legal ethics pat final (1)

8/20/2019 Legal Ethics Pat Final (1)

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PAGE 4 (Number 12 – 16)

SECOND PART

PEOPLE VS. TEOFILO TANEO (284 SCRA 251 [1998])

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117683. January 16, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEOFILO

TANEO, accused appellant .

E ! I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Teofilo Taneo was charged[1] and convicted of the crime rape and

accordingly sentenced by the Regional Trial Cort! Branch " of the Ceb City [#] to sffer

the penalty of death and to indemnify the offended woman! $encina Taneo! the amont

of % "&!&&&'&& as moral damages and the amont of % #"!&&&'&& as e(emplary

damages! as a deterrent to other fathers from se(ally molesting his own daghters)

and to pay the costs'[*] +n atomatic review! appellant assigns as errors the following,

I

T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N .2.N 50// CRE4ENCE T+ T-E

TE6T.$+N3 +5 T-E %R+6EC0T.+N 7.TNE66 $ENC.NA TANE+ 7-.C- .6

-.-/3 .NCRE4.B/E AN4 C+NTRA4.CT+R3'

II

T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N N+T A%%REC.AT.N .N E2.4ENCE T-

$E4.CA/ 5.N4.N6 +5 4RA' E$$A $ACAC-+R A6 C+N40CTE4 +N T-E

%ER6+N +N -ER %R.2ATE C+$%/A.NANT $ENC.NA TANE+ AN4 .N

.NC+RRECT/3 A4+%T.N .T6 +7N B.A6E4 .NTER%RETAT.+N +5 T-E

%-36.CA/ E2.4ENCE +N REC+R4 7-.C- C/EAR/3 .6 BE3+N4 .T6 A4804.CAT.2E %+7ER T+ 4+ 6+'

III

T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N N+T .2.N CRE4ENCE T+ T-E

4E5EN6E .NTER%+6E4 B3 T-E ACC06E49A%%E//ANT AN4 .N

0N5A2+RAB/3 %RE60$.N AA.N6T T-E ACC06E4 -.6 5A./0RE T+

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%RE6ENT A6 4E5EN6E97.TNE66 +NE /ET.C.A $AN0BAT T-06 6-.5T.N

T-E B0R4EN +5 %R++5 +N-T4E5EN6E 7-.C- .6 C+NTRAR3 T+ T-E

R0/E6 +5 %R+CE40RE'

I"

T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N C+N2.CT.N T-E ACC06E49

A%%E//ANT 4E6%.TE 5A./0RE +5 T-E %R+6EC0T.+N T+ %R+2E -.6

0./T BE3+N4 REA6+NAB/E 4+0BT'[:]

Aptly stated by the trial cort are the following fact with corresponding page

reference to the stenographic notes and e(hibits spplied by the +ffice of the 6olicitor

eneral which we have verified to be dly spported by the records,

+n $ay #*! 1;;:! $encina Taneo! a barrio lass! with physical virginity! was

with her parents and three


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$encina watched her sister and pt her to sleep on a hammoc' 7hen her

baby sister was already asleep! she also went to sleep as her wont after lnch

! supra='

6he noticed her cycling pants


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revealed to her ant! %aciencia Taneo who resides also in 6itio Bihang!

Borbon! Ceb! abot half a ilometer from the hose of Teofilo Taneo


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father becase the medical certificate issed after her e(amination did not

show that she was raped' That her father will be freed becase the doctor in

4anao eneral -ospital was paid by Engracio 0rot! brother9in9law of her

father


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Appellants argment is not persasive' -is assertion is a dismal attempt to distort

private complainants narration' 5or clarity! we Dote herender the material testimony of

private complainant spplying the portions which appellant omitted in his brief! ths,

C+0RT,


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F 3o stated that yor father was inserting his finger into yor vagina! will yo please tell the

cort! is it left or right finger

A Right hand

F 7hy! what happened to the left hand of yor father! what was he doing dring that time'G

A -e pinned me down with his left hand'

5.6CA/ BERC./E6,

F 7hen yo stated yo were pinned down by yor father! what happened ne(t

A After he inserted his finger! my father inserted his penis into my vagina'

C+0RT,

F 7as there penetration

A 3es! 3or -onor'

5.6CA/ BARC./E6,

F 7hat happened ne(t

A . tried to free myself in order that he will not scceed in his evil desire bt . was

overpowered by him'

F And becase yo were overpowered by yor father! what was yor initial reaction

A . was helpess


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F 7hat what


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A The pains'

F %ains where

A .n my vagina'

F And what did yo do when yo fell


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%rivate complainants frail physiDe is obviosly no match to appellants strong and

sperior physical bilt' Appellants pretension then that the prosection is dty bond to

show that he was sch an adroit prveyor of his sills at se(al intimidations to btress

his conviction loses force in the face of the physical ineDality between the concerned

parties'

$oreover! the force or violence necessary in rape is natrally a relative term!

depending not only on the age! sie and strength of the parties bt also on their relation

to each other '[;] And considering that the assailant is no less than private complainants

own father who wields parental inflence over her person! the crime ndobtedly was

consmmated with facility'[1&]The reason is that in a rape committed by a father against

his own daghter! the formers moral ascendancy over the latter sbstittes for violence

or intimidation'[11] Evidently! a woman of yong age lie the private complaint in the case

at bench! can only cower in fear and yield into sbmission' Appellants imptation of

implasibility! therefore! is more imagined than real'

Appellant stresses in his second assignment of error that 4ra' $acachor! the

attending physician who e(amined private complainant a day after the se(al assalt!

fond no fresh hemenal lacerations! contsion or trama on the other parts of [the

victims] organ'[1#] -e adds that the victims vaginal orifice still admits the forefinger which

is a normal state for women who have had no se(al e(perience' This is! therefore!

[appellant emphasies]! the e(act implication of the whole testimony of 4ra'

$acachor, N+ ABRA6.+N! N+ RA%E'[1*] At best the crime to which he shold have

been held liable! appellant sggests! is for certain acts of lasciviosness' [1:]

The contention lacs merit' The medical certificate issed by 4ra' $acachor reads

as follows,

6.R,

. have the honor to inform yo that $encina Taneo a medico9legal case has

been attended to in this hospital on $ay #:! 1;;: H #,:& %'$'

%ertinent 5inding, Body, No sign of violence) no abrasions! contsions or

hematoma noted on the breast! anterior chest! perinem! pper I lower

e(tremities' (((((((

/abia $aora, No laceration)

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/abia $inora, 6light redness noted in the posterior part of the labia minora)

(((((

5orchette, 6lightly distended) ((((((

-ymen, .ntact! no laceration or abrasion noted) (((((

2aginal +rifice admits forefinger) ((((((

2aginal smear, Negative (((((

((( ((( (((

2ery respectflly yors!

Chief of -ospital

By,


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the vaginal rgosities! to determine whether there was previos se(al

contact' The medical e(aminer did not even care to as for the clothings worn

by $encina Taneo at the time of the incident for laboratory e(amination! or at

least for visal e(amination for signs of strggle' [1?]

.t is nfortnate that cosel for appellant has made hasty accsation against the

trial cort for the above prononcement as taing a partial and biased position [1@] and

having adopted its own biased interpretation of the physical evidence' [1>] 7e do not find

any cogent and valid grond in the records of this case which cold stify sch a grave

imptation pon a member of the bench who merely performed his fnction and

e(pressed his observation on the condct of the e(amination' Consel shold be

reminded of his dty to observe and maintain the respect de the corts of stice and

dicial officers'[1;] Argments! written or oral! shold be gracios to both the cort and

opposing consel and be of sch words as may be properly addressed by one

gentleman to another'[#&]

Another serios reason why the medical e(amination yielded negative reslt is the

nrebtted testimony of the private complainant' Ths,

F, 7hom did yo see in yor residence

A, $y mother Elisa Taneo and my yonger sisters'

F, 7hat! if any! did Elisa tell yo at that precise moment when yo visited yor mother

A, $y mother reDested me to st pardon my father becase he cannot be imprisoned

becase in the medical certificate there is no showing that . was raped'

F, 7hat else did yor mother tell yo after she informed yo that there is nothing in the

medical certificate regarding the


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A, /eonila 0rot'[#1]

7ith the trial corts formidable observation and the victims nrebtted testimony!

appellants reliance with the medical certificate! as well as the testimony of the doctor!

assmes no significance'

.n any event! appellants argment proceeds from a misconception that a medical

certificate is an indespensible element in the prosection for rape and rns roghshod

over the well9settled rle that the absence of medical findings by a medico9legal officer

does no disprove the occrrence of rape' [##] The fact that the medical certificate show no

e(ternal signs of physical inries and spermatooa on the victim does not negate the

commission of rape[#*] for the slightness penetration of the labia consmmates the

offense'[#:] The medical e(amination of the victim! as well as the medical certificate! is

merely corroborative in character' 7hat is important is that the testimony of private

complainant abot the incident is clear! neDivocal and credible' 7hen a woman

testifie that she has been raped! she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has

been committed'[#"] +n this score! the trial cort declared,

The Cort sbected the testimony of the offended girl with painstaing

scrtiny! which was given in a straight9forward manner! and fond it

nimpaired by material discrepancies and contradictions and consistent with

ordinary hman e(perience' -er testimony ndobtedly bears the imprint of

trth and! therefore! mst be accepted'[#?]

5rthermore! private complainants firm resolve! Dicness and spontaneity in

devising a way to flee immediately after the day she was violated from the appellants

cltches and in tearflly confiding her harrowing ordeal to her ant spea well of the

natral reaction of a virtos and an aggrieved woman' /iewise! when she was given a

choice whether to e(clde the pblic dring her trial! private complainant

appeared resolte in testifying before an open cort' -er condct simply shows the

fervent drive to place before the bar of stice her rthless assailant' +r risprdential

annals! in this connection! reveal that no woman! especially of tender age! as in this

case! wold concoct a story of defloration! allow an e(amination of her private parts!

and thereafter pervert herself by being sbected to a pblic trial if she was notmotivated solely by the desire to have the clprit apprehended and pnished' [#@] 2erily!

lie the trial cort we find no valid reason to dobt private complainants testimony which

bears the earmars of trth' Besides! this Cort accords de deference to the trial

corts views on who shold be given credence! since the latter is in a better position to

assess the credibility of witnesses considering its opportnity to observe their

demeanor! as well as their deportment and manner of testifying dring trial' [#>] To be

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sre! this rle is sbect to some well definced e(ceptions [#;] none of which! however! is

attendant in this case'

Appellant claims in his third assessment of error that the trial cort erred in not

giving credence to his defenses of alibi and denial' Apart from this general averment!

however! appellant did not elaborate why his defense shold be accepted' Appellant

thereafter trails his attac on the alleged erroneos shifting of the brden of proof from

the prosection to the defense'Ths,

/astly! it is beyond cavil that the prosection has the onus probandi in

establishing the gilt of the accsed and the weaness of the defense does

not relieve it of this responsibility'


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$encina categorically candidly! and withot hesitation! positively identified his

father as the perpetrator of the crime'

The assertion of the accsed that $encian falsely charged him of the crime

becase he disallowed his daghter to wor as hosehelper! is! to say theleast! absrd'

.t is nthinable and nbelievable for $encina to e(pose herself to

embarrassment by telling very intimate matters dring a pblic trial and to

destroy the ftre of the whole family! st to spite and get even with her father

for a trivial reason' Besides! only a daghter who may have lost her senses

wold dare charge falsely her own father of committing a heinos crime of

rape' %erhaps against a stranger'

A woman does not go arond flanting her having been raped' There is no

evidence presented to show that $encina is so desperate and base that she

wold sacrifice her honor and that of her father st to satisfy a personal rge

for a petty vengeance'

((( ((( (((

The denial of the accsed cannot prevail over the positive straight forward and

candid testimony of the offended daghter' The categorical declarations of$encina on the details of the crime are more credible than the denial

interposed by the accsed'

6imilarly! appellants alibi that he was at the store one ilometer away from their

hose when the incident transpired cannot be taen seriosly' The short distance and

brief travel time between the store and appellants hose did not foreclose the

commission of the felony' .t is a cardinal rle that for alibi to prosper! the accsed mst

prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and it was physically

impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime' [*#] 6o too! alibi cannot prevail

over positive identification of the accsed by the prosection witness' [**] .n this regard!

we Dote with approval the conclsions reached by the trial cort in reecting appellants

alibi' Ths,

The alibi of the accsed has to be reected' Accsed was positively identified

by his victim' .t has been repeatedly held! to the point of being trite! that alibi

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cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accsed' Besides! the alibi

appears dbios having been corroborated only by his wife! who testified that

her hsband! accsed herein! accompanied her to the store to get the sac of

corn grits bt who contradicted herself when on cross9e(amination! she

admitted that her hsband did not accompany her bt st followed her later tothe store) ths! corroborating instead the testimony of her daghter that

accsed followed her mother to the store after raping her'[*:]

The residal contention that the trial cort sbstantially dedced an nfavorable

presmption against the accsed9appellant for his spposed failre to present $s'

$angbat as a defense witness [*"] thereby shifting the brden of proof on the

defense[*?] is nworthy of serios consideration' Apparently! appellant based his

observation from the following passage in the trial corts decision,

No reason is given by the accsed that /etecia $angbat! the owner of the

store! is not available as witness to prove his alibi' 6aid spposed

ninterested witness had not been presented to testify for the accsed' As

nfavorable presmption may be dedced from the accseds failre to

present her'[*@]

6aid paragraph is neither obectionable nor contrary to the rles on criminal

procedre and evidence'[*>] The non9prodction of a corroborative witness! withot any

e(planation given why he was not so prodced! weaens the testimony of the witness

who named that corroborating witness in his testimony' [*;] Ths! appellants notion that

the brden of proof has been shifted on the defense is misplaced' 7hat the trial cort

did is to merely e(press a valid observation why appellants alibi! a wea defense!

became manifestly inferior vis99vis the evidence for the prosection' At any rate! the

basis of conviction is not the non9prodction of $rs' $angbat bt private complainants

credible and categorical testimony'

5inally! e(tant in the records is the testimony of appellants wife to the effect that,

F, .n fact on $ay #*! 1;;: st one word from yor hsband to go to the store made yo

afraid of yor hsband! is that correct

A, 7hen . proceeded to the store . was accompanied by my hsband'

F, 4oes it mean yo went ahead to the store

A, 3es! . went ahead with my hsband and after my arrival my hsband arrived also'

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F, 7hen for the first time did yo now that yo are going to testify


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forgive means to absolve! to pardon! to cease! to feel resentment against on

accont of wrong committed) give p claim to reDital from or retribtion pon

#! 11? 6CRA

1;*='[:1]

7e see no plasible reason why the foregoing principle may not be applied in the

case at bench'

%rescinding from the foregoing discssion! appellants last assignment of error has

to be brshed aside as it has no leg to stand on'

7e now come to the imposable penalty for the crime committed' 0nder Article **"of the Revised %enal Code! as amended by Repblic Act No' @?";! death penalty shall

be imposed if the crime of rape is committed where the victim is nder eighteen =

years of age and the offender is a parent! ascendant! step9parent! gardian! relative by

consanginity or affinity within the third civil degree! or the common law spose of the

parent of the victim'[:#] The imposition of the death penalty in sch instance is mandatory'[:*] .n the case at bench! the victim at the commission of the offense on $ay #*! 1;;:!

was e(actly seventeen


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DIGEST:


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URBINA VS. MACERAN (5 SCRA 4!" [194])

Repblic of the %hilippines

S$PRE%E !O$RT$anila

EN BANC

A.!. No. &88'J 8ne 1;! 1;@:

GA$EN!IO S. $R(INA an) "EASTO (. GES%$NO! omplainants!

vs'

J$GE %A*I%O A. %A!EREN! respondent '

R E S O L $ T I O N

!""#$NK"", J%

After the CortJs resoltion of 5ebrary ?! 1;@: dismissing the complaint Kfor failre to mae

ot a prima facie case withot predice to respondentJs filing a separate administrativecomplaint for nwarranted harassment against complainant Atty' 2edasto B' esmndo as

soght in respondentJs comment!L there were belatedly reported to the Cort


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fiscal correctly rled that K


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to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it wold have been e(tremely foolhardy

and pointless for respondent to have ased Atty' Esgerra to mae the alleged threats

against complainant' The Cort finds respondentJs comment to be satisfactory and will not

sbect respondent to frther needless harassment and distraction if it were to give de

corse to the complaint9motion! as insisted by complainant in his reply to comment'

.t is appropriate to enoin complainants and members of the bar who file administrative

complaints against dges of inferior corts that they shold do so after proper

circmspection and withot the se of disrespectfl langage and offensive personalities!

so as not to ndly brden the Cort in the discharge of its fnction of administrative

spervision over inferior cort dges and cort personnel' The Cort has meted the

corresponding disciplinary measres against erring dges! inclding dismissal and

sspension where warranted! and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the

tas' Bt lawyers shold also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the corts as well as to

their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgrntled litigants of nfonded or frivolos

charges against inferior cort dges and the se of offensive and intemperate langage as

a means of harassing dges whose decisions have not been to their liing


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DIGEST

*+ CR$ -/ 0 1egal "t2is 0 1a34er o3es 5idelit4 to t2e ourts

Atty' 0rbina and one Atty' 2edasto esmndo lost a case filed in the sala of 8dge

$aceren' The two lawyers then filed a criminal case against $aceren for nowingly

rendering an nst dgment' The fiscal dismissed the case as he deemed the action to be

inappropriate considering that the dgment issed by $aceren at that time was pending

appeal' Allegedly however! prior to dismissal by the fiscal! 0rbina received a phone call from

another lawyer


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CASTANEDA VS. AGO (#5 SCRA 5!5 [195])

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-28546. July 30, 1975.

V!N"N#IO #"ST"$!D" %&' NI#!T"S (!NSON, Petitioners, ). *"STOR D. "GO, LO+RD!S + "GO%&' T(! #O+RT OF "**!"LS, Respondents.

u/%&o "oyo, o Petitioners.

Jo . Luo& o Respondents.

SNO*SIS

In a decision of the Supreme Court affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a replevincase, Pastor Ago was ordered to deliver personal properties or pay sums of money to the plaintiffs therein.he case was conse!uently remanded to the trial court for e"ecution, levy was made on Ago#s house and

lots, and auction was scheduled. Ago moved to stop the sale, failing in which he filed a petitionfor certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed it. his dismissal was affirmed $y the Supreme

Court. %fforts to o$tain a writ of preliminary injunction having failed, the sheriff sold the house and lots and

awarded them to herein petitioners as highest $idders. As Ago failed to redeem, a final deed of sale wase"ecuted in favor of the vendee in whose favor the Court of First Instance of Manila issued writ of possession

to the properties.

Su$se!uently, Ago, joined $y his wife, filed with the Court of First Instance of &ue'on City, an action toannul the sheriff#s sale on the ground that the o$ligation upon which judgment had $een rendered against

Ago was his personal o$ligation that could not legally affect his wife#s half(share in their conjugal house andlots levied upon and sold for the satisfaction of the judgment. he &ue'on City court issued an e" parte writ

of preliminary injunction restraining the registration of the final deeds of sale and the carrying out of anywrit of possession. For a couple of times this was lifted and then restored, $efore the said court finally liftedthe restraining order. )hile these processes were $eing pursued, Ago filed with the Supreme Court a petitionfor certiorari and prohi$ition praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcingthe writ of possession. he same was dismissed for lac* of merit and so with a similar petition in the Courtof Appeals. he dismissal $y the Court of Appeals was the su$ject of another petition in the Supreme Court

which was li*ewise dismissed.

Finally, the spouses succeeded in having another petition of the same nature given due course $y the Courtof Appeals which granted, and later made permanent, the preliminary injunction from enforcement of the

writ of possession on and ejectment from the one(half share in the properties involved $elonging to the wife.his decision of the Court of Appeals is the su$ject of the instant petition.

he Supreme Court ruled that an injunction cannot $e availed of to protect a wife#s half(share in theconjugal properties for her share is merely an inchoate interest, not a right in esse. It li*ewise condemned

respondents and their counsel#s misuse of legal remedies and maneuver of tactics for fourteen years toresist satisfaction of judgment. It motu proprio e"amined the records of Civil Case &(+- /the mother case

of the present action0 and found that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemented andamended, are all untena$le.

1udgment of the Court of Appeals reversed2 the civil case, in which Ago was joined $y his wife ordereddismissed without prejudice to the re(filing of petitioner#s counterclaim in a new and independent action2

tre$le costs against respondents to $e paid $y their lawyer.

SLL"+S

3. C456S2 467%6S2 I8%6F%6%8C% )I9 467%6S 4F A C4(%&5A: C456 84 A::4)%72 74C6I8%I8APP:ICA;:% I8 CAS% A ;A6. < he CFI of Manila, in Civil Case 8o. =+=>3, issued a writ of possession to

the properties sold to enforce a writ of e"ecution. he CFI of &ue'on City, in Civil Case &(+-,countermanded this order $y issuing an e" parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the registration of


25/58

the final deeds of sale and carrying out of any writ of possession. Su$se!uently, the latter court lifted thepreliminary injunction it had previously issued. he Court of Appeals, in another petition for certiorari and

prohi$ition with preliminary injunction /CA ?6(@@-(60 granted preliminary injunction against theenforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one(half share in the properties involved.9%:7B he doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co(e!ual court cannot apply in the

case at $ar. he CFI of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with $y itsco(e!ual court, the CFI of &ue'on City, as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued

against the enforcement of the Manila court#s writ of possession. It is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, inpart, the enforcement of the writ.

=. 157?M%8S2 %%C5I482 ISS5A8C% 4F )6I 4F P4SS%SSI482 6I?9S 4F 9I67 PA6I%S, %FF%C265:I8? I8 9% CAS% 4F 4M8AS v. 6ID%6A. < he ruling in the case of 4mnas v. 6ivera, + Phil. 3, isnot that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, $ut

that the writ of possession $eing a complement of the writ of e"ecution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue thelatter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval $etween the judicial sale and the

issuance of a writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. his rulingis inapplica$le to the present case for here, there has $een no change in the ownership of the properties or

any interest therein from the time the writ of e"ecution was issued up to the time the writ of possession wasissued, and even up to the present.

@. I7.2 I7.2 :%DE 48 P64P%6E 4F 157?M%8 7%;462 C:AIM F46 %C:5SI48 F64M :%DE 4F SP45S%#SC4815?A: S9A6% ;A66%7 ;E :AC9%S. < It is much too late in the day for the respondents to raise the

!uestion that part of the property is unlevia$le $ecause it $elongs to the wife who was not a party to herhus$and#s $usiness venture which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not $enefit the

conjugal partnership, considering that /30 a wife is normally privy to her hus$and#s activities2 /=0 the levywas made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 332 /@0 she lives in the very properties in

!uestion2 /0 her hus$and had moved to stop the auction sale2 />0 the properties were sold at auction in3@2 /0 her hus$and had thrice attempted to o$tain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from

enforcing the writ of e"ecution2 /+0 the sheriff e"ecuted the deed of final sale on April 3+, 3, when PastorAgo failed to redeem2 /-0 the hus$and had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could $e leviedupon $y his pleas to save his family house and lot in his efforts to prevent e"ecution and2 /0 it was onlyon May =, 3 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff#s sale upon the issuethat the wife#s share in the properties cannot $e levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the

logging $usiness and not a party to the replevin suit. he spouses had every opportunity to raise the issue inthe various proceedings $ut did not2 laches now effectively $ars them from raising it.

. I7.2 I7.2 I7.2 )IF%#S 9A:F(S9A6% I8 9% P64P%6E :%DI%7 A M%6% %P%CA8CE2 I8158CI48 84

ADAI:A;:% 4 P64%C A 6I?9 84 I8 %SS%. < he Court of Appeals decision enjoined the enforcementof the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one(half share in the properties involved $elonging tothe wife of the judgment de$tor. 9%:7B hat half(share is not in esse, $ut is merely an inchoate interest, amere e"pectancy, constituting neither legal nor e!uita$le estate, and will ripen into title only when uponli!uidation and settlement there appears to $e assets of the community. he decision sets at naught thewell(settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.

>. I7.2 I7.2 I7.2 MIS5S% 4F :%?A: 6%M%7I%S 4 9)A6 SAISFACI48 4F 157?M%8, C487%M8A;:%.< he attitude of respondents and their counsel of maneuvering for fourteen years to doggedly resiste"ecution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another is to $e condemned

$ecause far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who see* justice, they tried to use them to su$vertthe very ends of justice.

. A468%ES2 C4875C2 :A)E%6#S I8SIS%8C% 7%SPI% PA%8 F5I:IE 4F 9IS C:I%8#S P4SII48,A 7IS6%?A67 4F 9IS MISSI48 AS A8 4FFIC%6 4F 9% C456. < )here counsel has allowed himself to

$ecome an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and aconciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true e"ponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, he has forgotten his sacred mission as a sworn pu$lic servant and his

e"alted position as an officer of the court.

D ! # I S I O N

#"STRO, J.


26/58

he parties in this case, e"cept :ourdes Eu Ago, have $een commuting to this Court for more than a decade.

In 3>> the petitioners Denancio CastaGeda and 8icetas 9enson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago inthe Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries /civil case =+=>30. In 3>+ judgmentwas rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of

money. Ago appealed, and on 1une @H, 33 this Court, in Ago v. CastaGeda, :(3H, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August =>, 33 a writ of e"ecution for the sum ofP3+=,[email protected]+. Ago moved for a stay of e"ecution $ut his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago#shouse and lots located in &ue'on City. he sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on 4cto$er =>,33. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court ofAppeals. he appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. 4n 1anuary @3, 3 this Court, inAgo v. Court of Appeals, %t Al., :(3+3-, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to o$tain a writ ofpreliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of e"ecution to save his family houseand lot2 his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March , 3@ to the highest$idders, the petitioners CastaGeda and 9enson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 3+, 3 the sheriffe"ecuted the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees CastaGeda and 9enson. 5pon their petition, the Courtof First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.

9owever, on May =, 3 Pastor Ago, now joined $y his wife, :ourdes Eu Ago, as his co(plaintiff, filed acomplaint in the Court of First Instance of &ue'on City /civil case &(+-0 to annul the sheriff#s sale on the

ground that the o$ligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suitwas his personal o$ligation, and that :ourdes Eu Ago#s one(half share in their conjugal residential house andlots which were levied upon and sold $y the sheriff could not legally $e reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. hey alleged in their complaint that wife :ourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of e"ecution was issued only against hus$and Pastor, and that wife:ourdes was not a party to her hus$and#s venture in the logging $usiness which failed and resulted in thereplevin suit and which did not $enefit the conjugal partnership.

he Court of First Instance of &ue'on City issued an e" parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining thepetitioners, the 6egister of 7eeds and the sheriff of &ue'on City, from registering the latter#s final deed ofsale, from cancelling the respondents# certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners are fromcarrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to $edone, the &ue'on City court countermanded. 4n 8ovem$er 3, 3>, however, the latter court lifted thepreliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the 6egister of 7eeds of &ue'on City cancelled therespondents# certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. ;ut enforcement of the writof possession was again thwarted as the &ue'on City court again issued a temporary restraining order whichit later lifted $ut then re(restored. 4n May @, 3+ the court finally, and for the third time, lifted therestraining order.

)hile the $attle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was $eing fought in the&ue'on City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohi$ition with this Court under date of May=, 3, doc*eted as :(=33, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff fromenforcing the writ of possession. his Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minuteresolution on 1une @, 32 reconsideration was denied on 1uly 3-, 3. he respondents then filed onAugust =, 3 a similar petition for certiorari and prohi$ition with the Court of Appeals /CA(?.6. @+-@H(60,praying for the same preliminary injunction. he Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. herespondents then appealed to this Court /:(=+3H0. )e dismissed the petition in a minute resolution onFe$ruary -, 3+.

he Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petitionforcertiorari and prohi$ition with preliminary injunction /CA(?.6. @@-(60. he said court gave due courseto the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portionof which readsB jgcBchanro$les.com.ph

)9%6%F46%, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession and ejectment fromthe one(half share in the properties involved $elonging to :ourdes Eu Ago dated 1une 3>, 3+ is madepermanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case 8o. &(+- and ordering respondent Court toproceed with the trial of Civil Case 8o. &(+- on the merits without unnecessary delay. 8o pronouncementas to costs.cralawvirtua3awli$rary


27/58

Failing to o$tain reconsideration, the petitioners CastaGeda and 9enson filed the present petition for reviewof the aforesaid decision.

3. )e do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co(e!ual court canapply in the case at $ar. he Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimatelywas not interfered with $y its co(e!ual court, the Court of First Instance of &ue'on City as the latter liftedthe restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court#s writ of

possession2 it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.

=. Invo*ing Comilang v. ;uendia, %t Al., 3 where the wife was a party in one case and the hus$and was aparty in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have :ourdesEu Ago similarly $ound $y the replevin judgment against her hus$and for which their conjugal propertieswould $e answera$le. he case invo*ed is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions wereadmittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses2 in the present case, the Agosdeny that their conjugal partnership $enefited from the hus$and#s $usiness venture.

@. 6elying upon 4mnas v. 6ivera, + Phil. 3, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may notissue until the claim of a third person to half(interest in the property is adversely determined, the saidappellate court assuming that :ourdes Eu Ago was a stranger or a third(party to her hus$and. heassumption is of course o$viously wrong, for, $esides living with her hus$and Pastor, she does not claimignorance of his $usiness that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got em$roiled, and of the auction salemade $y. the sheriff of their conjugal properties. %ven then, the ruling in 4mnas is not that a writ of

possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, $ut that the writ ofpossession $eing a complement of the writ of e"ecution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval $etween the judicial sale and the issuance of the writof possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. he ruling in 4mnas is clearlyinapplica$le in the present case, for, here, there has $een no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of e"ecution was issued up to the time writ of possession wasissued, and even up to the present.

. )e agree with the trial court /then presided $y 1udge :ourdes P. San 7iego0 that it is much too late in theday for the respondents Agos to raise the !uestion that part of the property is unlevia$le $ecause it $elongsto :ourdes Eu Ago, considering that /30 a wife is normally privy to her hus$and#s activities2 /=0 the levy wasmade and the properties advertised for auction sale in 332 /@0 she lives in the very properties in !uestion2/0 her hus$and had moved to stop the auction sale2 />0 the properties were sold at auction in 3@2 /0her hus$and had thrice attempted to o$tain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcingthe writ of e"ecution2 /+0 the sheriff e"ecuted the deed of final sale on April 3+, 3 when Pastor failed to

redeem2 /-0 Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could $e levied upon $y his pleas tosave his family house and lot in his efforts to prevent e"ecution2 and /0 it was only on May =, 3 whenhe and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff#s sale upon the issue that the wife#s share inthe properties cannot $e levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging $usiness and nota party to the replevin suit. he spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the variousproceedings herein$efore discussed $ut did not2 laches now effectively $ars them from raising it.

:aches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasona$le and une"plained length of time, to dothat which, $y e"ercising due diligence, could or should have $een done earlier2 it is negligence or omissionto assert a right within a reasona$le time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it eitherhas a$andoned it or declined to assert it. =

>. he decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

/a0 It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one(half share in theproperties involved $elonging to :ourdes Eu Ago. his half(share is not in esse, $ut is merely an inchoateinterest, a mere e"pectancy, constituting neither legal nor e!uita$le estate, and will ripen into title whenonly upon li!uidation and settlement there appears to $e assets of the community. @ he decision sets atnaught the well(settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may neverarise.

/$0 he decision did not foresee the a$surdity, or even the impossi$ility, of its enforcement. he Ago spousesadmittedly live together in the same house > which is conjugal property. ;y the Manila court#s writ ofpossession Pastor could $e ousted from the house, $ut the decision under review would prevent theejectment of :ourdes. 8ow, which part of the house would $e vacated $y Pastor and which part would


28/58

:ourdes continue to stay in he a$surdity does not stop here2 the decision would actually separate hus$andand wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during covertureand $efore the dissolution of the conjugal union.

. 7espite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff#s sale /civil case&(+-0, elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in thereplevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, a$etted $y their lawyer 1ose M. :uison, have

misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to thee"tended prejudice of the petitioners. he respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered forfourteen /30 years to doggedly resist e"ecution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one courtto another /> times in the Supreme Court0.

)e condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who see* justice, have tried to use them to su$vert thevery ends of justice.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn pu$lic servant and his e"alted position as an officer of the court,Atty. :uison has allowed himself to $ecome an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead ofa mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigationinstead of a true e"ponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.

A counsel#s assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client#s cause must $e encouraged andis to $e commended2 what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer#s insistence despite the patentfutility of his client#s position, as in the case at $ar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law,on the merit or lac* of merit of his case. If he finds that his client#s cause is defenseless, then it is his$ounden duty to advise the latter to ac!uiesce and su$mit, rather than traverse the incontroverti$le. Alawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client#s propensity to litigate. Alawyer#s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client2 its primacy is indisputa$le.+

+. In view of the private respondents# propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to see* justice,and in order to o$viate further delay in the disposition of the case $elow which might again come up to theappellate courts $ut only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio e"amined the record of civil case &(+-/the mother case of the present case0. )e find that

/a0 the complaint was filed on May =, 3 /more than 33 years ago0 $ut trial on the merits has not evenstarted2

/$0 after the defendants Castanedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed asupplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties(defendants2

/c0 after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amendedsupplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party(defendant /no action has yet $een ta*enon this motion02

/d0 the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint2 and

/e0 the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April =H, 3+, grants an e"tension to the suspensionof time to file answer.

/%"pediente, p. -3>0

)e also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amendedsupplemental complaint are all untena$le, for the reasons hereunder stated.

he Complaint

5pon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spousesAgo despite the fact that the judgment to $e satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the $usiness


29/58

venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the $enefit of theconjugal partnership. he issue here, which is whether or not the wife#s inchoate share in the conjugalproperty is levia$le, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as $arred $y laches, in stri*ing downthe decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which washerein($efore !uoted. his ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.

5pon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on 1anuary >, 3> the CastaGedas and the sheriff,

pursuant to an alias writ of sei'ure, sei'ed and too* possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P=>,HHH up to May >, 3. his second cause of action failsto state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of sei'ure is invalid or illegal.

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff#s sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegaland unlawful $ecause the sheriff did not re!uire the CastaGeda spouses to pay or li!uidate the sum ofP33,+>H /the amount for which they $ought the properties at the auction sale0 despite the fact that therewas annotated at the $ac* of the certificates of title a mortgage of P+>,HHH in favor of the Philippine8ational ;an*2 moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P33,+>H despite the pendency of :(3+3-where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P,-++.H- out of the judgment value of P3+=,=@.@+ in civilcase =+=>32 and $ecause of said acts, the Agos suffered P3+,-++.H- in damages.

Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no o$ligation to re!uire payment of the purchase pricein the auction sale $ecause when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third(party claim has $eenfiled, he need not pay the amount of the $id if it does not e"ceed the amount of his judgment. /Sec. =@,

6ule @, 6ules of Court0

he annotated mortgage in favor of the P8; is the concern of the vendees CastaGedas $ut did not affect thesheriff#s sale2 the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agos.

Case :(3+3- where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P,-++.H- out of the amount of the judgment wasdismissed $y this Court on 1anuary @3, 3.

his third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover $arred $y prior judgment.

he fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered $y the Agos on account of the actscomplained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from thepreceding causes of action, which, as shown, are $aseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarilyfail.

he Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the CastaGedas aver that the action was unfounded and as aconse!uence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P+,>HH2 that$ecause the Agos o$tained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of theproperties to the CastaGedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 3+,3, the value of such deprived use $eing =HJ annually of their actual value2 and that the filing of theunfounded action $esmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.

he Supplemental Complaint

5pon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, ta*ingadvantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross $ad faith and evidentintent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff#s final deed of sale2 that, tocause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in !uestion2that the purchasers ac!uired the properties in $ad faith2 that the defendants mortgaged the two otherparcels to the 6i'al Commercial ;an*ing Corporation while the defendants# lawyer and his wife alsomortgaged the parcels $ought $y them to the 6i'al Commercial ;an*2 and that the $an* also acted in $adfaith.

he second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused $y the defendants# $adfaith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

he Amended Supplemental Complaint


30/58


31/58


32/58

4n May =@, 3@, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or

associate of respondent 1udge when the latter was still in the

practice of law $efore his appointment to the $ench, entered his

appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro ;ravo, vice

Attorney Antonio 6esngit. 4n 1une 3, 3@, the defendant, throughAtty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas $ond to stay the e"ecution of the

judgment, and on 1une =H, 3@ respondent 1udge granted the stay

of e"ecution, over the o$jection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff

to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the

defendant. he petitioner li*ewise had as*ed for the appointment of

a receiver over the parcel of land located at ;ayam$ang, which

prayer was granted $y respondent 1udge on 1uly -, 3@2 $ut upon

the filing of a $ond $y the defendant for the non(appointment of areceiver, the order receivership was set aside. 4n August =, 3@,

pending the approval of the defendantLs amended record on appeal,

Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment

and, over the vigorous o$jection of plaintiffs, the respondent 1udge

granted the said motion on 8ovem$er +, 3@. he hearing on the

retrial was finally set for Fe$ruary 3H, 3.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

;efore the opening of the courtLs session in the morning of Fe$ruary3H, 3, Atty. 7aniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co(

plaintiffs, saw respondent 1udge in his cham$er and ver$ally

transmitted to him the re!uest of petitioner that he /the 1udge0

inhi$it himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that

the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Si*at, was his

former associate. he respondent 1udge, however, rejected the

re!uest $ecause, according to him, the reason for the re!uest of his

inhi$ition is not one of the grounds for dis!ualification of a judgeprovided for in the 6ules of Court. hereafter, when the case was

called for hearing in open court, the following transpired, as shown

$y the transcript of the stenographic notes ta*en during said

hearingB2

APP%A6A8C%B chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary


33/58

AE. 7A8I%: C. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

appeared in $ehalf of plaintiffs. /After the case was called0 chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

Eour client is here chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

Ees, Eour 9onor.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary


)here is hechanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary


9e is here, Eour 9onor.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


)hat is your name chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

P:AI8IFFB chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

7omingo Austria, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary


Eou are one of the plaintiffs in this casechanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

74MI8?4 A5S6IABchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

Ees, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary



34/58

Atty. Macaraeg approached me in cham$ers re!uesting me to

dis!ualify myself in hearing this case. 7id you authori'e Atty.

Macaraeg to approach me ver$ally to dis!ualify myself from hearing

this case $ecause the lawyer of the other party was my former

assistantchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

74MI8?4 A5S6IAB chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary



Is that your reason why you re!uested Atty. Macaraeg to approach

me, re!uesting me to dis!ualify myself simply $ecause the lawyer of the other party was my assistant chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary




All right. 7o you dou$t the integrity of the presiding 1udge to decidethis case fairly and impartially $ecause the lawyer of the other party

was my former assistant 7o you dou$t 1ust answer the !uestion chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary




he Court here$y finds you guilty of contempt of Court and you are

here$y ordered to pay a fine of P>H.HH. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary



35/58

)ith due indulgence of this 9onora$le Court ( I have learned, after I

have conferred with you in cham$ers, another ground of the

plaintiffs for their re!uesting me to as* for the dis!ualification of

Eour 9onor in this case, and this ground consists of the rampant

rumor coming from the defendant Pedro ;ravo himself that he is$oasting in San Carlos that $ecause he has a new lawyer, that

surely he is going to win this case. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


)hy did you not wait until the case is finally decided and find out if

that is true or not chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary


And may$e, that is why the plaintiffs re!uested me to approach

Eour 9onor $ecause of that rampant rumor that Pedro ;ravo is

spreading.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


Eou mean to say $ecause of that rumor, you are going to dou$t my

integritychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


As for me, I entertain no dou$t, Eour 9onor.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


Eour client e"pressed openly in Court his dou$ts on the integrity of

the Court simply $ased on rumors and that is a ground for contempt

of court, if only to maintain the faith of the people in the courts. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary



36/58

a*ing into consideration that these plaintiffs are laymen and we

cannot e"pect from them the thin*ing of a lawyer, I am most

respectfully praying that the 4rder of this Court $e reconsidered.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


7enied. Eour client should pay a fine of P>H.HH. )e will hear this

case this afternoon. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary


Ees, Eour 9onor.

he respondent 1udge forthwith dictated the following orderB3

;efore this Court opened its sessions this morning, Atty. 7aniel C.

Macaraeg, counsel for the plaintiffs, approached the presiding 1udge

of this Court in his cham$ers and manifested the desire of his

clients for the 1udge to dis!ualify himself from trying the a$ove(

entitled case for the reason that counsel for the defendant, Atty.

Marciano C. Sicat was formerly an associate of the 1udge of this

Court while he was still engaged in the practice of law. o this

manifestation of Atty. Macaraeg, the Presiding 1udge informed the

latter that such fact alone does not in itself constitute a legal ground

to dis!ualify the Presiding 1udge of this Court, from trying this

case.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

)hen the a$ove(entitled case was called for hearing, the Presiding

1udge called on one of the plaintiffs who was present, namely,

7omingo Austria, and in!uired from the latter if it was true that he

as*ed his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the 1udge in cham$ersand to as* him to dis!ualify himself from trying this case $ecause

defendantLs lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the said

1udge. o this !uery 7omingo Austria answered in the affirmative.

)hen he was also as*ed as to whether the said 7omingo Austria

has lost faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the Presiding


37/58


38/58

?iven in open Court this 3Hth day of Fe$ruary, 3, at :ingayen,

Pangasinan.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

Petitioner 7omingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P>H.HH

under protest. 9aving $een punished summarily for direct contemptof court, and the remedy of appeal not $eing availa$le to him,

petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari $efore this Court. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

It is the position of the petitioner that under the facts and

circumstances attendant to the hearing of the Civil Case 8o. 3@=>H

on Fe$ruary 3H, 3H@, he had not committed an act of contempt

against the court and the respondent 1udge had acted in e"cess of

his jurisdiction with grave a$use of discretion when he declared

petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him the fine

of P>H.HH as a penalty.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

After a careful study of the record, )e find merit in this petition. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

he respondent 1udge declared the petitioner in direct contempt of

court. 4ur tas*, therefore, is to determine whether or not the

petitioner was guilty of mis$ehavior in the presence of or so near a

court or judge, as to o$struct or interrupt the proceedings $eforethe same, or had committed an act of disrespect toward the court or

judge.4chanro$les virtual lawli$rary

he respondent 1udge considered the actuation of the petitioner, in

the premises, as offensive, insulting, and a reflection on his integrity

and honesty and a showing of lac* of respect to the court. he

respondent 1udge considered that the petitioner was not justified

and had no reason to entertain dou$ts in his fairness and integrity

simply $ecause the defendantLs counsel was his former associate. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

)e do not agree with the respondent 1udge. It is our considered

view that when the petitioner re!uested respondent 1udge to inhi$it

himself from further trying the case upon the ground that the

counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the


39/58

respondent 1udge, petitioner did so $ecause he was impelled $y a

justifia$le apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant

who sees what seems to $e an advantage on the part of his

adversary2 and that the petitioner made his re!uest in a manner

that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to therespondent 1udge or to the court. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

)e are in accord with the statement of respondent 1udge in his

memorandum that the circumstance invo*ed $y petitioner in as*ing

him to inhi$it himself from further trying the case ( that Atty. Sicat

was his former associate in his practice of law ( is not one of the

grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 3, 6ule 3@+ of

the new 6ules of Court for dis!ualifying a judge. )hile it is true thatrespondent 1udge may not $e compelled to dis!ualify himself, the

fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel

for a party in the case $eing tried $y him, may constitute a just or

valid reason for him to voluntarily inhi$it himself from hearing the

case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the

second paragraph of Section 3 of the said 6ule 3@+.5chanro$les virtual lawli$rary

he apprehension of petitioner regarding the pro$a$le $ias of

respondent 1udge does not appear to $e groundless or entirely

devoid of reason. he respondent 1udge had decided the case in

favor of petitioner and his co(plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffsL

timely motion and filing of $ond they were already placed in

possession of the lands in !uestion pending appeal. It was when

Atty. Sicat too* over as new counsel for defendant that the latter

was given $ac* the properties, upon a motion to stay the e"ecution

of the judgment which was filed $y said counsel and was granted $y

respondent 1udge over the opposition of petitionerLs counsel. Again,

when the same counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial,

said motion was granted $y respondent 1udge in spite of the

vigorous o$jection of counsel for the petitioner and his co(plaintiffs.

And then the petitioner $ecame aware of the fact that his adversary,


40/58


41/58

with the other party or counsel ( feels that no matter how upright

the judge is there is peril of his $eing unconsciously swayed $y his

former connection and he may unwittingly render a $iased or unfair

decision. 9ence, while it may $e conceded that in re!uesting the

dis!ualification of a judge $y reason of his relation with a party orcounsel there is some implication of the pro$a$ility of his $eing

partial to one side, the re!uest can not constitute contempt of court

if done honestly and in a respectful manner, as was done $y

petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at

all, is his having as*ed his counsel to ma*e the re!uest to

respondent 1udge inside the latterLs cham$er.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

he following o$servation of this Court, spea*ing through Mr. 1ustice7i'on, is relevant to the !uestion $efore 5sB

Petitioner invo*ing the provisions of section 3, 6ule 3= of the 6ules

of Court, argues that the case of respondent judge does not fall

under any one of the grounds for the dis!ualification of judicial

officers stated therein. Assumingarguendo that a literal

interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitionerLs

contention to a certain degree, it should not $e forgotten that, in

construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its

true intention nor the real ground for the dis!ualification of a judge

or judicial officer, which is the impossi$ility of rendering an impartial

judgment upon the matter $efore him. It has $een said, in fact, that

due process of law re!uires a hearing $efore an impartial and

disinterested tri$unal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing

less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge /@H Am. 1ur. p.

++0. Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision,

is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion

as to its fairness and the integrity of the 1udge. Conse!uently, we

ta*e it to $e the true intention of the law ( stated in general terms (

that no judge shall preside in a case in whichhe is not wholl free,

disinterested, impartial and independent /@H Am.

1ur.supra0 . . . . 6 /%mphasis supplied0.


42/58


43/58

paragraph. ;ut the petitioner was simply truthful and candid to the

court when he gave that answer. It would have $een unfair to

respondent 1udge had petitioner answered 8o, sir, $ecause then

he would not $e sincere with the court, and he would $e

inconsistent with the re!uest that he made through his counsel forrespondent 1udge to inhi$it himself from further hearing the case.

)hen respondent 1udge as*ed that !uestion, he necessarily

e"pected a truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed petitioner

gave him the truthful answer. )e are not persuaded that in so

answering petitioner meant to $e disrespectful, offensive or

insulting to respondent 1udge. 8or do )e consider that in so

answering petitioner meant to cast reflection on the integrity and

honesty of respondent 1udge. )e $elieve that in so answering thepetitioner was simply manifesting the misgiving of an ordinary

layman a$out the outcome of his case that is going to $e tried $y a

judge who has $een closely associated with the counsel for his

adversary. he petitioner would never have e"pressed that

misgiving of his had respondent 1udge not as*ed him in open court

a !uestion that evo*ed that answer. A judge can not prevent any

person ( even a litigant or counsel in a case $efore him ( to

entertain in his mind an opinion a$out him as a judge. Certainly,any person is entitled to his opinion a$out a judge, whether that

opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would $e different if a

person would deli$erately and maliciously e"press an adverse

opinion a$out a judge, without reason, $ut simply to malign and

discredit the judge. In the case now $efore 5s )e $elieve that

petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit respondent 1udge in

answering as he did. It can $e said that petitioner was simply

moved $y a desire to protect his interests in the case pending$efore the court, presided $y respondent 1udge. A citi'en of this

6epu$lic is entitled to e"pect that our courts of justice are presided

$y judges who are free from $ias and prejudice ( and it should not

$e made a count against the citi'en if he so e"presses himself

truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a pu$lic servant,


44/58

should not $e so thin(s*inned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended

if a citi'en e"presses an honest opinion a$out him which may not

altogether $e flattering to him. 10 After all, what matters is that a

judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his

conscience and the light that ?od has given him. A judge shouldnever allow himself to $e moved $y pride, prejudice, passion, or

pettiness in the performance of his duties. And a judge should

always $ear in mind that the power of the court to punish for

contempt should $e e"ercised for purposes that are impersonal,

$ecause that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as

persons $ut for the functions that they e"ercise.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have $eenwhere judges, and even mem$ers of this Court, were as*ed to

inhi$it themselves from trying, or from participating in the

consideration of, a case, $ut scarcely were the movants punished for

contempt even if the grounds upon which they $ased their motions

for dis!ualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is

only when there was direct imputation of $ias or prejudice, or a

stu$$orn insistence to dis!ualify the judge, done in a malicious,

arrogant, $elligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants wereheld in contempt of court. 11 And this li$eral attitude of the courts is

in *eeping with the doctrine that he power to punish for contempt

of court should $e e"ercised on the preservative and not on the

vindictive principle. 4nly occasionally should the court invo*e its

inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the

administration of justice must falter or fail. 12 he power to punish

for contempt, $eing drastic and e"traordinary in its nature, should

not $e resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

13chanro$les virtual lawli$rary

)herefore, the order of respondent 1udge dated Fe$ruary 3H, 3,

in Civil Case 8o. 3@=> of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,

declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering him to

pay a fine of P>H.HH, is here$y annulled and set aside2 and it is


45/58

ordered that the sum of P>H.HH, paid under protest $y petitioner as

a fine, $e refunded to him. 8o costs. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Rees, J.!."., Di#on, Ma$alintal, !eng#on, J.P.,

%anche#, Castro, Angeles and &ernando, JJ., concur.


46/58

MARTELINO VS. ALE%ANDRO ("2 SCRA 1!# [19!])

%8 ;A8C

G.R. No. L-30894 %;: 25, 1970

!D+"RDO L. "RT!LINO, #IRILO ORO*!S", T!ODOROF"#!LO, R+*!RTO "ISOTO, "L!RTO SOT!#O, SOLF!RINOTITONG, !T "L., Petitioners, vs. JOS! "L!J"NDRO, R+!N S.

ONTO", SI>TO R. "L("R", "V!LINO #. !N!=, !FR"INS. "#L"NG, !T "L., Respondents.

Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.

Colonel Manuel '. Rees (Judge Advocate )eneral, )%C*, Major

%amuel M. %oriano (JA)%*, Major +iginio . Dacana, Jr. (JA)%, PC*

and %olicitor )eneral &eli- '. Ma$asiar, Assistant %olicitor )eneral

Crispin '. !autista, %olicitor Jaime M. "antin and )uillermo a$ar,

Jr. for respondents.

#"STRO, J.

his case presents another aspect of the court(martial proceedingsagainst the petitioner, Major %duardo Martelino, alias A$dul :atif

Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers

and men under him, for violation of the th and +th Articles of

)ar, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 3-, 3- of some

Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of

Corregidor. 4nce $efore the !uestion was raised $efore this Court

whether the general court(martial, convened on April , 3- to try

the case against the petitioners, ac!uired jurisdiction over the casedespite the fact that earlier, on March =@, a complaint for frustrated

murder had $een filed in the fiscalLs office of Cavite City $y 1i$in

Arula /who claimed to have $een wounded in the incident0 against

some of the herein petitioners. he proceedings had to $e

suspended until the jurisdiction issue could $e decided. 4n 1une =@,


47/58

3 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military

court.1chanro$les virtual lawli$rary

he jurisdiction !uestion thus settled, attention once again shifted

to the general court(martial, $ut no sooner had the proceedingsresumed than another hitch developed. his came a$out as the

petitioners, the accused in the court(martial proceedings, in turn

came to this Court, see*ing relief against certain orders of the

general court(martial.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

It appears that at the hearing on August 3=, 3 the petitioner

Martelino sought the dis!ualification of the President of the general

court(martial, following the latterLs admission that he read

newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. he petitioner

contended that the case had received such an amount of pu$licity in

the press and other news media and in fact was $eing e"ploited for

political purposes in connection with the presidential election on

8ovem$er 33, 3 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After

deli$erating, the military court denied the challenge. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

hereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col.

Alejandro, as president of the court(martial, and Col. 4lfindo, :t.Col. Camagay, :t. Col. Dalones, :t. Col. ;lanco and Col. Malig, as

mem$ers. )ith regard to peremptory challenges it was the

petitionersL position that for each specification each accused was

entitled to one such challenge. hey later changed their stand and

adopted that of the trial judge advocate that for each specification

jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 3 peremptory

challenge2 and that with respect to the specifications tried

commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptorychallenge. hey there contended that they were entitled to a total

of eleven peremptory challenges. 4n the other hand the court(

martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory

challenge as the specifications were $eing jointly tried.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary


48/58

he petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and

prohi$ition, to nullify the orders of the court(martial denying their

challenges, $oth peremptory and for cause. hey allege that the

adverse pu$licity given in the mass media to the Corregidor

incident, coupled with the fact that it $ecame an issue against theadministration in the 3 elections, was such as to unduly

influence the mem$ers of the court(martial. )ith respect to

peremptory challenges, they contend that they are entitled to

eleven such challenges, one for each specification. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

4n August =, 3 this Court gave due course to the petition,

re!uired the respondents as mem$ers of the general court(martial

to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from proceedingwith the case. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary

In their answer the respondents assert that despite the pu$licity

which the case had received, no proof has $een presented showing

that the court(martialLs presidentLs fairness and impartiality have

$een impaired. 4n the contrary, they claim, the petitionerLs own

counsel e"pressed confidence in the integrity, e"perience and

$ac*ground of the mem$ers of the court. As a preliminary

consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the

petition on the ground that it has no power to review the

proceedings of the court(martial, e"cept for the purpose of

ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the

person and su$ject matter, and whether, though having such

jurisdiction, it had e"ceeded its powers in the sentence

pronounced, and that at any rate the petitioners failed to e"haust

remedies availa$le to them within the military justice system.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

Ichanro$les virtual lawli$rary

It is true that civil courts as a rule e"ercise no supervision or

correcting power over the proceedings of courts(martial, and that

mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. he


49/58

single in!uiry, the test, is jurisdiction.2;ut it is e!ually true that in

the e"ercise of their undou$ted discretion, courts(martial may

commit such an a$use of discretion ( what in the language of 6ule

> is referred to as grave a$use of discretion ( as to give rise to a

defect in their jurisdiction.3his is precisely the point at issue in thisaction suggested $y its nature as one for certiorari and prohi$ition,

namely, whether in overruling the petitionersL challenges, the

general court(martial committed such an a$use of discretion as to

call for the e"ercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus

o$vious that no other way is open to this Court $y which it may

avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. 8or will

the fact that there may $e availa$le remedies within the system of

military justice $ar review considering that the !uestions raised are!uestions of law.4chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

And so the threshold !uestion is whether the pu$licity given to the

case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a

fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino challenged the

court(martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of

what had come to $e referred to as the Corregidor massacre

might unduly influence the trial of their case. he petitionerLscounsel referred to a news item appearing in the 1uly =, 3 issue

of the Dail Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that

coffins are $eing prepared for the President /of the Philippines0 in

1olo, that according to Senator A!uino massacre victims were

given sea $urial, and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Dice

President candidate, had gone to Corregidor and found $ullet

shells. In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila

/imes editorial of August =, 3 which states that he 1a$idahcode name of the training operationsN issue was $ound to come up

in the course of the election campaign. he opposition could not

possi$ly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the

administration. he petitioners argue that under the circumstances

they could not e"pect a just and fair trial and that, in overruling


50/58

their challenge for cause $ased on this ground, the general court(

martial committed a grave a$use of discretion. In support of their

contention they invo*e the rulings of the 5nited States Supreme

Court in 0rvin v. Dowd ,5Rideau vs. "ouisiana,6stes v.

/e-as,7and %hepard v. Ma-well .8chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary

An e"amination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are

widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for

instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the petitionerLs

arrest in connection with si" murders committed in Dander$urgh

County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police officials issued press

releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the si" murders

and that a $arrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons andpictures was unleashed against him during the si" or seven months

preceding his trial. In reversing his conviction, the Court saidB

9ere the pattern of deep and $itter prejudiceL shown to $e present

throughout the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total

of the voir diree"amination of a majority of the jurors finally placed

in the jury $o". %ight out of the 3= thought petitioner was guilty.

)ith such an opinion permeating their minds, it would $e difficult to

say that each could e"clude this preconception of guilt from his

deli$erations. he influence that lur*s in an opinion once formed is

so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the

processes of the average man. ... )here oneLs life is at sta*e ( and

accounting for the frailties of human nature ( we can only say that

in the light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does

not meet the constitutional standard.9

0rvin mar*s the first time a state conviction was struc* down solelyon the ground of prejudicial pu$licity. 10 In the earlier caseof %hepherd v. &lorida, 11 which involved elements of pu$licity, thereversal of the conviction was $ased solely on racial discrimination

in the selection of the jury, although to concurring 1ustice 1ac*son,

who was joined $y 1ustice Fran*furter, It is hard to imagine a more


51/58

prejudicial influence than a press release $y the officer of the court

charged with defendantsL custody stating that they had confessed,

and here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross(

e"amined and uncontradicted, was conveyed $y the press to the

jury. 12

In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the ro$$ery of a $an* in :a*e

Charles, :ouisiana and in the *idnapping of three of its employees,

and in the *illing of one of them, was similarly given trial $y

pu$licity. hus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was

ta*en of him in an interview with the sheriff. he interview,

which lasted appro"imately =H minutes, consisted of interrogation

$y the sheriff and admission $y 6ideau that he had perpetrated the$an* ro$$ery, *idnapping and murder. he interview was seen and

heard on television $y =,HHH people. wo wee*s later he was

arraigned. 9is lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue $ut

their motion was denied and 6ideau was convicted and sentenced to

death. 6ideauLs counsel had re!uested that jurors $e e"cused for

cause, having e"hausted all of their peremptory challenges, $ut

these challenges for cause had $een denied $y the trial judge. In

reversing his conviction, the Court saidB

)Ne hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the

re!uest for a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish

had $een e"posed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of

6ideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he

was later to $e charged. For anyone who has ever watched

television the conclusion cannot $e avoided that this spectacle, to

the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real

sense was 6ideauLs trial ( at which he pleaded guilty to murder. A

legal ethics pat final (1)

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