korean war dissemination of combat information 17 jan 1953

8/7/2019 Korean War Dissemination of Combat Information 17 Jan 1953

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p I --UNCLASSIFIEDOFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCESFor t Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26350. 05/1(DOCI)(C)(17 Jan 53) 17 January 1953SUBJECT:

TO:-

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See distribution FE3 1

- - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ 1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Process ing o ( Combat I : : ~ o r mation, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded for evaluat ion and necessary action. I t may be appropriate, in cer tain cases , to take actionupon a single extracted i tem; i n o t h e ~ s , i t may be desirable to developa cross - section of accumulated extracts on a part icular subject beforeinitiating action; and o f t e ~ , the .extracted i tem serves to reaffirm ourdoctr ines and techniques.

2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep theminformed concerning theater problems from the front line through thelogist ical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are c lass i fied SECRET. F or the greater conv-enience of the user , this Office a ssigns each extracted i tem the lowest clas sification compatible with secur i ty . No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the ext racted remarks , so that none of the original intent is lost .

4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicableto t raining at the company-bat tery level a lso appear in Army FieldForces TRAINING BULLETINS.

Awe LOG # FOR THE CHIEF ARMY FIELD FORCES:DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF

53- ~ : c ~ 0 1 - 1 i ~ ~ H A ~ M ~ ~ 7 (1_ Extracts from sources Lt Col, AGC

604 thru 639 Asst Adjutant General'>DISTRIB UTION: Copy No ")V

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DISTRIBUTION: 1- 3 ACOFS, G- l , DA 100-10 1 Executive for Reserve4- 6 ACOFS, G-2, DA and ROTC Affair s7-21 ACOFS, G-3, DA 102-111 Chief Signal Officer22-41 ACOFS, G-4, DA 112-121 The Surgeon General42-43 The Adjutant General 122-125 Chief of Transportat ion44-45 Chief of Chaplains OCAFF 46-55 Chief Chemical Officer 126 G l 56-65 Chief of Enginef;rs 127 G2 66-67 Chief of Finance 128-147 G3 68-69 Chief of Information 148-149 G4 70-71 The Inspector General 150-154 RD 7Z-73 The Judge Advocate 155 Chaplain

General 156 Cml 74-75 Chief of Military 157 ComptHistory 158 Engr76-77 Chief, National Guard 159 InfoBureau 160 Med 78-87 Chief of Ordnance 161 Ord 88-89 The Provost Marshal 162 PMGeneral 163 QM90-99 The Quarte rmas te r 16 4 SigGenera l 165 TransCopie s furnished:

166-299 TAG (40 CINCFEi 44 CG, 'US Army, Europe; 10 ea CINC 's andother Major Oversea Commands)CG's

300-301 Fi r s t Army 302-303 Second Army 304-305 Third Army 306-315 Four th Army 316-317 Fifth Army 318-319 Sixth Army 320-323 Army AA Command 324-325 Mili tary Dist r ic t of Washington ; ; r326-327 Tact ical Air Command r (fT1 Co_32 8 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff G)fT1329-330 Chief of Naval Operat ions, Dept of the Navy 331 CO, Mountain & Cold Weather Tng Command 332-333 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Command and StaffSchool, Air Universi ty

(See next page)

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ATTNG-26 350. 05!1(DOCI)(C)(17 Jan 53) 17 January 1953Subject : Dissemination of Combat InformationCopies furnished: (Cont)

334-335336

347 - 33 8339-340341-342343-344345-346

34 7348

349-350351-352353-354355-356357-358359-360361-362

36 336436536636736 8369370

371-374375-388389390-400

Comdt of Cadets, US Military Academy, ComdtArmed Forces Staff College, NOBMarine Corps S ~ o o l USAF Air-Ground Operat ions SchoolCounter Intell igence Corps SchoolThe Provost Marsha l Genera l ' s School

Chief, Army Security AgencyOfficer in Charge, Atlantic Fleet Intell igence Cen,

Attn: Ground Forces Officer. Director , Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Secy of

Defense, Attn: Col TrainCG'sThe Armored Center The Art i l lery Center The Infantry Ce'1.ter

ComdtArmy War CollegeCGSCArmy Genera l School

Asst Comdt, The Art i l lery School,Pres

A FF Bd No 1AFF Bd No 2A FF Bd No 3AFF Bd No 4

CO, Arctic Tes t BranchChiefs

AFF HRU No 1AFF HRU No 2

OCAFFDCOFSCombat Arms Advisory GpG3(26)AG RecordsExtra Copies

AA&GM Branch

UNCLASSIFIED3J!CltEJ SlId; lULl Lt


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UNCLASSIFIED SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army, Aviation SectionDATE: October 1952 Source No 604

(SECRET)TACTICAL NIGHT FLYING. - 1. Atact ica l weakness of Army avia

tion has always been the cessat ion of actiyit ies after sundown. One of theoperational activit ies of this section has been the monitoring and encouragingof eXperimental tactical night flights. To date, these flights have been car r ied on chiefly by I Corps Arti l lery and the 7th Infantry Division . .

Z. Flights are conducted ei ther on bright moonlight nights, or withart i f icial aids such as searchl ight i l lumination or radar fixes. S e a r ' c ~ . l i g h t s seem to be effective only as navigational or reference aids. Radar promisesthe best 'and s imple /method ond a rk nights. The facilities of DetachmentNo -Z, 608th AC8z.W Squadron, USAF, are used because Army sets lack sufficient flexibility to scan the e n t i r ~ sky both horizontally and vertically.Army aircraft fl y over art enemy gun or vehicle while under radar controland: the pilot asks for a fix. The opserver report9 the nature of the ta rgetand th e radar team immediately telephones the coordinates and' t a rge t to thefire direction .center. The results of the fire are then observed, but adjustment of the' fire is d i f f i ~ u l t ; only surveil lance has been accomplished to date'by this method. Only under full moon conditions ~ h a s art i l lery been a d j u ~ t e d successfully on single tar'gets other than those large enough -to require areaf i re. . , ..3. No f ~ n a l conclusions have been reached as to the feasibility of nighttact ical flying. Experimental flights will be continued to afford mater ia l formore complete evaluation of night flying operations.

SOURCE: Command' Report - 1st FA Obsn BnDATE: August 1952 Source No 605

(CONFIDENTIAL)SCR-784. - One trouble has ar isen in the SCR-784 recently emplacedin the Commonwealth Division sector which has been solved by op'erating ,minus one tube. With the elevation anti-hunt tube in i ts socket, hunting occurs in elevation. ' When the tube is removed, th e set functions properly andno hunting occurs . This same trouble occurred in one other SCR-784 in this' .theater previously, when normal operation was also achieved by r e m o v a _ ~ ofthe anti-hunt tube. After several months with the tube removed, t l l ~ antenna

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again s tar ted hunting in 'elevation. At that t ime the elevation anti-hurtt tubewas inser ted and normal operat ion once again was achieved. The radarrepair rnen together with the ass is tance of the 16th SRMU cannot find anexplanation for this trouble, which to date has ' occurred in tw o SCR-784' semployed in this theater .

SOURCE: Command Report - 13th Engr Combat BnDATE: July 1952 Source No 606

(CONFIDENTIAL)IMMEDIATE OVERHEAD'COVER FOR INFANTRY. - During t h ~ . , period.

Company A made severa l e x p e r i m e n t ~ in providing immediate overhead coverfor infantry to pe rmi t th e re 'Jrganizat ion for counterat tack. The cover wa'sdesigned to withstand VT,artillelTY fire on the po'sition. The effort, was madealong the l ines of a sapling m at which could be ei ther braced and car r ied flator rol led as a carpe t and placed immediate ly over a foxhole to support up tofive layers of sandbags . The exper iments involved the use of suspended M3mines over dummy posit ions and resu l t s indicated no break in the mats and amaximum penetrating effect of two l ayers of sandbags.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Division

DATE: June 1952 Source No 607(RESTRICTED)

AIR SUPPORT. - A regiment of the 9th ROK Di vision, supported by the73d Tank Battal ion(-) received continuous a ir cover and close a ir supportd u ~ i n g their attack in the * * * Valley on 22 June .

" During this exceptional operat ion the a ir support was 'd i rected by thetank bat ta l ion commander by the use of VHF , radios and Tact ical A ir ControlPar t ies .

Two VHF radios were insta l led in the battalion, one of which was withthe. battal ion headquar ters tank of the assaul t ing company. One TACP waswith each radio. One flight of continuous a ir cover was on call for ground .s tr ikes when needed and the battalion commander was authorized to cal l inavailable a ir support from other areas . To fa e i l i tate control , a ir s t r ikescalled for ,by ei ther the tank or infantry elements were channeled through thebattalion commander and the TACP's .

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.. s!!I'E. Covering fiigh,ts were relieved each hour. lflights not receiving re

, quests for st r ikes during their hour of cover were instructed to attack,critical a ir targets in the area after they were relieved. Thus no combatload'ed planes returned to base without performing a mission. It was deter mined that frequently more damage was done during,these cri t ical targets t r ikes than during close.' support missions.

Recommend that similar a ir cover and close support be employed morefrequently, espec'ially in conjunction with tank attacks so far forward of theMLR that art i l lery suppor t is not available.(RESTRICTED)

TRAINING OF SCOUT DOGS. - The 26th I ~ f a n t r y Scout Dog Pla+-,on hasbeen hampered somewhat by insufficient training of the dogs in the ZI for thetactical situations encountered in this theater .

The dogs have been trained primari ly for reconnaissance type patrols , where the dogs are continually moving. Ambush patrols in which the dogs are participating require the animal's to remain in one place and often in one ,position for as long as eight hours.

Many dogs 'have been lost to the platoon because they were not accustomed to perform under heavy art i l lery and mortar fire. Flash, sound and concussion of exploding shells causes the dogs to become tense and excited.

The majority of the patrols in which the dogs are-used are night patrols .On these missions the animals are able to overcome the barr ier of darkness" by means of their keen sense of smell and thus aid immeasurably the memberso.f...t.he ,patrol.

Recommend that additional-intensive t 'raiiling be given at the W ar Dog School, Camp Carson, ,Colorado emphasizing the ' three condit ions mentioned above. I f this were accomplished. i t would ass is t t ra iners and handlers in the combat zone in that the dogs would be trained from the beginning under these conditions and would be less difficult to condition and handle in a combat zone.

The Z6th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon is the only unit of i ts type in the Eighth Army area . Thus, personl\el and dogs from this unit are assigned numerous patrol missions with other divisions of the Army. This si tuation

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4couples the hardship of long t r ips to and from these missions to that of th e

, patrol actions themselves .Therefore. recommend that one Infantry Scout Dog Platoon be assigned

to each Infantry Division in Korea.(RESTRICTED)

M29 PERSONNEL CARRIERS FOR REGIMENTAL TANK CO. - A minimum of two personnel car r ie rs , M29. or similar vehicles should be available for th'e use of the regimental tank company. In muddy weather andmountainous te r ra in , 'wheeled vehicles are not always able to resupply ammu nition to tanks on position and often t imes i t is impract ical to resupplv a pointwhich can be reached by wheeled vehicles. The Personnel Carr ier . M39, isnot sufficiently maneuverable for this purpose.

The "Weasel" is highly maneuverable, has sufficient traction forsteep inclines, and sufficient flotation to p r e v e n t e ~ c e s s , i v e damage toroads. At the same time i t is capable of transporting necessary payloadswithout undue danger of becoming bogged down.

SOURCE: Com:manaReport - 1st Field Artil lery Observation B a t t a l i ~ n DATE: July 1952 Source No 608

(RESTRICTED)USE OF HELICOPTERS IN ARTILLERY SURVEY. - A test of the practicability of helicopters in ar t i l lery survey was completed. early in July.

The five day test initiated late in June proved t h ~ effectiveness of the helicopter . Especia l effectiveness is shown in the operations of reconnaissance,recovering of survey stations, policing of survey stations, flagging of survey,control points, a.nd occupation of survey points by instrument parties . Im mediate results of helicopter transportation are to leap-frog areas where useof paths is denied by marked and unmarked mine fields; by-passing of slopesdifficult or impract ical climb; t r a n s p o r t a ~ i o n of equipment difficult to packup steep slopes; and almost total elimination of t ravel t ime which at presentconsumes 600/0 to 800/0 of ,e'xpended man hours . This m e a n ~ of transportationalso reduces the effective field party to a helicopter, one pilot, and onesurvey specialist . The present strength of an instrument field party is foufto six men and at least one vehicle. In one instance nine survey points. in adistant-area were recovered and flagged in three hours including t ravel t ime.All mater ials and equipment were carried in the aircraf t or lashed to theunder car r iage . A normal party would have consisted of four men t r a n s p o ~ t e d

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in a 1/4-ton vehicle and consumed three hours to reach this area . The per sonnel would be quartered with another unit and take approximately one week to find routes of approach and search for markers in an area cC;C r ice paddies and Udal mud flats . Another one-half day would be consumed in returning. , 'Thus, approximately 250-man' hours and extremely hard w ear on the vehicle would be required normally as against 6-man hours q.nd 3 hours of normal use on the helicopter . Considering the hazards of mine fields, cl imbing of formidable hills (some reaching heights of 3000 - 4000 feet), losses and wear on equipment, fatigue on personnel, and reduction of pe,rsonnel needed in the field, i t has been recommended that two helicopters , pilots and necessary maintenance equipment and personnel be added

.to the T /O&E of this observation battalion. Numerous other miss ions withinthe battalion sphere of operations can he effectively assigned to these ' l i rcraf t .(CONFIDENTIAL)COMBAT TESTING OF NEW SOUND RANGING SET . .;. I t is understoodthat a ne'w v e r s ~ o n of a, sound ranging set is undergoing t es t s by AFF BoardNo 1. A great opportunity for supplementing these tests by combat tests in,Korea exis t s and the new se t should be air l i f ted to Korea without delay inorde'r that such combat tests can be undertaken. I t is proposed that a teamof technicians accompany the. set to Korea and that the combat t es t be conducted in a manner s imilar to that ant icipated for the AN/MPQ-I0 r adar set .

* * *(CONFIDENTIAL)NEED FOR HEAVIER CALIBER ARTILLERY (240-MM OR LARGER.The need f:or he.avier cal iber weapons is becoming more apparent as thesummer wears on. The passage of t ime appears mere ly to allC?w the enemyto dig himself deeper into the hills In view of the se circumstances, rec ommend that heavy c a l i b ~ e r weapons' (of the 240-mm var ie ty or larger) besent to the Korean theater . Certainly, i t is difficult to visualize a moreideal situation for the employment of heavy weapons than exists a t the pres ent t ime in Korea. In this connection, it is proposed that, i f the pre'sentmanpower ceil ing prevents the ass ignment of 240-mm bat ter ies or battalions, the weapons be issued to selected field art i l lery battalions in additionto their present weapons on the basis of one or two per battalion. Recipient hatJal ions could easi ly train thei r gun crews in the use of such weapons,and could fire the weapons as l ikely t n r g d s presented themselves. Believethat field art i l lery battalions in K O ~ ' e a wO\lld welcome the opportunity of, ,augmenting their f i res .

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'SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engr Combat GroupD A T ~ ; iv1arch 1952 Source No 609

, (RESTRICTED)SPECIAL IMPROVISATIONS. - Twelve very pract ical expedient mecan

ical sand spreaders built from salvage 1/4- ton vehicle rea r ends were developed by this group and proved most valuable in sanding icy roads duringthe past winter. Essentially. the spreader . which was pulled behind a sandt ruck, consisted of a 1/4-ton vehicle rear end towed so that the differentialhousing faced .upward. On the housing at the point where the drive shaft isnormally connected. a sand spreading blade was attached. A smal ler ho.)pperconcentrated the sand for most efficient spreading action.

As the t ruck towed the spreader, the sand spreading blade rotated in a h o r i ~ o n t a l plane. spinning sand centrifugally from th e blade tips over the road. The hopper was hand-loaded by personnel riding in the sand t ruck. (RESTRICTED) .

EXCAVATION PROBLEMS IN FROZEN GROUND. - During the coldestpar t of th e winter of 1952. units were req'uired to conduct excavations inground that was frozen to a d e p ~ h of between two feet in compact clay and s ixf ~ e t in loose g r a v e ~ . Experimentation with physical eruption equipment suchas shovels, graders . dozers . and even roo ters produced unsatisfactory resll:lts. As the frost became deeper none of these pieces of equipment couldoperate . Various methods such as burning gasoline and diesel fuel weret r ied while a t ~ e m p t i n g Ito eliminate the frost but these were not successful .Demolit ion was finally found to be the answer . Holes were blaste4 throughthe f r o ~ t using s ~ a p e d charges . These holes were then charged with left.over propelling charge increments obtained from nearby ar t i l lery units.Since these excess increments are normally burned. thei r use in this mannerwas considered an economical utilization of supplies and mater ia ls . Theholes were charged with twenty t9 twenty-five pounds of black powder,andprimed with a quarter of a pound of C - 3. The re sultant pushing effect of theblack powder caused excel lent fracture and allowed ear th moving equipmentto operate in zero temperatures.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Battalion (M)DATE: April 195Z Source No 610 -(RESTRICTED)

DOUBLE-DRUM TYPE WINCH FOR TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES. Recommend that the future tank recovery vehicle include a double-drum typewinch of the capacity and l e n ~ t h of th e present MZ6 transporter winch. As atemporary expedient, it would be exceedingly helpful to have a winch of thistype mounted on present M3Z tank recovery vehicles whose present winch 'lacks both length and capacity of the MZ6.

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(RESTRICTED)TANK DOZERS. - Recommend that serious consideration be given to

decreasing the number of dozer blades authorized a tank battalion. Onetank dozer per company is believed more than adequate. The use fo r thisM3 dozer is not only limited, but the problem of where to mount two of themon tanks in the company is a matter of local determination and concern. Thecompany commander does not want his tank's mobility diminished; neitherdoes he want his FO tank nor a platoon leader 's tank occupied with dozer bladeand accompanying missions. Consequently, tw o platoon tanks become specialpurpose or dozer tanks, although there is no real necessity for such tankdozers per com_any. Two per battalion would be ddequate to meet and accomplish proper tank dozer missions.

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OVM EQUIPMENT. - Recommend that tank-mounted radio sets losetheir identity as T/O&tE Signal property and be included in OVM. Underthe present system property records require additional posting and readjustment - as well as slight confusion - when tanks are evacuated or are re -Iplaced with radios already mounted in the replacement tanks.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 15th AAA A W Bn(SP) DATE: June 1952 Source No 611

I ...... ~ , . . ............ - - -_ \ . \ ~ ~ . , .1 ~ J L..1 J!"U}O&:E CHANGE RECOMMEN DATIONS, LIGHT AA. - Recommend: 1.That one ca l ibe r . 30 machine gun be mounted on M16 to cover th e area d i

rect ly in front of t rack.2. ThtLt each bat tery be provided with one generator , E-3, 3.0 KW.

This gener.ator is required for showing of training fi lms, film s tr ips andfor general lighting purposes.

SOURCE: Command'Report - 19th Engr Combat GroupDATE: June 1952 Source No 612

(RESTRICTED)RECRUITING POLICIES. - During the past tw o years a great deal ofemphasis has been placed on the Army re-enlis tment program, without

appreciable resu l ts .I f a l a rger re-enlis tment bonus could be paid; i t would have a greater

appeal because of the monetary gain. At present there is a $300 muster ingout bonus given to discharged veterans. In comparison, the re -en l is tmentbonus is much le'ss at tract ive, ranging from a minimum of $40 for a two yearre -en l is tment to a maximum of $360 for a six year enl is tment .

* * *(RESTRICTED)

AWARDS. - Presen t emphasis on increas ing the number of awards hastended to reduce the value of the awards .

Basing awards upon a given percentage of rotation personnel givesawards to many people for just doing their normal everyday work. Suchwas not the original intent of these awards .

All awards should be more closely scrutini/?'.crl ; t l1r l quality of achjevement should come before quantity of awa rd s .

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SOURCE: Command Report - 409th Engr Brig-DATE: May 1952 Source No 613

(RESTRICTED)STANDARDIZATION OF ENGIN;EER HEAVY EQUIPMENT. - Recom

mend that engineer heavy equipment be standardized as far as possible topermi t interchange of at tachments and spare par ts . i. e . crane or shovelbooms to fi t power plants of any manufacturer (within each capacity range),engine beds to fi t any motor of required horsepower. etc .

SOURCE: Command Report - 552d Engr Base DepotDATE: May 1952 Source No 614

(RESTRICTED)SP ARE PART SUPPORT FOR NEW MODELS OF ENGINEER EQUIP!"

MENT. - Considerable difficulty in spare parts support for new i tems ofengineer equipme.nt shipped t.o Korea is being experienced. I t developed thatspare parts support for some equipment cannot be anticipated by less than s ixmonths . Suggest thlit shipping of new models of equipment, not heretofo.reused in Korea, be discontinued unless spare parts support can be furnishedimmediately after receipt of such i tems.

SOURCE: Command Report 226th Ordnance Base DepotDATE: July 1952 Source No 615

(RESTRICTED)T.RAINING OF ORDNANCE REPLACEMENTS. - Replacement personnel

sent to this command have not been trained in the ammunition field and. thisfactor is having a ser ious effect upon the proper operation of the depot. Actio n should be taken to qualify both officers and enlis ted men in this field ofOrdnance pr ior to shipment overseas . Recoommend that a personnel surveybe conducted and report of findings sent to proper authority in an effort tocor rec t this condition.

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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army, Aviation Section

DATE: March 1952 Source No 61 6(RESTRICTED)

FIRE FItiHTING EQUIPMENT FOR UNITS HAVING ARMY AVIATION.Applicable 'T!08tE'S or TAIs of all units having aviation should be amended toallow addit ional fire fighting equipment for fighting aircraf t f i res. For unitshaving ten or more aircraft , 'a crash fire fighting t ruck of Air Forces 0-11should be authorized. Additional fire extinguishers of C0 2 15 1b capacity andcarbon tetrachloride of 2-ga11on capacity should be added to authorizations forall units having one or more airc raft .

SOURCE: Command Report - 4.09th Engr Brigade DATE: July 1952 Source No 617

(RESTRICTED)PO L STORAdE TANKS. - Recommend that POL storage tanks beequipped wi.th both pressure and vacuum valves. Without valves the vaporloss caused by higher temperature can be large during warm weather . Re ..l ief valves are buil t to open with excessive pressure caused by the increasedtemperature in a closed tank. The pressure valve holds the vapor loss to aminimum while still maintaining a safe pressure in the tank. The vacuumvalve is a safety device insuring that the clos.ed tank does not collapse whilebeing drained. There is a possibil i ty of inexperienced personnel forget t ingto open the rel ief hatch while draining a tank, causing the outside a tmospheric pressure to collapse t i l l ' tank.

SOURCE: Command Rt 'port - 10th Field Arti l lery BnDATE: June 1952 Source No 618

(RESTRICTED)SEQUENCE OF F1HE COMl\.IANDS BY FO. - Recommend that when

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the d e v e l o p ~ e n t of a l ight, fast, armored, t racked vehicle to permft rea rdoor loading of l i t ter patients; that each regiment be equipped with four suchvehicles, thus allowing one for each battalion and one at regimental collect-.ing stations .. These vehicles would be assigned to regimental tank companyfor maintenance.

SOURCE: Command Report - 31st Inf Regt)DATE: April 1951 Source No 622

(RESTRICTED) INFANTRY SERVICE COMPANY WRECKER. - I t is recommended that

"the Z-I/Z-ton t ruck present ly used in service company as a wrecker, be repla!=ed by a 4- ton wrecker or s imilar vehicle. The present 2-1/2- ton wreckeris too l ight to perform th e duties required in the field. I t will not efficientlypull another Z-I/Z-ton t ruck which is loaded, n o ~ will i t lift a 2-1/2- ton t ruck.The overload which resul ts from u,sing a l ight weight" wrecker in the field isuneconomical. Since 1 January the 2-1/2- ton truck used as a wrecker in theorganization has required the replacement of th e intermediate axle and assem ..bly, the t ransmission, the clutch, and the engine; In addition; the clutch a n ~ brakes require much more adjustment than the average 2-1/2- ton t ruck. Thepresent l ight wrecker is not equipped with swinging booms and th e presentwinch is too l ight. These deficiencies prevent use of the wrecker to maximum"advantage.

The curren t 4-ton wrecker would be sufficient to perform the jobs required by th e regiment . This t ruck was designed primari ly as a wrecker and has n"one of the shortcomings of the modified 2-1/2- ton wrecker .

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Battalion (Medium) DATE: July 1952 Source No 623

(RESTRICTED)TANK FIRE TO PROTECT BRIDGES. - On 27 July a total of 96 rounds

of 90-mm HE ammunition was fired in an at tempt to break up floating raftswhich might damage the vital White Front and Babicz bridges which span theImjin and Han-tan Rivers . Although the rafts were difficult to break, theywere weakened by the tank fire to the extent that they disintegrated when theystruck the fenders protecting the bents. Engineers charged with preservat ionof th e bridges gave much credi t to the effectiveness of th e 90-mm firing.

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. SOURCE: Command Report - 151st Engr Combat Bn D A T ~ : April 1952 Source No 624

(RESTRICTED) .STANDARDIZATION OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. - Recomm.end that

thought be given on the highest level to the possibility of procuring only onetype of any given piece of engineer equipment. For example, instead of havin g many different kinds of three-fourth yard shovels, issue only one kind.This could be carr ied out in all other kinds of equipment including graders ,t rac tors , a ir compressors and rock crushers .

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Transportation Military Railway ServiceDATE: July 1952 Source No 625

(RESTRICTED)LOSS OF LEAVE CREDITS. - Many personnel are losing leave credi ts

through no fault of their own. Recommend that an adjustment be made sothat leave t ime can accrue over sixty days or else monetary compensation bemade in l ieu thereof.

* * *(RESTRICTED)

MAIL SERVICE. - 1. The a ir mail service during July was exceptionally poor since mail was not received by this headquarters for five or six-dayperiods.

2. Boat mail does not seem to receive any special handling. Four andfive weeks is the normal t ime for delivery in Korea from the t ime that it isdelivered to the car r ie r in the United States. It is recommended that thisservice be speeded up.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Engr Combat BnDATE: July 1952 Source No 626

(RESTRICTED) DEFICIENCIES OF THE US ARMY STANDARD SANDBAG. - The follow


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14a, Average life of US Army standard sandbag is entirely dependent

upon condition and use,

b . Discussion of types of sandbags:(1) The gunny type sandbag, non-treated. 500 per bale, has shown

poor holding qualit ies. Effects of weather a re such as to render this type ofsandbag unsuitable for i ssue in this theater . The bags rot very quickly.They are not easi ly checked due to the large number per, bale, and the bindings have a tendency to split . This makes combat loading and hauling verydifficult. The sandbags have no protect ion from the weather while in b ~ l e s , ' Consequently the bales contain from 75 to 98 per cent unserviceable bags dueto rot . The gunny sandbag is easy to fill and stack. Many of this type sandbag lack string8.

(2) The He'ssian type sandbag, t rea ted, 200 per bale, appears tobe the bes t available in this theater . This sandbag will not deter iora te inoutdoor storage, and the bindings a re such as to insure that the bags willreach dest inat ion proper ly packed. Fur thermore , the data concerning thedates of m anufacture and shipment is a great help to supply agencies in i ssu ing the oldest bag f i rs t . This assures users a serviceable i tem when rec e i v e d . T h e 10" x 28" bag is easy to fill and shows no rot effects duringthe period of use. This, bag is easily overfil led. causing poor stacking qualit ies .

(3) Sandbags should definitely be t reated with a fungicide to res i$trot . The ideal measurements a re 13" x 26". A bag of such constructionwould facilitate stacking and s torage. Sandbags should be protected from theeffects ' of weather while in the bale. Nylon f iber as a replacement for jutewould also produce a super ior bag.

Command Report - IX CorpsApri l 1952 Source No 627

' (RESTRICTED), MINE PLOW. - Considerablp. t ime and effort has' been devoted todeveloping an elficient mine detector or locator . Detect ion by means of

water and a ir have been tr ied, but due to supply or compresso r failures,have been rejected as not pract ical . Mechanical means such as rol lers orthrashing chains have been experimented with for years , but have general ly

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run into a heavy mine that damages the detonating mechanism or detonatesan igni ter connected to a mine which explodes under the tank i tself . The38th Infantry Regir,nental Tank Company has developed an idea on a mineplow which seem S to overcome th e above difficulties.

This mine plow operated similar to that used for plowing up a fieldfor planting. I t turns th e earth up in front of each t rack to a depth dependingon the length of t e e t h ~ and guides th e dirt or objects in the dirt to the outsid,eof each t rack so that there is no direct contact between th e mine and tank.A booby t rapped,mine would be rendered less effective as the mine would bemoved away from the track pr ior to the operation of the igniter and l ess 'damage would be done to the tank due to distance of ' the mine away from thet rack . The mines rol led to the side of the t rack can be disarmed, or marked.and detonated later . '

The mine plow consists of tw o teeth mounted on a dozer blade in sucha manner as to be e ~ s i 1 y detached or swung back over th e blade 'when notrequired.(RESTRICTED)

CAL. 50 CO-AXIAL MG FOR TANK. - A modified ca l . 50 co-axial MGis needed for tanks in use in Korea for the following reasons:1. Presen t static situation require s more accurate firepower at ranges

'o f I, 000 to 2, 500 yards.Presen t ca l . 30 co-axial MG mounted in the medium tank, M4A3E8,lacks the necessary accuracy and power at th e greater ranges.

3. Research has proven that a ca l . 50 co-axial MG should be mountedin tanks, as in late models of all types of tanks.

** *(RESTRICTED)

ARMORED REGIMENT.' - Observation in Korea leads to the recommendation that an "Armored Regiment" be formed. This regiment would becommanded by a full colonel wh o would have equal representat ion on the stafflevel with infantry commanders and who would obtain fuller support for a rmor .

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SOURCE: 'Command Report - 7th Infantry Divisipn

DATE: July .1952 Source No 628(RESTRICTED)

SWITCHBOARD BD-9l-D FOR ARTILLsERY BATTALION FSCC. - Thebattalion commanders field art i l lery battalions in direct support of infan try regiments are responsible for the co-ordination of the a ~ t i l l e r y fires forthe regimental commander .

The Fire Support Co-ordination Center, located at the ar'tillery bat tal ion command p,ost, is the agency by' which these ar t i l lery f i res are co-ordi nated. Therefore , normal wire communications and alternate l ines should bemaintained between the FSCC and l iaison part ies with the infantry battalions,the regimental command post , the countermortar radar section, the battalion observation post, a.nd the firing batteries.

In addition, .wire communication must link the FSCC with the regimen: 'tal mortar company, tactical a ir control party, AAA u n ~ t s support ing theregiments and with adjacent and support ing ar t i l lery battalions.

Present ly, there are no switchboards authorized in the T /O&tE for thear t i l lery battalion FSCC.

To insure that vital wire communications are properly maintained between the FSCC and the aforementioned elements , recommend that tw os w i t c h b o a r d ~ , BD-91-D, be added to the T/O&tE of the FSCC of the n ~ l d ar t i l lery batta,1ion. The BD-91-D is a 24-drop, magneto-type board.

In a normal tac t ica l situation it would be advantageous to employ twoboards of this size when a battalion displaces. In such displacement a forward FSCC is usually organized to provide for th e needs of units alreadydisplaced. When the operation is complete the forward and rea r FSCC' smerge , forming one co-ordination center . . In this situation one switchboardcould be kept at each FSCC and combined when the FSCC' s finally merge .(RESTRICTED)

SCOUT DOG PLATOON - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES INT/O&tE. - The personnel and equipment allotted by T/O&'E to the Z6thInfantry Scout Dog Platoon does not permi t the platoon to adequately per formits tactical mission. The T /0 provide s for a platoon leader, platoon sergeant ,one veterinarian technician, eighteen handlers , and twenty-seven dogs. To

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enhance the efficiency of the platoon and to increase i ts abil i ty to m e e t theneeds of the infantry units in a division, there should be an increase in thenumber of .dogs and handlers in the uni t .

Recommended that the T10 for the scout dog pla toon be changed toinclude: a platoon leader , platoon sergeant , t w e n t y - s e v ~ n handlers one ofwhom would be the veter inar ian technician, twenty-seven working dogs-' ands ix rep lacement dogs. The additional dogs and handlers would pe rmi t fullcoverage of the infantry units in a di vision. I f six rep lacements were addedto the T10, the platoon would have dogs on hand to take the place of any working'dogs that suddenly become unfit for duty. This organic rep lacement system would a lmos t c6mpletely abolish the t remendous cost of t ranspor t ing afew dogs a t a t ime to the uni t .

Toge the t with these change s in organization the following changesequipment a re recommended:

1. Instead of. the 18 wris t compasses allot ted, the number of lensat iccompasses be increased from two to twenty-one per pla toon.

Z. A carpente r kit should be added for repa ir of dog kennels . No toolsare available in the platoon for this purpose .

3. The miss ion in which the platoon is normal ly employed does notrequire extensive use of binocular s M 13AI, therefore the eight binocularsnow authorized should be reduced to th ree .

4. The t ra i ler , I- ton, 2-wheel, cargo now authorized is not necessaryfor the success fu l movement of the platoon and should be removed f rom theTIE.

5. Experience has indicated that the th ree 2-1 /2- ton t rucks , 6x6, ca rgo ,m e e t the needs involved in movement of the 'platoon's organic personnel andequipment .

6. The pat ro l miss ions undertaken by the unit requi re handlers anddogs to t r ave l to far flun'g locat ions in the di vision and often corps sectors ,Since the platoon,has no vehicles except the three 2- I /Z- ton t rucks , four1/4-ton t rucks , 4x4, should be authorized each platoon to provide' one persquad and one for platoon headquar te r s .

7. The al lotment of tenso kennel chains, choke chain collars , andl ea ther harne-sses (medium) should be increased from 36 to 54 per platoon.These i t ems are in constant use, frequently need repair and a t t imes a refound to be beyond repa ir .

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18(CONFIDENTIAL), n

COUNTERFIRE PLATOONS. - From past experience with the counter fire platoon. the following ' recommendations are offered for consideration:

1. Personnel and equipment are not adequate to accomplish the platoon's assigned mission. Recommend that an addition of elevep men' beauthorized; this will give the platoon one additional counterfire, squad oC sixmen; four assigned dr ivers and one assis tant platoon sergeant . Recommendauthorization of three '3/4-ton trucks w/tra i lers and one 1/4-ton truck inlieu of present three 1/4-ton trucks w/tra i lers .

2. With the additioIl;al counterf ire squad, recomm'end that one complete se t GR6A sound locat ing equipment be authorized.

3. Recommend that a manual or text book be written on the tact ics.and techniques of the counterfire platoon. More detail, information isneeded i f personnel are to accomplish the mission of the counterf ire platoon. .

SOURCE: Eighth Army Arti l lery Information Bulletin 1115ATE: September 1952 Source No 629

(SECRET)ROK ARTILLERY EXPANSION PROGRAM. - The ROK art i l , lery exp an

~ i o n program has reached the point where ROK field art i l lery groups, formedand t rained at The Korean Arti l lery Training Center, 'are given 60-90 daysbattle i n d o c t r ~ n a t i o n and advanced training in the 5th US Field Art i l lery Groupbefore attachment to a ROK division. The final stage in this process wasinit iated on 30, June when the 1st ROK Field A rt i l lery Group. c o n s i ~ t i n g of aheadquarters and headquarters bat tery and two 105-mm howitzer battalions.joined the 9th ROK Di vision. With the already assigned organic l ight bat tal ion, a ROK direct s:u,pport battalion was thereby provided for each ROK reg i ment for the first t ime. The group headquarters became the division a r ~ i 1 -lery headquar ters . Additional groups, similar ly const i tuted. will now becomea v a i l a b l ~ at the rate of one every four weeks until each ROK division has one.

Upon complet ion of training. the medium battal ions being formed byUS divisions will become the general support b a t t ~ l i o n s of the ROK divisions,along with the 4 ROK medium battalions already in act ion. The new medium 'battalions have received half of their heavy equipment and most of their per sonnel, and are making rapid progress in training. Most of them f i red combat missions within five weeks of being formed.

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s"".o'; ;;WbA.'''OS; Command Report -I CorpsJuly 1952 Source No 630

(CONFIDENTIAL)DEFENSE AGAINST COUNTERATTACK. - In recent operat ions, where

friendly forces have taken and occupied posit ions formerly held by the enemy.th e enemy's react ion has been strong and violent. During these operat ionsthe enemy has proven his abili,ty to effectively mass his ar t i l lery and mortarf i res and to commit limited objecti ve attacks or counterat tacks up to regi mental s t rength with little or no warning.

Because,.ofthe enemy's react ions and capabili t ie s, it is necessary inthe planning of. operations, where we expect to take and hold ground, toensure that friendly forces have the capability of immediately organizingand fortifying the position once i t is secured. To do this i t is necessary toplan for adequate fortification materials , tools, gnd equipment. to be car r iedwith the assaul t force or to follow the force immediately on posit ion. Thesoldier mu st be prepared to "dig in" once.he is on the objective in order to,protect himself from enemy art i l lery and mor ta r fir 'es and to prepare fight ing holes from which to defend newly won posi t ions. Such i tems as tact icalwire, sand 'bag's, t imbers , and demolit ions should follow closely behind theassaul t force and move onto posit ion at the f i rst opportunity. With this equip ..ment hasty fortif ications can be prepared to meet th e onslaught of the enemycounterat tacks.

Experience has shown that without the ,equipment and tools with whichto establ ish adequate defense measures , it is difficult and costly in casua l t ies to withstand the pressure of th e enemy's counterat tacks. Where ade quate measu res have been taken, and fortif ications have been constructed,th e friendly forces have been able to hold their newly won positions with aminimum number of casual t ies .

Command Report - 31 st Inf Regt1952 Source No 631

(RESTRICTED). M 16 AS ORGANIC EQUIPMENT FOR INF ANTR Y REGIMENT. - Since

April 1951 this regiment has had a special authorization for three M16'sOver

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rJ(quadruple . 50 cal iber machine guns, electr ical ly operated' on a half- trackvehicle) . These weapons have been used continually since that t ime andhave proven invaluable.

The M16's have been ~ m p l o y e d very e f f e c t i v ~ l y in support of attacks,since they can mane uver rapidly, bring fire on enemy posi t ions from the( l . ~ , n k or rear , while personnel receive some prote'ction from the a rmor ofthe vehicle. This weapon is highly ae


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,8 E @ X i f z ~ UNClASSIFIEl,

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Recommendation: . That study be init iated for th e Chief of Trans portation on the development of nominal pier cells, with possible augmentation, for the operation of on e pier at an overseas port . By use of cel ls , aunit ordered into a port such as PUSAN could ascertain in advance fromintell igence the number of piers to be worked, and would then request thedesired number of cells be added to i ts organization. As addit ional piersor outports are developed, additional cells could be made available withoutinterference with the organization or operation of the main port . Each cel lwould be a self-contained unit: a pier superintendent for over-al l direct ionof activities; pier officers for supervis ion of labor, warehousing, portc learance, h'affic control, and in ternal organization (including security); andstevedore officers in charge of ship discharge and loading, checking, prepa ration of rough stow plans, ordering of ship and dock gangs, assembling ofgear necessary to work slips, loading to t ransportat ion units, rai l cars ,barge s, etc. The enlisted personnel would be divided into office and pierassignments, typing, filing, and manifest clerks, movement control clerkson truck, ra i l car and/or barge util ization and dispatch, ber th foremen,operations gear locker gangs, supervision of ship and ber th gangs, and thenumerous assignments incident to pier operations.

Equipment could be p r o v i ~ e d as organic to the cell or drawn frompor t companies. Mess and supply personnel would not be required s ince 'cel lmembers could mess with the major headquarters to which attached.(RESTRICTED)

IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATIONS OF VHF BATTALIONS. - In theoperation of a VHF battal ion, the car r i e r terminal and radio relay stationsmus t be synchronized in all respects . This could be accomplished mostefficiently by personnel working under the operational control of a singleunit . >

Recommend that in future planning for operational functions of VHFbattalions" consideration be given to the entire circui t system includingradio relay, and car r ie r terminals . This recommendat ion is being implemented in EUSAK except where the VHF car r i e r equipment is only a smallportion of the total car r ie r equipment at a gi ven installation.(RESTRICTED)

PROVISION FOR ..lUALIFIED INTERPRETERS. - In operations whereUS units have been required to provide close support for units whose personneldo not speak English, the lack of qualified in terpre ters has been the biggestobstacle to training progress and operat ional efficiency.

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22Recommend that in future operat ions where US units are required to

provide close support for units whose personnel do not speak English, pr iorplanning provide for the supplying by the supported unit of qualified in ter pre te r s at each echelon where they ~ i l l be needed.(RESTRICTED)

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO GRANT SECRET CLEARANCE. Officer replacements have general ly not been previously cleared for accessto classified informat ion pr ior to ar r ival in Korea .

Recommend that the commanding genera l of an Army in the field bedelegated the authority to grant clearances for access to classified mater ia land informat ion up to and including SEC RET to all officer personnel withoutreference to National Agency check 'as current ly prescr ibed and that suchclearance be withdrawn upon t ransfen of the officer from Korea .

SOURCE: Command Report - 73d Tank Battalion (M) DATE: July 1952 Source No 633

.(RESTRICTED)NEED FO R A TRACKED VEHICLE FOR EVACUATION OF WOUNDED

Due to the type of te r ra in over which units of the United States A r m y have beoperating in this theatre , there is a need for a t racked vehicle which can beused in the evacuation of wounded from the f ront l ines under shel l f i re . Bythe use of such a vehicle wounded could be evacuated to the neares t medicala id station or to the neares t road not under enemy ar t i l le ry f i re , where thewounded could be t ransfer red to conventional type ambulances . Lack of asuitable vehicle has necess i ta ted the adoption of a field expedient . In thisbattalion the M39 personnel ca r r i e r has been uti l ized with grea t success .When the battalion has not been com mit ted i t has loaned i ts M39 I s to theinfantry regiments for the i r use in medical evacuation.

Some of the advantages of using a t racked vehicle for evacuation ofwounded are as follows:

1. The ability to t raverse te r ra in ordinari ly only access ib le tol i t te r bearers .

J 2. Cons ervat ion of manpower because of vehicles ability, to t ranspor tmore than one casual ty at a t ime.

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3. Comparat ive smoothne s s of ride o,,'er rough t er ra in .4. Speed of t ravel , cross country, which reduces the per iod of t ime

the wounded a re without medical attel1tion.5. Light a r m o r for protection against smal l a r m s f i re .6. Light weight of vehicle makes i t possible to operate over the

present road net with a minimum of damage to the roads .A vehicle should be designed which would be equally successful in the

dual role of perspnnel car r ie r and evacuation vehicle. In the design of sucha vehicle the capabili t ies of the M39 should be considered as well as theseaddit ional points .

1. Increase, the size of th e vehicle to allow for the equipment whichm ust be car r i ed and yet leave room in the passengev compar tment for l i t te r s .This could be accompl ished by lengthening the vehicle and providing s t rapholders .on which l i t ters could be strung to provide for a double bunk effect .

2. The addition of a top and the providing of a r ea r ent rance . Thiswould give the additional protection needed against art i l lery and mor ta r fireand make for grea te r ease in loading and unloading the vehicle, both forwounded and other personnel .

3. Raising the height of th e vehicle, While this makes a higher s i l houette and consequently a better target to enemy fire, the addit ional heightis necessary for i ts dual mission. Personnel normal ly car r i ed in the vehi cle would be cramped for headroom. While rais ing the height would give thenecessary room for the upper row of l i t ters when the vehicle is used formedica l evacuation.

I f such a vehicle is constructed, recommend that the T /O&'E for theme'dical detachment of the tank bat tal ion be amended to authorize tw o suchvehicles and the T /O&'E of the medical company of each infantry reg imentbe amended to authorize four such vehicle s.

SOURCE: C o ~ m a n d Report - 40th Infantry Division. A T E : July 1952 Source No 634Ok

(RESTRICTED)SECURITY CLEARANCE. - This section has been confronted with,a

problem relatille to securi ty clearances . Final results on requests, forU N C L A S S I F I E D " ' ~ " , . Q ~ ~ .. ,

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service or complet ion of tour of for-eign duty. Our personnel system hasbeen establ ished to provide qualified replacements for anticipated losses ,but these resu l t s .are not being attained in this corps .

Recommend that the 'personnel replacement system be s u r v ~ y e d toi ~ s u r e that i t provides qualified replacements . needed.(RESTRICTED)

ENEMY PRISONER CAPTURE ATTEMPTS. - There were severa lrepor ts of hosti le use of concussion grenades or r e m o t e - c ~ n t r o l l e d minefields, apparently as a device to stun or temporar i ly shock friendly sol d ie r s to facilitate the i r capture.

SOURCE: Command Report - 980th Field Arti l lery BnDATE: August 1952 Source No 636

(RESTRICTED) .. REASONS GIVEN BY NONCOMS FOR FAILURE TO REENLIST.

Eighty-nine f irs t three grade noncommissioned officers a re due for rotationto the 'zone of in te r ior within the next forty-fi ve days; seventy-one do not planto reenlis t . The principal reasons stated by these men for not reenlis t ing(among those who would ordinari ly be expected to reenlis t) are:

1.. The insecuri ty of grade and MOS including the possibi l i ty of beingforced to qualify for an unfamil iar MO S or face reduct ion in grade . .

2. The feeling that the Army broke faith with them in the extension oftheir enlis tments .

3. The prospects of spending the future as a replacement in a pipelinewith no hopes of unit or even branch of service stabil i ty.

4. The present promot ion policy.

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th E ' n ~ i n e c r Combat GpDATE: July 1952 Source No 637

(RESTRICTED)TECHNICAL RATINGS OF NCO'S. - The discontinuance of technical

ra t ings for enlisted men who- do specialized jobs in the Army,has had a


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organic l iaison par t ies with the infantry bat tal ions, the supported unit,division ar t i l lery, countermor tar radar sect ion, bat tal ion o b s e r v a t i ~ n post , and al ternate l ines to the se ins ta l la t ions . To provide the facil i t ies

'" recommend that a 30-drop. switchboard would provide more lines ofcommunicat ion which are essent ia l in a regimental FSCC for a highdegree of eft iciency.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX CorpsDATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 63 9

(RESTRICTED)TANK TRACK HOLDING DEVICE. - The f irs t step of t rack throwing

is the "b10Vfout" or increase of s lack of the t r ack between the l as t roadwheel and the sprocket , which takes place on the inner t rack during a turn.This more. readi ly permits foreign mat te r to be carr ied up between thet r ack and hub, thus forcing the t rack away from the sprocket tee th. Then,l a tera l movement of the t rack , clue to the turn , quite often causes thet r ack to be thrown.

Three t rack holding devices (1 O-in wide, l l - in long, and I - in thick)were ins ta l led on the outside sprocket of an M46 tank and operated 520miles without failure. Special tes ts were conducted in a sand bin and inmud, with the t r acks excess ively loose and the auxi l iary tension wheelra ised c lear of the t rack . Maneuver ing, under these condit ions, causedthe t racks to be forced c lear of the sprocket teeth and la teral ly againstthe holding devices .

On the basis of these tes ts , r e c ommend that the t rack holding d ey k ebe considered sat isfactory as a field fix when the vehicle mus t operatewith loose t r acks , and te r ra in conditions are such that t r ack throwing caneasi ly take place .

UNCLASS'F'ED 27

korean war dissemination of combat information 17 jan 1953

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