Kingsford | 2

5G’s Vulnerabilities Affect Communications Infrastructure Integrity, Market Diversity, and Human Impact Parker Kingsford April 2020

Executive Summary

Fifth-generation wireless, or 5G, increases the speed and lowers the latency of previous generations of broadband cellular network technology1 and increases the number of connected devices;2 however, the need to protect the deluge of new data that will derive from these new devices is critical in protecting national security. Despite its promise to dramatically advance previous communication infrastructure through interconnectedness, enhanced security, and increased speed; 5G brings with it new vulnerabilities,3 the vulnerabilities of previous generations,4 and lacks the necessary standards to promote future resiliency and security.5

It is projected that 5G connections are likely to reach upwards of 100 million by 2021,6 with spending to reach $2.3 billion by the end of 2022.7 Chinese manufacturer Huawei currently holds 30% of 5G market share,8 threatening US market diversity,9 US technological leadership,10 and pushing the US to succumb to increased dependency11 on vulnerable foreign-manufactured infrastructure and supply chains.12

5G differs from previous telecommunications generations due to the broad millimeter wavelength spectrum at which it transmits data. As such, 5G will require the deployment of millions of additional small cell antennas. This will increase human exposure to electromagnetic frequencies (EMFs) at unprecedented rates, which could lead to long term adverse health effects. The rise of fringe conspiracy theories about 5G creates a danger that legitimate scientific inquiry about understudied health impacts may not be appropriately assessed before the widespread implementation of 5G. Currently, there are no industry-backed studies focusing on the short- and long-term health effects and safety of millimeter-wavelength 5G infrastructure and services.13

As widespread 5G adoption and implementation grows, the aforementioned challenges will become increasingly magnified, making them more difficult to address later on. Adequate resilience strategies will need to be implemented to protect the critical nature of US telecommunications infrastructure. Required compliance in patching physical infrastructure elements and the software layer of the network can mitigate many identified vulnerabilities. In addressing market diversity concerns, the US would benefit from promoting open-source, domestic, or non-Chinese manufactured alternatives which will create further innovation and market competition among public and private sector actors. Finally, 5G health concerns can be eased by taking reasonable measures to limit full 5G expansion until additional scientific studies can be done to assure that increased EMF exposure poses no significant danger to human health.

Center for Anticipatory Intelligence

Student Research Reports

Kingsford | 3

Introduction

The implementation of fifth-generation wireless (5G) will profoundly change the way societies communicate, with speeds around 20 times faster than that of 4G.14 5G’s increased communication speeds will subsequently improve autonomous vehicles, mobile phone networks, warfighting capabilities, and how IoT devices connect to the internet.15 As consumers become increasingly eager to adopt this technology, network carriers are continuing to push for rapid implementation of 5G, with security often being an afterthought. These vulnerabilities may hold significant implications for US infrastructure integrity, market diversity, and human health.

Vulnerabilities in 5G Infrastructure Exacerbate Threats to US Networks and Communications

Due to a lack of secure industry-wide standards, foreign and domestic adversaries will seek to exploit 5G vulnerabilities,16 seeking to perform eavesdropping17 and other forms of spying with the intent to disrupt US national and industrial security.18 5G has inherited many known vulnerabilities from previous generations of telecommunications technology including weakness to eavesdropping, jamming, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.19 In early research and implementation, more than 11 design vulnerabilities in 5G have already been found by security researchers. These known vulnerabilities could expose location data, phone activity, and potentially spoof emergency alerts intended to cause “artificial chaos.”20 Security researchers have already demonstrating the ability to exploit 5G authentication standards,21 displaying with ease how the aforementioned attacks could be executed.

The implementation of 5G’s millimeter-wavelength (MMW) spectrum results in the need for an increased number of antennas and added infrastructure.22 Unlike 4G LTE cell towers, millions of additional small cell antennas will need to be deployed to telephone poles, streetlights, homes, schools, parks and business offices.23 These small cells will require both physical and software security protecting them from malicious actors attempting to conduct Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks24 or DoS attacks.25 These vulnerabilities are subsequently heightened due to an increased attack surface area both physically and virtually through the software layer of the network.26

5G relies heavily on a software layer for the virtualized portion of the network, creating the ability for operators to perform network slicing.27 5G implementations of network slicing allow for a “single physical network to be partitioned into multiple virtual networks allowing the operator to offer optimal support for different types of services for different types of customer segments.”28 This added benefit from previous generations allows operators, businesses, sports arenas, and universities to offer customized connectivity, security, and functionality.29 However, the added functionality of this software layer comes at a cost. As this additional network layer is added, subsequent measures will need to be employed to secure this larger attack vector. Software layers can be exploited through improper or inconsistent patching, manufacturer backdoors, and zero-day vulnerabilities.

As such, 5G will require increased maintenance and support, more so than previous generations.30 5G's virtualized environment of physical items such as routers and switches is likely to lead to new forms of attacks, ones that have not been seen previously.31 This layer allows

Kingsford | 4

malicious actors to virtually move between networks and potentially steal various forms of data. If not adequately addressed, malicious actors will also have the ability to push users to a previous less secure standard, such as 2G. Increased resources will need to be allocated to support and protect the increased number of required antennas and software in the network. This will be a private sector-driven maintenance burden. Manufacturers and/or wireless providers will need to ensure adequate patching of both the software and physical layer of the system.32

5G builds upon and incorporates previous generations of wireless communication infrastructure. 5G will therefore be integrated on top of the legacy vulnerabilities contained within 4G.33 This inheritance brings with it the previous generations’ vulnerable security settings, permissions, standards, and infrastructure. This was shown as researchers used a known vulnerability from 4G, mobile network mapping (Mnmap), to view information sent from a device in plain text, create a map of devices on the network, and view identifying information about each device.34 This known vulnerability could potentially allow malicious actors to perform targeted attacks on 5G networks. Security researchers also discovered that MiTM attack vulnerabilities present in 4G were also present in 5G.35 This vulnerability enables hackers to intercept packet data information and alter the packet before it reaches the base station.36 Researchers reported that "22 out of 32 tested LTE networks worldwide were vulnerable to these types of attacks."37

Although 5G seeks to improve wireless security, adequate measures have not been taken to develop and test standards38 and protocols to secure the addition of cars, cell phones, and IoT39 devices onto the network. These standards are necessary to adequately provide encryption, authentication, patches, and risk segmentation to protect against the vulnerabilities of previous generations including DoS attacks, network mapping, MiTM attacks, spoofing, and user location tracking.40 Many of the currently developed standards were implemented by foreign manufacturers. For example, due to Chinese manufacturer Huawei's large market size and power, it has had a significant influence on advancing its preferred 5G standards, which lack necessary security requirements and contain vulnerabilities that could provide Huawei and Chinese officials access to large amounts of valuable data.

Due to the distrust of foreign manufacturers and to compete effectively in the market, US wireless carriers may look to build and implement custom 5G infrastructure.41 However, the currently stated security standards for 5G are scripted in an abstract or complex manner which makes implementing and testing requirements difficult for carriers. These forms of custom wireless carrier infrastructure will not meet interoperability standards and will be difficult in the future to update, repair, or replace.42 Proper security of 5G technology depends on the adequate development and implementation of industry-based standards in collaboration with government and industry leaders.

Resilience Recommendations to Address Vulnerabilities in 5G Infrastructure and Services

The aforementioned vulnerabilities and current state of 5G implementation lack the critical security requirements and interoperability standards to protect the US from eavesdropping, espionage, and hacking by transnational criminal organizations or foreign state competitors. This leaves the US public and private sector and its citizens’ data vulnerable, and

Kingsford | 5

subsequently fails to adequately protect user privacy.43 This lack of control in the planning and implementation of these standards leaves a critical infrastructure sector vulnerable to foreign interference or even control, positioning the US as a passive and exposed provider in telecommunications infrastructure.

US actors and stakeholders involved in the implementation of 5G need to orient their planning around the security concepts of resistance and resilience. Resistance within 5G telecommunications infrastructure means endeavoring to prevent or mitigate potential foreign threats through public and private sector cooperation to patch 5G vulnerabilities and promote increased security measures due to the introduction of the 5G software layer and increased installation of small cell antennas within the system. Resilience within the system means ensuring that telecommunications infrastructure can quickly recover in the event of an attack, doing so through leveraging redundant systems.

Requiring compliance in patching the software layer and providing a means where manufacturers, carriers, and those actors who deploy sliced portions of the network are held accountable will further promote resistance and resilience in the US’s telecommunications network. When the actors and stakeholders who deploy sliced portions of the network through small cells are held responsible for providing both software and physical security, significant advances will be made in 5G infrastructure security. Additional research and testing to develop standards that adequately address current vulnerabilities need to be completed in collaboration with stakeholders of the public and private sector. If the US fails to mitigate current and future vulnerabilities contained within 5G core infrastructure and promote resilience in a critical communication channel through the increased development of specific standards, as well as the elimination of carriers’ use of custom software and infrastructure, then the long-term security of US telecommunications infrastructure will ultimately be jeopardized.

Chinese 5G Manufacturing Threatens US Supply Chain, Market Diversity, and Tech Leadership

Chinese manufacturers of 5G infrastructure, services, and phones such as Huawei and ZTE leave countries and consumers apprehensive due to these companies' ties to the Chinese government and military.44 These ties to the Chinese military come in many forms. It is believed by Western intelligence agencies that Huawei's CEO and founder Ren Zhengfei was previously an officer in the Chinese Army, and it is believed that Zhengfei still has ties with the Chinese Army.45 In addition, Huawei employees over the past decade have been directly involved in at least 10 research projects supporting the Chinese armed forces, ranging from artificial intelligence to radio communication equipment.46

When infrastructure and devices are deployed outside China, Chinese-manufactured devices have the potential to be controlled by a foreign government. China's 2017 National Intelligence Law requires all Chinese companies to furnish data to the government on demand. US national security agencies have previously classified Huawei as a "Communist Party-controlled" body within China's civil-military system.47 Due to Chinese control, this infrastructure often lacks independent judicial review, as well as third-party testing and review to verify industry best practices and secured standards, and may contain vulnerabilities with the intent to commit espionage and other malicious attacks.48 For example, a threat discovered in late 2018 and

Kingsford | 6

announced by The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) revealed that cell phone carriers using Huawei routers to support Internet Service Provider (ISP) services contained a vulnerability that allowed malicious actors to detect if routers contained the default credentials or not, without even connecting to the router.49 China also poses a significant threat to US national and economic security due to industrial espionage. The FBI currently has more than 1,000 open cases involving China's attempts to acquire US research and technology “spanning almost every industry and sector.”50 Industrial espionage could increase with the implementation of Huawei manufactured telecommunications infrastructure across the US.

Huawei is China's largest manufacturer of 5G infrastructure and services with 2019 annual revenue reaching $122 billion.51 Huawei currently holds over 30% of the world market share in 5G infrastructure and services,52 followed by Finnish manufacturer Nokia holding 17%, and Swedish manufacturer Ericsson holding 13% market share.53 Huawei has been able to rapidly grow because for over 25 years Huawei has directly received as much as $75 billion in loans, grants, and tax incentives from Chinese state support,54 allowing the firm to significantly expand in size in a short time and undercut competitors’ pricing by up to 30%.55

Looking to create a US domestic 5G alternative provider to Huawei could be difficult, due to the time-consuming process intrinsic in creating, developing, and verifying 5G standards, which has taken place over the past 10 years.56 Huawei also maintains control of several of the key patents for 5G.57 With a lack of domestic alternatives, if the US fails to promote market diversity and competition does not naturally exist in the 5G supply chain, US partner countries will be forced to use potentially tainted Huawei technology to support their networks.58 US allies and partners who elect to use Huawei infrastructure jeopardize the US’s ability to securely share intelligence with these countries due to the potential of intercepted data.59 As the US seeks to avoid using Chinese manufactured 5G infrastructure, the US will likely pay a higher price for its infrastructure due to few market competing firms. With no viable domestic alternatives equipped to develop 5G infrastructure,60 the US is left with few timely options.61

In mid-2019, the Trump administration fully banned the use of Huawei equipment and added it to the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List.62 This sharp measure may ultimately increase market diversity in the US, as the Huawei ban allows other non-Chinese manufacturers to potentially increase 5G market share by marketing to Huawei-banned regions. However, banning Chinese infrastructure could cause the Chinese government to maliciously retaliate against Western companies.63 China recently detained several Canadian citizens in response to the US’s attempted extradition of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou,64 and other types of direct or indirect reprisals are possible.

Market diversity and tech leadership allowed the US to become a leader in the rollout of 4G. This subsequent lead in the progression of 4G implementation allowed for other US tech firms to dominate the market afterward;65 this is often referred to as the rise of the “app economy.”66 5G leadership has the potential to bring with it large scale innovation, networked smart cities,67 and autonomous vehicles.68 China hopes to capitalize on current 5G market share and leadership, seeking to become the next global power with a vision to be "the next Apple or Microsoft."69 Since 2015 China has outspent the US by $24 billion in wireless infrastructure.70 In the next five years, China intends to invest $400 billion in 5G implementation.71 China currently

Kingsford | 7

has over 350,000 operable 5G base stations, 10 times more than the number the US has deployed,72 potentially displacing US tech leadership in telecommunications technology. The pace of development is illustrated by Chinese manufacturer ZTE, which announced in early 2018 that it planned to invest $2.1 billion in 5G development.73 By early 2019, ZTE had already verified the maturity of its network infrastructure implementation by fully testing and meeting all of the necessary standards and requirements of 5G and had begun researching 6G opportunities.74 This is further evidence to suggest the US’s potential loss in global tech leadership. Allowing China to win the 5G race could subsequently give the nation first access to developing and monetizing products and services which directly use 5G,75 and primacy in dictating the global and ethical norms surrounding the technology, including the Chinese government’s use of widespread surveillance, artificial intelligence, and smart city infrastructure to underpin its efficient model of “digital authoritarianism.”

US 5G leadership is additionally threatened due to a lack of 5G proficiency. Chinese university students outpace US students in receiving more patents in wireless communication technology.76 Allies and partner countries such as India and Estonia look to the US to become a technological leader in 5G, seeking alternatives that promote trust and secure infrastructure— something they cannot trust Huawei or the Chinese government to adequately provide.77

Resilience Recommendations to Address Supply Chain, Market Diversity, and Tech Leadership

Chinese manufactured 5G infrastructure and services from firms such as ZTE and Huawei present a risk to the security of the US supply chain, a disruption of market diversity, and potential loss in US tech leadership. Failure to rapidly execute market strategy and promote domestic innovation in 5G technologies with the intent to bring about additional market competition for Chinese firms will result in a potential loss in market gains from 5G infrastructure, the innovation that proceeds it, and further limit the possibility of a resurgent market.

To promote resistance and resilience in 5G infrastructure and services the US should look to promote open source, domestic, or non-Chinese manufactured alternatives which will create further innovation and market competition among public and private sector actors and help negate the need for proprietary foreign manufactured goods. US lawmakers have previously called for the government to support open-source 5G infrastructure.78 Open-source infrastructure would allow new players to enter the market and develop specific components that would directly interface with existing infrastructure, eliminating the need for a single manufacturer, further promoting market diversity and subsequently promoting domestic competition with foreign manufacturers such as Huawei.79

Market diversity in 5G infrastructure components is essential for ensuring seamless integration of multiple vendors within the communication network, preventing proprietary vendors from automatically clinching contracts and subsequently allowing for increased negotiating power from carriers with the intent to decrease overall implementation costs.80 Encouraging market diversity will provide increased security and threat resistance to a rapidly advancing technological domain. Market diversity also provides allies who have limited innovation or development resources an alternative in supplying 5G infrastructure and services.

Kingsford | 8

To further establish resistance, resilience, and to ensure adequate security, all countries must ensure that Chinese manufactured 5G infrastructure, devices, and services are only acquired from reputable suppliers, further protecting all countries from unauthorized backdoor access.81 It is of great strategic interest that the US seek to promote similar secure standards to ally and partner nations with whom the US shares intelligence data. This will subsequently promote resistance and resilience in US foreign relationships and improve the US’s trust in intelligence sharing efforts with these nations.

Increased EMF Emission from 5G Small Cells Could Result in Potential Adverse Health Effects

A third potential security challenge associated with the widespread implementation of 5G is the scientifically understudied question of whether adverse health effects could be associated with some Electromagnetic Frequencies (EMFs) used in telecommunications technology. The rise of conspiracy theories about unfounded or flatly untrue health impacts of 5G, including a theorized connection to the COVID-19 pandemic, creates a danger that legitimate scientific inquiry about understudied long-term health impacts may not receive appropriate attention.

EMFs come from both natural sources such as sunlight and manmade sources such as cell phones, household appliances, and microwaves.82 Cell phones communicate to cell towers wirelessly through the use of radiofrequency (RF) waves. RF waves are a form of electromagnetic energy and are in the spectrum between FM radio waves and microwaves. These forms of RF waves are known as non-ionizing radiation. This essentially means that the waves are not strong enough to cause serious DNA damage.83 Ionizing radiation, on the other hand, is typically found in x-rays and ultraviolet (UV) light. Ionizing radiation is far stronger than non-ionizing radiation and subsequently has the potential to break chemicals bonds in DNA.84 Ionizing radiation can cause damage due to its ability to easily pass through human tissue, causing DNA and mitochondria damage which often subsequently lead to other adverse health effects.85

Figure 1. The Spectrum of EMFs 86

Kingsford | 9

5G falls within non-ionizing radiation, with current deployments of 5G using radio waves less than 6 GHz (see Fig. 1) 5G operates at higher frequencies than that of 4G;87 in the near future as 5G expands it will add bandwidth between 24 and 28 GHz. However, it is anticipated that later deployments will use bandwidth well above 30 GHz. Humans can safely be exposed to short-term radiation between 300 kilohertz and 100GHz, but studies have not yet been done to determine the health and safety of long-term exposure within the 30GHz to 100GHz range. This deployment range will expose humans, consistently and on an ongoing time frame, to a broad spectrum of frequencies that could have long term negative health consequences.88

Higher frequencies of EMF, known as millimeter waves (MMW), can rapidly transmit enormous amounts of data with increased network capacity compared with current technologies, making it an excellent spectrum for 5G. MMWs do not travel as far and do not penetrate the body as deeply as do the wavelengths from the lower frequencies. MMWs are likely to penetrate no deeper than the skin, whereas lower frequencies have been shown to penetrate at least three to four inches into the human body.89 Due to 5G’s higher-frequency MMW, 5G will require the additional deployment of millions more antennas than current 4G technology requires. It is estimated that a small cell will need to be deployed every 300 feet to adequately carry the signal.90 Through these additional 5G antennas, cell phones, and appliances, humans will be regularly exposed to an increasing amount of 5G-spectrum EMFs inside and outside the home.

It is important to note that there are currently no industry-backed studies focusing on the public health and safety of long-term exposure to millimeter-wavelength 5G infrastructure and services.91 As such, 5G infrastructure and devices have not been adequately tested for human safety, leaving some consumers apprehensive regarding the technology and creating space for both legitimate and more unfounded concerns.92 Some scientists, doctors, and concerned citizens from a range of countries across the world have petitioned and protested the implementation of 5G.93 In 2017, over 260 doctors and scientists petitioned the EU for a moratorium on the deployment of 5G until the potential health risks associated with the technology could be further studied.94 Countries such as Poland have taken precautionary steps to limit the implementation of 5G infrastructure until additional tests and studies can be performed.95 Unfortunately, these petitions have garnered little to no attention in the US.

However, previous research and studies have shown that there are some legitimate negative effects of EMF exposure, even within the non-ionizing radiation portion of the spectrum. In 2011 cell phones were listed by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a Group 2B carcinogen.96 An additional study in 2011 conducted by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) concluded that radiofrequency radiation in the frequency range of 30khz-300 GHZ displayed similar results as a possible Group 2B carcinogen.97 Since 2011, additional animal studies and epidemiological studies have been done to further strengthen the findings of the 2011 study98 with the potential to classify RF radiation as Group 1 human carcinogen, making it equivalent to smoking and asbestos.99 A 2018 study by the National Toxicology Program (NTP) showed that 2G and 3G cell phones presented clear evidence of high levels of radiofrequency radiation which later resulted in damaged DNA and the development of cancerous tumors in the heart, brain, and adrenal glands of rats.100 In addition to a potential carcinogenic effect, EMFs

Kingsford | 10

may cause a host of other adverse health effects on the human body. Long term exposure has been shown to be a risk factor for conditions including Alzheimer’s and male infertility.101

Early studies have shown that MMW exposure increases skin temperature; alters gene expression; promotes cellular proliferation and synthesis of proteins linked with oxidative stress, inflammatory and metabolic processes, and ocular damage; and affects neuro-muscular dynamics.102 MMWs may also have negative effects on plants and insects.103 However, it is important to note that few to no scientific studies have been done to establish a safe threshold for MMW exposure, nor have there been studies examining the prolonged effects of MMW. For individuals who claim to suffer from “electromagnetic hypersensitivity” (EHS),104 anxiety is expressed that 5G infrastructure and additional small cells will "cause undue harm and added electromagnetic pollution."105 Individuals who believe they are affected by EHS indicate suffering from a range of symptoms including dermatological, neurasthenic, and vegetative problems,106 including “headaches, concentration difficulties, sleep problems, depression, lack of energy, fatigue, and flu-like symptoms.”107

Due to the addition of small cell antennas necessary for 5G functionality, the ability to limit exposure to EMF will be difficult. As 5G implementation grows, Internet of Things (IoT) connections such as washing machines, TVs, and refrigerators will subsequently grow with estimated connections reaching 75.4 billion by 2025.108 These increased IoT device connections will cause a substantial increase in prolonged EMF exposure for most Americans, with the long-term consequences uncertain.109

Resilience Recommendations to Mitigate Increased EMF from 5G Small Cells

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) continues to stand by the public safety of 5G technology, even though no biological studies have been done on 5G technology to determine its overall short-term and long-term effects on human tissue.110 The US would benefit from the example of several other countries by taking reasonable measures to limit full 5G expansion until additional scientific studies can be done to confirm that increased RF-EMF exposure will not jeopardize the health of the American people. To approach this in a scientifically-grounded way, the US could benefit from creating a nonpartisan, non-industry backed task force which includes a diverse team of scientists and medical professionals to further study the potential health effects of 5G EMF exposure over the long term and advise key public and private sector actors.

The US could also consider increasing resistance and resilience in US public health vis-à-vis telecommunications technology through the implementation of a primarily wired 5G infrastructure. The implementation of a wired infrastructure is more “future-proof,” reliable, sustainable, and often more secure.111 Fiber-optic cabling could be deployed to connect small cells to macro towers, and macro towers to central routing facilities. Ultimately a fiber-optic infrastructure would greatly reduce the transmission of 5G EMFs and could provide a more secure and efficient infrastructure to address other 5G security concerns as well.

If the US fails to adequately research and test the human impacts of 5G electromagnetic frequencies, the US risks jeopardizing the long-term health of millions of Americans by advancing on a massive infrastructure project without appropriate scientific grounding. Once millions of small cells have been installed, it will be difficult to alter course.

Kingsford | 11

Conclusion

Although 5G may take telecommunication speeds and innovations to unprecedented levels, it does not come without a cost. Vulnerabilities to criminal or foreign interference contained within 5G infrastructure and services will be magnified due to the added software layer of the network and the increased installation of millions of additional 5G small cell antennas. A 5G supply chain that is becoming increasingly monopolized by Chinese manufacturing threatens market diversity and US technological leadership, and creates increased pressure for the US and its allies and partner nations to succumb to increased dependency on potentially compromised foreign-manufactured infrastructure. Finally, additional 5G small cells will increase human exposure to electromagnetic frequencies (EMFs) at unprecedented rates, with insufficient scientific certainty on the long-term consequences and potential adverse effects this may hold. While 5G has no shortage of enthusiastic advocates in the technology and telecommunications sectors, the US must take seriously the significant risks associated with 5G and approach widespread implementation with an eye toward security and getting it right—the first time.

Kingsford | 12

Endnotes

1 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Finley, Klint. “The WIRED Guide to 5G.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 18, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/wired guide-5g/?itm_campaign=GuideCarveLeft. Newman, Lily Hay. “5G Is More Secure Than 4G and 3G-Except When It's Not.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 13, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/5g-more-secure-4g-except-when-not/. Harrell, Peter. “5G: National Security Concerns, Intellectual Property Issues, and the Impact on Competition and Innovation.” Center for a New American Security, May 16, 2019. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/5g-national-security-concerns-intellectual-property-issues-and-the-impact-on-competition-and-innovation. Feinstein, Dianne. “Feinstein Statement on 5G National Security Concerns.” United States Senator for California, May 14, 2019. https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=FDC03D62-C440-40DB-9568-91E1103C8B0F. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. CLARKE, RICHARD A. FIFTH DOMAIN: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats. S.l.: PENGUIN BOOKS, 2020. Jee, Charlotte. “5G Has Security Flaws That Could Let Hackers Track Your Location.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, November 13, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614709/5g-has-security-flaws-that-could-let-hackers-track-your-location/. 2 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Knight, Will. “The Real Reason America Is Scared of Huawei: Internet-Connected Everything.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, February 12, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612874/the-real-reason-america-is-scared-of-huawei-internet-connected-everything/ Harrell, Peter. “5G: National Security Concerns, Intellectual Property Issues, and the Impact on Competition and Innovation.” Center for a New American Security, May 16, 2019. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/5g-national-security-concerns-intellectual-property-issues-and-the-impact-on-competition-and-innovation. Feinstein, Dianne. “Feinstein Statement on 5G National Security Concerns.” United States Senator for California, May 14, 2019. https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=FDC03D62-C440-40DB-9568-91E1103C8B0F. Halpern, Sue. “The Terrifying Potential of 5G Technology.” The New Yorker. The New Yorker, April 30, 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-communications/the-terrifying-potential-of-the-5g-network. Gallager, Jill. “Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service . Congressional Research Service , January 30, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45485.pdf. 3 HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx. Strayer, Robert. “US Policy on 5G Technology - United States Department of State.” US Department of State. US Department of State, August 28, 2019. https://www.state.gov/US-Policy-On-5g-Technology. Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. Schneier, Bruce. “China Isn't the Only Problem With 5G.” Foreign Policy, January 10, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/10/5g-china-backdoor-security-problems-united-states-surveillance/. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states.

Kingsford | 13

“THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G ...” Insa.org. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE, June 2019. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. Miley, Kathie. Interview by Parker Kingsford. Email. February 6, 2020 4 HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx. Newman, Lily Hay. “5G Is More Secure Than 4G and 3G-Except When It's Not.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 13, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/5g-more-secure-4g-except-when-not/. Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. 5 Turnage, Mark. Interview by Parker Kingsford. Email. February 6, 2020 HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx. Strayer, Robert. “US Policy on 5G Technology - United States Department of State.” US Department of State. US Department of State, August 28, 2019. https://www.state.gov/US-Policy-On-5g-Technology. Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. Schneier, Bruce. “China Isn't the Only Problem With 5G.” Foreign Policy, January 10, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/10/5g-china-backdoor-security-problems-united-states-surveillance/. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G ...” Insa.org. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE, June 2019. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. Miley, Kathie. Interview by Parker Kingsford. Email. February 6, 2020 6 “5G Subscriptions Worldwide 2020-2025 | Statista.” 2020. Statista. Statista. 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/858278/5g-subscriptions-forecast-worldwide/. 7 “5G Mobile Infrastructure Spending Worldwide 2019-2021 | Statista.” 2019. Statista. Statista. 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/687439/5g-mobile-infrastructure-spending-worldwide/. 8 Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/. 9 Johnson, Derek. 2019. “5G Supply Chain Order Worries Industry, Experts -- FCW.” FCW. May 20, 2019. https://fcw.com/articles/2019/05/20/5g-supply-chain-order.aspx. Kelion, Leo. 2020. “Huawei Set for Limited Role in UK 5G Networks.” BBC News, January 28, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51283059. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Winning the Race to 5G, Securely INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE Cyber Council.” 2019. Insa.Org. Intelligence and National Security Alliance. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. Gallagher, Jill. 2019. “Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45485.pdf. 10 Amoroso, Edward. 2020 Interview by Parker Kingsford. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Winning the Race to 5G, Securely INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE Cyber Council.” 2019. Insa.Org. Intelligence and National Security Alliance. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. 11 Lewis, James, and Jessica Rosenworcel. 2019. “Mitigating Security Risks to Emerging 5G Networks.” Csis.Org. 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/mitigating-security-risks-emerging-5g-networks. 12 McPherson-Smith, Oliver. 2019. “Huawei Is Embedded in Our Infrastructure and the Federal Government Subsidized It | TheHill.” TheHill. The Hill. August 21, 2019. https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/458260-huawei-is-embedded-in-our-infrastructure-and-the-federal.

Kingsford | 14

Robertson, Jordan, and Michael Riley. 2018. “The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate US Companies.” Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. October 4, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies. Seals, Tara. 2018. “Huawei Router Flaw Leaks Default Credential Status.” Threatpost.Com. Threatpost. December 20, 2018. https://threatpost.com/huawei-router-default-credential/140234/. Sherman, Justin. 2019. “Huawei Controversy Shows US Need for Robust Supply Chain Security Strategy.” C4ISRNET. C4ISRNET. November 25, 2019. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/5g/2019/11/25/huawei-controversy-shows-us-need-for-robust-supply-chain-security-strategy/. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. 2019. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD CLEARED For Open Publication Department of Defense OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW.” Defense Innovation Board. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Winning the Race to 5G, Securely INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE Cyber Council.” 2019. Insa.Org. Intelligence and National Security Alliance. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. 13 Hardy, Michael. 2020. “To These People, Electronic Devices Are the Enemy.” Wired. WIRED. February 4, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/the-disputed-diagnosis-forcing-people-into-faraday-cages/?bxid=5c4914b4fc942d0477dd03bd&cndid=55299713&esrc=WIRED_CRMSeries&source=EDT_WIR_NEWSLETTER_0_DAILY_ZZ&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_mailing=WIR_Daily_020420&utm_medium=email&utm_source=nl&utm_term=list1_p3. 14 “5G Vs. National Security - Stiftung-Nv.de.” Stiftung Neue Verantwortung , February 2019. https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/5g_vs._national_security.pdf. Ayres, Thomas. "How to Pre-Empt the Huawei Threat." Wall Street Journal, Nov 18, 2019, Eastern edition. Behreandt, Dennis. “Security and Surveillance in a 5G World.” The New American, December 12, 2019. https://www.thenewamerican.com/print-magazine/item/34151-security-and-surveillance-in-a-5g-world. Burnham, Christopher. “5G Is The Essential National Security Imperative Of Our Time.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, April 12, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherburnham/2019/04/12/5g-is-the-essential-national-security-imperative-of-our-time/#3fd1a64012c2. CLARKE, RICHARD A. FIFTH DOMAIN: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats. S.l.: PENGUIN BOOKS, 2020. Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress. Vol. R45485. Congressional Research Service, n.d. "FEINSTEIN STATEMENT ON 5G NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS." States News Service, May 14, 2019. Gale Academic Onefile (accessed January 16, 2020). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A585564914/AONE?u=utah_gvrl&sid=AONE&xid=52313718. 15 SEGAN, SASCHA. “What Is 5G.” PC Magazine, May 2019. “Smart City Solutions.” Accenture. Accessed January 17, 2020. https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-smart-cities. 16 “We Must Tackle the Risks of 5G before National Security Is Compromised.” European CEO, August 29, 2019. https://www.europeanceo.com/industry-outlook/we-must-tackle-the-risks-of-5g-before-national-security-is-compromised/. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states 17 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Harrell, Peter. “5G: National Security Concerns, Intellectual Property Issues, and the Impact on Competition and Innovation.” Center for a New American Security, May 16, 2019. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/5g-national-security-concerns-intellectual-property-issues-and-the-impact-on-competition-and-innovation.

Kingsford | 15

Knight, Will. “The Real Reason America Is Scared of Huawei: Internet-Connected Everything.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, February 12, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612874/the-real-reason-america-is-scared-of-huawei-internet-connected-everything/. Basin, David, Sasa Radomirovic, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi , and Vincent Stettler. “A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication,” January 10, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf. Dilanian, Ken. “Does China's Huawei Really Pose a Threat to National Security?” NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, January 28, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/does-china-s-huawei-really-pose-threat-national-security-n1124746. 18 Strayer, Robert. “US Policy on 5G Technology - United States Department of State.” US Department of State. US Department of State, August 28, 2019. https://www.state.gov/US-Policy-On-5g-Technology. 19 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. 20 Hussain, Syed Rafiul, Mitziu Echeverria, Imtiaz Karim, Omar Chowdhury, and Elisa Bertino. “5GReasoner.” Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, June 6, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354263. Jee, Charlotte. “5G Has Security Flaws That Could Let Hackers Track Your Location.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, November 13, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614709/5g-has-security-flaws-that-could-let-hackers-track-your-location/ Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. 21 Basin, David, Sasa Radomirovic, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi , and Vincent Stettler. “A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication,” January 10, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. 22 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. Finley, Klint. “The WIRED Guide to 5G.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 18, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-5g/?itm_campaign=GuideCarveLeft. 23 Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board , April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. Gallager, Jill. “Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service . Congressional Research Service , January 30, 2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45485.pdf. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G ...” Insa.org. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE, June 2019. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. CLARKE, RICHARD A. FIFTH DOMAIN: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats. S.l.: PENGUIN BOOKS, 2020 24 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx

Kingsford | 16

25 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states 26 Miley, Kathie. Interview by Parker Kingsford. Email. February 6, 2020 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Finley, Klint. “The WIRED Guide to 5G.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 18, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-5g/?itm_campaign=GuideCarveLeft. Schneier, Bruce. “China Isn't the Only Problem With 5G.” Foreign Policy, January 10, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/10/5g-china-backdoor-security-problems-united-states-surveillance/. Kelion, Leo. “Huawei Set for Limited Role in UK 5G Networks.” BBC News. BBC, January 28, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51283059. 27 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. inley, Klint. “The WIRED Guide to 5G.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 18, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-5g/?itm_campaign=GuideCarveLeft. Newman, Lily Hay. “5G Is More Secure Than 4G and 3G-Except When It's Not.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 13, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/5g-more-secure-4g-except-when-not/. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. 28 Mateusz Przepiórkowski, Vice President - Head of Technology, Media & Telecommunications (TMT), intive. “These Three Industries Are about to Undergo a 5G-Powered Revolution (Reader Forum).” RCR Wireless News, RCR Wireless News, 31 Mar. 2020, www.rcrwireless.com/20170106/internet-of-things/network-slicing-5g-tag23-tag99. Accessed 31 Mar. 2020. 29 Mateusz Przepiórkowski, Vice President - Head of Technology, Media & Telecommunications (TMT), intive. “These Three Industries Are about to Undergo a 5G-Powered Revolution (Reader Forum).” RCR Wireless News, RCR Wireless News, 31 Mar. 2020, www.rcrwireless.com/20170106/internet-of-things/network-slicing-5g-tag23-tag99. Accessed 31 Mar. 2020. 30 Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board , April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. 31 Kelion, Leo. “Huawei Set for Limited Role in UK 5G Networks.” BBC News. BBC, January 28, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51283059. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states 32 Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD.” Defense Innovation Board, April 3, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. 33 “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G ...” Insa.org. INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE, June 2019. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. 34 HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx Shaik, Altaf, and Ravishankar Borgaonkar. “New Vulnerabilities in 5G Networks - Black Hat Briefings.” SINTEF Digital and Kaitiaki Labs, August 2019. https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Shaik-New-Vulnerabilities-In-5G-Networks.pdf 35 HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019.

Kingsford | 17

https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146 36 Newman, Lily Hay. “5G Is More Secure Than 4G and 3G-Except When It's Not.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 13, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/5g-more-secure-4g-except-when-not/. Basin, David, Sasa Radomirovic, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi , and Vincent Stettler. “A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication,” January 10, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. 37 HoffmanOct, Karen Epper. “5G Inherits Some 4G Vulnerabilities.” GCN, October 21, 2019. https://gcn.com/articles/2019/10/21/5g-security.aspx. Whittaker, Zack. “5G Flaws Let Attackers Track Locations, Spoof Emergency Alerts.” TechCrunch. TechCrunch, November 12, 2019. https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/12/5g-flaws-locations-spoof-alerts/. Shaik, Altaf, and Ravishankar Borgaonkar. “New Vulnerabilities in 5G Networks - Black Hat Briefings.” SINTEF Digital and Kaitiaki Labs, August 2019. https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Shaik-New-Vulnerabilities-In-5G-Networks.pdf. 38 Strayer, Robert. “US Policy on 5G Technology - United States Department of State.” US Department of State. US Department of State, August 28, 2019. https://www.state.gov/US-Policy-On-5g-Technology. Newman, Lily Hay. “5G Is More Secure Than 4G and 3G-Except When It's Not.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 13, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/5g-more-secure-4g-except-when-not/.Basin, David, Sasa Radomirovic, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi , and Vincent Stettler. “A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication,” January 10, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf Jee, Charlotte. “5G Has Security Flaws That Could Let Hackers Track Your Location.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, November 13, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614709/5g-has-security-flaws-that-could-let-hackers-track-your-location/. 39 Turnage, Mark. Interview by Parker Kingsford. Email. February 6, 2020 Miley, Kathie. Interview by Parker Kingsford. Email. February 6, 2020 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. Ahmad, Ijaz, Tanesh Kumar, Madhusanka Liyanage, Jude Okwuibe, Mika Ylianttila, and Andrei Gurtov. “5G Security: Analysis of Threats and Solutions.” 2017 IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking (CSCN), September 2017. https://doi.org/10.1109/cscn.2017.8088621. Knight, Will. “The Real Reason America Is Scared of Huawei: Internet-Connected Everything.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, February 12, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612874/the-real-reason-america-is-scared-of-huawei-internet-connected-everything/ 40 Basin, David, Sasa Radomirovic, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi , and Vincent Stettler. “A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication,” January 10, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf Newman, Lily Hay. “5G Is More Secure Than 4G and 3G-Except When It's Not.” Wired. Conde Nast, December 13, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/5g-more-secure-4g-except-when-not/. Jee, Charlotte. “5G Has Security Flaws That Could Let Hackers Track Your Location.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review, November 13, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614709/5g-has-security-flaws-that-could-let-hackers-track-your-location/. 41 Fang, Dongfeng, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu. “Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks.” IEEE 6 (December 4, 2017): 4850–74. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146. “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. 42 “Overview of Risks Introduced by 5G Adoption in the United States.” CISA. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency , July 31, 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/overview-risks-introduced-5g-adoption-united-states. 43 Basin, David, Sasa Radomirovic, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi , and Vincent Stettler. “A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication,” January 10, 2020. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.10360.pdf.

Kingsford | 18

44 Robertson, Jordan, and Michael Riley. 2018. “The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate US Companies.” Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. October 4, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies. 45 “Huawei Personnel Worked With China Military on Research Projects.” 2019. Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. June 27, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-27/huawei-personnel-worked-with-china-military-on-research-projects. Sherisse Pham, CNN Business. 2019. “Huawei CEO: US Scare Tactics Will Frighten off Investors.” CNN. March 13, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/tech/huawei-ren-zhengfei/index.html. 46 “Huawei Personnel Worked With China Military on Research Projects.” 2019. Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. June 27, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-27/huawei-personnel-worked-with-china-military-on-research-projects. 47 Ayres, Thomas. 2019. “How to Pre-Empt the Huawei Threat.” WSJ. The Wall Street Journal. November 17, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-pre-empt-the-huawei-threat-11574018700. 48 “UNITED STATES ESTONIA JOINT DECLARATION ON 5G SECURITY.” 2019. States News Service, NA-NA. https://go.gale.com/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T004&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA604516935&docType=Article&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZONE-MOD1&prodId=AONE&contentSet=GALE%7CA604516935&searchId=R1&userGroupName=utah_gvrl&inPS=true. Nakashima, Ellen, and Souad Mekhennet. 2019. “US Officials Planning for a Future in Which Huawei Has a Major Share of 5G Global Networks.” Washingtonpost.Com. The Washington Post. 2019. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=utah_gvrl&id=GALE%7CA580864659&v=2.1&it=r&sid=ebsco. McPherson-Smith, Oliver. 2019. “Huawei Is Embedded in Our Infrastructure and the Federal Government Subsidized It | TheHill.” TheHill. The Hill. August 21, 2019. https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/458260-huawei-is-embedded-in-our-infrastructure-and-the-federal. Robertson, Jordan, and Michael Riley. 2018. “The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate US Companies.” Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. October 4, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies. Seals, Tara. 2018. “Huawei Router Flaw Leaks Default Credential Status.” Threatpost.Com. Threatpost. December 20, 2018. https://threatpost.com/huawei-router-default-credential/140234/. Sherman, Justin. 2019. “Huawei Controversy Shows US Need for Robust Supply Chain Security Strategy.” C4ISRNET. C4ISRNET. November 25, 2019. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/5g/2019/11/25/huawei-controversy-shows-us-need-for-robust-supply-chain-security-strategy/. Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. 2019. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD CLEARED For Open Publication Department of Defense OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW.” Defense Innovation Board. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Winning the Race to 5G, Securely INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE Cyber Council.” 2019. Insa.Org. Intelligence and National Security Alliance. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. 49 Seals, Tara. 2018. “Huawei Router Flaw Leaks Default Credential Status.” Threatpost.Com. Threatpost. December 20, 2018. https://threatpost.com/huawei-router-default-credential/140234/ 50 FitzGerald, Drew, and Sadie Gurman. 2020. “Attorney General Barr Suggests US Firms Take Financial Interest in Huawei Rivals.” WSJ. The Wall Street Journal. February 6, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/attorney-general-barr-suggests-u-s-firms-take-financial-interest-in-huawei-rivals-11581009569. 51 Strumpf, Dan. 2019. “Huawei’s Revenue Hits Record $122 Billion in 2019 Despite US Campaign.” WSJ. The Wall Street Journal. December 31, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/huaweis-revenue-hits-record-122-billion-in-2019-despite-u-s-campaign-11577754021. 52 Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/. 53 Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/. 54 Chuin-Wei Yap. 2019. “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise.” WSJ. The Wall Street Journal. December 25, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736.

Kingsford | 19

55 Arjun Kharpal. 2020b. “Op-Ed: America Has Limited Options on 5G to Fend off China’s Huawei Challenge.” CNBC. CNBC. February 25, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/25/america-has-limited-options-on-5g-to-fend-off-chinas-huawei-challenge.html. Chuin-Wei Yap. 2019. “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise.” WSJ. The Wall Street Journal. December 25, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736. 56 Arjun Kharpal. 2020a. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge.’” CNBC. CNBC. February 21, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html. Arjun Kharpal, 2020b. “Op-Ed: America Has Limited Options on 5G to Fend off China’s Huawei Challenge.” CNBC. CNBC. February 25, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/25/america-has-limited-options-on-5g-to-fend-off-chinas-huawei-challenge.html. 57 Arjun Kharpal. 2020b. “Op-Ed: America Has Limited Options on 5G to Fend off China’s Huawei Challenge.” CNBC. CNBC. February 25, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/25/america-has-limited-options-on-5g-to-fend-off-chinas-huawei-challenge.html. 58 Khanapurkar, Uday. 2019. “India’s Huawei Conundrum.” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 75 (3): 380–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419860924. 59 Dilanian, Ken. 2020. “Does China’s Huawei Really Pose a Threat to National Security?” NBC News. NBC News. January 28, 2020. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/does-china-s-huawei-really-pose-threat-national-security-n1124746. Ayres, Thomas. 2019. “How to Pre-Empt the Huawei Threat.” WSJ. The Wall Street Journal. November 17, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-pre-empt-the-huawei-threat-11574018700. Kharpal, Arjun. 2020b. “Op-Ed: America Has Limited Options on 5G to Fend off China’s Huawei Challenge.” CNBC. CNBC. February 25, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/25/america-has-limited-options-on-5g-to-fend-off-chinas-huawei-challenge.html. 60 Johnson, Derek. 2019. “5G Supply Chain Order Worries Industry, Experts -- FCW.” FCW. May 20, 2019. https://fcw.com/articles/2019/05/20/5g-supply-chain-order.aspx. 61 Dano, Mike. 2018. “AT&T Names Samsung, Ericsson and Nokia as 5G Equipment Suppliers.” FierceWireless. September 10, 2018. https://www.fiercewireless.com/5g/at-t-names-samsung-ericsson-and-nokia-as-5g-equipment-suppliers. Arjun Kharpal. 2020. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge.’” CNBC. CNBC. February 21, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html. 62 Keane, Sean. “Huawei Ban: Full Timeline as It Posts Smallest Profit Increase in 3 Years.” CNET, CNET, 31 Mar. 2020, www.cnet.com/news/huawei-ban-full-timeline-us-government-china-trump-security-threat-p40/. Accessed 1 Apr. 2020. 63 Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/. 64 Grauer, Perrin. 2019. “China’s Detention of Canadians Part of Bid to Challenge Western Democratic Norms, Experts Say | The Star.” Thestar.Com. thestar.com. 2019. https://www.thestar.com/vancouver/2018/12/31/chinas-detention-of-canadians-part-of-bid-to-challenge-western-democratic-norms-experts-say.html. 65 Khanapurkar, Uday. 2019. “India’s Huawei Conundrum.” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 75 (3): 380–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419860924. Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/. 66 Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/. Nakashima, Ellen, and Souad Mekhennet. 2019. “US Officials Planning for a Future in Which Huawei Has a Major Share of 5G Global Networks.” Washingtonpost.Com. The Washington Post. 2019. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=utah_gvrl&id=GALE%7CA580864659&v=2.1&it=r&sid=ebsco. 67 Sherman, Justin. 2019. “Huawei Controversy Shows US Need for Robust Supply Chain Security Strategy.” C4ISRNET. C4ISRNET. November 25, 2019. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/it-networks/5g/2019/11/25/huawei-controversy-shows-us-need-for-robust-supply-chain-security-strategy/. 68 Groll, Elias. 2019. “Who Benefits From the US Crackdown on Huawei?” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. January 31, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/who-benefits-from-the-u-s-crackdown-on-huawei/.

Kingsford | 20

69 Woyke, Elizabeth. 2018. “China Is Racing Ahead in 5G. Here’s What That Means.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. December 18, 2018. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612617/china-is-racing-ahead-in-5g-heres-what-it-means/. 70 “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Winning the Race to 5G, Securely INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE Cyber Council.” 2019. Insa.Org. Intelligence and National Security Alliance. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. 71 “THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES OF FIFTH GENERATION (5G) WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS Winning the Race to 5G, Securely INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE Cyber Council.” 2019. Insa.Org. Intelligence and National Security Alliance. https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/INSA_WP_5G_v5_Pgs.pdf. 72 Medin, Milo, and Gilman Louie. 2019. “THE 5G ECOSYSTEM: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES FOR DoD DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD CLEARED For Open Publication Department of Defense OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW.” Defense Innovation Board. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/04/2002109654/-1/-1/0/DIB_5G_STUDY_04.04.19.PDF. 73 Sijia Jiang. 2018. “China’s ZTE Corp to Raise $2 Billion in Share Placement for 5G Plans.” US Reuters. January 31, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zte-5g-placement/chinas-zte-corp-to-raise-2-billion-in-share-placement-for-5g-plans-idUSKBN1FK1NQ. 74 Tomas, Juan. 2020. “5G Talent Talk Podcast: Breaking Down the Barriers to Fiber Broadband Deployments.” RCR Wireless News. RCR Wireless News. February 18, 2020. https://www.rcrwireless.com/20190118/5g/zte-completes-5g-test-china-unicom. 75 Woyke, Elizabeth. 2018. “China Is Racing Ahead in 5G. Here’s What That Means.” MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. December 18, 2018. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612617/china-is-racing-ahead-in-5g-heres-what-it-means/. 76 Decker, Susan, Alex Tanzi, and Bloomberg. 2019. “In Tech Race With China, US Universities May Lose a Vital Edge.” Fortune. Fortune. March 2, 2019. https://fortune.com/2019/03/02/us-tech-race-china/. 77 Khanapurkar, Uday. 2019. “India’s Huawei Conundrum.” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 75 (3): 380–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419860924. 78 Arjun Kharpal. 2020a. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge.’” CNBC. CNBC. February 21, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html. 79 Arjun Kharpal. 2020a. “Huawei Says US Push to Create a 5G Rival ‘Would Be a Challenge.’” CNBC. CNBC. February 21, 2020. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/21/huawei-says-us-push-to-create-a-5g-rival-would-be-a-challenge.html. Nakashima, Ellen, and Souad Mekhennet. 2019. “US Officials Planning for a Future in Which Huawei Has a Major Share of 5G Global Networks.” Washingtonpost.Com. The Washington Post. 2019. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&u=utah_gvrl&id=GALE%7CA580864659&v=2.1&it=r&sid=ebsco. Nicola, Stefen. 2020. “Huawei Scare Pushes Carriers to Tackle Dominance of 5G Suppliers.” Yahoo.Com. February 17, 2020. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/huawei-scare-pushes-carriers-tackle-095424069.html. 80 Nicola, Stefen. 2020. “Huawei Scare Pushes Carriers to Tackle Dominance of 5G Suppliers.” Yahoo.Com. February 17, 2020. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/huawei-scare-pushes-carriers-tackle-095424069.html. Amoroso, Edward. 2020 Interview by Parker Kingsford. 81 “UNITED STATESESTONIA JOINT DECLARATION ON 5G SECURITY.” 2019. States News Service, NA-NA. https://go.gale.com/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T004&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA604516935&docType=Article&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=ZONEMOD1&prodId=AONE&contentSet=GALE%7CA604516935&searchId=R1&userGroupName=utah_gvrl&inPS=true. 82 “What Are Electromagnetic Fields?” 2016. World Health Organization, August. https://doi.org//entity/peh-emf/about/WhatisEMF/en/index.html. Panagopoulos, Dimitris J., Olle Johansson, and George L. Carlo. 2015. “Polarization: A Key Difference between Man-Made and Natural Electromagnetic Fields, in Regard to Biological Activity.” Scientific Reports 5 (1). https://doi.org/10.1038/srep14914. “EMF-Portal | Sources of EMF.” 2020. Emf-Portal.Org. 2020. https://www.emf-portal.org/en/emf-source/a. “Electromagnetic Fields: Your Environment, Your Health | National Library of Medicine.” 2019. Tox Town. 2019. https://toxtown.nlm.nih.gov/sources-of-exposure/electromagnetic-fields. 83 2011. Cancer.Org. American Cancer Society. 2011. https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/radiation-exposure/cellular-phones.html.

Kingsford | 21

Schmidt, Charles. 2018. “New Studies Link Cell Phone Radiation with Cancer.” Scientific American. March 29, 2018. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-studies-link-cell-phone-radiation-with-cancer/. “High Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation Associated With Cancer in Male Rats.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/2018/november1/index.cfm. Reisz, Julie A., Nidhi Bansal, Jiang Qian, Weiling Zhao, and Cristina M. Furdui. 2014. “Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Biological Molecules—Mechanisms of Damage and Emerging Methods of Detection.” Antioxidants & Redox Signaling 21 (2): 260–92. https://doi.org/10.1089/ars.2013.5489. 84 2011. Cancer.Org. American Cancer Society. 2011. https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/radiation-exposure/cellular-phones.html. 85 Reisz, Julie A., Nidhi Bansal, Jiang Qian, Weiling Zhao, and Cristina M. Furdui. 2014. “Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Biological Molecules—Mechanisms of Damage and Emerging Methods of Detection.” Antioxidants & Redox Signaling 21 (2): 260–92. https://doi.org/10.1089/ars.2013.5489. “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. “Electric & Magnetic Fields.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/emf/. “High Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation Associated With Cancer in Male Rats.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/2018/november1/index.cfm. 86 BBC News. 15 July 2019. “Does 5G pose health risks?” 87 Nasim, Imtiaz, and Seungmo Kim. 2018. “Mitigation of Human EMF Exposure in Downlink of 5G.” Annals of Telecommunications 74 (1–2): 45–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12243-018-0696-6. 88 “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. 89 “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. 90 Hardy, Michael. 2020. “To These People, Electronic Devices Are the Enemy.” Wired. WIRED. February 4, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/the-disputed-diagnosis-forcing-people-into-faraday-cages/?bxid=5c4914b4fc942d0477dd03bd&cndid=55299713&esrc=WIRED_CRMSeries&source=EDT_WIR_NEWSLETTER_0_DAILY_ZZ&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_mailing=WIR_Daily_020420&utm_medium=email&utm_source=nl&utm_term=list1_p3. 91 Hardy, Michael. 2020. “To These People, Electronic Devices Are the Enemy.” Wired. WIRED. February 4, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/the-disputed-diagnosis-forcing-people-into-faraday-cages/?bxid=5c4914b4fc942d0477dd03bd&cndid=55299713&esrc=WIRED_CRMSeries&source=EDT_WIR_NEWSLETTER_0_DAILY_ZZ&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_mailing=WIR_Daily_020420&utm_medium=email&utm_source=nl&utm_term=list1_p3. 92 Anthony Clark Carpio. 2019. “Protesters Voice Opposition to 5G Telecommunication Devices.” Burbank Leader. Burbank Leader. May 17, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/socal/burbank-leader/news/tn-blr-me-att-5g-protest-20190515-story.html. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. Zmyślony, Marek, Paweł Bieńkowski, Alicja Bortkiewicz, Jolanta Karpowicz, Jarosław Kieliszek, Piotr Politański, and Konrad Rydzyński. 2020. “Protection of the Population Health from Electromagnetic Hazards - Challenges Resulting from the Implementation of the 5G Network Planned in Poland.” Medycyna Pracy 71 (1): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.13075/mp.5893.00867. 93 Anthony Clark Carpio. 2019. “Protesters Voice Opposition to 5G Telecommunication Devices.” Burbank Leader. Burbank Leader. May 17, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/socal/burbank-leader/news/tn-blr-me-att-5g-protest-20190515-story.html.

Kingsford | 22

Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. Zmyślony, Marek, Paweł Bieńkowski, Alicja Bortkiewicz, Jolanta Karpowicz, Jarosław Kieliszek, Piotr Politański, and Konrad Rydzyński. 2020. “Protection of the Population Health from Electromagnetic Hazards - Challenges Resulting from the Implementation of the 5G Network Planned in Poland.” Medycyna Pracy 71 (1): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.13075/mp.5893.00867. 94Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. “EU 5G Appeal – Scientists Warn of Potential Serious Health Effects of 5G – JRS Eco Wireless.” 2011. Jrseco.Com. 2011. https://www.jrseco.com/european-union-5g-appeal-scientists-warn-of-potential-serious-health-effects-of-5g/. “Sign the Petition.” 2020. Change.Org. 2020. https://www.change.org/p/5g-network-can-cause-serious-health-issues-must-be-stopped-asap. 95 Zmyślony, Marek, Paweł Bieńkowski, Alicja Bortkiewicz, Jolanta Karpowicz, Jarosław Kieliszek, Piotr Politański, and Konrad Rydzyński. 2020. “Protection of the Population Health from Electromagnetic Hazards - Challenges Resulting from the Implementation of the 5G Network Planned in Poland.” Medycyna Pracy 71 (1): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.13075/mp.5893.00867. 96 Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. Kovvali, Gopala. 2011. “Cell Phones Are as Carcinogenic as Coffee.” Journal of Carcinogenesis 10 (1): 18. https://doi.org/10.4103/1477-3163.83044. “IARC CLASSIFIES RADIOFREQUENCY ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS AS POSSIBLY CARCINOGENIC TO HUMANS.” 2011. International Agency for Research on Cancer. https://www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/pr208_E.pdf. Hardell, Lennart. 2017. “World Health Organization, Radiofrequency Radiation and Health - a Hard Nut to Crack (Review).” International Journal of Oncology 51 (2): 405–13. https://doi.org/10.3892/ijo.2017.4046. “Cell Phones and Cancer: Assessment Classifies Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields as Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans.” 2011. ScienceDaily. 2011. https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/05/110531133115.htm. 97 Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011. Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. Kovvali, Gopala. 2011. “Cell Phones Are as Carcinogenic as Coffee.” Journal of Carcinogenesis 10 (1): 18. https://doi.org/10.4103/1477-3163.83044. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. 98 Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011. Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. Kovvali, Gopala. 2011. “Cell Phones Are as Carcinogenic as Coffee.” Journal of Carcinogenesis 10 (1): 18. https://doi.org/10.4103/1477-3163.83044. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. 99 Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011.

Kingsford | 23

Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. Kovvali, Gopala. 2011. “Cell Phones Are as Carcinogenic as Coffee.” Journal of Carcinogenesis 10 (1): 18. https://doi.org/10.4103/1477-3163.83044. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. 100 “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. DeBaun, Daniel T. 2020. “Is 5G Safe? Are EMF Radiation Emissions Harmful at This Level?” DefenderShield. February 20, 2020. https://www.defendershield.com/5g-technology-safe-emf-radiation-emissions. “Electric & Magnetic Fields.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/emf/. “High Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation Associated With Cancer in Male Rats.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/2018/november1/index.cfm. “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. 101 “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. “Electric & Magnetic Fields.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/emf/. “High Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation Associated With Cancer in Male Rats.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/2018/november1/index.cfm. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011. Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. Zmyślony, Marek, Paweł Bieńkowski, Alicja Bortkiewicz, Jolanta Karpowicz, Jarosław Kieliszek, Piotr Politański, and Konrad Rydzyński. 2020. “Protection of the Population Health from Electromagnetic Hazards - Challenges Resulting from the Implementation of the 5G Network Planned in Poland.” Medycyna Pracy 71 (1): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.13075/mp.5893.00867. 102 Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011. 103 “Effect of Millimeter Waves with Low Intensity on Peroxidase Total Activity and Isoenzyme Composition in Cells of Wheat Seedling Shoots.” 2013. Scribd. 2013. https://www.scribd.com/document/163699319/Effect-of-Millimeter-Waves-with-Low-Intensity-on-Peroxidase-Total-Activity-and-isoenzyme-Composition-in-Cells-of-Wheat-Seedling-Shoots. 104 Hardy, Michael. 2020. “To These People, Electronic Devices Are the Enemy.” Wired. WIRED. February 4, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/the-disputed-diagnosis-forcing-people-into-faraday-cages/?bxid=5c4914b4fc942d0477dd03bd&cndid=55299713&esrc=WIRED_CRMSeries&source=EDT_WIR_NEWSLETTER_0_DAILY_ZZ&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_mailing=WIR_Daily_020420&utm_medium=email&utm_source=nl&utm_term=list1_p3

Kingsford | 24

105 World Health Organization: WHO. 2014. “Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health: Mobile Phones.” Who.Int. World Health Organization: WHO. October 8, 2014. https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/electromagnetic-fields-and-public-health-mobile-phones. 106 “Electromagnetic Fields and Public Health.” 2016. World Health Organization, August. https://doi.org//entity/peh-emf/publications/facts/fs296/en/index.html. 107 “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. “Electric & Magnetic Fields.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/emf/. “High Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation Associated With Cancer in Male Rats.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/2018/november1/index.cfm. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011. Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. Zmyślony, Marek, Paweł Bieńkowski, Alicja Bortkiewicz, Jolanta Karpowicz, Jarosław Kieliszek, Piotr Politański, and Konrad Rydzyński. 2020. “Protection of the Population Health from Electromagnetic Hazards - Challenges Resulting from the Implementation of the 5G Network Planned in Poland.” Medycyna Pracy 71 (1): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.13075/mp.5893.00867. 108 Mercola, Joseph. 2020. EMF*d : 5G, Wi-Fi & Cell Phones : Hidden Harms and How to Protect Yourself. Carlsbad, California: Hay House. 109 “Cell Phone Radio Frequency Radiation.” 2018. Nih.Gov. 2018. https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/whatwestudy/topics/cellphones/index.html?utm_source=direct&utm_medium=prod&utm_campaign=ntpgolinks&utm_term=cellphone. “Electric & Magnetic Fields.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/health/topics/agents/emf/. “High Exposure to Radio Frequency Radiation Associated With Cancer in Male Rats.” 2018. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 2018. https://www.niehs.nih.gov/news/newsroom/releases/2018/november1/index.cfm. Adams, Jessica A, Tamara S Galloway, Debapriya Mondal, Sandro C Esteves, and Fiona Mathews. 2014. “Effect of Mobile Telephones on Sperm Quality: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” Environment International 70: 106–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2014.04.015. Di Ciaula, Agostino. 2018. “Towards 5G Communication Systems: Are There Health Implications?” International Journal of Hygiene and Environmental Health 221 (3): 367–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2018.01.011. Hardell, Lennart, and Rainer Nyberg. 2020. “Appeals That Matter or Not on a Moratorium on the Deployment of the Fifth Generation, 5G, for Microwave Radiation.” Molecular and Clinical Oncology 12 (3): 247–57. https://doi.org/10.3892/mco.2020.1984. Zmyślony, Marek, Paweł Bieńkowski, Alicja Bortkiewicz, Jolanta Karpowicz, Jarosław Kieliszek, Piotr Politański, and Konrad Rydzyński. 2020. “Protection of the Population Health from Electromagnetic Hazards - Challenges Resulting from the Implementation of the 5G Network Planned in Poland.” Medycyna Pracy 71 (1): 105–13. https://doi.org/10.13075/mp.5893.00867. 110 Center for Devices and Radiological Health. 2020. “Scientific Evidence for Cell Phone Safety.” US Food and Drug Administration. 2020. https://www.fda.gov/radiation-emitting-products/cell-phones/scientific-evidence-cell-phone-safety. 111 Armijo, Patrick. 2018. “New Method Examined to Bring Fiber Optics to Homes.” Durango Herald. Durango Herald. May 6, 2018. https://durangoherald.com/articles/221644. (Tweed 2020)

Kingsford | 25

Fazlollahi, Amir H., and Jason Chen. 2015. “Copper Makes 5G Wireless Access to Indoor Possible.” 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), December. https://doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2015.7417247. Mercola, Joseph. 2020. EMF*d : 5G, Wi-Fi & Cell Phones : Hidden Harms and How To Protect Yourself. Carlsbad, California: Hay House. Bloemker, Diane. 2020. “Fiber Optic vs. 5G Wireless Networks: A Closer Look at an Emerging Debate (Reader Forum).” RCR Wireless News. RCR Wireless News. February 19, 2020. https://www.rcrwireless.com/20190220/opinion/readerforum/fiber-optic-5g-reader-forum. Cyphers, Bennett. 2019. “Why Fiber Is Vastly Superior to Cable and 5G.” Electronic Frontier Foundation. October 16, 2019. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/10/why-fiber-vastly-superior-cable-and-5g.