korsgaard 1st long paper

8/8/2019 Korsgaard 1st Long Paper

1/7

1 | P a g e

David Mackey

Professor Battaly

Philosophy 410 Ethical Theory

April 9, 2009

First Longer Paper

How badly do you want it? Would you kill for sleep? Can we universalize murder for the

prospect of rest? Can we say that we would universalize the maxim of: In order to get some

sleep, I will kill children who tend to cry at night more than average1? It seems to me a long

way to go to prove a point. It seems to me that this example is emotionally charged. However, if

we where to will that this maxim where to become universal law, it would be a contradiction of

conception, or more pointedly a practical contradiction of conception.

There are three types of contradictions of conception that Korsgaard examines in her

article Kants Formulation of Universal Law2, they are the Logical, Teleological and Practical

Contradictions of conception. Logical contradiction of conception is defined by Korsgaard as,

a logical impossibility in the universalization of the maxim if the maxim were

universalized, the action or policy that it purposes would be inconceivable3. Teleological

contradiction of conception is explained as, The maxim is inconsistent with a systematic

harmony of purpose, or with the principle that any organ, instinct, or action-type has a natural

purpose for which it must be the one best suited.4 And finally Korsgaard defines the practical

1Korsgaard Page 28

2Korsgaard Page 25

3Korsgaard Page 25

4Korsgaard Page 25


2/7

2 | P a g e

contradiction of conception as, the contradiction is that your maxim would be self-defeating if

universalized.5

Immanuel Kants first formulation of the Categorical Imperative states: Act only

according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become universal

law.6 And Korsgaard would suggest that by willing that the maxim In order to get some sleep,

I will kill children who tend to cry at night more than average7, that is can be universalizable

because it does not result in a Practical Contradiction of Conception. This means that if we

willed that everyone where to kill children who tend to cry more than average, as is does not

advocate the murder of all children and as it specifies that this murder is to take place only in

order to get sleep, that this maxim could be universalized and the resulting in a self defeating

law. While it should be noted that Korsgaard was using this example to illustrate that The

Practical Contradiction Interpretation allows us to sketch an explanation, in terms of autonomy,

of why the conformity to the Formula of Universal Law is a requirement of reason8.

If the definition of a Practical Contradiction is that it would be self-defeating if

universalized, then to will that the maxim of killing children who tend to cry at night more than

average, in order to get sleep, would be a practical contradiction in so much as no one could ever

partake in this action. This action would simply be impossible because it would require

presupposed knowledge and presupposed capability that no one is in possession of. This maxim

is in trouble from the start as it takes a quasi-rule utilitarianism move by qualifying the situation

to validate the moral actions, and the more qualification that it takes on the more cumbersome

5Korsgaard Page 25

6Korsgaard Page 25

7Korsgaard Page 28

8Korsgaard Page 44


3/7

3 | P a g e

this maxim becomes. In a practical sense, this maxim could be tailored to no end to fit any

number of qualifications that would only serve to make the maxim that much more difficult to

ever be seen as possible, despite the unsavory quality of child murder.

What makes this action impossible, or more over a Practical Contradiction in so much as

it is self defeating. Well, the maxim begins with the qualification of in order to get sleep9

this leads us to this that whatever action follows will then grant sleep. But this is not the case,

there are very few things that could follow this opening qualification and actually provide sleep

universally. Then there is the section ...children who tend to cry at night10

, this presupposes

that the person who is going to act knows if the child or children intended for murder tend to cry

at night, after all at which point do we draw a line at what is a trend, two nights, three nights, a

month. And what about the crying, do we count sobbing, weeping, whining, yelling and

whimpering? This maxim presupposes that crying in all of its forms is clearly defined and

viscerally understood. Finally there is the end where the qualification of more than average11

is inserted. Like the qualifications before it, this begs the question, What is more than average?

From here it is easy to see the further qualifications that would be required to actually

universalize this maxim, such as definitions of Average and Children, not to mention

Night and Tend. Given all of this qualification and presupposition it is impossible to

universalize the maxim simply on the grounds that no one could ever meet the qualifications for

such an action, thereby making this maxim self defeating.

Despite the pedantic nature of this argument against the universalization of this maxim,

there is a more effective way of showing that this action would be a Practical Contradiction, and

9Korsgaard Page 28

10Korsgaard Page 28

11Korsgaard Page 28


4/7

4 | P a g e

that is simply to apply Kants second Categorical Moral Imperative which states, Act in such a

way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,

never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. This means that to kill any

child, regardless of the qualification of sleep or crying more than usual, would be to use that

child as a means to an end, and not as an end in and of themselves. And it is this objection to the

universalization of this maxim that I would expect a Kantian to raise in so much as they would

see all moral actions as having to abide by all of the Categorical Moral Imperatives and not just

the first.

So what does this say about Kants ability to deal with evil? Like a table with legs, Kants

ethical system cannot stand on one leg alone, but it also shows that when taken as a whole, the

Categorical Moral Imperatives are more sophisticated and more capable of dealing with evil. If

the first formulation of the categorical imperative where the only one, then using Korsgaards

example could eventually lead to a maxim that would allow the murder of children, or at very

least an action towards another that would be wrong, but acceptable to the first formulation.

One possible objection to my argument would be that the maxim of killing children who

cry at night more than usual, in order to get some sleep, could be universalized in some cases. As

extreme of a situation where the action of murdering a child might be universalized, there is yet

another way of showing that this maxim is self-defeating and therefore a Practical Contradiction

of the first formulation of the categorical imperative. And that is to point out that both Kant and

Korsgaard ignore the fact the every action contains within it the token of many types of actions.

For example, the action type of killing children could be seen as a token action of murder, or the

token action of trying to get some sleep, or the token action of living in a society that allows such


5/7

5 | P a g e

behavior. Kant and Korsgaard do little or nothing to help their reader decided which actions it is

that their token action is most important to apply the first formulation to.

Kantians might reply that this problem can be handled by the distinction between perfect

duties and imperfect duties. According Kant there are 2 types of duties, perfect duties are ones

that we must always do when the opportunity arises, and imperfect duties which are duties one

must sometimes do but not always pursue. Given this distinction, one could argue that certain

actions which do not lead to contradictions of conception are perfect duties and therefore must

always be sought. And if one could somehow make a case that killing children is not a

contradiction of conception then we could state that the action is a perfect duty. To which I

would ask, why then if that where the case would the qualifications be necessary? Why would it

matter why it would matter if the child cries at night more than average?

This brings me to the most important objection I have to the formulations of the

Categorical Imperatives, and that is that they are unintuitive. The fact that every action must be

filtered through the Categorical Imperatives and that in order to act one must do so out of duty

seems to cumbersome to be practical. In fact, I would argue that the Categorical Moral

Imperatives are so unwieldy that they render themselves self defeating in a practical application.

For I cannot will that the maxim of using the Categorical Imperatives is something that I would

want to will as universal law, nor do I think that it could be willed to be a universal law. My

reason for this is that for every action that might be taken, the thought process of trying to decide

if action is a perfect duty or an imperfect duty or if the action where to comply to all the

formulations of the Categorical Imperative, would leave the uninitiated trapped within their head

unable to act until the action where not only understood but thought through as a universal law.

This much contemplation would make tying ones shoes a daunting endeavor. To truly embrace


6/7

6 | P a g e

such an ethical scheme would require an idealic state of society which I do not think is possible.

Like so much of Kants system, it would require that everyone everywhere subscribe to it, in

order to function properly. But most importantly it would be to accept the short comings of this

ethical system as unimportant which they are not. To that end I would say that I have not yet

seen an ethical system that isnt without some flaw that would require some compromise or

conformity on the part of society. But it is possible that this is indicative not of a flaw in this

ethical system, or in any ethical system, but rather that human society is far more complex, and

far more imperfect than we have the ability to completely compensate for in terms of ethical

theories and that the best we can hope for is a system that works despite its flaws, that is until the

next system comes along.


7/7

7 | P a g e

Bibliography

Korsgaard, Christine. "Kant's Formula of Universal Law." Pacific Philosphical Quaterly

1985: 24-47.

korsgaard 1st long paper

Documents