HISTORICAL GENERAL

ASSEMBLY

STUDY GUIDE

TOPIC: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1962

INTRODUCTION:

The Cuban missile crisis was a 13-day confrontation in October 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba. It played out on television worldwide and was the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full scale nuclear war and to witnessing the horrific truth behind the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction. It was unlike any other proxy war, during the famed USA-USSR stalemate. With the backfiring of Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba, a country dangerously close to the USA, was the ideal place to set up a base for the USSR, owing to their relative inability to manufacture effective cross continental missiles. Cuban relations with the USA were brittle while Castro greeted Khrushchev with open arms.

By August, American intelligence confirmed the setup of Soviet military in Cuba and in October 1962, a U.S. spy plane caught the Soviet Union attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba, 90 miles off the United States' coast. Kennedy determined at the outset that this could not stand. MIGs, II28 Bombers and a myriad of surface to air ballistic missiles were sighted. After a week of secret deliberations with his most trusted advisers, he announced the discovery to the world and imposed a naval blockade on further shipments of armaments to Cuba. The blockade prevented additional materiel from coming in but did nothing to stop the Soviets from operationalizing

the missiles already there. And a tense second week followed during which Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev stood "eyeball to eyeball," neither side backing down.

The committee shall convene on the 22 nd of October 1962 .

The General Assembly shall conduct its first meeting after US President Kennedy’s historical speech outlining US policy with regards to Cuba, in which US decision to impose quarantine on Cuba, was presented to the world.

BACKGROUND

In 1945 after the Second World War

officially ended, the world was introduced to an era clouded with tensions between the two ‘superpowers’ which had emerged after the war; the USSR and the

USA, who had been allies during the war. This alliance of convenience was broken as soon as the war ended, and both countries became locked in a global struggle to achieve superiority with regards to military, politics, economy and ideologies of each, in a new “Cold War” time period.

Although both countries managed to prevent an all-out nuclear war throughout the Cold War period, they came dangerously close to one in October 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba, an island around 160 km from Florida in Southern USA, was considered ‘the backyard of the USA’ but was also an underdeveloped nation with abject conditions, poverty rife and a shortage of basic necessities for Cuban people. An American backed dictator Batista ruled over Cuba, but his reign had created a jarring disparity within Cuban society, and corruption was widespread. In 1956, the communist Fidel Castro, a lawyer and leading figure in student protests, lead a revolution against Batista to free Cuba from the oppression faced by the Cuban population under Batista’s dictatorial and authoritarian regime. However, he was defeated by Batista’s forces and so, fled to the mountains surrounding Guevara. Guerrilla fighting took place at Guevara between Batista’s Cuban army and Castro’s forces. The land that Castro’s forces gained was given to the peasants in Cuba. This led to more people joining his forces.

Fidel Castro, Communist Revolutionary

In 1959 Castro’s army defeated Batista’s forces and so, Castro was able to succeed in his armed revolt and form a government. Fidel Castro now spent his time rebuilding Cuba. He nationalized all American industries and US property within Cuba but allowed the US navy base to remain in Cuba. He stated that he wanted to run Cuba without interference from foreign countries. This led to the United States freezing all Cuban assets on US soil, severing diplomatic ties and placing an embargo on sugar inflow into the United States. This was intended to have a disastrous effect on the Cuban economy as the US was the primary importer of Cuban sugar. However, this was counterproductive and so resulted in Cuba allying with the USSR, who not only agreed to buy Cuban sugar but also supplied them with arms. This led to the USA cutting all diplomatic ties with Cuba in January 1961 and so tensions increased between the USA and the USSR. Castro thought that the USA was preparing to invade. It was clear that the USA was no longer prepared to tolerate a Soviet satellite in the heart of its own ‘sphere of influence.’

President Eisenhower, who first authorized the CIA to plan the Bay of Pigs

Invasion

In the wake of the revolution, thousands of disaffected anti-Batista rebels, former Batista supporters, and campesinos (peasants) had fled to Cuba's Las Villas province, where an anticommunist underground had been forming since early 1960. Operating out of the Escambray Mountains, these counterrevolutionary rebels, also known as Alzados, made a number of unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the Cuban government, including the abortive, United States-backed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961. The Cuban Revolution of 1949 to 1959 had seen President Fulgencio Batista, a right-wing ally of the U.S., ousted. He was replaced by a new left-wing administration dominated by Castro, which had severed the country's formerly strong links with the U.S. by expropriating their economic assets and developing links with the Soviet Union, with whom the U.S. was then embroiled in the Cold War. The U.S. government of President Dwight D.

Eisenhower was concerned at the direction which Castro's government was taking, and in March 1960, Eisenhower allocated $13.1 million to the CIA in order to plan Castro's overthrow. The CIA proceeded to organize the operation with the aid of various Cuban counter-revolutionary forces, training Brigade 2506 in Mexico. Following his election in 1960, President John F. Kennedy was informed of the invasion plan and gave his consent.

Map showing location of the Bay of Pigs

The Bay of Pigs Invasion was a failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by the CIA-sponsored paramilitary group Brigade 2506 on 17 April 1961. A counter-revolutionary military, trained and funded by the United States government's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Brigade 2506 fronted the armed wing of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (DRF) and intended to overthrow the revolutionary left-wing government of Fidel Castro. Launched from Guatemala, the invading force was defeated within three days by the Cuban armed forces, under the direct command of Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

The failed invasion strengthened the position of Castro's administration, which proceeded to openly proclaim their intention to adopt socialism and strengthen ties with the Soviet Union. This led eventually to the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

INITIATION OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:

By early October 1962, the United States possessed about 27,000 nuclear weapons, and the Soviets had about 3,000. In a first salvo of a nuclear exchange with its intercontinental adversary, the United States could launch about 3,000 nuclear weapons and the Soviets about 250. Such use of nuclear weapons in 1962 could imperil not only the Soviet and U.S. peoples, but all of humankind.

In seeking to determine policy in October 1962, President John Kennedy met in secret from October 16 to 22 with his chosen high-level advisers in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm.

The Chiefs of staff all thought that attacking Cuba and overthrowing Castro was a viable solution. However, the President was averse to this idea. In his opinion, overthrowing Castro would be an invitation to the Russians to capture Berlin. This would ruin their reputation with their Allies as well. Soon other officials also began to agree with Kennedy. ExComm discussed the strategic

balance of power, in military as well as political terms. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained their views on overthrowing Castro. Contrary to that, though, the US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara stated that supposing the MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba were 40 in number, it would not affect the balance of power.

ExComm weaved together two Operational Plans to be considered, OPLAN 312 and OPLAN 316. OPLAN 316 was a full scale Naval and Army Marine Invasion, while OPLAN 312 was Air-Force and Navy carrier Invasion which was capable of both, individual missile launches as well as providing air support to OPLAN 316. Between the 19th and 21st of October, 1962, EXCOMM held meetings in the Oval Office of the White House to discuss whether to use the Invasion plan or a Naval blockade. The plan eventually agreed upon by ExComm was not revealed till October 22nd.

To the world, the week of the Cuban missile crisis begins publicly on October 22nd, with Kennedy’s dramatic TV and radio announcement of what he terms Soviet “offensive” missiles in Cuba. He declares that the weapons must be withdrawn and that he is establishing a naval quarantine. To do nothing in the face of the Soviet act would be unacceptable, he indicates. The implication of Kennedy’s October 22 speech and various other U.S. government statements is that the Soviet deployment in Cuba is overturning the strategic nuclear balance and that unless the Soviet missiles in Cuba are removed, they would

place the United States in imminent military peril. Kennedy also implies that first trying secret diplomacy would be inadequate and that a public confrontation, the quarantine, is both essential and prudent. Left unspoken in public by Kennedy on October 22 and throughout the week by the U.S. government is what would happen if the Soviets militarily challenged the U.S. quarantine or if they did not soon agree to withdraw their missiles from Cuba. The odds of war seem quite high.

It may seem lamentable and not easily explicable that Kennedy and his advisers have so easily rejected an initial attempt at secret diplomacy with the Soviets before moving to the dangerous option of quarantine. No one in the ExComm has significantly pushed for trying secret diplomacy first, and so, the quarantine has emerged as the responsible

alternative to invasion or attack, and there is a developing majority on endorsing the quarantine route.

To particular advisers to Kennedy, it seems that diplomacy may be a safer route. Upon lines of trying diplomacy, a letter of advice to Kennedy from Charles Bohlen, a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and recognized Soviet expert, was given in which Bohlen argued that diplomacy first was far safer. If it failed, the United States could still move to other routes to try to secure withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. In contrast, if the United States began with a public confrontation—quarantine or even more—the result could be war. While Bohlen has not spelled out the implications, they are stark.

To proceed with the quarantine, McNamara, Secretary of Defense orders Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations of the USA, to author a position paper declaring the clear difference between a blockade and quarantine. Kennedy requested him to describe the way in which the Navy would execute the blockade. It was made clear that the US Navy would obey the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) when it came to intercepting, stopping and even boarding Soviet ships.

On the 22nd of October 1962 ExComm was officially established. Till then, it had been an unofficial organization of Kennedy’s most trusted men. Kennedy

officially announced the blockade to the public then, following which he said “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”

PHASE 1 OF THE CRISIS:

Placement of Soviet Weapons in Cuba:

The Soviet Union's objective in placing strategic weapons in Cuba is not clear. Perhaps its leaders were apprehensive about the claims of substantial strategic superiority that the Administration had been making since the previous fall. If so, they may have regarded the forward basing of shorter range missiles as an appropriate “quick fix,” much as the United States had regarded the stationing of IRBM's in Europe at the time of apparent Soviet superiority in intercontinental missiles. Like the European bases, however, those in Cuba would have been vulnerable to and even invite surprise attack. A more ominous possibility is that the Cuban operation was part of a broad political strategy regarding Berlin. In July Premier Khrushchev announced that progress toward settling the Berlin problem could be deferred until after the U.S. election, a position reiterated by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his talk with the President. In October, there was considerable speculation that Premier Khrushchev might be coming to the United States later in the fall. By the late fall, of course, the missiles would have become operational.

Whatever their military value, the sudden disclosure of the missiles could have had a great impact. If the United States responded not with concessions on Berlin but with military action against the bases in Cuba, the Soviet Union would have a pretext for moves in Berlin. By this time the Western Alliance might be in such disarray as to make an effective response there impossible. Another possibility is that the Soviet Union was putting weapons into Cuba only, or partially, to be able to withdraw them later in return for concessions elsewhere.

Whatever the motivation, the Soviet operation required both secrecy and haste in order to succeed and, in particular, to preclude the United States from taking action, or threatening to, before the missiles become operational and to permit the Soviet Union to maintain the initiative in any showdown. In establishing some kind of balance between these two partially irreconcilable requirements, the Soviet Union apparently gave greater emphasis to the latter. The missile components were unloaded from the ships and transported across the Cuban countryside at night, but, at the construction sites, careful camouflage was largely sacrificed for fast action. Since early 1961 the United States had maintained continual surveillance of Cuba, including, prior to late August 1962, twice-monthly, and high-altitude U-2 flights around the periphery of the island. Beginning in the latter part of the summer, U.S. intelligence received numerous reports from Cuban refugee sources about missiles being installed in Cuba. These refugee groups, however, had a record of exaggeration and irresponsibility. Numerous similar stories had been received previously, all of which proved to be false. Therefore,

intelligence officials had an undoubted and understandable inclination to downgrade these reports. The discovery, when at the end of August direct over flights of Cuba began, of ground-to-air (air defense) missiles led to the conclusion that it was these that the refugees had seen and that these were the only missiles in Cuba. On the other hand, this discovery should have produced speculation as to what these missiles were intended to protect. Further reconnaissance was temporarily interrupted as a result of the Administration's response to the two recent U-2 incidents. It is easy now to say that such deference to other concerns than the surveillance of Cuba was unwise, but this was less evident at the time.

PHASE TWO OF THE CRISIS:

U2 Plane Surveillance of Cuba:

Apart from the temporary grounding of all U-2's during the second week of September, surveillance of Cuba continued, as the President promised at his news conferences. By the end of September disturbing but inconclusive evidence was available. On October 14 a U-2 overflew San Cristobal on the western end of the island. The US first obtained U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14, when a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province (now in Artemisa Province), in western Cuba. On October 15, the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. That

evening, the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8:30 pm EDT, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy elected to wait until morning to tell the President. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of the images. At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisors, in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by the National Security Action Memorandum 196. Without informing the members of EXCOMM, President Kennedy tape recorded all of their proceedings.

Threat to the USA by the Placement of Missiles:

Two aspects of the threat had to be evaluated. The first was the pure military and strategic significance of the missiles. By being so close in, they greatly reduced the warning time available to SAC, particularly since the missiles would become operational before the United States would have time to rearrange its warning systems and defenses to best take account of this new factor. Even so, forty-two missiles perhaps were not terribly significant. But if the United States had not acted the number would have become still greater. Presumably the Soviet ships that turned back from the blockade were bringing additional missiles; still more could have been installed later.

Possible Course of Action Considered by ExComm:

The Excom had four alternative courses of action, of varying degrees of intensity, from which to choose. The first was to go to the United Nations and demand the removal of the bases. The second was some sort of blockade or embargo of Cuba. The third was a surprise air attack to destroy the missile sites. The fourth was an invasion.

The Excom also had to anticipate the Soviet response. Direct military action against Cuba would encourage Soviet countermoves, probably not in Cuba but elsewhere (Berlin), or perhaps comparable actions against Turkey, where the United States (as it was soon to be reminded) had intermediate range missiles “ninety miles” from Soviet territory. Such a Soviet countermove would create symmetry of crises and lead to worldwide pressure for both sides to call a halt. The missiles might then remain

in Cuba. Otherwise the crises might escalate. The United States action had to be designed to minimize the likelihood of such a countermove. Nevertheless every contingency was analyzed and prepared for.

Course of Action Chosen by Kennedy:

Presidents Kennedy & Khrushchev

The President read his eighteen minute speech with "grimness unparalleled in recent times.” He immediately revealed the well-kept secret. He called the Soviet missiles “offensive,” retaining the distinction that he had introduced earlier and could hardly drop now. He directed his speech entirely against the Soviet Union, treating Cuba as a mere pawn in the conflict. He noted Soviet deceptions, specifically the September 11 statement and Gromyko’s assurances, each of which he quoted. And of each he said: “That statement was false.” He objected to the Soviet operation primarily because it upset the "precarious status quo.” And in demonstrating his determination to resist, he clearly laid American prestige

on the line: “But the secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles . . . is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country or our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.”

He then announced United States actions, clearly indicating that more would follow if necessary “I have directed that the following steps be taken immediately”: (1) “To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers." (2) Continued and increased close surveillance. At the same point he again suggested that further, more violent, action might follow. (3) “It shall be the policy of this , nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union.”(5) An immediate OAS meeting. (6) An emergency Security Council meeting. (7) “I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

The quarantine had two purposes. First, it was designed to deter, or if necessary physically prevent the introduction of additional strategic weapons into Cuba. Second and more importantly, it was designed to establish a pattern of irresistible United States momentum and visible willingness to run high risks until the weapons already in Cuba were removed. But it did not involve

unnecessary risks. It gave the Soviets time to reconsider their action; it permitted them to comply without having to back down before a specific ultimatum.

The blockade and the entire range of the United States action were tightly, centrally controlled. Complicated precautions were taken so that the President and his associates could control virtually every move, military and diplomatic.

PHASE THREE:

Course of Events after the 22nd of October:

In the most blatant challenge to the United States, the Soviet Union threw away its usual advantage of local military superiority. The Administration followed up its initiative quickly with a diplomatic offensive. Briefings of and consultations with diplomats and foreign governments

were continued. In these private meetings, U.S. officials stressed not the missiles themselves nor their “offensive” character but that the Soviet Union had undertaken to upset the status quo by secretly introducing into Cuba weapons never before outside of Soviet territory, despite repeated assurances that this was not necessary.

On the same day low-level reconnaissance of Cuba began, providing photographs which not only gave intelligence workers more detailed information but also were comprehensible and persuasive to people other than expert interpreters of aerial photography. They were therefore politically useful.

The buildup of conventional military forces in the Caribbean and southeast United States was continued and now made visible. The buildup, which the Defense Department later called “quite a development of power," served both to persuade the Soviet Union of the desirability of complying with U.S. demands and to support subsequent actions should that persuasion fail.

On Monday the Soviet government had received an advance copy of the President's speech and a personal letter to Premier Khrushchev. The next day it was sent a copy of the blockade proclamation but this was returned as unacceptable. The Soviet government’s reaction to the United States initiative was an uncertain one. The first official pronouncement was cautious in commitment. The statement suggested that the blockade was primarily an act of aggression against Cuba which the Soviet Union was obliged to take account of, rather than a direct challenge. It in effect denied that the missiles were in Cuba as

the United States charged. The only proposal was that old standby — withdrawal of all foreign bases. The statement gave the impression that the Soviet Union had not expected the United States action and had not decided upon a response.

Soviet diplomats continued to deny the existence of the missiles. But on Wednesday Premier Khrushchev called William Knox, an American business man who happened to be in Moscow, into his office and more or less acknowledged that they did exist and told him that they would be used if necessary and that interception of a Soviet ship would mean war. The next day Ambassador Zorin was still denying everything in the Security Council, but, in his letters to President Kennedy, Khrushchev became more and more blunt. In his letter of October 28 he was as explicit about the missiles as was politically possible.

United Nations Attempts To Solve the Crisis:

The United Nations provided a forum for both consultations and insults. A principal United States objective here was to convince the whole world of the existence of the missiles. Rival Soviet and United States resolutions were submitted to the Security Council but neither was ever voted on. An innocuous neutralist resolution was adopted instead.

In his speeches to the Security Council Adlai Stevenson used some of the bluntest words ever uttered in that forum by an American delegate. He indirectly accused Ambassador Zorin of “perfidy” and directly accused his government of “deliberate, cynical deception.” Zorin maintained that the U.S. case was based on “falsified evidence.” This charge led to the famous confrontation between Stevenson and Zorin, which was followed by Stevenson's presentation of the most recent reconnaissance photographs. Zorin again questioned their authenticity. Stevenson responded by suggesting the issue could best be solved by allowing UN investigators to inspect the Cuba sites.

This ended the debate. Stevenson's performance effectively convinced the world of the existence of the missiles, despite, or perhaps with the help of, Zorin protestations — a politically important accomplishment in itself. It also underscored the unswerving determination of the United States to see the missiles removed.

The other point of focus at the UN was Secretary-General U Thant. On Wednesday, going beyond the urgings of the neutralist nations, he sent identical messages to Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy calling for “the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the search of ships bound for Cuba.” Premier Khrushchev quickly replied with a letter that apparently accepted his half of the bargain unconditionally and that provided the first clear indication of his desire to find a graceful avenue for retreat. President Kennedy politely but firmly turned down the proposal, as U.S. policy plainly required. U Thant quickly replied with two more letters, one to each statesman. To Premier Khrushchev he suggested that all Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay out of the interception area for the time being. He asked President Kennedy to "do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident.” These proposals were hardly symmetrical. Provided the Soviet ships stayed away, the United States could hardly fail to avoid a “direct confrontation” with those ships. Nevertheless, Khrushchev readily accepted and announced Soviet vessels would not challenge the blockade.

President Kennedy, in an extremely carefully worded reply, accepted this proposal on the condition that the Soviet Union complied with its half of the bargain. U Thant's initiative probably was an important contribution in avoiding a confrontation at sea. The Secretary-General could do nothing to alter the physical situation but he could change the political climate. Premier Khrushchev was apparently searching for some good excuse to turn his ships around. U Thant's appeal provided a convenient rationale. It was easier to appear to accede to the appeals of the representative of world public opinion than to appear to buckle under to overwhelming pressure from an adversary. Because of the extreme deliberation and caution with which the United States conducted the blockade operations, he could appear to do the former. President Kennedy, for his part, wanted to halt the flow of weapons to Cuba, not to humiliate his opposite number, and was perfectly willing for Khrushchev to be able to execute a dignified retreat, so U Thant's initiative served his purpose as well.

Resolution of the Crisis:

By Thursday evening, the blockade had evidently accomplished the first of its purposes — no more strategic weapons were going into Cuba. However, the missiles already in Cuba remained there, and, according to the latest photographs, work was continuing rapidly. And the blockade, having been in effect for several days, would soon lose its shock effect. The United States offensive had to be stepped up or it would peter out, giving the Soviet Union time to recoup its political forces.

Beginning late Thursday, therefore, the United States began to increase pressure on the Soviet Union in a most deliberate fashion. At no time, however, did it move further up the scale of violence or directly threaten to do so. But it created the impression, probably well-founded, that it was willing to do so if the missiles were not quickly removed. At the same time, the United States never once gave the impression that, if it did successfully achieve its goal, it would press its offensive further and broaden its objective, by seeking, for example, the elimination of the Castro government or of all Soviet influence in Cuba or the humiliation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders knew exactly what the United States wanted and could be quite confident that “this was our last demand.”

On Friday the United States stepped up pressure on the Soviet Union. The State Department released a statement calling attention to one phrase in the President's speech — “these actions may only be the beginning” — and said it had been made with deadly seriousness. That evening a statement was released directly from the White House which described the latest

intelligence information indicating that work at the bases was continuing rapidly. Neither statement carried an explicit threat, nor did they set a time limit on Soviet compliance, but together they conveyed to the Soviets a sense of urgency.

The decisive break in the crisis was the private letter received by President Kennedy from Premier Khrushchev late Friday evening. This letter has never been published, but apparently it was long and rambling, confused but conciliatory, almost panicky in tone. But it appeared to say what the President wanted to hear — the Soviet Union would halt construction and remove the bases in return for a United States pledge not to invade Cuba and to lift the blockade. To avoid embarrassing Moscow, the Administration decided not to publish the letter; work began immediately on a reply. But the next morning Moscow Radio broadcast the text of a letter from Khrushchev to the President, and this was a different message, which reached the White House a little later. The letter was long and somewhat informal but, unlike the previous one, firm in tone though not truculent. It offered to withdraw the missiles but with a catch — that the United states withdraw its missiles from Turkey. It indicated no willingness to halt construction prior to such an agreement. This offer confronted the Excom with a dilemma. The possibility of such a deal had been discussed in the press and elsewhere earlier in the week. The Turkish bases were without significant military value; the President had wanted the missiles dismantled a year earlier but the Turks would not agree. But the President was extremely reluctant to allow such a tie-in with the Cuban problem; he did not want to win

concessions on Cuba by bargaining away the rights of a NATO ally over the head of the government directly involved. He could have persuaded the Turks to agree but this would have involved extended inter-allied consultations. Hence the offer was unacceptable, particularly coming after the message of Friday night. Besides, there was considerable suspicion about Soviet intentions in view of the inconsistency of the messages.

The White House released a statement noting “inconsistent” and conflicting proposals from the Soviet Union and reiterating the United States demand. Then the President sent a letter to Premier Khrushchev where he twice emphasized that the first requirement was that work cease on the bases and the missiles be “rendered inoperable under effective United Nations arrangements.” The next morning Radio Moscow broadcast Premier Khrushchev's reply, which accepted everything. Even before formal receipt of the letter, the White House issued a statement welcoming the Soviet decision. A quick reply was drafted to seal the bargain. Thus the open crisis ended with the objective achieved.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Fidel Castro laying a wreath at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C., 1959

Cuba, a small island located towards the south of the USA became involved in the Cold War in 1959, when Fidel Castro rose to power. The puppet regime under Batista, set up by the USA itself, was a corrupt one which finally lost the support of the United States after it nationalized American owned sugar factories and estates stationed there. Diplomatic ties between the two states were formally abolished in 1961. Following this cut off, the Cuban government under Fidel Castro sought the military and financial aid of the next best ally, and a world power who could potentially prevent the USA from

further interfering within Cuban affairs; the USSR. Cuba had been significantly threatened by the United States through a series of violent measures, such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961, which attempted to thwart Castro’s communist regime within Cuba, in correspondence with the policy of containment. In response, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev arranged a meeting with Castro, in which it was agreed that both allies would engage in joint defense against the USA to prevent the further loss of innocent lives in Cuba.  While the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Such an involvement was also a direct violation of the Monroe doctrine; a United States policy which, while limiting the United States' involvement with European colonies and European affairs, held that European powers ought not to have involvement with states in the Western Hemisphere. Doing so would otherwise be considered an act of aggression.

The CIA had also been heavily involved in this sector of the USA’s foreign policy. The general view of the USA at the time was that it was quite permissible for them to interfere in the affairs of any state that they felt threatened by. Their global responsibility to protect the international community from ‘coercive’ ideologies, such as communism, should also be taken

into account when analyzing their actions. The Bay of Pigs Invasion followed with Castro openly declaring that Cuba was now a Marxist state; the countless Cuban merchant ships that had been sunk, along with the sabotage of the installations at the island and invasion exercises carried out by the USA seemed to have provoked the Cuban government to not only approach the USSR for assistance, but also become heavily influenced by it when choosing a political ideology to abide by. Khrushchev seemed to try to heighten the consternation between the two states to the best of his ability when he suggested the placement of an assortment of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles that could cover up to at least 2000 miles, which meant that major cities such as New York, Washington, Chicago and Boston would be under threat. The decision was a very risky one, especially since the USSR was behind in the arms race as far as ICBMs were concerned, and this was a way of seizing initiative back from the USA after they too, had stationed their own Jupiter Missiles in Turkey. The darkest moment in the countries' relationship came on the morning of October 15, 1962 when U.S. spy planes discovered evidence that the Soviet Union was building missile bases in Cuba. President Kennedy learned of the threat the following morning, while still in pajamas, and for the next 12 days the U.S. and Russia were locked in a white-knuckled nuclear face-off — the Cuban Missile Crisis — that ended only when Nikita Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's

secret proposal to remove U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for the de-arming of Cuba. The Soviet missiles were gone within six months, but it would take a long time for America to forgive the nation that allowed them to be placed so close to the American mainland.

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the Unites States to receive the support of the Organization of American States. Cuba’s immediate suspension from the OAS also fostered the hostility between the two. Upon holding secret meetings with EXCOMM policy makers, Kennedy concluded the most appropriate course of action to be taken was quarantine over Cuba.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS TIMELINE:

Day 1: October 16:

The thirteen days marking the most dangerous period of the Cuban Missile Crisis begin.

President Kennedy, principal foreign policy and national defense officials are briefed on the U-2 findings. Discussions begin on how to respond to the challenge.

Two principal courses are offered: an air strike and invasion, or a naval quarantine with the threat of further military action.

To avoid arousing public concern, the President maintained his official schedule, meeting periodically with advisors to discuss the status of events in Cuba and possible strategies.

Day 2: October 17:

American military units begin moving to bases in the Southeastern U.S. as intelligence photos from another U-2 flight show additional sites; and 16 to 32 missiles.

President Kennedy attends a brief service at St. Matthew's Cathedral in observance of the National Day of Prayer.

After, he has lunch with Crown Prince Hasan of Libya, and then makes a political visit to Connecticut in support of Democratic congressional candidates.

Day 3: October 18:

President Kennedy is visited by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who asserts that Soviet aid to Cuba is purely defensive and does not represent a threat to the United States.

Kennedy, without revealing what he knows of the existence of the missiles, reads to Gromyko his public warning of September 4 that the "gravest consequences" would follow if significant Soviet offensive weapons were introduced into Cuba.

Day 4: October 19:

President Kennedy leaves for a scheduled campaign trip to Ohio and Illinois.

In Washington, his advisers continue the debate over the necessary and appropriate course of action.

Day 5: October 20:

President Kennedy returns suddenly to Washington and after five hours of discussion with top advisers decides on the quarantine. Plans for deploying naval units are drawn and work is begun on a speech to notify the American people.

Day 6: October 21:

After attending Mass at St. Stephen's Church with Mrs. Kennedy, the President meets with General Walter Sweeney of the Tactical Air Command who tells him that an air strike could not guarantee 100% destruction of the missiles.

Day 7: October 22:

(Day Committee Convenes)

President Kennedy phones former Presidents Hoover, Truman and Eisenhower to brief them on the situation. Meetings to coordinate all actions continue.

Kennedy formally establishes the Executive Committee of the National Security Council and instructs it to meet daily during the crisis.

Kennedy briefs the cabinet and congressional leaders on the situation. Kennedy also informs British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the situation by telephone.

Day 8: October 23:

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin seeks a resolution of support from the Organization of American States.

Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson lays the matter before the U.N. Security Council.

The ships of the naval quarantine fleet move into place around Cuba. Soviet submarines threaten the quarantine by moving into the Caribbean area.

Soviet freighters bound for Cuba with military supplies stop dead in the water, but the oil tanker Bucharest continues towards Cuba.

In the evening Robert Kennedy meets with Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy.

Day 9: October 24:

Chairman Khrushchev replies indignantly to President Kennedy's October 23 letter stating in part:

"You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us."

Day 10: October 25:

Knowing that some missiles in Cuba were now operational, the President personally drafts a letter to Premier Khrushchev, again urging him to change the course of events.

Meanwhile, Soviet freighters turn and head back to Europe.

The Bucharest, carrying only petroleum products, is allowed through the quarantine line.

U.N. Secretary General U Thant calls for a cooling off period, which is rejected by Kennedy because it would leave the missiles in place.

Day 11: October 26:

A Soviet-chartered freighter is stopped at the quarantine line and searched for contraband military supplies.

None are found and the ship is allowed to proceed to Cuba. Photographic evidence shows accelerated construction of the missile sites and the uncrating of Soviet IL-28 bombers at Cuban airfields.

In a private letter, Fidel Castro urges Nikita Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike against the United States in the event of an American invasion of Cuba.

John Scali, ABC News reporter, is approached by Aleksander Fomin of the Soviet embassy staff with a proposal for a solution to the crisis.

Later, a long, rambling letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy makes a similar offer: removal of the missiles in exchange for lifting the quarantine and a pledge that the U.S. will not invade Cuba.

Day 12: October 27:

A second letter from Moscow demanding tougher terms, including the removal of obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey, is received in Washington.

Over Cuba, An American U-2 plane is shot down by a Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile and the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, is killed.

President Kennedy writes a letter to the widow of USAF Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., offering condolences, and informing her that President Kennedy is awarding him the Distinguished Service Medal, posthumously.

Day 13: October 28:

The thirteen days marking the most dangerous period of the Cuban missile crisis end.

Radio Moscow announces that the Soviet Union has accepted the proposed solution and releases the text of a Khrushchev letter affirming that the missiles will be removed in exchange for a non-invasion pledge from the United States.

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER

How can the General Assembly stop the United States of America and the Soviet Union from turning the world into an arena for nuclear war?

Can a peaceful political agreement be brought about between the two opposing blocs with regards to the respective ideologies they espouse?

Accountability measures and mechanisms for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons Can the development of nuclear weapons be regulated and whether or not it is a

necessary step for the future of warfare? Should restrictions be placed over joint defense treaties to prevent the

circumvention of international law? Can both blocs be expected to compensate for the damages incurred as a result of

the conflict? The impact of the conflict on the Cold War as a whole

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. “The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: 3 Perspectives- A Teacher’s Guide” by Phillip Brenner of Yale University.

2. Wilson Center’s “Cold War International History Project Bulletin: The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50”.

3. “Naval Blockades And Seapower: Strategies and Counter- Strategies” by Bruce Allen Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine.

4. Total Politics‟ article on “Macmillan’s Secret Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis” by Len Scott, on 24th August 2012.

5. The National Security Archive of George Washington University. 6. CIA‟s ex-Top Secret “Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on

Operation Mongoose” on 4th October 1962. 7. The British Ambassador to Cuba‟s letter to the Ministry of External Affairs in Cuba, titled

“The Cuban Crisis-Chapters I & II”, November 10th, 1962. 8. Modern History Guide‟s “The Warsaw Pact, 1955”. 9. http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cold-war/Warsaw-Pact.pdf 10. October1962.com 11. A Chronology of Events, The Cuban Missile Crisis, Source Notes 12. CIA Documents – 1962. 13. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/

cuban_missile_crisis/index.html14. http://rt.com/op-edge/198160-cuban-missile-crisis-us/ 15. http://cubanmissilecrisissla.weebly.com/index.html 16. http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-

states/p2794517. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11 18. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/comp1 19. http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/frequently-asked-questions/ 20. http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html 21. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis 22. http://history.stackexchange.com/questions/5614/was-the-un-critically-involved-

in-defusing-the-cuban-missile-crisis23. http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=13206