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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155109 March 14, 2012

C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, LABOR ARBITER ANTONIO M. VILLANUEVA, LABORARBITER ARTURO L. GAMOLO, SHERIFF OF NLRC RAB-XI-DAVAO CITY,NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL),FELIXBERTO IRAG, JOSHUA BARREDO, ERNESTO CUARIO, EDGAR MONDAY,EDILBERTO DEMETRIA, HERMINIO ROBILLO, ROMULO LUNGAY, MATROILDELOS SANTOS, BONERME MATURAN, RAUL CANTIGA, EDUARDOCAMPUSO, RUDY ANADON, GILBERTO GABRONINO, BONIFACIO SALVADOR,CIRILO MINO, ROBERTO ABONADO, WARLITO MONTE, PEDRO ESQUIERDO,ALFREDO TROPICO, DANILO MEJOS, HECTOR ESTUITA, BARTOLOMECASTILLANES, EDUARDO CAPUYAN, SATURNINO CAGAS, ALEJANDROHARDER, EDUARDO LARENA, JAIME MONTEDERAMOS, ERMELANDOBASADRE, REYNALDO LIMPAJAN, ELPIDIO LIBRANZA, TEDDY SUELO, JOSEAMOYLIN, TRANQUILINO ORALLO, CARLOS BALDOS, MANOLITOSABELLANO, CARMELITO TOBIAS, PRIMITIVO GARCIA, JUANITO

ALDEPOLLA, LUDIVICO ABAD, WENCISLAO INGHUG, RICARDO ALTO,EPIFANIO JARABAY, FELICIANO AMPER, ALEXANDER JUDILLA, ROBERTOANDRADE, ALFREDO LESULA, JULIO ANINO, BENITO MAGPUSAO, PEDROAQUINO, EDDIE MANSANADES, ROMEO ARANETA, ARGUILLAO MANTICA,CONSTANCIO ARNAIZ, ERNESTO HOTOY, JUSTINO ASCANO, RICARDOMATURAN, EDILBERTO YAMBAO, ANTONIO MELARGO, JESUS BERITAN,ARSENIO MELICOR, DIOSDADO BONGABONG, LAURO MONTENEGRO,CARLITO BURILLO, LEO MORA, PABLO BUTIL, ARMANDO GUCILA, JEREMIAHCAGARA, MARIO NAMOC, CARLITO CAL, GERWINO NATIVIDAD, ROLANDOCAPUYAN, EDGARDO ORDIZ, LEONARDO CASURRA, PATROCINIO ORTEGA,FILEMON CESAR, MARIO PATAN, ROMEO COMPRADO, JESUS PATOC,RAMON CONSTANTINO, ALBERTO PIELAGO, SAMUEL DELA LLANA, NICASIOPLAZA, ROSALDO DAGONDON, TITO GUADES, BONIFACIO DINAGUDOS,PROCOPIO RAMOS, JOSE EBORAN, ROSENDO SAJOL, FRANCISCOEMPUERTO, PATRICIO SALOMON, NESTOR ENDAYA, MARIO SALVALEON,ERNESTO ESTILO, BONIFACIO SIGUE, VICENTE FABROA, JAIME SUCUAHI,CELSO HUISO, ALEX TAUTO-AN, SATURNINO YAGON, CLAUDIO TIROL,SULPECIO GAGNI, JOSE TOLERO, FERVIE GALVEZ, ALFREDO TORALBA andEDUARDO GENELSA, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 155135

NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL),FELIXBERTO IRAG, JOSHUA BARREDO, ERNESTO CUARIO, EDGAR MONDAY,EDILBERTO DEMETRIA, HERMINIO ROBILLO, ROMULO LUNGAY, MATROILDELOS SANTOS, BONERME MATURAN, RAUL CANTIGA, EDUARDO

CAMPUSO, RUDY ANADON, GILBERTO GABRONINO, BONIFACIO SALVADOR,CIRILO MINO, ROBERTO ABONADO, WARLITO MONTE, PEDRO ESQUIERDO,

ALFREDO TROPICO, DANILO MEJOS, HECTOR ESTUITA, BARTOLOMECASTILLANES, EDUARDO CAPUYAN, SATURNINO CAGAS, ALEJANDROHARDER, EDUARDO LARENA, JAIME MONTEDERAMOS, ERMELANDOBASADRE, REYNALDO LIMPAJAN, ELPIDIO LIBRANZA, TEDDY SUELO, JOSEAMOYLIN, TRANQUILINO ORALLO, CARLOS BALDOS, MANOLITOSABELLANO, CARMELITO TOBIAS, PRIMITIVO GARCIA, JUANITOALDEPOLLA, LUDIVICO ABAD, WENCISLAO INGHUG, RICARDO ALTO,EPIFANIO JARABAY, FELICIANO AMPER, ALEXANDER JUDILLA, ROBERTOANDRADE, ALFREDO LESULA, JULIO ANINO, BENITO MAGPUSAO, PEDRO

AQUINO, EDDIE MANSANADES, ROMEO ARANETA, ARGUILLAO MANTICA,CONSTANCIO ARNAIZ, ERNESTO HOTOY, JUSTINO ASCANO, RICARDOMATURAN, EDILBERTO YAMBAO, ANTONIO MELARGO, JESUS BERITAN,ARSENIO MELICOR, DIOSDADO BONGABONG, LAURO MONTENEGRO,CARLITO BURILLO, LEO MORA, PABLO BUTIL, ARMANDO GUCILA, JEREMIAHCAGARA, MARIO NAMOC, CARLITO CAL, GERWINO NATIVIDAD, ROLANDOCAPUYAN, JUANITO NISNISAN, AURELIO CARIN, PRIMO OPLIMO, ANGELITOCASTANEDA, EDGARDO ORDIZ, LEONARDO CASURRA, PATROCINIOORTEGA, FILEMON CESAR, MARIO PATAN, ROMEO COMPRADO, JESUSPATOC, RAMON CONSTANTINO, MANUEL PIAPE, ROY CONSTANTINO,ALBERTO PIELAGO, SAMUEL DELA LLANA, NICASIO PLAZA, ROSALDODAGONDON, TITO GUADES, BONIFACIO DINAGUDOS, PROCOPIO RAMOS,JOSE EBORAN, ROSENDO SAJOL, FRANCISCO EMPUERTO, PATRICIOSALOMON, NESTOR ENDAYA, MARIO SALVALEON, ERNESTO ESTILO,

BONIFACIO SIGUE, VICENTE FABROA, JAIME SUCUAHI, CELSO HUISO, ALEXTAUTO-AN, SATURNINO YAGON, CLAUDIO TIROL, SULPECIO GAGNI, JOSETOLERO, FERVIE GALVEZ, ALFREDO TORALBA and EDUARDO GENELSA,Petitioners,vs.C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., EDITHA I. ALCANTARA, ATTY. NELIA A.CLAUDIO, CORNELIO E. CAGUIAT, JESUS S. DELA CRUZ, ROLANDO Z.ANDRES and JOSE MA. MANUEL YRASUEGUI, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 179220

NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA ALSONS-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFL), AND ITSMEMBERS whose names are listed below, Petitioners,vs.C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERALTA, J .:

For resolution are the (1) Motion for Partial Reconsideration1filed by C. Alcantara &

Sons, Inc. (CASI) and (2) Motion for Reconsideration2 filed by NagkahiusangMamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (the Union) and the Union officers

3 and their striking

members4of the Courts Decision

5dated September 29, 2010. In a Resolution

6dated

December 13, 2010, the parties were required to submit their respective Comments.After several motions for extension, the parties submitted the required comments.Hence, this resolution.

For a proper perspective, we state briefly the facts of the case.
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The negotiation between CASI and the Union on the economic provisions of theCollective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) ended in a deadlock prompting the Union tostage a strike,

7but the strike was later declared by the Labor Arbiter (LA) to be illegal

having been staged in violation of the CBAs no strike-no lockout provision.8

Consequently, the Union officers were deemed to have forfeited their employmentwith the company and made them liable for actual damages plus interest andattorneys fees, while the Union members were ordered to be reinstated withoutbackwages there being no proof that they actually committed illegal acts during thestrike.

9

Notwithstanding the provision of the Labor Code mandating that the reinstatementaspect of the decision be immediately executory, the LA refused to reinstate thedismissed Union members. On November 8, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the LAdecision insofar as it declared the strike illegal and ordered the Union officersdismissed from employment and liable for damages but modified the same byconsidering the Union members to have been validly dismissed from employment forcommitting prohibited and illegal acts.

10

On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals (CA) annulled the NLRC decision andreinstated that of the LA. Aggrieved, CASI, the Union and the Union officers andmembers elevated the matter to this Court. The cases were docketed as G.R. Nos.155109 and 155135.

11

During the pendency of the cases, the affected Union members (who were ordered

reinstated) filed with the LA a motion for reinstatement pending appeal and thecomputation of their backwages. Instead of reinstating the Union members, the LAawarded separation pay and other benefits.

12On appeal, the NLRC denied the Union

members claim for separation pay, accrued wages and other benefits.13

Whenelevated to the CA, the appellate court held that reinstatement pending appealapplies only to illegal dismissal cases under Article 223 of the Labor Code and not tocases under Article 263.

14 Hence, the petition by the Union and its officers and

members in G.R. No. 179220.

G.R. Nos. 155109, 155135, and 179220 were consolidated. On September 29, 2010,the Court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo saAlsons-SPFL and its officers and members in G.R. No. 155135 for lack of merit, and

REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP59604 dated March 20, 2002. The Court, on the other hand, GRANTS the petition ofC. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. in G.R. 155109 and REINSTATES the decision of theNational Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA M-004996-99 dated November 8,1999.

Further, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition of the Nagkahiusang Mamumuosa Alsons-SPFL and their dismissed members in G.R. No. 179220 and ORDERS C.Alcantara & Sons, Inc. to pay the terminated Union members backwages for four (4)months and nine (9) days and separation pays equivalent to one-half month salary forevery year of service to the company up to the date of their termination, with interestof 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until suchbackwages and separation pays are paid. The Court DENIES all other claims.

SO ORDERED.15

The Court agreed with the CA on the illegality of the strike as well as the terminationof the Union officers, but disagreed with the CA insofar as it affirmed thereinstatement of the Union members. The Court, instead, sustained the dismissal notonly of the Union officers but also the Union members who, during the illegal strike,committed prohibited acts by threatening, coercing, and intimidating non-strikingemployees, officers, suppliers and customers; obstructing the free ingress to andegress from the company premises; and resisting and defying the implementation ofthe writ of preliminary injunction issued against the strikers.16

The Court further held that the terminated Union members, who were ordered

reinstated by the LA, should have been immediately reinstated due to the immediateexecutory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision. In view, however, ofCASIs failure to reinstate the dismissed employees, the Court ordered CASI to paythe terminated Union members their accrued backwages from the date of the LAdecision until the eventual reversal by the NLRC of the order of reinstatement .

17 In

addition to the accrued backwages, the Court awarded separation pay as a form offinancial assistance to the Union members equivalent to one-half month salary forevery year of service to the company up to the date of their termination.

18

Not satisfied, CASI filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the above decisionbased on the following grounds:

I.

IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT A PRECEDENT SETTINGRULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ESCARIO V. NLRC [G.R. No.160302, 27 SEPTEMBER 2010] PARTICULARLY ON THE PROPERAPPLICATION OF ARTICLES 264 AND 279 OF THE LABOR CODE SUPPORTS THE AFFIRMATION AND NOT THE REVERSAL OF THEFINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ["CA"], AND NEGATES THEENTITLEMENT TO ACCRUED WAGES OF THE UNION MEMBERS WHOCOMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS DURING THE ILLEGAL STRIKE,NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER AWARDED THESAME.

II.

IT IS RESPECTFULY SUBMITTED THAT THIS HONORABLE COURTERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED TO GRANT SEPARATION PAY TO THE

UNION MEMBERS WHO COMMITTED ILLEGAL ACTS DURING THEILLEGAL STRIKE CONSIDERING THAT JURISPRUDENCE CITED TOJUSTIFY THE GRANT OF SEPARATION PAY DO NOT APPLY TO THEPRESENT CASE AS IT APPLIES ONLY TO DISMISSALS FOR A JUSTCAUSE.19

The Union, its officers and members likewise filed their separate motion forreconsideration assailing the Courts conclusions that: (1) the strike is illegal; (2) thatthe officers of the Union and its appointed shop stewards automatically forfeited theiremployment status when they participated in the strike; (3) that the Union memberscommitted illegal acts during the strike and are deemed to have lost their employmentstatus; and (4) that CASI is entitled to actual damages and attorneys fees .

20 They

also fault the Court in not finding that: (1) CASI and its officers are guilty of acts ofunfair labor practice or violation of Article 248 of the Labor Code; (2) the lockoutdeclared by the company is illegal; (3) CASI and its officers committed acts ofdiscrimination; (4) CASI and its officers violated Article 254 of the Labor Code; and (5)
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CASI and its officers are liable for actual, moral, and exemplary damages to theUnion, its officers and members.

21

Simply stated, CASI only questions the propriety of the award of backwages andseparation pay, while the Union, its officers and members seek the reversal of theCourts conclusions on the illegality of the strike, the validity of the termination of theUnion officers and members, and the award of actual damages and attorneys fees aswell as the denial of their counterclaims against CASI.

After a careful review of the records of the case, we find it necessary to reconsider

the Courts September 29, 2010 decision, but only as to the award of separation pay.The LA, the NLRC, the CA and the Court are one in saying that the strike staged bythe Union, participated in by the Union officers and members, is illegal being inviolation of the no strike-no lockout provision of the CBA which enjoined both theUnion and the company from resorting to the use of economic weapons available tothem under the law and to instead take recourse to voluntary arbitration in settlingtheir disputes.

22We, therefore, find no reason to depart from such conclusion.

Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code lays down the liabilities of the Union officers andmembers participating in illegal strikes and/or committing illegal acts, to wit:

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

(a) x x x

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of anunlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any Unionofficer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or Union officerwho knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may bedeclared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of aworker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of hisemployment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during suchlawful strike.

Thus, the above-quoted provision sanctions the dismissal of a Union officer whoknowingly participates in an illegal strike or who knowingly participates in thecommission of illegal acts during a lawful strike.

23In this case, the Union officers were

in clear breach of the above provision of law when they knowingly participated in theillegal strike.24

As to the Union members, the same provision of law provides that a member is liablewhen he knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike. Wefind no reason to reverse the conclusion of the Court that CASI presented substantialevidence to show that the striking Union members committed the following prohibitedacts:

a. They threatened, coerced, and intimidated non-striking employees,officers, suppliers and customers;

b. They obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the companypremises; and

c. They resisted and defied the implementation of the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued against the strikers.

25

The commission of the above prohibited acts by the striking Union members warrantstheir dismissal from employment.

As clearly narrated earlier, the LA found the strike illegal and sustained the dismissalof the Union officers, but ordered the reinstatement of the striking Union members forlack of evidence showing that they committed illegal acts during the illegal strike. Thisdecision, however, was later reversed by the NLRC. Pursuant to Article 223

26of the

Labor Code and well-established jurisprudence,27

the decision of the LA reinstating adismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,shall immediately be executory, pending appeal.

28 The employee shall either be

admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to hisdismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employee, merely reinstated in thepayroll.

29It is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of

the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the highercourt.

30 If the employer fails to exercise the option of re-admitting the employee to

work or to reinstate him in the payroll, the employer must pay the employees salariesduring the period between the LAs order of reinstatement pending appeal and theresolution of the higher court overturning that of the LA.

31In this case, CASI is liable

to pay the striking Union members their accrued wages for four months and ninedays, which is the period from the notice of the LAs order of reinstatement until thereversal thereof by the NLRC.

32

Citing Escario v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division),33

CASI claimsthat the award of the four-month accrued salaries to the Union members is not

sanctioned by jurisprudence. In Escario, the Court categorically stated that thestrikers were not entitled to their wages during the period of the strike (even if thestrike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike. The Courtfurther held that it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees shouldlitigate against their employer on the latters time.

34 In this case, however, the four-

month accrued salaries awarded to the Union members are not the backwagesreferred to in Escario. To be sure, the awards were not given as their salaries duringthe period of the strike. Rather, they constitute the employers liability to theemployees for its failure to exercise the option of actual reinstatement or payrollreinstatement following the LAs decision to reinstate the Union members asmandated by Article 223 of the Labor Code adequately discussed earlier. In otherwords, such monetary award refers to the Union members accrued salaries byreason of the reinstatement order of the LA which is self-executory pursuant to Article

223.35

We, therefore, sustain the award of the four-month accrued salaries.1wphi1Finally, as regards the separation pay as a form of financial assistance awarded bythe Court, we find it necessary to reconsider the same and delete the award pursuantto prevailing jurisprudence.

Separation pay may be given as a form of financial assistance when a worker isdismissed in cases such as the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation of theestablishment, or in case the employee was found to have been suffering from adisease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law.36 It is a statutoryright defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severancefrom the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal duringthe period that he is looking for another employment.37 It is oriented towards the

immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergobefore locating a replacement job.38 As a general rule, when just causes for
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terminating the services of an employee exist, the employee is not entitled toseparation pay because lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal acts.

39The

rule, however, is subject to exceptions.40

The Court, in Philippine Long DistanceTelephone Co. v. NLRC,41laid down the guidelines when separation pay in the formof financial assistance may be allowed, to wit:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of socialjustice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causesother than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where thereason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense

involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, theemployer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, orfinancial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of socialjustice.

A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewardingrather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree thatthe punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to dowith the wrong he has committed x x x.

42

We had the occasion to resolve the same issue in Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. WorkersAssociation (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission.

43 Following the

declaration that the strike staged by the Union members is illegal, the Union officersand members were considered validly dismissed from employment for committing

illegal acts during the illegal strike. The Court affirmed the CAs conclusion that thecommission of illegal acts during the illegal strike constituted serious misconduct.44Hence, the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members was notsustained.

45

Indeed, we applied social justice and equity considerations in several cases to justifythe award of financial assistance. In Piero v. National Labor RelationsCommission,

46the Court declared the strike to be illegal for failure to comply with the

procedural requirements. We, likewise, sustained the dismissal of the Union presidentfor participating in said illegal strike. Considering, however, that his infraction is not soreprehensible and unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard of his long years ofservice, and considering further that he has no previous derogatory records, wegranted financial assistance to support him in the twilight of his life after long years ofservice.

47The same compassion was also applied in Aparente, Sr. v. NLRC

48where

the employee was declared to have been validly terminated from service after havingbeen found guilty of driving without a valid drivers license, which is a clear violation ofthe companys rules and regulations.

49We, likewise, awarded financial assistance in

Salavarria v. Letran College50

to the legally dismissed teacher for violation of schoolpolicy because such infraction neither amounted to serious misconduct nor reflectedthat of a morally depraved person.

However, in a number of cases cited in Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. WorkersAssociation (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission,

51we refrained from

awarding separation pay or financial assistance to Union officers and members whowere separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal actsduring the strike.

52 In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Pilipino Telephone

Employees Association (PILTEA),53

the strike was found to be illegal because ofprocedural infirmities and for defiance of the Secretary of Labors assumption order.

Hence, we upheld the Union officers dismissal without granting financial assistance.In Sukhotai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court of Appeals,

54and Manila Diamond Hotel

and Resort, Inc. (Manila Diamond Hotel) v. Manila Diamond Hotel EmployeesUnion,

55 the Union officers and members who participated in and committed illegal

acts during the illegal strike were deemed to have lost their employment status andwere not awarded financial assistance.

In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. Court of Appeals,56the Court heldthat the strikers open and willful defiance of the assumption order of the Secretary ofLabor constitute serious misconduct and reflective of their moral character, hence,granting of financial assistance to them cannot be justified. In Chua v. National LaborRelations Commission,

57 we disallowed the award of financial assistance to the

dismissed employees for their participation in the unlawful and violent strike whichresulted in multiple deaths and extensive property damage because it constitutesserious misconduct on their part.

Here, not only did the Court declare the strike illegal, rather, it also found the Unionofficers to have knowingly participated in the il legal strike. Worse, the Union memberscommitted prohibited acts during the strike. Thus, as we concluded in Toyota,Telefunken, Chua and the other cases cited above, we delete the award of separationpay as a form of financial assistance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration of the Union, itsofficers and members are DENIED for lack of merit, while the motion for partialreconsideration filed by C. Alcantara & Sons, Inc. is PARTLY GRANTED. TheDecision of the Court dated September 29, 2010 is hereby PARTLY

RECONSIDERED by deleting the award of separation pay.SO ORDERED.
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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 187188 June 27, 2012

SALVADOR O. MOJAR, EDGAR B. BEGONIA, Heirs of the late JOSE M. CORTEZ,RESTITUTO GADDI, VIRGILIO M. MONANA, FREDDIE RANCES, and EDSON D.TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC., et al.,1Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J. :

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking toannul the entire proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102201,in which it issued its Decision dated 21 July 2008 and Resolution dated 16 March 2009.2

Statement of Facts and of the Case

Petitioners were employed as security guards by respondent and assigned to the variousbranches of the Bank of Commerce in Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur.

In separate Office Orders dated 23 and 24 May 2002, petitioners were relieved from their

respective posts and directed to report to their new assignments in Metro Manila effective3 June 2002. They, however, failed to report for duty in their new assignments, promptingrespondent to send them a letter dated 18 June 2002. It required a written explanation whyno disciplinary action should be taken against them, but the letter was not heeded.

On 15 February 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondentand the Bank of Commerce, Dagupan Branch, before the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC). Petitioners claimed, among others, that their reassignment was ascheme to sever the employer-employee relationship and was done in retaliation for theirpressing their claim for salary differential, which they had earlier filed against respondentand the Bank of Commerce before the NLRC. They also contended that the transfer toManila was inconvenient and prejudicial, since they would incur additional expenses forboard and lodging.

On 22 May 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision3finding that petitioners were

illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondentsto reinstate all the complainants to their former assignment in Pangasinan with fullbackwages and if reinstatement is no longer possible, to pay separation pay of one monthfor every year of service each of the seven complainant security guards. (A detailedcomputation of the judgment award is attached as Annex "A.")4(Italicized in the original)

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LAs ruling, with the modification that the Complaintagainst the Bank of Commerce was dismissed.5The dispositive portion provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of Agro Commercial Security ServiceAgency, Inc. is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Appeal of Bank of Commerce isGRANTED for being impressed with merit. Accordingly, judgment is hereby renderedMODIFYING the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 22, 2006 by DISMISSING the

complaint against Bank of Commerce-Dagupan. All other dispositions of the Labor Arbiternot so modified, STAYS.6

On 23 January 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Extension to file a Petition for Certioraribefore the CA. In a Resolution dated 20 February 2008, the latter granted the Motion forExtension, allowing respondent until 10 February 2008 within which to file its Petition. On 9February 2008, respondent filed its Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court.

On 30 June 2008, the CA issued a Resolution noting that no comment on the Petition hadbeen filed, and stating that the case was now deemed submitted for resolution.

On 21 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision. Finding merit in the Petition, it found theOrders transferring petitioners to Manila to be a valid exercise of management prerogative.The records were bereft of any showing that the subject transfer involved a diminution of

rank or salaries. Further, there was no showing of bad faith or ill motive on the part of theemployer. Thus, petitioners refusal to comply with the transfer orders constituted willfuldisobedience of a lawful order of an employer and abandonment, which were just causesfor termination under the Labor Code. However, respondent failed to observe the dueprocess requirements in terminating them. The dispositive portion of the CA Decisionprovides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailedDecision and Resolution of the NLRC dated July 31, 2007 and October 31, 2007[,]respectively, in NLRC NCR CA No. 046036-05 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thecomplaints of private respondents for illegal dismissal are hereby DISMISSED. However,petitioner is ordered to pay private respondents the sum of P 10,000.00 each for havingviolated the latters right to statutory due process.

7

On 1 August 2008, petitioner Mojar filed a Manifestation8 before the CA, stating that he

and the other petitioners had not been served a copy of the CA Petition. He also said thatthey were not aware whether their counsel before the NLRC, Atty. Jose C. Espinas, wasserved a copy thereof, since the latter had already been bedridden since December 2007until his demise on "25 February 2008."9Neither could their new counsel, Atty. Mario G.

Aglipay, enter his appearance before the CA, as petitioners failed to "get [the] folder fromthe office of Atty. Espinas, as the folder can no longer be found."10

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Annul Proceedings11 dated 9 September 2008before the CA. They moved to annul the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.They argued that the NLRC Decision had already attained finality, since the Petition beforethe CA was belatedly filed, and the signatory to the Certification of non-forum shoppinglacked the proper authority.

In a Resolution dated 16 March 2009, the CA denied the Motion to Annul Proceedings.

Hence, this Petition.The Petition raised the following arguments: (1) There was no proof of service attached tothe Motion for Extension to file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA; thus, both the Motionand the Petition were mere scraps of paper. (2) Respondent purposely intended to excludepetitioners from the proceedings before the CA by omitting their actual addresses in theCA Petition, a mandatory requirement under Section 3, Rule 46; in relation to Section 1,Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Further, respondent failed to prove the valid service of itsCA Petition upon petitioners former counsel of record. (3) The CA was grossly ignorant ofthe law in ignoring jurisprudence, which states that when the floating status of anemployee lasts for more than six months, the latter may be considered to have beenconstructively dismissed.

On 3 September 2009, respondent filed its Comment on the Petition, pursuant to thisCourts 29 June 2009 Resolution. In its Comment, it argued that the CA Decision had

already become final and executory, inasmuch as the Motion to Annul Proceedings, aprocedural approach not provided for in the Rules, was filed some 44 days after the
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service of the CA Decision on the counsel for petitioners. Further, Atty. Aglipay had thenno legal standing to appear as counsel, considering that there was still no substitution ofcounsel at the time he filed the Motion to Annul Proceedings. In any case, petitioners arebound by the actions of their counsel, Atty. Espinas.

On 1 March 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring petitioners to file their reply,which petitioners complied with on 26 April 2010. In their Reply, petitioners state amongothers that the records of the CA case showed that there was a deliberate violation of theirright to due process. The CA Petition did not contain the required affidavit of service, whichalone should have caused the motu proprio dismissal thereof. Further, the instant Petitionbefore this Court is an appropriate mode to contest the CA Decision and Resolution, whichpetitioners contend are void judgments. They also argue that there is no rule on the clientssubstitution in case of the death of counsel. Instead, the reglementary period to filepleadings in that case must be suspended and made more lenient, considering that theduty of substitution is transferred to a non-lawyer.

On 30 March 2011, respondent filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case. Petitionerslikewise filed a Motion for Leave (For the Admission of the Instant Comment on PrivateRespondents Motion for Early Resolution), stating that they were joining responden t inmoving for the early resolution of the case.

This Court will resolve the issues raised in seriatim.

Actual Addresses of Parties

Petitioners contend that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the Petition before it,

as their actual addresses were not indicated therein as required under Section 3, Rule 4612

of the Rules of Court, and pursuant to Cendaa v. Avila.13In the 2008 case Cendaa, thisCourt ruled that the requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain the actualaddresses of all the petitioners and the respondents is mandatory. The failure to complywith that requirement is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of a petition.

This rule, however, is not absolute. In the 2011 case Santos v. Litton Mills Incorporated,14this Court ruled that where the petitioner clearly mentioned that the parties may be servedwith the courts notices or processes through their respective counsels, whose addresseshave been clearly specified as in this case, this act would constitute substantialcompliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46. The Court further observed thatthe notice required by law is notice to counsel if the party has already appeared bycounsel, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

In its Petition before the CA, respondent clearly indicated the following:

THE PARTIES

2.0. The petitioner AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, INC. (hereafterpetitioner AGRO), is a corporation existing under Philippine laws, and may be served withprocess thru counsel, at his address hereunder indicated; private respondents (1)SALVADOR O. MOJAR; (2) EDGAR B. BEGONIA; (3) JOSE M. CORTEZ; (4) FREDDIERANCES; (5) VIRGILIO MONANA; (6) RESTITUTU [sic] GADDI; and, (7) EDSON D.TOMAS, are all of age, and during the material period, were in the employ of petitioner

AGRO as security guards; said respondents may be served with process thru theircommon counsel, ATTY. JOSE C. ESPINAS at No. 51 Scout Tuazon, Quezon City; on theother hand, respondent National Labor Relations Commission, 1st Division, Quezon City,is the agency having jurisdiction over labor disputes in the Philippines and may be servedwith process at offices in Quezon City;15

The foregoing may thus be considered as substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46.In any case, and as will be discussed further below, the CA had sufficient reason to takecognizance of the Petition.

Affidavit of Service

Section 3, Rule 46 provides that the petition for certiorari should be filed together with theproof of service thereof on the respondent. Under Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules ofCourt, if service is made by registered mail, as in this case, proof shall be made by anaffidavit of the person mailing and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Section3, Rule 46 further provides that the failure to comply with any of the requirements shall besufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioners allege that no affidavit of service was attached to the CA Petition. Neither isthere any in the copy of the CA Petition attached to the instant Petition. In its Comment,

respondent claims that petitioners through their counsel, Atty. Aglipay can be chargedwith knowledge of the pendency of the CA Petition. It says that on April 2008, Atty. Aglipayfiled before the NLRC an Entry of Appearance and Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.16However, petitioners merely indicated therein that they were "respectfully mov[ing] for theexecution pending appeal of the Labor Arbiters decision dated 22 May 2006 affirmed bythe NLRC."17There was no indication that they had been served a copy of the CA Petition.No other proof was presented by respondent to show petitioners actual receipt of the CAPetition. In any case, this knowledge, even if presumed, would not and could not takethe place of actual service and proof of service by respondent.

In Ferrer v. Villanueva,18 petitioner therein failed to append the proof of service to hisPetition for Certiorari. Holding that this failure was a fatal defect, the Court stated:

There is no question that petitioner herein was remiss in complying with the foregoingRule. In Cruz v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that with respect to motions, proof of service is

a mandatory requirement. We find no cogent reason why this dictum should not apply andwith more reason to a petition for certiorari, in view of Section 3, Rule 46 which requiresthat the petition shall be filed "together with proof of service thereof." We agree with theCourt of Appeals that the lack of proof of service is a fatal defect. The utter disregard of theRule cannot be justified by harking to substantial justice and the policy of liberalconstruction of the Rules. Technical rules of procedure are not meant to frustrate the endsof justice. Rather, they serve to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thuseffectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. (Emphasis in the original)

Indeed, while an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has beenmade on the other party, it is nonetheless essential to due process and the orderlyadministration of justice.19

Be that as it may, it does not escape the attention of this Court that in the CA Resolutiondated 16 March 2009, the appellate court stated that their records revealed that Atty.

Espinas, petitioners counsel of record at the time, was duly served a copy of the following:CA Resolution dated 20 February 2008 granting respondents Motion for Extension ofTime to file the CA Petition; CA Resolution dated 24 April 2008 requiring petitioners to filetheir Comment on the CA Petition; and CA Resolution dated 30 June 2008, submitting thecase for resolution, as no comment was filed.

Such service to Atty. Espinas, as petitioners counsel of record, was valid despite the facthe was already deceased at the time. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel,service of pleadings and judgments shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unlessservice upon the party is specifically ordered by the court. It is not the duty of the courts toinquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representingone of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, orwhether its associates are still connected with the firm.20

It is the duty of party-litigants to be in contact with their counsel from time to time in order

to be informed of the progress of their case. It is likewise the duty of parties to inform thecourt of the fact of their counsels death.

21Their failure to do so means that they have been
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negligent in the protection of their cause.22They cannot pass the blame to the court, whichis not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel.

Substitution of Counsel

Petitioners claim that Atty. Espinas passed away on 8 February 2008. They further claimthat he was already bedridden as early as December 2007, and thus they "failed to get anyinformation whether [he] was served with a copy of the [CA Petition]."23

Petitioners were negligent in the conduct of their litigation. Having known that Atty. Espinaswas already bedridden as early as December 2007, they should have already obtained

new counsel who could adequately represent their interests. The excuse that Atty. Aglipaycould not enter his appearance before the CA "because [petitioners] failed to get [their]folder from the office of Atty. Espinas"24is flimsy at best.

The requirements for a valid substitution of counsel have been jurisprudentially settled inthis wise:

Under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a validsubstitution of counsel has the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written applicationfor substitution; (2) the client's written consent; (3) the consent of the substituted lawyer ifsuch consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be procured, (4) aproof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the mannerrequired by the Rules. Where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution ofthe counsel, a verified proof of the death of such attorney (usually a death certificate) mustaccompany the notice of appearance of the new counsel.25

The fact that petitioners were unable to obtain their folder from Atty. Espinas is immaterial.Proof of service upon the lawyer to be substituted will suffice where the lawyers consentcannot be obtained. With respect to the records of the case, these may easily bereconstituted by obtaining copies thereof from the various courts involved.

Petitioners allegedly went to the CA sometime prior to 31 July 2008, or the date of filing oftheir Manifestation before the CA, to inquire about the status of their case. Allegedly, they"always visited the Court of Appeals for [the] development of their case. "26 It is doubtfulthat a person who regularly follows up the status of his case before a court would not betold, first, that a petition has been filed against him; and, second, that the courtsresolutions have been sent to his counsel. It is questionable why, knowing these matters,petitioners did not seek the replacement of their counsel, if the latter was unable to pursuetheir case. Further, despite their manifestation that, sometime prior to 31 July 2008, theywere already aware that the case had been submitted for resolution, they still waited until 9

September 2008 or until they allegedly had knowledge of the CA Decision before theyfiled the Motion to Annul Proceedings.

In Ampo v. Court of Appeals,27this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercised bya party:

We are not persuaded by petitioners argument that he was not aware that his counsel haddied or that an adverse judgment had already been rendered until he received the notice ofpromulgation from the RTC of Butuan City on April 20, 2005. Time and again we havestated that equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Petitioner shouldhave taken it upon himself to periodically keep in touch with his counsel, check with thecourt, and inquire about the status of the case. Had petitioner been more prudent, hewould have found out sooner about the death of his counsel and would have taken thenecessary steps to prevent his present predicament.

x x x x x x x x x

Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sitback, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party whoseeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law wasdue to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner onlyhas himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process issimply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded afair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Wherea party, such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so,he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it isdeemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.

In this case, petitioners must bear the fruits of their negligence in the handling of theircase. They may not decry the denial of due process, when they were indeed afforded theright to be heard in the first place.

Substantive Issue: Illegal Dismissal

Petitioners argue that they were illegally dismissed, based on the 1989 case AgroCommercial Security Services Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.,28which holds that when the floatingstatus of employees lasts for more than six (6) months, they may be considered to havebeen illegally dismissed from the service.

Unfortunately, the above-mentioned case is not applicable here. In Agro, the servicecontracts of the security agency therein with various corporations and governmentagencies to which the security guards were previously assigned were terminated,generally due to the sequestration of the said offices. Accordingly, many of the security

guards were placed on floating status. "Floating status" means an indefinite period of timewhen one does not receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law .29 In this case,petitioners were actually reassigned to new posts, albeit in a different location from wherethey resided. Thus, there can be no floating status or indefinite period to speak of. Instead,petitioners were the ones who refused to report for work in their new assignment.

In cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever theemployment relationship between the security guards and their agency. Employees havethe right to security of tenure, but this does not give them such a vested right to theirpositions as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change their assignment ortransfer them where their services, as security guards, will be most beneficial to theclient.30

An employer has the right to transfer or assign its employees from one office or area ofoperation to another in pursuit of its legitimate business interest, provided there is no

demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the transfer isnot motivated by discrimination or bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment ordemotion without sufficient cause.31

While petitioners may claim that their transfer to Manila will cause added expenses andinconvenience, we agree with the CA that, absent any showing of bad faith or ill motive onthe part of the employer, the transfer remains valid.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 July 2008and Resolution dated 16 March 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102201 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 152048 April 7, 2009

FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA, Petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO,

Respondents.D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J. :

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent PhilippineTelegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively,in PT&Ts Shipping Section, Materials Management Group.

Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the ShippingSection, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the matter. It wasdiscovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goodsshipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces oftampering, alteration and superimposition.

On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days fortheir alleged involvement in the anomaly.1 Their suspension was extended for 15 daystwice: first on October 3, 19932and second on October 18, 1993.3

On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued by respondents:

In line with the recommendation of the AVP-Audit as presented in his report of October 15,1993 (copy attached) and the subsequent filing of criminal charges against the partiesmentioned therein, [Mr. Felix Perez and Mr. Amante Doria are] hereby dismissed from theservice for having falsified company documents.4(emphasis supplied)

On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegaldismissal.5They alleged that they were dismissed on November 8, 1993, the date theyreceived the above-mentioned memorandum.

The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of petiti oners suspension and their

subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered respondents to pay petitioners theirsalaries during their 30-day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them withbackwages and 13th month pay.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the laborarbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they were accorded dueprocess and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days (without stating the reasonfor the reduction of the period of petitioners illegal suspension).6

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its January 29, 2002 decision,7 theCA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners illegal suspension for 15 days anddismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissedwithout due process.

Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision. They contend that there was no justcause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process and that they wereillegally suspended for 30 days.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

Respondents Failed to Prove JustCause and to Observe Due Process

The CA, in upholding the NLRCs decision, reasoned that there was sufficient basis forrespondents to lose their confidence in petitioners8 for allegedly tampering with theshipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order orrequest, as it was the basis of their liability to a cargo forwarder.9

We disagree.

Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find respondentsevidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss ofconfidence resulted.10Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documentscame into petitioners hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence ofpetitioners functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approvalof shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved.There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the allegedtampering of shipping documents.

The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitionersbecause it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to thesedocuments. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunalsshould not rely only on the statement of the employer that it has lost confidence in itsemployee.11

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or dulyauthorized representative is a just cause for termination.12However, in General Bank andTrust Co. v. CA,

13we said:

[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge forcauses which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarilyasserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not amere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause inview of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the LaborCode. The employers evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which theloss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest.14 It must be adequatelyproven by substantial evidence.15Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure toobserve due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of anemployee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a writtennotice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonableopportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon dueconsideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer'sdecision to dismiss the employee.16

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance todefend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work and servednotices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security oftenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found that respondents failed to comply withthe two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

Petitioners likewise contended that due process was not observed in the absence of a

hearing in which they could have explained their side and refuted the evidence againstthem.
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There is no need for a hearing or conference. We note a marked difference in thestandards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and itsimplementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer mustprovide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with theassistance of his representative if he so desires:

ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. x x x

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to beprotected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice tothe requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the

worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing astatement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity tobe heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he sodesires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant toguidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by theemployer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity orlegality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National LaborRelations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid orauthorized cause shall rest on the employer. (emphasis supplied)

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing andconference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond tothe charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him:17

Section 2. Security of Tenure. x x x

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shallbe substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the LaborCode:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds fortermination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which toexplain his side.

(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with theassistance of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond tothe charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented againsthim.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upondue consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to

justify his termination. (emphasis supplied)

Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in cases involvingthe dismissal of an employee? Can the apparent conflict between the law and its IRR bereconciled?

At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in case of conflict, the lawprevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.18The authority to promulgateimplementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or regulation mustconform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute.19As such, itcannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.20

Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an

employee must be given "ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself." Thus, theopportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word "ample"

which ordinarily means "considerably more than adequate or sufficient. "21 In this regard,the phrase "ample opportunity to be heard" can be reasonably interpreted as extensiveenough to cover actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of theImplementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article 277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Codeshould not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a conditionsine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination ofemployment. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot bewhether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer andthe employee. The "ample opportunity to be heard" standard is neither synonymous norsimilar to a formal hearing. To confine the employees right to be heard to a solitary formnarrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducingevidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation isoverly restrictive. The "very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible

procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."22

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in generallanguage revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability tomeet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such asa formal hearing will defeat its spirit.

Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Codeitself provides that the so-called standards of due process outlined therein shall beobserved "substantially,"not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing orconference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

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