chapter 6 and 7 cases

8/11/2019 Chapter 6 and 7 Cases

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CHAPTER 6 AND 7 CASES

G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

C. de G. Alvear for petitioner.Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the Province of Panto a certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buthe terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commissio30973, 36830, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an applicatioperate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with the termexisting certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of September 26, 1939, application for increase of equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:

Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada por e454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de convenciencia publica expedidos en los expediente36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos sigu

Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba mencionados seran validos y subsistentes solamente duanos, contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta decision.

Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del mismque lo deseare previo pago del precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la Coadquisicion.

Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service Commission on November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 2petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Publcertify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that this court, after hearing, render a decisiCommonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commoconstitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not applicable to valid and subsisting certific

8, 1939. Stated in the language of the petitioner, it is contended:1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, withexcept the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislapremises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.

2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Puhas exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.

Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the respoCommission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads as follows:

With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines without subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promin a proper and suitable manner.

The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its ureasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violationshall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Co

In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or other cirvalue in the market shall be taken into consideration.


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applicable to existing certificates of public convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there wasway of amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time," but the

x x x x x x x x x

Sr. CUENCO. Seor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina, lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las palabrascertificate shall be valid only for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Pvigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que bo se puede determinar cuando los intereses del servexplotacion de un servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de Servisios, si en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la explotacion de los servicios publicos depende de condiciones fvolumen como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el servicio publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicoexige. El interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es permanente; es un proceso mas o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempen el caucus de anoche.

EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. Que dice el Comite?

Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista de que esto certificados de conveniencia publica esepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compaia durante el tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir laextendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia publica de una manera que podanos, porque seria anticonstitucional.

x x x x x x x x x

By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de mayo de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)

The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted before June 8, 19Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted tunder the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Ja similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporatioconditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Conprovided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, excit shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires." The Nvirtue of the Constitution, logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal angranted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, ththe extent therein provided, has declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.

Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operat

Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's operations prior to May 1subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the statesoon as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities, become at once subject to the police power thProcedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after itsthose already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute pthe police power. The only distinction recognized in the statute between those established before and those established afteis in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A certificate of public convenience and necessity it required for ansuch certificate is required of any transportation company for the operation which was actually carried on in good faith on distinction in the creation of their operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to supervise and regulatepower of the Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against companies securing their operative rightagainst those subsequently securing such right under a certificate of public convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. Commission of California et al., 209 Pac. 586.)

Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fa common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public rproperty is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to ahas an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for thextent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but so long as he maintains thecontrol. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to exercisepublic utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners. (Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil., 1, citi


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U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. BriConnecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.) This right of utilities is founded upon the police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thethe public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligaproperty without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily placservice he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-10.) in the hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property right, and is m(Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of DepartmentMass. 583, 160 N. E. 321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], [d] 220; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)

Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are, however, of the opiniPublic Service Commission should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for further proceedings for the reason now toService Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at any time any certificate iof this Act, whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was issued have been misrepresechanged." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its ecomply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years ofpublic convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. Thehave taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) yeatwenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinamust be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes theinterested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hugh(304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimenplay." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rbut the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 90the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented cor consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity whnamely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at leas(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutionathe vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission for further proceelaw and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.


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CONNALLY V. SCUDDER, 160 N.E. 655

G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,vs.CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the officCommissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investig

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner oposition created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitlcompensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The appropriation laws (Rep. 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression:

1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing not why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, conconsolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answeSecretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relabe submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and RRules of Court.

On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of thebased on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public intere"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."

On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Ju

jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denieRegistration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administnature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incid judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Sthe conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and prCourt of First Instance.

First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspensspecifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unexist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of LanJudge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication theonly by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the sameby a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. These fathe Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No. 4631) and (e) the SecurCommissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implicatgrant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and whichplaced under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).


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Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the Presideby the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the CourJustices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive oprivileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of thAgrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (Republic Act 1267, as amendNo. 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same manner provided Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Cthe Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in pllanguage.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really intended to inclu"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Coor removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it woudoctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over execusimultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655), saying:

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except whthe fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al., 281 U.S. 469, 74 Law

But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was bro judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases anwithin the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or partfunctions which are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. CWarehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assoed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (FCommission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis supplied.)

In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required

to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transpo600).1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of is endowed with judicial functions. The section invoked runs as follows:

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to thstep to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submCommissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which hsuggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by thim, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be takbe made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, wdisagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial functioadministrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commconclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation1 in effect identifies Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alonCommissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is licorresponding department head.


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But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quanalysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, wresolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the l

Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meathem in conflict with the Constitution,2 We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissionethe "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, theinvestigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwisprivileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of thCommissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor act

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No co


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SPRINGER V. P.I., 277 U.S. 189

G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs,vs.MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, F. C. Fisher, and Hugh C. Smith for plaintiff.Jose Abad Santos; Ross, Lawrence and Selph; Paredes, Buencamino and Yulo;Araneta and Zaragoza; Charles E. Tenney; Camus, Delgado and Recto and Mariano H. de Joya for defendants.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three dirCompany who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vestedcommittee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representativ

The material facts are averred in the complaint of the plaintiff and admitted in the demurrer of the defendants.

The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine Legislatur2822, and of the Corporation law. By the terms of the charter of the corporation, the Governor-General was directed to subGovernment of the Philippine Islands for at least fifty-one per cent of the capital of the corporation. The government eventumore than ninety-nine per cent of the thirty thousand outstanding shares of stocks of the National Coal Company. Only ninenames of private individuals.

On November 9, 1926, the Government-General promulgated Executive Order No. 37. Reference was made therein to opiAdvocate General of the United States Army and of the Acting Attorney-General of the United States wherein it was held tstatutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties arespect to certain corporations in which the Philippine Government is the owner of stock, are nullities. Announcement wasthe invalidity of the portions of the Acts creating the voting committee or board of control, the Governor-General would, thexclusivelythe duties and powers theretofore assumed by the voting committee or board of control. Notice of the contents ogiven to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (24 Off. Gaz., 2419.)

A special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company was called for December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the aof electing directors and the transaction of such other business as migh properly come before the meeting. Prior thereto, onPresident of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as members of the voting committee, requested thconvene the committee at 2:30 p. m., on December 6, 1926, to decide upon the manner in which the stock held by the GoveCoal Company should be voted. TheGovernor-General acknowledged receipt of this communication but declined to particimeeting. The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives did in fact meet at the time and placeto the Governor-General. It was then and there resolved by them that at the special meeting of the stockholders, the votes reof the Government in the National Coal Company, should be cast in favor of five specified persons for directors of the com

On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company with the call. The Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the sole power to vote the stock of the GovernmeSenate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the secretary of the company aminutes of the meeting of the committee held at the office of the company a half hour before. The Governor-General, throuthereupon objected to the asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, aobjected to the assertion of the Governor-General.

The chair recognized the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in their capacity as majovoting committee as the persons lawfully entitled to represent and vote the Government stock. To this the representative of made protest and demanded that it be entered of record in the minutes. The vote cast by the President of the Senate and theof Representatives was in favor of Alberto Barretto,Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, Anselmo Hilario, and Frank B. IGeneral through his represetative, alleging representation of the Government stock, cast his vote in favor of Alberto BarretFrank B. Ingersoll, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo. The chair declared the ballot cast by the President of the Senate aHouse as electing the names therein indicated, directors of the National Coal Company.

Immediately after the stockholder's meeting, the persons declared by the chairman to have been elected, met and undertookof directors of the National Coal Company by the election of officers. All the directors for whom the President of the Senat


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House of Representatives voted and who were declared elected at the meeting of the stockholders participated in this meetthem, were the three defendants, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario.

The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of Augusenacted under authority of that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it.

The Government of the Philippine Islands is an agency of the Congress, the principal, has seen fit to entrust to the Philippinare distributed among three coordinate departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It is true that the Organidistributing clause. But the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our Admiand again been approvingly enforced by this court.

No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by the Organothers. Again it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division ofdepartments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this cobranches of the Government is in the main independent of the others. The doctrine is too firmly imbedded in Philippine ins(Administrative Code sec. 17; Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson [1905], 5 Phil., 87; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; Sevand Provincial Board of Occidental Negros [1910], 16 Phil., 366; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco vs. Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil., Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338; Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho [1922], 43 Phil., 1; AbuevPhil., 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon [1924], 46 Phil., 83.)

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other waythe Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. The Governor-General must find his powers and dutiAn act of the Philippine Legislature must comply with the grant from Congress. The jurisdiction of this court and other couconstitutional provisions.

These canons of political science have more than ordinary significance in the Philippines. To the Government of the Philipdelegated a large degree of autonomy, and the chief exponent of that autonomy in domestic affairs is the Philippine LegislaGeneral on the other hand of the Government and symbolizes American sovereignty. That under such a political system, libetween the legislative and the executive departments are difficult to fix, and that attempted encroachments of one on the onot dissuade the Supreme Court, as the guardian of the constitution, from enforcing fundamental principles.

The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands. In addition to spgiven "general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of the Philippine Islands as fawith the provisions of this act. "He is also made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islandsoperative within Philippine Islands."The authority of the Governor-General is made secure by the important proviso "that aGovernment must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under thesupervision

Governor-General. "(Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive owith the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through the Secretaries of Departmenagency, according to law." (Se.58)

The Organic Act grants general legislative power except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature. (Orgabefore the approval of the existing Organic Act, it was held that the Philippine Legislature has practically the same powersiwithin the sphere in which it may operate as the Congress of the United States. (Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.)is now that an Act of the Philippine Legislature which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid, unless thecovered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the Organic Law. The legislative poGovernment is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. (Gaspar vs. Molina [1905], 5 Phil., 197; U. S. vs. Bu[1913], 24 Phil., 37; U. S. vs. Limsiongco [1920],41 Phil., 94; Concepcion vs. Paredes, supra.)

An independent judiciary completes the governmental system. Thejudicial power is conferred on the Supreme Couts, Courinferior courts. (Organic Act, se. 26)

It is axiomatic that the Philippine Legislature was provided to make the law, the office of the Governor-General to execute to construe the law. What is legislative, an executive, or a judicial act, as distinguished one from the other, is not alwayseasclassification is difficult. Negatively speaking, it has been well said that "The legislature has no authority to execute or conhas no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." (U. S. vs. And Ta

It is legislative power which has been vested in the Philippine Legislature. What is legislative power? Judge Cooley says heauthority, under the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." Those matters which the constitution specificexecutive "the legislature cannot directly or indirectly take from his control." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,President Wilson in his authoritative work, "The State", page 487, emphasizes by italics that legislatures "are law making bgifts of charters, and are by these charters in most cases very strictly circumscribed in their action." If this is true, the conveis not executive or judicial or governmental power needs no demonstration. The Legislature essentially executive or judicia


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make a law and them take part in its execution or construction. So the Philippine Legislature is not a partaker in either execexcept as thePhilippine Senate participates in the executive power through the Governor-General, and except as the Philippin the executive power through having the right to confirm or reject nominations made by the Governor-General, and exceparticipates in the judicial power through being made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its electihaving the right to try its own members for disorderly behavior. The Philippine, Legislature may nevertheless exercise sucnecessary and appropriate to its indenpdence and to make its express powers effective. (McGrain vs. Daugherty [1927], 27580.)

When one enters on a study of the abstract question, Where does the power to appoint to public office reside?, one is nearlyconflicting authority. Yet we have been at pains to review all of the cases cited by counsel and others which have not been loose from the encumbering details of the decisions, we discern through them a few elemental truths which distiguish certawhich point the way for us in the Philippines.

The first principle which is noticed is that the particular wording of the constitution involved, and its correct interpretation Does the constitutions deny the legislative body the right of exercising the appointing power. The legislature may not do so[1857], 7 O. St., 547; Clark vs. Stanley[1872], 66 N. C., 28.) Does the constitution confer upon the government the power tappointment. The authorities are in conflict as to whether the legislature the power to prescribe the manner of appointment.conflict as to whether the legislature may itself make the appointment. Does the constitution merely contain the usual clausof government and no clause regulating appointments. The weight of judicial opinion seems to be that the power of appointexclusively an executive function and that the legislature may not only create offices but may also fill them itself, but with most respectable quarters. (Contrast Pratt vs. Breckinridge [1901], 112 Ky., 1, and State vs.Washburn [1901], 167 Mo., 680Freeman [1889], 80 Cal., 233, and Richardson vs. Young [1909], 122 Tenn., 471.)

The second thought running through the decisions is that in the state governments, the selection of persons to perform the fis primarily a prerogative of the people. The general powerto appoint officers is not inherent in any branch of the governmeexercise their political rights directly or by delegation. Should the people grant the exclusive right of appointment to the goright; but if they should otherwise dispose of it, it must be performed as the sovereign has indicated. Inasmuch, however, asthe repository of plenary power, except as otherwise restricted, and the chief executive of the State is not, legislative bodieslatitude in the premises. But this situation does not obtain in the Philippines where the people are not sovereign, and wherenot flow from them but are granted by delegation from Congress.

It may finally be inferred from the books that the appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as properly an exof appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power. Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts, btaken as an incident to the discharge of functions properly within their respective spheres. (State vs. Brill [1907], 100 Minn[1912], 55 Colo., 24; Spartanburg County vs. Miller [1924], 132 S. E., 673; Mechem on Public Officers, secs. 103-108; MeAppoint to Office; Its Location and Limits, 1 Mich. Law Rev. [1903], 531.)

From the viewpoint of one outside looking in, it would seem that the State legislatures have all too often been permitted to properly belonging to the executive deparment, and that the governor of the State has been placed with the responsibility ogovernment without the means of doing so. The operations of the executive department have been fundamentally variedbydepartment. The legislature has absorbed strength, the executive has lost it. This tendency has rather been tolerated than acexecutive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have complete cothrough whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a geeblegovernment. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may practice a bad government." The mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here..

The history of the power of appointment and the stand taken by the judiciary on the question in the State of Kentucky is of interest. Kentucky was permitted to become an independent State by Virginia. The clause in the Kentucky constitution seppowers of government came from the pen of the author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson. He it was wKercheval, dated July 16, 1816, said: "Nomination to office iss an executive function. To give it to thelegislature, as we do the principle of the separation of powers. It swerves the members from correctness by the temptation to intrigue for office fcorrupt barter for votes, and destroys responsibility by dividing it among a multitude." Possibly inspired to such action by tof the State constitution which was under consideration, in the early days of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Mr. Chief Jusof Taylor vs. Commonwealth ([1830], 3 J. J.Marshall, 4010) announced that "Appointmets to office are intrinsically executperformed by a judicial officer when the duties of the office pertains strictly to the court. This opinion was shaken in the caCommissioners vs. George ([1898], 104 Ky., 260) only to be afterwards reaffirmed in Pratt vs. Breckinridge ([1901], 112 KGarrett ([1922], 246 S. W., 455). in the decision in the latter case, one of the most recent on the subject, the Supreme Courtreviewing the authorities refused to be frightened by the bugaboo that numerically a greater number of courts take a contraconvinced that they by doing so are inviting destruction of the constitutional barriers separating the departments of governminterpretation is much the sounder one and is essential to the future preservation of our constitutional form of government the forefathers who conceived it. . . . Such power (of appointment) on the part of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it shou


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Possibly, the situation may better be visualized by approching the question by a process of elimination. Is the power of appso contends. Is the power of appointment legislative? Not so if the intention of the Organic Law be carried out and if the Lelaw-making function. Is the power of appointment executive? It is.

The exact question of where the power of appointment to office is lodged has never heretofore arisen in this jurisdiction. Band a controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court are in point.

In Concepcion vs. Parades, supra, this court had before it a law which attempted to require a drawing of lots for judicial poexecutive power. The case was exhaustively argued andafter prolonged consideration, the questioned portion of the law waviolation of the provisions of the Organic Act. Following the lead of Kentucky, it was announced that "Appointment to offiexecutive act involving the exercise of discretion."

In the case of Myers vs. United States ([1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160), the United States Supreme Court had preswhether, under the Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The answer was that he has. The decision is ephocal. The Chief Justice qfollowing:

If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution more sacred than another, it is that which separateand judicial powers. If there is any point inwhich the separation of the legislative and executive powers ought to be maintaithat which relates to officers and offices.

'The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and partly executive. The legislature creates the office, defines the powannexes a compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating the maconceive to be of an executive nature. Although it be qualified in the Constitution, I would not extend or stain that qualificaprecisely fixed for it. We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it was foundedshall readily conclude that if the legislaturedetermines the powers, the honors, and emoluments of an office, we should be idesignate the officer also. The nature of things restrains and confines the legislative and executive authorities in this respecConstitution stipulates for the independence of each branch of the Government.' (1 Annals of Congress, 581, 582. Also seeFederalist, Nos. 47, 46.).

The distinguished Chief Justice said:

"* * * The Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legislative powers therein granted, to vest in the Presidand to vest in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress might establish, the judicial power. From this divisioreasonable construction of the Constitutionmust be that the branches should be kept separate in all cases in which they werand the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires. Madison, 1 Annals of Con

x x x x x x x x x

The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the Presidcould not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. This view has since been repeatedlyafAs he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence oas part of his execute power he should select those who werre to act for him under his direction in the execution of the lawmust be, in the absence of any express limitation respecting removals, that as his selection of administrative officers is essethe laws by him, so must be his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible. (Fisher Ames, 1 AIt was urged that the natural meaning of the term "executive power" granted the President included the appointment and remsubordinates. If such appointments and removals were not an exercise of the executive power, what were they? They cetainof legislative or judicial power in government as usually understood.

It is quite true that in state and colonial governments at the time of the Constitutional Convention, power to make appointmsometimes been lodged in the legislatures or in the courts, but such a disposition of it was really vesting part of the executivbranch of the Government.

x x x x x x x x x

We come now to a period in the history of the Government when both Houses of Congress attempted to removes this constto subject the power of removing executive officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to the control finally to the assumed power in Congress to place the removal of such officers anywhere in the Government.

x x x x x x x x x


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The extreme provisions of all this legislation were a full justification for the considerations so strongly advanced by Mr. Mthe First Congress, for insisting thatthe power of removal of executive officers by the President alone wasessential in the dithe executive and the legislative bodies. It exhibited in a clear degree the paralysis to which a partisan Senate and Congressexecutive arm and destroy the principle of executive responsibility, and separation of the powers sought for by the framers President fhad no power of removal save by consent of the Senate. It was an attempt to redistribute the powers and minimiPresident.

x x x x x x x x x

For the reasons given, we must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876 by which the unrestricted power of rempostmasters is denied to the President is in violation of the Constitution and invalid.

Membership in the Committee created by Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822 is an office. No attempt will be made to accomplish theformulate an exact judicial definitions of term "office." The point is that the positions in question constitute an "office," whthat word as used in the Code of Civil Procedure under the topic "Usurpation of Office," and in the jurisprudence of Ohio fthe Code were taken; whether within the local definitions of "office" found in the Administrative Code and the Penal Codeconstitutional definitions approved by the United States Supreme Court. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 197 et seq., 519; Avs. Kennon, supra, cited approvingly in Sheboygran co. vs. Parker [1865], 3 Wall., 93; Administrative Code, sec. 2; Penal CParaphrasing the United States Supreme Court in alate decision, there is not lacking the essential elements of a public staticharacter, created by law, whose incidents and duties were prescribed by law. (Metcalf & Eddy vs. Mitchell [1926], 269 U.[1823], 2 Brock., 96; U. S. vs.Hartwel [1867], 6 Wall., 385.) The Legislature did more than add incidentalor occasional dutoffices for two of the members of the voting committee are representatives of thelegislative branch. The Supreme Court of that the Act of the General Assembly giving to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representativesproxies and directors in all corporations in which the State has an interest, creates a public office and fills the same by appoLegislature. (Clark vs. Stanley [1872], 66 N. C., 28;Howerton vs. Tate [1873], 68 N. C., 498; Shoemaker vs. U. S. [1892], Opinion to Governor [1905], 49 Fla., 269; Mechem on Public Officers, Ch. I.)

To tell the truth, it is possible that the earnestness of counsel has just led us to decide too much. Not for a moment should thour minds the unusual and potently effective proviso of section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Gvery least,the performance of duties appurtenant to membership in the voting committee is an executive function on the GoOrganic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered control of the Government-General. The administrative dominatioorganized and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-makingpower.

The incorporation of the National Coal Company has not served to disconnect the Company or the stock which the GovernGovernment and executive control. The Philippine Legislatureis empowered to create and control private corporations. (M

de Seoras Damas del Santo Asilo de Ponce [1909], 213 U. S., 20.) The National Coal Company is a private corporation.(Na private corporation. (National Coal Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue [1924], 46 Phil., 583.) By becoming a stoCoal Company, the Goverment divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporationPlanters' Bank of Georgia [1824], 9 Wheat., 904.) Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its consenttaxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall ithe United States said, "It was not created for its own sake, or for private purposes. It has never been supposed that Congrecorporation." (Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S. [1824], 9 Wheat., 738; National Bank vs. Commonwealth [1869], 9 Wall., 353;[1873], 18 Wall., 5; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. vs. U. S. [1918], 250 U. S., 123.) Of the National Coal Company, iJustice Johnson as the organ of the court in National Coal Company vs. Collector of Interanl Revenue, supra, that "The GovIslands is made the majority stockholder, evidently in order to insure proper governmental supervision and control, and thuin a position to render all possible encouragement, assistance and help in the prosecution and furtherance of the company'sis closer in the companionNational Bank case, No. 27225.

It further is inconvertible that the Government, like any other stockholder, is justified in intervening in the transactions in thprotecting its property rights in the corporation. Public funds were appropriated to create the National Coal Company. Thopurchase stock. The voting of the government stock is the prerogative of the stockholder, not the prerogative of the corporabut not of, the corporation. The stock is property. The Government, the owner of the majority stock in the company, naturalmanagement of its property. The Government may enforce its policies and secure relief in and through the corporation and

The situation will be better understood if it be recalled that, in addition to the National Coal company (Acts Nos. 2705 and Legislature has created the Philippine National Bank (Acts Nos. 2612, 2747, 2938, and 3174), the National Petroleum ComNational Development Company (Act No. 2849), the National Cement Company (Act No. 2855), and the NationalIron Coaggregate authorized capital stock of these companies is P54,500,000. The Legislature has in each of these instances directshares of stock shall be purchased for the Government, and has appropriated money for this purpose. There have likewise corporations for the promotion of the merchant marine (Act No. 2754). The stock of the Manila Railroad Company has beeGovernment. (Acts Nos. 2574, 2752, and 2923.) All these are conspicuous instances of a paternally inclined government in


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business enterprises which after acquisition or organization have vitally concerned the Government. In all of the companieto be voted by a committee or board of control, consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the SpRepresentatives. The power of the majority stckholders to vote the government stock in the corporation carries with it the rCorporation Law, to elect all the directors, to remove any or all of them, and to dissolve the corporation by voluntary procesecs. 31, 34, 62.) In the case of the Philippine National Bank, the law explicitly enumerates variousfunctions of the bank wwithout the express approval of the Board of Control. (Act No. 2938.)

Very important property rights are involved in the transactions in the governmental directed corporations. Just as surely as tgovernment property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it as surely executive. Yet a majority of the voting comis made up of the presiding officers of the two houses of the Legislature and they are in a position to dictate action to the dipersonel of these corporations.

Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minexecutive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function; that the Natisimilar corporations are instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and governmthe executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes anLegislative Department of the provileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government of delegated powerlegislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under which specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly perform functiothrough the designation of its presiding officers as majority membersof a body which has executive functions. That is the mtri-partite theory of the division of powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the Organic Law. That has been the deci judicial opinion.

The intimation contained in the conclusions just reached does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will be privileged to sdesignated by the Governor-General for those designated by the two presiding officers in the Legislature. The burden has hdefenfants. From this point, it will be on the plaintiff. It is well established in quo warranto proceedingsthat the failure of thtitle does not established that of plaintiff. (People vs. Thacher [1874], 10 N. Y., 525.)

The answer to the problem comes from two directions. The acting Attorney-General of the United States finds the solutionpower entrusted to the Governor-General, while cousel for the plaintiff advance the rule of statutory construction pertaininare frank to say that we experience difficulty in following the lead of the law officer of the Government of the United Statesince the approval of the last Organic Act has had no prerogative powers. His powers are so clearly and distincly stated thadoubt as to what they are. Like the Legislature and the judiciary,like the most inconspicuous employee, the Governor-Genehis every act in the law. At this stage of political development in the Philippines, no vague residuum of power should be lefprovsions of the Organic Law.

Counsel for the plaintiff rely on a decision of this court (U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759) as best expressing the lovoid in part. Counsel for the defendants cite an earlier case (Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44). As the principle anncase is the more comprehensive and is much fairer to the defendants, we give it preference. It was there announce:

Where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable fand be enfored. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to prwould have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remaiintelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causipurpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statutor efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part sinto legislate.

Omitting reference to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representative in section 4 of Act No. 27section 2 of Act No. 2822, it would then read: "The voting powerof all such stock owned by the Government of the Philippexclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor- General." Would the court be justified in so enforcing the law witholegislative field?

The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is authourized to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has lawfullyCoal Company, but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the committee. Would this court be doing violethe votig power be continued solely in the hands of the Governor-General until different action is taken by the Legislature?would not, for the reason that the primordial purpose of the Legislature was "to promote the business of developing coal de. . and selling the coal contained in said deposits." (Act No. 2705, sec 2; Act No.2822, sec.1.) The incidental purpose of theprovide a method to vote the stock owned by the Government in the National Coal comapny. In the words of the United Stastriking out is not necessarily by erasing words, but it may be by disregarding the unconstitutional provision and reading thprovision was not there." (Railroad companies vs. Schutte [1880], 103 U. S. 118; State vs. Westerfield [1897], 23 Nev., 468


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supra; State vs. Wright [1913], 251 Mo., 325; State vs. Clausen [1919], 107 Wash.,667; 1 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory consIX.)

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Clayton vs. People ([1890], 132 U. S., 632) is particularly applicable ovalidity of an Act passed by a territorial legislature, the question of partial invalidity, and the contention likewise here madequestion had been on the statute books for a number of years, it must be considered as having been impliedly ratified by theLegislature of Utah of 1878 had declared that the auditor and the treasurer shall be elected by the voters of the territory. In in 1886, the Supreme Court of the territory of Utah held the act void because in conflict with the organic act creating the tethe governor, with the consent of the legislative council, shall appoint such officers. It further held that a territorial statute ivalidated by the failureof the congress expressly to disapprove it. (People vs. Clayton [1886], 4 Utah, 421.) The United Staappeal affirmed the judgment. It said:

It can hardly be admitted as a general proposition that under the power of Congress reserved in the Organic Acts of the terrof their legislature the absence of any action by Congress is to be construed to be a recognition of the power of the Legislatconflict with the Act of Congress underwhich they were created. . . . We do not think that the acquiescenceof the people, orUtah, or of any of its officers, in the mode for appointing the auditor of public accounts, is sufficient to do away with the clorganic Act on that subject. It is also, we think, very clear that only that part of the Statute of Utah which is contrary to the relating to the mode of appointment of the officer, is invalid; that so much of it as creates the office of auditor of public accTerritory is valid; and that it can successfully and appropriately be carried into effect by an appointment made by the goverTerritory, as required in the Act of Congress.

On the assumption, however, that the entire provision authorizing the voting committee be considered as wiped out, yet weon the Governor-General to protect the public interests and public property. He is made responsible for the execution of theunfaithful to that trust if, through inaction, instrumentalities of government should fail to function and government propertydissipated.

Counsel for the dependants have injected the argument into the discussion that, as the President of the Senate and the SpeakRepresentatives are at least de facto officers, their right to act as members of the voting committee cannot be collaterally atdefendants in this suit are the de jure members of the board of directors of National Coal Company. Contentions such as thewith the avowed purpose to avoid technical obstruction, and to secure a definite expression of opinion on the main issue. Hsaid that this is a direct proceeding to test the right of the defendants to the offices to which they consider themselves entitlgo, as is proper in quo warranto proceedings, to the extent of determining the validity of the act authorizing the offices. Therelating to the de facto doctrine is that, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office, there cannot be a de factoffice. There is no such thing as de facto office under an unconstitutional law. (Norton vs. Shelby County [1886], 188 U. S

Before terminating, a few general observations may be appropriate.The case has been carefully prepared and elaborately a

to desire to have the matter at issue definitely determined. We have endeavored to accomodate them. But in such a bitterly ingenuity of counsel presses collateralpoints upon us which the court need not resolve. We thus find it unnecessary to exprepropriety or legality of Executive Order No. 37, on that portion of section 18 of the Organic Act which disqualifies Senatorelection or appointment to office and no other subsidiary matters. Need it be added that the court is solely concerned with adecision on a purely legal question.

Every other consideration to one side, this remains certainThe congress of the United States clearly intended that the Governor- Geshould be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the Governor-General should be saddledof administering the government and of executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippinesstrict adherence to the basic principles of constitutional government.

We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, avoting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the SpeakerRepresentatives, is unconstitutional and void. It results, therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and as it would be imprto answer, judgment shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the offices of directors of the National Coalcompacosts.


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CASE DIGEST

50 Phil 259 Law on Public Officers Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (AcThe voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor -General, the President of the Senate, and the Spthe House of Representatives. In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the SenSpeaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO wSenate President and the House Speaker.However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstandinobjection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafterquo warranto proceediin behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.

HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasicreates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a publexecutive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power oit, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executiveCourt however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public ofbe found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it doweaken the executive branch.

OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, L-7918

G.R. No. L-7918 May 25, 1955


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act of the authorized agent is the act of the partners themselves (2 American Jurisprudence, 169, 276). It is not, therefore, nhad actual notice of the sale, and she can not be considered a third person or party in relation thereto. The sale made by theher (Cruz vs. Buenaventura, 84 Phil., 12, 46 Off. Gaz., 6032.)As respects the children of Jose Lagon, the other plaintiffs-appellees, they may not be considered third parties because therbetween them and their father. They only succeed to whatever rights their father had and what is valid and binding against binding as against them.For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendants absolved from the comagainst the plaintiffs-appellees.Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,concur.

DE LA LLANA VS. ALBAG.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTOAGUILA, petitioners,vs.MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNJustice, Respondents.

FERNANDO,C.J.: This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an approprthe crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriafor Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when apower, that of judicial reorganization,1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the independence of the judiciary2as protected andsafeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Courdiscipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."3 For the assailed legislation mandates thaJustices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sanof Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judtermination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the securityConstitution has been ignored and disregarded,That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Proh4 considered by tCourt as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of theand respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners5 sought to bolster their claim bimputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the Presidentcompensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the redeemed completed. In the very comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,6 it was pointed out that there isvalid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in treorganize the judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitithe hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard throughamiccuriae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition for decision.


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The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. Aftdeliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court,hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he cerprinciple set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion inPeople v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the valimust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result oenforcement."9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of "any psubstantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:10 "Thenthere is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most what they consider a public right and not protecting This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest well-ordered state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and aspects of the totality of the legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers,been amply demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed inPascual v. Secretary of Public Works,foreshadowed byvery decision ofPeople v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are prepRespondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine inMellon v. Frothinghamwith their claim that what petitionpossess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to aassurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. Warren clearly pointed out in the later case ofFlast v. Cohen,the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered."11 2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judiorganized.12This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It cleaassigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted withAugust 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embracthe Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the13 OnOctober 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "TReorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity aand means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are prpressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delaand at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the administration of justice could be shakethere be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially those of modest means much more so, the poorest and humblest can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way thebe manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their that the Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform inThe experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court o

municipal courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient asuffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first oAct became effective on June 16, 1901."14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of this century are attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the coinarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting grievances previthe judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mthey are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is weconstantly on the search for solutions that will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continuprogress."15 After which comes: "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed and rightly so. All effare geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progmeasured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP).16 For the New Society, its implication gofurther than economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economsubstantiation of the true meaning of social justice."17 This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in theregulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be effectively18 There islikelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grouquestion does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. ... There could be pleas for orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the executembodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in development."19 For, as mentioned in such Report, of vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Jfrom the time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more case20 It isunderstandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the increasing urbanization, anthe judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis situatiothe Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and ybe duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.


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3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urg21 It is worth notinlikewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorogenerations.22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901,23 amended in a significant way, only twiprevious to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed "oten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on ApNational Assembly,24 It could"sit en banc,but it may sit in two divisions, one of six and another of five Judges, to transact businesdivisions may sit at the same time."25 Two years after the establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Ju194826 was passed. It continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First 27 theMunicipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Mumembership of the Court of Appeals has been continuously increased.28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five mPresiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the CourtAppeals in 1954,30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955,31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and Domestifor Manila in 1955,32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit CrimiCourts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of C344. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, wasforth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's instructions, this propdrafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the reorganization, more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proIn consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that somReport be not availed of. Instead of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appreference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Suprepreference has been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill."35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bsponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. ThReport No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amensponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganiza17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the 'Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the options presented by these gset forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parlMoreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, referred, following the public hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitationJustice, Human Rights and Good Government."36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firsattainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by thenecessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together w jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the preseand hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Ba

Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort astudy before the act was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest hbasis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is thcharacterized its enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if doneno infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes inCruz v. Primicias, Jr . 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find this point urged by respobe without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolitionlegal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor se... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary quto the merits of the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of iprinciple that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval inBendanillo, Sr. v.Provincial Governor,40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it.41 As with the offices in the other branches of thgovernment, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuoenactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The concurringinZandueta v. De la Costa42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and nentitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganizati43 a yearafter the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appoFourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then Nationthe same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his beinposition This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless,of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the opinion that Commonwealreorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising MRizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments


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Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jcourts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of thethe security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitutionharmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort.

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