L.A. Relations Aff

L.A. Relations Solvency

Removing Embargo Key to U.S.-L.A. RelationsLifting the embargo improves the perception of the U.S. in Latin America.

Carlos PASCUAL Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy The Brookings Institution AND Vicki HUDDLESTON Visiting Fellow The Brookings Institution ‘9 (April 2009, Cuba: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away

from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive

engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that

he has been listening to the region. He can underline this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as promised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time. If the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a new policy and a long term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. If he is prepared to discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of critical and constructive engagement, he and his administration will lay the foundations for a new approach toward Cuba and the latin America. like his predecessors, president Obama has the authority to substantially modify embargo regulations in order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with the Cuban people and their government. He has the popular support—domestic and international—to engage Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island and recapture the high road in our relations with the hemisphere. Although it will take Cuban cooperation to achieve a real improvement in relations, we should avoid the mistake of predicating our initiatives on the actions of the Cuban government. The United States must evaluate and act in its own interests. We must not tie our every action to those of the Cuban government, because doing so would allow Cuban officials to set U.S. policy, preventing the United States from serving its own interests. The majority of Cuban Americans now agree with the American public that our half-century-old policy toward Cuba has failed. For the first time since Florida international University (FiU) began

polling Cuban American residents in 1991, a December 2008 poll found that a majority of Cuban

American voters favor ending current restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, and support a

bilateral dialogue and normal diplomatic relations with the Cuban regime by substantial margins.

L.A. Key to U.S. SoftpowerUS-Latin American relations solve climate change and soft power

Valenzuela 11- Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (Arturo Valenzuela, January 6, 2011, .S.-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2011/154105.htm)

Since its first days in office, the Obama Administration has worked very hard to shift the balance in the U.S.-Latin American relationship in a positive and constructive direction – and we are confident that our approach is achieving results. I see so many here who, like me, have spent the better part of their careers studying the Americas, or U.S. policy in the region. For us, in particular, these are fascinating times. That’s because we are seeing the convergence of two powerful and positive trends: the consolidation of successful market democracies that are making big strides in meeting their peoples’ needs, and the growing global integration of Latin America. These trends are fundamentally reordering our interaction with each other. Indeed, our greatest regional challenges – including inequality, the impunity of power, lack of rights, ineffective institutions, lack of opportunity – are receding in most countries in the Americas. And nations of the hemisphere are realizing their stake in new global challenges, like food security, climate change, transnational crime, and economic competitiveness. Most importantly, they are realizing their capacity to act, on a global level, to address these issues. So there is a whole new set of incentives for democratic societies to adjust national policies, pursue greater regional integration, and join in new networks of partnership around the world in order to help meet the tests of our times. Therefore, any discussion of U.S. policy in the Americas has to start from the recognition that the world has changed. It’s getting harder to extrapolate from the past to predict what’s around the corner, or to advance our interests based on traditional ways of doing business. These considerations are at the core of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, also known as the QDDR, that the State Department just unveiled. Secretary Clinton initiated the groundbreaking QDDR process to enhance our capacity to lead through civilian power. As she has emphasized, advancing American interests and values will require leading other nations in solving shared problems in the 21st century. Therefore, we must increase our reliance on our diplomats and development experts as the first face of American power. In 2011, the concepts underpinning the QDDR will also guide our approach of “dynamic engagement” that seeks to advance U.S. interests in partnership with Latin America as a whole, while recognizing the value of accommodating diverse needs and interests. The Obama Administration has focused our efforts on four over-arching priorities critical to people in every society: promoting social and economic opportunity for everyone; securing a clean energy future; ensuring the safety and security of all of our citizens; and building effective institutions of democratic governance. All this we seek to achieve while harnessing and strengthening multilateral and regional institutions, especially the Organization of American States. Our priorities are based on the premise that the United States has a vital interest in contributing to the building of stable, prosperous, and democratic nations in this hemisphere that can play a pivotal role in building a rules-based international system capable of meeting today’s global challenges. Achieving that objective has required an important shift in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. As President Obama and Secretary Clinton have said, policy must be conducted on the basis of mutual respect and co-responsibility through dialogue and engagement. The United States must be a more effective and determined partner in helping countries throughout the Americas achieve their own chosen paths as determined by their own people. With this in mind, we have developed collaborative platforms like Pathways to Prosperity and the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas, which invite partner governments to join us in addressing key elements of the hemispheric agenda. We are also pursuing diplomatic initiatives to support racial and ethnic inclusion in

the hemisphere and look forward to increasing these efforts during 2011, which the United Nations has named the International Year for People of African Descent. Today, we remain very optimistic about the state of the hemisphere. Indeed, the Western Hemisphere is experiencing a period of economic and political health that is a far cry from the troubles of the past. Not only did the region avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis, but current growth rates are projected to exceed five percent this year. And politically speaking, we welcome the reduction in tensions between Colombia and its neighbors, and note the smooth transfer of power that has occurred in many countries throughout the Americas. Moreover, the Obama Administration’s new strategy of engagement has contributed to a shift in Latin American public opinion. In the 2010 poll by the public opinion research firm Latinobarometro, two-thirds of the population in most countries had favorable attitudes toward the United States – an increase of 10 to 20 points from 2008 levels. The role of the United States in Latin America is also overwhelmingly viewed as positive. This suggests that the Obama Administration’s strategy has prompted an important replenishment of U.S. soft power in Latin America, thereby reversing the dangerous depletion of good will toward the United States that had occurred during the prior decade. Indeed, the region’s reaction to the recent Wikileaks cables incident, far from disrupting our regional relations, has actually highlighted their renewed strength. While the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, we are also heartened by the support and understanding that has been offered by most of our regional partners. We also recognize the central role played by economic integration in our hemispheric relations. In 2009, total U.S. merchandise trade between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean reached $524 billion and more than 40 percent of the region’s exports flowed to the United States, making us the region’s single largest export destination – as well as the largest source of foreign direct investment – and the Western Hemisphere, including Canada, absorbs 42 percent of U.S. exports. Around 84 percent of our overall trade with the region takes place with our FTA partners. Half of our energy imports come from the Western Hemisphere.

Softpower Key to US LeadershipSoft power key to US security

O’Hanlon and Petraens 13- Director of Research, Foreign Policy (Michael E. O’Hanlon, April 30th 2013, Fund - Don't Cut - U.S. Soft Power, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/04/30-us-soft-power-ohanlon-petraeus)

Such an outcome would be bad for our nation’s security. As each of us has testified on Capitol Hill in past years America’s ability to protect itself and advance its global interests often depends as much on its “softer” power as it does on our nation’s armed forces. For example, though Latin American countries were themselves primarily responsible for their progress, the headway many of them made in stabilizing their countries in recent years has been a big plus for American security, too — and American aid had a role in that progress. That is part of why we have supported a budget deal that would repeal sequestration and achieve most further deficit reduction through savings in entitlement spending with similar increases in revenue generation. Implicit in our approach was the thinking that lawmakers should avoid the temptation to gut foreign aid just because it generally lacks a strong constituency in the United States.

Soft Power is more important for U.S. security than hardpower.

Bev 12- Serial Entrepreneur, Publisher, Chief Editor, Author, Columnist, Book Reviewer. Forbes (Jennie S. Bev, 5/23/12, The Power of American "Soft Power", http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-american-soft-power/)

The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory.  It is just how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a lasting mental image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and political maneuver. Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to the ability to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive favorable treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. “Soft power” can be hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there. Also, thanks to low US dollar value, a record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011. In 2010, some 1.04 million immigrants applied for permanent residency, following 1.13 million in the previous year, which reflects the world’s insatiable faith in the US brand. The people of the world still believe that the USA is the place to visit, to reside, and to prosper.

Anti-Americanism Terrorism Anti-Americanism increases the risk of terrorism- extremists like al Qaeda

Walt 05 professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (Stephen M. Walt, October 2005, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/20031709)

Disagreement with U.S. foreign policy does not mean the policy is wrong, but it does mean U.S. actions come with a price. When foreign populations disapprove of U.S. policy and are fearful of U.S.

dominance, their governments are less likely to endorse Washington's initiatives and more likely to look for ways to hinder them. Rising anti-Americanism also increases the number of extremists who can be recruited into violent movements such as al Qaeda. The United States may still be able to gain others' compliance and overcome overt resistance, but achieving success will be more difficult and more expensive. Regardless of whether they disagree with U.S. policy or with the simple fact of U.S. power, can other states do anything to tame the American colossus? Historian Niall Ferguson has argued that the central issue is whether Americans have a "will to power" equal to their global responsibilities. President Bush, for his part, has downplayed the risk of going it alone: "At some point we may be the only ones left. ... That's okay with me. We are America." Such statements imply that the United States can overcome any international resistance to its agenda so long as its resolve is firm. But this confidence is unwarranted. Although other states cannot diminish U.S. primacy in the near term, there are still many ways they can rein in U.S. power. Some countries seek to manipulate the United

States for their own purposes, using accommodation to gain Wash ington's trust, support, and protection. Others are more confrontational, attempting to oppose and undercut U.S. interests. In either case, the

United States' ability to defend or advance its own foreign policy agenda is impaired. The United States is in a global struggle for hearts and minds, and it is losing. If anti-Americanism continues to grow, Washington will face greater resistance and find it harder to attract support. Americans will feel increasingly threatened in such a world, but trying to counter these threats alone will merely exacerbate the fear of U.S. power and isolate the United States even more.

Anti-Americanism fuels terrorism and sparks violence

LINDBERG and NOSSEL ‘5- The Princeton Project: Lindberg = American political expert and a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. His research focuses on political theory, international relations, national security policy, and American politics. Nossel = executive director of PEN American Center. She served as Executive Director of Amnesty International USA (Tod Lindberg and Suzanne Nossel, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ANTI-AMERICANISM CO-CHAIRS, http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/conferences/reports/fall/aa_exec.pdf) SA

The effects of anti-Americanism Several potential effects of anti-Americanism are of greatest concern: 1) anti-Americanism can feed terrorism and violence toward the United States, 2) anti-Americanism can harm U.S. commercial interests abroad, and 3) anti-Americanism can harm U.S. political interests by making it more difficult to rally support for specific U.S. policy objectives. Anti-Americanism can fuel violence by motivating terrorist recruits, making people more willing to harbor and assist terrorists, and undermining global counterterrorism cooperation. Looking at evidence from the Middle East, anti-Americanism does appear to play a significant role in the recruitment of some participants in violent terrorist movements and in the choice of others to abet terrorism. Because many other countries share an interest in combating terrorism, it is not clear that

anti-Americanism has hampered U.S. counterterrorism efforts. There exists considerable debate and limited empirical evidence on whether anti-Americanism has significantly affected U.S. economic interests. Some corporate chief executive officers, such as the

founders of Business for Diplomatic Action, are seriously concerned about the economic impact of anti-Americanism. While available evidence does not demonstrate negative economic consequences resulting from anti-Americanism, there are signs that perceptions of U.S. companies and brands are affected by attitudes toward the U.S. Accordingly, the possibility that persistent negative perceptions of the United States will erode American economic influence is hard to dismiss. Similarly, evidence demonstrating that anti-Americanism compromises U.S. political influence is mixed. That the political impact of anti-Americanism is difficult to isolate reflects the fact that the foreign policies of other countries are determined by many factors. The U.S.’s economic and military strength mean that other countries may opt to cooperate with Washington despite anti-American attitudes at home. Nevertheless, there are signs that anti-Americanism inhibits U.S. policymaking by causing the United States to scale back its requests in inhospitable environments, rather than risk possible rejection. In parts of the Muslim world especially, the discourse of anti-Americanism helps to fuel a

culture of anti-modernity because key ideals of modernity are associated with the United States. Anti-Americanism has also contributed to a climate in which other powers whose interests are not aligned with Washington have succeeded in expanding their economic and political influence around the globe. In these ways, anti-Americanism can interfere with the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives writ large.

L.A. ProlifBrazil and Argentina are important potential proliferators.

Poblete 13 (Jason Poblete, Poblete Tamargo LLP May 10th 2013, Latin American Nuclear Powers Ink Cooperation Deal, http://jasonpoblete.com/2013/05/10/latin-american-nuclear-powers-ink-cooperation-deal/) - ShireenA

Does the title of this blog post seem a little odd sounding, “Latin American” Nuclear Powers? A close friend was somewhat shocked when I told him earlier this week that Brazil and Argentina are the two more advanced nuclear powers in the Western Hemisphere. Mexico operates several reactors as well, but Argentina and Brazil are the regional nuclear trendsetters. My colleague, as is the case with most Americans, had no idea that there were reactors and ongoing nuclear research programs in various Latin American countries. Move over Iran. We have nuclear proliferation concerns right here in the Americas. Most policy experts in this town say there is no reason to really be concerned. I’m a little less sanguine. It is not that these nations should not be trusted with nuclear technology. If a country wants to pursue a nuclear program for peaceful purposes. have at it. The question is, can these two particular nations be trusted to do the right thing? The same questions we ask of regimes such as Iran and North Korea, are just as valid for Brazil and Argentina . Alright, the latter are not controlled by rogue regimes; however, the programs are anything but as transparent as they should be. And what about their cozy relationship, especially Brazil, with Iran? Brazil and Argentina used to be more than soccer rivals. These two countries have been nuclear competitors, and at times, nuclear efforts have been the source of some tension. Realizing that they needed to work together, the past few decades has seen more cooperation in this field including the seemingly successful Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Brazil — one of the Left’s poster child nations for green energy — has two nuclear reactors online for energy generation and four additional research reactors. Argentina, the first Latin American nation to use nuclear power, has four reactors online for energy generation and five research reactors. Should we care? Should we be worried? Concerned? Yes. Yes. And, hell yes. Pursuant to a treaty and various other international protocols, Latin America is supposed to be a nuclear-free weapons zone. There is no evidence that either country is pursuing a weaponized nuclear program. This does not mean that they have not tried to do so in the past. They did. I’ve think we’ve trusted them way too much with nuclear technology. Considering that both countries have rocket launch capabilities, we should be a little more than vigilant. Both countries have space agencies that used to be under military control. That was the case with the nuclear programs. Brazil is reportedly building nuclear submarines now. Argentina and Brazil relations with Iran should be reason enough to ask tough questions of our regional allies. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – the global UN watchdog for these matters – has yet to be granted full access to either nuclear program. What do they have to hide? There are bigger issues at play here than just Brazil and Argentina tinkering with nuclear energy. Think, Iran, for starters. And regional democracies are concerned about it, but will not say so in polite company. It is DC you know. But the U.S. Congress need not worry about being polite or diplomatic. They need to chime in.

Nuclear proliferation in Latin America would trigger an arms race.

ACA 2013 [ACA – Arms Control Association; “Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Tlatelolco)”; http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/tlatelolco] RahulNambiarThat the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of

mankind itself is to be assured, That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable, That general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand, That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament enormously difficult and would increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration, That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions, That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions where similar conditions exist, That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both in their own interest and for the good of mankind, That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources required for economic and social development, That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples,

AT: No Capability (Latin America)Latin American countries have the capability to proliferate.Trinkunas 9-1-2011 [Harold A. Trinkunas - Associate Professor and Deputy Director for Academic Affairs @ Naval Post-Graduate School; “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions”; http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac] RahulNambiarThree key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactivate nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place.

Venezuela willing to proliferateTrinkunas 9-1-2011 [Harold A. Trinkunas - Associate Professor and Deputy Director for Academic Affairs @ Naval Post-Graduate School; “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions”; http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac] RahulNambiarVenezuela has taken positions on proliferation issues that run directly against the mainstream of international public opinion, pursuing a highly publicized rapprochement with Iran, a potential nuclear supplier, and supporting both Iran‟s right to pursue nuclear technology without constraints and North Korea‟s periodic missile tests. It has also opposed international sanctions over nuclear issues on both powers.11 Venezuela‟s stated concern of a U.S. invasion has led it to officially orient its Armed Forces towards a policy of prolonged popular war and asymmetric warfare. This has translated into changes in doctrine and educational programs, and the creation of a militia.12 Certainly, nuclear forces would be the ultimate deterrent against outside intervention. Taken together, these factors have led some outside observers to claim that Venezuela is a potential nuclear proliferation risk. If we evaluate the contemporary domestic and international political context, it seems unlikely. At the international level, Argentina and Brazil have reacted very cautiously to the Venezuelan nuclear proposal. On the one hand, they would like the business for economic reasons, but on the other they are concerned about Chávez‟s ambitions. As members of the NPT and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSP), Argentina and Brazil are likely to insist on strong international safeguards on any nuclear technology sold to Caracas.13 However, neither the Argentine nor the Brazilian governments have opposed Venezuela‟s nuclear ambitions publicly, both because they are vulnerable domestically on their left flank, where Hugo Chávez has numerous sympathizers, and because internationally they still have common economic interests with Venezuela.

Latin American seeks nuclear technologyTrinkunas 9-1-2011 [Harold A. Trinkunas - Associate Professor and Deputy Director for Academic Affairs @ Naval Post-Graduate School; “Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions”; http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=whemsac] RahulNambiarArgentina and Brazil are likely to remain nuclear technology powers and continue to pursue further research in this domain. Nationalist leaders in both countries are interested in sustaining their nuclear programs as an economic resource and a means to demonstrate sovereignty and technological independence. However, they currently have no interest in introducing nuclear weapons into the region, and they are likely to continue supporting a reasonable international nonproliferation regime. Given their proven ability to develop nuclear technology to a substantial level of sophistication, Argentina and Brazil remain potential nuclear proliferators because they have capability to move towards weaponization in years rather than decades.

Climate Change

U.S.-L.A. Relations Solve Climate ChangeUS-Latin American cooperation only way to combat climate change- new research and technology

West 12 former Fulbright fellow, is a frequent contributor to NAFSA’s award-winning International Educator magazine. (Charlotte West, 2012, New Approaches to Cooperation with Latin America, http://www.nafsa.org/uploadedFiles/Chez_NAFSA/Find_Resources/Publications/Periodicals/Epublications/epub_latin_america.pdf)

One place where Latin America has a distinct research advantage is in the area of climate change. For example, a recent survey from MIT showed that 95 percent of major cities in Latin America are planning for climate change, compared to only 59 percent of such cities in the United States. Quito, Ecuador is considered a global leader in areas such as studying the effects of global warming on nearby melting glaciers and developing ways of dealing with potential water shortage.José Lever, Mexico coordinator at the University of Arizona, said that his institution has focused efforts on developing bilateral research in areas where they have a lot in common with Mexican institutions, such as biotechnology, environmental sciences, climate change, and pharmacology. Other areas where they are active include business, technology transfer, and innovation. Through partnerships with Mexican centers of excellence, they are trying to foster a better understanding of how innovation works, identify business opportunities from emerging technologies, and help market them in order to foster better economic prospects in the region. They are also building a network of U.S. university representatives, including institutions such as the University of Southern California, the State University of New York, and Texas A&M.“[We want to] work together with not only with Mexican higher education, but also with the Mexican National Council on Science and Technology (CONACYT— Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología),26 to address regional challenges and identify ways to bring faculties together to discover some of the best places to do research on these topics,” Lever said.

Multilateralism Solves Climate ChangeOnly cooperation solves warming- there needs to be an agreement

MACKEY and LI 07- Pacific Ecologists (Brendan Mackey and Song Li, 2007, Win the Struggle Against Global Warming, http://www.pacificecologist.org/archive/15/earth-charter.pdf) SA

Addressing the root causes of global warming will require a level of national and international cooperation not seen since the Allied nations’ response during World War II. So it’s not unreasonable to speak of ‘winning the war against global warming,’ although the analogy is imperfect as in this war the enemy is ourselves. Mandela said: “If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner.Global warming can only be solved through partnership and the cooperation of all sectors and nations. We are all aware of the need to reduce our greenhouse emissions from fossil fuel use. But what critical steps must we now take to ensure our efforts are not wasted? Voluntary agreements and

agreements that include only some of the world’s nations will not solve the problem. The sad fact is any benefits to the global climate system gained from reducing your greenhouse gas emissions by double-glazing your home’s windows, or cycling rather than driving a car to work, can and will be offset by

greenhouse gas emissions from dirty factories in Australia, deforestation in Brazil, or cars driven in

Beijing. Unless there is an agreed target and timetable for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to a safe level there can be no guarantee our efforts will help solve the problem.

AT: Warming IrreversibleEmissions cuts immediately reduce climate change.

Desjardins 13- Senior Advisor, External Communications at Concordia University. Damon Matthews - associate professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment. (Clea Desjardins, April 2nd 2013, Global Warming: Irreversible but not Inevitable, http://www.concordia.ca/now/what-we-do/research/20130402/global-warming-irreversible-but-not-inevitable.php) SA

There is a persistent misconception among both scientists and the public that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions. This misconception has led policy makers to argue that CO2 emission cuts implemented now will not affect the climate system for many decades. This erroneous line of argument makes the climate problem seem more intractable than it actually is, say Concordia University’s Damon Matthews and MIT’s Susan Solomon in a recent Science article. The researchers show that immediate decreases in CO2 emissions would in fact result in an immediate decrease in the rate of climate warming. Explains Matthews, professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, “If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented – not in several decades."“The potential for a quick climate response to prompt cuts in CO2 emissions opens up the possibility that the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as the political decisions themselves.” In their paper, Matthews and Solomon, Ellen Swallow Richards professor of Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate Science, show that the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at reducing CO2 emissions, and the resulting future emissions that we produce. This means that there are critical implications for the equity of carbon emission choices currently being discussed internationally.Total emissions from developing countries may soon exceed those from developed nations. But developed countries are expected to maintain a far higher per-capita contribution to present and possible future warming. “This disparity clarifies the urgency for low-carbon technology investment and diffusion to enable developing countries to continue to develop,” says Matthews.“Emission cuts made now will have an immediate effect on the rate of global warming,” he asserts. “I see more hope for averting difficult-to-avoid negative impacts by accelerating advances in technology development and diffusion, than for averting climate system changes that are already inevitable. Given the enormous scope and complexity of the climate mitigation challenge, clarifying these points of hope is critical to motivate change.”

Advantage One is Relations

Ending the embargo would expand credibility, US soft power, and improve US-Cuban relations.

Hinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true]

ConclusionThe two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies

toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations

with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists .

Cuba is the lynchpin to Latin American relations, goodwill, solving anti-americanism and successful soft power

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity. [*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of

Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to

advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba , despite its size and

isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America , having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the

Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own . n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.

It would provide immediate and substantial benefits to the US image globally

Holmes 10 MA The School of Continuing Studies, Georgetown [Michael G. Holmes, SEIZING THE MOMENT, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?sequence=1]

From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected.Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all countries to invest in Cuba again underscores the United States' position of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market place. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be immediate and substantial in regards to the United States reputation in the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the most are trade and fuel.

Independently - Soft Power limits the size and frequency of conflicts around the world.

Nye 96 Professor of International Relations – Harvard University [Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1995/1996, “Conflicts After the Cold War,” Washington Quarterly, 19:1, Winter]

Leadership by the United States, as the world's leading economy, its most powerful military force, and a leading democracy, is a key factor in limiting the frequency and destructiveness of great power, regional, and communal conflicts. The paradox of the post-cold war role of the United States is that it is the most powerful state in terms of both "hard" power resources (its economy and military forces) and "soft" ones (the appeal of its political system and culture), yet it is not so powerful that it can achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The United States lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve every conflict, and in each case its role must be proportionate to its interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Yet the United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations. This requires sustained attention to the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms that make U.S. leadership effective and joint action possible : forward stationing and preventive deployments of U.S. and allied forces, prepositioning of U.S. and allied equipment, advance planning and joint training to ensure interoperability with allied forces, and steady improvement in the conflict resolution abilities of an interlocking set of bilateral alliances, regional security organizations and alliances, and global institutions.

Action now is key – removing the embargo would boost overall Latin relations and undermine the perception of US isolation

globallyPerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

[*193] One of the lasting legacies of America's Cuba policy is that it isolates the U.S. and represents stubbornness in the face of ineffectiveness. After the 2008 election the calls to change U.S. policy toward Cuba were echoed by both allies and non-allies, including Brazil, n9 Colombia, n10 and Mexico, as well as Venezuela n11 and Bolivia. n12 The European Union has also expressed its opposition to "the extraterritoriality extension of the United States embargo." n13 Each year the UN considers a resolution condemning America's economic embargo of Cuba, and each year the measure is overwhelmingly adopted. In 2008 the vote was 184-4, meaning the U.S. policy to isolate Cuba has had the ironic effect of isolating the United States. Additionally, the travel ban may violate multiple articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. n14 Fortunately, for three reasons, the opportunity is ripe for a fresh approach to this old problem.

First , leadership changes in both countries allow each to signal a new way forward without necessarily repudiating long-held positions. Both governments have signaled a willingness to talk, which is already a step in the right direction. Specifically, within the United States, demographic changes in the Cuban-American community have led to attitudinal changes toward U.S.-Cuban relations. Florida International University's yearly polls have shown a trend whereby an increasing number of Cuban-Americans are opposed to the current U.S. policy of economic and political isolation.In 2008, those polls indicated that a majority of Cuban-Americans opposed the restrictions on family travel and remittances. n15 These polls also indicated that long-term demographic trends are breaking in the Democrats' favor: the divide is now between older Cuban Americans who still vote Republican, and the younger generation, increasingly more numerous, who lean Democrat. Not only did President Obama outpace Senator John Kerry's [*194] 2004 performance by ten points, but he won the twenty-nine or younger Cuban-American vote with fifty-five percent. n16 This shift in public opinion, combined with the fact that President Obama won Florida's electoral votes during the 2008 election despite narrowly losing the Cuban vote, gives the Administration a freer hand to construct a new policy with relatively little political costs.Moreover, migration from Cuba has picked up pace in recent years, suggesting that the aging hardliners will continue to lose clout relative to voting power. According to the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, over 131,000 Cubans have arrived and settled in South Florida since 2005. n17 In fact, a policy that eventually normalizes relations with Cuba would probably carry votes in Florida, and the rest of the south. n18 These domestic changes mean that the U.S. can more easily reorient its Latin American policy to encourage constructive engagement that inspires optimism and hope rather than fear and anger.Second , reforms recently enacted in Cuba indicate that the post Fidel Castro

leadership is more likely to embrace pragmatism. In recent years, and especially since Raul Castro took over the presidency from his brother Fidel, Cuba's leadership has slightly moderated its political repression. While Cuba still holds political prisoners in custody, the total number is down from 316 in July 2006, when Raul took the helm from his brother, to less than 170 today - the lowest total since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. n19 However, these political changes have been small, and do not yet represent structural or fundamental reforms in the long term, especially since they are all easily reversible. Nevertheless, these political changes, combined with small economic liberalizations in the agricultural, technological, and tourist sectors, represent the first significant reforms under the new leadership of Raul Castro.

[*195] Third , the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

U.S. Latin American relations are at a crossroads. Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Simply addressing an unfinished agenda is not enough. Both the United States and Latin America need to do more to exploit the enormous untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy. They need to work together to deal with global and regional problems. And they need to project common values, including peace, democracy, human rights, expansion of equal opportunity, and social mobility. They need to breathe new life and vigor into hemispheric relations.If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship.There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

Latin American relations are vital to the US. Needed to combat global problems like proliferation, climate change, and insure

economic growth. Only engagement solvesZedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF]

The Need for a Hemispheric PartnershipHistorically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also, the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained underresourced.If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase . Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits.Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary . First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the

hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future.For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as

a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these

networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms,

money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.The second change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic relations. Their range of trading and investment partners is expanding, with China in particular playing a prominent role in the region. Chinese imports from the LAC countries increased twentyfold between 1990 and 2005, while Chinese exports to the region grew even faster, from $620 million in 1990 to $37 billion in 2005. Latin America is also attracting significant foreign investment from nontraditional sources. Between just 2003 and 2005, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in the LAC region increased by 40 percent. China has become a key buyer of commodities, driving up prices and reversing the long-term decline in the region’s terms of trade. Meanwhile, the Caribbean countries have recently signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, immediately opening all European markets and gradually opening Caribbean ones. With more valuable exports and less expensive manufactured imports, living standards in the LAC region have improved significantly.At the same time, many LAC countries have moved beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status from credit-rating agencies and in recent years have been able to raise capital readily in international markets. The same is true of several other countries, including Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay, which until the recent financial crisis enjoyed ready access to private international capital. Regionally owned institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, have also reduced the region’s dependence on traditional sources of capital.Some Latin American countries are investing abroad on an unprecedented scale. In 2006, for example, Brazil invested more abroad ($28 billion) than it received in foreign direct investment ($19 billion). In Chile, private pension funds and the government have become active international investors. Surpluses have allowed Venezuela to inject billions of dollars into other countries, particularly through subsidized oil exports. Many Latin American multinationals—such as Brazil’s Vale, Gerdau, and Odebrecht; and Mexico’s CEMEX, America Movil, and Grupo FEMSA—have become global corporate giants. The current crisis may no doubt affect the relative magnitude of these investments, but economic relationships in the hemisphere will continue to diversify as the world economy recovers.The third change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their political and diplomatic relations. The most notable example is Brazil, which has opened thirty-two new embassies in the past five years. Together with Venezuela, Brazil is playing a more active political role in the region through the Union of South American Nations, which is already active at the presidential level and is expected to become a key forum for the discussion of defense issues. Mexico and Brazil are also playing prominent roles in international forums and organizations, including the finance ministers’ Group of Twenty and the trade ministers’ Group of Twenty. Brazil has announced its intention to join the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the Paris Club. Chile and Brazil are expected to become members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the not-too-distant future. Mexico, Peru, and Chile are active members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In sum, this diversification of political and economic relations reflects many LAC countries’ new confidence in their capacity to chart their own course in the world.Their enhanced confidence and autonomy will make many LAC countries much less responsive to U.S. policies that are perceived as patronizing, intrusive, or prescriptive, and they will be more responsive to policies that engage them as partners on issues of mutual concern. Also, the LAC countries’ diversification of economic and political relations means that Washington will have to compete with governments both outside and within the region for regional influence. In particular, Brasília and Caracas are both vying for leadership in South America; and though they may have different visions for regional integration and different ways to approach other governments, they agree that Washington should play a more limited role in their part of the world.

The fourth change is that, today, the LAC countries are better positioned to act as reliable partners. Despite remaining governance challenges, the vast majority of these countries are stable democracies for which competitive elections and peaceful transitions of power are the norm, not the exception. Throughout these countries, civil society groups now participate extensively in the policymaking process, and there is much less tolerance of violence as a means of political expression.Economic progress has also made the LAC countries more reliable partners. Leaders, including some on the left, are committed to fiscal responsibility. Most central banks are now independent bodies focused on inflation control. Exchange rates largely reflect market forces. As a result, many LAC countries can now look beyond their borders and commit to sustained partnerships and responsibilities on regional and global issues.In sum, the countries of the LAC region have made significant strides in economic and social development and will continue to prosper even if U.S. leaders remain disengaged. Washington must decide whether it wants to actively reengage and benefit from the region’s dynamism and resources or be sidelined as other economic and political actors fill the void left by its absence.

Proliferation risks nuclear conflict—inexperienced nations will be more likely to use their nukes

Horowitz 9—Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania [Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go – given the new risk of nuclear escalation – and uncertainty about relative capabilities . Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses. 3What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether or not actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior – shifts in uncertainty – on the part of potential adversaries.Learning to Leverage?When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Though nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo.This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system-wide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil-military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan, Feaver, and Blair suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit kno wledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1993). Sagan contends that civil-military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision-making towards more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999).Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators, and the bureaucratic

desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation, the “use it or lose it” mindset, may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, like launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995). 4Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make them more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.5 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenal is likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases where their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, in the short-term nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a war , the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.

Ignore warming critics – action is key, the science is indisputablePittock 10—led the Climate Impact Group in CSIRO until his retirement in 1999. He contributed to or was the lead author of all four major reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. He was awarded a Public Service Medal in 1999 and is CSIRO Honorary Fellow. (Barrie, Climate Change: The Science, Impacts, and Solutions, 2010, pg. 240)Is the science credible?As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, there are many uncertainties in relation to climate change. Nevertheless, the overwhelming body of evidence from relevant scientists is that there is a high probability that human-induced global warming , with associated

changes in other climatic conditions, is happening. Moreover, the evidence is that warming will continue , at an accelerating pace, through the twenty-first century and beyond, unless urgent measures are taken to slow and eventually reverse the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.These conclusions are hotly contested by a relatively small number of contrarians, discussed in Chapter 4, who for various reasons accuse so-called "˜establishment scientists' of bias and poor science. Genuine sceptics exist and are welcomed, as they keep scientists on their toes and ensure that what is accepted is well based and relevant to the real world. However, contrarians often present misleading arguments, and frequently seize upon any discussion of uncertainty as an excuse for dismissing the whole topic , rather than arguing for a balanced policy of risk management . Too often contrarians repeat old arguments that have already been thoroughly discredited.

Warming risks extinctionTickell 08 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean , in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction . The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable , bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost , complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland . The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced . Billions would undoubtedly die . Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks , notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the i ce melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea , and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene T hermal Maximum , when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present : the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

Loss of influence in Latin American undermines our overall primacy

Erikson 10 Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs, Inter-American Dialogue [Daniel P. Erikson, The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?, Working Paper No. 46, April 2010, The Centre for International Governance Innovation]

The Globalization of Latin AmericaThe United States has long been wary of foreign powers meddling in the Western Hemisphere for reasons both real and imagined. In recent years, Latin America’s increasingly diverse international relations have stoked these fears anew, as the US has witnessed the region draw closer to global rivals just as American influence is facing unprecedented challenges. The warm embrace that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad received from Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and, more recently, Brazil’s President Lula, provides the most dramatic example of a new trend that has seen Latin America and the Caribbean seek greater independence from the United States while deepening ties with such emerging powers outside the hemisphere as China, India and Russia. To be sure, many US policy makers intellectually understand that this increasingly complex mosaic of international relations is the product of a more globalized world. Still, there is an underlying current of unease that American primacy in the Western

Hemisphere is being threatened in subtle but important ways.Of course, there has long been a precept in US foreign policy that was developed to address precisely this problem. It is called the Monroe Doctrine, after its creator President James Monroe, and it represents the iconic assertion of the United States’ right to oppose foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere. Today, the realities that were the foundation for the Monroe Doctrine have fundamentally changed, but the United States has been slow to adjust its attitudes and mindset accordingly. In order to be effective in Latin America, the Obama administration recognizes that it must adapt to an increasingly globalized era in inter-American relations. As a result, the US has attempted to forge a middle path between counterproductive efforts to isolate countries with which it has difficult relations and efforts to engage Latin America’s rising powers that show little interest in reciprocating American goodwill. In May 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking at a public forum in Washington, D.C., was asked how the US should manage the challenges posed by Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan leader who has positioned himself as the chief opponent of American power in Latin America. Secretary Clinton (2009) used the opportunity to rebut the George W. Bush administration’s record in dealing with leftist leaders in the hemisphere, saying that “the prior administration tried to isolate them . . . It didn’t work.” She continued, I have to say that I don’t think in today’s world, where it’s a multipolar world, where we are competing for attention and relationships with at least the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, that it’s in our interest to turn our backs on countries in our own hemisphere.Clinton also stated that the new engagement between extra hemispheric actors and certain Latin American countries is “quite disturbing” (Clinton, 2009).Secretary Clinton is hardly the first US public official to cast China’s growing presence in Latin America as a sign that the US should deepen its own engagement in the region. During the 2008 US presidential campaign, China’s growing influence in Latin America was portrayed as a symptom of the perceived neglect of the region by the Bush administration. In his first debate with Republican candidate John McCain, Obama highlighted China’s role as a potential challenge: We’ve got challenges, for example, with China, where we are borrowing billions of dollars. They now hold a trillion dollars’ worth of our debt. And they are active . . . in regions like Latin America, and Asia, and Africa. The conspicuousness of their presence is only matched by our absence, because we’ve been focused on Iraq. (New York Times, 2009).To its credit, the Obama administration has adopted a more nuanced approach, with regard to China in Latin America. The US posture has continued in the largely clear-headed and restrained direction that was initiated by

the second Bush administration. Indeed, in the fall of 2009, Frank Mora, the top official managing Western Hemisphere affairs at the Pentagon, suggested that China could usefully help Latin America to address the issues of ungoverned territories, lack of economic opportunity, and narcotics and arms trafficking in the region (Mora, 2009). Similarly, Russia’s renewed interest in Latin America has been met with relative equanimity, despite the fact that Russian arms sales to the region have surged in recent years to overtake those of the US. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russian arms sales to Latin America in 2009 topped US$5.4 billion, principally to Venezuela, although Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru also made major purchases (UPI, 2010). It is the deepening engagement of Iran in Latin America that has provoked the greatest alarm in the Obama administration. In Congressional testimony in January 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned, “I’m more concerned about Iranian meddling in the region than I am the Russians,” adding,I’m concerned about the level of frankly subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America ... They’re opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts behind which they interfere in what is going on in some of these countries. (Reuters, 2009)Indeed, while the Obama administration has accepted — even embraced — the notion of a multipolar world, it continues to indicate that one of the potential poles, Latin America, should remain off-limits to those powers of which the US disapproves. These latent tensions were thrown into even sharper relief in November 2009, when Brazilian President Lula hosted a state visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, despite deep disapproval in Washington (see Sweig, 2010). The emergence of Iran as a worrisome new actor in the region has heightened the need to for the US to develop effective responses to the region’s increasing globalization.

That influence prevents global nuclear conflictsKagan 07 Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Robert Kagan (Senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund), “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Policy Review, August & September 2007, pg. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html]The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia , forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking

peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Latin-American Relations Adv

Relations Brink

Relations good but not purposeful – need moreShifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

All these changes taken together are transforming the nations of the hemisphere—and their relations with one another.What is at stake is the future of inter-American relations, which today are generally cordial but lack vigor and purpose . Efforts at hemispheric integration have been disappointing. Effective cooperation in the Americas— even on widely shared problems like energy security, organized crime and the drug trade, and international economic volatility—remains limited and sporadic.It is the good news of Latin America’s progress that has most altered hemispheric relations. In the past decade, the region has posted its best economic performance in a generation and managed largely to sidestep the world financial crisis in 2008–2009. The ranks of the middle classes have swelled. The region’s political structures have also opened up, giving way to growing participation by women, indigenous and Afro-descendant populations, and other once-excluded groups. All Latin Americans across a broadening spectrum have greater access to education and health services, consumer goods, and foreign travel. They now have real and rapidly expanding stakes in their societies.These advances have also led to new social stirrings which, along with demands and expectations, are notably on the rise. There are more and more pressures for further change and improvements.Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities. Indeed, the region’s most salient transformation may be its increasingly global connections and widening international relationships.Brazil’s dramatic rise on the world stage most visibly exemplifies the shift. But other countries, too, are participating actively in global affairs and developing extensive networks of commercial and political ties. China is an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries are intensifying their ties to the region as well.The United States has also changed markedly, in ways that many find worrisome. The 2008 financial crisis revealed serious misalignments in and poor management of the US economy—which, four years later, is still struggling to recover. Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while much-needed improvements in education and infrastructure are ignored. The most ominous change in the United States has taken place in the political realm. Politics have become less collaborative. It is increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to build solutions to the critical problems on the policy agenda. Compromise, the hallmark of democratic governance, has become an ebbing art, replaced by gridlock and inaction on challenges that would advance US national interests and well-being.In part as a result of these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant. The quality and intensity of ties have diminished. Most countries of the region view the United States as less and less relevant to their needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them.In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided. But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality and direction. Shared interests are not pursued as vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed. Well developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are scarce.

Improves Relations

Improves relations – politically easierPerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Conclusion For fifty years the Castro regime has ruled Cuba with an iron fist. In response, for nearly fifty years, the United States has tried to isolate Cuba, politically and economically. This policy has failed to achieve any discernible policy end, and has actually helped isolate the United States from the rest of the world. Moreover, America's hostile relationship with Cuba has become a symbolic rallying cry for an emerging class of Latin American leaders determined to convert anti-American sentiments into electoral victories. As a result, America's image has suffered, as has its ability to influence a region so intricately tied to its economic and national security interests. This report provides a starting point for dialogue with the Cuban government, which could eventually be used as a stepping-stone towards the normalization of relations. Additionally, this report attempts to accomplish another end: the fostering of a dialogue amongst policymakers in America who are ready and willing to listen to new ideas and a fresh approach.Implementing these recommendations will not be easy, but they certainly are not as insurmountable as some will claim. President Obama was the first Democrat to win Florida's Hispanic vote, and nearly tied Senator [*237] John McCain in the Cuban-dominated Miami-Dade County. n159 While in 2004 President Bush won 55% of the Hispanic vote, President Obama bettered that number by winning over 57%, compared to only 42% for Senator McCain. This emerging political climate has given the President enough room to maneuver around those who hope to continue the failures of the status quo.Freedom has always been an important part of America's narrative, but too many leaders in Cuba see America's promotion of human rights and democracy as a war on sovereignty. The new central premise of America's Cuba policy must focus on economic reform, including an American commitment to helping Cuba develop on its own terms. This approach would support our interest in one day seeing a free and open society flourish in Cuba.

Spills over

Embargo obstructs US-Latin relationsShifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement.At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step.

Cuba is the most important symbolic issue for Latin AmericaShifter 08 Oxford Analytica Staff, Latin American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, LATIN AMERICA/US: Obama may mark attitude shift, Oxford Analytica, November 21, 2008, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1686]

Cuba. No issue on the Latin America agenda is as symbolically important as Cuba and none

has been as much a prisoner of US domestic politics. On this issue in particular, many Latin Americans expect Obama to make a break with the past. Florida's election results show the political costs are not as high as they once were, making it more likely that he will at least fulfill his campaign pledge to remove remittance and travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans. Obama is unlikely to lift the embargo in the short term, but rather to seek to use that possibility to nudge Havana toward opening up its political system. Obama backed off his initial campaign promise to meet leaders such as President Raul Castro without preconditions, although he would probably pursue lower-level channels of communication and identify areas of cooperation with Havana -- in short, gradual relaxation, a cautious but determined approach.

Cuba is the most important nation globally – symbolic and historical tiesNaim 09 Senior Associate in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Moises Naim, The Havana

Obsession, Why all eyes are on a bankrupt island, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/06/12/the-havana-obsession.html] Bill Clinton and George W. Bush recently had a face-to-face debate in Canada to discuss current affairs. The only Latin American nation mentioned in their conversation? Cuba. In April the heads of state of the Americas met in Trinidad. The central theme? Cuba—the only country not invited to the summit. Last week the Organization of American States (OAS) had a summit in Honduras. What thorny problem dominated the discussions of the -foreign-affairs ministers, including Hillary Clinton, who had to divert her attention from the North Korean nuclear test and the crises in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan to travel to the summit of the OAS? Cuba, of course. A few months ago, the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Cuba. The room was overflowing. A few days later it held a far-less-attended meeting. The subject? Brazil.The obsession with Cuba is not exclusively American. It is as intense in Europe. It would be natural to conclude, there-fore, that no other Latin American country matters more to the rest of the hemisphere, or indeed to the rest of the world, than Cuba. Unless, of course, one looks at a map—or at some statistics. Brazil occupies almost half of South America's land mass and is the fifth largest country in the world. Its territory is nearly 80 times larger than that of Cuba. More people live in just one Brazilian city, São Paolo, than in all of Cuba. Brazil's economy is the ninth largest in the world and one of the most dynamic—it is also 31 times larger than that of Cuba. Trade between Brazil and the rest of the world is 25 times that of Cuba. There are 10 times as many Brazilians in the military as there are Cubans in the island's armed forces. In global negotiations on the environment, trade, nuclear proliferation, financial regulation, energy and poverty alleviation, Brazil is a major player.Why the Cuba obsession, then? Why is more attention given to this bankrupt Caribbean island than to a continental giant and global player like Brazil?The usual explanation is that Cuba has a unique symbolic allure. It is the small country that confronted the U.S. empire and has survived despite the attempts by all U.S. presidents since to subdue its communist government. It is the island with iconic leaders like Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, and the Latin American country that in the language of revolutionaries everywhere embodies the struggle of socialist humanism against the materialism of capitalist societies.Cuba is also the small nation that in the past sent its troops to die in faraway lands in Latin America and even Africa fighting for the poor (and to further the interests of the Kremlin, but that's another story). And it is also the country whose progress in health care and education for the majority became the stuff of legend. It is the small country that the United States has unsuccessfully tried to isolate for decades through a variety of means—including an absurd and useless embargo that hurts the United States more than Cuba. The embargo is the perfect example used by anti-Americans everywhere to expose the hypocrisy of a superpower that punishes a small island while cozying to dictators elsewhere.But Cuba is not just the David that stands against Goliath. Unfortunately, it is also a country where people are willing to risk their lives and take to the sea in rickety rafts to escape from material deprivation, brutal repression and political suffocation. It is a country whose economy cannot survive without the handouts from its allies and where food shortages and hunger are common. It is also the country where, for more than half a century, power has been in the hands of the same family.

Cuba spillsover to the regionPerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State

Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader. Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.

Spillsover to effect all Latin American relationsPerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Over the last decade, America's image and influence in Latin America have been declining as a result of poorly executed policies and general neglect. Given the region's importance to American economic and national security interests, the United States must begin pursuing policies that foster trust and cooperation with Latin America, rather than fear and enmity. Reaching out to the Cuban government would have positive and reverberating effects.

Cuba key to overall Latin relationsZedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF]

U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies toward Cuba have affected the United States’ image in the region and have hindered Washington’s ability to work constructively with other countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington, combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course.Though the reforms enacted recently in Cuba have thus far been mostly cosmetic, they could create openings for grassroots political and economic activity. The removal of restrictions on access to tourist facilities and on the

purchase of mobile telephones and computers may have an important psychological impact and increase contact with the outside world. Also, the Cuban government has recently lifted all wage caps, started to allow performance bonuses for certain salaried professions, liberalized the sale of farming equipment, and begun to lease idle state lands to increase agricultural output. These reforms may improve labor incentives, purchasing power, and productivity.Economic developments in Cuba will affect U.S.-Cuban relations.Today, the United States is Cuba’s fourth-largest trading partner; in 2007, it sold the island $582 million worth of goods (including shipping costs). Cuba is currently exploring its prospects for energy production in both sugarcane-based ethanol and offshore oil. Spanish, Canadian, Norwegian, Brazilian, Indian, and other international oil companies have secured contracts to explore drilling possibilities off the Cuban coast. If the ethanol and oil industries become fully operational in five to seven years, revenues of $3 billion to $5 billion annually could significantly strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce the government’s vulnerability to external political pressure. With stable inflows of hard currency from oil sales, the Cuban government would have more funds to use at its discretion, further eroding the effects of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.Demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community in the United States add to the prospects for reorienting U.S.-Cuban relations. The Cuban American population is getting younger demographically, and its priorities regarding Cuba have shifted from a traditional hard line to a focus on the day-to-day existence of those living on the island. According to 2007 polls by Florida International University, Cuban Americans are increasingly opposed to current U.S. policy, particularly restrictions on family travel, caps on remittances, and limitations on the sale of medical and other vital supplies to Cuba; 64 percent of those polled support a return to the more liberal policies of 2003. The Cuban American community has historically played a central role in U.S. domestic politics, with strong influence in the state of Florida. This shift in public opinion may ease the path toward reorientation for policymakers in Washington.The view of this Commission is that U.S. policy should be reframed to enable legitimate Cuban voices to shape a representative, accountable, and sustainable transition to democracy. The Cuban people should be empowered to drive sustainable change from within by facilitating the free flow of information and expanding diplomatic networks to support human rights and democratic governance.

Cuba key to overall cooperation on multiple issues.Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious juncture. In the past decade, most Latin American countries have made enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing inequality and, especially, poverty, within a democratic framework. These critical changes have brought greater autonomy, expanded global links, and growing self-confidence. It is now the United States that is in a sour mood, struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished international stature and influence, and fractured politics at home. These recent changes have profoundly affected Inter-American relations. While relations are today cordial and largely free of the antagonisms of the past, they also seem without vigor and purpose. Effective cooperation in the Americas, whether to deal with urgent problems or to take advantage of new opportunities, has been disappointing.The Inter-American Dialogue’s report is a call to all nations of the hemisphere to take stock, to rebuild cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction. All governments in the hemisphere should be more attentive to emerging opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues ranging across economic integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and climate change.

The United States must regain its credibility in the region by dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problems—including immigration, drugs, and Cuba—that

stands in the way of a real partnership. To do so, it needs the help of Latin America and the Caribbean.If the current state of affairs continues, the strain between the United States and Latin

America could worsen, adversely affecting the interests and wellbeing of all in the hemisphere. There is a great deal at stake. This report offers a realistic assessment of the relationship within a changing regional and global context and sets out an agenda of old and new business that need urgent attention. A collaborative effort should begin immediately at the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia.

Cuba undermines relations with the whole hemisphereShifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation. The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.Another chronic irritant is US drug policy, which most Latin Americans now believe makes their drug and crime problems worse. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that US anti-drug programs have not worked. Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the region, the United States has shown little interest in exploring alternative approaches.Similarly, Washington’s more than half-century embargo on Cuba, as well as other elements of United States’ Cuba policy, is strongly opposed by all other countries in the hemisphere. Indeed, the US position on these troublesome issues—immigration, drug policy, and Cuba—has set Washington against the consensus view of the hemisphere’s other 34 governments. These issues stand as obstacles to further cooperation in the Americas . The United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need to resolve them in order to build more productive partnerships.

Cuba critical to Latin America – US image tied to itGandásegui 11 professor at the University of Panama and a research fellow at the Arosemena Latin American Studies Center [Marco A. Gandásegui, Jr, President Obama, the Crisis, and Latin America, Latin American Perspectives 2011 38: 109]

Obama’s greatest challenge in Latin America concerns Cuba. After 50 years of embargo, everyone in the United States wants a solution to the problem, but no U.S. government has had the political ability to find the right way. Obama promised to solve this impasse and restore the U.S. image, but during his presidential campaign he spoke only once about his Cuban plans. In May 2008, at Miami’s Cuban American National Foundation, he said that it was high time Cuba and the United States listened to each other and learned from each other’s experience. He promised to open up travel and allow the sending of remittances without restrictions, but in two years he has only eliminated some of the radical measures introduced by Bush, bringing things back to where they were during the Clinton administration. In 2004 he said that the Cuban embargo had to end because it had failed to oust Castro, but in May 2008 he said that he would maintain an embargo that could serve as a weapon in negotiations. What, then, are his intentions?

The Basque journalists José Miguel Arrugaeta and Joseba Macías (2008) have suggested that, unlike his predecessors, Obama seemed to have no definite links to the more reactionary sectors of the U.S.-based Cuban counterrevolutionary movement and did not owe them his comfortable win in Florida. The recalcitrant sectors of this opposition and their domestic allies have been generously financed, supported, and even organized for decades by several U.S. administrations, but during the last electoral campaign most placed their bets on the losing candidate. Obama did not get the message.The Cuban Manuel Yepe (2008) has described the optimism generated by Obama’s election: the embargo might end, and the five Cuban fighters who have been unfairly incarcerated in the United States might finally be released. “Cubans . . . hope that the election of a president who has promised changes and who, in himself, represents change, will lead to a new period in relations between Havana and Washington.” But these possibilities do not fit the logic of U.S. foreign policy. Obama could have gained some points during the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Castor, 2010), but he let the United States address the tragedy as an issue of “national security.” Instead of sending aid, the White House’s first order was to send several regiments to occupy the island and aircraft carriers to areas with U.S tourists in case the latter had to be evacuated.Most observers agree that, for Obama, Latin America continues to be terra incognita. The United States has already lost its trade presence in the Southern Cone, and whatever changes Obama’s presence may have introduced into the White House, Latin America remains forgotten (Montecino, 2008).

Combats Chavez Message

Helping Cuba undermines Chavez’s anti-US messagePerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Above all else, Venezuela's most expensive petro-project is its subsidization of the Cuban economy, which over the last decade has helped keep Cuba's government solvent, while bringing the two countries closer together. Venezuela is Cuba's largest benefactor, sending billions of dollars worth of aid, including much-needed oil from Venezuela's state-owned energy sector. n109 It was no surprise then that Raul Castro's first official visit was to Venezuela. n110The relationship accomplishes at least three things. First, it gives Hugo Chavez the ideological credibility he desperately needs to respond to those who criticize him for being heavy on rhetoric and light on action. Second, a strong relationship with Venezuela props up Cuba's failing economy, and by default, its regime. In recent years Cuba has become increasingly reliant on Venezuelan aid, which it ostensibly pays for by sending Cuban doctors to Venezuela to shore up President Chavez's crumbling healthcare system. n111 Third, the relationship is structured in a way that it can only deepen. As Chavez edges closer to radical socialism, he becomes more dependent on the Cuban government's ideological support, while the Cubans become more dependent on Venezuelan largesse. n112 When Raul Castro visited Caracas in December 2008, he discussed additional cooperative ventures in agriculture, athletics, education, energy, medicine, as well as other governmental programs. n113Nevertheless, the Cubans would prefer to avoid another dependent relationship upon an unstable power, since the memories of the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union left a deep crater in the Cuban economy, are still fresh in many leaders' minds. For that reason, Cuba has been wary of Venezuela's erratic behavior, its dependence on high oil prices, its stagflationary outlook, and above all its negative debt rating, which restricts its ability [*223] to access funds. n114 Given Venezuela's vulnerability to the recent crash in oil prices, Cuba has been courting other trading partners, including Brazil and China. Any reassessment of Cuban-Venezuelan cooperation by Havana presents an enormous opportunity for the United States.The parallels between President Chavez's reliance on demonizing the U.S. in order to advance his domestic and foreign policy, and the Cuban regime's reliance on the embargo to scapegoat the U.S. for all its failures, should not be overlooked. Fixing America's reputation in the region would undercut Chavez's own image by removing a large part of his regime's raison d'etre, and would help prevent his taking up the mantle left by Fidel Castro's departure. American rapprochement with Cuba would be a nightmare scenario for Caracas, and a win-win for Washington: if Chavez opposes it, his credibility is undermined; if he endorses it, his critique of America is undermined.

US is competing with Chavez’s message in Latin America – must engagePerez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba

Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

In order to effectively engage Cuba and the rest of Latin America, the United States must accept that it is directly competing with Venezuela for the hearts and minds of the Latin American people. The U.S. should explicitly use any rapprochement with Cuba as a means to engage (and defeat) Venezuela in a regional battle of ideas that, to this point, it has been losing.Although President Bush was deeply unpopular in Latin America, perhaps the most polarizing figure throughout the continent is Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Chavez's message strikes a chord among millions of Latin Americans who have taken a liking to his role as both Fidel Castro's pinch-hitter, and the most reliable source of anti-American rhetoric. Although the last thing the U.S. would want is for another loud and erratic leftist to gain a permanent foothold in Latin American politics, Chavez's ascension to Castro's ideological throne makes that scenario likely, though not inevitable. The U.S. would have to directly compete with Chavez's message, which according to William Ratliff, a Latin America expert at the Hoover Institution, can be broken down into three parts. n88 First, Chavez argues that poverty is ubiquitous in Latin America because of an economic quagmire afflicting the entire region. Second, he blames the United States for this quagmire. Finally, he presents socialism - and himself - as an alternative to U.S. influence and the solution to all of Latin America's woes. n89Chavez's message to Latin Americans resonates for the same reason Fidel's message to Cubans has been so effective: it is much easier for governments and political leaders to scapegoat the "Colossus to the North" than to address their own domestic failures. However, this message is not new, it is simply a repackaging of the economically intrusive policies pursued during the 1960s and 1970s to horrific effect. Some governments in the region, such as Brazil and Chile, have eschewed these worn-out policies in favor of [*219] reform, while others have bought into Chavez's anachronistic ideas, such as Bolivia and Ecuador.Washington must accept the fact that it is competing directly with Chavez for the hearts and minds of the Latin American people, but so far it is losing the race . For too long the contest has been a one-man show featuring a relatively young leader who is able to give fiery speeches from his bully pulpit. Fortunately, despite its relative absence from the region during the last eight years, the U.S. still has a horse than can run circles around Venezuela, since the American market presents a much bigger carrot than Caracas could ever offer. For instance, Latin American exports to the U.S. has grown by more than 69% since 1996. n90Unfortunately, the stark economic comparisons that clearly show America's advantage over Venezuela have allowed Washington's policymakers to sit on their laurels while Chavez distorts the numbers to scapegoat the United States for Latin America's difficulties. Washington's recent neglect of the region should be replaced with an aggressive and humble courtship of the Latin American people. America's economic advantage over Caracas should be leveraged as a means to directly engage the region's leaders while challenging Chavez's message. We can no longer sit back and wait for the region to engage us while ignoring the obvious problem posed by Chavez's distortions.

Soft Power IL

Key to international soft power – anti-Cuba stance is regularly criticizedIglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408]

*GOC = Government of Cuba

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus. Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).100Another potential gain for U.S. interests would be to upgrade its diplomatic presence on the island. For decades, the countries have reciprocated diplomacy marginalization with low-level “interest sections” in each other capitals. The fallback reasoning for the U.S. has always been that it did not want to appear to reward the GOC’s legitimacy with an embassy. This is myopic and inconsistent. The national strategy clearly promotes engagement in order to “learn about the intentions and nature of closed regimes, and to plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that their governments are to blame for their isolations.101 Additionally, the diplomatic level is inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. accreditation of ambassadors to both friendly and hostile governments.102 An embassy in Cuba could support critical awareness and engagements. In the event of an opportunity or crisis, this presence could be the difference between knowing where, when, and with whom to act or just watching from across the Florida Straits.

Everyone Hates It

Everyone hates the embargo - everyoneColl 07 Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul College of Law [Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall, 2007, 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 199]

The overwhelming majority of United Nations members, including all of the United States' major allies, oppose the U.S. embargo against Cuba. As noted earlier in this article, the OAS, the only regional organization in the hemisphere with the legitimate authority to impose sanctions, ended its sanctions against Cuba in 1975, and called upon its members - including the United States - to follow suit. In addition to lacking United Nations and OAS endorsement and being opposed by 183 states in the international community, the embargo has no support from the international human rights community - not even from a single international NGO working on human rights or humanitarian issues. The world's two most prominent international human rights NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are sharply critical of the Cuban government's human rights policies. Both strongly oppose the embargo as harmful to human rights in Cuba and as counterproductive to the long-term objective of promoting democracy and human rights on the island. n424 The Roman Catholic Church, which under Pope John Paul II gained wide credibility for its stance on behalf of human rights across the globe, has also been highly critical of indiscriminate sanctions in general and of the Cuban embargo specifically. n425 The embargo's purely unilateral character is highlighted by the fact that, with the exception of the governments of the United States, Israel, Palau and the Marshall Islands, there is not a single credible international actor, governmental or otherwise, [*264] that supports the embargo or has not expressed clear opposition to it. Finally, even within the United States, the embargo's supporters consist of a narrow minority located in a small geographic corner of the United States as well as the successive U.S. administrations and members of Congress that are eager to court their votes and financial backing. A 2006 Gallup poll indicated that two-thirds of the American people, while disapproving of the Castro government, would like to reestablish U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba. n426 Similarly, a 2007 Zogby poll found that a majority of Americans were in favor of improving relations with Cuba and were against the embargo and its restrictions. n427Thus, the nearly universal disapproval for the Cuban embargo constitutes a fatal flaw in its legitimacy. The established consensus is that comprehensive human rights embargoes require international support in order to be legitimate and free from the taint of partiality and self-interest. This is also a crucial difference between the Cuban embargo and the earlier sanctions imposed against South Africa in the 1980s. Unlike the Cuban embargo, the South African sanctions were limited, supported by many states within the international community across a wide range of different cultures and economic and political systems, backed by a substantial number of international actors from the NGO and corporate sectors, and endorsed by leading members of the South African opposition, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu. n428

Laundry List Impact

Relations key to multiple issues – growth, democracy, prolif, and warming.Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties.Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance.For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights. With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership.Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing. If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart. The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation. Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention —both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

US-Latin relations are key to combat nuclear proliferation, climate change, and insure economic growth – Cuba is a key starting pointBROOKINGS 08 Brookings’s Partnership for the Americas Commission [Re-Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/11/24-latin-america-partnership]

Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have a very significant impact on the daily lives of those who live in the United States. Yet because of a lack of trust, an inability to undertake stable commitments by some countries, and different U.S. priorities, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional —let alone global—challenges.If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper

regional safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase . Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.Today, several changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. The key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries —such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. At the same time, the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic and political relations, making them less reliant on the United States. Finally, the LAC countries are better positioned than before to act as reliable partners.This report does not advance a single, grand scheme for reinventing hemispheric relations. Instead, the report is based on two simple propositions: The countries of the hemisphere share common interests; and the United States should engage its hemispheric neighbors on issues where shared interests, objectives, and solutions are easiest to identify and can serve as the basis for an effective partnership. In this spirit, the report offers a series of modest, pragmatic recommendations that, if implemented, could help the countries of the region manage key transnational challenges and realize the region’s potential.The report identifies four areas that hold most promise for a hemispheric partnership: (1) developing sustainable energy sources and combating climate change, (2) managing migration effectively, (3) expanding opportunities for all through economic integration, and (4) protecting the hemisphere from drug trafficking and organized crime. The next section of this report explores the growing need for a U.S.-LAC partnership. The subsequent four sections offer an analysis of each promising area for the potential partnership and provide concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers—which are previewed below. The last section addresses U.S. relations with Cuba. Though this issue is of a smaller order of magnitude than the other four areas, it is addressed here because Cuba has long been a subject of intense interest in U.S. foreign policy and a stumbling block for U.S. relations with other countries in the hemisphere.

Growth Impact

Latin America relations key to US economic growthZedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF]

As the crisis unfolds, Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis. Conversely, if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders. For the United States, coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications.

Environment Impact

US Latin relations key to energy policies – combat warming & Amazon deforestationZedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF]

To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports.However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners .

In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

Soft Power Good – Global Problems

Soft Power solves global problemsReiffel 05 Visiting Fellow at the Global Economy and Development Center of the Brookings Institution [Lex Reiffel, The Brookings Institution, Reaching Out: Americans Serving Overseas, 12-27-2005, www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf]

I. Introduction: Overseas Service as a Soft Instrument of Power The United States is struggling to define a new role for itself in the post-Cold War world that protects its vital self interests without making the rest of the world uncomfortable. In retrospect, the decade of the 1990s was a cakewalk. Together with its Cold War allies Americans focused on helping the transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union build functioning democratic political systems and growing market economies. The USA met this immense challenge successfully, by and large, and it gained friends in the process. By contrast, the first five years of the new millennium have been mostly downhill for the USA. The terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 changed the national mood in a matter of hours from gloating to a level of fear unknown since the Depression of the 1930s. They also pushed sympathy for the USA among people in the rest of the world to new heights. However, the feeling of global solidarity quickly dissipated after the military intervention in Iraq by a narrow US-led coalition. A major poll measuring the attitudes of foreigners toward the USA found a sharp shift in opinion in the negative direction between 2002 and 2003, which has only partially recovered since then.1 The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, failed states like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation. The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.2

Soft Power key to Heg

Soft Power key to sustaining US leadership – assumes the 21st centuryNYE 02 former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (Joseph, “The Paradox of American Power”)

PEERING INTO THE FUTURE The September 2001 wake-up call means that Americans are unlikely to slip back into the complacency that marked the first decade after the Cold War. If we respond effectively, it is highly unlikely that terrorists could destroy American power, but the campaign against terrorism will require a long and sustained effort. At the same time, the United States is unlikely to face a challenge to its preeminence unless it acts so arrogantly that it helps other states to overcome their built- in limitations. The one entity with the capacity to challenge the United States in the near future is the European Union if it were to become a tight federation with major military capabilities and if the relations across the Atlantic were allowed to sour. Such an outcome is possible but would require major changes in Europe and considerable ineptitude in American policy to bring it about. Nonetheless, even short of such a challenge, the diminished fungibility of military power in a global information age means that Europe is already well placed to balance the United States on the economic and transnational chessboards. Even short of a military balance of power, other countries may be driven to work together to take actions to complicate American objectives. Or, as the French critic Dominique Moisi puts it, “The global age has not changed the fact that nothing in the world can be done without the United States. And the multiplicity of new actors means that there is very little the United States can achieve alone.”73 The United States can learn useful lessons about a strategy of providing public goods from the history of Pax Britannica. An Australian analyst may be right in her view that if the United States plays its cards well and acts not as a soloist but as the leader of a concert of nations, “the Pax Americana, in terms of its duration, might. . . become more like the Pax Romana than the Pax Britannica:’74 If so, our soft power will play a major role. As Henry Kissinger has argued, the test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms . That was the greatness achieved by Rome and Britain in their times.75

United States leadership is solely dependent on Soft powerFRASER 03 doctorate in political science from Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, former Editor-in-Chief of National Post (Matthew, , p. 18, “Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire”).

Let's begin with soft power. The term has been championed by Joseph S. Nye, a Harvard professor who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under President

Bill Clinton. Nye has defined soft power as "the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion." Nye argues, more specifically, that America's global influence cannot depend solely on its economic strength, military muscle, and coercive capacities. Yes, hard power is needed as an implied threat, and should be used when necessary—as was demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. But American leadership in the world must depend on the assertion of soft power—namely, the global appeal of American lifestyles, culture, forms of distraction, norms, and values. In short, American leadership is more effective when it is morally based. Soft power has the advantage of being much less violent than brute force. It can claim, moreover, the not inconsequential virtue of being much less costly. Why keep the peace with ground troops, aircraft carriers, and inter-continental missiles when Big Macs, Coca-Cola, and Hollywood blockbusters can help achieve the same long-term goals? Soft power also includes artistic expression and institutional arrangements—such as travelling exhibitions and scholarly exchange programs—that help export American models. When foreign students undertake studies in the United States, they return to their home countries immersed in American values, attitudes, and modes of thinking.

China Module

US-Latin America relations are key to stop Chinese expansion in the region Lovelace 07 Ph.D., Director of the Strategic Studies Institute [Douglas, FOREWORD: CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” Strategic Studies Institute, September, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=806]

The U.S. Government is waking up to China's growing presence in Latin America. For the last several years as U.S. policymakers' attention and resources, largely diverted from Latin America, have been focused on the Middle East, China has pursued a policy of economic engagment with the region. Sino-Latin American trade has sky-rocketed, and Chinese investment in the region is picking up. In this monograph, Ms. Janie Hulse, a Latin American specialist based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, argues that increased Chinese investment in regional telecommunications and space industries has implications for U.S. national security. She believes that globalization, advances in information technology and China's growing capacity and interest in information warfare make the United States particularly vulnerable. Ms. Hulse details China's expansion into the U.S. withdrawal from these intelligence-related industries in Argentina and highlights associated risks for the United States. The author calls for the U.S. government to react to this current trend by increasing its engagement in regional strategic industries and bettering relations with its southern neighbors.

Regional influence is key to prevent a Chinese ASATs attackHulse 7 (Janie Hulse, Master’s degree in Politics of Development of Latin America from the London School of Economics, is an independent contractor based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, who provides communica-tions and research services to private and public sector organizations “CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” Strategic Studies Institute, September, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=806 )

Chinese presence in Western Hemisphere space creates particular vulnerabilities for the United States. Latin America?s geographical proximity makes for convenient satellite observance of the United States. Access to space tracking facilities in the region also could give China the ability to attack U.S. satellites. Moreover, Chinese space cooperation with Latin American governments that have historically collaborated with the United States provides the Chinese an opportunity to study U.S. space technologies and practices up close. As is the case with the telecommunications industry, there is increasing

competition in the international space markets. If the United States fails to maintain its preeminence in these markets, it will lose the ability to secure this extremely strategic industry. While China is not currently building a significant military presence in Latin America, the human and commercial infrastructure that it is building in the region increasingly gives China a powerful lever for disrupting and distracting the United States in the Western Hemisphere, should Sino-U.S. relations turn sour. The United States should work to counter China?s growing influence to mitigate future threats. To do so requires improving U.S. relations with Latin American countries and making U.S. companies more competitive in the region?especially in strategic markets where U.S. security is at stake. The most effective way for the United States to improve its standing and influence in Argentina and the Latin American region as a whole is to help these countries succeed economically through increased aid, trade, and investments. Aid should be expanded in a creative, cost-effective manner and should include middle-income countries in South America, which traditionally do not qualify for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance. Free trade should continue to be promoted, but in a more generous way. The U.S. Government should promote investment by bolstering the U.S. Commercial Service and assisting U.S. companies in gaining a foothold in the strategic telecommunications and space industries. It also behooves the U.S. Government to increase assistance to and cooperation with Latin American militaries to maintain friendships throughout the region. It is not too late for the United States to take remedial action to increase its presence in Latin America?s telecommunications and space sectors. Commercial and aid efforts should be complemented by a heavy dose of improved public diplomacy? especially in countries similar to Argentina where U.S. popularity is low and where China has made substantial inroads.

The impact is US-Sino nuclear warForden, PhD and Research Associate @ MIT, 8 (Geoffrey, PhD and Research Associate at MIT, “How China Loses the Coming Space War (Pt. 2),” 1/10, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-ch-1/, EMM)

The United States has five satellites in geostationary orbit that detect missile launches using the heat released from their exhaust plumes. These satellites are primarily used to alert US nuclear forces to massive nuclear attacks on the homeland. However, in recent years, they have played an increasing role in conventional conflicts, such as both Gulf Wars, by cueing tactical missile defenses like the Patriot missile defense systems that gained fame in their engagements with Saddam’s SCUD missiles. Because of this new use, China might find it useful to attack them with ASATs. Since there are only five of them, China could destroy the entire constellation but at the cost of diverting some of the few available deep-space ASATs from other targets. Of course, China would not have to attack all five but could limit its attack to the three that simultaneously view the Taiwan Straits area. If China did decide to destroy these early warning satellites, it would greatly reduce the area covered by US missile defenses in Taiwan against SCUD and longer range missiles. This is because the area covered by a theater missile defense system is highly dependent on the warning time it has; the greater the warning time, the more effective the missile defense system’s radar is. Thus a Patriot battery, which might ordinarily cover the capital of Taiwan, could be reduced to just defending the military base it was stationed at. Some analysts believe that China would gain a tremendous propaganda coup by having a single missile make it through US defenses

and thus might consider this use of its deep-space ASATs highly worthwhile even if it could not increase the probability of destroying military targets. On the other hand, China would run a tremendous risk of the US believing it was under a more general nuclear attack if China did destroy these early warning satellites. Throughout the history of the Cold War, the US has had a policy of only launching a “retaliatory” nuclear strike if an incoming attack is detected by both early warning satellites and radars. Without the space leg of the early warning system, the odds of the US misinterpreting some missile launch that it detected with radar as a nuclear attack would

be greatly increased even if the US did not view the satellite destruction as a

sufficiently threatening attack all by themselves. Such a misinterpretation is not without precedent. In 1995, Russia’s early warning radars viewed a NASA sounding rocket launch off the coast of Norway and flagged it as a possible Trident missile launch. Many analysts believe that Russia was able to not respond only because it had a constellation of functioning early warning satellites. Any Chinese attacks on US early

warning satellites would risk both intentional and mistaken escalation of the conflict into a nuclear war without a clear military goal.

Escalates to extinctionCheong, Senior Writer @ the Strait Times, 2k (Ching, Senior Writer at the Strait Times, “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” June 25th, Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national

interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors - raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate , east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order . With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China , 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons . The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

Prolif Bad

And arguments for slow proliferation are wrong—it will snowball and put everyone on hair trigger—that makes all their impacts worseSokolski 9—Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism [Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, Policy Review June & July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html]At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I . Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S . conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think . In such a world, the actions of just one or two state s or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge ; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before . Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets

and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

And multiple factors ensure miscalculation is likely—their deterrence checks evidence is outdated and falseEvans and Kawaguchi 9—President of the International Crisis Group & Former Foreign Minister of Japan [December 15, 2009, Gareth Evans (Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne) & Yoriko Kawaguchi (Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament), “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, pg. 31-32, http://www.icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/part-ii-3.html]3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nucleararmed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear -armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour . 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems , absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high . Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions.3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and india a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and

political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances . If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored.3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or india–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict .

Relations / Soft Power

Relations Bad Now

Cuba-U.S. relations bad – opposing U.S. views on SnowdenReuters 7/3/13 (“Cuba Denounces US Pressure Over Snowden's Fate”, Reuters, July 3 2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100863116)//CB

Cuba denounced U.S. efforts to pressure Latin American countries not to provide refuge to fugitive U.S. spy agency contractor Edward Snowden and urged countries to stand up to Washington's bullying."Cuba calls on the international community to mobilize against these violations of international law and human rights," said a foreign ministry statement that was issued late Tuesday and carried by state media Wednesday.The communique termed "inadmissible, unfounded and arbitrary" the decision by a number of European countries to deny flyover rights on Tuesday to a Bolivian plane carrying President Evo Morales and thought to possibly have Snowden aboard.The plane had departed from Moscow, where Snowden is holed up, and eventually landed in Vienna, where it was searched by Austrian authorities looking for the man who last month revealed details of U.S. surveillance programs.The statement said the incident, which Bolivia said amounted to a kidnapping of its president orchestrated

by Washington, "offended all Latin America and the Caribbean."

Embargo KeyThe Embargo on Cuba kills US credibility – symbol of US dominanceSafran 12 (Brian, Master of Science in Global Affairs at NYU, Private Sector: International Business, Economics, and Development, "End the Cuban Embargo," 08/14/12, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran)

The continuance of the embargo has incited widespread international condemnation of the Untied States. The United Nations General Assembly has consistently denounced the imposition of the embargo almost unanimously on the basis of its illegitimacy and violation of internationally accepted humanitarian standards. (Herrera, 2003, 50) The United States has also recently had to relinquish its seats on the human rights commissions both in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, which many analysts believe to be a form of retribution aimed at the United States in response to its continuation of the Cuban embargo in the midst of its unfathomable and deplorable effects on the Cuban populace. (Weinmann, 2004, 30) Many leaders in the international community have expressed their distain for the U.S. embargo through international organizations based on the fact that the United States attempts to impose the sanctions it places on Cuba via “extraterritoriality,” or against the international community, thus clearly violating internationally-accepted standards of national sovereignty and international law (Herrera, 2003, 51). Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.¶ In addition, U.S. public opinion appears to be shifting in favor of eliminating the embargo. By virtue of its geography, influence in national elections, near even split in terms of ideological composition, and preponderance of Cuban-Americans living within its borders, U.S.-Cuban policy is often procured by considering the views of the now anti-embargo Floridian constituency (Schechner, 7, 1994). Traditionally, Cuban-Americans living in Florida have tended to support the embargo, seeing it as a way to force democracy upon Cuba so as to make the Cuban government more responsive to the demands of the Cuban people, and by extension, their own interests abroad. (Schechner, 1994, 7) In recent years however, many have begun to view the embargo as a failure of foreign policy. In addition, the U.S. government has placed numerous restrictions upon them, prohibiting them from visiting their families in Cuba more than once every three years, and decreasing the

amount of remittance that they are entitled to provide for their Cuban relatives. (Lovato, 2004, 23) Based in part upon changing public opinion, the U.S. Congress has enacted numerous measures to decrease the extent of the Cuban embargo, including the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which allowed for limited sales of U.S. agricultural products and medical supplies. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In 2003, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate passed measures designed to prevent the U.S. treasury from providing the funding necessary to enforce the ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 28) Even within the Bush administration, many senior officials remain highly divided on how to best confront Cuban politics. (Weinmann, 2004, 25) Thus, many U.S. citizens and politicians believe the Cuban embargo to be unfounded and unnecessary in the contemporary world.

Other countries unhappy with U.S. foreign policy – contradictory claims Karon 1 (Tony, “U.N. Defeat Was a Message from Washington's Allies”, Time World, May 4 2001, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,108730,00.html)//CB

The consensus among U.N. diplomats is that the U.S. appeared to have taken its reelection for granted, and failed to lobby for support to secure one of the three seats on the commission allocated to Western nations (it was ultimately shut out by France, Sweden and Austria). But many traditional U.S. supporters clearly withdrew their votes in order to signal their displeasure at the increasingly go-it-alone stance of the U.S . Their grievances are not confined to Washington's delinquent habits when it comes to paying its dues to the international body — some $580 million in arrears is still tied up in Congress despite an agreement late last year to facilitate payment. The Europeans have been increasingly chagrined by Washington's tendency to ignore the international consensus on issues ranging from the use of land mines to the Kyoto climate change treaty.They're also critical of what they see as Washington's tendency to politicize the issue of human rights, using annual resolutions at the commission to denounce China or Cuba when that conforms to U.S. foreign policy objectives but for the same reason voting alone in defense of Israel when that country is in the dock over its conduct.

The embargo wastes US influence around the globeIglesias 2012(Commander Carlos Iglesias United States Navy, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba,” 10-3-12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408)

Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to gain from ¶ a more inclusive and less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N. anti-embargo ¶ resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt from General Assembly scrutiny have had ¶ longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically undercut American’s legitimacy ¶ and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New York City and ¶ across the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have netted few if any ¶ national objectives, all the while depleting substantial national soft power. The costbenefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain exceedingly unfavorable, if not ¶ outright counter-productive.

Embargo = Anti-Americanism

The embargo has backfired – It deflects blame away from the regime and unites Cubans against the USSeaman 2010 (David Seaman, Research Assistant and Lecturer at the University of Osnabrück – Department of social sciences, “U.S. Democracy Promotion- The Case of Cuba” - 2010)

By far, the greatest source of legitimacy for the Cuban Government is¶ derived from the embargo and hard-line U.S. policy itself (Hoffmann/¶

Whitehead 2006; Sweig 2007; Hawkins 2001). The U.S. policy offers a¶ source of legitimacy to the Cuban regime in two ways. Firstly , the embargo¶ serves to partly deflect system blame arising from the poor economic¶ conditions the Cuban regime helps to create. It is generally understood that¶ the embargo is not solely responsible for the economic difficulties in Cuba,¶ but rather many point to the unsound economic policies of the Cuban¶ Government itself as being partly responsible (Sweig 2007; Griswold 2002;¶ Bond 2003) . The existence of the embargo, however, enables the Cuban¶ regime to continuously blame the U.S. as the cause of Cuba's economic¶ problems. Secondly, Washington's aggressive policy creates a source of¶ legitimacy for the Cuban Government by allowing it to rally the population¶ against an outside enemy (Hawkins 2001, 448). Cuban revolutionary¶ ideology is grounded in the historical factor of U.S. hegemony over prerevolutionary¶ Cuba: from depriving Cubans of their independence in 1898,¶ meddling in the country's political affairs under the Platt Amendment and¶ supporting Batista's repressive dictatorship, to punishing Cubans for the last¶ half-century for supporting the revolution. The U.S. historical factor¶ underscores the revolution's ideological emphasis on the role of Cuban¶ unity in defending the island from this outside threat (Sweig 2007 , 44) .¶

Hoffmann and Whitehead (2006, 8) suggest that the Cuban regime "has¶ made resistance to foreign domination its central claim to . . . legitimacy ."¶ As long as Washington continues to play the role of the menacing enemy¶

seeking to destroy the revolution, the Cuban Government is not subject to¶ economic performance legitimacy alone, but is able to enjoy this second¶ source of performance legitimacy it would not otherwise have - fending off¶ and defying the imperialist aggressor. This phenomenon is particularly highlighted¶ by the festive celebrations in Cuba that accompany the U.N. General¶ Assembly's annual condemnation of the U.S. embargo. Every year Cubans¶ across the island tune in to the live televised U.N. debate and follow the¶

voting (CBS News 2004). As the Cuban Government has noted, Cuban's are¶ "accustomed to celebrating a crushing blow to the US blockade in the¶

United Nations for 14 years" now (Cuba versus Blockade 2006).

The embargo hurts US- Latin cooperation – Regime instability Morley & McGillion 05 associate professor of politics and international relations at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia & senior lecturer in

journalism, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, Australia. [Morris Morley & Chris McGillion, Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World: The International Dimensions of the Washington-Havana Relationship, pg 222-223]

In sum, Latin America has concluded that Cuba should be dealt with like any other country. As a result, no U.S. president could ever again hope to forge the consensus in favor of Cuba's isolation from the rest of the hemisphere that Washington managed to achieve in the 1960s and, to a lesser extent, in the 1970s. In May 2003, Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva underscored this reality when he announced that Fidel Castro would be invited, for the first time, to attend the next meeting of the Rio Group of nations in 2004.197 Castro's triumphant visit to Argentina that month also showed he was still a key factor in Latin American domestic politics.198Given Washington's promotion of a more competitive regional economic environment and a resurgence of political nationalism and populism, the United States could not blame anyone but itself if its Cold War approach toward Cuba was one the rest of Latin America rejected. Indeed, by making an exception of Cuba and frustrating its complete return to the inter-American family of nations, the White House risks inadvertently making the Caribbean island once again a rallying symbol for the popular left in Latin America and those governments intent on pursuing foreign and domestic policies at variance with imperial state interests.

Economics key to Relations

U.S. – Latin American economic ties key to relationsISN 5/31/13 (“The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in Latin America”, International Relations and Security Network, May 31 2013, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=164370)//CB

Relations between the United States and Latin America have experienced cyclical ups and downs. Geographically, the United States and Latin America are linked and have a natural shared market, so there will always be a relationship of one sort or another. The United States will continue to seek to exert its influence over the region, whether through future plans for the placement of military bases or the promotion of bilateral trade agreements. Leftist governments will have to address challenges such as those caused by social divisions and economic inequality. They will likely continue to focus on implementing their leftist discourse, particularly in the wake of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s death. However, it is important to consider that neoliberal philosophies are also still pervasive in many countries of Latin America. This is an advantage for the United States, giving it an opportunity to push for further privatization, but Latin American leftist movements should evaluate themselves and take actions to if they are to avoid a return of neoliberal policies of the 1990s. All that said, how can the United States improve its foreign policy towards Latin America? There are many problems in the region that should be faced together. Accepting this reality is the beginning to improving relations. Transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, and immigration problems are worth making joint efforts to resolve. The U.S. should encourage the strengthening of political and economic ties in the Americas as well as promoting compliance of international commitments as a sign of willingness to improve relations. There are many hemispheric conventions that provide the legal framework to begin to work together against negative outcomes. An example is the Declaration on Security in the Americas signed by the countries of the hemisphere in 2003. This document describes the new concept of multidimensional security, and incorporates as new threats issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, environmental degradation, natural resource and food scarcity, and uncontrolled population growth and migration.

Mean to Cuba hurts Cred

Refusal to change Cuban policy Hurts US International Standing Morley & McGillion 05 associate professor of politics and international relations at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia & senior lecturer in journalism, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, Australia. [Morris Morley & Chris McGillion, Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World: The International Dimensions of the Washington-Havana Relationship, pg 10]

The U.S. refusal to consider serious negotiations with Cuba in the absence of regime change has been the hallmark of post-Cold War American policy worldwide. Yet Cuba has not only survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and a resurgent American imperialism, but has also repositioned itself internationally, normalizing ties with key U.S. allies in Europe, Latin America, and Asia and beginning the process of assuming its place in regional and international forums from which it had long been ostracized or excluded.Today, Washington's uncompromising hostility toward Cuba almost totally isolates it from the rest of the international community, contradicts its professed commitment to free trade principles, undermines international laws, weakens its claim to global leadership, and creates problems for America's overseas investors and traders. The vast majority of countries fail to comprehend the logic of a policy approach still based on the proposition that of all former Cold War socialist bloc nations, only Cuba is immune from engagement as a step toward normalizing bilateral relations. This approach is seen as anachronistic, irrational, and presumptuous. America's allies place a much higher value on encouraging economic ties and political dialogue, on multilateralism and consensus building. This is the approach that they calculate will more likely produce desired changes in Cuba's political economy and limit friction between Havana and other nations over the issue of differing internal policies. The international dimensions of Washington's Cuba policy since the end of the Cold War and across a range of issues, more starkly than any other foreign policy issue, reveal the degree to which U.S. policymakers have exhibited a striking lack of realism about America's capacity to impose its political and economic will in a global environment unsympathetic to its imperial ambitions.

Embargo Causes Unrest

Embargo ruins Cuba – sets the stage for multiple escalation pointsRatliff & Fontaine 2k (Ratliff, William - research fellow at Stanford University, PhD (Chinese/Latin American histories) from U of Washington; Roger Fontaine. Former Director of Latin American Affairs, National Security Council.) "A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean." Lift the Embargo on Cuba (2000). p13-15

The present study supports a reversal in U.S. policy because the embargo now 1. Polarizes Cubans in Cuba and abroad; thus to the extent that the pressure is significant it increases the prospects for an eventual civil war rather than the “peaceful transition” U.S. leaders say they seek, and this in turn raises the prospects of a costly U.S. military intervention in Cuba to prevent Castro from crushing the reformers.332. Sets the stage for innumerable small encounters that could escalate. For example, what if the bomber on 1 January 2000 had dropped explosives rather than leaflets, or if Castro had shot him down as he did two Cessnas that allegedly overflew Cuban territorial waters in 1996? As it was, Castro sent up two MiGs and the United States launched an F-16. The flight was not illegal under U.S. law, and since many in Miami hailed it as a heroic act, the same thing could easily happen again. Also, Cuban American hawks closed down parts of Miami and stoked international tensions, calling the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) decision in early January 2000 to send Elia´n Gonza´lez back to his father in Cuba a sellout to Castro. The abandon with which many advocates of family values cast aside the rights of the boy’s father shows how politicized this matter has become.3. Encourages determined pressure groups to lobby a constantly compromising U.S. executive and Congress in such a way as to threaten the essential interaction of several branches of the government in the analysis and defense of U.S. interests.4. Antagonizes our allies around the world, complicating cooperation on other important issues.5. Sets the stage for new generations of hostility between Cubans and Americans because of the imperialistic demands of the Torricelli Act and especially the Helms-Burton Law.6. Serves more than it than impedes Castro’s own interests by providing a scapegoat for his hopeless economic policies and continuing domestic repression, making him the target of a U.S. vendetta that is condemned by the rest of the world and thus enables him to maintain at least a vestige of his all-important self-portrayal as a defiant warrior against “U.S. imperialism.”7. Imposes at least some degree of additional hardship on the Cuban people with no evidence that these hardships will improve their living conditions now or in the foreseeable future. Washington claims its policy is on behalf of the Cuban people, though there is no significant evidence that the Cuban people support the embargo and many indications that they do not. Even the majority of activists reportedly want it lifted.34

8. Makes critically important cooperation between and among Cubans in Cuba and abroad in the eventual post-Castro period more difficult to achieve.9. Has at least a better chance of opening up society and the economy than current policy, which does nothing of the sort.10. Is so cluttered with contradictions and inconsistencies it has become a dishonest, embarrassing, and pernicious policy unworthy of the United States. A few embargo supporters try to defuse criticism by maintaining that sanctions are valuable because they can “weaken a target country” even if they don’t “bring surrender on key issues.” According to an analyst featured in a CANF newsletter, the critics of the embargo have “set the bar too high.”35 But that bar—the proclaimed goals of the embargo—is the one set by the U.S. government and most supporters of the sanctions, not by the critics who simply measure the policy against its stated objectives.

Embargo causes civil war, pulls in USRatliff & Fontaine 2k (Ratliff, William - research fellow at Stanford University, PhD in Chinese/Latin American histories from U of Washington; Roger Fontaine - Former Director of Latin American Affairs, National Security Council.) "A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean." Lift the Embargo on Cuba (2000).p38-39

Inciting an InsurrectionThe strategy of U.S. policy is to make life evermore difficult in Cuba so that Castro will make reforms or the Cuban people will rise up and throw him out. Many acknowledge that the embargo doesn’t accomplish either of these objectives, but what would happen if it did spark significant protests? Would that truly be desirable? According to a former Interior Ministry official, the protests would be countered by “violent repression by the state apparatus. The situation could degenerate into a massacre and begin a devastating civil war.”78 A poll conducted in 1997 by Florida International University and the Miami Herald showed some 66 percent of Cuban Americans favoring U.S. military action to overthrow Castro and 71 percent supporting military action against Castro by Cubans in exile.79 But, as noted above, a recent Gallop poll showed that only 42 percent of Americans in general support even the embargo, much less a military operation. Our conclusion in talking with many Americans over the past decade is that few have any idea what the issues are and that support would plummet if people knew the facts or thought substantial numbers of Americans might be sent to die in or for Cuba. Nor would the U.S. military want to become involved in a conflict in a country that poses no strategic threat to the United States according to its own and other U.S. intelligence analyses. But, even if U.S. domestic opinion opposed intervention, significant losses by antiCastro forces during a general uprising or civil war—the reaction we have been encouraging—would result in enormous pressure on Washington to send military support to preserve those who remain and finally end Castro’s rule. Support for Reformers Some embargo supporters believe that pressures by the United States strengthen reformers within Cuba. Two eminent embargo supporters are concerned that ending the embargo might mean that reformers would be swallowed up by hard-liners, though one also notes that even if the sanction supporters carry out reforms there is nothing to stop Castro from reversing reforms at will even as the sanctions continue.80 In fact Castro

sometimes reverses “reforms,” such as they are, or arrests and sentences Cubans, seemingly in direct response to tougher—or milder—U.S. actions. Hufbauer is probably more nearly correct when he concludes that “when sanctions are applied broadside—as against Haiti, Cuba and Iraq—the hardest hit are the most vulnerable. . . . Left unharmed, and often strengthened, are the real targets: the political, military and economic elites.”81 In 1999 Elizabeth Gibbons, head of the UNICEF office in Haiti between 1992 and 1996, found a similar consequence of the multilateral embargo on that smaller island.

Cuban Instability Bad

Cuba could be the next major warGorrell 05 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army War College [Lieutenant Colonel Tim Gorrell, Cuba: The Next Unanticipated Anticipated Strategic Crisis?, Strategy Research Project, 18 March 2005, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074]

The end of the Cold War in 1989 closed the door on one of the most perilous times in the history of mankind. The euphoria felt by the free world as the Soviet Union and the United States dismantled their nuclear arsenals promoted a false sense of security that the world would somehow be safer. This optimism was reinforced by the establishment of emerging democracies in countries throughout the former Warsaw Pact and much of the rest of the Soviet sphere of influence. Unfortunately, during the Cold War and in the time since, each U.S. administration has been surprised by a major unanticipated strategic crisis and Cuba could very well trigger the next unanticipated crisis. Fidel Castro is 78 years old, the current life expectancy of a Cuban male. When Castro dies, anarchy could very well engulf Cuba. A power struggle in Cuba could have significant effects on the Central and South America regions, requiring the U.S. to divert resources from the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) to stabilize the region. In the meantime the Cuban infrastructure and economy may implode. The U.S. does not have an appropriate policy approach to address such an obvious crisis. When the end of Castro’s rule comes, the U.S. will likely take a “wait and see what happens” approach-and then respond. What is needed is a proactive policy that would promote a favorable post-Castro transition, thereby averting a Cuban and regional crisis. Such a policy is consistent with the preemptive approach of the National Security Strategy. The U.S., the region, and the rest of the world would benefit from such a forward-looking policy.

Unstable Cuba risks terrorism and US invasion – destroys democracies throughout the region.Gorrell 05 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army War College [Lieutenant Colonel Tim Gorrell, Cuba: The Next Unanticipated Anticipated Strategic Crisis?, Strategy Research Project, 18 March 2005, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074]

In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced

to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.

LA turning to Iran

Latin America turning to Iran for cooperation – against U.S. influenceFNA 7/1/13 - Fars News Agency (FNA) is Iran's leading independent news agency (Iran, Bolivia Discuss Ways to Develop Bilateral Ties”, FARS News Agency, July 1 2013, http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920410001250)//CB

The meeting took place on the sidelines of the 2nd summit of the Gas Exporting Countries forum (GECF) which will begin later today in the Russian capital of Moscow.Algeria, Bolivia, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela are the eleven members of the GECF.The two presidents discussed the latest world developments and issues of mutual importance and reviewed bilateral relations.Iran has been seeking to boost its ties with Latin American countries in recent years to the concern of the United States.Since taking office in 2005, President Ahmadinejad has expanded Iran's cooperation with many Latin American states, including Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Brazil.The strong and rapidly growing ties between Iran and Latin America have raised eyebrows in the US and its western allies since Tehran and Latin nations have forged an alliance against the imperialist and colonialist powers and are striving hard to reinvigorate their relations with the other independent countries which pursue a line of policy independent from the US.

LA key to US heg

Latin America is key to United States leadership and solving domestic and foreign problemsAndrés Cala master's in journalism and Michael J. Economides Professor of Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering @ Cullen College of Engineering 2012; Americas blind spot Chavez, oil, and US security pages 3-4

Perception is powerful when it comes to policy-making though.¶ Naturally, most US policymakers are fully aware of the reality in Latin ¶ American countries, but US citizens are not. This is critical because policy toward the region is driven by domestic issues, not foreign interests. So¶ while the White House and Congress are sufficiently proficient on Latin ¶ American issues , reality on the ground is mostly irrelevant. Washington¶ simply is not paying attention.¶ The United States missed the memo on Latin America's evolution into¶ a vital region in global affairs. Policies are still stuck addressing, at best,¶ Hollywood-exacerbated stereotypes, but in reality are mostly driven by¶ outdated and counterproductive Cold War misconception pressed by¶ powerful interest groups.¶ It's understandable that the United States didn't consider Latin ¶ America a priority last century. But policymakers-perhaps preoccupied ¶ with the Middle East and the worst economic crisis in decades-are ¶ increasingly undermining America's security by ignoring significant ¶ strategic shifts in Latin America.¶ This is about being able to protect global American interests, about¶ national security, about global terrorism, and above all about the ¶ country's economic growth that is vital to address Middle East instability, ¶ to contain a resurging Russia, and to preempt a soaring China that is not ¶ hesitating to fill the vacuum left by the United States. ¶ To be sure, this is about America's future as a world power. And it all¶ starts at home.

Advantage 1: Latin American RelationsThe US dragging its heals on the Cuban Embargo has placed Latin American on a collision course – ending the embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America, establishing better relationship throughout the region. White, Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, 13(Robert E., New York Times, 3/7/13, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 6/24/13, IC)FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, thepostwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America.¶ Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.¶ Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.¶ An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.¶ I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.¶ Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress , a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of F ranklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations.¶ Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.¶ During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service.¶ The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by

uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.¶ After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.”¶ Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative.¶ At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.”¶ Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor.¶ Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.¶ Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.¶ After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero.¶ And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.)¶ Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?¶ The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help.¶ Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments.¶ If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

Cuba is the litmus test for Latin American relations, but status quo gradualism loosening the embargo fails to achieve political cooperation.Sheridan, diplomatic correspondent for The Washington Post, 9(Mary Beth, The Washington Post, 5/29/09, “U.S. Urged to Relax Cuba Policy to Boost Regional Relations,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-29/politics/367988

31_1_cuba-scholar-oas-members-travel-restrictions, accessed 6/24/13, IC)

The U.S. government is fighting an effort to allow Cuba to return to the Organization of American States after a 47-year suspension. But the resistance is putting it at odds with much of Latin America as the Obama administration is trying to improve relations in the hemisphere.¶

Eliminating the Cold War-era ban would be largely symbolic, because Cuba has shown no sign of wanting to return to the OAS, the main forum for political cooperation in the hemisphere. But the debate shows how central the topic has become in U.S. relations with an increasingly assertive Latin America. The wrangling over Cuba threatens to dominate a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, scheduled for Tuesday in Honduras.¶ "Fifty years after the U.S. . . . made Cuba its litmus test for its commercial and diplomatic ties in Latin America, Latin America is turning the tables," said Julia E. Sweig, a Cuba scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations. Now, she said, Latin countries are "making Cuba the litmus test for the quality of the Obama administration's approach to Latin America."¶ President Obama has taken steps toward improving ties with Cuba, lifting restrictions on visits and money transfers by Cuban Americans and offering to restart immigration talks suspended in 2004. But he has said he will not scrap the longtime economic embargo until Havana makes democratic reforms and cleans up its human rights record. Ending the embargo would also entail congressional action.¶ Obama is facing pressure to move faster, both from Latin American allies and from key U.S. lawmakers. Bipartisan bills are pending in Congress that would eliminate all travel restrictions and ease the embargo.¶ Cuba has sent mixed signals about its willingness to respond to the U.S. gestures.¶ Latin American leaders say that isolating Cuba is anachronistic when most countries in the region have established relations with communist nations such as China. The OAS secretary general, José Miguel Insulza, has called the organization's 1962 suspension of Cuba "outdated" -- noting it is based on the island's alignment with a "communist bloc" that no longer exists. However, he has suggested that OAS members could postpone Cuba's full participation until it showed democratic reforms.¶

Latin American cooperation checks terrorism and proliferation – antiterror training, infosharing, and curbing proximate regional influence of Iran are vital internal links. Ferkaluk, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base WingLogistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, 10(Brian, Fall 2010, Global Security Studies, “Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage,” pg 12, ACCESSED June 29, 2013, RJ)The policy implications for the United States are to maintain the role of a guiding figure in Latin American developments. The stakes for the US have never been higher. In a region that has a strong history of domestic terrorism and stratocracy, strong oversight is warranted. The current US administration’s policy on nuclear deterrence is that the threat of a nuclear attack from a sovereign state has gone down, but the threat of

nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has gone up. No region of the world is closer to the US or has a greater ease of access to the US border than Latin America. Therefore, it is vital that the US continue providing antiterrorism training to key Latin American states, offer economic assistance and encourage mutual cooperation and information sharing among allied states. Once this is accomplished, Latin American nuclear proliferation will cease to be a factor in the terrorist activity that threatens each state to this day. The mutual cooperation will help to diminish the activities of groups like the FARC and the AUC. Furthermore, international groups such as Al Qaida and Hezbollah will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons should they develop a stronger presence in the region. A blind eye should also not be turned towards states that overtly refuse to cooperate in the GWOT. States like Venezuela and Nicaragua should not be left to their own devices. The relationships that are being built with Russia and Iran must also be carefully monitored. Venezuela may not be very close to a nuclear weapon, but the technology and applied sciences it receives from both Iran and Russia has the potential to speed up its development. It has already failed to acquire technology from its neighbors, so the US must continue to solidify its relations with states like Brazil and Argentina and discourage any relations with Iran. If its leaders and diplomats can continue to press that issue, it can curb the increase in trade between Latin America and Iran and end the political and diplomatic connections Iran has been forming in recent years. Above any other measure, the US must ensure that every Latin American nation knows that it cares about the development and defense of the region. If that region is secure, the US is secure; and as long as the region struggles with terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the US will be there to support it in every way possible.

Iranian basing in Latin America is establishing networks to sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks for decades. Levitt, director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6/14(Matthew, 6/14/13, Tico Times, “Iran agents in Latin America,” http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Iran-agents-in-Latin-America_Friday-June-14-2013, accessed 6/30/13, IC)But that's not all. Closer to the United States, Iran not only continues to expand its presence and bilateral relationships with countries like Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, but it also maintains a network of intelligence agents specifically tasked with sponsoring and executing terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The same day the State Department released its report, highly respected Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who served as special prosecutor for the investigation into the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, released a 500-page document laying out how the Iranian regime has, since the early 1980s, built and maintained "local clandestine intelligence stations designed to sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks" in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Nisman found evidence that Iran is building intelligence networks identical to the one responsible for the bombings in Argentina across the

region — from Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia to Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname.¶ Nisman's 2006 report on the AMIA bombing already demonstrated how Iran established a robust intelligence network in South America in the early 1980s. One document, seized during a court-ordered raid of the residence of an Iranian diplomat north of Buenos Aires, included a map denoting areas populated by Muslim communities and suggested an Iranian strategy to export Islam into South America — and from there to North America. Highlighting areas densely populated by Muslims, the document informed that these "will be used from Argentina as [the] center of penetration of Islam and its ideology towards the North American continent."¶ Nisman concluded that the driving force behind Iran's intelligence efforts in Argentina was Mohsen Rabbani, an Iranian who lived in Argentina for 11 years and played a key role in the Islamic Republic's intelligence operations in South America. Rabbani, the primary architect of the AMIA plot, reportedly had come from Iran for the express purpose of heading the state-owned al-Tawhid mosque in Buenos Aires, but he also served as a representative of the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, which was tasked with ensuring the quality of Argentine meat exported to Iran. The Argentine prosecutor reported that Rabbani began laying the groundwork for his spy network after arriving in the country in 1983. Indeed, just prior to his departure for South America, Rabbani met Abolghasem Mesbahi, an Iranian intelligence official who would later defect, and explained to Mesbahi that he was being dispatched to Argentina "in order to create support groups for exporting the Islamic revolution," according to Nisman's 2006 report.¶ Rabbani advanced his vision of the "Islamic revolution" through a variety of means — including the execution of two large-scale attacks in Argentina. In 1992, Iran and Hezbollah bombed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people. Two years later, they targeted the AMIA Jewish community center, killing 85 people. Based on Nisman's investigation, in 2007 Interpol issued six "red notices," which request international cooperation to arrest and extradite a suspect, for the key players behind the AMIA bombing. Two of those red notices were for Mohsen Rezaei and Ali Akbar Velayati, both of whom are running for president in Iran's upcoming election.¶ Rabbani's terrorist activities in South America, however, did not wane despite being indicted in Argentina. According to Nisman and U.S. District Court documents from the Eastern District of New York in Brooklyn, Rabbani helped four men who were plotting to bomb New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport in 2007 and who sought technical and financial assistance for the operation, codenamed "Chicken Farm." All four men were ultimately convicted in federal court.¶ The four men first sought out Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the Trinidadian militant group Jamaat al-Muslimeen, and Adnan el-Shukrijumah, an al-Qaida operative who grew up in Brooklyn and South Florida and fled the United States for the Caribbean in the days before the 9/11 attacks. Unable to find Shukrijumah, the plotters "sent [co-conspirator] Abdul Kadir to meet with his contacts in the Iranian revolutionary leadership, including Mohsen Rabbani," according to a news release issued by the U.S. attorney's office for the Eastern District of New York.¶ One co-conspirator was Kareem Ibrahim, an imam and leader of the Shiite Muslim community in Trinidad and Tobago. During cross-examination at trial, Ibrahim admitted that he advised the plotters to approach Iranian leaders with the plot and use operatives ready to engage in suicide attacks at the airport. In one of the recorded conversations entered into evidence, Ibrahim told Russell Defreitas — a plotter who was a JFK baggage handler and a naturalized U.S. citizen — that the attackers must be ready to "fight it out, kill who you could kill, and go back to Allah."¶ Documents seized from Kadir's house in Guyana demonstrated that he was a Rabbani disciple who built a Guyanese intelligence base for Iran much like his mentor had built in Argentina. In a letter written to Rabbani in 2006, Kadir agreed to perform a "mission" for Rabbani to determine whether a group of individuals in Guyana and Trinidad were up to some unidentified task.¶ In the 1990s and 2000s, Rabbani also oversaw the education and indoctrination of Guyanese and other South American Muslim youth, including Kadir's children, in Iran. Kadir was ultimately arrested in Trinidad aboard a plane headed to Venezuela, en route to Iran. He was carrying a computer drive with photographs featuring himself and his children posing with guns, which prosecutors suggested were intended as proof for Iranian officials of his intent and capability to carry out an attack.¶ In 2011, not long before the last defendant in the JFK airport bomb plot was convicted, evidence emerged suggesting Rabbani was still doing intelligence work in South America. An April 2011 article in the Brazilian magazine Veja, citing documents from the FBI, CIA, and Interpol, reported that Rabbani "frequently slips in and out of Brazil on a false passport and has recruited at least 24 youngsters in three Brazilian states to attend 'religious formation' classes in Tehran," according to an article in the Telegraph.¶ In the word of one Brazilian official quoted by the magazine, "Without anybody noticing, a generation of Islamic extremists is appearing in Brazil."¶ The growth of this Iranian extremist network in South America has immediate repercussions for the security of the United States. The same day that Nisman and the State Department released their reports, an Iranian-American used-car salesman from Texas was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role in an Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the

United States at a popular Washington restaurant. In the assessment by James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, this plot "shows that some Iranian officials — probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime."¶ Strangely, one of the countries most vulnerable to this terrorist threat appears more interested in placating, rather than opposing, the country responsible. In February, Argentina approved a deal with Iran for a joint "truth commission" to investigate the 1994 AMIA bombing — a step that insults the Argentine victims of the attack and makes a mockery of the rule of law. Of course, Nisman, Argentina's own special prosecutor, left no doubt in his 2006 report and his latest 500-page report about the truth of who was behind the bombing — Iranian agents.¶ The State Department has it right: There has indeed been a "marked resurgence" of Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism over the past 18 months. But as the new Nisman report drives home, here's an even more disturbing fact — Iran has run intelligence networks in the United States' backyard to "sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks" for decades.

Terrorist attack prompts nuclear response, drawing Russian retaliation. Morgan, Hankuk University Professor of Foreign Studies, 9 (Dennis, Professor @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (South Korea, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Futures, November, Science Direct, 6-31-13)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In other words, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use

them . Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

**Latin American Relations**

1AC – Module

UQ – Brink The US isn’t working towards better Latin American relations nowLehmann, Radio 5/30 (Catalina, Talk Radio News Service, Officials: Obama Has Yet To Improve U.S.-Latin America Relations, http://www.talkradionews.com/us/2013/05/30/officials-obama-has-yet-to-improve-u-s-latin-america-relations.html, May 30th 2013, EB)

Latin America, particularly South America, has experienced unprecedented political change in the past 15 years said officials who discussed the issue during a briefing held by the Center for Economic Policy and Research. The briefing analyzed how the Obama administration has responded to the region’s leftward shifting of political dynamics. In the past, during the Bush administration, efforts were made to isolate and suppress left-leaning political movements in Latin America, said the officials. When President George W. Bush attended the Summit of the Americas in Argentina, his lecture was received with protests against his administration’s polices. When President Barak Obama attended the Summit in Columbia, he spoke about the need for “equal partnerships” and “a new chapter of engagement” with the countries that make up Latin America. Leaders such as President Hugo Chavez had a new sense of hope instilled after President Obama’s remarks, said CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot. “When Latin America’s left presidents watched the campaign of Barack Obama for president in 2008, they thought that they might finally see a U.S. president who would change Washington’s foreign policy in the region,” said Weisbrot. However, panelists claimed that up to this point in time, little has been done to improve U.S.-Latin America relations . “The Obama administration, like that of President Bush, does not accept that the region has changed, Weisbrot stated. “That goal is to get rid of all of the left-of-center governments, partly because they tend to be more independent from Washington.” Panelists offered recommendations for improving U.S. relations with Latin America. Fellowship of Reconciliation Task Force on Latin America and the Caribbean Co-director John Lindsay-Poland advised Obama to continue moving away from the war on drugs by embracing regulation rather than prohibition. He also advised Obama against using the military to aid domestic law enforcement. Lindsay-Poland also suggested that the U.S. should stop the flow of assault weapons, other firearms, and ammunition across the U.S.-Mexico border. Weisbrot added that Obama should focus less on pleasing the American media since it has a tendency to “demonize” Latin America. “It must be remembered that the editorials in the newspapers have much more influence, even for members of Congress and other policy makers, than the news articles, and these are mostly an obstacle to improved relations with Latin America,” Weisbrot said. Despite the differences between the governments of Latin America and the U.S., the experts who spoke today all expressed belief that there is still time for the Obama administration to forge a better relationship with its southern neighbors.

Link – Plan is Key Plan is key to cooperation with Latin America, whereas status quo leads to conflict in the AmericasWhite, Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, 13(Robert E., New York Times, 3/7/13, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 6/24/13, IC)FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, thepostwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America.¶ Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.¶ Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.¶ An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.¶ I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.¶ Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress , a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of F ranklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations.¶ Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.¶ During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service.¶ The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.¶ After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we

pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.”¶ Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative.¶ At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.”¶ Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor.¶ Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.¶ Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.¶ After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero.¶ And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.)¶ Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?¶ The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help.¶ Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments.¶ If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

Plan solves for Latin American relations best—both the US and Latin America use it as a litmus test for diplomatic exchangeSheridan, diplomatic correspondent for The Washington Post, 9(Mary Beth, The Washington Post, 5/29/09, “U.S. Urged to Relax Cuba Policy to Boost Regional Relations,” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-05-29/politics/36798831_1_cuba-scholar-oas-members-travel-restrictions, accessed 6/24/13, IC)

The U.S. government is fighting an effort to allow Cuba to return to the Organization of American States after a 47-year suspension. But the resistance is putting it at odds with much of Latin America as the Obama administration is trying to improve relations in the hemisphere.¶

Eliminating the Cold War-era ban would be largely symbolic, because Cuba has shown no sign of wanting to return to the OAS, the main forum for

political cooperation in the hemisphere. But the debate shows how central the topic has become in U.S. relations with an increasingly assertive Latin America. The wrangling over Cuba threatens to dominate a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, scheduled for Tuesday in Honduras.¶ "Fifty years after the U.S. . . . made Cuba its litmus test for its commercial and diplomatic ties in Latin America, Latin America is turning the tables," said Julia E. Sweig, a Cuba scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations. Now, she said, Latin countries are "making Cuba the litmus test for the quality of the Obama administration's approach to Latin America."¶ President Obama has taken steps toward improving ties with Cuba, lifting restrictions on visits and money transfers by Cuban Americans and offering to restart immigration talks suspended in 2004. But he has said he will not scrap the longtime economic embargo until Havana makes democratic reforms and cleans up its human rights record. Ending the embargo would also entail congressional action.¶ Obama is facing pressure to move faster, both from Latin American allies and from key U.S. lawmakers. Bipartisan bills are pending in Congress that would eliminate all travel restrictions and ease the embargo.¶ Cuba has sent mixed signals about its willingness to respond to the U.S. gestures.¶ Latin American leaders say that isolating Cuba is anachronistic when most countries in the region have established relations with communist nations such as China. The OAS secretary general, José Miguel Insulza, has called the organization's 1962 suspension of Cuba "outdated" -- noting it is based on the island's alignment with a "communist bloc" that no longer exists. However, he has suggested that OAS members could postpone Cuba's full participation until it showed democratic reforms.¶

Plan is in concession to all of Latin America—even allies like Colombia and Mexico have condemned the embargoBallvé, writer for the Progressive Media Project, 8(Teo, NACLA, 12/30/08, “End the Embargo Against Cuba,” https://nacla.org/news/end-embargo-against-cuba, 6/24/13, IC)“The embargo is a policy that hasn't worked in nearly 50 years,” Wayne Smith, the former head of Washington's diplomatic mission in Havana under the Carter administration, recently told the AP. “It's stupid, it's counterproductive and there is no international support for it.”¶ For 17 straight years, the 192-member U.N. General Assembly has overwhelmingly approved a non-binding resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. Only the United States, Israel and Palau voted against the measure in October.¶ In the United States, the political tide is also turning against the embargo, which would require Congressional approval to lift.¶ Politicians have traditionally pandered to the Cuban exile community in Florida as a key — even decisive — voting bloc, giving Cuban-American hardliners essentially a veto over changes in U.S. policy. But these old guard, militant exiles, who generally left Cuba shortly after the Castro brothers declared victory, have found their influence waning.¶ A generational and demographic shift is under way in south Florida that changes the calculus.¶ A poll conducted by Florida International University a month after the presidential election shows a sea change in Cuban-American opinion. The poll revealed 55 percent of Cuban-American respondents favored ending the embargo, while 65 percent said they wanted

Washington to re-establish diplomatic relations with Havana.¶ Lifting the embargo would dramatically improve Washington's ties with the rest of Latin America.¶ On December 8, the heads of 15 Caribbean nations called on Obama to rescind the embargo: “The Caribbean community hopes that the transformational change which is under way in the United States will finally relegate that measure to history,” their statement said.¶ Then on December 17 in Brazil, the leaders of 33 Latin American countries, including conservative allies of Washington like Colombia and Mexico, convened for another gathering and unanimously called on Obama to drop the “unacceptable” embargo.¶ At that summit, Cuban President Raúl Castro even offered to release political prisoners as a gesture to pave the way for talks between Havana and Washington.¶ If Obama moves to lift the embargo, it would send a bold statement that his administration is serious about writing a truly new chapter in U.S. relations with Cuba — and the rest of Latin America.¶

Cuba is a key sticking point between US-Latin American relations, which are crucial to US economy and global problemsInter-American Dialogue, leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere Affairs, 12(4/2012, Inter-American Dialogue“REMAKING THE RELATIONSHIP: The United States and Latin America,” http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, p. 2-3, accessed 6/24/13, IC)

In part as a result of these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown ¶

more distant . The quality and intensity of ties have diminished . Most countries of the region view the United States as less and less relevant to their ¶ needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to ¶ deal with the issues that most concern them .¶ In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable . Open conflict is rare and, ¶ happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided . But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality ¶ and direction . Shared interests are not pursued as vigorously as they should ¶ be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed . Well developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are scarce Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and ¶ effective cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken ¶ immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United ¶ States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely ¶ refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on ¶

this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the ¶

interests of other nations .¶ Another chronic irritant is US drug policy, which most Latin Americans now ¶ believe makes their drug and crime problems worse . Secretary of State Hillary ¶ Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that US anti-drug programs ¶ have not worked . Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the region, the ¶ United States has shown little interest in exploring alternative approaches .¶ Similarly, Washington’s more than half-century

embargo on Cuba, as well ¶ as other elements of United States’ Cuba policy, is strongly opposed by all ¶ other countries in the hemisphere . Indeed, the US position on these troublesome issues—immigration, drug policy, and Cuba—has set Washington ¶ against the consensus view of the hemisphere’s other 34 governments .¶ These issues stand as obstacles to further cooperation in the Americas . The ¶ United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need to ¶ resolve them in order to build more productive partnerships .¶ There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to ¶ pursue more robust ties .¶ Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and ¶ expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources . Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market ¶ and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin ¶ America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance . For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become ¶ more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future .¶ The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean ¶ would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters ¶ as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human ¶ rights . With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 ¶ million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and ¶ Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis ¶ for hemispheric partnership.

Removing economic sanctions against Cuba would increase relations with Latin American countries

Lugar ’09 (Richard, 2-23-09, Changing Cuba Policy – “in the United States National Interest” pg 11-12)Cuba is important for the United States because of proximity, intertwined history, and culture. Cuba is important in Latin America because it is a romanticized symbol of a small country that stood up to the most powerful country in the world. The Cuban Revolution legitimizes some of the passions that fuel the outrage that many Latin Americans feel regarding the inequality of their own societies, and for 50 years, rightly or wrongly, Cuba has ably portrayed itself as having fought this fight for them, as well as for the downtrodden around the world. During the visit, a Cuban official stated to staff that ‘‘U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America goes through Cuba.’’ With the end of the Cold War, however, the GOC does not represent the security threat to the U.S. that it once did. The USG still has significant grievances with the GOC—mostly, its human rights practices and the stifling of political pluralism and property rights as well as the lack of adequate compensation for expropriated assets of U.S. firms and individuals. The remaining security issues, on the other hand, are limited to the potential for a migration crisis provoked by political or economic instability on the island. While Cuba’s alliance with Venezuela has intentions of influencing regional affairs, the GOC has not been positioned to ably export its Revolution since the collapse of the Soviet Union forced an end to Cuba’s financial support for Latin American guerrilla movements. The GOC’s program of medical diplomacy, which exports doctors to developing countries, bolsters the island’s soft power, but does not represent a significant threat to U.S. national security. Given current economic challenges, any revenue gained from economic engagement with the United States would likely be used for internal economic priorities, not international activism.¶ Reform of U.S.-Cuban relations would also benefit our regional relations. Certain Latin American leaders, whose political appeal depends on the propagation of an array of anti-Washington grievances, would lose momentum as a centerpiece of these grievances is removed. More significantly, Latin Americans would view U.S.

engagement with Cuba as a demonstration that the United States understands their perspectives on the history of U.S. policy in the region and no longer insists that all of Latin America must share U.S. hostility to a 50-year-old regime. The resulting improvement to the United States’ image in the region would facilitate the advancement of U.S. interests.

Plan appeases all of Latin America—they see foreign policy towards Cuba as symbolic of Latin American policyGoodman, reporter for Bloomberg News, 09(Joshua, Bloomberg, 4/13/09, “Latin America to Push Obama on Cuba Embargo at Summit,” http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLnOE1ib3E3Y, accessed 6/24/13, IC)April 13 (Bloomberg) -- When Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century.¶ While Latin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexico’s pro-business Felipe Calderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving U.S. relations with the region, which are at their lowest point in two decades.¶ Obama, born six months before President John F. Kennedy imposed the embargo, isn’t prepared to support ending it. Instead, he’ll seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17-19 summit in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealing restrictions on family visits and remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush.¶ That would mesh with his stated goal of changing the perception of “U.S. arrogance” that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy speech on the region last May.¶ “All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in policy toward Cuba,” Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an interview. “They value what Obama has promised, but they want more.”¶ The policy changes unveiled today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allow U.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba.¶ Symbolically Important¶ Cuba, the only country in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the region’s leaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its longtime leader Fidel Castro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and his brother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with the island.¶ “Cuba represents a 50-year policy failure in Latin America and that’s why it’s so important for Obama to address it now,” says Wayne Smith , a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, who headed the State Department’s Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979-1982. “Unless Obama wants to be booed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas.”¶ The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be “unfortunate” if Cuba is the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy, poverty and the environment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White

House’s top adviser for the meeting. Obama also understands that he can’t control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders as partners, Davidow told reporters on April 6.¶

US-Cuban Relations Key to US-Latin American RelationsSweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, 13(Julia, 6/23/13, Council Foreign Relaions, “Cuba After Communism”, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-after-communism/p30991?cid=rss-fullfeed-cuba_after_communism-062413&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cfr_main+(CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed), 6/27/13, AL)In January, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry opened his confirmation hearing by celebrating his close

collaboration with Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) in overcoming the legacy of war in order to restore U.S.

relations with Vietnam. Yet both Kerry and Obama still seem to defer to the outdated conventional wisdom on

Cuba, according to which Washington cannot change its failed policy so long as Cuban Americans in Congress

continue to oppose doing so. Reality, however, is already changing. These legislators' constituents have started

voting with their feet and checkbooks, traveling to the island and sending remittances to family there as never

before. Several wealthy Cuban Americans, moreover, are now talking directly with Havana about large-scale

future investments. As a Democrat who won nearly half of Florida's Cuban American vote in 2012, Obama is in a better position than any of his predecessors to begin charting an end to the United States' 50-

year-long embargo. The geopolitical context in Latin America provides another reason the U.S. government should make a serious shift on Cuba. For five years

now, Obama has ignored Latin America's unanimous disapproval of Washington's position on Cuba. Rather than

perpetuate Havana's diplomatic isolation, U.S. policy embodies the imperial pretensions of a bygone era,

contributing to Washington's own marginalization. Virtually all countries in the region have refused to attend

another Summit of the Americas meeting if Cuba is not at the table. Cuba, in turn, currently chairs the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, which excludes Washington. The Obama administration has begun laying out what could become a serious

second-term agenda for Latin America focused on energy, jobs, social inclusion, and deepening integration in the

Americas. But the symbolism of Cuba across the region is such that the White House can definitively lead U.S.–Latin American relations out of the Cold War and into the twenty-first century only by shifting its Cuba policy

Continuing Embargo leads to military conflict with a Cuba

Amash, writer for international of international affairs at UCSD, 2012[Brandon, 7-23-12, Prospect, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/, 6-29-13, GZ]The current policy may drag the United States into a military conflict with Cuba. Military conflict may be inevitable in the future if the embargo’s explicit goal — creating an insurrection in Cuba to overthrow the government — is achieved, and the United States may not be ready to step in. As Ratliff and Fontaine detail, “Americans are not prepared to commit the military resources […]” (Fontaine 57), especially after unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much like America’s current situation with isolated rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, Cuba’s isolation may also lead to war for other reasons, like the American occupation of Guantanamo Bay. These consequences are inherently counterproductive for the democratization of Cuba and the improvement of human rights.

Link – Plan Solves Terrorism

So long as we lack trans-border cooperation, terrorist groups will continue to thrive in Latin America- Latin American cities are key places for recruiting and hiding terrorists. Abbot, Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, 2004Philip K, September 2004, Military Review, “Terrorist Threat in The Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/abbott.pdf EJH]Terrorist groups seek target-rich environments¶ for financial support, safe haven, and recruitment.¶ Six million Muslims inhabit Latin American cities,¶

which are ideal centers for recruiting and hiding¶ terrorists. Ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon regions of Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present¶ easily exploitable terrain over which to move people¶ and material. Over-populated Latin American cities¶ are home to many disenfranchised groups and¶ marginalized communities capable of supporting¶ terrorist activities or fomenting homegrown terrorism. The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile;¶ Maicao, Colombia; and Colon, Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical support for terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. In addition,¶ Cuba and Venezuela have cooperative agreements¶ with Syria, Libya, and Iran.10¶ The population in the Tri-Border Area is concentrated in three border cities: Ciudad¶

del Este, Paraguay; Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil; and Iguazu, Argentina. The Arab¶

community of immigrants that represents a slice of the urban population in the¶

area, mainly Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, is estimated to be nearly 30,000.MILITARY REVIEW l September -October 2004 53¶ Terrorist groups are flexible, patient, and use globalization to achieve their objectives. Unless its leaders cooperate with the U.S. National Strategy for¶ Combating Terrorism, Latin America will remain a¶ lucrative target for terrorist funding, recruiting, and¶ safe haven.11

Diplomacy is key to stopping the growing threat of terrorism from Latin America- al-Qaida has access to nuclear weapons and Latin America has an “open invitation” to terrorist groups. Abbot, Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, 2004Philip K, September 2004, Military Review, “Terrorist Threat in The Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/abbott.pdf EJH]¶ The new terrorism is more radical, irrational, and¶ difficult to detect. Clear dividing lines once separated¶ terrorists from guerrillas or criminals and homegrown¶ terrorists from state-sponsored terrorists, but these¶ lines have become blurred.20 Terrorist groups like alQaeda now likely have access to weapons of mass¶ destruction and use extreme methods, as observed¶ during attacks on the World Trade Center and the¶ Pentagon.¶ Economically marginalized and disenfranchised¶ groups are made-to-order for terrorists to exploit.¶ The piqueteros (picketers) in Argentina, cocaleros¶ (cocaine dealers) in Bolivia, Movimento Sem Terra¶ (Movement of Those Without Land) in Brazil, and¶ the Pachakutik indigenous peoples in Ecuador, the¶ Bolivarian Circles in Venezuela, and peasants’ groups¶ in

Paraguay are ethnically and economically opCiudad del Este, Paraguay¶ revistaturismo.comMILITARY REVIEW l September -October 2004 55¶ pressed groups whose destabilizing power is growing, whose leaders are gaining political prominence,¶ and who could be susceptible to terrorism’s appeals.¶ The TBA’s exact role in attracting terrorist groups¶ is not entirely clear, but Ciudad del Este’s Arab and¶ Muslim community has raised funds through money¶ laundering, illicit drug and weapons trafficking, smuggling, and piracy, with some of the funds reportedly¶ going to Hezbollah and Hamas to support terrorist¶ acts against Israel. The FARC also reportedly maintains a fundraising presence in the TBA. This extensive terrorist financial network also stretches to¶ Margarita Island, Panama, and the Caribbean.¶ The TBA’s dangerous combination of vast ungoverned areas, poverty, illicit activity, disenfranchised¶ groups, ill-equipped law-enforcement agencies and¶ militaries, and fragile democracies is an open invitation to terrorists and their supporters. Undeterred¶ criminal activity, economic inequality, and the rise of¶ disenfranchised groups with the potential to collaborate with terrorists present a daunting challenge.¶ Terrorism today is transnational and decentralized.¶ International support of a multidimensional counterterrorism strategy is necessary to defeat it.¶ Colombia’s less-than-successful counternarcotics¶ strategy demonstrates that unilateral action does not¶ necessarily eradicate or eliminate drug trafficking.¶ The same is true of terrorism. Unilateral action in¶ Afghanistan has not eliminated the global terrorist¶ threat. Without multilateral, cooperative deterrence,¶ terrorist organizations will simply migrate across porous borders to less scrutinized areas. As long as¶ Lieutenant Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is Army Section Chief, United States¶ Military Group, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. He received a B.A. from Norwich University,¶ an M.A. from Kansas University, and he is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and¶ General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Latin America, and Europe.¶ terrorism does not directly affect them, nations in the¶ TBA will place economic considerations ahead of¶ security concerns, seek economic prosperity, and¶ remain reluctant to tighten border controls or place¶ new restrictions on commerce and transportation.¶ The potential for terrorism in the TBA and elsewhere in Latin America is clearly no myth. The TBA¶ and several other tri-border areas in Latin America¶ will emerge as ideal breeding grounds for terrorists¶ and those groups that support them, unless countries¶ in the region make changes in their judicial systems,¶ improve their law-enforcement and military capabilities, take effective anticorruption measures, and cooperate with each other. The potential for Middle¶ East terrorists to operate in the TBA and elsewhere¶ in Latin America warrants closer scrutiny.¶ The United States can only win the GWOT if it¶ has regional partners ready and willing to take preemptive action and not just wait for the United¶ States to act. Closing down charities that fund terrorism, rounding up suspected terrorists, and denouncing terrorism is in the regional partners’ selfinterest.21 Only effective diplomacy can bring this¶ to pass. According to Ambassador J. Cofer Black,¶ DOS Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “[Diplomacy] is the instrument of power that builds political will and strengthens international cooperation.¶ Through diplomatic exchanges, we promote¶ counterterrorism cooperation with friendly nations,¶ enhance the capabilities of our allies, take the war¶ to the terrorists, and ultimately cut off the resources¶ they depend on to survive.”

Impact – Laundry List

The impact is extinction --- LA relations key to nuclear deterrence, secure borders, preventing nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and preventing China, Russia, and Iran from gaining political influence in Latin America.Ferkaluk, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base WingLogistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, 10(Brian, Fall 2010, Global Security Studies, “Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage,” pg 12, ACCESSED June 29, 2013, RJ)The policy implications for the United States are to maintain the role of a guiding figure in Latin American developments. The stakes for the US have never been higher. In a region that has a strong history of domestic terrorism and stratocracy, strong oversight is warranted. The current US administration’s policy on nuclear deterrence is that the threat of a nuclear attack from a sovereign state has gone down, but the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has gone up. No region of the world is closer to the US or has a greater ease of access to the US border than Latin America. Therefore, it is vital that the US continue providing antiterrorism training to key Latin American states, offer economic assistance and encourage mutual cooperation and information sharing among allied states. Once this is accomplished, Latin American nuclear proliferation will cease to be a factor in the terrorist activity that threatens each state to this day. The mutual cooperation will help to diminish the activities of groups like the FARC and the AUC. Furthermore, international groups such as Al Qaida and Hezbollah will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons should they develop a stronger presence in the region. A blind eye should also not be turned towards states that overtly refuse to cooperate in the GWOT. States like Venezuela and Nicaragua should not be left to their own devices. The relationships that are being built with Russia and Iran must also be carefully monitored. Venezuela may not be very close to a nuclear weapon, but the technology and applied sciences it receives from both Iran and Russia has the potential to speed up its development. It has already failed to acquire technology from its neighbors, so the US must continue to solidify its relations with states like Brazil and Argentina and discourage any relations with Iran. If its leaders and diplomats can continue to press that issue, it can curb the increase in trade between Latin America and Iran and end the political and diplomatic connections Iran has been forming in recent years. Above any other measure, the US must ensure that every Latin American nation knows that it cares about the development and defense of the region. If that region is secure, the US is secure; and as long as the region struggles with terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the US will be there to support it in every way possible.

Impact – PovertyUS- Latin America Relations good- Key to solving poverty and inequalityBarshefsky et. al., senior international partner at WilmerHale in DC, 08,(Charlene Barshefsky, R. Rand Beers, Alberto Coll, Margaret Crahan, Jose Fernandez, Francis Fukuyama, Peter Hankim, James Hermon, John Heimann, James Hill, Donna Hrinak, James Kimsey, Jim Kolbe, Kellie Meiman, Shannon O'Neil, Maria Otero, Arturo Porzecanski, David Rothkopf, Julia Sweig, 5/2008, Council on Foreign Relations, “US- Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279, 6/30/2013) GM.

Latin America has never mattered more for the United States.¶ The region is the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States and a strong partner in the development of alternative fuels. It is the United States' fastest-growing trading partner, as well as its biggest supplier of illegal drugs. Latin America is also the largest source of U.S. immigrants, both documented and not. All of this reinforces deep U.S. ties with the region—strategic, economic, and cultural—but also deep concerns.¶ This report makes clear that the era of the United States as the dominant influence in Latin America is over. Countries in the region have not only grown stronger but have expanded relations with others, including China and India. U.S. attention has also focused elsewhere in recent years, particularly on challenges in the Middle East. The result is a region shaping its future far more than it shaped its past.¶ At the same time Latin America has made substantial progress, it also faces ongoing challenges. Democracy has spread, economies have opened, and populations have grown more mobile. But many countries have struggled to reduce poverty and inequality and to provide for public security.¶ The Council on Foreign Relations established an Independent Task Force to take stock of these changes and assess their consequences for U.S. policy toward Latin America. The Task Force finds that the long-standing focus on trade, democracy, and drugs, while still relevant, is inadequate. The Task Force recommends reframing policy around four critical areas—poverty and inequality, public security, migration, and energy security—that are of immediate concern to Latin America's governments and citizens.¶ The Task Force urges that U.S. efforts to address these challenges be done in coordination with multilateral institutions, civil society organizations, governments, and local leaders. By focusing on areas of mutual concern, the United States and Latin American countries can develop a partnership that supports regional initiatives and the countries' own progress. Such a partnership would also promote U.S. objectives of fostering stability, prosperity, and democracy throughout the hemisphere.

Poverty outweighs nuclear warGilligan, Harvard Psych Prof 96 (James, Dept. of Psych. @ Harvard Med & Dir. of the Center for the Study of Violence Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes p. 191-196, 6-31-13)

You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcibly and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterize their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their virulent behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major violence of our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from being the main causes of most violent deaths. Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence of this country. Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint By “structural violence” I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstratably large portion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major respects The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide---or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

Impact – Democracy

US Latin American relations key create economic cooperation and foster regional democracy Hill, President of the JT Hill Group Inc, 8 (James, May 08, CFR-council for foreign relations, “US Latin America Relations”, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279, 6/24/13, AL)The region is the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States and a strong partner in the development of alternative fuels. It is the United States' fastest-growing trading partner, as well as its biggest supplier of illegal drugs. Latin America is also the largest source of U.S. immigrants, both documented and not. All of this reinforces deep U.S. ties with the region—strategic, economic, and cultural—but also deep concerns. At the same time Latin America has made substantial progress, it also faces ongoing challenges. Democracy has spread, economies have opened, and populations have grown more mobile. But many countries have struggled to reduce poverty and inequality and to provide for public security. The Task Force urges that U.S. efforts to address these challenges be done in coordination with multilateral institutions, civil society organizations, governments, and local leaders. By focusing on areas of mutual concern, the United States and Latin American countries can develop a partnership that supports regional initiatives and the countries' own progress. Such a partnership would also promote U.S. objectives of fostering stability, prosperity, and democracy throughout the hemisphere.

US- Latin American cooperation key to democracyArcos et al., Senior Advisor @ The National Defense University’s Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, ‘12(Cresencio, The Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America?”, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, 6/30/2013, PD)

The democratic outlook in the Americas is on balance positive, particularly when compared with previous periods and to the rest of the world . Free, competitive elections are regularly held and, happily, the massive human rights violations associated with earlier periods of authoritarian rule have passed . Nonetheless, there are fundamental challenges that, if unaddressed, could spread and become far more serious. These problems need to be dealt with collectively through established regional mechanisms . Among these is the defense of democracy, an important area for greater cooperation among the United States, Canada, and Latin America . Today, threats to democratic rule from the actions of the military, as occurred in the June 2009 coup in Honduras, are rare. More commonly, elected executives, once in office, centralize power and assume increasing control

of critical institutions, public and private. Checks on presidential authority are, thereby, weakened or eliminated. Governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have all followed this pattern, undermining press freedom and other basic rights. Although the Inter-American Democratic Charter calls for collective action to prevent and repair such transgressions, they have, in fact, been met with relative silence. Indeed, the charter has rarely been invoked . This inaction stems from the lack of consensus in the hemisphere about what constitutes violations of democratic principles and how best to respond to them. The charter should be reformed to establish mechanisms for redress when elected executives run roughshod over independent institutions . Although unlikely to be accomplished in the near future, the long-term goal of the United States and other hemispheric governments should be agreement on collective actions to hold nations to the standards of the charter. The United States and Canada cannot be effective if they are the only voices calling for action to defend democracy and enforce the charter. The United States should pursue a longer-term strategy of consulting and finding common ground with Latin American and Caribbean governments on the appropriate use of the charter, which should play an important role in hemispheric affairs.

Democracy promotion is key to US leadership and conflict de-escalationLynn-Jones, Editor of International Security for Belfer Center Studies in International Security, 98 (Sean, “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy,” Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, March 1998, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html, 6-30-13)

C. America''s Goal: Liberal DemocracyGiven the variety of definitions of democracy and the distinction between democracy and liberalism, what type of government should the United States attempt to spread? Should it try to spread democracy, defined procedurally, liberalism, or both? Ultimately, U.S. policies should aim to encourage the spread of liberal democracy. Policies to promote democracy should attempt to increase the number of regimes that respect the individual liberties that lie at the heart of liberalism and elect their leaders. The United States therefore should attempt to build support for liberal principles-many of which are enshrined in international human-rights treaties-as well as encouraging states to hold free and fair elections.Supporting the spread of liberal democracy does not, however, mean that the United States should give the promotion of liberalism priority over the growth of electoral democracy. In most cases, support for electoral democracy can contribute to the spread of liberalism and liberal democracy. Free and fair elections often remove leaders who are the biggest impediments to the spread of democracy. In Burma, for example, the people would almost certainly remove the authoritarian SLORC regime from power if they had a choice at the ballot box. In South Africa, Haiti, and Chile, for example, elections removed antidemocratic rulers and advanced the process of democratization. In most cases, the United States should support elections even in countries that are not fully liberal. Elections will generally initiate a process of change toward democratization.

American policy should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by insisting that countries embrace liberal principles before holding elections. Such a policy could be exploited by authoritarian rulers to justify their continued hold on power and to delay elections that they might lose. In addition, consistent U.S. support for electoral democracy will help to bolster the emerging international norm that leaders should be accountable to their people. Achieving this goal is worth the risk that some distasteful leaders will win elections and use these victories at the ballot box to legitimize their illiberal rule.The United States also should attempt to build support for liberal principles, both before and after other countries hold elections. Policies that advance liberalism are harder to develop and pursue than those that aim to persuade states to hold free and fair elections, but the United States can promote liberalism as well as electoral democracy, as I argue below.II. The Benefits of the Spread of DemocracyMost Americans assume that democracy is a good thing and that the spread of democracy will be beneficial. Because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and considered. Democracy is not an unalloyed good, so it is important not to overstate or misrepresent the benefits of democratization. Nevertheless, the spread of democracy has many important benefits. This section enumerates how the spread of democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national interests of the United States.A. Democracy is Good for the Citizens of New DemocraciesThe United States should attempt to spread democracy because people generally live better lives under democratic governments. Compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. Skeptics will immediately ask: Why should the United States attempt to improve the lives of non-Americans? Shouldn''t this country focus on its own problems and interests? There are at least three answers to these questions.First, as human beings, American should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. The bonds of common humanity do not stop at the borders of the United States.19 To be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system. In a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism. The human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. But there are many possibilities for action motivated by concern for individuals in other countries. In the United States, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that Americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. The emergence of the so-called "CNN Effect"-the tendency for Americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. If Americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end.

Second, Americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty. The United States was founded on the principle of securing liberty for its citizens. Its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. Among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is Samuel Huntington, who argues that America''s "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values."20 As I argue below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty. Given its founding principles and very identity, the United States has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has argued: "The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in Britain''s 13 American colonies-and that to secure the `unalienable rights'' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive `their just powers from the consent of the governed.''"21Third, improvements in the lives of individuals in other countries matter to Americans because the United States cannot insulate itself from the world. It may be a cliché to say that the world is becoming more interdependent, but it is undeniable that changes in communications technologies, trade flows, and the environment have opened borders and created a more interconnected world. These trends give the United States a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage that will affect Americans. As I argue below in my discussion of how promoting democracy serves U.S. interests, the spread of democracy will directly advance the national interests of the United States. The growing interconnectedness of international relations means that the United States also has an indirect stake in the well-being of those in other countries, because developments overseas can have unpredictable consequences for the United States.For these three reasons, at least, Americans should care about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries.1. Democracy Leads to Liberty and Liberty is GoodThe first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property.22 Respect for the liberty of individuals is an inherent feature of democratic politics. As Samuel Huntington has written, liberty is "the peculiar virtue of democracy."23 A democratic political process based on electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and freedom to make electoral choices. Moreover, governments that are accountable to the public are less likely to deprive their citizens of human rights. The global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. Even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. Freedom House''s 1997 survey of "Freedom in the World" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free." In contrast, only 20 of the world''s 73 nondemocracies were "partly free" and 53 were "not free."24

The case for the maximum possible amount of individual freedom can be made on the basis of utilitarian calculations or in terms of natural rights. The utilitarian case for increasing the amount of individual liberty rests on the belief that increased liberty will enable more people to realize their full human potential, which will benefit not only themselves but all of humankind. This view holds that greater liberty will allow the human spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately benefit all of humankind. The rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. This argument is most memorably expressed in the American Declaration of Independence: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ..."The virtues of greater individual liberty are not self-evident. Various political ideologies argue against making liberty the paramount goal of any political system. Some do not deny that individual liberty is an important goal, but call for limiting it so that other goals may be achieved. Others place greater emphasis on obligations to the community. The British Fabian Socialist Sidney Webb, for example, articulated this view clearly: "The perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine."25 To debate these issues thoroughly would require a paper far longer than this one.26 The short response to most critiques of liberty is that there appears to be a universal demand for liberty among human beings. Particularly as socioeconomic development elevates societies above subsistence levels, individuals desire more choice and autonomy in their lives. More important, most political systems that have been founded on principles explicitly opposed to liberty have tended to devolve into tyrannies or to suffer economic, political, or social collapse.2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.28 Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People''s Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war

that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects."30 (2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.313. Democracy Enhances Long-Run Economic PerformanceA third reason for promoting democracy is that democracies tend to enjoy greater prosperity over long periods of time. As democracy spreads, more individuals are likely to enjoy greater economic benefits. Democracy does not necessarily usher in prosperity, although some observers claim that "a close correlation with prosperity" is one of the "overwhelming advantages" of democracy.32 Some democracies, including India and the Philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few years. Others are among the most prosperous societies on earth. Nevertheless, over the long haul democracies generally prosper. As Mancur Olson points out: "It is no accident that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic performance across generations are all stable democracies."33Authoritarian regimes often compile impressive short-run economic records. For several decades, the Soviet Union''s annual growth in gross national product (GNP) exceeded that of the United States, leading Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to pronounce "we will bury you." China has posted double-digit annual GNP increases in recent years. But autocratic countries rarely can sustain these rates of growth for long. As Mancur Olson notes, "experience shows that relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have a strong dictator who happens to have unusually good economic policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two dictators."34 The Soviet Union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. Most experts doubt that China will continue its rapid economic expansion. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argues that "no one can maintain these growth rates in the long term. Sooner or later China will have to rejoin the human race."35 Some observers predict that the stresses of high rates of economic growth will cause political fragmentation in China.36Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run. Most of the world''s leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the

world''s population and 99% of the world''s wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world''s output even though they had only 17% of the world''s population.37 A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.38 Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies.Second, democracies that embrace liberal principles of government are likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals will only make long-term investments when they are confident that their investments will not be expropriated. These and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary."39 These conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. Mancur Olson thus points out that "the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. ... the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights."40 Thus liberal democracy is the basis for long-term economic growth.A third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms.41 This factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions India and the Philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms.424. Democracies Never Have FaminesFourth, the United States should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press."43 This striking empirical regularity has been overshadowed by the apparent existence of a "democratic peace" (see below), but it provides a powerful argument for promoting democracy. Although this claim has been most closely identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins, for example, argues that: "Wherever political rights for

all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy."44 Most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world''s least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy.Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity."45 On the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents.Second, the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities. A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful.46 Inadequate information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country''s grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."47 The 1974 Bangladesh famine also could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.48The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. These factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines.The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically. Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls. Botswana''s food production fell by 17% and Zimbabwe''s by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas Sudan and Ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not.49 If, as I have argued, democracies enjoy better long-run economic performance than

nondemocracies, higher levels of economic development may help democracies to avoid famines. But the absence of famines in new, poor democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines.The case of India before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in 1947, India suffered frequent famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of 1943 killed 2-3 million people. Since India became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine.50B. Democracy is Good for the International SystemIn addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations."51 One scholar argues that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."52 If the number of democracies in the international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace."1. The Evidence for the Democratic PeaceMany studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states.53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."54 Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance.55 Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56Most studies of the democratic-peace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go to war with nondemocracies.57 There are, however, several scholars who argue that democracies are inherently less likely to go to war than other types of states.58 The evidence for this claim remains in dispute, however, so it would be premature to claim that spreading democracy will do more than to enlarge the democratic zone of peace.2. Why there is a Democratic Peace: The Causal LogicTwo types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent democracies from fighting one another. The second claims that institutional (or structural) constraints make it difficult or impossible for a democracy to wage war on another democracy.a. Normative Explanations

The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies.59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.60b. Institutional/Structural ExplanationsInstitutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.62c. Combining Normative and Structural ExplanationsSome studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace.63 It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under different conditions. For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace.64 Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist (systemic) predictions.C. The Spread of Democracy is Good for the United StatesThe United States will have an interest in promoting democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and contributes to a more peaceful international system. To the extent that Americans care about citizens of other countries and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy. Spreading democracy also will directly advance the national interests of the United States, because democracies will not launch wars or terrorist attacks against the United

States, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the United States, and will tend to ally with the United States.1. Democracies Will Not Go to War with the United StatesFirst, democracies will not go to war against the United States, provided, of course, that the United States remains a democracy. The logic of the democratic peace suggests that the United States will have fewer enemies in a world of more democracies. If democracies virtually never go to war with one another, no democracy will wage war against the United States. Democracies are unlikely to get into crises or militarized disputes with the United States. Promoting democracy may usher in a more peaceful world; it also will enhance the national security of the United States by eliminating potential military threats. The United States would be more secure if Russia, China, and at least some countries in the Arab and Islamic worlds became stable democracies.2. Democracies Don''t Support Terrorism Against the United StatesSecond, spreading democracy is likely to enhance U.S. national security because democracies will not support terrorist acts against the United States. The world''s principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Sudan.65Some skeptics of the democratic-peace proposition point out that democracies sometimes have sponsored covert action or "state terrorism" against other democracies. Examples include U.S. actions in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973.66 This argument does not undermine the claim that democracies will not sponsor terrorism against the United States. In each case, the target state had dubious democratic credentials. U.S. actions amounted to interference in internal affairs, but not terrorism as it is commonly understood. And the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the United States itself, which suggests that the United States has little to fear from other democracies.3. Democracies Produce Fewer RefugeesThird, the spread of democracy will serve American interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the United States. The countries that generate the most refugees are usually the least democratic. The absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of which encourage the flight of refugees.67 The spread of democracy can reduce refugee flows to the United States by removing the political sources of decisions to flee.The results of the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti demonstrate how U.S. efforts to promote democratization can reduce refugee flows. The number of refugees attempting to flee Haiti for the United States dropped dramatically after U.S. forces deposed the junta led by General Raoul Cedras and restored the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, even though Haiti''s economic fortunes did not immediately improve.68In addition to reducing the number of countries that generate refugees, the spread of democracy is likely to increase the number of countries that accept refugees, thereby reducing the number of refugees who will attempt to enter the United States.694. Democracies will Ally with the United StatesFourth, the global spread of democracy will advance American interests by creating more potential allies for the United States. Historically, most of

America''s allies have been democracies. In general, democracies are much more likely to ally with one another than with nondemocracies.70 Even scholars who doubt the statistical evidence for the democratic-peace proposition, agree that "the nature of regimes ... is an important variable in the understanding the composition of alliances ... democracies have allied with one another."71 Thus spreading democracy will produce more and better alliance partners for the United States.5. American Ideals Flourish When Others Adopt ThemFifth, the spread of democracy internationally is likely to increase Americans'' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions. Part of the impetus behind American attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that American democracy will be healthier when other countries adopt similar political systems. To some extent, this belief reflects the conviction that democracies will be friendly toward the United States. But it also reflects the fact that democratic principles are an integral part of America''s national identity. The United States thus has a special interest in seeing its ideals spread.726. Democracies Make Better Economic PartnersFinally, the United States will benefit from the spread of democracy because democracies will make better economic partners. Democracies are more likely to adopt market economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. The United States generally will be able to establish mutually beneficial trading relationships with democracies. And democracies provide better climates for American overseas investment, by virtue of their political stability and market economies.

Impact – Narcoterror Latin America cooperation is key to the War on Terror – only be improving relations can we solve for the militant ideologies of the leftist regimes.Ferkaluk, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base WingLogistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, 10(Brian, Fall 2010, Global Security Studies, “Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage,” pg 12, ACCESSED June 29, 2013, RJ)The policy implications for the United States are that of close surveillance and even closer diplomacy. Latin America has historically been an area of relative hostility for the US. It is an area prone to authoritarianism and is an ideal environment for violent ideologies to take root. Because of these factors, it is potentially susceptible to influence from the enemies of the US. Although it has made great strides in the last few decades, its tendency toward disunion has made it particularly difficult to fully mobilize it against terrorist activity. It also means the US cannot afford to ignore Latin America as a potential battleground in the GWOT. The dramatic pink tide in Latin American politics has commanded the attention of US foreign policy. If the US does not continue to engage Latin America with anti-terrorist support, it will quickly become a manifestation of the type of terrorism that has exploded in the Middle East and the political-revolutionary type of terrorism that has exploded in Africa. The US must continue to demonstrate to Latin American states that it fully supports their struggle against leftist guerrillas. It must do this also as delicately as possible. For instance, the US provided economic and military assistance to El Salvador in its struggle against a leftist guerrilla insurgency. If the US does not continue to support Latin states who call out for help in their time of need, they will either be overcome by the revolutionaries that threaten their existence, or they will be heavily influenced by the more leftist Latin American regimes, spreading their militant ideologies across the region. The first thing that must be done is the US must pass stronger legislation which hampers illegal immigration. At the same time it must build the much debated fence along its southern border. In doing so, it will constrain the illegal drug market that originates in Latin America, making leftist guerrillas just about incapable of financially sustaining their violent operations. It will also hamper their efforts to enter the US to exploit any other market that it could potentially live off of. In the meantime, the US must continue to maintain a presence in every Latin American ally. It must continue to train Latin governments to conduct better airport security, counterterrorism measures and law enforcement cooperation. In providing military, and even economic, support, the goal of the US should be increased cooperation amongst all Latin American states. That way, Latin American allies will be able to overcome the leftist trends taking place in the region and, most importantly, overcome the influences of the belligerent states of the region, namely Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela .

The drug market is the best internal link to latin American NarcoterrorismFerkaluk, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base WingLogistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, 10(Brian, Fall 2010, Global Security Studies, “Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage,” pg 12, ACCESSED June 29, 2013, RJ)In light of Central and South America’s proximity to the United States, both geographically and politically, more attention must be placed on them in the current War on Terror. Central and South America, which shall hereto be referred to as Latin America, are no strangers to terrorist activity on their soil. On the surface, Latin America does not seem as though it is a region that would have to struggle with such subversive activity. After all, Latin states do not have significant Muslim populations for international terrorist networks such as Al Qaida to blend into. Furthermore, unlike Middle Eastern States, their democratically elected leaders will not hesitate to engage them in military confrontations. Lastly, their economies are not as easy to establish faceless financial networks as they are in Europe or the Middle East. However, beneath the surface, Latin America is a porous region, ideal for terrorist activity to flourish. These factors fall in line with the current administration’s policy of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It has stated that although the threat of a nuclear attack by sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has gone up. Latin America has not only a history of terrorist activity and stratocracy, but nuclear activity as well. Although the region is known internationally as a nuclear-free zone, recent developments have demonstrated that a renewed interest in nuclear weapons development may be on the rise. This will mean a risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of domestic or international terrorists is now a real concern for the US in the region itself. Terrorism in Latin America is almost completely characterized by domestic, guerrilla insurgents. These insurgents channel their terrorist activity against the authoritarian democracies they live under. Groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) implement similar tactics to those of international terrorist groups. These tactics include car bombings, kidnappings and, according to the Congressional Research Service, “murders of elected officials and attacks against military and civilian targets in urban and rural areas.” 1 However, although it has tactical similarities to international terrorist groups, they differ quite profusely in their purpose. Whereas other groups maintain religious differences as the premise for their activity, domestic Latin American groups have Marxist political and economic ideologies underlying their activity. Their livelihood comes from the most profitable market they are capable of exploiting, drug trafficking. This poses a significant and immediate threat to the United States. The initial threat is the fact that many of these drugs find their way to the US border. The greater danger lies in what this market is being used to fund, domestic attacks on key leaders of Latin American states who are key allies of the US and supporters of the GWOT. In many cases, these groups are further supported by neighboring states who seek to undermine US interests as well as US allies in the region. These

neighboring states have supported terrorist groups more and more in recent years as a result of a leftward political trend across the region.

Impact – Narcoterror – Brink Narco Terrorism is the most likely cause of nuclear conflict in Latin AmericaFerkaluk, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base WingLogistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, 10(Brian, Fall 2010, Global Security Studies, “Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage,” pg 12, ACCESSED June 29, 2013, RJ)In light of Central and South America’s proximity to the United States, both geographically and politically, more attention must be placed on them in the current War on Terror. Central and South America, which shall hereto be referred to as Latin America, are no strangers to terrorist activity on their soil. On the surface, Latin America does not seem as though it is a region that would have to struggle with such subversive activity. After all, Latin states do not have significant Muslim populations for international terrorist networks such as Al Qaida to blend into. Furthermore, unlike Middle Eastern States, their democratically elected leaders will not hesitate to engage them in military confrontations. Lastly, their economies are not as easy to establish faceless financial networks as they are in Europe or the Middle East. However, beneath the surface, Latin America is a porous region, ideal for terrorist activity to flourish. These factors fall in line with the current administration’s policy of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. It has stated that although the threat of a nuclear attack by sovereign states has gone down, the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has gone up. Latin America has not only a history of terrorist activity and stratocracy, but nuclear activity as well. Although the region is known internationally as a nuclear-free zone, recent developments have demonstrated that a renewed interest in nuclear weapons development may be on the rise. This will mean a risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of domestic or international terrorists is now a real concern for the US in the region itself. Terrorism in Latin America is almost completely characterized by domestic, guerrilla insurgents. These insurgents channel their terrorist activity against the authoritarian democracies they live under. Groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC) implement similar tactics to those of international terrorist groups. These tactics include car bombings, kidnappings and, according to the Congressional Research Service, “murders of elected officials and attacks against military and civilian targets in urban and rural areas.” 1 However, although it has tactical similarities to international terrorist groups, they differ quite profusely in their purpose. Whereas other groups maintain religious differences as the premise for their activity, domestic Latin American groups have Marxist political and economic ideologies underlying their activity. Their livelihood comes from the most profitable market they are capable of exploiting, drug trafficking. This poses a significant and immediate threat to the United States. The initial threat is the fact that many of these drugs find their way to the US border. The greater danger lies in what this market is being used to fund, domestic attacks on key leaders of Latin American states who are key allies of the US and supporters of the GWOT. In many cases, these groups are further supported by neighboring states who seek to undermine US interests as well as US allies in the region. These

neighboring states have supported terrorist groups more and more in recent years as a result of a leftward political trend across the region.

Impact – Terrorism Iran is sponsoring terrorism in Latin America – it uses Hezbollah as its proxyFarah, president of IBI Consultants and senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 6/26(Douglas, Mark, 6/26/13, Miami Herald, “Terror and foreign policy,” http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/26/3472275/terrorism-as-an-instrument-of.html, accessed 6/30/13, IC)Earlier this month, Alberto Nisman of Argentina, the special prosecutor responsible for investigating the Iranian-planned 1994 bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people, handed down a chilling document detailing Iran’s hand in terrorist activities in Latin America and the United States. It shows that the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy is an integral part of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s revolutionary DNA and that it is unlikely to change with Hassan Rouhani as president.¶ The document, based on years of painstaking investigations by Nisman, is a timely reminder of the limits of what so-called “moderates” in Iran, like Rouhani, will accept. Nisman’s investigations show that Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the Iranian president in 1994 and now remembered as even more moderate than Rouhani, directly participated in planning the Argentine bombing.¶ Rafsanjani is under indictment for his role in the attack. Rouhani, his close advisor, was the chair of the Islamic Republic’s powerful Supreme National Security Council and, in that position, would have been intimately familiar with its planning.¶ The election of Rouhani is a gift to the Argentine government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was already moving in the opposite direction to her prosecutor — rapidly forgetting her nation’s history by normalizing relations with the Islamic Republic’s soon-to-be former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and pushing the bombing investigation into cold storage.¶ Tehran is on a charm offensive in the region and maintains strong ties to Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Argentina’s status as a regional heavyweight would make it a big prize for Tehran, which makes Fernández de Kirchner’s increasingly cozy relationship with the ayatollahs of considerable concern.¶ Nisman draws on the oft-forgotten history of Iran in Latin America to flesh out his original, devastating 2006 indictment of senior Iranian leadership in the worst case of Islamist terrorism in Latin America. Those indicted include current defense minister Ahmad Vahidi, former president Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign minister and a leading presidential candidate in Iran’s recent elections, Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who also ran in Iran’s presidential campaign, and Moshen Rabbani, the chief intelligence operative for Latin America. Based on the indictments Interpol has issued “red notices” for the arrest of five senior Iranian officials.¶ Nisman shows that the 1994 bombing was not an isolated incident but rather a part of an ongoing strategy that embraced the use of international terrorism adopted in an extraordinary meeting of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary leaders and mullahs in Tehran in 1982.¶ As Nisman noted in 2006, the decision to carry out the 1994 mass bombing was “adopted by a consensus of the highest representatives of the Iranian government . . . within the context of a foreign policy that was quite willing to resort to violence” to achieve the goals of the 1979 revolution.¶ In Latin America, Iran’s strategy ran on parallel tracks: Argentina in the south, Guyana in the north and several countries in between. Perhaps most surprising to U.S. readers is that Iran’s Guyana cell planned and very nearly executed the 2007 plot to blow up natural-gas lines under JFK Airport in New York City, bragging it would surpass 9/11 in devastation. While Iran’s involvement in the funding and planning of the attack are documented in court filings in the case, in which two people were convicted and sentenced to life in prison, it was barely mentioned either by U.S. prosecutors or the media covering the trial.¶ The activities of Iran’s different government agencies, from the ministries of foreign affairs to its intelligence structure to its cultural centers and mosques all play a role in exporting the Iranian revolution. Nisman lays out the role of each part of the government, as well as Hezbollah, acting as Iran’s proxy.¶

Iranian sponsored terrorism is extensive in Latin America – Iran’s 2011 plot to assassinate a diplomat in DC proves – it even used Mexican drug cartel agentsAhlert, former NY Post op-ed columnist, 6/4(Arnold, 6/4/13, Frontpage Mag, “Iranian Terror Cells Infest South America,” http://frontpagemag.com/2013/arnold-ahlert/iranian-terror-cells-infest-south-america/, accessed 6/30/13, IC)

Last Wednesday, Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman accused Iran of “infiltrating” South America and establishing intelligence networks aimed at carrying out more terrorist attacks in the region. Nisman said the effort has been ongoing since the 1980s in Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Surinam and Trinidad and Tobago. “These are sleeper cells,” he explained. ”They have activities you wouldn’t imagine. Sometimes they die having never received the order to attack.”¶ Nisman’s remarks were made as he presented a 500-page indictment detailing the case against former Iranian officials accused of masterminding the 1994 bombing of a Buenos Aires Jewish center that killed 85 people. The effort has resulted in Interpol arrest warrants for eight Iranians and one person believed to be Lebanese. They include former Iranian cultural attaché in Argentina, Mohsen Rabbani; Iran’s current defense minister, Gen. Ahmad Vahidi; former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian; former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former Revolutionary Guard chief Mohsen Rezaei; former ambassador to Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour; and the Iranian Embassy’s former third-ranking diplomat, Ahmad Reza Asghari.¶ Velayati and Rezaei are candidates in Iran’s current presidential election, scheduled for June 14. Rabbani is the alleged the architect of the bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Buenos Aires, as well as ”coordinator of the Iranian infiltration of South America, especially in Guyana,” according to Nisman.¶ With a population of 200,000, Argentina’s Jewish community is the largest in South America, making it the most obvious target for terror in the region.¶ Nisman’s report contends that the 1994 bombing “has to be investigated as a segment in a larger sequence.” This includes the case of Guyanese men Russell M. Defreitas and Abdul Kadir, who were convicted in 2010 of conspiring to attack New York’s Kennedy International Airport by blowing up fuel tanks and triggering a series of explosions along a pipeline that wends its way through the city. During cross-examination by prosecutors in that case, Kadir, a former Guyanese government official, admitted he had drafted regular reports to the Iranian ambassador in Venezuela, outlining plans to infiltrate the Guyanese military and police forces.¶ According to Nisman, Kadir was Rabbani’s “disciple.” Kadir “received instructions” from Rabbani “and carried out the Iranian infiltration in Guyana, whose structure was nearly identical … to that established by Rabbani in Argentina,” the prosecutor wrote. He further insisted that Interpol should step up its efforts to execute arrest warrants for the bombers.¶ The indictment has been sent to Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, the judge in charge of the case, as well as the countries targeted for infiltration. Iran has sought “to infiltrate the countries of Latin America and install secret intelligence stations with the goal of committing, fomenting and fostering acts of international terrorism in concert with its goals of exporting the revolution,” Nisman wrote.¶ Unsurprisingly, Iran has denied any involvement in the 1994 attack. Furthermore, the regime refuses to allow Rabbani or any of the other suspects to be extradited to Argentina. The Iranians insist a viable compromise is a newly agreed upon “truth commission” that will purportedly allow Nisman to obtain testimony from the accused — in Tehran — following years of legal deadlock.¶ The establishment of the truth commission was announced in January, following a concession made by Iran last July to cooperate with Argentina on the investigation, which the Iranians contended ”was going down the wrong way.” It will be comprised of five judges, none of whom come from Argentina or Iran.¶ AMIA officials, as well as other Jewish groups in Argentina, are vehemently opposed to the move. ”To ignore everything that Argentine justice has done and to replace it with a commission that, in the best of cases, will issue, without any defined deadline, a ‘recommendation’ to the parties constitutes, without doubt, a reversal in the common objective of obtaining justice,” said a joint statement released by AMIA and the Delegation of Israelite Argentine Associations, which also contended the move would ”imply a decline in our sovereignty.”¶ Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor was equally furious, saying that that Buenos Aires had committed a “breach of trust towards Israel.” The Israeli embassy in Argentina was bombed in 1992, killing 29 and injuring more than 200 others. The pro-Iranian group Islamic Jihad claimed it did it to avenge Israel’s assassination of a Hezbollah leader. Yet like the AMIA case, no one has ever been brought to justice for that attack.¶ Countering Jewish opposition, Argentine president Cristina Fernandez, who maintains ties with other Latin American nations on good terms with Iran, called the agreement “historic.” ”It guarantees the right to due process of law, a fundamental principle of international criminal law,” she contended. On her Twitter account, Fernandez further insisted the commission would ”analyze all the documentation presented to date by the judicial authorities of Argentina and Iran.”¶ Parliaments in both countries have yet to approve the deal, the status of which remains a ”memorandum of understanding” signed by Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman and his Iranian counterpart, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi Salehi, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.¶ The Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles was delighted with Nisman’s massive compilation of evidence, contending it should be the impetus for abandoning the truth commission. ”There is no question that the AMIA bombing was an action planned and carried out by Iranians and their agents. Prosecutor Nisman’s expose of the Tehran regime’s continent-wide tentacles must render the Iran-Argentine cooperation agreement on investigating the AMIA bombing null and void,” said a statement issued by Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Dr. Shimon Samuels and Sergio Widder, senior officials at the center.¶ Iran has no embassy in Argentina at the present time, but has added six in the region since 2005, bringing the total there to 11. Iran has also established 17 cultural centers in the Western Hemisphere. Following Nisman’s statements, no one answered the phone at the Iranian

embassy in Brasilia, Brazil.¶ Nisman’s efforts might bolster the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act,” signed into law on Dec. 28. The act gives Secretary of State John Kerry 180 days to provide Congress with a report assessing Tehran’s activities in the hemisphere, in order to deter threats posed by “the Government of Iran the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the IRGC’s Qods Force, and Hezbollah.”¶ The law was undoubtedly prompted by Iran’s 2011 plot to assassinate a Saudi diplomat in Washington, D.C., using members of a Mexican drug cartel to carry out the killing. “Reports of Iranian intelligence agents being implicated in Hezbollah-linked activities since the early 1990s suggest direct Iranian government support of Hezbollah activities in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, and in the past decade, Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil,” the law states.¶ Unfortunately, the administration remains behind the curve, either by accident or design. In December 2012, YNet News published a report noting that U.S. officials have been aware of an “extensive web of contacts” linking drug cartels in Mexico and other South American countries with Iran, Hezbollah and al Qaeda since at least 2010. That’s when a report commissioned by the House Committee on Intelligence revealed that ties between Hezbollah, the Mexican drug cartels and Iran “were getting stronger.” Illegal aliens associated with those groups have been smuggled into Mexico by those cartels, “placing them a virtual stone’s-throw away from the United States,” the magazine reported.¶ One suspects that report, as well as the one by Alberto Nisman, will be downplayed at least for the next two months, while those dedicated to “comprehensive immigration reform” attempt to get their handiwork approved in both houses of Congress. Nisman’s establishment of Iranian terror cells in South America, as well as the establishment of their involvement with drug cartels a “stone’s throw” from the U.S. border would undoubtedly complicate a bill in which border control “metrics” would be assessed by the same administration determined to convince Americans that terror is “on the run.” Running loose in South and Central America is more like it.

Argentina will allow for these terrorists – Kirchner wants to increase relations with Iran and strengthen the Anti-US coalition created by Chávez – there are even three Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups that infiltrated the USCollins, Paulding County Republican Examiner, 6/24(Christopher, 6/24/13, The Examiner, “Argentina forges ties with Iran, terrorist networks in South America and U.S.” http://www.examiner.com/article/argentina-forges-ties-with-iran-terrorist-networks-south-america-and-u-s, accessed 6/30/13, IC)The Center for Security Policy on Monday reported that Argentine President Cristina Kirchner has been building closer ties with the Iranian regime and that a 500-page report was compiled and released on the infiltration of Iranian terrorist groups in South America , Argentina , and the U.S . The report on the Iranian terrorist network as compiled and released by the Argentinean federal prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, who is the lead investigator of the 1994 terrorist attack against the Jewish headquarters, the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires.¶ The bombing was Argentina's deadliest bombing ever that killed 85 people and injuring hundreds more. Argentina was also the home to a Jewish community of 200,000, the largest in the region.¶ The Center for Security Policy Editor-in-Chief of The Americas Report, Nancy Menges and Editor Luis Fleischman stated that the alleged report detailed that Iran’s terrorist networks have a presence in several countries in South America and that Iran plans to establish intelligence bases in every country in order to carry out, promote, and sponsor terrorists .¶ The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a non-profit, non-partisan policy institute working to defend free nations against their enemies obtained the report and released a condensed 31 page summary that outlines the evidence.¶ In that report, it states in part:¶ “For the first time in the Argentine and world judicial history, it has been gathered and substantiated in a judicial file, evidence that proved the steps taken by a terrorist

regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, to infiltrate, for decades, large regions of Latin America, through the establishment of clandestine intelligence stations and operative agents which are used to execute terrorist attacks when the Iranian regime decides so, both directly or through its proxy, the terrorist organization Hezbollah.”¶ “This intelligence and terrorist network had already caused devastating consequences in Argentina in 1994 and almost strike again in the United States in 2007, when the blowing of fuel pipes and tanks of “John F. Kennedy” New York´s International Airport was dodged by the timely intervention of US law enforcements agencies, which –in this case- led to the arrest of the plotters and their conviction to life imprisonment. Several of those terrorists were veteran Iranian intelligence agents that were active in the region. Among them was Guyanese citizen Abdul Kadir, whose importance lies in his close relationship and hierarchical subordination to Mohsen Rabbani.”¶ “These actions have been taking place within the so-called “export of the revolution”, which was never masked by Tehran and is, in fact, written in their own constitution.”¶ “It was demonstrated that in 1982 an important seminar was held in the Islamic Republic of Iran, attended by approximately 380 religious men from 70 different countries. This meeting was a turning point on the regime’s method to export the revolution, understood as the cultural, political and religious infiltration promoted to expand a radical and violent vision of Islam. In the seminar, it was concluded that the regime would use violence and terrorism to reach its expansionist objectives. And that is why Javad Mansouri called to turn each Iranian embassy into an intelligence center and a base to export the revolution.”¶ Menges and Fleischman said, “These allegations are based on a number of reports including factual and legal documentation coming from Europe, Latin America and the United States. Prosecutor Nisman provided details of how the Iranian terrorist machine operates and also pointed out that the Iranians have a presence in countries such as Brazil, the United States, Guyana, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Trinidad & Tobago and Surinam.”¶ Menges and Fleischman stated that Argentine President Cristina Kirchner is more interested in forging closer ties with Iran that dealing with the justice in prosecuting the guilty in the AMIA terrorism case.¶ “Argentina's President, Cristina Kirchner is moving to ignore Nisman’s report and completely let Iranian perpetrators of terror off the hook in order to strengthen relations with Iran and reinforce the anti-American coalition created by Hugo Chavez, who was and continues to be a role model for her,” Menges and Fleischman said.¶ “The victims of the terrorist attacks served the Kirchners’ desire to accumulate political capital. As such, Nestor Kirchner embraced the AMIA tragedy and the demands of justice in 2003. Now the families of the victims, the Jewish community, and justice itself are all expendable as President Cristina moves to ignore Nisman’s report; patch up the entire affair; and completely let the Iranian perpetrators off the hook,” said Menges and Fleischman.¶ “But what is worse is Kirchner’s benevolent policies towards Iran that sets a dangerous precedent.”¶ Although the Obama administration denies any Iranian terrorist cells or threats exist in the United States, Reza Kahlili, author of "A Time to Betray," served in the CIA Directorate of Operations, a spy in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and a counter-terrorism expert reported last month that Iran gave the go-ahead to operatives of three terrorist groups that have infiltrated the United States to carry out missions.

Iranian bases in Latin America are to execute the Islamic Revolution, and they are ready to directly respond to US threats – the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador provesLevitt, director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6/14(Matthew, 6/14/13, Tico Times, “Iran agents in Latin America,” http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Iran-agents-in-Latin-America_Friday-June-14-2013, accessed 6/30/13, IC)But that's not all. Closer to the United States, Iran not only continues to expand its presence and bilateral relationships with countries like Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela, but it also maintains a network of intelligence agents specifically tasked with sponsoring and executing terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The same day the State Department released its report, highly respected Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who served as special prosecutor for the

investigation into the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, released a 500-page document laying out how the Iranian regime has, since the early 1980s, built and maintained "local clandestine intelligence stations designed to sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks" in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Nisman found evidence that Iran is building intelligence networks identical to the one responsible for the bombings in Argentina across the region — from Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia to Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname.¶ Nisman's 2006 report on the AMIA bombing already demonstrated how Iran established a robust intelligence network in South America in the early 1980s. One document, seized during a court-ordered raid of the residence of an Iranian diplomat north of Buenos Aires, included a map denoting areas populated by Muslim communities and suggested an Iranian strategy to export Islam into South America — and from there to North America. Highlighting areas densely populated by Muslims, the document informed that these "will be used from Argentina as [the] center of penetration of Islam and its ideology towards the North American continent."¶ Nisman concluded that the driving force behind Iran's intelligence efforts in Argentina was Mohsen Rabbani, an Iranian who lived in Argentina for 11 years and played a key role in the Islamic Republic's intelligence operations in South America. Rabbani, the primary architect of the AMIA plot, reportedly had come from Iran for the express purpose of heading the state-owned al-Tawhid mosque in Buenos Aires, but he also served as a representative of the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, which was tasked with ensuring the quality of Argentine meat exported to Iran. The Argentine prosecutor reported that Rabbani began laying the groundwork for his spy network after arriving in the country in 1983. Indeed, just prior to his departure for South America, Rabbani met Abolghasem Mesbahi, an Iranian intelligence official who would later defect, and explained to Mesbahi that he was being dispatched to Argentina "in order to create support groups for exporting the Islamic revolution," according to Nisman's 2006 report.¶ Rabbani advanced his vision of the "Islamic revolution" through a variety of means — including the execution of two large-scale attacks in Argentina. In 1992, Iran and Hezbollah bombed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people. Two years later, they targeted the AMIA Jewish community center, killing 85 people. Based on Nisman's investigation, in 2007 Interpol issued six "red notices," which request international cooperation to arrest and extradite a suspect, for the key players behind the AMIA bombing. Two of those red notices were for Mohsen Rezaei and Ali Akbar Velayati, both of whom are running for president in Iran's upcoming election.¶ Rabbani's terrorist activities in South America, however, did not wane despite being indicted in Argentina. According to Nisman and U.S. District Court documents from the Eastern District of New York in Brooklyn, Rabbani helped four men who were plotting to bomb New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport in 2007 and who sought technical and financial assistance for the operation, codenamed "Chicken Farm." All four men were ultimately convicted in federal court.¶ The four men first sought out Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the Trinidadian militant group Jamaat al-Muslimeen, and Adnan el-Shukrijumah, an al-Qaida operative who grew up in Brooklyn and South Florida and fled the United States for the Caribbean in the days before the 9/11 attacks. Unable to find Shukrijumah, the plotters "sent [co-conspirator] Abdul Kadir to meet with his contacts in the Iranian revolutionary leadership, including Mohsen Rabbani," according to a news release issued by the U.S. attorney's office for the Eastern District of New York.¶ One co-conspirator was Kareem Ibrahim, an imam and leader of the Shiite Muslim community in Trinidad and Tobago. During cross-examination at trial, Ibrahim admitted that he advised the plotters to approach Iranian leaders with the plot and use operatives ready to engage in suicide attacks at the airport. In one of the recorded conversations entered into evidence, Ibrahim told Russell Defreitas — a plotter who was a JFK baggage handler and a naturalized U.S. citizen — that the attackers must be ready to "fight it out, kill who you could kill, and go back to Allah."¶ Documents seized from Kadir's house in Guyana demonstrated that he was a Rabbani disciple who built a Guyanese intelligence base for Iran much like his mentor had built in Argentina. In a letter written to Rabbani in 2006, Kadir agreed to perform a "mission" for Rabbani to determine whether a group of individuals in Guyana and Trinidad were up to some unidentified task.¶ In the 1990s and 2000s, Rabbani also oversaw the education and indoctrination of Guyanese and other South American Muslim youth, including Kadir's children, in Iran. Kadir was ultimately arrested in Trinidad aboard a plane headed to Venezuela, en route to Iran. He was carrying a computer drive with photographs featuring himself and his children posing with guns, which prosecutors suggested were intended as proof for Iranian officials of his intent and capability to carry out an attack.¶ In 2011, not long before the last defendant in the JFK airport bomb plot was convicted, evidence emerged suggesting Rabbani was still doing intelligence work in South America. An April 2011 article in the Brazilian magazine Veja, citing documents from the FBI, CIA, and Interpol, reported that Rabbani "frequently slips in and out of Brazil on a false passport and has recruited at least 24 youngsters in three Brazilian states to attend 'religious formation' classes in Tehran," according to an article in the Telegraph.¶ In the word of one Brazilian

official quoted by the magazine, "Without anybody noticing, a generation of Islamic extremists is appearing in Brazil."¶ The growth of this Iranian extremist network in South America has immediate repercussions for the security of the United States. The same day that Nisman and the State Department released their reports, an Iranian-American used-car salesman from Texas was sentenced to 25 years in prison for his role in an Iranian plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States at a popular Washington restaurant. In the assessment by James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, this plot "shows that some Iranian officials — probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime."¶ Strangely, one of the countries most vulnerable to this terrorist threat appears more interested in placating, rather than opposing, the country responsible. In February, Argentina approved a deal with Iran for a joint "truth commission" to investigate the 1994 AMIA bombing — a step that insults the Argentine victims of the attack and makes a mockery of the rule of law. Of course, Nisman, Argentina's own special prosecutor, left no doubt in his 2006 report and his latest 500-page report about the truth of who was behind the bombing — Iranian agents.¶ The State Department has it right: There has indeed been a "marked resurgence" of Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism over the past 18 months. But as the new Nisman report drives home, here's an even more disturbing fact — Iran has run intelligence networks in the United States' backyard to "sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks" for decades.

Cooperation with Latin America k2 Security in the U.S. Mazetti, Columnist for the LA Times, ‘04(Mark, 11/17/04, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/17/world/fg-rumsfeld17, accessed 6/30/13, ARH)Although countries of the region are beginning to see the benefits of greater economic cooperation in recent years, "we need to strengthen security cooperation, so we can see the benefits there," Rumsfeld said during a news conference with Ecuadorean Defense Minister Nelson Herrera. Failure to deal directly with the issues of drugs and terrorism, U.S. officials argue, could lead to more countries in Latin America experiencing internal conflicts like those Colombia faces. Colombia has been roiled for years by violence among left-wing rebels, right-wing paramilitary groups and government forces, as the lines between political agendas and drug trafficking have blurred. "Colombia learned this too late, that's why they're in the situation they are in today," the senior U.S. defense official said. U.S. officials are particularly worried that the region where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay converge, with its large Arab population, has become a fundraising hub for militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. American intelligence agencies believe that international terrorists may be operating in the region, although they have no concrete evidence of cells plotting to attack the United States. The problem of international terrorism in Latin America, officials say, could become more acute as terrorists seek to exploit what Rumsfeld calls the "seams" that exist between the security infrastructures of various nations. "They look for weaknesses, they look for seams, they look for vulnerabilities. They use borders to their advantage," Rumsfeld said during the news conference.

Terrorism results in ExtinctionMorgan, Hankuk University Professor of Foreign Studies, 9

(Dennis, Professor @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (South Korea, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Futures, November, Science Direct, 6-31-13)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In other words, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them . Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

Impact – Terrorism – Impact BoosterLatin America is the key infiltration point for terrorists- repurposed smuggling routes. Fox News Latino, 2012[4-30-2012, Fox News Latino, “U.S. Ties to Latin America Key to War on Terror- Top General Says,” http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/03/30/us-ties-to-latin-america-key-to-war-on-terror/print EJH]In his first trip to Latin America, Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey said that the U.S. is working to improve security ties in Latin America because they worry that smuggling networks used to move illegal drugs into the U.S. could be tomorrow's path for a terrorist's bomb.¶ Dempsey said he is wary of a dangerous network of drug traffickers, weapons smugglers and organized criminal elements in South and Central America. They have developed transit avenues -- by land, sea and air -- that one day could be used to move far more dangerous things, like weapons of mass destruction, across the southern U.S. border, he said in an interview with reporters traveling with him.¶ "That network can move anything," he said. "It'll go to the highest bidder. So looking to the future, it's certainly in our interest to do what we can to help the nations in this region to break those networks" to prevent it being used by terrorists.¶ "It's both the narcoterrorism activities that we see destabilizing our southern border (and) it's that network itself that can be used for other purposes -- and probably will be," he added.¶ Asked whether he sees this network as akin to the al-Qaida network of terrorist cells, money raisers and facilitators, he said, "That is a fair analogy. We learned how to defeat al-Qaida by attacking the network along its entire length. Now in that case we did most, if not all, of the heavy lifting. The question here (in South America) would be, can we take the same paradigm in how to attack a network -- but not do it ourselves?"¶

Best Pix of the Week¶ Dempsey is not advocating a surge of U.S. military activity in Latin America, although the Obama administration has identified this region as increasingly important to U.S. national security. To underscore that importance, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is due to visit Colombia, Brazil and Chile next month, and President Barack Obama is due to attend a Summit of the Americas in Colombia in mid-April.¶ Brazil was the final stop on a three-day tour of South America that on Tuesday took Dempsey to a jungle outpost in northeastern Colombia a couple of miles from the Venezuelan border, where the Colombian military -- with help from U.S. military advisers -- is stepping up its decades-long fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the insurgent group known by its Spanish initials, FARC.¶ Dempsey has used his visits to reaffirm a U.S. commitment to working with the region's militaries. The visit also served to highlight a key tenet of the Obama administration's new defense strategy: partnering with other militaries in regions where the U.S. does not have a substantial military footprint and helping countries like Colombia fight their insurgents rather than intervening with U.S. troops.¶

Dempsey said arrangements are being made to send Army and perhaps Marine Corps colonels who have commanded combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to Colombia to share what they learned about countering an insurgency. The plan is to have one such colonel spend two weeks with each of the seven specially tailored

task forces that the Colombian military is establishing in various parts of the country to counter the FARC. The Colombians see this as a way to help them accelerate their campaign to further degrade the FARC.¶ Colombia also would like the Pentagon to provide additional aircraft for moving cargo and troops, as well as more surveillance aircraft for tracking the rebels, Dempsey said, adding that he is not yet ready to recommend to Panetta when or whether the U.S. should make those additional contributions.¶ On Wednesday, Dempsey visited the Brazilian city of Manaus, near the confluence of the Amazon river and the Rio Negro. He toured a steamy outpost where Brazilian troops train in jungle warfare, a skill that U.S. soldiers have lost during a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We need bilateral and multilateral channels of diplomacy to stop major Latin America terrorism threats- Iranian terrorism groups taking root in multiple Latin American countries. Vann, Director of the Latino and Latin American Institute, 2008[Dina Siegel, 2008, ajc.org, “Iran’s Prescence in Latin America: Trade, Energy and Terror” http://www.ajc.org/atf/cf/%7B42D75369-D582-4380-8395-D25925B85EAF%7D/IranPresenceLatinAmerica_032007.pdf EJH]The main players in the international arena have insistently identified Iran’s undeterred ¶ development of nuclear capability as a clear threat to world peace. Its hostile relationship ¶ with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as its frequent belligerent ¶ statements regarding the U.S. and Israel are in the news almost every day. In addition, ¶ Iran’s financial, logistical and political support of terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and ¶ Hamas operating in the Middle East and as far away as Argentina is well documented. ¶ The prevailing question seems to be how can the world community, through the use of ¶ bilateral or multilateral channels and pressure points, leverage its relations with Iran to ¶ deter it from becoming a nuclear power. ¶ There is one aspect of this thorny issue, however, that has remained relatively unknown. ¶ For several decades, Iran has made strategic attempts to increase its presence and activity ¶ in Latin America. With fully-operational embassies in Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil ¶ and Argentina, plans to reopen embassies or strengthen its diplomatic presence in Chile, ¶ Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay, and the founding of a new embassy in ¶ Bolivia, Iran is expanding its stronghold on the continent. Times could not be more ¶

auspicious, with emerging populist leaders in the region viewing this relationship as part ¶ of a political realignment that excludes the United States, and with American attention ¶ focused primarily on other areas of the world. ¶ Relations between Iran and Latin America have existed for decades, but since taking ¶ office in August 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has pursued an aggressive ¶ foreign policy aimed at building alliances with Latin American nations. Iran’s Foreign ¶ Ministry hosted “The First International Seminar on Latin America: Its Role and Status in ¶ the Future International System” in late February 2007.1¶ The encounter brought together ¶ representatives from many of these nations to discuss ways in which the relationship ¶ could be brought to a new level. Stronger alliances with countries that allegedly are ¶

antagonistic to the U.S. seem to be facilitated by a populist trend sweeping the region, led ¶ by President Chávez of Venezuela.

Anti-American ideologies are being fostered by Iran in Latin America while garnering support for their nuclear program- trade and political agendas. Vann, Director of the Latino and Latin American Institute, 2008[Dina Siegel, 2008, ajc.org, “Iran’s Prescence in Latin America: Trade, Energy and Terror” http://www.ajc.org/atf/cf/%7B42D75369-D582-4380-8395-D25925B85EAF%7D/IranPresenceLatinAmerica_032007.pdf EJH]¶ There is no doubt that the recent impetus in Iranian-Latin American relations has as much ¶ to do with regional as with geopolitical factors. Take the case of Bolivia and Venezuela, ¶ who are among the world’s richest sources of gas and oil, respectively. President Chávez ¶ sees his country’s oil supplies as a means to pursue an independent diplomatic course ¶ from “U.S. imperialism” and supported Morales’ May 2006 nationalization of Bolivia’s ¶ oil and natural gas industry. Ahmadinejad welcomed Chávez’s proposal for tripartite ¶ cooperation among Iran, Venezuela, and Bolivia on energy production. Cuba’s proximity ¶ to the U.S. has also served Ahmadinejad’s goal of unnerving Washington and fostering ¶ an anti-U.S. axis in the Western Hemisphere.¶ Whether through trade promotion, the joint development of nuclear capabilities, or the ¶ advancement of shared ideological and political agendas, Iran is taking advantage of ¶ whatever front- or back-door options are available to win allies in the Western ¶ Hemisphere. Most of the nations in the Americas are addressing the Iranian overtures ¶ either as committed ideological or business partners or as bystanders. Regardless, they ¶ are helping Iran persevere in pursuing a nuclear program with clear aggressive ¶ undertones, despite the threat that it represents to world peace.

Iran is creating ties in the Western Hemisphere to undermine the U.S. and make us vulnerable- joint ventures and political and economic agreements. Vann, Director of the Latino and Latin American Institute, 2008[Dina Siegel, 2008, ajc.org, “Iran’s Prescence in Latin America: Trade, Energy and Terror” http://www.ajc.org/atf/cf/%7B42D75369-D582-4380-8395-D25925B85EAF%7D/IranPresenceLatinAmerica_032007.pdf EJH]Iran’s endeavors in Latin America are not to be taken lightly. Joint ventures, political and ¶ economic agreements, and the increased exchange of ideas on the future of the Western ¶ Hemisphere are coalescing to help make Ahmadinejad’s dream of an anti-U.S. axis a ¶ reality. This growing alliance seeks to counterbalance the international community’s ¶ front against Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities that are rightly perceived as a ¶ threat to world peace. In Iran’s view, times are auspicious given the election of leaders in ¶ the region who, due to their political bent, can allegedly prove to be sympathetic to its ¶ goals. In addition, growing anti-American sentiment and the apparent search for political ¶

realignment can also prove to be helpful in fostering the right climate to oppose what is ¶ generally perceived as an interventionist attitude on the part of the U.S. and Europe. If ¶ Iran feels that there is a serious threat of an attack against its nuclear sites, it has already ¶ announced that it will rely on suicide bombers to defend its interests. This ominous ¶ scenario is compounded by Cuba and Venezuela’s firm commitment to standing beside ¶ Iran.

Unfortunately, Latin America has twice in the past experienced Tehran’s support for ¶ terror operations. Clarity of thought and purpose are required to thwart Iran’s goals in the ¶ Western Hemisphere.

Latin American terrorism is a serious threat- ties to Hezbollah, Hamas and al-Qaeda in the tri-border area. Abbot, Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, 2004Philip K, September 2004, Military Review, “Terrorist Threat in The Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/abbott.pdf EJH]¶ Ambassador Philip Wilcox, former Department of¶ State (DOS) Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testified before the International Relations Committee¶ of the U.S. House of Representatives that Hezbollah¶ activities in the TBA have involved narcotics, smuggling, and terrorism. Many believe the TBS’s Arab¶ and Muslim community contains hardcore terrorist¶ sympathizers with direct ties to Hezbollah, the proIranian, Lebanese Shiite terrorist group; Hamas, the¶ Palestinian fundamentalist group; the Egyptian group¶ Islamic Jihad; and even al-Qaeda.3 However, Arab¶ and Muslim TBA leaders claim their community¶ members are moderates who have lived in harmony¶ with the rest of the population for many years and¶ have rejected extremist views and terrorism. Most¶ of the TBA’s 20,000 Arabs and Muslims say it¶ would be impossible for terrorists to hide in their¶ midst and deny remittances sent abroad go to¶

Hezbollah. A minority of Arabs and Muslims, however, make no secret about their sympathy and financial support for Hezbollah, which they say is a¶ legitimate Lebanese political party

Impact – ProlifThe TIME IS NOW – LA is susceptible to leftist governments that could result in nuclear proliferation.Ferkaluk, Executive Officer to the Commander at 88 Air Base WingLogistics Readiness Officer at United States Air Force, 10(Brian, Fall 2010, Global Security Studies, “Latin America: Terrorist Actors on a Nuclear Stage,” pg 12, ACCESSED June 29, 2013, RJ)

The close relationship the US must maintain with Latin America is not only vital in the fight against domestic and international terrorism, but also in the fight to curtail nuclear proliferation in the region. Although there is no immediate risk of Latin America in becoming a haven for a nuclear arms race, it could pose a serious threat of pursuing nuclear weapons in the coming years if the civilian-run governments of these states fall victim to leftist revolutionaries. Another factor to consider is the fact that Latin America has historically been active in both nuclear weapons development and nuclear power development. And given Latin America’s tendency toward military junta regimes (stratocracy), the US cannot turn a blind eye to the possibility of nuclear activity in Latin America. All Latin American countries are party to the NPT. Not all are members of international conventions such as the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and not all adopt an Additional Protocol (AP) to their safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The region itself has been declared a nuclear-free zone according to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It entered into force in 1969 and did not have all 33 Latin American states sign onto it until Cuba added its name in 2002. However, the treaty itself has not served as an absolute ban of nuclear weapons in the region. Brazil, for instance, has not let the Treaty of Tlatelolco stand in the way of its own weapons development program in the late 1970s. And Venezuela today is not letting it stand in its way either. The most significant weakness of the treaty is the fact that it permits parties of the treaty to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Therefore, Latin America has served as battlefield in the fight for non-proliferation.

Proliferation makes extinction inevitable—terrorism, miscalculation, and retaliation Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, 2(Victor A., “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Survival, Summer, p. 87-90, 6-31-13)

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable

supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nucleararmed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons failing into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.’ These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states ‘known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear

capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat. And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?” If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states. Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognize clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.’ Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants

before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. This kind of world is in no nation’s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff’s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats.

Impact Booster—ProlifProlif causes extinctionToon, Department of Atomspheric and Oceanic Science at CU, 7(Owen B, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf, 6-31-13)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to

create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there . Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear

“counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

Most probable scenarioRussell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf, 6-31-13)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to

pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

Impact – Competitiveness

Cooperation k2 Growth of Latin America in EVERY FIELDGoodman, Guest Contributor to the Diplomatic Courier, 5/24/13(Allen, 5/24/13, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/opinion/1464-cooperation-is-key-to-growth-for-latin-america, accessed 6/30/13, ARH)On a recent visit to Latin America, it was increasingly clear to me that policymakers in both the public and private sector are committed to investing in higher education to develop their workforce and future leaders. Learning, research, institution-building, and community engagement have become top priorities for many governments across Latin America in the past ten years, and an emphasis on international study as a means to advance national economic growth has been one of the keys to achieving these priorities. The Institute of International Education has been involved in many of these developments over the years, beginning with establishing a Latin America Division at our New York headquarters in the 1930, and then through our Latin America regional office in Mexico City since 1974. Chief among the programs managed by IIE beginning in the 1970s was the ITT International Fellowship Program, which served as an exemplary model of corporate involvement in international educational exchange for 17 years. Over the years, the Institute’s work in the Western Hemisphere has grown to include a number of dynamic initiatives related to higher education, scholarship, and fellowship programs, promoting study abroad, workforce and professional development, institutional partnership building, educational advising, and English language testing.In the United States, the Obama administration has made it a priority to expand academic exchanges between Latin America and the United States. The U. S. government is working with foreign governments, universities and colleges, and the private sector to reach the goal of “100,000 Strong in the Americas” to increase the flow of students between Latin American and the Caribbean and the United States to 100,000 in each direction. The most recent data in Open Doors report, published by IIE in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, shows that 64,021 students from the region studied in the United States and 39,871 students from the U.S. studied abroad in Latin America and the Caribbean. As described in a chapter on Western Hemisphere Academic Exchanges by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Meghann Curtis and Policy Adviser Lisa Kraus at the U.S. Department of State, “Strong partnerships in the region are critical to both U.S. domestic and global strategic interests.” The authors note that science and technology innovations have accelerated through cooperative partnerships and are key to shared sustainable growth, and that working collaboratively across borders in the region is necessary to attain energy security and to combat transnational crime and narcotrafficking, as well as to support the global effort to promote democracy, rule of law, social inclusion and human rights around the world. “At the center of these partnerships—and U.S. strategy in the region—are educational exchanges, which help us establish a strong foundation for empowering the best innovators, entrepreneurs, and leaders of today to meet all these challenges.”

Protectionism unleashes multiple scenarios for global nuclear warPanzner, Prof. at the New York Institute of Finance, 9 (Michael Panzner, Prof. at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, 2009, p. 136-138, 6-31-13)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole

new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and

interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

Impact – Energy CooperationUS- Latin American cooperation key to economy and energy cooperationArcos et al., Senior Advisor @ The National Defense University’s Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, ‘12(Cresencio, The Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, "Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America?”, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, 6/30/2013, PD)

Expanded trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin American relations. Independent of government policies, these areas have seen tremendous growth and development, driven chiefly by the private sector. The US government needs to better appreciate the rising importance of Latin America—with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning opportunities for US investments, enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply of needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy . With Brazil and many other Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid growth and rising incomes, the search for economic opportunities has become the main force shaping relationships in the hemisphere. Intensive economic engagement by the United States may be the best foundation for wider partnerships across many issues as well as the best way to energize currently listless US relations with the region. What Latin America’s largely middle and upper middle income countries— and their increasingly middle class populations—most want and need from the United States is access to its $16-trillion-a-year economy, which is more than three times the region’s economies combined . Most Latin American nations experienced quicker recovery from the financial crisis than did the United States, and they are growing at a faster pace Nonetheless, they depend on US capital for investment, US markets for their exports, and US technology and managerial innovation to lift productivity. They also rely on the steady remittances from their citizens in the United States . The United States currently buys about 40 percent of Latin America’s exports and an even higher percentage of its manufactured products. It remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly every country in the region. And it provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and upwards of 90 percent of the $60 billion or so in remittance income that goes to Latin America. US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years. Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports originated in the United States. Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin America’s imports. China and Europe have made huge inroads. China’s share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia. Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves. Argentina, for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil’s second largest trading partner, just behind China. Still, these changes must be put in perspective. Even as the US share of the Latin American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace. They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US

exports worldwide. US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin America’s growth continues to be strong. But the United States will have to work harder and harder to compete for the region’s markets and resources. While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the region’s expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability. Today the United States exports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia. Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how much the United States depends on the region for oil and minerals. Latin America accounts for a third of US oil imports. Mexico is the second-biggest supplier after Canada. Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia sit among the top dozen, and imports from Brazil are poised to rise sharply with its recent offshore discoveries. Within a decade, Brazil and Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the United States. The potential for heightened energy cooperation in the Americas is huge, with wide-ranging ramifications for economic well-being and climate change. Latin America is an important destination for US direct and portfolio investments, absorbing each year about eight percent of all US overseas investment. At the same time, Latin American investment in the United States is growing fast. And no economic calculus should omit the vital value to the US economy of immigrant workers; US agriculture and construction industries are heavily dependent on them. These workers, mostly from Latin America, will drive the bulk of US labor force growth in the next decade and are important elements in keeping social security solvent over the longer term.

Resource conflict causes extinctionHeinberg, New College of California, 3

(Richard, New College of California, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies, p. 230, 6-30-13)

While the US has not declared war on any nation since 1945, it has nevertheless bombed or invaded a total of 19 countries and stationed troops, or engaged in direct or indirect military action, in dozens of others. During the Cold War, the US military apparatus grew exponentially , ostensibly in response to the threat posed by an archrival: the Soviet Union. But after the end of the Cold War the American military and intelligence establishments did not shrink in scale to any appreciable degree . Rather, their implicit agenda — the protection of global resource interests emerged as the semi-explicit justification for their continued existence . With resource hegemony came challenges from nations or sub-national groups opposing that hegemony. But the immensity of US military might ensured that such challenges would be overwhelmingly asymmetrical. US strategists labeled such challenges “terrorism” — a term with a definition malleable enough to be applicable to any threat from any potential enemy, foreign or domestic, while never referring to any violent action on the part of the US, its agents, or its allies . This policy puts the US on a collision course with the rest of the world. If all-out competition is pursued with the available weapons of awesome power , the result could be the destruction not just of industrial civilization, but of humanity and most of the biosphere.

Impact – Economy

Latin American Relations Key to U.S. Economy – It’s On the Rise Now

Inter-American Dialogue, Think Tank, 2012(“Remaking the Relationship: the United States and Latin America”, pg. 18, MK)

Expanded trade, investment, and energy cooperation offer the greatest promise for robust US-Latin American relations. Independent of ¶ government policies, these areas have seen tremendous growth and development, driven chiefly by the private sector. The US government needs to ¶ better appreciate the rising importance of Latin America—with its expanding markets for US exports, burgeoning opportunities for US investments, ¶ enormous reserves of energy and minerals, and continuing supply of ¶ needed labor—for the longer term performance of the US economy.¶ With Brazil and many other Latin American economies thriving and showing promise for sustained rapid growth and rising incomes, the search for ¶ economic opportunities has become the main force shaping relationships in ¶ the hemisphere . Intensive economic engagement by the United States may ¶ be the best foundation for wider partnerships across many issues as well as ¶ the best way to energize currently listless US relations with the region.¶ What Latin America’s largely middle and upper middle income countries—¶ and their increasingly middle class populations—most want and need from ¶ the United States is access to its $16-trillion-a-year economy, which is more ¶ than three times the region’s economies combined. Most Latin American ¶ nations experienced quicker recovery from the financial crisis than did ¶ the United States, and they are growing at a faster pace. Nonetheless, they ¶ depend on US capital for investment, US markets for their exports, and US ¶ technology and managerial innovation to lift productivity. They also rely on ¶ the steady remittances from their citizens in the United States. The United States currently buys about 40 percent of Latin America’s ¶ exports and an even higher percentage of its manufactured products.

China’s share of trade ¶ in Brazil, Chile, and ¶ Peru has surpassed ¶ that of the United ¶ States; it is a close ¶ second in Argentina ¶ and Colombia.¶ remains the first or second commercial partner for nearly every country ¶ in the region . And it provides nearly 40 percent of foreign investment and ¶ upwards of 90 percent of the $60 billion or so in remittance income that ¶ goes to Latin America.¶ US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent ¶ years. Just a decade ago, 55 percent of the region’s imports originated in the ¶ United States. Today, the United States supplies less than one-third of Latin ¶ America’s imports. China and Europe have made huge inroads. China’s ¶ share of trade in Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United ¶ States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia. Furthermore, Latin ¶ American nations now trade much more among themselves. Argentina, for ¶ example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil’s second largest trading partner, just behind China.

Still, these changes must be put in perspective. Even as the US share of the ¶ Latin American market has diminished, its exports to the region have been ¶ rising at an impressive pace. They have more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2 percent higher than US exports ¶ worldwide. US trade should expand even faster in the coming period as Latin ¶ America’s growth continues to be strong. But the United States will have to ¶ work harder and harder to compete for the region’s markets and resources .¶ While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, ¶ the region’s expanding economies have become more critical to US economic growth and stability. Today the United States exports more to Latin ¶ America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than it does to ¶ China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia .¶ Even a cursory examination of the numbers points to how much the United ¶ States depends on the region for oil and minerals . Latin America accounts ¶ for a third of US oil imports. Mexico is the second-biggest supplier after ¶ Canada. Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia sit among the top dozen, and ¶ imports from Brazil are poised to rise sharply with its recent offshore discoveries. Within a decade, Brazil and Mexico may be two of the three largest suppliers of oil to the United States. The potential for heightened energy ¶

cooperation in the Americas is huge, with wide-ranging ramifications for ¶

economic well-being and climate change .¶ Latin America is an important destination for US direct and portfolio investments, absorbing each year about eight percent of all US overseas investment .¶ At the same time, Latin American investment in the United States is growing fast . And no economic calculus should omit the vital value to the United States and Latin America 13¶ A critical step for ¶

the United States ¶ would be to ease its ¶ long-standing protection ¶ of agriculture through ¶ tariffs, subsidies, ¶ and quotas.¶ economy of immigrant workers; US agriculture and construction industries ¶ are heavily dependent on them . These workers, mostly from Latin America, ¶ will drive the bulk of US labor force growth in the next decade and are ¶ important elements in keeping social security solvent over the longer term.

Latin American Relations Key to Democracy – Encourages Problem Solving

Alvarado, Diplomat, 2013(Liza, 5/31, ISN, “The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in Latin America”, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=164370, 6/30/13, MK)

Relations between the United States and Latin America have experienced cyclical ups and downs. Geographically, the United States and Latin America are linked and have a natural shared market, so there will always be a relationship of one sort or another. The United States will continue to seek to exert its influence over the region, whether through future plans for the placement of military bases or the promotion of bilateral trade agreements.¶ Leftist governments will have to address challenges such as those caused by social divisions and economic inequality. They will likely continue to focus on

implementing their leftist discourse, particularly in the wake of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s death. However, it is important to consider that neoliberal philosophies are also still pervasive in many countries of Latin America. This is an advantage for the United States, giving it an opportunity to push for further privatization, but Latin American leftist movements should evaluate themselves and take actions to if they are to avoid a return of neoliberal policies of the 1990s.¶ All that said, how can the United States improve its foreign policy towards Latin America? There are many problems in the region that should be faced together. Accepting this reality is the beginning to improving relations.

Transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, and immigration problems are worth making joint efforts to resolve. The U.S. should encourage the strengthening of political and economic ties in the Americas as well as promoting compliance of international commitments as a sign of willingness to improve relations. There are many hemispheric conventions that provide the legal framework to begin to work together against negative outcomes. An example is the Declaration on Security in the Americas signed by the countries of the hemisphere in 2003. This document describes the new concept of multidimensional security, and incorporates as new threats issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, environmental degradation, natural resource and food scarcity, and uncontrolled population growth and migration.¶ The United States should take active part in establishing institutional networks through which policies can be coordinated, and through these promote the expansion of employment opportunities for the population, stimulate fair trade agreements, and encourage the protection of the hemisphere against drug trafficking and organized crime. These are all proposals that would certainly help to create better relations between the states of the Western Hemisphere. Relations between the United States and Latin America are complex and changing. If they are based on cooperation, with respect to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, they can become stronger. As such, the U.S. must be willing to re-evaluate its foreign policy and perspectives toward the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

Economic collapse causes nuclear warHarris and Burrows, PhD European History at Cambridge and NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, 9 (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf, 6-31-13)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever.

While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that

period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century . For

that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even

more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth

continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly

be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed

Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the

great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict

and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian

missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an

impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises . 36 Types of conflict that the world

continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of

renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are

providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If

the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea

lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

AT: Alt Causes To Relations The embargo has poisoned US-Latin American relations- a 50 year sticking point.Rathbone, Financial Times Latin American editor, 2012[John Paul, 9-5-2012, Financial Times Blog, “The ‘Great Game’ of Columbia’s Peace Process”, http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2012/09/the-great-game-of-colombias-peace-process/ EJH]Now take Cuba. For the past half century, it has been the US’s most persistent foreign policy headache in the region, and one that has poisoned its relations with the rest of Latin America. But now Havana is playing a key role by hosting the Colombian peace process, while also politely but firmly encouraging the Farc to put down their guns. Indeed, one can imagine Fidel Castro, that great patriarch of Latin American revolution, laying his hands on Farc guerrilla leaders and telling them: it’s ok, peace is a kind of revolutionary victory too.¶ What is in this for Cuba, a country that has always played a long strategic game? Simple. It wants to be seen as playing a constructive regional role in a way that Washington cannot ignore. The fact that in these straightened times Colombian peace, abetted by the Cubans, might also save the US a few hundred millions dollars of aid a year is surely no small thing.¶ Might that be enough to help end the 50-year embargo, a perennial sticking point in US-Latin American relations? Perhaps. Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos has said he’d like to see the embargo end. Washington might also like to see the same, but domestic political opposition has always made that impossible.¶ So there you can now glimpse the contours of a great regional game. Mr Santos has launched a peace process that could end a conflict that has caused tens of thousands of deaths. That is a boon in its own right, and would also corroborate the success of the US initiative, Plan Colombia – a plus for the US profile in the region.¶ By launching the peace process, Washington’s closest ally in Latin America, Mr Santos, also grows his regional profile – a plus for him, and also probably the US. At the same time, Cuba is opening a way that makes it easier for whoever is in Washington to relax the embargo – potentially another strategic boost for US regional relations. Venezuela, meanwhile, is helping end a guerrilla-sponsored conflict that contributes to drug smuggling, which in turn creates regional instability. Who can complain about that? Everyone is a winner.

The Embargo hurts US relations with other Latin American countries- makes the U.S. perceptually stubborn and discluded us from meetings and alliances. Malinowski, staff writer for law360 and featured on Forbes.com, 2010[Nick, 4-29-2010, Law360, “Congress Mulls Over Opening Cuba to Travel, Trade”

http://www.law360.com/articles/164048/congress-mulls-opening-cuba-to-travel-trade EJH]The current embargo prohibiting trade, travel and most diplomatic contact has done little to effect change for the Cuban people and has hurt American trade interests, isolating Washington diplomatically and straining already tense relationships with other Latin American countries, the panel told members of the trade subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee. ¶ The Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act, introduced by Rep. Collin Peterson, D-Minn., in February and referred to the House Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Financial Services committees, would prohibit any regulation limiting travel to Cuba and end restrictions on direct transfers from Cuban financial institutions to their U.S. counterparts. ¶ Thursday's panelists included Reagan administration Secretary of Agriculture John Block, the Center for International Policy's Wayne Smith, the Washington Office on Latin America's Geoff Thale, Jose Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch, Myron Brilliant of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Michael Kelly of the Creighton University School of Law. ¶ Smith, who was serving in the U.S. embassy in Havana when the U.S. ended diplomatic relationships with Cuba in 1961, told the subcommittee that at the time — when Cuba was trying to overthrow other governments in Latin America and was a staunch ally of the Soviet Union — efforts to isolate and contain Cuba seemed to make sense, and other nations supported and joined the U.S. in these measures. ¶ Today, however, Cuba has normal diplomatic and trade relationships with every other country in the Western Hemisphere, and Washington's inflexible stance on this issue has caused its allies in the region, including Brazil, to suggest that this stubbornness detracts from its credentials of leadership, Smith said. ¶ “I thought the United States was supposed to be flexible, but we haven't adjusted our policy at all,” he said. “Cuba seems to have the same affect the full moon has on werewolves, and that's been true of every administration.” ¶ Sanctions have not only failed to improve repression and other human rights abuses in Cuba but have cut American diplomats off from the people who will make up Havana's next generation of political leaders, Thale said. ¶ Washington's lack of engagement with Cuba has caused the U.S. to pull out of hemispherewide meetings, weakening relationships with international partners and negatively affecting national security interests, such as in the drug trade and human trafficking, issues where Cuba, as a major Caribbean player, could be an ally, Thale said. ¶ The nationalization of property on the island following Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959 could be a sticking point in trade normalization efforts because the new regime took land and intellectual property from American and Cuban citizens, including those who have since emigrated to the U.S., and still maintains those assets. ¶ While other nations have arranged for the return of property, the lack of diplomatic relations has left property owners in the U.S. on the outside of these deals.

The embargo undermines American relations with Latin American countries- relic of paternalism. Creamer, political organizer and strategist, 2011

[Robert, 1-18-2011, The Huffington Post, “Changes in US Policy Good First Step—But it’s Time to Normalize Relations,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/changes-in-us-cuba-policy_b_810161.html EJH]¶ But to the extent it persists, the policy of isolating Cuba and limiting American travel there not only limits our freedom -- it actually prevents the presumed goal of our policy -- to open up Cuba.¶ ¶ 3). By maintaining our economic embargo we penalize the American economy and cost American jobs.¶ ¶ Our economic "boycott" does not so much prevent Cuba from getting the things its needs (though it definitely makes the lives of ordinary Cubans more difficult), as it prevents American companies and farmers from selling them American products.¶ ¶ Creating American jobs should be our government's number one priority yet the Cuban embargo prevents the sales of American-made products to a customer that would be ready and willing to buy. The result? Other countries sell Cuba the same products and benefit by the creation of jobs in their countries rather than the United States.¶ ¶ 4). Our failure to normalize relations with Cuba undermines American interests throughout the world -- and particular in Latin America.¶ ¶ U.S. policy towards Cuba has been a major sore point with other countries in Latin America, who view it as a vestige of Yankee paternalism toward the entire region. And it is used by those who want to harm America as another piece of anti-American propaganda.¶ ¶ Far from isolating Cuba, we have isolated ourselves. Virtually all of America's major allies have normal economic and political relationships with Cuba. Last year, the United Nations General Assembly voted for the seventeenth time -- in seventeen years -- to condemn our economic embargo of Cuba -- this time by a vote of 185 to 3.¶ ¶ In December the thirty-three Caribbean and Latin American nations that are members of the Rio Group voted to give Cuba full membership and called on the U.S. to end the embargo.¶ ¶ 5). Domestic political support for the embargo -- especially among Cuban Americans in Florida -- has crumbled.¶ ¶ The proximate political reason for our past Cuba policy has been the large Cuban American voter block in southern Florida. Many Cuban Americans emigrated here immediately after the Cuban Revolution half a century ago and were virulently anti-Castro.¶ ¶ In fact, with the Republican takeover of the House, hard line anti-Cuba Congresswoman Illeana Ros-Lehtinen is now the Chair of the House Committee on International Relations. She works with a well organized hard-line lobby, that has raised a large financial war chest to punish Members of Congress who support changing our relations with Cuba. But Ros-Lehtinen and her hard line allies are increasingly isolated in the Cuban American community itself.¶ ¶ Polls now show that 67 percent of Cuban Americans support allowing all Americans to travel to Cuba (Bendixen poll: Conducted April 14-16, 2009 -- Cuban Americans only).¶

Lifting the Embargo key to Latin American relations- explodes old US stereotypes. Tisdale, assistant editor of the Guardian, 2013[Simon, 3-5-2013, The Guardian, “Death of Hugo Chavez brings chance of a fresh start for US and Latin America,”

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print EJH]"For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said.¶ Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban problem, which continues to colour the way Latin Americans view Washington.¶ "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Raúl Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said.¶

A move by Obama to end travel restrictions and the trade embargo on Cuba would be applauded across the region, explode old stereotypes about gringo oppressors, and help build confidence with Venezuela, the Castro regime's key backer, she suggested.¶ If Obama were to match a Cuban rapprochement with initiatives to curb US gun sales (a major concern for violence-plagued Mexico), reduce domestic demand for illegal drugs (a priority for Colombia), and settle on fair immigration rules, he would be well on the way to inaugurating a new era in political relations with Latin America.

The Embargo demonizes the US in the eyes of Latin Americans. Piccone, deputy director of foreign policy at Brookings, 2013, [Ted, 1-17-2013, brookings.edu, “Opening to Havana,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/opening-to-havana EJH]Current U.S. policy long ago outlived its usefulness and is counterproductive to advancing the goal of helping the Cuban people. Instead it gives Cuban officials the ability to demonize the United States in the eyes of Cubans, other Latin Americans and the rest of the world, which annually condemns the embargo at the United Nations. At this rate, given hardening attitudes in the region against U.S. policy, the Cuba problem may even torpedo your next presidential Summit of the Americas in Panama in 2015. It is time for a new approach: an initiative to test the willingness of the Cuban government to engage constructively alongside an effort to empower the Cuban people.

Cuba is the main sticking point with the rest of Latin America- Hillary Clinton’s trip. Ghattas, political sciences degree from the American University of Beirut, 2010[Kim, 3-1-2010, BBC News, “Hillary Clinton Begins Latin American Tour,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8543122.stm EJH]

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is starting a five-day tour of Latin America, with her first visit to countries like Chile and Brazil.¶ She will also attend the inauguration of the Uruguayan President and former guerilla fighter Jose Mujica.¶

The US secretary of state was expecting to spend a day in Chile on Tuesday.¶ State Department officials said she would still be stopping in Santiago, but the agenda of her visit may change in the wake of the earthquake there.¶ Hillary Clinton may be going to Latin America, but she will be partly focused on Iran.¶ Question time¶

Washington is pushing for a fourth round of UN sanctions against Tehran.¶ Brazil, a rising regional player with civilian nuclear power, currently sits on the UN Security Council and it has been reluctant to get tough with Iran.¶ The talks in Brasilia will be a test for Mrs Clinton as she seeks to revamp Washington's credibility south of its border.¶ After promising to turn a new page with its southern neighbours, the Obama administration has brought little change to US policies in Latin America and has paid little attention to the region.¶ Washington's policy of isolating Cuba is still the main sticking point, and Mrs Clinton is likely to face tough questions throughout her trip.

If US relations don't improve in Latin America US credibility will explode and cause more tension in Latin America Inter-American Dialogue, US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs’ 12 (Remaking the relationship The US and Latin America http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, EB)

Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious juncture . In the past decade, most Latin American countries have made enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing inequality and, especially, poverty, within a democratic framework . These critical changes have brought greater autonomy, expanded global links, and growing self-confidence . It is now the United States that is in a sour mood, struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished international stature and influence, and fractured politics at home . These recent changes have profoundly affected Inter-American relations . While relations are today cordial and largely free of the antagonisms of the past, they also seem without vigor and purpose . Effective cooperation in the Americas, whether to deal with urgent problems or to take advantage of new opportunities, has been disappointing . The Inter-American Dialogue’s report is a call to all nations of the hemisphere to take stock, to rebuild cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction . All governments in the hemisphere should be more attentive to emerging opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues ranging across economic integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and climate change . The United States must regain its credibility in the region by dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problems—including immigration, drugs, and Cuba—that stands in the way of a real partnership . To do so, it needs the help of Latin America and the Caribbean . If the current state of affairs continues, the strain between the United States and Latin America could worsen, adversely affecting the interests and wellbeing of all in the hemisphere .

There is a great deal at stake . This report offers a realistic assessment of the relationship within a changing regional and global context and sets out an agenda of old and new business that need urgent attention . A collaborative effort should begin immediately at the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia

Cuban US relations is the strongest tension between the US and Latin AmericaHakim, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, 3/27(Peter, Reuters, Post Chavez: Can Us rebuild Latin American ties, March 27th 2013 http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/03/27/post-chavez-can-u-s-rebuild-latin-american-ties/, EB)

Cuban ruler Raul Castro, another determined U.S. adversary, was elected to head the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations (CELAC), a new organization that includes every nation in the Western Hemisphere — except the United States and Canada. Next year’s meeting is scheduled to be in Havana, though CELAC’s charter requires that members be governed democratically. At the 2012 meeting of the Summit of the Americas (every country of the hemisphere except Cuba), the discussion, despite Washington’s objections, focused on two topics: drug policy and Cuba. Both are sources of long-standing tension between the United States and Latin America. The assembled Latin American heads of state closed the meeting by warning Washington that, unless Cuba is included in future summits, they would no longer participate.