Legal PhilosophyCase Studies

Functionalist PerspectiveModern Legal Realist PerspectiveCritical Legal Analysis Policy Science

Esplana, Maria CarlaOctaviano, ClarenceYu, Benjamin

3/1/2009

I. Functionalist Perspective

a. Teresita Arobang v. Mayor Vicente Bermejo

b. Hon. Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati v.

Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission of Audit

II. Modern Legal Realist Perspective

a. Alejandro Estrada v. Soledad Escritor

b. Ferdinand Marcos v. Hon. Raul Manglapus

III. Critical Legal Analysis

a. International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) v. Hon. Leonardo

A. Quisumbing

IV. Policy Science Perspective

a. In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus: Laurente C. Ilagan

vs. Hon Juan Ponce Enrile

b. Florentino Joya and Juan Tahimic and Domingo Joya v. Pedro

Pareja

V. Scandinavian legal realism

a. Primitivo Ansay, et al v. The Board of Directors of the National

Development Company et al.

Cases for functional perspective

Arrobang v. Martinez

G.R. No. 153974 August 7, 2006

Austria- Martinez, J.

Before this Court is a petition for review questioning the Decision of the Court of

Appeals (CA) dated March 20, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47052, as well the Resolution dated

June 11, 2002 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration thereof.

Facts:

Petitioners are owners of parcels of land with a total area of about 20,424 square

meters, covered by Free Patent Nos. 7265, 7266, 7267, 7268, 7269, and 7270. On

November 8, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution

No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate

expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on April 14,

1997 by the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 18 of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6958.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but

only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners

voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed

beneficiaries of the land sought to be expropriated have not actually signed a petition

asking for the property but their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing

the same.

On July 31, 1997, the trial court denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and declared that

the expropriation in this case is for "public use" and the respondent has the lawful right to

take the property upon payment of just compensation. Petitioners filed an Answer on

August 12, 1997 reasserting the issues they raised in their Motion to Dismiss.

On October 1, 1997, the trial court issued an Order appointing three persons as

Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the property. Petitioners

filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners to

Determine Just Compensation and for Clarification of the Courts Order dated October 1,

1997" which was denied by the trial court on November 3, 1997. Petitioners Motion for

Reconsideration was also denied on December 9, 1997.

Petitioners then filed on March 2, 1998 a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming

that they were denied due process when the trial court declared that the taking was for

public purpose without receiving evidence on petitioners claim that the Mayor of Panay

was motivated by politics in expropriating their property and in denying their Motion to

Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners; and that the trial

court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the affidavits of

persons denying that they signed a petition addressed to the municipal government of

Panay. On January 17, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Attached Memorandum

and the Memorandum itself where they argued that based on the Petition for Expropriation

filed by respondent, such expropriation was based only on a resolution and not on an

ordinance contrary to Sec. 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160; there was also no valid and

definite offer to buy the property as the price offered by respondent to the petitioners was

very low.

On March 20, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.

Thus, the present petition claiming that:

Issue:

Petitioners were utterly denied procefural due process of law by the court, when it

PETITIONERS WERE UTTERLY DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE

COURT A QUO, WHEN IT SIMPLY DECLARED IN ITS ORDER DATED 31 JULY 1997 THAT

THE TAKING BY RESPONDENT OF PETITIONERS PROPERTIES IS PURPORTEDLY FOR

PUBLIC PURPOSE WITHOUT RECEIVING EVIDENCE ON THEIR ASSERTED CLAIM THAT

RESPONDENTS MUNICIPAL MAYOR WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED IN SEEKING THE

EXPROPRIATION OF THEIR PROPERTIES AND NOT FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE.

Ruling:

Petitioners argue that: contrary to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 7160 of the Local Government

Code, which provides that a local government may exercise the power of eminent domain

only by "ordinance," respondents expropriation in this case is based merely on a

"resolution"; while objection on this ground was neither raised by petitioners in their

Motion to Dismiss nor in their Answer, such objection may still be considered by this Court

since the fact upon which it is based is apparent from the petition for expropriation itself; a

defense may be favorably considered even if not raised in an appropriate pleading so long

as the facts upon which it is based are undisputed; courts have also adopted a more

censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of local bodies of

the delegated power of expropriation, as compared to instances when it is directly

exercised by the national legislature; respondent failed to give, prior to the petition for

expropriation, a previous valid and definite offer to petitioners as the amount offered in

this case was only P10.00 per square meter, when the properties are residential in nature

and command a much higher price; the CA failed to discuss and rule upon the arguments

raised by petitioners in their Memorandum; attached to the Motion to Dismiss were

affidavits and death certificates showing that there were people whose names were in the

supposed petition asking respondent for land, but who did not actually sign the same, thus

showing that the present expropriation was not for a public purpose but was merely

politically motivated; considering the conflicting claims regarding the purpose for which

the properties are being expropriated and inasmuch as said issue may not be rightfully

ruled upon merely on the basis of petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Answer as well as

respondents Petition for Expropriation, what should have been done was for the RTC to

conduct hearing where each party is given ample opportunity to prove its claim.

Respondent for its part contends that its power to acquire private property for public

use upon payment of just compensation was correctly upheld by the trial court; that the CA

was correct in finding that the petitioners were not denied due process, even though no

hearing was conducted in the trial court, as petitioners were still able to adduce their

objections and defenses therein; and that petitioners arguments have been passed upon by

both the trial court and the CA and were all denied for lack of substantial merit.

Respondent filed a Memorandum quoting at length the decision of the CA to support its

position. Petitioners meanwhile opted to have the case resolved based on the pleadings

already filed. Petition is impressed with merit.

Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private

property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the

legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs),

other public entities and public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated entities

is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the

delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private

property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and restraints

imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by

themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power

of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must

conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in

eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter

cannot go against the principals will or modify the same.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a

fundamental right. It greatly affects a land owners right to private property which is a

constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of

personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Thus,

whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the

exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.

Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still

the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being

exercised in accordance with the delegating law.

The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot

authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking

body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an

ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the

municipal council will not suffice.

A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; and

the reason for this is settled:

x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a

resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a

specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a

resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third

reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by

a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such

expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy

promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of

its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such

power.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

SP No. 47052 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Action No. V-6958 is

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Hon. Jejomar Binay and the Municipality of Makati v.

Hon. Eufemio Domingo and the Commission of Audit

G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991

Paras, J.

The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under

Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under

the general welfare clause.

Facts:

On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved

Resolution No. 60 which reads:

A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL

ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE

TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL

TREASURY.

Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of

Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a

month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the

amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati.

Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal

secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for

the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program.

Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its

expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA

disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the

implementation thereof.

Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners were denied by respondent in its

Decision No. 1159.

However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.

Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari

praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.

Issue: Whether or not Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of

Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of police power and

parens patriae.

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty,

which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere

tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is

securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI

of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such

power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the

repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise

from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal

corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers

within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give

effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public

corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the

enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called inferred police

powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in

express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of

the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully

accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs.

Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies,

must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their

governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus,

not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but

the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant

thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such

regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred

upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety,

comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the

prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure

the protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local

government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied

therefore, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote

health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in

the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants

therein."

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,

insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute

of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions.

(Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life

and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the

enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said

to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S.) However, it is not

confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must

follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).

In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or

relation between the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988,

supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."

Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its

exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."

In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an

exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all

comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to

anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and

flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be

commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people

in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private

rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation

and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,

and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,

and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal

with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by

promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the

preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is

deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the

limits of police power.

COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still

subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public

purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of

the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional

merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed

out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "The drift is towards social welfare legislation

geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the

general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for

human rights

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor

has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of

legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying

treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the

welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the

disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban

poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is

a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial

Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a

family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened

by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon

Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however

must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to

embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby

GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE.

Functional Perspectives case analysis

The social interest therefore in the preservation of human personality and dignity

emphasizes personal security from abusive application of power by private individual or

groups of individual and from unreasonable application of authority by the government,

namely, police power, power of taxation, power of eminent domain. The essence of this

social interest is two-fold. The first is the right of the people without discrimination among

individuals, to have a voice and to participate in the formation of government policies and

functions. Of this right there is no doubt since the people are called upon to support these

policies morally, physically and financially. The second is the reasonable expectation of the

people that their optimum social requirements will be met.

The two cases above were historical expression of the social interest context in our

country that properly displays the functional perspective view of law. The court in ruling

these cases expressly applies the maxim of salus populi est suprema lex. It is thus based on

the title and concern of the entire social group against those forms and acts and practices

which adversely affect the stability of existence and happiness of the people. There is an

abundance of historical illustrations where national decay has been the result with the

wanting of the esteem fro personality and dignity. Paradoxically, the preservation of this

social interest is a continuous fight and endeavor.

Case for Modern Legal Realist Perspective

Alejandro Estrada v. Escritor

A.M. No. P-02-1651

August 4, 2003

Facts:

Soledad Escritor works as a Clerk of Court in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas. In

July 27, 2000, complainant Estrada, requested for an investigation in relation to rumors

that respondent was engaged in a relationship with a man who is not her husband.

Respondent testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow,

her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with Luciano

Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband

was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have

a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the

Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement

is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In

fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of

Pledging Faithfulness.”

For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have

been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus

makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world

except in countries where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the

Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple

cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of legal

impediments. Only those couples which have been baptized and in good standing may

execute the Declaration. The declaration requires the approval of the elders of the

congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their

respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the declarations are

executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were executed in the usual and approved

form prescribed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where

the declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.

Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal impediments for the

couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases, and the couple should legalize their

union. In Escritor’s case, although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal

impediment to marry on her part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus,

their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is

concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and

Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in

asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral

conduct for which she should be held administratively liable.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be reprimanded for her alleged extra-marital

affairs.

Held:

No. Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for

accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in

arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had

was “illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its

very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the Solicitor General

failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality

based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests

Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a

case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including

religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred

freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the

state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the

very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that

such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and nondiscriminatory but

in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In the interpretation of a document, such as the

Bill of Rights, designed to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which

perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history,

structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the clauses, all point toward this

perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a reading of the religion clauses which leaves

both politically dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability

to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others, makes the most

sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document designed to protect minorities

and individuals from mobocracy in a democracy.

Case Analysis for Modern Legal Realist Perspective

Estrada v. Escritor

The Modern Legal Realist Perspective’s American Legal Realism states that “the law is

an instrument of social control entrusted to the Courts with regard to experience and

prevailing moral and political theories and policies”. Law is what the Court says it is. The

Courts are affected by certain Metalegal Factors. These are the elements which stimulate a

Judge either against or for a specific matter or controversy. The Metalegal Factor of the

Stimuli Set Up by the Judges’ Predilections and Preconceptions may be applied in the case

at bar. The leading case of Estrada v. Escritor was penned by Chief Justice Reynato Puno, a

known religious and virtuous man.

The Metalegal stimulus that is present in the case is the Judge’s or Justice’ Legal

Sympathies. Legal Sympathies arise from a judge’s community of experience, education,

interests, and even temperament. Chief Justice Puno’s disposition towards fairness and

equality are well known in the Philippines. It is an area in which he is forthright, clearly

reflecting his legal sympathies towards the protection of equal rights as well as religious

rights.

In the Estrada case, Chief Justice Puno of the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the

respondent. The Chief Justice, who penned the opinion, characterized the acts of the

respondent to be well in the realm of the free exercise of her religious beliefs. Furthermore,

it was held that there was no compelling state interest to warrant a punishment against the

respondent.

The mind of a Judge or Justice is a store of legal sympathies and legal antipathies which

is acquired in the process of maturing and education. The metalegal stimuli come into

operation only because certain issues strike familiar notes which may set a judicial tone.

Marcos vs. Manglapus,

GR no. 88211 September 15, 1989

August 2, 2008

Facts:

The petitioners are Ferdinand E. Marcos and his immediate family, while Raul

Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the respondent. The call is about the request of

Marcos family to the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.

Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the

president’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President

may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:

Petition was dismissed. President did not arbitrarily or with grave of discretion in

determining that return of former president Marcos and his family at the present time and

under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in

prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

Case Analysis for Modern Legal Realist:

Marcos v. Manglapus

The Metalegal Factor of the Stimuli Set Up by Historical or Political Events and

Precedents may be applied in the case at bar. As was held in the case: “The duties of the

President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect

and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the

Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under

present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear

showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving

at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.”

The petitioners in the case at bar raise their inherent right as citizens of the Philippines

to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the

rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution. However, if the Marcoses were

allowed to return, it may provide a catalytic effect which, instead of erasing fears of

destabilization, might even cause the opposite.

The historic-political setting of the case shows that it was barely four years after the

dramatic EDSA Revolution and that strong political feelings were still at its height. The

Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners not because of existing prejudices against the

family, but because the Motion was filed during a time when emotions were still high and a

strong possibility of government destabilization was apparent.

Case for Critical Legal Studies

International School Alliance of Educators v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing

G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000

Kapunan, J.

Facts:

Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational institution

established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary

residents. The school hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,

classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said

International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better treatment of their

colleagues who have been hired abroad. These foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not

accorded the local-hires which include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home

leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local-hires. Petitioner

claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the school is discriminatory to

Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial

discrimination.

Issue:

Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent school constitutes racial

discrimination.

Held:

YES. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts

Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance

the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."

The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his

rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and

observe honesty and good faith."

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment

opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal

work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the

spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to

promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and

discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.

In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent school to justify

the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification.

There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and

local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires

contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long

honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially

equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid

similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character"

notwithstanding. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the

presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by

logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not

for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That

would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it

is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

Case Analysis for Critical Legal Studies

Critical legal studies views the law as an instrument to redeem the people from social

divisions and hierarchies. It is an advocacy of the law as a neutral and objective means of

social control with emphasis on its liberating function. In the case cited, there exists a

duality which is often called by the realist theorists as paired opposite. This is the

classification made by the international school categorizing the members of the faculty of

the International School as foreign-hires and local-hires. Dualities, such as this one, are

being eradicated by the critical legal realism theorists to show how they create an ideology

that furthers the interest of the ruling class. They envisioned a future in which the

categories that currently divide and separate people—including sexual, racial, political, and

class categories—are broken down, allowing people to share more values and to create a

more harmonious society. It is only when the law is neutral and maintains its neutrality in

the inevitable conflict of claims, demands, and expectations can everyone in society accept

it as a means of social control and feel safe and secure from illegitimate divisions and

hierarchies.

Critical Legal Studies pushes the liberal premises about state and society, about

freedom from dependence and governance of social relations by the will, to the point at

which they merge into a larger ambition: the building of a social world less alien to a self

that can always violate the generative rules of its own mental or social constructs and put

other rules and other constructs in their place. It therefore seeks to reform the law and

society in such a way as to liberate and empower every individual.

Case for Policy Science

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus: Laurente C. Ilagan

v. Hon Juan Ponce Enrile

October 21, 1985

Facts:

A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Free

Legal Assistance Group on behalf of Attorneys Laurente Ilagan, Antonio Arellano, and

Marcos Risonar.

The three lawyers were arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan solely on the basis of a

Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander of the Ministry

of National Defense. The petition for habeas corpus was then filed on the ground that the

arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, because arrests cannot be made on

the basis of Mission Orders and there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers

who are involved in national security cases.

The respondents contended that the attorneys were arrested on the basis of a Decree

issued by the President. Respondents further allege that the detained attorneys played

active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the

National Democratic Front.

The Court resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the

recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely retired Chief Justice

Concepcion and retires Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. However, despite the Order of the

Court, the detained attorneys were not released. Respondents field an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration stating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of

ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case.

Furthermore, the respondents alleged that an Information for Rebellion was filed

against the detained attorneys and thus making the petition for Habeas Corpus moot and

academic. Petitioners opined, saying that the detained attorneys were not given the benefit

of preliminary investigation, ant that they were denied their constitutional right to due

process.

Issue:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of an Information is a bar to a petition for Habeas

Corpus.

Held:

Case was dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners were detained

by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation

to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.

Case Analysis for Policy Science:

Ilagan v. Enrile

The concept of Habeas Corpus as presented in this case is the materialization of the

concept of “Liberty” as a social value. The social value of “liberty” moves towards the

ability of people to act or to do things which are crucial to his way of life.

In the famous case of Calalang v. Williams, the Supreme Court stated that liberty is a

blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over

authority because then society will fall into anarchy and neither should authority be made

to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

In the present case, the social value of “liberty” was apparent. Liberty means security

from restraint, it is deemed to embrace the right of a man to enjoy the faculties with which

he has been endowed by his creator subject only to restraints necessary for the public

welfare. The Social Value of “Liberty” may take an active or passive mode. In the case, it

took an active form. The active form of “liberty” is that which may be the basis of legal

claims or legal powers. The exercise of the right to Petition the Court for Habeas Corpus is

an example of an active form of “liberty” based on a legal claim.

But whether “liberty” is in its active or passive form, it is an area of human endeavor

which the government should not encroach upon or permit undue restriction to. In the

case at bar, a conflict arose between the claim of the government to national security and

individual rights. The government applied unrestricted and unreasonable interference

which may be detrimental to social values.

The social value of “Power” was also evident in the case at bar. The first aspect of

“Power” as a social value is the capacity to secure and maintain fundamental Human Rights.

These rights cannot exist under a benevolent despot. In Ilagan v. Enrile, the captives were

arrested under the authority of the then dictator Ferdinand Marcos. It can be gainsaid that

the arbitrary authority exercised over the lawyers were unnatural and undesirable.

Florentino Joya, Juan Tahimic and Domingo Joya v. Pedro Pareja

G.R. No. L-13258; November 28, 1959

Florentino Joya is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 11 hectares (lot No.

1171), situated in Sanja Mayor, Tanza, Cavite, which had been under lease to one Maximina

Bondad for 16 years. For the duration of said period, the land was tenanted and worked on

for the lessee by Pedro Pareja.

In April, 1954, upon termination of the lease agreement, the property was returned to

the landowner, with the lessee recommending that the same be leased to Pareja. The said

tenant and the landowner, however, failed to agree on the terms under which the former

could work on the lands, specifically on the matter of rental, as Joya demanded 120 cavanes

as annual rental therefore. Notwithstanding such lack of understanding between them,

Pareja continued on his cultivation of the property.

On May 24, 1954, the tenant filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (before the

creation of the Court of Agrarian Relations) Tenancy Case No. 5281-R against Florentino

Joya for the purpose of securing a reduction of the rental allegedly being imposed upon him

by the respondent. The landowner resisted the complaint disclaiming that Pareja had ever

his tenant.

Two days thereafter or on May 26, Florentino Joya leased the land to Domingo Joya at

an annual rent of 120 cavanes. As the aforesaid lessee found Pareja already working on the

land, the former agreed to allow him (Pareja) to continue with his cultivation on condition

that they would equally share its produce after deducting the rental for the land. In view of

this development, Pareja moved for the dismissal of his complaint against the landowner,

then pending in the Court of Industrial Relations, on the ground that the parties therein had

already reached an agreement on the matter in controversy.

One year later, or on April 10, 1055, Florentino Joya renewed the lease in favor of

Domingo Joya but included as co-lessee one Juan Tahimic. The rent was reduced to 105

cavanes a year. Pareja, with whom Domingo had worked during the previous year, refused

to surrender the land to Tahimic. Thereupon, Florentino filed with the Justice of the Peace

Court of Tanza, Cavite, a complaint for usurpation against Pareja who, consequently, was

arrested and stayed in jail for a week. When finally released on Bail, Pareja filed a counter-

charge with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, against Florentino Joya, Juan Tahimic, and

Domingo Joya, for alleged violation of Republic Act 1199.

However, threatened to be imprisoned again or fined in the usurpation case if he did

not desist and surrender the land, he withdrew his complaint manifesting that he was

surrendering the property to its owner but "leaving to the Court of Industrial Relations or

Agrarian Court the determination of whatever right he may have in the said land."

Thereafter, at the instance of Florentino Joya, the criminal case for usurpation was also

dismissed.

On January 31, 1956, Pareja filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations a complaint against

Florentino Joya and Juan Tahimic for alleged violation of Republic Act 1199 (Tenancy Case

No. CAR-6, Cavite), consisting of his allegedly unlawful ejectment from the land he was

working on for 16 years and the appointment by Florentino Joya of his co-defendant Juan

Tahimic as tenant in his (Pareja's) stead; of the landowner's filing a criminal action when

he refused to vacate the property and making it a condition for its dismissal his (Pareja's)

surrender of the same. And contending that he unwillingly vacated the land for fear of

being again indicted in court, Pareja prayed for his reinstatement to the landholding;

payment to him of his share of the crops for the agricultural year 1955-56 which he failed

to receive; for damages and attorney's fees.

In their answer with counterclaim, defendants Florentino and Juan denied the existence

of tenancy relationship between plaintiff and defendant Florentino; and claimed that the

complaint stated no cause of action and that the case had already been passed upon the

competent authorities (apparently referring to the dismissal by the Court of Industrial

Relations and the Provincial Fiscal's Office of the previous complaint of Pareja against the

same defendants.) Domingo Joya also filed an answer in intervention praying for the

recognition of his and Tahimic's superior right to work on and cultivate the land.

After due hearing, the Court rendered judgment holding that upon termination of the

civil lease in favor of Maximina Bondad, Pedro Pareja, the lessee's tenant, automatically

became the tenant of the landowner, pursuant to Section 264 of Act 4054; that said tenant,

on the other hand, in agreeing to share equally with Domingo Joya the produce of the land

for the agricultural year 1954-55 in effect waived his right over an undetermined 1/2 of

the landholding; that the subsequent contract of lease entered into between the landowner

and Domingo Joya and Juan Tahimic as lessees could not prejudice the right of Pareja to

work on the same land and, accordingly, was declared valid only insofar as that portion

given up by the latter in favor of Domingo Joya was concerned. Consequently, Pedro Pareja

was ordered reinstated to 1/2 of the 11 hectare landholding, while Domingo Joya and Juan

Tahimic were recognized as joint tenants over the other half. As the rental for the lease of

the land was fixed at 53.75 cavanes per agricultural year after taking into consideration its

nature and productivity, the court also directed Florentino Joya to return to plaintiff Pareja

and intervenor Domingo Joya 21.25 cavanes of palay or their value, which were overpaid to

him (the landowner) for the agricultural year 1954-55; and to Domingo Joya and Juan

Tahimic 55 cavanes or their corresponding value which were overpaid to him for the year

1955-56 and 1956-57. The court, however, finding that plaintiff's failure to continue on the

cultivation of the land its return to the owner could not be imputed to the latter,

exonerated Florentino Joya from the charge of violation of Republic Act 1199. Not satisfied

with this decision, therein defendants and intervenor filed this petition for review.

Admittedly, the respondent-tenant cultivated the land for the lessee for 16 years or for

the entire duration of the tenancy relationship existed between Maximina Bondad, the

lessee, and Pareja, the tenant. The question now interposed in this petition is whether the

tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite the termination of the lease,

or said in other words, whether his being a tenant of the lessee makes him, upon the

expiration of the contract, a tenant of the lessor.

The question thus presented must be answered in the affirmative, not so must because

of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court, but pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act

1199, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act 2263, which reads in part:

SEC 9. Severance of Relations. The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the

voluntary surrender or abandonment of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the

tenant:

xxx xxx xxx

The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the sale,

alienation or transfer of legal possession of the land does not of itself extinguish the

relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and

obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the

landholder, his heir shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that tenancy relationship is not extinguished by (1) the

expiration of the contract(of tenancy); (2) sale; (3) alienation; or (4) transfer of legal

possession of the land.

In a contract of lease, the lessee, for the duration of the contract subject of the

agreement.1 The return by the lessee of the property to the lessor, upon expiration of the

lease contract, naturally involves again a transfer of possession from one lawful holder to

another. But it may be asked, is this transfer of possession included in or comprehended by

the aforequoted Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended?

Prior to the enactment of Republic Act 2263, amending Republic Act 1199, our tenancy

legislations, while providing for the tenant's right in case of sale or alienation of the

property, is silent where there is only a transfer of legal possession of the land. With

amendment of the Agriculture Tenancy Act (Rep. Act 1199) on June 19, 1959, the tenure

even in cases of transfer of legal possession. Petitioner-landowner, however, claims that to

hold that the lessee's tenant, with whom he had no dealing whatsoever, automatically

become his tenant upon the return of the property to him would constitute a restraint on

his right to enter into contract and deprive him of his liberty (to contract) and property

without due process of law.

This same contention was raised during the deliberations of the then Senate Bill No.

119, but Congress, decided to implement its policy and objective in adopting the

Agricultural Tenancy Law and passed the bill in its present form. The following is quoted

from the Congressional Record:

SENATOR PRIMICIAS. On the severance of relationship of tenant and landowner, it

seems that there is an intention on the part of Your Honor to amend Section 9 of the Act so

as to include the transfer of legal possession of land in one or two cases which do not

extinguish the relationship . . . .

SENATOR PELAEZ. I would say that this afternoon, in the committee on Revision of

Law, we were considering amendments to the effect that the present tenants must have the

priority right, and I think we should give priority to those tenants who are there and that

any transfer of lands should not affect them the least.

SENATOR PRIMICIAS . . . Does Your Honor think that the landowner is not entitled to

transfer the lease to another person even if the police offered is better?

SENADOR PELAEZ. Under the present law, he cannot do it.

SENATOR PRIMICIAS. Would that not constitute a deprivation of property without due

process of law.

SENATOR PELAEZ. It is deprivation of property without due process of law. It is in the

present law. But we have to remember here social values and human values against

material values. Precisely, the agricultural tenancy act remedied an existing evil because

before the agricultural tenancy act provided for security of these poor tenants, they were

pushed out of the land by the landlords . . . (Senate Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 54,

April 21,1958, p. 905-906.)

It is our considered judgement, since the return by the lessee of the leased property to

the lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves also a transfer of legal possssion and

taking into account the manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to

provide the tenant with security of tenure in call case of transfer of legal possession, that

the instant case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act

1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263. The termination of the lease, therefore, did not

divest the tenant of the right to remain and continue on his cultivation of the land.

Furthermore, should any doubt exist as to the applicability of the aforementioned provision

of law to the case at bar, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the tenant.3

Petitioner landowner likewise assails the legality of the judgment of the court a quo

prescribing the rental that must be paid by the tenants, it being claimed that such question

was never raised in the pleadings filed in said court. This is not exactly the case, because it

must be remembered that the main reason for the refusal of the landowner to let petitioner

continue in the cultivation of the landholding in 1954 was precisely the question of the

rental to be paid, the tenant claiming that the 120 cavanes being asked by the landowner

was excessive. This therefore, is a matter of dispute between the parties and the action

taken by the Agrarian Court is sanctioned by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1267 which

provides:

SEC. 11. Character of Order or Decision. In issuing an order or decision, the Court shall

not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the

dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or determination which may

be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing

further disputes, provided that said matter for determination has been established by

competent evidence during the hearing.

Contrary to petitioners' contention that no proof was adduced during the trial to

support the lower court's finding that the entire landholding has an average annual yield of

215 cavanes, we have the testimony of Florentino Joya himself that "the land normally

produces more than 300 cavanes per year" (pp. 207 & 225, Records). There is also the

statement of Pareja that in 1954-55, he harvested 133 cavanes, in spite of poor crop. (p.45,

Record.) Hence, we find no reason to disturb the finding of fact of the lower court.

Petitioner also allege that the tenant voluntarily surrendered the property to the

landowner, as evidence by an affidavit executed by Pareja on July 16, 1955 and subscribed

before the Justice of the Peace of Tanza, Cavite, the translation of which reads:

I, PEDRO PAREJA, of legal age, and residing in the municipality of Tanza, Cavite, under

oath state the following:

That in accordance with what I have declared before the provincial Fiscal of Cavite

during the investigation (July 6, 1955), I will not interfere with or continue the cultivation

in the land of Mr. Florentino Joya in Balite, Tanza, Cavite, Lot No. 1171, and which I am

voluntarily returning to him, nevertheless I am leaving to the C.I.R. or Agrarian Court the

determination of whatever right I may have in said land.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign this document, in the Municipal building of

Tanza, Cavite, this 16th day of July, 1955.

(Sgd.) PEDRO PAREJA

This statement notwithstanding, the lower court found that "petitioner's fear after his

incarceration was ordered by the Justice of the Peace was such that his freedom of choice

was impaired, or at least restricted. Under such circumstances, he was not acting

voluntarily."

This conclusion is fully supported by the record of the case. The explanation of the

tenant is sufficiently borne out by the circumstances attending the execution of the

document. At the time he made the statement both in the office of the Provincial Fiscal and

the Justice of the Peace of Tanza (who ordered his previous arrest), petitioner Florentino

against him was then pending in the justice of the peace court. The facts that immediately

after the execution of the affidavit the landowner moved for the dismissal of the

aforementioned criminal case corroborates Pareja's testimony that he had to do as he did

out of fear of further harassment.

Significantly too, it may be observed from a reading of the document that the affiant did

not over the property to the owner unconditionally. On the contrary, he made a reservation

of his right to secure from the property court a judicial declaration of whatever interest he

may have in the land. This indeed contradicts the supposed "voluntaries" of the tenant's act

in giving up the land.

With respect to the charge that a portion of the land was utilized by the tenant as a

"tilapia" fish pond, we agree with the lower court that there is no evidence that it resulted

in material injury to the land (Sec. 51, Rep. Act 1199). The uncontradicted testimony is that

the fishpond was made on requirement of the Bureau of Agricultural Extension that every

farmer in the vicinity should have a small fishpond, and that this particular fishpond was

on the portion ("balot") not used for planting rice (pp. 81-82, Record.)

Wherefore, finding no reason to review the decision appealed from, the same is hereby

affirmed, with costs against petitioner Florentino Joya. So ordered.

Case Analysis for Policy Science

Joya v. Pareha

The policy science jurisprudence is an advocacy of the social value. In this advocacy,

the policy science school deplores the failure of the ontological schools, for all their legal

craftsmanship, in supplying the empirical basis for the legal ordering of the society,

especially in the solution of problems involving the relation of the individual to the state

and the conflict between individual rights and national security. In this advocacy, the policy

science school also underscores the thesis that if legal philosophy is to succeed in providing

norms for the criticism or evaluation of the rules of positive law, whether national or

international, it must take into account the social values. In the instant case, the enactment

of the Agricultural Tenancy Law upholds the social value and human value against material

value remedied an existing evil because before the agricultural tenancy act provided for

security of these poor tenants, they were pushed out of the land by the landlords.

Case for Scandinavian Legal Realism

Primitivo Ansay et al, v.

The Board of Directors of the Natioanal Development et al.

G.R. No. L-13667 April 29, 1960

Paras, C. J.:

On July 25, 1956, appellants filed against appellees in the Court of First Instance of

Manila a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The

court a quo on appellees' motion to dismiss, issued the following order:

Considering the motion to dismiss filed on 15 August, 1956, set for this morning;

considering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there

was no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court waited for sometime for them;

considering, however, that petitioners have submitted an opposition which the court will

consider together with the arguments presented by respondents and the Exhibits marked

and presented, namely, Exhibits 1 to 5, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss; considering

that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a Christmas bonus for

petitioners workers in the National Development Company; considering that the Court

does not see how petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus because:

(a) A bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not within its judicial

powers to command respondents to be liberal;

(b) Petitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but

that they had only ask that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of

respondents to give that but as this Court understands, it has no power to compel a party to

comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.).

IN VIEW WHEREOF, dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

A motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied. Hence this appeal.

Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their

claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.

Since appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed

bonus; that the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they

discussed in their brief, this Court feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition

and meaning of natural obligation.

Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. "Civil

obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not being

based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to

enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the

retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof".

It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable

by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but

only after there has been voluntary performance. But here there has been no voluntary

performance. In fact, the court cannot order the performance.

At this point, we would like to reiterate what we said in the case of Philippine Education

Co. vs. CIR and the Union of Philippine Education Co., Employees (NUL) (92 Phil., 381; 48

Off. Gaz., 5278)

x x x x x x x x x

From the legal point of view a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It

is so when it is made a part of the wage or salary compensation.

And while it is true that the subsequent case of H. E. Heacock vs. National Labor Union,

et al., 95 Phil., 553; 50 Off. Gaz., 4253, we stated that:

Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or

compensation of an employee, the same may nevertheless, be granted on equitable

consideration as when it was given in the past, though withheld in succeeding two years

from low salaried employees due to salary increases.

still the facts in said Heacock case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence the

ruling applied in said case cannot be considered in the present action.

Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without

pronouncement as to costs.

Case Analysis for Scandinavian Legal Realism

The Scandinavian legal realists believe that legal ideology has no place in the

conception of the law and its component jural relations. Characterizing statutes as just or

unjust whether the evaluation is in terms of the natural law or the will of the supreme

political superior is meaningless. The reason behind is that the interpreter is only

expressing a personal preference or statement that he or she likes or dislikes a particular

statute or rule without any conscious reference to any known quality of the statute or rule.

They believe that the legal ordering of society is based on the feeling for justice prevalent

and current within the society. It is this feeling for societal good that gives substance and

meaning to the legal ordering of society. To them, the law is the means of regulating human

behavior based on the feeling for what is best for the social welfare. Therefore, its binding

force is no longer on the illusory idea of the consent of the governed.

For the Scandinavian legal realist, the conventional concepts of “right” and

“obligation” are verbal magic. It is pointed out that this is word magic for there can be

rights and obligations even without legal rules and sanctions. In the case cited, the Board of

Directors of the National Development Company, in performing the obligation of paying the

Christmas bonus, feels that in good conscience should comply with the undertaking which

is based on moral grounds.