kurtz v. verizon new york, inc., no. 13-3900-cv (2d cir. july 16, 2014)

8/12/2019 Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc., No. 13-3900-cv (2d Cir. July 16, 2014)

1/22

133900cv

Kurtzv.VerizonNewYork,Inc.

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHESECONDCIRCUIT

AugustTerm,2013

(Argued:April11,2014 Decided:July16,2014)1

2

DocketNo.133900cv3

4

x5

6

JACKKURTZ,onbehalfofhimselfand7

allotherssimilarlysituated,JOSEPH8

GRILLO,husband,VIVIANGRILLO,wife,9

JEFFMICHAELS,husband,BARBARA10

MICHAELS,wife,311130THAVELLC,11

AGRINIOSREALTYINC.,K.A.P.REALTY12

INC.,LINDA

DAVIS,

PETER

BLIDY,13

VASILIOSCHRYSIKOS,3212ASTORIABLVD.14

REALTYCORP.,MNTREALTYLLC,ANTHONY15

CARDELLA,BRIANCARDELLA,460630TH16

AVENUEREALTYCORP.,CATHERINEPICCIONE,17

CROMWELLASSOC.LLC,18

19

PlaintiffsAppellants,20

21

v.

22

23

VERIZONNEWYORK,INC.,FKANEWYORK24

TELEPHONECOMPANY,VERIZON25

COMMUNICATIONSINC.,IVANG.SEIDENBERG,26

LOWELLC.MCADAM,RANDALLS.MILCH,27


2/22

JOHNDOES,1

2

DefendantsAppellees.*3

4

x5

6

Before: JACOBS,CALABRESIandLIVINGSTON,Circuit7

Judges.8

9

ThePlaintiffsAppellants,aputativeplaintiffclassofpropertyownersin10

NewYork,appealfromajudgmentoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe11

EasternDistrictofNewYork(Irizarry,J.),dismissingtheirtakingsanddue12

processclaimsasunripeunderthetwoparttestinWilliamsonCnty.Regl13

PlanningCommnv.HamiltonBankofJohnsonCity,473U.S.172(1985). We14

concludethat1)WilliamsonCountyappliestophysicaltakingsclaimsasitdoes15

toregulatory

takings,

with

the

recognition

that

an

allegation

of

a

physical

taking16

satisfiesthefinalityrequirement;and2)WilliamsonCountyappliesto17

proceduraldueprocessclaimsarisingfromthesamecircumstancesasatakings18

claim. Affirmed.19

20

21

*TheClerkofCourtisrespectfullydirectedtoamendtheofficialcaption

inthiscasetoconformwiththecaptionabove.

2


3/22

DAVIDM.WISE,LawOfficesofDavidM.1

Wise,P.A.,Cranford,NJ,forPlaintiffs2

Appellants.3

4

PATRICKF.

PHILBIN

(John

S.

Moran,

on5

thebrief),Kirkland&EllisLLP,6

Washington,DC,forDefendants7

Appellees.8

9

10

DENNISJACOBS,CircuitJudge:11

12

NewYorkallowstelecommunicationscompaniestoexercisethestates13

eminentdomainpowerstofacilitatetheconstructionandmaintenanceof14

telecommunicationsnetworks. Propertyownersarecompensatedbythe15

companyundertheproceduresoutlinedinstatelaw. Aputativeplaintiffclass16

allegesthatVerizoninstalledmultiunitterminalboxesontheirpropertywithout17

justcompensation,

and

cites

procedural

due

process

violations

in

connection18

withtheinstallation. TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictof19

NewYork(Irizarry,J.)dismissedthecomplaintbecausetheclaimswereunripe20

underthetestestablishedbyWilliamsonCnty.ReglPlanningCommnv.21

Hamilton

Bank

of

Johnson

City,

473

U.S.

172

(1985).

That

case

held

that

a

takings22

claimundertheFifthAmendmentisnotripeforfederalreviewuntilafinal23

decisionisreachedbylocalauthoritiesandtheownerexhaustsstateremedies.24

3


4/22

Onappeal,theplaintiffsarguethatWilliamsonCountyappliesonlyto1

regulatorytakingsclaimsandnottotheirphysicaltakingsclaims,andthat2

WilliamsonCounty

is

inapplicable

to

their

due

process

claims.

We

conclude

that3

WilliamsonCountydoesapplytophysicaltakings,withtherecognitionthatthe4

finalityrequirementissatisfiedbyaphysicaltaking. Theexhaustion5

requirement,however,remains. Astotheplaintiffsdueprocessclaims,we6

concludethatWilliamsonCountyappliestosuchclaimsarisingfromthesame7

circumstancesasatakingsclaim. Becausetheplaintiffshavefailedtoexhaust8

theirstateremediesthroughaninversecondemnationproceeding,weaffirmthe9

judgmentofthedistrictcourt.10

11

BACKGROUND12

Telecommunicationsnetworks,particularlyincongestedurbanareas,may13

requireinstallationofnetworkequipmentonprivateproperty. Often,the14

companysecurespermissionfromtheownerintheformofalicenseoreasement.15

If

consent

cannot

be

obtained,

however,

New

York

law

permits

the

company

to16

employthestatespowerofeminentdomain. Section27oftheTransportation17

CorporationsLawprovidesthisauthority:18

4


5/22

Any[telephone]corporationmayerect,constructandmaintainthe1

necessaryfixturesforitslinesupon,overorunderanyofthepublic2

roads,streetsandhighways...andmayerect,constructand3

maintainitsnecessarystations,plants,equipmentorlinesupon,4

throughor

over

any

other

land,

subject

to

the

right

of

the

owners5

thereoftofullcompensationforthesame. Ifanysuchcorporation6

cannotagreewithsuchownerorownersuponthecompensationto7

bepaidtherefor,suchcompensationshallbeascertainedinthe8

mannerprovidedintheeminentdomainprocedurelaw.9

10

N.Y.Transp.Corp.Law27.11

TheplaintiffsallegethatVerizonexercisedthispowerofeminentdomain12

toinstallmultiunitterminalboxesontheirproperties. Theseboxes,typically13

attachedtoanexteriorwallortoapoleintheyard,splitthelocalhighcapacity14

cablesintothelinesthatserveindividualphonesubscribersinnearbybuildings.15

Thus,theseboxesservetheneighborhoodaswellasthesubscribersonthe16

subjectproperty.

17

TheplaintiffsassertthatVerizonfailedtopayfullcompensationfor18

placingterminalsontheirproperties. TheyfurtherassertthatVerizonviolated19

theirproceduraldueprocessrightsby:1)concealingtheirrighttofull20

compensation,

or

failing

to

notify

them

of

it;

2)

offering

them

no

compensation;

3)21

givingthefalseimpressionthattheymustconsentiftheywantedtelephone22

23

5


6/22

serviceintheirownbuildings;and4)placingtheonusonthemtoinitiatean1

eminentdomainproceedingifnoagreementwasreached.2

Tworelated

cases

in

the

New

York

state

courts

have

bearing

on

the

present3

matter. Bothwerefiledbyplaintiffscounselhereandbothinvolvethesame4

plaintiffs,orplaintiffssimilarlysituated. Thefirst,Corsellov.Verizon,was5

commencedin2007onbehalfofaputativeclassrepresentedbyWilliamand6

EvelynCorsello. TheyallegedVerizonsuseoftheirpropertywithoutconsent7

andassertedclaimspremisedonNewYorkstatutoryandcommonlaw(notthe8

DueProcessandTakingsClauseclaimsatissuehere). Afterdiscovery,the9

Corsellossoughtclasscertification. TheNewYorkSupremeCourt,Kings10

County,deniedcertificationonthegroundsthatindividualinquiriesintohow11

Verizonacquired

permission

to

install

the

terminals

would

predominate

and

that12

theCorselloswerenotadequateclassrepresentatives. SeegenerallyCorsellov.13

VerizonN.Y.Inc.,No.39610/07,2009WL3682595(N.Y.Sup.Ct.Nov.5,2009).14

Appealsofthatcertificationdecision(andotherdecisionsmadebythetrial15

court)

eventually

reached

the

New

York

Court

of

Appeals,

which

held

(interalia)

16

thattheplaintiffsallegedavalidinversecondemnationclaim,butaffirmedthe17

18

6


7/22

denialofclasscertification. SeeCorsellov.VerizonN.Y.,Inc.,18N.Y.3d777,7831

87,79192(2012).2

Whilethe

Corsello

appeal

was

pending,

plaintiffs

counsel

commenced

two3

otherputativeclassactions:thiscaseinfederalcourt;and(afterward)Grillov.4

VerizonN.Y.,Inc.inNewYorkSupremeCourt,QueensCounty. (TheCorsellos,5

originallynamedasclassplaintiffsintheGrilloaction,werelaterdropped.) The6

Grillocomplaintacknowledgedthefilingofthisfederalcaseandstatedthatthe7

plaintiffswishedtoholdtheirclaimsinabeyanceuntilthefederalcourtssubject8

matterjurisdictionwasdetermined. SeeGrilloCompl.,J.A.at19899. The9

proceedingsinGrillohavebeenstayedaccordingly.10

TheplaintiffscommencedthisactioninDecember2010andfiledaSecond11

AmendedComplaint

in

July

2010.

(As

in

Grillo,

the

Corsellos

were

originally12

namedasclassplaintiffsandlaterdropped.) Thecomplaintallegedseveral13

causesofactionunder28U.S.C.1983forwrongfultakingofplaintiffsproperty14

withoutjustcompensationandforviolationoftheirassociateddueprocess15

rights.

The

complaint

also

sought

certification

for

a

class

consisting

of

all16

propertyownerswithVerizonmultipropertyterminalsotherthanthosewho17

havesignedaneasementorreceivedcompensationgreaterthanonedollar.187


8/22

Verizonmovedtodismissonthegroundsthat:1)thedistrictcourtlacked1

jurisdictionbecausetheclaimswereunripepursuanttotheSupremeCourts2

decisionin

Williamson

County;

2)

the

plaintiffs

lacked

standing;

3)

the

claims3

weretimebarred;4)thecomplaintfailedtostateacauseofaction;and5)the4

declaratoryjudgmentreliefsoughtbytheplaintiffswasanimpermissible5

attempttoobtainanadvisoryopinion. ThedistrictcourtgrantedVerizons6

motioninSeptember2013,holdingthatWilliamsonCountybarredtheplaintiffs7

claims. SeegenerallyCorsellov.VerizonN.Y.,Inc.,976F.Supp.2d354(S.D.N.Y.8

2013). Theplaintiffstimelyappealed.9

10

DISCUSSION11

Wereview

denovoadistrictcourtsdeterminationthatitlackssubject12

matterjurisdictiononripenessgrounds. NatlOrg.forMarriage,Inc.v.Walsh,13

714F.3d682,687(2dCir.2013);seealsoConnecticutv.Duncan,612F.3d107,11214

(2dCir.2010)(Adistrictcourtsripenessdeterminationis...alegal15

determination

subject

to

denovo

review.).16

17

18

8


9/22

I1

Tobejusticiable,acauseofactionmustberipeitmustpresentareal,2

substantialcontroversy,

not

a

mere

hypothetical

question.

Natl

Org.

for3

Marriage,714F.3dat687(quotationmarksomitted). Aclaimisnotripeifit4

dependsuponcontingentfutureeventsthatmayormaynotoccurasanticipated,5

orindeedmaynotoccuratall. Thedoctrinesmajorpurposeistopreventthe6

courts,throughavoidanceofprematureadjudication,fromentangling7

themselvesinabstractdisagreements. Id.(quotationmarksandinternalcitation8

omitted).9

Totesttheripenessofaconstitutionaltakingsclaiminfederalcourt,we10

consultWilliamsonCounty. Inthatcase,aplaintiffownerofatractofland11

sueda

Tennessee

regional

planning

commission

alleging

that

the

commissions12

applicationofvariouszoninglawsandregulationstotheplaintiffsproperty13

amountedtoanunconstitutionaltakingundertheFifthAmendment.14

Doughertyv.TownofN.HempsteadBd.ofZoningAppeals,282F.3d83,88(2d15

Cir.

2002).

Williamson

County

held

that

the

claim

was

unripe:

a

plaintiff16

allegingaFifthAmendmenttakingofapropertyinterestmust...showthat(1)17

thestateregulatoryentityhasrenderedafinaldecisiononthematter,and(2)18

9


10/22

theplaintiffhassoughtjustcompensationbymeansofanavailablestate1

procedure. Id.2

Asto

finality,

a

claim

that

the

application

of

government

regulations3

effectsatakingofapropertyinterestisnotripeuntilthegovernmententity4

chargedwithimplementingtheregulations...hasreachedafinaldecision5

regardingtheapplicationoftheregulationstothepropertyatissue. Williamson6

County,473U.S.at186. ThisrequirementiscompelledbytheTakingsClause7

becausethefactorsrelevanttodeterminingwhetheratakinghasoccurredarethe8

economicimpactofthestatesactionsanditsinterferencewithinvestment9

backedexpectations,andthesefactorscannotbeevaluateduntilthe10

administrativeagencyhasarrivedatafinal,definitivepositionregardinghowit11

willapply

the

regulations

at

issue

to

the

particular

land

in

question.

Id.

at

191.

12

Thefinalityrequirementalsohelpstodevelopafullrecordforreview,limits13

judicialentanglementinconstitutionaldisputes,andgivesproperrespectto14

principlesoffederalism. SeeMurphyv.NewMilfordZoningCommn,402F.3d15

342,

348

(2d

Cir.

2005).

Because

the

plaintiff

in

Williamson

County

sought

no16

variancefromthezoningprovisionatissue,therewasnofinal,definitive17

positiontoreview. 473U.S.at18890.18

10


11/22

TheFifthAmendmentsproscriptionofatakingwithoutjustcompensation1

underliesWilliamsonCountysexhaustionrequirement:theFifthAmendment2

[doesnot]

require

that

just

compensation

be

paid

in

advance

of,

or3

contemporaneouslywith,thetaking;allthatisrequiredisthatareasonable,4

certainandadequateprovisionforobtainingcompensationexistatthetimeof5

thetaking. Id.at194(quotationmarksomitted). Therefore,ifaStateprovides6

anadequateprocedureforseekingjustcompensation,thepropertyownercannot7

claimaviolationoftheJustCompensationClauseuntilithasusedtheprocedure8

andbeendeniedjustcompensation. Id.at195. Inotherterms,becausethe9

Constitutiondoesnotrequirepretakingcompensation,andisinsteadsatisfiedby10

areasonableandadequateprovisionforobtainingcompensationafterthetaking,11

theStates

action

...is

not

complete

until

the

State

fails

to

provide

adequate12

compensationforthetaking. Id. Aplaintiff,however,mayachieveexhaustion13

byshowingthatthestatesinversecondemnationprocedureisunavailableor14

inadequate. Seeid.at196. TheWilliamsonCountyplaintiff,havingfailedtouse15

Tennessees

inverse

condemnation

action,

failed

to

exhaust.

Id.16

17

18

11


12/22

II1

PlaintiffsarguethatWilliamsonCountywasacaseaboutregulatory2

takings,and

that

it

does

not

govern

claims

in

which,

as

in

theirs,

the

taking

is3

physical. Wedisagree. Thefinalityandexhaustionrequirementsareboth4

derivedfromelementsthatmustbeshowninanytakingsclaim:[i]ataking[ii]5

withoutjustcompensation. Seeid.at19091,19495. SoWilliamsonCounty6

appliestoalltakingsclaims. SeeIslandPark,LLCv.CSXTransp.,559F.3d96,7109(2dCir.2009)(Beforeafederaltakingsclaimcanbeasserted,compensation8

mustfirstbesoughtfromthestateifithasareasonable,certainandadequate9

provisionforobtainingcompensation.(quotationmarksomitted)). Williamson10

[County]drewnodistinctionbetweenphysicalandregulatorytakings,andthe11

rationaleof

that

case,

that

a

property

owner

has

not

suffered

a

violation

of

the12

JustCompensationClauseuntiltheownerhasunsuccessfullyattemptedto13

obtainjustcompensationthroughtheproceduresprovidedbytheState,14

demonstratesthatanysuchdistinctionwouldbeunjustified. VillagerPond,Inc.15

v.

Town

of

Darien,

56

F.3d

375,

380

(2d

Cir.

1995)

(internal

citation

omitted)16

(quotingWilliamsonCnty.,473U.S.at195).17

18

12


13/22

WhileWilliamsonCountyappliestoregulatoryandphysicaltakingsalike,1

aphysicaltakinginitselfsatisfiestheneedtoshowfinality. [A]nalleged2

physicaltaking

is

by

definition

a

final

decision

for

the

purpose

of

satisfying3

Williamson[Countys]firstrequirement.Julianov.MontgomeryOtsego4

SchoharieSolidWasteMgmt.Auth.,983F.Supp.319,323(N.D.N.Y.1997);see5

alsoHallv.CityofSantaBarbara,833F.2d1270,1281n.28(9thCir.1986)6

(Wheretherehasbeenaphysicalinvasion,thetakingoccursatonce,and7

nothingthecitycandoorsayafterthatpointwillchangethatfact.).8

Theplaintiffsfurtherarguethataphysicaltakingalsosatisfiesthetestof9

exhaustion,andtherebyobviatesWilliamsonCountyaltogether,becauseitis10

unconstitutionaltorequirethemtoinitiateasuitforcompensationafterataking11

occurs.

Thecases

cited

by

the

plaintiffs

do

not

support

this

argument.

For12

example,thevenerableBloodgoodv.Mohawk&HudsonR.R.Co.,18Wend.913

(N.Y.1837)wasaglossonNewYorklaw,anditsholding(thatcompensation14

mustbepaidpriortoataking)restedonastatestatute. Id.at19. Thefederal15

principle

is

prescribed

in

Williamson

County:

Nor

does

the

Fifth

Amendment16

requirethatjustcompensationbepaidinadvanceof,orcontemporaneously17

with,thetaking;allthatisrequiredisthatareasonable,certainandadequate18

13


14/22

provisionforobtainingcompensationexistatthetimeofthetaking. 473U.S.at1

194.2

Thecases

relied

on

by

plaintiffs

are

inapposite.

See

Kruse

v.

Vill.

of3

ChagrinFalls,Ohio,74F.3d694(6thCir.1996);Juliano,983F.Supp.at32324. In4

eachcase,aphysicaltakingsclaimwasheldtoberipe. Butneithercaseis5

incompatiblewiththeanalysisinthisopinion:thephysicaltakingsatisfiesthe6

finalityrequirement;andtheexhaustionrequirementissatisfiedbythe7

unavailabilityofanadequateprocedureforposttakingcompensation. See8

Kruse,74F.3dat698700(holdingthatOhiosinversecondemnationremedyis9

uncertain,confusing,andlacksstatutoryauthority);Juliano,983F.Supp.at32310

(noevidenceintherecordofanadequateprovisionforobtainingcompensation11

inthe

state).

In

both

cases,

ripeness

under

Williamson

County

was

achieved.1

12

1TheSixthCircuitsopinioninKrusedoessuggestthatWilliamson

Countyexhaustionneednotbeshownwhentherehasbeenaphysicaltaking.

See74F.3dat701. Thispassageoftheopinion,however,isdictasaidtobein

furthersupportforaconclusionalreadyreached:thattheplaintiffswerenot

requiredtopursueastatelevelinversecondemnationproceeding. Id. Inany

event,suchadispensationcontradictsWilliamsonCounty,whichtiesthe

exhaustionrequirement

directly

to

the

wording

of

the

Fifth

Amendment.

See

473

U.S.at195([I]faStateprovidesanadequateprocedureforseekingjust

compensation,thepropertyownercannotclaimaviolationoftheJust

CompensationClauseuntilithasusedtheprocedureandbeendeniedjust

compensation.).

14


15/22

SeeJuliano,983F.Supp.at323(Here,underthephysicaloccupationtheoryof1

takingsliabilityPlaintiffshavemetbothprongsoftheripenesstest.(emphasis2added)).

3

Theplaintiffstakingsclaimhereisunripe. Althoughthepleadingofa4

physicaltakingsufficientlyshowsfinality,plaintiffsflunktheexhaustion5

requirementbytheirfailuretoseekcompensationatthestatelevel. Itiswell6

settledthatNewYorkStatehasareasonable,certainandadequateprovisionfor7

obtainingcompensation. [email protected]

Brookhaven,452F.Supp.2d142,157(E.D.N.Y.2006)(quotationmarksomitted);9

seealsoIslandPark,559F.3dat110(holdingclaimwasnotripebecauseplaintiffs10

failedtopursueaninversecondemnationproceedingunderNewYorksEminent11

DomainProcedure

Law).

The

plaintiffs

have

pending

an

action

in

the

New

York12

courtstoseekcompensation(theGrilloaction). Untilsuchlitigationhasrunits13

course,theplaintiffshavenoripetakingsclaimforadjudicationinthefederal14

courts.15

16

17

18

15


16/22

III1

WilliamsonCountysapplicabilitytotheplaintiffsdueprocessclaimsis2

lessclear.

After

Williamson

County,

courts

have

attempted

to

settle

questions

of3

ripenessintheseveralcontextsofdueprocessclaims:substantiveorprocedural;4

substantiveclaimsallegingregulatoryoverreachorthoseallegingarbitraryand5

capriciousconduct;claimsarisingfromthesamenucleusoffactasatakings6

claim,ornot;andregulatoryorphysicaltakings. Myriadpermutationscan7

result. Theplaintiffsdueprocessclaimspresentonesuchpermutationthatis8

notconsideredinprecedent. Thoughtheprecedentswehaveare9

distinguishable,theyareinstructivenevertheless.10

WestartwithWilliamsonCountyitself. Theplaintifftherepursueda11

substantivedue

process

claim

of

regulatory

overreach

arising

from

the

same

set12

offactsasthetakingsclaim:whenaregulation...goessofarthatithasthe13

sameeffectasatakingbyeminentdomain[suchthatit]isaninvalidexerciseof14

thepolicepower. 473U.S.at197. Insteadofjustcompensation,theremedy15

for

such

a

claim

would

be

invalidation

of

the

regulation

and,

possibly,

damages.16

Id. Withoutdecidingwhethersuchaclaimiscognizable,theCourtruledthatit17

wasunripebecausetheeffect[couldnot]bemeasureduntilafinaldecisionis18

16


17/22

madeastohowtheregulationswillbeappliedto[theplaintiffs]property. Id.1

at200. Itisthus(atleast)impliedthatfinalityisaprerequisitetothistypeofdue2

processclaim.

The

Court

did

not

reach

any

issue

of

exhaustion.3

SinceWilliamsonCounty,thisCourthasconsidereditsapplicabilitytodue4

processclaimsononlyafewoccasions. Substantivedueprocessclaimshave5

beentreateddifferentlybasedonthenatureoftheclaim. Claimsalleging6

regulatoryoverreach,suchastheoneconsideredinWilliamsonCounty,must7

satisfythefinalityandexhaustionrequirementstoberipe. SeeSouthview8

Assocs.,Ltd.v.Bongartz,980F.2d84,96(2dCir.1992)(Ifthestateprovidesan9

acceptableprocedureforobtainingcompensation,thestatesregulatoryaction10

willgenerallynotexceeditspolicepowers.). Substantivedueprocessclaimsof11

arbitraryand

capricious

conduct,

however,

require

only

a

showing

of

finality

12

thereisnoexhaustionrequirement. Seeid.at97;seealsoVillagerPond,56F.3d13

at381.2 WehavealsosuggestedthatWilliamsonCounty(thefinality14

2WilliamsonCountygenerallycontrolsforsubstantivedueprocessclaims

basedonthesamenucleusoffactsasatakingsclaim,ontheprinciplethatcourts

shouldnot

use

a

generalized

notion

of

substantive

due

process

when

the

Constitutionprovidesanexplicitsourceofprotectionagainsttheconduct

alleged. SeeGrahamv.Connor,490U.S.386,395(1989)(BecausetheFourth

Amendmentprovidesanexplicittextualsourceofconstitutionalprotection

againstthissortofphysicallyintrusivegovernmentalconduct,thatAmendment,

17


18/22

requirementatleast)appliesbroadlyinthecontextoflandusechallenges. See1

Dougherty,282F.3dat88(statingWilliamsonCountyhasbeenextendedto2

equalprotection

and

due

process

claims

asserted

in

the

context

of

land

use3

challenges);Murphy,402F.3dat34950(observingthatWilliamsonCountyhas4

notbeenstrictlyconfinedtoaregulatorytakingschallengeand[f]ollowing5

theviewof...othercircuits,wehaveappliedprongone[finality]ripenessto6

landusedisputesimplicatingmorethanjustFifthAmendmenttakingsclaims).7

Theplaintiffsdueprocessclaimsfallwithinagapinourprecedents:8

proceduraldueprocessclaimsarisingfromaphysicaltaking.3 Theplaintiffs9

arguethatthisCourthasrepeatedlynotapplied[WilliamsonCounty][r]ipeness10

toproceduraldueprocessclaimsinvolvingdenialofappropriatenoticeand11

hearingin

takings

type

contexts.

Appellant

Br.

at

49.

The

cases

cited

by

the12

plaintiffs,however,failtosupporttheirargumentthatWilliamsonCountyis13

notthemoregeneralizednotionofsubstantivedueprocess,mustbetheguide

foranalyzingtheseclaims.).

3The

plaintiffs

also

argue

Williamson

County

does

not

apply

to

their

substantivedueprocessclaimofarbitraryandcapriciousconduct,citingVillager

PondandSouthviewAssociates. However,theplaintiffscomplaintand

argumentsinthedistrictcourtreferonlytoproceduraldueprocessviolations.

Thisargumentis,therefore,waived.

18


19/22

inapplicable. InFordMotorCreditCo.v.N.Y.C.PoliceDept,503F.3d186(2d1

Cir.2007),theCourtaddresseddueprocessinacriminalforfeitureproceeding.2

Althoughthe

district

court

dismissed

a

taking

claim

for

lack

of

ripeness,

that3

issuewasnotpresentedonappealand,accordingly,wasunremarkeduponin4

ouropinion. Similarly,theothercasescitedbytheplaintiffsalloweddueprocess5

claimswithlittleconnectiontoatakingclaimanddidso,again,withoutmention6

ofWilliamsonCounty. SeeBrodyv.Vill.ofPortChester,434F.3d121,127(2d7

Cir.2005)(addressingwhetherthepublicuseandjustcompensationlimitations8

triggerproceduraldueprocessrightsforacondemnee);Kraebelv.N.Y.C.Dept9

ofHousingPreservation&Dev.,959F.2d395(2dCir.1992)(remandingto10

determineiftherewasapropertyinterestinapaymentfromthecityafter11

determiningthatadelayinentitlementpaymentscannotconstituteataking).12

WearepersuadedbythosecourtsholdingthatWilliamsonCountyapplies13

todueprocessclaimsarisingfromthesamenucleusoffactsasatakingsclaim.14

See,e.g.,B.Willis,C.P.A.,Inc.v.BNSFRy.Corp.,531F.3d1282,1299n.19(10th15

Cir.

2008)

(This

court

has

acknowledged

the

possibility

that,

under

certain16

circumstances,dueprocessrightsmayarisewhicharebeyondthemore17

particularizedclaimassertedpursuanttotheJustCompensationClause....18

19


20/22

Nevertheless,thiscourthasheldthat,wherethepropertyinterestinwhicha1

plaintiffassertsarighttoproceduraldueprocessiscoextensivewiththeasserted2

takingsclaim,

Williamson

Countys

ripeness

principle

still

applies.

(quotation3

marksomitted));GreenfieldMills,Inc.v.Macklin,361F.3d934,961(7thCir.4

2004)([O]urcaselawexplainsthattheWilliamsonCountyexhaustion5

requirementapplieswithfullforcetodueprocessclaims(bothproceduraland6

substantive)whenbasedonthesamefactsasatakingsclaim.);Goldfinev.7

Kelly,80F.Supp.2d153,158(S.D.N.Y.2000)(Conner,J.)(Althoughin8

Williamson[County]theripenesstestwasappliedtoatakingsclaimonly,the9

sameripenesstestappliestodueprocessandequalprotectionclaims.). Sucha10

rulefindssupportinWilliamsonCountyitself:iftheonlyprocessguaranteedto11

onewhosepropertyistakenisapostdeprivationremedy,afederalcourtcannot12

determinewhetherthestatesprocessisconstitutionallydeficientuntiltheowner13

haspursuedtheavailablestateremedy. See473U.S.at194.14

ApplyingWilliamsonCountymorebroadlytothesedueprocessclaims15

confers

other

benefits.

It

prevents

evasion

of

the

ripeness

test

by

artful

pleading16

ofatakingsclaimasadueprocessclaim. SeeBatemanv.CityofWestBountiful,17

89F.3d704,709(10thCir.1996)(TheTenthCircuitrepeatedlyhasheldthatthe18

20


21/22

ripenessrequirementofWilliamson[County]appliestodueprocessandequal1

protectionclaimsthatrestuponthesamefactsasaconcomitanttakingsclaim...2

.A

contrary

holding

would

render

the

Supreme

Courts

decision

in

Williamson3

[County]nugatory,asitwouldenablearesourcefullitiganttocircumventthe4

ripenessrequirementssimplybyallegingamoregeneralizeddueprocessor5

equalprotectionviolation.). ApplyingWilliamsonCountygenerallytothese6

typesofdueprocessclaimsalsoprovidesaclearrulethatavoidsmessy7

distinctionsbasedonhowadueprocessclaimispled.8

WeconcludethattheWilliamsonCountyripenessrequirement(finality9

andexhaustion)appliestoallproceduraldueprocessclaimsarisingfromthe10

samecircumstancesasatakingclaim.4 SincewehaveconcludedthatNew11

Yorksinversecondemnationproceduresareadequateontheirface,noclaim12

wouldariseuntiltheplaintiffs,havingavailedthemselvesofthoseprocedures,13

showthemtobewantinginpractice. Theproceduraldueprocessclaimsinthis14

4TheplaintiffsalsoarguethatWilliamsonCountydoesnotapplyto

claimsfordeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief. Thecasescitedbytheplaintiffs,

however,do

not

support

this

argument.

This

case

is

not

one

in

which

we

need

to

decidewhetheraparticularstatestatutefaciallyviolatestheFifthAmendment.

SeeWash.LegalFound.v.LegalFound.ofWash.,236F.3d1097,1104(9thCir.

2001). Theremainingcasesrelatetocriminalforfeiturepractices,whichare

distinctfrompublicusetakings.

21


22/22

case,whicharebasedonthecircumstancessurroundingthetakingsclaim,are1

thereforepremature. Becausetheplaintiffsdidnotexhaustavailablestate2

remedies,their

due

process

claims

are

not

ripe

for

federal

review.3

4

CONCLUSION5

Fortheforegoingreasons,weaffirmthejudgmentofthedistrictcourt.6

22

kurtz v. verizon new york, inc., no. 13-3900-cv (2d cir. july 16, 2014)

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