always dangers in setting precedents.
4 Although the rhetoric surrounding both these cases seems, on the face of it, remarkably similar, the substantive argument against the Russian action in Crimea is that the Russian-speaking population was never in any danger, nor was it under any discernible threat of danger, whereas in Kosovo, human rights abuses were real and blatant.
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