Lessons from Simulations of Regional Crises

For the Study of Fanaticism and Peace

Hemda Ben-Yehuda & Guy Zohar

Bar-Ilan University, Israel

Emails: hemdaby@gmail.com, guyzoharbiu@gmail.com

Prepared for the ISA’s 57th Annual Convention Atlanta Georgia, March 16th-19th, 2016

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Lessons from Simulations of Regional Crises For the Study of Fanaticism and Peace

Hemda Ben-Yehuda & Guy Zohar Bar-Ilan University

Abstract

This study presents lessons from feedback surveys for designing simulations and highlighting the role of fanaticism in world politics. It focuses on nine face-to-face and online simulations of regional crises as an innovative tool to study fanaticism. During interactive exercises, participants confronted fanaticism in historical or current events, mostly on Middle-Eastern topics. Feedback questions guided students to revisit their learning experience covering: (1) Simulation and participant attributes. (2) Cognitive, affective, and behavioral gains in a gradual learning cycle, from preparation, via interactions to feedback. (3) Fanaticism in real and simulated environments. Results indicate that participants identify with their role and team, enjoy and learn but show limited awareness to fanaticism and its challenges. Students see the situation in less extreme terms than it is, regard themselves as moderates and label rivals as extremists. Yet, they view behaviors as a response to extremism, creating a dangerous escalation spiral. Fanaticism is associated with learning but not with accommodation. The way negotiations end appeared unrelated to research variables, with the exception of enjoyment and empathy. The implication for instructors is to employ fanaticism carefully to activate team behavior and advance learning but to remember the limits of control over how rivals conclude simulations. Introduction

Lessons from feedback surveys on simulations of regional crises provide insights on

how to design simulations and make participants more aware of fanaticism and its

deadly consequences in world politics. This analysis involves nine simulations

conducted from 2014 to 2016, mainly on the contemporary Middle East and the Arab-

Israel conflict. It uses survey data from 196 undergraduate and graduate students and

some faculty members to explore three topics: (1) Attributes of the simulation and its

participants. (2) Cognitive, affective and behavioral gains from preparation, via the

simulation experience to feedback and debriefing, as a gradual learning cycle. (3)

Fanaticism in real and simulated environments. The research regards fanaticism as an

important element in world politics, shaping its interactions and affecting its outcomes.

Although sometimes overlooked in international relations literature, fanaticism often

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becomes a major obstacle for compromise, accommodation, and peace between

individuals, states and non-state actors. Increased awareness to fanaticism and its

implications may promote the understating of conflict dynamics, escalation to violence

and the quest for peace in simulated and real worlds.

Fanaticism: Real, Virtual and Simulated

The brutal acts committed during the civil wars in Iraq and Syria, especially by fighters

of the Islamic State (ISIS),1 have helped raise public and practitioners’ attention to

fanaticism and its implications as major obstacles to peace. Nevertheless, quiet

surprisingly, acknowledgement of the issue’s importance did not penetrate the heart of

international relations debate and scholarly research. The discipline deals with

attributes of fanaticism and possible motives such as ideology and religion to explain

the phenomenon and its impact, but systematic cross unit investigation over regions and

time is still limited. Empirical inquiries mostly include case studies such as Nazi

Germany, Stalin’s USSR, today’s Iran, and various terror organizations with little

regard for constructing a general theory of political fanaticism.2 As the study of

fanaticism is still in its infancy, there is even little agreement about how to define the

concept and its true meaning. For the purpose of this study, fanaticism and its synonyms

of extremism and radicalism mean encouraging, condoning, justifying or supporting

the commission of violent acts inside a state or in interactions between actors in world

politics, to achieve political, ideological, religious, social or economic goals that

challenge the existing status quo.3 Some of the difficulties in exploring fanaticism stem

from the collision between the basic assumptions of realism and liberalism, the leading

paradigms in international relations, and the existence of abnormal actors in world

politics. Fanatic actors disregard power limitations and sometimes act against their own

interests, thereby challenging the realist assumptions that states behave according to

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their material self-interest and power. Neorealism, emphasizing the anarchic structure

of the international system, claims that all states act more or less the same, according

to the simple rule of self-help, disabling meaningful deviation from this principle.

Similarly, when fanatic regimes are involved, cooperation through international

organizations, central to liberal thought, leads to consequences that negate peaceful

conflict resolution anticipated by this paradigm. The inability to examine fanaticism

within the leading paradigms leaves the issue on the periphery of international relations

scholarly research and makes it hard to conduct comparative mainstream studies on

fanaticism.4

By the use of simulations as part of active learning, this study hopes to increase

awareness to fanaticism, advance its study and encourage further investigations on the

subject. Along with extremism among individuals, collective minorities, states and non-

state actors, much radicalization takes place nowadays on virtual platforms, especially

on social networks. These environments offer users quick access to radical contents and

allow them to express themselves rather freely, with minimal legal barriers and few

moral inhibitions.5 Escalation of fanaticism on social network environments often

spillovers to activities in the real world, triggering terror and violence. Recognizing the

powerful role of social networks in contemporary lives, we choose to utilize Facebook,

a familiar and popular network, as a tool to confront fanaticism by creating

academically controlled environments where students become aware of extremism and

cope with its dangerous consequences. We use Facebook groups as the main platform

for simulation interactions within and between teams, over time.6 Facebook also

supplements face-to-face engagements, to enhance policy formation in advance of

inter-team negotiations and to discuss outcomes after the simulation ends.7 Feedback

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from such exercises serves as an authentic input to advance our goal of increasing

awareness to fanaticism for educational purposes.

Simulations for the Study of Fanaticism

Ranging from simple role-playing to complex simulations, experimental reproductions

of reality have a long-standing teaching tradition in political science and international

relations.8 Their extensive use led to vast scholarship on the subject, including hundreds

of articles and books.9 One of the central themes that appears in these publications is

the many advantages simulations have over or alongside traditional learning as they

enable students to apply theories and concepts in concrete situations, explore world

politics complexities, and understand that not all situations have an analytical solution.

Such experimental learning simply makes the study more tangible and therefore

narrows the gap between theory and reality. Simulations offer an innovative and rich

experience that is hard to achieve by standard lectures and textbooks.10 Gradual

exposure to information during a learning cycle, from preparation and simulation

interactions to feedback and debriefing, helps expand traditional learning gains beyond

cognitive knowledge accumulation to affective and behavioral aspects.11 Ben-Yehuda,

Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015, Ch. 7) make a distinction between individual

feedback and interactive debriefing. The first is a student assignment in response to an

instructor’s questions, usually submitted in writing after the simulation ends while the

second is an exchange between students and instructors, usually in class, to gain insights

from the simulation experience. Simulations also provide tailored situations to practice

teamwork, leadership, creativity, identification, empathy, persistence, decision-

making, critical thinking and logical reasoning.12 They offer opportunities to confront

a variety of cultural, ethical and religious dilemmas.13 As the closest methodological

tool to a laboratory in the social sciences, simulations combine study, training and

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research.14 They enhance the study of various topics such as paradigms, decision-

making, negotiations, strategy, or fanaticism along with actual training. Simulations

exercises in controlled environments, set ahead of time or observed after they end,

create a wealth of materials and data for research.

Many strategy or action games build on radical historical topics like the Crusades, the

battles of the Second World War, and guerilla combat in Vietnam. Nevertheless, very

few simulations deal with radical issues, especially when compared to the variety of

other topics like humanitarian interventions, economic cooperation, sustainability

issues of environment conservation, climate, and resources or alliance management and

negotiations to resolve conflict. The rare exceptions that integrate fanaticism into

academic simulations illustrate its importance and potential teaching value. Asal,

Fahrenkopf, and Sin (2014) describe an exercise in which students return in time to

December 1941 when Nazi Germany is at the height of its power and controls most of

continental Europe. They face a dilemma of whether to accept a peace proposal from

Hitler’s representatives. If they do, they win or retain their independence, but have to

give up their left-handed team members, participants with glasses or others with beards,

all branded as undesirables by the Germans. In most simulations, except for the UK,

countries gave up their undesirables and concluded peace agreements under the

appeasement terms, caving in to fanaticism, in line with the findings we highlight

regarding the tendency to underestimate and downplay fanaticism. The same trend

appears in the computer simulation called COUNTRY X on the issues of mass atrocities

and genocide in African regional conflicts (Harding and Whitlock, 2013). Not even one

game of 17 simulations had an outcome of mass killing. Other simulations confront

students with acts of terrorism such as hostage taking and suicide bombing to highlight

and discuss modes of decision-making, negotiation styles, counterterror measures and

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possible implications for military strategy or domestic and foreign policy.15 These

exercises show how simulations on radical topics can be an effective teaching tool, to

add drama, trigger emotions, touch upon ethical dilemmas, practice compromise and

bring affective elements to light, altogether contributing to a strong and long lasting

learning experience. Despite these contributions and growing interest in fanaticism,

scholars still have to integrate extremism further into the simulation world.

Simulation Surveys

Surveys appear frequently in simulation literature.16 Their use covers a wide range of

topics like (1) Knowledge gains compared in pre-post quizzes. (2) Assignments for

individual/teams. (3) Tasks for skill development and feedback about skill attainment.

(4) The impact of knowledge on simulation interactions. (5) Practice of skills and

improved understanding of complex topics and abstract theories. (6) The affective

outcomes of familiarity with empirical cases and theoretical matters, that is, the

development of identity, empathy, enjoyment, or frustration. (7) Ways to improve

simulations. While many studies employ surveys, most research regards them in

technical terms, setting aside core differences in type of surveys. Some of them include

pop quizzes, papers and exams that objectively test knowledge accumulation. Others

contain subjective feedback, opinions, attitudes and evaluations on cognitive, affective

and behavioral aspects of one’s simulation experience. The latter type is very different

from most traditional assignments designed to measure cognitive knowledge based on

preset grading rubrics. The murky grouping of surveys with little attention to the nature

of data they contain weakens their important role in planning and adapting simulations

to create a better learning environment. This study seeks to highlight a specific type of

feedback survey and use it to map participants’ approach to fanaticism in simulated

crises. Surveys, used herein, include subjective views, examinations, or descriptions of

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‘someone’ or ‘something’ related to the simulation experience, provided by an

individual participant. Survey answers from a single simulation contain individual

assessments from all its participants. Over time and multiple simulations, cumulative

data illuminates collective trends representing a cognitive mapping of the ways students

see, feel, practice, understand and learn in simulations. This study uses survey data to

produce an initial cognitive mapping of fanaticism in simulations of regional crises. It

elevates surveys from a simple technique to a major source particularly fitting to

demarcate regularities and obtain individual and collective insights from active learning

experiences.

Model, Variables and Method

This analysis consists of feedback from 196 participants who took part in nine

simulations of regional crises as detailed in Table 1. The empirical and theoretical

topics in all of them had to do with fanaticism and contained extreme and moderate

actors, state and non-state ones, with undergraduate, graduate and scholars as

participants that negotiated in scenario settings of historical and contemporary cases.

Table 2 outlines the variables included in the feedback survey and analyzed below. It

consists of four sets of questions: (1) Simulation attributes focus on type of platform

for the exercise, face-to-face in class, on Facebook as a cyber platform or hybrid

combining at least one of each. Fit with reality measures the gap between the real world

and that of the simulation. It distinguishes between scenarios regarded by participants

as a close replica of a real event and others that players view as far from it, either as

fictional analogies or as imaginary cases. (2) Participants attributes address study

level, of undergraduate and graduate players, willingness to play again in future

simulations, teams they represent and the role and importance of non-state actors to

illuminate the difference between their activities and those of states. (3) Learning

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captures cognitive, affective and behavioral gains along specific indicators like

understanding rivals, identifying with them, showing empathy or reaching a

compromise. (4) Extremism characterizes the real and simulated environments based

on empirical and theoretical topics, dramatic scenarios, attributes and behaviors of

teams and rivals and the link between studying extremism and understanding it.

Table 1: Simulations of Regional Crises

Simulation Code

Empirical Topic

Theoretical Topic

Teams Period

Graduate IR 1947 Palestine Partition

Fanaticism UK, core Arab states, Palestinian Arabs & Zionist battling for independence

Historical

Academic ISA 1938 Munich

Fanaticism Great powers & Czechoslovakia confronting German demands for the Sudetenland

Historical

Graduate IR 2014-15 Internal Strife in Yemen

Paradigms & fanaticism

Israel, core Arab states & superpowers confronting Houthi insurgency

Contemporary

Graduate IR 2014-15 Civil War in Ukraine

Paradigms & fanaticism

USA, EU, Ukraine & Israel confronting Russian involvement in Ukraine

Contemporary

Graduate IR 2014-15 Iranian Nuclear Quest

Paradigms & fanaticism

Superpowers, EU, core Arab states & Israel tackle non-conventional proliferation in the Gulf

Contemporary

Undergraduate NSA

2015 Terror in the Middle East

Fanaticism Superpowers, EU, core Arab states, Iran, Israel & Turkey confronting: ISIS, Syrian insurgences, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Authority, Palestinian ‘lone wolves’

Contemporary

Graduate IR Paradigms & fanaticism

Graduate Terror Cycles

Fanaticism

Undergraduate IR

Paradigms & complexity

The feedback survey includes responses, in a written digital format, to multiple choice

or open questions, on all variables, some of them requiring informative answers and

others requesting assessments, attitudes and opinions. An example of an informative

question is ‘what team did you participate in’ while ‘how radical was your team’

illustrates an assessment. Together, feedback questions lead students to engage in a

comprehensive overview of the innovative learning process they have experienced,

with a critical mindset, in retrospect.

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Table 2: Variables

Feedback on: Variable Values Question type Simulation Type (1) Face-to-Face (F2F) (2) Cyber (3)

Hybrid Informative

Fit with reality (1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High (5) Very High

Assessment

Participants Study level (1) Undergraduate (2) Graduate (3) Scholar

Informative

Play again (1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High (5) Very High

Assessment

Team types (1) State (2) NSA (3) IGO (4) Media Informative

NSA importance (1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High (5) Very High

Assessment

NSA role (1) Disturbing (2) Irrelevant (3) Neutral (4) Positive

Learning Cognitive Learn (1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High (5) Very High Preparation

Understand rivals Behavioral Negotiation

outcome (1) Victory (2) Compromise/Stalemate (3) Defeat

Accommodation (1) Non-accommodative (2) Accommodative

Affective Enjoy (1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High (5) Very High Identify team

Empathy Extremism Reality (1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4)

High (5) Very High Scenario

(1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High

Team Main rival Team behavior Rival behavior Study (1) Increases understanding (2) Does

not matter (3) Reduces Gain understanding

(1) None (2) Low (3) Medium (4) High (5) Very High

The unit of analysis for feedback questions is an individual participant. The analysis

below builds on descriptive statistics of survey responses and qualitative content

analysis of written feedback from each student. Our feedback data includes a nearly

equal split between undergraduates and graduates as well as some scholars who served

as a control group of experienced players that wanted to practice the use of simulations

on cyber platforms. Differences in views, opinions and evaluations between the three

groups on research variables were insignificant, so we report findings from all

participants as one set.

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Participants’ life experiences may affect the familiarity, attitudes and learning of

insiders to a conflict they role-play, in a different way than outsiders who take part in

the simulation. This survey covers mainly Israeli respondents that were insiders taking

part in simulations of the Arab-Israel conflict. So findings summarized below and their

implications derive mostly from students who live in Israel and have stepped into the

shoes of their own leaders or those of their rivals that confront and threaten them in real

life. They play scenarios they know about from close encounters as civilians, soldiers

or active reservists called to duty on a yearly basis. Issues of identification, empathy

and willingness to compromise come mostly from the point of view of insiders that face

an overlap between real life experiences and the simulation topic, even and perhaps

especially when they play their Arab adversaries. In other simulations of the

contemporary civil wars in Ukraine and Yemen or the 1938 Munich crisis, Israelis are

outsiders that need to cope with fanaticism in a detached and unfamiliar reality. Besides

Israeli students, some participants were from the University of Catania and faculty

members from various US universities, all as outsiders to the nine simulation topics

summarized in table 1.17 The distinction between insiders and outsiders adds diversity

to participants’ involvement with the simulation topic, designed to show that fanaticism

may appear in many disguises. It may characterize insiders rather than outsiders, or

both, as a universal trait. For example, we find little difference between insiders and

outsiders in assessments of team and rival extremism or in their evaluations of

extremism in behaviors. In the future, data and findings from inter-cultural simulations

with insiders and outsiders from many countries will help validate the impact of

differences between insiders and outsiders on perceptions of fanaticism. So this study

of feedback surveys illustrates the direction we believe researchers should pursue to

increase simulation effectiveness. Future analysis should involve a large number of

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simulations, face-to-face ones and on cyber platforms, with many participants from

diverse countries and cultures, addressing like topics. Conceptual mapping, like our

pilot one, will include aggregate results on individuals, teams, cultures and countries,

all assuring data replication. In face-to-face simulations, we characterize the exercise

by observing the interactive process and save our notes for later use. Concluding

documents of agreements and disagreements, summarized by teams at the end of the

simulation also help. In simulations on cyber platforms, a wealth of information is

available, for example, as comments, photos or links posted by each participant on the

Facebook wall. For research purposes, one can aggregate these posts, with time tags,

for individuals, teams, blocs and the entire process. Data mining driven by theoretical

questions or serendipity can investigate many topics in international relations, as they

appear in the simulations-lab. More robust testing of the link between fanaticism and

negotiation outcomes or other issues will benefit from the use of a semiautomatic

computerized system for events data analysis of interactions, currently under

construction, to generate a simulation process database that will supplement the

feedback one used herein. This analysis of fanaticism first addresses each of the

research variables separately, looking at aggregate frequencies and qualitative feedback

comments. Then, the analysis shifts to the links between research variables and to the

conceptual mapping of fanaticism in regional crises.

I. Findings on Research Variables

Aggregate results of frequency distributions on research variables appear in figures 1-

3. Figure 1 presents results on the attributes of the simulations and their participants,

figure 2 focuses mainly on the learning process and figure 3 accounts for fanaticism in

these exercises. As seen in figure 1A, the simulations conducted for the purpose of this

study included all three types: face-to-face (F2F), simulations on cyber platforms and

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hybrid ones consisting of at least one cyber round and one face-to-face. Although we

regularly use cyber tools and social networks, this use does not necessarily come at the

expanse of traditional face-to-face simulations. However, while face-to-face

engagements are still very popular and widespread, we gradually employ hybrid

learning, combining the advantages of both face-to-face and cyber interactions. The use

of cyber simulations alone takes place when students from distant countries interact in

the same simulation, like the 1947 Palestine partition simulation included in this

analysis. Such inter-cultural events epitomize the benefits of social networks as a free

and friendly platform that can easily incorporate Skype sessions with proxy face-to-

face interactions to conclude negotiations and finalize agreements.

By running several simulations on similar topics in undergraduate and graduate courses,

it is possible to compare learning efficiency. Findings in Figure 1B show a near equal

split between undergraduates and graduates in this feedback survey. Study level may

have an impact on the simulation results, as participants acquire theoretical and

empirical knowledge. However, crosstab examination of research variables revealed

insignificant differences between these groups. Few participants were scholars who as

our colleagues practiced the use of simulations on cyber platforms. Their feedback

helped us design better simulations and advance the spread of inter-cultural simulations.

Learning involves cognitive knowledge accumulation and skill development so we

integrated both matters into the feedback questions.18 In order to capture the different

areas of learning, we gave students a detailed list of theoretical and empirical topics to

choose from on areas of knowledge they had gained. Each student could choose any

number of topics. Seven of them plainly said, “I did not learn anything”, which we

translated to possibly mean frustration, detachment or resentment, given the rather

comprehensive list of options.

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articipantsPimulations and S :Figure 1

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Of the topics other students chose, 24% involved complexities of domestic and foreign

affairs, international relations, decision-making and team management. Some 25% of

the topics selected had to do with paradigms and theories of great power involvement,

international relations and political science. Another 15% concerned empirical topics

like contemporary crises and conflicts, Arab-Israel and inter-Arab conflicts, the road to

World War II in Europe and the relevance of historical background and patterns of

behavior to current events. Closely the same, 13%, related to psychological aspects like

the role of diplomats, leadership and its effects, individual personalities in the course

of negotiations and empathy for others. Almost 10% marked simulation as a learning

tool, a figure understandably high for a single topic, but reflecting the exposure to a

new tool of innovative learning. Less common were communications and media (4%),

fanaticism and appeasement (3%), and the role of non-state actors (3%). These results

show the broad spectrum of simulation contributions to learning. At the very low

percentages of 2-3% each, limited learning about fanaticism and empathy accord with

findings we discuss below on a common trend to belittle fanaticism in the scenario, as

a trait of one’s actor and its behavior as well as the difficulty to reach empathy.

Along with cognitive learning, simulations also provide students with an opportunity

to practice and develop skills. Like with topics of cognitive knowledge, students could

mark as many skills as they felt they advanced during the simulation. Listed from the

most common to the least, findings show decision-making (20%), negotiations (18%),

leadership, (14%), teamwork, (12%), creativity and rhetoric skills, (9% each), critical

thinking (8%), persistence, (5%), coping with uncertainty, (3%) and empathy with

rivals (2%). This ranking highlights the role of simulations in advancing skills for

functioning individually and in a collective, but also the limits of showing empathy,

consistent with other topics addressed below.

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Figure 1C presents answers regarding the question: how compatible the simulation was

with real world events. Most participants (76%) felt that the simulations were rather

compatible with the real world. However, very reasonably, only a handful of

participants (7%) felt that simulations mirror world politics events. So no matter what,

and how successful, enjoyable or educating the simulation is, it remains an exercise, or

at best a lab trial and has limitations in fully reflecting reality. This finding also suggests

that instructors should not try to portray reality with full accuracy but rather to use it as

an approximation of a situation students have learnt in class. This way, some latitude

remains for critique, creativity and diplomatic initiatives that do not imitate reality with

a perfect fit.

Figure 1D contains participants’ feedback to the question of changing their political

assessment of the conflict they played after the simulation. Not surprisingly, the figure

shows that many participants (42%) did not change their evaluation of the conflict at

all. As one student stated, “My personal politics or assessments have not changed after

having played the game because my actor’s assessment was similar to my assessment”.

Another wrote, “I’ve thought and I think now that the only solution to the Arab-Israeli

problem is compromise from both sides”. A third revealed, “We had to learn how to

make compromises with four teams in order to achieve our team goals”, and the fourth

explained, “Preparing for the simulation, as well as taking active part in it, made me

read and learn more about the conflict. Being more informed, I started viewing the

conflict slightly different from before”. Since simulations are planned for fun and

learning, it is not surprising to find little attitude change. Practice may still have some

impact on perceptions, identification, empathy and even attitude change. Indeed,

findings show that roughly a half of all participants changed their minds to some extent

about the conflict. This indicates that simulations may trigger critical thinking, second

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thoughts about prejudices, and perhaps even a practical potential to reduce hostility and

promote peace. A student admitted, “I learned that the pursuit of justice is not always

the right way, you should also use common sense and sometimes be willing to

compromise for a better future”. However, another student declared, “because I was

born and raised in Israel, my identification may make it difficult to change my

positions”. One explained, “I understand the players in the conflict better now and why

they do what they do regarding the conflict”, while a different student claimed, “I’m

not a terrorist, and I don’t think that this is the right way to achieve my goals”. An

answer summarizing the common approach to attitude change was, “During the

simulation and the project that preceded it I came to recognize the goals and values of

the Islamic republic of Iran. While I hardly agree with most of their goals, getting to

know them did change my perception a bit over what is really going on in the diplomatic

arena of the Middle East, and what states are the real powerhouses in the region”.

The fact that attitudes may be re-examined are especially important in light of the

complexities and negative heuristics held by rival parties during protracted and

intractable and conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.19 Kelman (2010:374-

75) described a method of interactive problem solving, quite similar to simulations, in

which Palestinians and Israelis participated together in guided workshops at Harvard.

The workshops were an opportunity for participants to get to know one another, and

translate their personal experiences, from one-time events or continuous meetings over

the years, to produce attitude change. The idea was that personal changes the workshop

triggered would eventually lead to a political debate, and decision-making processes in

respective societies, to unlock deep-rooted cycles of hatred and mistrust. Our goals are

more modest, academic rather than political, and yet we hope that as knowledge of the

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‘other’ spreads, a more objective view of complex situations may emerge and creative

use of non-violent crisis management may gain popularity.

Figure 1E deals with participants’ willingness to take part in future simulations. It

shows that about two-thirds (66%) of the respondents were very enthusiastic and most

of them (83%) wanted to play again in later games. Even though simulations are more

time consuming than traditional modes of study and require more intensive individual

efforts than standard lectures, they provide a different and unique learning experience

that most participants want to repeat. This result relates to the multifaceted learning

process simulations offer, illustrated in figure 2, and discussed below. Figure 1F

presents the types of actors we include in our simulations. Findings are consistent with

the realist paradigm’s assumption regarding the centrality of states in world politics, as

78% of participants played in teams representing state actors. Nevertheless, as evident

in figure 1G, more than half of the participants think that non-state actors (NSAs) have

an important role in world politics, contrary to the realist assumption. What exactly is

their role? According to figure 1H, 47% believe that NSAs have a disturbing impact

on world politics. The results in figure 1G and 1H fit the Middle Eastern topics we play

in our simulations, and the Middle Eastern reality in which many powerful NSAs exist,

control large territories, and often employ terror and other violent acts as their choice

of policy. A change in simulation topics may offer cues as to whether or not there is a

relationship between events and paradigm choice for behavior or perhaps the choice

has to do with culture, personal experiences, value preferences or ideologies.

Sometimes we request students to play according to a given paradigm, to try out the

specifics of a theory studied earlier in class. Often, however, the narrative of the

scenario and the reality behind it, in the participants’ perceptions, leave little leeway

for flexibility.

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Figure 2 focuses on the feedback results regarding the cognitive, affective and

behavioral learning processes. Figure 2A introduces findings regarding learning in

general. It shows that most respondents (66%) believe that the simulation was a

meaningful learning experience. Only 10% say they did not learn anything, or close to

that, from the simulation. These results are consistent with recent studies, asserting that

simulations encourage an attentive and active learning process, which over time may

increase students’ performance as well.20

Figure 2B deals with another aspect of the learning process: enjoyment. As instructors

in academe, we often forget that learning is not about knowledge accumulation alone.

As a complex process, it involves affective and behavioral aspects alongside the

traditional cognitive ones. Simulations can encourage creativity and improvisation,

incite, frustrate, clarify and change emotions, all together making the engagement

intensive and enjoyable.21 Therefore, it is not surprising that 78% thought the

simulations were an especially enjoyable experience. Comparing figure 2A with 2B

revels that fun and learning go hand in hand. Most participants who report that a

simulation is an enjoyable event also assert that they had an above average learning

experience. Vice versa, students who do not really try to step into the shoes of leaders

and engage in the intensive event, stay detached and unfortunately learn less than

others. The implication of these results is that enjoyment and affective learning increase

overall perceptions of learning gain.

Figure 2C moves on to behavioral learning and presents feedback results regarding

outcomes. Two interesting observations comes to mind by looking at this figure: first,

most respondents (67%) believe that the simulation did not end by compromise.

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: Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral LearningFigure 2

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This finding shows that many participants gained a valuable experience and perhaps an

understanding of the complexities and difficulties involved in negotiations and

decision-making, and the need for give-and-take, to solve hard issues at stake among

rivals, especially during protracted conflicts. Second, only 3% thought that the

simulation ended in a defeat for their side. This means that humans rarely, if ever, will

admit severe setbacks, regardless of the actual outcome. These findings can have

important implications for students and practitioners alike. Even if one side of the

conflict faces defeat, continued struggle might be a choice, rather than admit defeat.

This observation, like others mentioned before, is even more relevant to protracted

conflicts, sometimes regarded as zero-sum situations in which defeat also means

physical annihilation. With such results, instructors should keep in mind that too much

frustration may impinge on the feelings of a successful simulation event. That in turn

will lower the learning products of the simulation. Some intervention may help, during

the interaction process to prevent complete deadlock, or all out compliance early on.

Figure 2D presents participants’ feedback on what they consider as the outcome of the

simulation in terms of accommodation between the warring parties. Results show that

the answers divide almost equally between accommodative and non-accommodative

ending, 54% and 46% respectively. These results, similar to the ones shown in figure

2C, point to the hardships participants confront during negotiations and the difficulties

in giving up some core values in order to promote others and reach compromise.

Figure 2E concludes the results regarding the weight of preliminary preparation before

the simulation. Preparations relate to cognitive learning and include various

assignments, for instance reading about the topic, actors, and decision-makers, and

handing in written assignments such as actor portfolio and character biography, filling

short questionnaires and so on.22 The figure illustrates that most participants (67%)

21

regarded pre-simulation preparations as a crucial step for the success of the simulation

as a whole. This teaches us that simulations are not ‘just for fun’ and most of them

involve some cognitive learning activities and chores as well. Learning about the topic,

actors and decision-makers also relates to the question in figure 1C on how well the

simulation reflects reality. The implication here is that if instructors want students to

play ‘for real’, the simulation process should integrate some preliminary tasks in

preparation for the interactive activities designed to replicate a real world event.

Enhanced individual study by participants and in class lectures also means that students

have initial knowledge to understand the situation they will step into, thereby enabling

them some extent of identification with their role, team and rivals, as displayed in

Figure 2F. This figure shows that 72% of the participants understand their rivals better

after the simulation ends than they did before. Yet, just a few participants (9%) believe

they reached a very high level of understanding, indicating that the use of simulation

does not create ‘magic’ results and should be part of a comprehensive learning cycle,

with traditional study methods. In order to reach a holistic understanding of a rival, one

must know more than just facts and be able to identify and show empathy towards rival

as displayed in figure 2G and figure 2H respectively. Studies often assume that

simulations are a vital tool for teaching world politics and conflict in particular, as they

enable identification, facilitate the emergence of some empathy and may ultimately

result in attitude modifications.23 While the question of attitude change, dealt above,

reasonably points to rather confined changes, this study confirms a gradual process of

affective transformation, even if incomplete. Close to 80% of them said they identify

with the team they played during the simulation. What makes this claim even more

powerful is the fact that most participants, in this survey, were Israelis that played Arab

actors that are still bitter enemies of Israel in day-to-day reality. We plan to test the

22

question of affective processes further by comparing surveys from other simulations

that involve students who are insiders to the conflict they play along with many

outsiders in inter-cultural simulations between campuses from afar. It may be

reasonable to expect that participants from afar that learn about a conflict but do not

confront it daily, may find it much easier to feel positive emotions to rivals that do not

threaten them in real situations. It was not surprising that an Israeli wrote, “I think that

Putin is not flexible and thinks only of his benefit, and I’m not that kind of person, but

I didn't let my personality effect my performance” or “I played the role of President

Erdogan. I did my best to look out for Turkey’s interests and basic beliefs. Some might

say I did a good job and they enjoyed my role…Nevertheless, I could not relate to him

or change my opinion of Turkey in our current reality”. Outsiders, that take part in a

regional conflict can benefit from the inter-cultural engagements, as a student put it “To

put in practice what you have just read in books means to acquire a new and better

knowledge of the issue. I enriched my political background by hearing all these

different voices from different countries and from the country of the conflict itself”.

This survey shows that while identification was relatively high, empathy was quite

lower. Half of the participants report that they show no or little empathy towards their

rivals, although many of them actually stepped into the shoes of an ‘other’. Only 18%

have reached a high level of empathy. These findings illuminate the fact that

simulations may be an effective tool to practice negotiations and conflict management

but they do not provide instant identification or the achievement of full empathy. We

suggest sharing this finding with students after the simulation, as a core debriefing

insight, discussing the fears and moral inhibitions many participants might have

regarding complete identification with rivals, especially when students live in a conflict

region and face its realities in person.

23

Figure 3 focuses on fanaticism as our theoretical case study, to use Gerring’s (2004:

342) conceptualization, on the meaning of a case study, not confined to empirical

events. This type of case study focusses on a theoretical subset that one probes in order

to generalize about a larger population in mind. The study of fanaticism and extremist

behaviors in the simulations serves a dual purpose. First, it illustrates how to use

simulations to teach theoretical topics with implications for improving simulations.

Second, findings from this study of extremism are an initial pilot for more advanced

research on the topic, based on more participants, by comparison of insiders and

outsiders to a conflict in inter-cultural simulations and contrasted with events data

analysis of simulation proceedings.

Together simulations data and feedback surveys are useful to test the question of

fanaticism from a comprehensive point of view by looking at relationships between

radical escalations, simulation outcomes and perceptions reported in feedback

regarding awareness of radicalism and its impact. The main point that appears in most

findings below is that participants tend to deny fanaticism, primarily about their own

characterization and about situations as a whole, that is, extremism in the simulation

scenario. The value-laden meanings of extremism are easily used, however, to

characterize rivals and their behavior and to the action-reaction radicalization in

behaviors between foes in conflict. Some of the results on fanaticism also serve as

useful guidelines for improving the effectiveness of simulations as a method of teaching

as detailed below. Figure 3A deals with whether fanaticism in the simulations reflected

reality. In general, findings are quite similar to the ones presented in figure 1C regarding

the question of how compatible the simulation is with real world events. It shows that

most participants (71%) felt that fanaticism in the simulations replicated reality to some

extent.

24

ons: Fanaticism in SimulatiFigure 3

25

Although it may seem trivial, we find this result astonishing, giving the fact that as

simulation administrators we purposely embedded very radical acts in the scenario in

order to increase fanaticism levels and test participants’ responses. We believe that

many students chose to disregard accounts of fanaticism and ignore fanatic ad-hoc

events we added during the interaction process. In doing so, they followed many

historical events in which decision-makers preferred to disregard radicalism and

overlook its dangers, most notably the 1938 Munich crisis and the policy of

appeasement.24 This pattern of sidestepping fanaticism was especially striking given

the scenarios we use.

Figure 4 illustrates a typical scenario of ours. It opened the Ukrainian civil war

simulation with a bloody massacre at the Russian town of Rostov-on-Don. The brutal

acts conducted by nationalists from the Ukrainian militia Azov Battalion enhanced the

narrative dramatically. A headline “This is only the beginning!” and a dead man’s photo

with ‘rivers of blood’ flowing in the streets, completed the vivid demonstration of an

acute situation. This opening confronted all teams with acts of fanaticism as inputs for

policymaking. In a similar manner, the 1938 Munich scenario included Nazi slogans

“Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer”, that is, one people, one realm, one leader, adjoined

with reports on aggression and ethnic cleansing in Sudeten border towns taken over by

SS troops. In the Yemeni internal strife simulation, photos of mutilated bodies

accompanied the text and in the simulations on terror in the Middle East, provocative

announcements from an ISIS spokesperson: “The White House will turn black with our

fire, Allah willing” and “the US, France, and other allies are all slaves and dogs”.

Figure 3B shows that even though most of our scenarios, formatted as newspaper’s

front page, deliberately included extremely brutal acts, inciting headlines and vulgar

photos, only 20% thought that fanaticism levels displayed in the scenarios were high,

26

while more than a third (37%) even claimed that they had no or very little fanaticism.

Together figures 3A and 3B demonstrate how individuals repress unacceptable or

potentially harmful behavior as a defense mechanism in order to preserve stability in

their perceptions of reality, and regard what they come to see selectively, as normalcy.

These perceptions of reality also relate to images of one’s ‘self’ and ‘the other’,

displayed in figure 3C and figure 3D respectively. While participants viewed their own

actor as less fanatic than it really was, they often exaggerated rival attributes, leading

to a noticeable gap, repeated from one simulation experience to another irrespective of

the political attributes of the team in reality. Accordingly, students playing Iran will

regard their team as moderate and view the US and Israel as extremists and vice versa.

Figure 3C, indicates that most participants characterized their team as not fanatic at all

(37%) or slightly fanatic (29%), while only a handful (15%) claimed their team is highly

fanatic. In contrast, figure 3D that deals with participants’ main rival displays a mirror

image of these self-perceptions. Few (15%) characterized their rival as not fanatic at

all, while more than a third (37%) claimed that this actor is highly fanatic. Such images

of the ‘other’ are evident throughout history, as great nations and civilizations usually

labeled outsiders as savages or barbarians.25 This classification has also taken a modern

form of fanaticism, as superpowers brand their adversaries as ‘pariah’, ‘rogue’, or

‘crazy’, usually without delineating objective criteria to distinguish between ‘deviant’

and ‘normal’ ones. The more different attributes of the ‘other’ are in terms of culture,

religion or regime the easier it becomes to label it as a fanatic. 25F

26 This process and its

dangerous implications highlight the importance of running inter-cultural simulations

that bring together students from distant countries and different cultures.

27

Figure 4: The Ukrainian Civil War Simulation Scenario

Provdo Bringing You The Truth

14.5.2015

Massacre at Rostov 400 men, women and children were beheaded at Rostov last night with blood covering the streets.

Andriy Biletsky, Azov commander threatens

This is only the beginning!

More to comeunless Russia evacuates Eastern

Ukraine immediately

Putin: Death to the Traitors! Ultimatum expires May 19, 2 PM

1. Comply or the troops will invade.

2. Hand in Azov battalion leaders and fighters.3. Stop all Israeli and US weapon shipments toUkrainian militias. 4. Mediate the transfer of Eastern Ukraine toRussia or face discontinuation of gas supplies.

* Ukraine deniesinvolvement in Rostov events.

* Says photos arefabricated.

* Calls for EUinspectors to enter the city immediately.

* PM Yatsenyuk calledObama and requested immediate guaranties for Ukrainian sovereignty.

President PoroshenkoBlames Russian

Propaganda

LAST MINUTE:

Merkel leaves for consultations in London

before the Democratic Front summit on May 19.

Israel trains Neo-Nazis? Undisclosed sources: IDF experts were seen at an urban combat training site near Mariupol where Azov battalion fighters operate.

ESCALATION AT THE BORDER

Pro-Russians Fighters

We will confront Biletsky and liberate Novorussia andwipeout all Azov battalionStrongholds.

All graphics retrieved from Wikimedia Commons and are labeled as copyright free

Yes to Russia!

28

When participants switch sides, each playing the team of the other, like American

students playing Israelis and students from Israel representing the US, the spotlight

shines on hidden prejudices, misconceptions, biases and the specter of false attributions,

not merely as a theoretical topic but by interactive practice. Figure 3E and figure 3F

strengthen these findings, as they display accounts regarding extremist behavior in the

simulations. Mirror images also appear regarding behaviors, 67% of participants saw

their own team’s behavior as not fanatic or only slightly so, while only 44% of them

regarded their rival’s behavior at parallel levels. Only 13% regarded their behavior as

highly fanatic, this number more than doubled to 29% regarding the rival’s most

extreme behavior. The findings from the last four figures on self and rival attributes and

behavior highlight the role of misperceptions and mirror images in world politics and

the importance of awareness to baseless branding of rivals as a starting point for

compromise and peace. Figure 3G and figure 3H support our previous findings

regarding fanaticism as an overlooked element. These figures examine the results of

learning and increased awareness to fanaticism on individual behavior during the

simulation and after it ends. It is reasonable to expect that learning about fanaticism

will increase awareness to the phenomenon and its deadly implications in world

politics, and consequently reduce radicalism in the game itself. Nevertheless, 55% of

participants felt that learning about fanaticism did not change their behavior during

simulation interactions. In a similar manner, one might expect that participants will

understand fanaticism better after taking part in simulations on extreme topics and

involving radical actors and events. Yet, only a third (34%) of the participants claim

that they gained a high or very high understanding of fanaticism and its role in world

politics. Findings from these last two figures help illuminate the fact that fanaticism

29

remains a hard to grasp phenomenon, one which many prefer to suppress, even if they

are fully aware of its existence and harmful consequences.

II. Findings on Links between Research Variables

The relationships between the variables described in table 3 illuminate the impact of

fanaticism on the learning process by use of simulations. The idea of teaching with

simulations depends on the links between variables, shaping the conceptual map of

fanaticism and learning in simulations of regional crises, summarized in figure 5. Such

experiences foresee a learning cycle in which paradigms have an impact in making a

choice between core values, confronting moral tradeoffs and finding ways to apply

abstract theories to reach compromise and forward one’s goals. The findings we address

refer to correlations that are statistically significant at p=0.05 or p=0.01. The

conceptual mapping of fanaticism contains four groups of variables: (1) enjoyment and

learning, (2) identification and empathy, (3) extremism, (4) the way simulations end in

terms of negotiated outcomes and accommodation. This map shows that enjoyment and

fanaticism affect learning with moderate and weak ties respectively. Empathy and

enjoyment affect compromise outcomes and accommodation with weak ties.

Identification with roles affect identification with teams with strong ties. Extremism in

reality affects learning and other variables of radicalism, mostly with weak ties but with

a moderate one to scenario extremism. Extremism in scenario affects identification and

other variables of radicalism with weak ties. Team extremism affects behavior and

learning with strong and weak ties respectively. In all, the map reveals mostly weak ties

along with a few moderate and strong ones. Due to the many elements that affect one

another, it is reasonable that individual links are weak. Future research will employ

regression analysis to verify the role of fanaticism from objective events data of

simulation interactions and views of extremism as reported in feedback.

Table 3: Correlations between Research Variables

Identify with

team Identify with

role Empathy Enjoy Learn Outcomes Accommodation in outcome

Scenario extremism

Team extremism

Behavior extremism Rival extremism Extremism in

rival behavior Extremism in

reality

Spearman's rho Identify with team Correlation Coefficient

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

Identify with role Correlation Coefficient .706**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000

N 196

Empathy Correlation Coefficient .085 .022

Sig. (2-tailed) .234 .762

N 196 196

Enjoy Correlation Coefficient .154* .111 .135

Sig. (2-tailed) .031 .123 .059

N 196 196 196 Learn Correlation Coefficient .064 .037 .276** .542** Sig. (2-tailed) .373 .606 .000 .000 N 196 196 196 196 Outcomes Correlation Coefficient -.092 -.137 -.159* -.078 -.010 Sig. (2-tailed) .197 .056 .026 .277 .893 N 196 196 196 196 196 Accommodation in outcome Correlation Coefficient .017 .030 .288** -.196** -.029 -.063 Sig. (2-tailed) .814 .679 .000 .006 .689 .383 N 196 196 196 196 196 196 Scenario extremism Correlation Coefficient -.106 -.180* .031 .063 .248** .033 -.118 Sig. (2-tailed) .187 .024 .697 .434 .002 .684 .142 N 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 Team extremism Correlation Coefficient -.252** -.227** .111 .071 .164* .048 -.025 .228** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .123 .322 .022 .508 .728 .004 N 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 156 Behavior extremism Correlation Coefficient -.203** -.272** -.023 .046 .192** .027 -.017 .184* .625** Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 .751 .523 .007 .712 .810 .022 .000 N 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 156 196 Rival extremism Correlation Coefficient .226** .151* .002 .111 .159* -.059 -.117 .267** -.038 .049 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .035 .976 .120 .026 .410 .101 .001 .593 .492 N 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 156 196 196 Extremism in rival behavior Correlation Coefficient .257** .186** -.069 .070 .135 -.046 -.074 .206** -.061 .145* .750** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .009 .335 .326 .059 .525 .299 .010 .395 .042 .000 N 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 156 196 196 196 Extremism in reality Correlation Coefficient .021 -.025 .091 .238** .337** -.084 -.110 .415** .211** .372** .316** .344** Sig. (2-tailed) .797 .757 .256 .003 .000 .297 .171 .000 .008 .000 .000 .000 N 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

31

Beyond offering ways to run better simulations, this study also highlights specific

insights from simulation feedback on fanaticism and problems that result from the ways

people think about the subject, confront it and adapt to fanatic ‘others’.

As far as learning is concerned, identification with role and team are enhancers of

learning via enjoyment. Fun is not merely a gimmick but a useful element to embed

cognitive learning. In a one-sentence summary of the simulation most students simply

say, “It was both fun and productive”. They characterize simulations as a “great and

joyful studying tool”, mention that “I had a lot of fun; it was a great way to demonstrate

international relations and make theories come to life”, or even point to “an exciting

dip in the icy water of international diplomacy”. In short: “enthusiastic, interesting and

a good learning method” or “One of the best experiences I had in International

Relations”.

Survey findings point to strong ties between role and team identification. This link

suggests that participants feel they have successfully managed to step into the shoes of

others, leaving an affective impact, beyond cognitive knowledge acquisition. As in

theatre, it is easier to play a dramatic and colorful figure like Adolf Hitler or Muammar

Gaddafi then a technocrat or mediocre personality such as Neville Chamberlain.

Therefore, we suggest incorporating figures considered as radical leaders in the

simulation plan and scenario, for at least some of the teams, to help students identify

with the decision-makers they represent. Common statements showing identification

appear frequently in feedback. “I really was the Secretary of State of the US!!! Not

bad!”, or alternatively, “Before the simulation started I decided my approach would be

to be bossy and proactive and I was satisfied that I accomplished what I set out to do”.

One student revealed, “I realized that I could make stuff up and as long as I sounded

sure of myself no one would stop and challenge me. So I just kept announcing things

32

and bulldozed everyone along” and another admitted, “I was surprised to see such

strong resistance to my fanaticism… As in reality, anti-war climate in the West was a

decisive constraint on British, French and American decision-makers”. Another student

added a comment on the complex relationship between different ‘lives’ exposed by the

simulation experience: “It’s been great fun playing a role from a different life that

actually affects my life every day”.

Figure 5: Conceptual Map

Participants who identify with their role and team tend to regard their side and its

behavior as moderate while they view rivals and their behavior as fanatic. For instance,

a player wrote, “They wanted the nuclear bomb. I know.” However, the other explained,

“My Iran’s primary goal was financial, but we did think of Shiites worldwide, and the

conflict with Sunnites. We weren’t prepared to just ignore that” and “We were very

dominant, like it supposed to be in reality”.

Identification, however, appears to be unrelated to empathy. This means that

participants’ ability to identify with their team and role, as detailed in figure 2H, does

not translate further to feelings regarding rivals. Empathy, even if qualified and partial,

does have some effect on compromise outcomes. When instructors add detail and décor

33

to create atmosphere, they help students identify and encourage expressions of

empathy. The use of inter-cultural simulations may help students realize that hidden

biases act as powerful barriers between rivals and make it hard to reach

accommodation. Even so, control over simulation outcomes remains very limited.

Extremism in reality is a core variable having a moderate link with scenario extremism

and weak ties with students’ enjoyment, learning and extremism in the simulation. As

one student put it: “Reality is stronger than fiction”. In other words, students who

participate in current events simulations of the Middle East and are confronted by ISIS,

or others taking part in historical simulations like the 1938 Munich crisis, are likely to

regard the situation as extreme and act accordingly. One student wrote “The simulation

is like a mirror, It reflects what’s really happens”. Another participant admitted, “I think

we were somewhat moderate compared to radical groups in real life”. A third

elaborated, “The actors were reflected very realistically during the simulation. The real

world is more radical. Terrorist attacks by non-state actors such as ISIS are far more

extreme than in the simulation”.

Most simulations we run involve crises with extreme situations. Their scenarios are a

useful device to trigger more radical interactions between teams than events in reality

are. We use this design deliberately because team and rival attributes have strong ties

with their respective behaviors and extreme interactions have an impact on learning.

Radicalism sets the simulation in motion, affects learning and advances fanaticism

awareness. In feedback comments, students explained: “Frankly, I think Saudi Arabia

is right to be suspicious of Iran’s intentions”, “Iran is radical”, “it felt real”. With respect

to the civil war in Ukraine one student wrote, “They were ready to kill and keep with

the war if Ukraine didn’t grant them independence” and added, “It has been an ongoing

fight against my team during last decades”. Pointing to more and less radical actors a

34

student declared, “They were all playing international relations”, but remarked, “The

USA did not want to change the system, as we wanted”. Others presented their

moderate stance, “we only wanted to defend our border and solve the refugee problem”.

One of them concluded, “I think it was an amazing learning experience that enriched

my background! Looking forward the next one”.

Given the ease to represent radical figures and their impact on interactions, participants

playing Hitler or Gaddafi are likely to escalate simulation extremism while others in

the roles of Barack Obama and his associates are likely to add moderation. A mix of

radicals and moderates leaves some chance of compromise and accommodative

outcomes, depending on the weight of each side and the narrative played. Incorporating

rogue states like North Korea, extreme NSAs such as ISIS or radical media teams like

Dabiq, improve students’ learning either directly as they get to know their actor, its

goals and politics, or indirectly by negotiating with other teams that challenge them

with extreme behaviors. Though participants actually play less extreme roles than the

scenario dictates, and usually regard their own team as moderate, even when they

represent a radical actor, simulations with extreme scenarios usually escalate, making

it more difficult to reach compromises. The implication from these findings is that

extreme situations consisting of fanatic leaders and radical teams are useful additions

to a simulation plan. In all, the result of an extreme setting is a spiral of fanaticism that

tests peaceful crisis management but adds drama and increases knowledge gains.

The intertwined nature of radical aspects that affect one another and other simulation

variables means that instructors should avoid an ‘overdose’ of radical inputs that might

lead to frustrating deadlocks, the collapse of negotiations, or outbursts of animosity

between teams or individual players at the end of the simulation. While deliberate

amplification of extremism may be a useful as educational tool, one must remember the

35

shortcomings of experimental engagements. By integrating cognitive study with

practice and emotions, the experience of confronting extremism may touch upon

personal values, real life events and political beliefs to trigger unexpected outcomes.

Careful coaching and in-depth debriefing after the simulation can help students cope

with such results, if they occur. Since reality seems to be more important than the

scenario in shaping simulation extremism, instructors can look for historical or current

analogies to the narrative they plan and share them with students to help them step

successfully into their roles and teams. After the simulation, analogies can also help

participants step out of the characters they played, remove their costumes and analyze

the interaction process and its implications for academic goal fulfillment.

Conclusion

This study presented lessons from feedback surveys for designing simulations and

highlighting the role of fanaticism in world politics. It focused on nine face-to-face and

online simulations of regional crises as an innovative tool to study fanaticism. During

these interactive exercises, participants have confronted fanaticism in historical or

current events, mostly on Middle-Eastern topics. Results indicate that participants

identify with their role and team, enjoy and learn but show limited awareness to

fanaticism and its challenges. Students see the situation in less extreme terms than it is,

regard themselves as moderates and label rivals as extremists. Yet, they view behaviors

as a response to extremism, creating a dangerous escalation spiral. Fanaticism is

associated with learning but not with accommodation. The way negotiations end

appeared unrelated to research variables, with the exception of enjoyment and empathy.

The analysis of separate variables and the relationships between them leads to some

practical implications for planning and running successful simulations. In a capsule,

two of them are: (1) Add fun and enjoyment to the exercise, as they are an essential part

36

of learning and enhance it. (2) Incorporate radical actors, but make sure not to

exaggerate, and balance extremism with moderate teams as a challenge for all

participants. The integration of fanaticism is one topic among others one can

incorporate into simulations. We believe that in the future, with the gradual

development of rigorous procedures to run simulations and agreed-upon methods to

appraise them, users will come closer to the ideal of having a so called ‘political science

lab’. Entry to this lab and its frequent use will provide participants with an enhanced

learning environment and effective practice under controlled conditions. Planning,

backup and analysis of lab products will offer scholars the option to use critical cases

constructed specifically for comparison with real world occurrences, along with a

multitude of data to test theories. The combined use of study, practice and research of

this sort will hopefully increase awareness to extremism and its consequences and

improve the understanding of fanaticism by students, scholars and practitioners.

37

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Endnotes

1 See Stern and Berger (2015) for details on the brutal acts of ISIS. 2 Fanaticism seems to have universal traits that do not necessarily bind to a certain country, religion, regime or leader. Marimaa (2011:33-34) and Rudin (1969:1-4) provide a review of fanaticism as a universal phenomenon. Hughes and Johnson’s collection (2005) includes in depth case studies of fanaticism. Calhoun (2004) discusses regime and Doran (2002) addresses rationality. 3 We build upon and extend the FBI definition available at https://cve.fbi.gov/whatis/. For an analysis and conceptualization of radicalization see: Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010); Goerzig and Al-Hashimi (2015, Ch.3); Hafez and Mullins (2015:960-61); Mandel (2009); Neumann (2013); Sedgwick (2010). 4 For a discussion regarding mainstream international relations theory and the study of rogue or fanatic actors see: Wagner, Werner, and Onderco (2014:1-5). 5 Regarding online radicalization and the usage of virtual platform to transfer radical content see: Berger (2015); Berger and Morgan (2015); Berger and Strathearn (2013); Cole (2012); Klausen et al. (2012); Pauwels and Schils (2016); Perliger and Pedahzur (2011); Stevens (2015). 6 Throughout our simulations, Facebook interactions took place on closed groups as to ensure privacy and security. For the importance of this issue see: Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015:44). 7 On the use of Facebook for running simulations, see: Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015). Other educational applications of Facebook related to simulations are detailed in Darling and Foster (2012), Simpson and Kaussler (2009), and Smolinski and Kesting (2012). 8 Simulations of world politics are processes in which participants representing political or media actors interact with one another according to a fiction or non-fiction story to advance their goals and policies. Simulations are also political systems set up intentionally to replicate specific situations. Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015:3, 13). For some of the leading simulation projects see the following websites and publications: ICONS at www.icons.umd.edu, and Crookall and Wilkenfeld (1985); Starkey and Wilkenfeld (1996). See also Model UN at www.nmun.org, and Crossley-Frolick (2010); Obendorf and Randerson (2012). Other examples include PeaceMaker at www.peacemakergame.com/index.php, and Cuhadar and Kampf (2014); Gonzalez, Saner, and Eisenberg (2013) and Statecraft at http://statecraftsim.com/. For a temporal mapping and the development of simulations throughout the years see: Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015:32-35). 9 For literature reviews on simulations see Boyer (2011); Brynen and Milante (2013); Hudson and Butler (2010); Kee (2011); Kikkawa and Crookall (2011); Mayer (2009); McDermott (2011); Mintz, Yang, and McDermott (2011); Pepinsky (2005); Shubik (2009); Smith (2010); Van Ments (2011); Wilson et al. (2009). 10 For literature on the goals simulations promote, see Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015:6). For studies beyond the temporal boundaries of their review, see: Asal et al. (2014:357); Asal, Griffith, and Schulzke (2014:488-89); Bridge and Radford (2014:432-34); Elias (2014:412-15); Gill (2015, Ch. 2); Kempston and Thomas (2014:470). 11 On the components of a learning cycle by use of simulations see Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015:10-11). On the importance of debriefing see: Crookall (2010, 2013, 2014); Kirz (2010); Lederman (1992); Peters and Vissers (2004); Petranek (2000); Petranek, Corey, and Black (1992). 12 For simulations highlighting skill development see: Asal and Blake (2006); Austin, McDowell, and Sacko (2006); Baylouny (2009); Bernstein (2008); Bridge and Radford (2014); Coffey, Miller, and Feuerstein (2011); Crossley-Frolick (2010); Darling and Foster (2012); DiCicco (2014); Elias (2014); Fliter (2009); Gill (2015); Lay and Smarick (2006); Levintova et al. (2011); McMahon and Miller (2012); Rackaway and Goertzen (2008); Rivera and Simons (2008); Schnurr, Santo, and Craig (2013); Shaw (2006); Shellman and Turan (2006); Taylor (2013); Weir and Baranowski (2011). 13 For simulations confronting value-laden issues see: Asal and Schulzke (2012); Baylouny (2009); Brynen (2010); Coffey, Miller, and Feuerstein (2011); Dexter and Guittet (2014); Fowler (2009); Parmentier (2013); Rackaway and Goertzen (2008); Schrier (2015); Weir and Baranowski (2011). 14 On simulations as a lab for training and research see: Asal, Griffith, and Schulzke (2014); Asal and Schulzke (2012); Austin, McDowell, and Sacko (2006); Baylouny (2009); Ben-Yehuda, Naveh, and Levin-Banchik (2013); Boyer et al. (2009); Garrison, Redd, and Carter (2010); Mintz (2004); Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz (2006); Shaw (2006). 15 Asal and Schulzke (2012); Shellman and Turan (2006); Siegel and Young (2009). 16 Baranowski and Weir (2015) discuss the development of simulations and their utility. They specify different methods used in simulation research and highlight the centrality of surveys. 17 In all nine simulations, some 70% of the participants were insiders and the rest were outsiders.

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18 By allowing a choice of more than one answer on learning topics and skills, the unit of analysis changes from a survey response of an individual student (N=196), used for all research variables, to a choice of a learning topic or a skill, with an overall of 1350 and 804 answers respectively. 19 For definitions and characteristics of intractable conflicts see: Bar-Tal (1998, 2013); Halperin and Sharvit (2015); Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson (1989). See also The Beyond Intractability Project at http://www.beyondintractability.org/. 20 Asal (2005); Butcher (2012); Fowler (2009); Gorton and Havercroft (2012); Kelle (2008); Korosteleva (2010); Loggins (2009); Mendeloff and Carolyn Shaw (2009); Obendorf and Randerson (2012); Simpson and Kaussler (2009); Smolinski and Kesting; (2012); Taylor (2013); Weir and Baranowski (2011). 21 Brynen (2010); Crossley-Frolick (2010); Fliter (2009); Jackson (2013); Kelle (2008); Parmentier (2013); Shaw (2004); Weir and Baranowski )2011( . 22 For more details on these and other assignments see: Ben-Yehuda, Levin-Banchik, and Naveh (2015:54-58) 23 Baylouny (2009); Dexter and Guittet (2014); Rackaway and Goertzen (2008); Sasley (2010); Stover (2005, 2007); Williams and Williams (2011, 2010). 24 For details on the Munich crisis, its implications and historical evaluation see: Beck (1989); Taylor (1979); Weinberg (1997). 25 See Bowden (2013, Ch. 4) on this point. 26 On the branding or labeling problem in this classification see Ben-Yehuda and Zohar (2014:8-9). Elaborations on the pariah/rogue doctrine and crazy state theory are presented by Dror (1971); Harkavy (1981); Henriksen (2001); Hoyt (2000); Klare (1995); Litwak (2000); Malici (2009); Tanter (1999).