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HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group
Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: the role of business and the private sector
Kenya case studyJim Drummond and Nicholas Crawford
January 2014
About the authors
Jim Drummond is an independent consultant. Formerly he served in several senior leadership positions with the UK Department for International Development, including as its Director for UN, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs. He conducted this assignment in association with the Humanitarian Futures Programme at King’s College London.
Nicholas Crawford is an independent consultant and former Chief of Humanitarian Policy and Transitions at the World Food Programme. He conducted this study in association with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge everyone who provided information and insights for this paper (see Annex 1 for a full list of interviewees). They are particularly grateful to the OCHA Country Office in Kenya, which provided support for the team in Nairobi, and to the World Food Programme’s offices in Lodwar and Isiolo for arranging and hosting the team’s field visits. Lastly, the authors would like to acknowledge several individuals at OCHA in New York and Geneva who provided guidance on the paper, including Helena Fraser, Karen Smith, Charlotta Benedek and Antoine Gerard.
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Acronyms iii
Executive summary 1
Introduction 3
1.1 Outlineandmethodology 3
1.2 Contextualoverview:theeconomy,governanceandthe 4
humanitariancontext
The role of the private sector in humanitarian action 7
2.1 Theprivatesectorandtheemergencyresponsetothe2011drought 7
2.2 Privatesectorcontributionstoemergencypreparednessandresilience 12
2.3 Theprivatesectorandemergencypreparednessandresponse 14
aroundelectionviolence
Humanitarian–private sector engagement: opportunities and constraints 17
3.1 Growth,theprivatesectorandimplicationsforhumanitarianaction 17
3.2 Futureprospects 19
Opportunities and options 23
4.1 Takingadvantageofchangingmarkets 23
4.2 Procurementandtransport 23
4.3 Devolution 23
4.4 Makingthemostofpopularsupportincrises 24
4.5 Whatdoesthismeanforinternationalhumanitariancoordination? 24
References 27
Annex 1 Interviewees 29
Annex 2 Map of the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya 31
1
2
3
4
Contents
�� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
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ASAL AridandSemi-AridLands
BBCMA BBCMediaAction
CSR CorporateSocialResponsibility
DFID UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment
DRR DisasterRiskReduction
EAC EastAfricanCommunity
EDES EndingDroughtEmergenciesStrategy
GDP GrossDomesticProduct
GoK GovernmentofKenya
HSNP HungerSafetyNetsProgramme
IDP InternallyDisplacedPeople
IT InformationTechnology
K4K KenyaforKenyans
KAM KenyaAssociationofManufacturers
KCB KenyaCommercialBank
KEPSA KenyaPrivateSectorAlliance
KRCS KenyaRedCrossSociety
KSA KenyaShippers’Association
MMS MobileMoneyService
NDMA NationalDisasterManagementAuthority
NDOC NationalDisasterOperationsCentre
NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation
OCHA UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumaniatarianAffairs
ODA OfficialDevelopmentAssistance
OECD OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment
TMEA TrademarkEastAfrica
Acronyms
�v Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
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Executive summary
Kenyawasselectedasacasestudyforthisprojectontheroleoftheprivatesectorinhumanitarianresponsebecauseithasavibrantandinnovativeprivatesector,ahistoryofsevereandrepeatedhumanitariancrisesandatrackrecordofpublic–privatepartnershipsforhumanitarianaction.Thestudyfoundawiderangeofsuchpartnershipsandcontractualrelationships.Theseincludetraditionalemergencyresponserolessuchastransportandfoodandnon-foodprocurement;financialtransfersystems,includingthroughinnovativee-moneytransfersviamobilephonesorvillagebankingagents;effortstokeepmarketsfunctioningduringdroughts,includingdestockingbeforeanimalslosetheirvalueandpayingoutoninsurancepreviouslyboughtbypastoralists;andground-breakingcorporatecollaborationandfundraisinginsupportoftheKenyaRedCrossSociety(KRCS).
Opportunities and constraints
AlthoughhumanitarianinterventionsinKenyahavebeendominatedby‘classic’reliefoperations(e.g.foodaid),thereisamovetowardsmoremarket-sensitiveoptionsthatwillbroadenthebaseofprivatesectorengagement.Themostexcitingdevelopments,fromahumanitarianperspective,arewithintherapidlygrowingsectorsoffinanceandtelecommunications.PartnershipshavebeendevelopedwithKenyanmobilephonecompaniesandbankstofacilitatecashtransfers:theirrapidgrowthisdirectlytouchingcrisis-affectedpopulationsinKenya.ManyKenyanmobileoperatorsandbankshavebusinessmodelscommittedtoreachingthepoorest,crisis-proneareasofthecountry.
Duringthe2011droughtresponseinterventionsweremostlypilotsandrepresentedarelativelysmallproportionofoveralltransfers,andinsufficientmobilephonecoverageandinadequateruralmarketscontinuetoslowthespreadofthesepartnerships.Therearealsoquestionsabouthowsustainablesomeofthemwillbeifprofitsfortheprivatesector–independentofaidcontracts–donotfollow.Nevertheless,theswitchtocashfordroughtresponseandthenewpartnershipsforgedwithbanksandtelecomscompaniesrepresentaradicaldeparturefromthefoodaid-basedemergency
responsepracticeinKenya.Thepossibilitiesforotherhumanitarian(orhumanitarian-related)products,suchascropandlivestockinsurance,healthservicesandimprovedmarketinformation,haveonlyjustbeguntobeexplored.Anotherarearipeforincreasedhumanitarian–privatesectorpartnershipisinthecommercialisationofthelivestocksectorinKenya’saridlands,asenvisagedinKenya’sEndingDroughtEmergenciesStrategy(EDES).Atapracticalleveltherearenowissuesforthegovernment,donorsandtheprivatesectortoresolvearoundwhichinitiativesshouldbetakentoscalequickly,thepaceofchangefromfoodtocash,andtheneedfordonorsubsidiestopromotenewpartnerships.
Theprivatesectorhaslimitedconfidenceingovernmenttodeliverinhumanitariancrises.Ithasrespectforbutnodetailedknowledgeofhowtheinternationalhumanitariansystemworks.Kenyahasawell-developedsetofbusinessassociations,whichcurrentlyengagemostlyonhumanitarianissuessuchaspoliticalviolencethatimpactthemdirectly.Buttheycouldbecomeavaluablechannelforwideningtheprivatesectorengagementinotherhumanitariancrises.TheEDESandtheNationalDisasterManagementAuthority(NDMA)StrategicPlanenvisageengagingtheprivatesector.Thiswillworkbestifgovernmentanddonorscanarticulateacompelling,business-motivatingcaseforreducinghumanitariancrises–acasethatwouldexplainbottomlinebenefitsfrominvestmentsinthearidandsemi-aridlands(ASAL)andusingmarketmechanismstorespondtodroughts.Thiswillbealong-termprojectbutonethatrecentdevelopmentsinbanking,mobiletelephony,transportandminingsuggestisahighpriority.
ThereisagrowingawarenessofhumanitarianissuesamongsttheKenyanpopulationandKenyanfirms,whichincreasinglymatchdonationsmadebytheirstaff.TheKenyaRedCrossSociety(KRCS)annualfundraisinggalaistheplaceforseniorbusinessexecutivestobeseen.Thisispartofanencouragingtrendtowardswidercorporatesocialresponsibility.Severalofthelargerfirms,suchasSafaricomandEquityBank,havesetuptheirownfoundations,thoughmostlyforsmall-scale,longer-termdevelopmentwork.Thegovernment
� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
anddonorsshouldencouragethepublicandprivatemediatogiveouthumanitarianinformationtoeducatecitizensfurtheraboutrolesandresponsibilitiesinhumanitariancrisesinordertoenhanceaccountabilityandencouragefurthergiving.
KRCSiswidelyacceptedasthefirstresponderforsmallandmedium-scalehumanitariancrises,andpartneredwithmobilephonecompaniesandothernationalandinternationalfirmstoraisemoneyforboththedroughtresponseandintheaftermathoftheWestgatemallattackinNairobiinSeptember2013.KRCS’businessmodelincludesraisingfundsfrompropertyincludinghotels,anditsambulancefleetismanagedbyitsprivatesectorarm.
Whenaskedbythestudyteam,mostprivatesectoractors(aswellasmanyUN,NGOandgovernmentofficials)equatedpartnershiponhumanitarianactionwithfundraising,suggestingaquitestraightforwardinterpretationofprivatesectorengagementwithhumanitarianactionasopposedtothemorenuanceddiscussionsonprivate-publicpartnershipsintheinternationalhumanitarianworld.
Lookingahead,ifKenyaistocutdependenceonfoodassistanceandreduceandmanageitsownhumanitariancrises,anumberofchangesareneeded,includingamoreprominentrolefortheprivatesectorinpreparednessandresponse.Takinggreaternationalresponsibilityforhumanitarianchallengeswillrequireacapacitytoraisemoreresourcesdomesticallyorthroughborrowinginternationally;animprovedtransportsystemthatallowstheprivatesectortodeliverreliefitemsrapidly;moreintegratedandresilientmarketsindrought-proneareas;acapacitytotransfercashtocrisis-affectedpeoplesothattheycanmakeuseofthosemarkets;amiddleclasseducatedonhumanitarianissuesandwillingtocontributeandholdtheirgovernmenttoaccount;andagovernmentthatplanswiththeprivateandNGOsectors,takingadviceoninternationalbestpractice.SomeofthesepointsfeatureintheEDES.Overall,Kenyaismakinggoodprogressinsomeareas,butthereareuncertaintiesinothers,particularlyovertheroleofthegovernment.
IfKenyaistotakegreaterresponsibilityformanaginglargerhumanitariancrises,itwillbecrucialtoencouragemarketstofunctionduringdroughtsandtoexplorenewwaystotransferresourcestopeoplemadevulnerablebycrises.Donorsaresupportingawiderangeofexperimentsintheseareas,andtheseshouldcontinue,coordinatedbythegovernmentinclosecooperationwiththeprivatesectorandinternationaldonors.TechnologychangesmeanthatfirmslikeSafaricomaremakingcommercialdecisionstoinvestinpreviouslyunprofitableareas.Withthespreadofprivatesector-facilitatedcashtransfermechanismstoKenya’saridandsemi-aridlands(ASALs),theneedforfoodandnon-foodinputsfromaidagenciesshoulddecline.Morebroadly,significantnewinvestmentintheASALs(e.g.byforeignoilcompanies),andnewwaterandtransportlinks)meansthathumanitarianactorswillneedtoengagelargeprivatesectorinvestorstosensitisethemtohumanitarianissuesandbuildtherelationshipsthatwillbeneededinacrisis.LargeagenciessuchastheWorldFoodProgrammeshouldengagemorecloselywithtransportplannerstoensurethattheirconcernsaretakenintoaccountasnewinfrastructureisplanned.Astransportefficiencyimprovestherewillbemoreopportunitiesforthepurchaseofhumanitariansuppliesintheregion.Thismeritsseparatestudy.
Persuadingbusinessestoengagewiththehumanitariancommunitywillrequireaconvincingcasethatparticipationinpreparednessandresponsewillimprovetheirprofits.Thisstudysuggeststhattheelementsofsuchacasearethere.TheinternationalhumanitariancommunitywillbeabletobringbestpracticefromothercountriesandtheKRCShasthelocalstandingwiththeprivatesectorandtheKenyanpublictohelpthegovernmentandthebusinessassociationsinthistask.Staffinthefieldshouldbeconsultedonwhatpartnershipswillworkbestforthem,andbegivenaclearsteeronhowbesttotakeadvantageofexistingUNheadquarterspartnerships.WhiletherearemanyopportunitiesforlinkingupaidagenciesandthebusinesscommunityinKenya,thetimeandresourcesneededtobuildpartnershipsinthefieldshouldnotbeunderestimated.
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1 Introduction
ThispaperexplorestheroleoftheprivatesectorinhumanitarianactioninKenya.Kenyawasselectedasacasestudybecauseithasavibrantandinnovativeprivatesector,ahistoryofsevereandrepeatedhumanitariancrises,notablydroughtinthecountry’saridandsemi-aridlands(ASALs),andatrackrecordofpublic–privatepartnershipsforhumanitarianactionthathaveexploitednewtechnologiesandexperimentedwithnewmodelsoffundraising.Thestudyexplorestheprivatesector’scurrentandpotentialrolesinemergencypreparednessandresponse;analysestheperceivedbenefitsandnegativeimpactsofprivatesectoractivityinsupportofpeopleaffectedbycrisis;identifiesframeworks,structuresandmechanismsthroughwhichtheprivatesectorsupportsemergencypreparednessandresponse,andhowthesemightbeenhancedforbetterfuturecollaboration;andinvestigateshowhumanitarian–privatesectorpartnershipscanbeststimulateeconomicgrowthinKenya,whilealsoprotectinghumanitarianoutcomes.
Thisstudyispartofabroaderprojecton‘HumanitarianCrises,EmergencyPreparednessandResponse:TheRolesofBusinessandthePrivateSector’,financedbytheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)withthecloseinvolvementoftheUnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA).TheprojectisjointlyimplementedbytheHumanitarianPolicyGroup(HPG)attheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute,theHumanitarianFuturesProgramme(HFP)atKing’sCollegeLondonandVantagePartners,aglobalconsultingfirmheadquarteredintheUnitedStates.ItisoverseenbyDrSaraPantuliano(HPG)andDrRandolphKent(HFP).Theprojectaddressesissuessuchashowhumanitarianassistanceandprivatesectorbusinessactivityaffecteachother,wherepotentialopportunitiesandsynergiescanbeachievedandnegativeinteractionsavoidedandhowrelevantactorscanlearnfrompastexperiencetodeveloporenhanceframeworksandmechanismsthatgovernmental,multilateralandprivatesectoractorscanjointlysubscribetoandimplementinordertobetterrespondtocrisesandreducethevulnerabilityofcrisis-affectedpeople.BuildingoncountrystudiesinJordan,KenyaandIndonesia,andastrategyandoptionsanalysisofHaiti,theoverarchinganalysisconsiderswhattheprivate
sectorcouldpotentiallycontributetohumanitarianaction,includingitsroleasanactorinitsownrightandthroughcollaborationwithhumanitarianactors.
Lookingattrendsandtransformationsinthehumanitariancontext,analysisbyKingsCollege/HFPsuggeststhattheestablishedsystemsofhumanitarianaction–wherebyahandfulof(mostlyWestern)donorsandaidagenciesmonopoliseinformationandaction,sometimesattheexpenseofnationalinvolvement–arechanging.Anumberoffactorsarecontributingtothischange,includingtheincreasingabilityandwillingnessofhostgovernmentstoassertcontroloveraiddeliveryontheirterritory,theincreasingnumber,scaleandintensityofcrisesrelativetodonorresourcesandtheconvergenceofhumanitariananddevelopmentinvestmentsindisasterriskreductionandresilience-building(KentandBurke,2011).Atthesametime,themushroomingoflow-costtechnologiesacrosscrisis-affectedareas–mostobviouslymobilephones–iscreatingrelationshipsbetweenlong-marginalisedcommunitiesandtheprivatesector(andbetweenpotential‘beneficiaries’andtheirgovernments)thatneverexistedbefore.Whilethepressureofthesechangesiserodingthemonopolyofthetraditional‘system’,itisalsoopeningupenormouspossibilitiesforpartneringwithnewactors,includingtheprivatesector,andenablingtheuseofnewtechnologiestodeliverassistance.Thisprocessis,however,justbeginning.
1.1 Outline and methodology
Followingthisintroduction,thepaperprovidesanoverviewoftheprivatesector’sroleinrecentemergencypreparednessandresponse,notablythe2011droughtandpoliticalviolencerelatedtoelections.Theanalysisdrawsfromtheseexperiencestoexploreopportunitiesandconstraintsforfuturehumanitarian–privatesectorengagement.Thefinalsectionslookatfutureprospectsandproposesomemodestrecommendations.
Thestudyteamwasguidedbytheoverallproject’sguidingquestions,whichseektounderstand(i)howhumanitarianassistanceandprivatesector
� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
businessactivityaffecteachother,wherepotentialopportunitiesandsynergiescanbeachievedandnegativeinteractionsavoidedandhowgovernments,multilateralorganisationsandcivilsocietycanstimulatetheprivatesectortomoreeffectivelyengageinpreparednessandresponseandcontributetoresilienceoutcomes,nowandinthefuture;and(ii)howtouselearningfrompastexperiencetodeveloporenhanceframeworksandmechanismsthatgovernmental,multilateralandprivatesectoractorscanjointlysubscribetoandimplementinordertoreducepeople’svulnerabilitytoshocksandcrises,withtheultimateaimofimprovingtheeffectivenessofemergencypreparednessandresponseefforts.
Thestudyteambeganwithapre-missiondeskreviewofexistingdocumentation(annualreports,studies,programmereviews,evaluations,etc.)onglobalthinkingabouthumanitarian–privatesectorpartnerships,humanitarianactioninKenyabeginningwithpost-electionviolencein2008,trendsintheKenyaneconomyandthestructureoftheprivatesectorinKenya,andtheroleoftheprivatesectorinhumanitarianactioninKenya.Duringits14-daycountryvisit,theteamundertookdiscussionsandinterviewswithabroadrangeofactors(seeAnnex1foracompletelist),includinglocalandnationalauthorities,donorgovernments,privatesectorcompaniesandfoundations,localandnationalprivatesectorbusinessassociationsandlocalandinternationalhumanitariananddevelopmentagenciesandactors.Theteamtriedtomeetaswidearangeofstakeholdersaspossible.Discussionswereintheformoffocusgroupandone-to-oneinterviews/consultations,eachguidedbyasetofstandardquestionsadaptedaccordingtothetypeofactorbeinginterviewed.Althoughtheteam’stimewasconcentratedinNairobi,eachteammemberalsospenttwodaysconductinginterviewsandgatheringinformationinseparatedrought-proneareasofKenya:Isiolo(IsioloCounty)andLodwar(TurkanaCounty),respectively.
Limitedtimedidnotpermitin-depthfieldvisits,whichwouldhaveallowedfordiscussionswithdisaster-affectedpeople.Furthermore,theprivatesectorinKenya,aseverywhere,issprawlinginscopeandgeography,andmanyactorshaveadirectorindirectimpactonhumanitarianaction,fromportsandcerealstradersinMombasatolivestockherdersinGarissaandkioskownersinDaadab.Ratherthantryingtocaptureallofthiscomplexity,theresearch
teamconcentrateditsinterviewsandanalysisonthosepartsoftheprivatesectorthatpaststudiesandkeystakeholdersidentifiedashavingsignificant,orpotentiallysignificant,engagementwithhumanitarianactorsandwithhumanitarianchallengesinKenya.
1.2 Contextual overview: the economy, governance and the humanitarian context
Kenyahasamarketeconomyandforeignprivateinvestmentisencouraged.Theprivatesectoraccountsfor80%ofthecountry’sgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)andmorethanhalfofwageemployment,althoughtheinformalsectorcontributes75%ofemployment.Tea,tourismandhorticulturearetheleadingforeignexchangeearners,butKenya’sinternationalreputationisincreasinglybuiltoninformationtechnology(IT)andfinance.TheWorldBankcallsM-PESA‘themostdevelopedandsuccessfulmobilemoneypaymentsystemintheworld’,upfrom19,071subscribersin2007toover15min2012.ThenewEastAfricanSubmarineCablesystemreducedinternationalbandwidthpricesby90%.WithinAfricaKenyaissecondtoSouthAfricaininnovationandfinanceinthe2013‘DoingBusinessSurvey’,andNairobiisaregionalhubformultinationals.KenyaisthethirdmostpopulardestinationforprivateequityinAfricaandhasastrongnetworkofbusinessassociationsledbytheKenyaPrivateSectorAssociation(KEPSA)(IFC/WorldBank,2013;Deloitte,2012).However,businessgrowthisconstrainedbycorruptionandaweakregulatoryenvironment.
TheKenyangovernment’sVision2030strategy,launchedafternationalconsultationsin2008,envisagesreachingmiddle-incomestatus,helpedbyagrowthrateof10%perannumfrom2012andamodernisedeconomywithhigherdomesticsavings,foreigndirectinvestmentandaid(GoK,2008).Prioritywillbegiventoimprovingtransport,addingvaluetoagriculturalproduce,modernisingthefinancialsectorandmakingKenyaacentreforIT.TheVisionisimplementedthroughmedium-termplans,thesecondrunningfrom2013–17andincludingastrategytoenddroughtemergencies.TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andWorldBank(WorldBank2012b)expectKenya’seconomytogrowbyabout6%in2013andthatitcouldsustainthatlevel,makingitaleaderamongst
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EastAfricaneconomies.Inflationandthecurrencyhavestabilisedaftertheeffectsofthe2011drought.GDPpercapitawas$850in2012.In2011OfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)was7.3%ofGDP;humanitarianassistanceaccountedfor16%ofODA.
Kenya’splaceonthenortherntransportcorridor,particularlyMombasaport,meansthatthefunctioningofitstransportinfrastructureiscriticaltotradeandthedeliveryofhumanitariansuppliesacrosstheregion.Transittimesareimprovingbutarestillwellshortofinternationalbestpractice.DwelltimesatMombasaportfellfrom24daysin2011tofivedaysin2012(SCEA,2013).Ninety-sixpercentoffreightleavestheportbyroad.AdealhasbeensignedwithChinatobuildanewraillinetotheUgandanborder.In2010ittook48hoursbylorrytotransportanimalsthe730kmtoNairobifromMoyaleatacostof$723foronelorry-loadof18cattle(Pavanello,2010).WorkisnowwellunderwaytotarmactheroadfromIsiolotoMoyale,completingthelinktoEthiopia.Effortsarebeingmadetoreducenon-tariffbarrierswithinEastAfricaundertheauspicesoftheEastAfricanCommunity.
Kenyarestrictsmaizeimportsmeaningthatdomesticpricesareoftensubstantiallyhigherthanworldmarketpricesintimesofdrought,althoughdutiesweretemporarilysuspendedduringtherecentdrought.Currentlyonly5%ofAfrica’sgrainimportscomefromAfrica,suggestingscopetomeetshortfallswithintheregioniftransportisimproved.
1.2.1 Politics and governance KenyaislistedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)asafragilestate.Thecountryhasalsoseenseriouspoliticalviolence,notablyaroundelectionsin2007,whensome1,200peoplewerekilledand664,000displaced.AnewConstitutionwasapprovedinareferendumin2010aimedatseparatingpowers,withanexecutivePresidency,aHouseofRepresentativesandaSenate.Regionalandlocalgovernmentisfocusedon47newcounties,eachwithanelectedGovernorandAssembly.Article43oftheConstitutionguaranteestherightofallKenyanstobefreefromhunger.ElectionsunderthenewconstitutionpassedrelativelypeacefullyinMarch2013,butthePresidentandVice-PresidentarenowbeingtriedbytheInternationalCriminalCourtfortheirallegedroleinviolenceafterthe2007election.Thenewgovernmenthasreducedthenumberofministriesfrom42to18andisconsideringreducingthenumberofparastatals.
Kenya’snewconstitutionprovidedfortheintroductionofcountygovernmentimmediatelyaftertheelection.Thecountiesabsorbthemunicipal,districtandprovincialauthorities(WorldBank,2012a).Theirresponsibilitiesincludeagriculture,health,tradeanddevelopmentanddisastermanagement.Countiescanraisesomeoftheirownrevenueandwillreceiverevenuefromthecentreaccordingtoaweightedformulaincludingpopulationandpoverty.Thisisanambitiousdevolutionplanbeingimplementedveryrapidly.Therearesomeprivatesectorconcernsthatlocalrevenueraisingwilldeterbusiness.
Kenya’spopulationwasabout9matindependenceand,accordingtoUNestimates,couldreach96mby2050(UNDESA,2010).Itiscurrently42mandgrowingby1mperyear.Thereare10mprimaryschoolagechildren.TheUNalsoestimatesthathalfofKenyanswillliveinurbanareasby2050.TheKenyaIntegratedHouseholdBudgetSurveyfor2005/6(GoK,2005)showsurbanpovertyfallingto34%from49%in1997,buttherearelargedisparitiesbetweenNorthProvince(74%)andCentral(30%).Morethanhalfofhouseholdsinthearidlandsreceivesomeformoftransfer,includingremittances.
1.2.2 Humanitarian crisesKenyaishighlysusceptibletonaturaldisasters,particularlydroughtinthearidandsemi-aridlands(ASALs),whichmakeupabout70%ofthecountry’sterritory.Themostrecentdrought,whichstrucknorthernandpartsofeasternKenyain2011,affected3.7mpeople.Sincethedrought,theUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)hasgraduallywounddownitsKenyacountryoffice,andmostotherhumanitarianagenciesarewindingdownorfocusingonresiliencework.
Table 1: People affected by natural disasters D�saster Date Affected
Drought 1991 2,700,000
Epidemic 1994 6,500,000
Drought 1994 1,200,000
Drought 1997 1,600,000
Flood 1997 900,000
Drought 1999 23,000,000
Drought 2004 2,300,000
Drought 2005 3,500,000
Flood 2006 723,000
Drought 2008 3,800,000
Drought 2011 3,700,000
Source:PreventionWeb,2013.
� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
Followingthe2008–2011droughtsthegovernmenthasreshapeditspolicyandstrategyforthenorthernareasandotheraridlands,focusingonintegratingthempoliticallyandeconomicallywiththerestofKenya.Theaimistoshifttheemphasisfromdroughtresponse,whichoftenarrivedlateandfocusedonfoodaid,toresilience,preparednessandtheuseofnewtechnology.ThenewpoliciesandstrategiesaresetoutintheNationalPolicyfortheSustainableDevelopmentofNorthernKenyaandotherAridLandsandtheDroughtRiskManagementandEndingDroughtEmergenciesStrategyfor2013–17,partofKenya’sMediumTermPlan.Thesespeakofthepublicsectorenablingtheprivatesectorthroughinvestmentininfrastructureandeducationandprovidingincentivesforinvestors.TheNationalDisasterManagementAuthority(NDMA),formedin2011andnowreportingtotheMinistryofPlanningandDevolution,hasaleadingroleinimplementation.
AnASALStakeholderForumincludingtheprivatesectorhasalsobeenestablished.UncertaintyremainsovertheimpactofdevolutiononhumanitariancrisesandthesettingupandbudgetaryprovisionforthenewNationalDroughtContingencyFund.
Thesecondrecentformofhumanitarianemergencyinvolvespoliticalviolenceandterrorism.Post-electionviolencein2007/8killedabout1,200peopleanddisplaced664,000;another192arereportedtohavediedduringthe2013elections.TheWestgateattackinSeptember2013,thefirstlarge-scaleterroristattackonaKenyanestablishment,left67peopledeadand175injured.KenyaisalsohometoalargeSomalirefugeepopulationasaresultofconflict,insecurity,terrorismanddroughtinSomalia;thecombinationofthesefactorsledthenumberofSomalirefugeesinKenyatoriserapidlytooverhalfamillion.
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Kenya’sprivatesectorisgrowingsteadily.However,whilesectorsthattraditionallymightserveemergencyresponseandpreparedness–suchasroadandportinfrastructure,transportandfoodandnon-foodsuppliers–continuetoshowsteadyprogress,itistheneweconomysectorscentredaroundfinancialinstitutionsandtelecommunications(includingsocialmedia)whoserapidgrowthisdirectlytouchingcrisis-affectedpopulationsinKenya.Fromanemergencyperspective,whatdistinguishestheboom-likeatmosphereevidentintheNairobiheadquartersofthemobileoperatorsandbanksisthesecompanies’insistence–motivatedpartlybybusinessandpartlybycorporatesocialresponsibility–ontheircommitmenttoreachingthepoorestandmostmarginalareasofthecountryand,inparticular,thedrought-pronearidandsemi-lands.
Forthemostpart,formalprivatesectorengagementwiththemachineryofhumanitarianpreparednessandresponseatthenationallevelhasbeenminimal.InterviewswithanumberofbusinessassociationsinNairobiaswellasareviewofthevariousgovernment-ledandUN-supportedcoordinationstructuresrevealedthattheprivatesectorisnotgenerallyrepresented.Fortheirpart,businessassociationsnotedthattheywerenotinvitedtoplayaroleingovernment-ledemergencyresponseandplanning.Instead,ininstanceswhenthebusinesscommunitydoesbecomedirectlyinvolvedwiththegovernment–forexamplefollowingthepost-electionviolencein2007–2008andaftertheWestgateattack–theyinterprettheirrolenotasapartner,butratherasareluctantsubstituteforineffectualgovernmentaction.
Atthelocallevel,formalprivatesectorinvolvementwithgovernment-ledemergencycoordinationmechanismshaslikewisebeenminimal.GovernmentofficialsnotedthattheroleandcompositionofthenewCountyandSub-CountySteeringCommittees(successorstotheformerDistrictSteeringCommittees),chargedwithdisasterpreparednessandresponse,isstillbeingdebated.OfficialsinLodwarwereespeciallykeentoincludelocaltransportersincountyplanningandcoordinationmechanismsinordertopre-emptthe
contractdisputesthatcreatedmajorproblemsduringthe2011droughtresponse.ThepictureissimilarinIsiolo,wheretheCountyDisasterManagementCommitteehasnotyetbeenformedandthelocalNDMAisonlyreceivingfundsforsalaries.Underthepreviousarrangementspredatingthe2010ConstitutiontheDistrictDisasterManagementCommitteeincludedthelocalchairoftheIsioloChamberofCommerce.
Amajorexceptiontotheprivatesector’sexclusionfromhumanitarianpreparednessandresponsestructures–anditsreluctancetotakealeadwhereitfeelsgovernmentshouldbeleading–isintheareaoffundraisingfortheKRCS,wheretheKenyansforKenya(K4K)initiativeistheprimeexample(seeBox1,nextpage).
2.1 The private sector and the emergency response to the 2011 drought
The2011droughtaffectedmorethan3.7mpeopleinKenyaandbroughtemergencyconditionstosevencountiesinnorthernandeasternKenya:Turkana,Mandera,Marsabit,Garissa,Wajir,IsioloandTanaRiver.Whiletheareaoftheaffectedregionsisproportionallylarge(58%ofKenya’stotalterritory),thetotalpopulationoftheseregionsisrelativelysmall(3.8m,orapproximately10%ofKenya’spopulation)andtheircontributiontoKenya’seconomy,atabout5%ofoveralleconomicactivity,isevensmaller(WorldBank,2011).Intheariddistricts,mobilepastoralismdominatestheeconomy;thesemi-aridareashaveamixofrain-fedandirrigatedagriculture,agro-pastoralism,bio-enterpriseandconservationortourism-relatedactivities(Fitzgibbon,2012).Theprivatesector’sstakeinthedrought-affectedregionsis,fromanationaleconomicpointofview,relativelysmall,atleastfornow.Thiswasreflectedinthestudyteam’sinterviewsandfocusgroupdiscussionsinLodwar(TurkanaCounty)andIsiolo(IsioloCounty),wherethe2011
2 The role of the private sector in humanitarian action
� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
droughtresponsewasdescribedalmostexclusivelyasatraditionalpublicsector(government,UNandinternationalandnationalNGO)response,mainlyinvolvingdistributionsoffoodaidin-kindandlivestock/agricultureinputs.
Althoughtraditionalinterventionsdominatedthedroughtresponse,itisclearthattheseedsofmoremarket-sensitivehumanitarianresponseoptions–optionsthatbroadenthebaseofprivatesectorengagementbeyondcontractedtransportersandlocalsuppliers–hadbeguntotakerootduringthe2011response.Aspartofthewidelyembraced‘resilience’agendainthedrought-proneregionsofKenya,thesemarket-friendlyinnovationsandwideningprivatesectorpartnerships,somefirsttestedduringthe2011droughtresponse,havebecomefirmlyembeddedinpost-droughtresponsesandarecentraltoplanningforfuturedroughtpreparednessandresponse.
Duringthedrought,theprivatesectorpartneredwiththegovernmentandinternationalagenciesinanumberofnotableways.Inadditiontothemoretraditional(andstilldominant)contractingoftransportersandsuppliersfordeliveryoffoodandtheprocurementoffoodandnon-fooditems,banksandtelecomcompanieswerecontractedtodelivercashtransferstoregisteredbeneficiaries.Humanitarianagenciesandthegovernmentalsoprovidedsubsidiestotheprivatesector,especiallyinthelivestocktrade,inordertomaintainmarketstructures.Weather-basedinsuranceforlivestockwasalsopilotedduringthedrought.Finally,theKenyancorporatecommunity,inpartnershipwiththeKRCS,playedaground-breakingroleinfundraising,donatingtechnologyplatformsandensuringtransparencyandaccountability(e.g.probonofinanceandaccountingservices)throughtheKenyansforKenya(K4K)initiative(seeBox1).
2.1.1 Traditional contracting for drought responseUntanglingexpendituresoncontractstotheprivatesectorforthe2011droughtresponseisdifficultsincegovernmentandagencyprogrammesoftenspannedtheextended2008–2011droughtperiod,andbecausemanyagenciescontractoutgoodsandservicesindependently.Nevertheless,thegovernment’sdroughtresponseprioritiesgivesomeindicationofwheretheprivatesectorwasmostengaged.Accordingtothegovernment’spost-disasterneedsassessment,governmentexpendituresfocusedonwater(includingwatertruckingandfuelsubsidies),
livestock(includingoff-take),healthandnutrition(includingsupplementaryandtherapeuticfeeding),agriculture(inputssupply)andfoodaid(GoK,2012b).Theprocurementoffoodaid(includingnutritioninterventions),watertrucking,livestockoff-takeandagriculturalinputs,aswellasassociatedtransportandlogisticscosts,allreliedheavilyonlocalprivatesectorsuppliers.
Someindicationofthevolumeofthistypeoftraditionalprivatesectorengagementindroughtresponsecanbeseenfromtheactivitiesofoneofthemainplayers,WFP.InAugust2011,WFPreviseditsprogramme(roughly2009–2011)inthearidandsemi-aridlandsfrom800,000beneficiariestoatotalof1.7mthroughgeneralfooddistributionsandfood-orcash-for-assetsactivities.ThisbroughtWFP’soveralloperationalbudgetfortheperiodtoatotalof$527m,ofwhich$97.8mwasallocatedforlandsidetransportation,storageandhandling,mostofwhichisprocuredthroughtheprivatesector.Foodcostsbudgetedfortheperiodamountedto$271m,includinglocallyandregionallypurchasedfood(WFP,2011).In2011,WFPpurchasedatotalof$66mofcommoditiesfromtheEastAfricanCommunity,ofwhich$22.9mwasprocuredinKenya(WFP,2012).
TheKenyansforKenya(K4K)initiativeusedmobilebankingandsocialmediaplatformsprovidedprobonobytelecomsandmediacompanies–notablySafaricom,Kenya’slargestmobileprovider,butitscompetitorsaswell–toattractindividualdonorsandaggregatetheircontributionstowardstheKRCSemer-gencyresponse.Companiesalsomadecashcontributionsaspartoftheircorporatesocialresponsibilitycommitments.In-kindcontribu-tionswerecollectedbyparticipatingcompanies.Otherprivatesectorpartners,suchasKenyaCommercialBankandmajorauditingcompa-nies,offeredprobonofinancialandauditingservices.TheK4KinitiativefarexceededitsinitialfundraisingtargetofKsh500m,eventu-allyraisingoverKsh7.5billion(approximately$8.5m)aswellasdonationsin-kindvaluedatKsh278m(ZehraZidi,2012).Evenso,theoverallamountraisedwasasmallfractionofthehumanitarianaidreceivedinresponsetodroughtappeals($427.4m)(Fitzgibbon,2012).
Box 1: The Kenyans for Kenya initiative
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2.1.2 Private sector platforms for cash transfers Theuseofcashtransfersthroughfinancialinstitutionsandmobilemoneyservices(MMS)duringthe2011droughtresponsehasreceivedagreatdealofattention,althoughtheinterventionswerepilotinnatureandrepresentedarelativelysmallproportionofoveralltransfers.WFPestimatesthat10–15%ofits2011droughtresponsetransferswasintheformofcash.Likewise,itsongoingcashtransfersforsafetynetsandresilience-buildingindrought-proneareasremainsmallnexttoin-kindfoodtransfers.Nevertheless,theswitchtocashfordroughtresponseandthenewpartnershipsforgedwithbanksandtelecomcompaniesrepresentaradicaldeparturefromtraditionalemergencyresponsepracticeinKenya.Accordingtoonedonorrepresentative,the2011droughtresponseputtorestanyremainingdebateinKenyaaboutthemeritsoffoodin-kindversuscashorvouchertransfers:thedefaultthinkinginthehumanitariancommunitynowisthatcashispreferabletoin-kindtransfersaslongasadequatemarketstructuresareinplace.Thereverberationsofthistransformationhavebeenfeltbythoseintheprivatesectoratlocallevelwhotraditionallyhavebenefitedfromthehumanitarianaideconomy.Onesmall-scaletransporterinLodwar(TurkanaCounty)isrefittinghisvehiclestoseeknewclientsbecause‘weareawarethataidisover’.
WorkingwithitsNGOpartners,WFPhasbeenexploringinnovativemechanisms–withtheprivatesector–todeliverrelieftransfers,incash,tofood-insecurehouseholds.Inbothitsresilience-buildingactivitiesandinitsdroughtresponse,WFPhastestedtwomodels:abankingmodel,wherecashtransfersaremadeelectronicallytobeneficiaries’personalaccounts(inWFP’scasewithEquityBank);andthroughthemobilemoneyservicesofmobilenetworkoperatorsSafaricom(M-PESA),thegiantintheKenyamarket,andOrange(OrangeMoney).OthermobilenetworkoperatorsinKenya(YuandAirtel)alsooffermobilemoneyservices,thoughtheirmarketshareismuchlessthanSafaricom’s.
Underthebankingmodel,beneficiariesopenaccountswithEquityBankandareissuedATMcardstowithdrawcashatvillagebankagents.Equityalsoprovidesfinancialliteracytrainingtobeneficiaries.NGOsinTurkanadescribedsimilararrangementsfortheiractivitiesinpartnershipwithotherbanks(KenyaCommercialBank(KCB),PostbankandtheCo-operativeBankofKenya).EquityBankandKCBalsoprovidefinancialliteracytraininginIsioloCounty.
Amajoradvantageofthebankingmodelisthatthefullservicesofabank–savings,loans,insuranceetc.–areavailabletoabeneficiaryonceheorshehasopenedanaccount.Amajordisadvantage,fromahumanitarianpointofview,isthelengthyprocessingtimeforopeningaccountsandissuingATMcards.AsaWFPself-assessmentnotes,inthe‘emergencysettingthelimitationsofthebankaccountmodelbecameclear:openingbankaccountsanddistributingcardsisalengthyprocessnotsuitedtoashort-term,large-scaleemergencyresponse’(WFP,2013).Furthermore,withoutthelabour-intensiveworkofcommunity-basedtargetingandsensitisation(includingfinancialliteracytraining),‘mosthouseholdsstoppedusingtheiraccountswhentheprogrammeended’.Ontheotherhand,settingupaccountsduringnon-emergencyperiods,astheKenyaHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP)isdoing,isgooddroughtpreparationandacontributiontolonger-termdevelopment.
Usingmobilemoneyservicesisasimpler,lesstime-consumingandcheaperprocess.Initspilotemergencyresponseprogramme,whichtargetedthreeharder-hitaridcounties(Isiolo,TurkanaandWajir)thatpreviouslyhadreceivedonlyfoodaid,WFPwasabletoregisterbeneficiaries(includingissuingtheirSIMcards)inasingledayforthoseunderM-PESA,andin2–3daysforthoseunderOrangeMoney(forwhomanEquityBankaccountwasalsosimultaneouslyopened).Beneficiaryverificationandpaymentprocessingtookmoretime,buttheaveragewaitforbeneficiariesbetweenverificationandreceivingtheirmoneywasjust23days.
Amajorimpedimenttoenlargingboththebankingmodeland,toalesserextent,theMMSmodeliscoverage.Bothrequirecellphonenetworkcoverageandthepresenceofagentswhocandisbursecashondemandclosetobeneficiaries.TheSafaricom/M-PESAnetworkislarge(15msubscribersin2012,upfrombelow20,000in2007)expandingquicklyandwellacceptedbyconsumers.Theothermobileoperatorsarelikewiseexpandingtheirnetworkcoverage,andmorecost-efficientmodelsforerectingandsharingtheuseofnewcellphonetowersamongoperatorsarenowbeingexplored.Inaddition,newregulationsspearheadedbytheCentralBankofKenyamayresultinSafaricomhavingtoopenupitsM-PESAplatformtoothermobilefirms,whichwouldallowcashtransfersfromanyprovidertoreachasdeeplyastheexistingM-PESAnetwork(Wokabi,2013).Thebanks,ledbyEquity,arelikewiseexpandingtheirbranchandagentnetworktomoremarginalareas,thoughataslowerpaceandwithaviewtowardsgrowinglonger-termclientrelationships.
�0 Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
DespitethefeverishpaceofgrowthofM-PESAanditscompetitorsintomoremarginalareasandthepositiveexperienceofWFPandothersinpilotingrelativelysmall-scaleemergencycashtransfers,therearestillsignificantobstaclestousingtheseinnovativeprivatesectorplatformstotransfercashtobeneficiariesonalargescale.Anumberofhumanitarianactorspointedtoinsufficientgeographicalcoveragebythebanksandmobileproviders.OneNGO,anearlyhumanitarianagencytopartnerwithM-PESAfollowingthepost-electionviolencein2008,andwhichcontinuestoworksuccessfullywithitoncashtransfersinslums,dismissedthepossibilityofusingmobilemoneyforitscashtransferoperationsinMarsabitCountyduetopoormobilephonecoverage.TheNGOinsteadoptedforalternativepartnershipswithprivatesectoractors,subsidisingsmallkioskownerstoserveascashdistributionagents.1HumanitarianactorsinTurkanaandIsioloCountyalsonotedthatcellcoveragewaslimitedtolargertownsandalongsomestretchesofmainroads.AnumberofhumanitarianactorsalsovoicedconcernsaboutM-PESA’sreluctancetoadjustitsbusinesspracticestomeettheauditingandaccountabilityneedsofNGOsorUNagencies.ReferringtoMandera,WajirandGarissacounties,anotherinternationalNGOemphasisedagenerallackofprivatesectorinterestintheseareasduebothtothesparsenessofthepopulationandtoinsecurity.ThisNGOisnowhopefulthatitsrecentnine-monthnegotiationwithSharia-compliantFirstCommunityBanktoopenabranchinManderawillallowittotransferthemanagementandrisksofitsmicro-lendingschemestoacommercialentity.ThiswillbethefirsttimeinthisNGO’sextensiveglobalmicro-lendingoperationsthatamicro-lendingprogrammehasbeentakencommercial.2
Afurtherimpedimenttogrowingthehumanitarian–privatesectorrelationshipforemergencycashtransfersistheshortageofcashdonationsfromdonorsandthecontinuingsupply-sideavailabilityoffoodcommodities.TheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),which,alongwithDFID,theEuropeanCommunityHumanitarianOffice(ECHO)andtheSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC),hasbeenleadingdonoreffortstoenhancetheuseofcashandvouchersinKenya–andwhichitselfwasamajorcashcontributorduringthe
2011droughtresponse–notedthatcashdonationscontinuedtolagwellbehindin-kinddonations.3TheWFPofficeinLodwar,citingitsstrongerfoodcommoditypipeline,notedthatitwasalackofcashresourcesratherthanoperationalortechnicalissueswiththeprivatesectorthatwashamperingeffortstoexpanditscashtransfersintheregion.
ArecentWFPstudy,fundedbyECHO,onmarketsandfinancialservicesinKenya’saridlandsisoptimisticabouttheprospectsforexpandedcash-basedinterventions,butiscautiousaboutthepaceofthatexpansion(WFP/ECHO/GoK,2013).Notingmarketconstraintssuchasfluctuatingfoodavailability(andvolatileprices)inlocalmarketsasaresultofseasonalproductioncyclesandpoortransportation,thestudyrecommendstargetingcash-basedinterventionstolargermarkets(e.g.districtheadquarters-sizedtowns)andonlygraduallyexpandingtolocalmarketsastheroadinfrastructureimproves.Thestudynotesthat,whileconnectivityformobilemoneyandbankingservicesisrapidlyexpandinginandaroundtradingcentres,geographicalexpansiontomoreremoteareasisslower.Theextensionofcashorvoucherprogrammes,accordingtothestudy,willbeconstrainedbythepaceofthatexpansion:thestudyrecommendslimitingcashandvoucherprogrammestobeneficiarieslivingnomorethan30kilometresfromdistrictheadquartersandafewotherselectedmarketsonthemaintransportcorridors.Otherssuggestedthatthestudywasover-cautiousontheroll-outofcashprogrammes,notingthatdecades-oldinstitutionalpracticesandincentivesforfoodaidin-kind–fordonors,thegovernment,agenciesandcontractors–wereprobablyslowing,unconsciouslyornot,thepaceofchange.Theavailabilityofmobileagentscouldtakethecoverageofserviceswellbeyondtheproposed30kmradiusinpartsoftheASALs.
Irrespectiveofthepaceofimplementationofnewfinancialtransfermodels,therewillcontinuetobequestionsabouttherelativevalueformoneyofthevariousmodels(cash,vouchers,bankagent,mobilemoney,etc.)indifferentsettings.
ThemarchofmobilecoverageinKenyaisexpandingrapidly,augmentedbytechnologicalinnovationssuchassoon-to-be-introducedsatellite-linkedSIMcards.4Many
1 Interview,internationalNGO,Nairobi.
2 Interview,internationalNGO,Nairobi.
3 Interview,donorrepresentative,Nairobi.
4 InterviewswithEquityBank,LodwarandCaLP,Nairobi.
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informantsinterviewedbythestudyteamreferredtocompletemobilecoverageinKenyaasinevitableandevenimminent.Othersweremorecautiousaboutthepaceofexpansion,butinvestmentssuchasthe$298msetasidebySafaricomin2012toexpanditsnetworkacrossthecountryconfirmthetrend(DailyKenya,2012).Thatsaid,forsomeofthereasonsoutlinedabovetheabilityofhumanitarianactorstopartnerwiththeprivatesectorinKenyatodeliverbasicdroughtreliefintheformofseamlesselectroniccashtransfersmayremainconstrained,atleastforthetimebeing.OneexpertoncashandvouchertransfersinKenyaextolledthedegreeoflearningaboutmarketsandpotentialprivatesectorpartnersinaridandsemi-aridlandsthatthe2011cashandvoucherexperimentshadprompted.Inhisview,aparadigmshiftinthinkingtowardsmarket-sensitiveapproacheshastakenplaceamonghumanitarians,thoughheechoedconcernsaboutdeliverycapacity.ShouldKenyabefacedwithadroughtofsimilardimensionsintheshortterm,heestimatedthatcashtransferswouldonlycomprise5%to10%moreoftheresponsethanduring2011.5
2.1.3 Subsidising the livestock market for emergency preparedness and responseAnothersignificantprivatesectorpartnershipduringthe2011droughtresponseinvolvedsupportingprivatesectorlivestockactorsandmarkets.Aswithcashandvouchersforfood-insecurehouseholds,thestudyteamfoundastrongawarenessofmarket-sensitiveinterventions.Humanitarians,localprivatesectoractorsandgovernmentofficialsallpointedtotheimportanceofdroughtresponseactivitiesbuiltonpartnershipswiththeprivatesector.Theseactorscontrastedmorerecenthumanitarianinterventionsthatprotectedlivestock-basedlivelihoodswitholderinterventionsthatcircumventedtheprivatesectorandunderminedordistortedmarkets.
EmergencyprogrammessupportedbytheFoodandAgricultureOrganisation(FAO)inresponsetothreatstolivestockin2009and2011werebasedonnewlyadoptedguidelinesforprotectingandrebuildinglivestockassets(FAO,2013)andexplicitlysoughttoavoidpast(andinsomecasesstillcontinuing)practicesofpoorlytimed,market-distortingdestocking.Inthepast,astandardpracticehadbeentoslaughterweakanimalsanddistributethemeatforfreetopoorhouseholds–aninefficientfoodtransfer(lackofrefrigerationmeansthatitneedstobeconsumedimmediately)thatalsodoeslittletoprotectlivelihoodsorthelivestocktrade.Instead,
livestockdealerswereprovidedwithsubsidiestocarryontheirnormaltradeevenastheirbusinessrisksincreasedbecauseofuncertaintiesaboutthequalityandquantityoflivestockavailableforpurchase.Thiskeptthewheelsofcommercerolling–withlivestocktraderstransportingingoodstodrought-affectedcommunitiesandtransportingouthealthyanimalsbeforedroughtconditions(ortheperceptionofdroughtconditionsamongtraders)madelivestockunmarketable.Anumberofothermarket-friendly,private-sectorpartnershipprogrammes–aimingtoprotectlivestocklivelihoods–wereimplementedduringthe2011droughtresponse.OnesupportedbySavetheChildrenandOxfamhelpedbutchersandothersmallvendorsinWajirandManderatosourcemeat,milkandfishlocallyanddistributethemtoupto80,000drought-affectedpeoplemonthlythroughvoucherprogrammes.6
PrivatesectorlivestocktradersinTurkanaandIsiolocounties,ontheotherhand,emphasisedtheoverallweakintegrationofthelivestockmarketinnorthernKenya.Theypointedtoineffectualgovernmentdestockinginterventionsduringthe2011droughtthroughtheKenyaMeatCommission,aswellasunfinishedorunder-performinggovernment-financedabattoirsinbothcounties.InTurkana,only2.6%ofthecountybudgetisallocatedtothelivestocksector,whichnonethelessaccountsforsome60%ofthecounty’seconomy.Thismaybepartofthereasonwhytheprivatesectortakesadimviewofthegovernment’sabilitytocontributetoimprovingconditionsforlivestockmarketing.
2.1.4 Private sector partnerships for livestock and agriculture insuranceThehumanitarianresponsetothe2011droughtincludedpayoutsforindex-basedlivestockinsurancepoliciesbeingpilotedinaridareas.ThroughapartnershipbetweentheInternationalLivestockResearchInstitute(ILRI)basedinNairobiandtheprivateinsurancecompanyUAPanditspartnerinsurers(APAandTakafulInsuranceofAfrica),livestockholdersinMarsabitCountywhopurchasedinsurancein2010receivedpayoutsofapproximatelyKsh10,000(roughly$150perfamily)inOctober2011andagaininMarch2012asaresultofthedroughtconditions.Arecentreviewoftheimpactoftheinsuranceschemereportedsubstantialimmediatebenefitsforinsuredfamilies–includingonhouseholdfoodsecurity–aswellaspositivespill-overeffectsforthenon-insuredinthecommunity(Janzen,2012).TheschemeisnowbeingexpandedintoIsioloandWajircounties.
5 Interview,internationalexpert,Nairobi. 6 Interview,donorrepresentative,Nairobi,andFitzgibbon(2012).
�� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
Anothermicro-insuranceweatherindexinitiative,KilimoSalama(‘SafeAgriculture’),isapartnershipbetweentheSyngentaFoundationforSustainableAgriculture(oftheSwissagribusinessSyngenta),UAPinsuranceandSafaricom(payoutsaremadethroughM-PESA).KilimoSalamareportedpayoutsofKsh9m(roughly$105,000)during2011,withitsoperationscentredinLaikipiaCounty.Althoughsmallinscopeandwithunevenresults(accordingtoNGOsworkinginthesameareas),thesepublic–privatepartnershipsforinsuranceofferapotentiallypowerfulandcost-efficientalternativetopost-disasterhumanitarianaid.
2.1.5 Private sector fundraising for drought responseAspreviouslymentioned,the2011droughtresponseincludedunprecedentedparticipationfromtheKenyancorporatecommunityandfromordinarycitizensraisingfundstosupportKRCSemergencyandpost-emergencydroughtresponses.WhenaskedbythestudyteamaboutprivatesectorengagementwithhumanitarianactioninKenya,mostprivatesectoractors(aswellasmanyUN,NGOandgovernmentofficials)focusedalmostexclusivelyontheK4KmodelandonfundraisingfortheKRCS.Privatesectorpartnershipwasusuallyequatedwithfundraisingopportunities,suggestingaquitestraightforwardinterpretationofprivatesectorengagementwithhumanitarianaction,asopposedtothemorenuanceddiscussionsonprivate–publicpartnershipsintheinternationalhumanitarianworld.OnerepresentativeofaUNhumanitarianagencysuggestedthatthispointedtotheneedforhumanitariansinKenyatodoabetterjobofeducatingthepublicandthecorporatesectoronthecomplexitiesofhumanitarianaction,perhapsthroughconcertedeffortswiththemedia.BothBBCMediaAction(BBCMA)andtheNationGrouphighlightedalackofmediainterestinhumanitarianmessaging,whichinsteadrelieslargelyonhumanitarians(ororganisationssuchastheBBCMA)producingprogrammingorpayingforspotsonlocalradio.
2.2 Private sector contributions to emergency preparedness and resilience
Thisstudyfoundlittleevidenceofstructuredprivatesectorengagementinemergencypreparednessactivitiespriortothe2011drought.Accordingtogovernment
officialsfromtheNDMAandtheNationalDisasterOperationsCenter(NDOC),theprivatesectorisnotaformalmemberofgovernmentemergencypreparednessstructuressuchastheKenyaFoodSecuritySteeringGroup,thoughthegovernmentiscurrentlyrevisingitsdisastermanagementpolicywiththeaimofstreamliningandclarifyingnationalgovernmentroles.Oncethispolicyisapproved,thenewdisastermanagementstructureswillbebetterabletoincludeprivatesectorparticipants–aprospectthatwaswelcomedbytheofficialsinterviewed.
Anumberofcompaniesofferedsomeanecdotalevidenceoftheirownbusinesscontinuityanddisasterpreparednessactivities.EastAfricaBreweries,forexample,citedtheeffectofdroughtsonitssupplychain,notingthatitprocured30%ofitsstarchfromsorghumgrownindryerareasofKenya,andthatstockpilinggrainwasabusinessnecessity.Suppliesfallduringdroughtand,whenWFPentersthemarket,accordingtotheBreweries,pricesforcerealsarefurtherinflated.TheprivatesectorwasmoreheavilyengagedinpreparednessexercisesledbyOCHAforthe2013elections,asdiscussedbelow.Safaricomandothercompaniesalludedtoextensive,andconfidential,disastermanagementandcontinuityplansfortheirownbusinesses.
2.2.1 Cementing ongoing humanitarian and the private sector partnerships around resilienceInthepost-droughtperiod,manyoftheprivatesectorpartnershipsdescribedabovehavebeenmaintainedandcontinuetogrow,particularlyinthecontextofresilienceprogrammingthatincorporatesdisasterpreparednessandriskreductionelements.Clearly,theresilienceagenda(confirmedintheKenyangovernment’sPost-DisasterNeedsAssessment(PDNA)),hastakenholdasacommonvisionamongallcategoriesofactorinterviewedbythestudyteam,andthemoremarket-sensitiveapproachesemployedinthe2011drought(manywithdirectprivatesectorpartnerships)havebeeneasilytransferabletoactivitiesnowbeingimplementedbydual-mandatedagenciesandNGOs.Asonelong-servinglocalgovernmentofficialinLodwarputit,‘everybody’stalkingDRRnow…somethingthatwasnotseeninthepast.Theissueisthatwehadbecomedependentonemergencies;theNGOswouldcomeandsay“take,take”andthenleaveinsixmonths’.TheofficialdescribedagrowingconsensusacrossthecountyanddowntothevillagelevelaroundtheneedforeffectiveDRRactivities.
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TheEquityBankmanagerinLodwarechoedthesesentiments–‘wewantlong-termsolutions,notshort;IknowsomeoftheNGOswouldnotwanttohearthat’.
Oneofthemostextensiveongoingprivate–publicpartnershipsrelatedtoresilienceanddroughtresponseistheKenyaHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP),whichtargetsimpoverishedhouseholdsinfourcounties,Mandera,Wajir,MarsabitandTurkana.Phase1oftheHSNP,from2008–12,fundedcashtransfersto69,000households(approximately500,000people).EquityBankmanagedthetransfersthroughitsbanksandagents.Phase2aimstoregisterandprovidefullbankaccountsto400,000householdsacrossthefourcounties.InternationalNGOsareorganisingtheregistrationprocess,whiletheprogrammepaysEquityBanktoopentheaccounts.TheHSNPwillmakeregulartransfersto100,000ofthepooresthouseholdsaspartofitsongoingsocialsafetynetprogramme,andtheremainingaccountscanbeusedforcashtransfersintimesofdrought.Itshouldbenoted,though,thatHSNPpaymentsarecurrentlynotbeingproposedasanalternativetofoodaid,norcouldtheysubstituteatthisstageforin-kinddeliverieswheremarketsarenotfunctioning.Nevertheless,aspointedoutinarecentanalysis,amajorobjectiveoftheHSNPishungerreductionand‘itwouldclearlybepracticalandefficientifWFP’s(foodassistance)pipelinecouldbedistributedusingthesamecard(andalsousingprivatedistributionagentsandtradersinthemodeoftheHSNP)’(Fitzgibbon,2012).ThisHSNP-EquitypartnershipisapotentialgamechangerforaddressingfuturedroughtneedsinthearidareasofKenya.
Similarly,themajorUNagenciesandinternationalNGOscontinuetogrowandexpandtheirpartnershipswithmobilemoneyoperatorsandbanksinthecontextoftheirpost-droughtresilience-buildingefforts.Forexample,ajointWFP–EquityBank–MasterCard‘cash-lite’pilotwasrolledoutinAugust2013withtheaimofovercomingtheshortageofphysicalcashinremoteandinsecureareas.TheexperimentallowsbeneficiariestoreceivecashonaMasterCard-brandedbankcardandthenspendthatcashelectronicallyatnearbyretailshopsequippedbyEquityBanktoacceptbanktransactions.
2.2.2 Opportunities for new public–private partnerships around resilienceInsomeofthearidareasofKenya–andalmostcertainlyinpartsofTurkanaCounty–thepost-
2011droughtperiodappearstobecharacterisedbyagrowingconvergenceofinterestsamongimportantprivatesectoractorsandthehumanitarian/developmentcommunity.OnebankinLodwar,forexample,describeditseffortsto‘bank’alargeproportionofthepopulationofTurkanaCountyaspartofitsroleasaleadpartneronphase2oftheHSNP.ThebankisbeingsubsidisedbytheHSNPtoexpanditsclientbaseintheregion(atpresentonly2%ofTurkana’spopulationofabout850,000hasabankaccount).Phase2oftheHSNPwillincreasethenumberofbeneficiaryhouseholdsinTurkanafrom30,000familiesinPhase1toover40,000andmakethemall,forthefirsttime,fullholdersofbankaccounts.TheaveragehouseholdfamilysizeacrossthefouraridregionscoveredbytheHSNPis7.2(HSNP,2013),meaningthataroundone-thirdofthepopulationormoreofTurkanaalonewillbecomebankingclientsunderPhase2.Theplanisforthisnumbertobeincreasedifwarrantedbydroughtconditions.
Clearly,thebankseescommercialpossibilitiesbeyondtheHSNPthatmakeitspartnershipwiththeprogrammesoattractive.Thebank’sbranchmanagerdescribedtheregionasthecountry’snextbigeconomicfrontier,citingagrowinglevelofinterestintheregionfromhisbank’smanagementaswellastheimminentopeningofanumberofotherbankbranchesinLodwar.Discoveriesofmajorwaterandoilresourcesintheregionareanimportantdriverofthisinterest.Arangeofactorsinterviewedfullyexpectedthetransportandcommunicationinfrastructureintheregiontobeupgradedsoontoenableexploitationoftheseresources
Kenya’srefugeecampspresentaparticularopportunityfortheprivatesector.ResearchfortheUNHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)in2010reportedthat5,000busi-nesses,rangingfromindividualtraderstolargeshops,wereoperatingintheDadaabcamp,withanannualturnoverof$25m(DANIDA,2010).Around30%ofUNHCR’sfundingforDadaabin2011camefromtheprivatesector,althoughalmostallwasfromoutsideKenya.Somelocalandinternationalprivatesectorpartnershipsarefundingprogrammesinthecamp,includingacollaborationbetweenSafaricomandMicrosoftone-learningprogrammes.
Box 2: Refugees and the private sector
�� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
–investmentsthatwouldbenefittheresilienceobjectivesofdonorsandagencies,aswellasfuturehumanitarianresponses.Similartrendsinprivatesectorengagementweredescribedbyactorsoperatinginotherdrought-proneregions,thoughthepaceofchangeisunlikelytobeasquickwithoutthepullofsuchlargeextractiveandnaturalresourceopportunities.
2.3 The private sector and emergency preparedness and response around election violence
PoliticalviolencebrokeoutinKenyaaroundthe2007election,afterarelativelypeacefulelectionin2002,andonanunprecedentedscaleandbreadthacrossthecountry.Inallabout1,200peoplewerekilledand664,000displaced,thousandsofwhomstillare.Privatelyownedvernacularradiostations,setupfollowingcommercialpressureonthegovernmenttoliberalisetheairwavestoserveandselltoparticularethnicandlinguisticcommunities,hadplayedapartinincitingviolencebybroadcastinghatemessages,asdidviralhatetextmessaging(Deane,2013).
ThelevelsofviolenceshockedtheinternationalcommunityandmuchoftheKenyanprivatesector.Transportroutesweredisruptedforthefirst2–3monthsof2008,withfuelpricesrisingsharplyasfarafieldaseasternDRC.TheKenyaShippersAssociation(KSA)7liaisedwiththepolicetoadviseitsmembersonhowbesttosecuretheirsupplychains.Thiswasthefirsttimethatpoliticalviolencehadseriouslydamagedbusiness,andaftertheviolencewasovertheprivatesectoruseditsnetworkofbusinessassociationstoapplypressureonthegovernmenttotackletherootcausesoftheviolence(usuallyjudgedtolieinthewinner-takes-allConstitution,post-coloniallanddistributionandacultureofimpunity)andavoidarepeat.
DuringtheviolencenewprivatelyownedwebsitessuchasUshahidistartedtousecrowdsourcingtorecordandmapincidentsofviolenceandhumanrightsabuses.TheprivatesectorcontributedtotheNationalHumanitarianFundfortheMitigationofEffectsandResettlementofVictimsofthepost2007ElectionViolence,butbeyondthemediadidnotfeaturesignificantlyamongthe
witnessestotheWakiCommission,whichinvestigatedtheviolence.Theinternationalhumanitariancommunitywasinvolvedinfundingreliefeffortsforthedisplaced,butlikeotherswascaughtlargelyunpreparedforthescaleoftheviolence.
Between2008andthe2013electionsmajorchangesweremadetotheConstitution,hatespeechwasmadeacrimeandallmobilephoneuserswererequiredtoregisterbeforegettingaSIMcard.Averythoroughpreparednessprocesswasputinplaceinvolvingthegovernment,theKRCSandinternationalhumanitarianagenciesanddonors,ledbyOCHA.Hubsweresetupinregionalcentrestohelpreducetherisksofviolenceandmakecontingencyplans.Somehubs,suchasKisumu,activelyinvolvedtheprivatesector;somebusinessleaderswerereportedtohaveinfluencedpoliticalleaderstoshowrestraint,andthepublicandprivatemediamoderatedtheirtonetotheextentthattheywereaccusedbypartsofthemediaofbeingsupine.KRCSleda‘votepeace’campaignusingtextmessaging,andpersuadedpoliticalleaderstosignapubliccommitmenttohonourtheelectionresultsandtakeanycomplaintsthroughthecourts.Ushahidiandothersiteswereprimedtomonitorelectionviolence.Intheend,although192peoplearereportedtohavediedduringtheelections,thepollwaswidelyjudgedasuccessandmanyofthecontingencyplansthathadbeendrawnupdidnothavetobeused.Theprivatesectorhadplayedapartinthis,albeitnotinasystematicway.
PoliticallydrivenviolencereturnedwiththeAl-ShabaabattackattheWestgateCentreinNairobion21September2013,whichleft67peopledeadand175injured.HerethefirstrespondersweretheKRCSandthelocalbusinesscommunity,whichwasdirectlyaffectedintheattack.Westgateisasignificantbusinesscentre–thesupermarketchainNakumatt,forexample,took14%ofitsrevenuethroughitsWestgatestore.Inresponsetotheattack,onemobilenetworkoperatorsetuphotspotsprobonoaroundWestgatetoenablecommunications;itandothertelecomsproviderscoordinatedbyKRCSsetupafundforthevictimswhichhadraised$1mwithinaweekfromindividualandcorporatedonations,manymadebymobilephone.Bymid-October,totaldonationsamountedtoKsh123m(closeto$1.5m)(Njagi,2013).Accountancyfirmsagreedtoaudittheuseoffundsprobono,andtwitteruserswerequicktoquestiontheuseofthefunds,halfofwhichwenttopaymedicalbillsatlocalprivatehospitals.SecurityaspectsoftheWestgatecrisiswerehandledbytheKenyanpoliceandarmy,with7 Interview,KSA.
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someinitialinvolvementfromlocalprivatesecuritycompanies,butmuchoftherestoftheresponsewasledbyKRCSandtheprivatesector,fillinginforaperceivedlackofgovernmentaction.
Westgatewasthefirstdirect,large-scaleattackonNairobi’sbusinesscommunityandtheirfamilies.Whentheirbusinessinterestsaredirectlythreatened
orharmed,aswiththeblockageofroadsduringthepost-electionviolenceortheattackatWestgate,thebusinesscommunitydoesreact.KEPSAandtheKenyaAssociationofManufacturers(KAM)bothcitedadvocacyandlobbyingeffortswiththegovernmentforsecuritysectorreformandimprovedsecurityenforcementinresponsetoboththepost-electionviolenceandtheWestgateattack.
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Ifhumanitarian–privatesectorengagementinKenyaistocontributefurthertonationalresponsestofuturehumanitariancrises,anumberoftheexamplesandtrendsdescribedabovecouldbebuiltupon.Inmostcases,though,existinghumanitarian–privatesectorengagementcouldbemorestrategicandmoreefficient–possibly,asastart,throughamorestructureddialoguebetweenemergencyandpreparednessleadersingovernmentandthehumanitariancommunityandrepresentativesoftheprivatesector.
3.1 Growth, the private sector and implications for humanitarian action
OneofthemorepromisingopportunitiesforprivatesectorengagementinhumanitarianactionovercomingyearsissimplythewidespreadandgrowingawarenessamonghumanitarianactorsinKenya(aswellaswithintheKenyangovernment)oftheneedtoworkwithintheslipstreamofprivatesectoractivitiesandmarkets.Asthe2011droughtresponseactivitiesandthepost-droughtresilienceworkdemonstrate,thisisnotaboutcedinghumanitarianresponsibilitytothemarket,butinsteadaboutrecognisingthatfunctioningmarketswill,formanywhoarecurrentlyperennialrecipientsofhumanitarianaid,bringopportunitiesthatwillreducetheneedforhumanitarianassistanceand–whenitisneeded–makethatassistancemoreefficientandcost-effective.Thesemarket-friendlyapproachesandexperimentscouldbenefitfromthesortofin-depthunderstandingoftheprivatesectorthatcomeswithworksuchastheECHO-WFP-governmentstudyonmarketsinthearidlands(citedabove).
3.1.1 Partnering with the private sector for transport and logisticsTheKenyanprivatesectorisstronglyengagedineffortstoimproveKenya’spositionasaregional
transporthub,includingbyimprovingtradelinksandport,railandroadinfrastructure.Theprivatesector,forexample,partnerscloselywithTrademarkEastAfrica(TMEA),adonor-supportedmechanismthatworkstoincreasetrade,marketaccessandcompetitivenessintheEastAfricanCommunity.ThegoalsofTMEAcoincidesquarelywithhumanitarianprocurementandlogisticsneedsintheregion,includingmaintainingefficientandopencorridorstoSouthSudan,SomaliaandnorthernKenya.Butwhilehumanitariansareawareofdiscussionsandaresometimesinvolvedinmeetings,thereappearstobelimitedstructuredengagementofhumanitariansinthedebatebetweentheprivatesectorandthegovernmentabouttransportandinfrastructurepriorities.
3.1.2 Private sector platforms for delivering humanitarian aid in cashCashtransferplatformsprovideanopportunityforrevolutionisinghumanitarianresponseinKenyaandforbringinglong-marginalisedpopulationsintomoreintegratedmarketsandtheorbitofbankingandfinancialservices.TheresilienceagendainKenyaiscontributingtorealisingthesepossibilities.However,thesehumanitarianresponsesarelargelystillattheexperimentalstageandtherearereasonsforcaution:switchingtotheseplatformswillbeaslowprocess,especiallyastheyarerolledouttodistantareas;thesustainabilitywithwhichbankandtelecomsystemscandeliveraidrestsonunprovenbusinessmodels;anddialoguebetweentheprivatesectorandhumanitarianactorsonsharedandrespectiveobjectivesisadhocanddispersed.
Theremarkablespreadofmobilemoneytransfersandvillage-levelbankinginKenya–nowextendingintomoredistantanddrought-affectedareas–bringsapotentialconvergenceofbusinessandhumanitarianintereststoplaceswherepastemergencyresponseshadfewoptionsforutilisingprivatemarketsanddeliverychannels.EquityBankandSafaricomarewayoutinfrontofthecompetition,thoughnewfinancialplayers,
3 Humanitarian–private sector engagement: opportunities and constraints
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suchastheFirstCommunityBankinMandera,arearriving.OngoingresilienceinvestmentssuchastheHSNPorWFP’sworkoncashforassetssuggestthattheseplatformsmaybemovingclosertothepointwherehumanitarianresponsesusingcashtransferscouldbedoneonalargescale.
Buttheremaybereasonstoavoidcomplacencyinthinkingthatthespreadofmobilebanking–whetherthebankagentormobilemoneymodel–willmeettheimmediateneedsofhumanitarianagenciesor,moreimportantly,helptoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofthoseneeds.Mostnotably,therearelegitimatequestionsabouttheincentivesandbusinessmodelsofthetelecomcompaniesandthebanks,andtowhatextentthesecoincidewithindependentandimpartialhumanitarianaction.Atthemoment,anumberofexperimentsareunderway:onthehumanitariansidetoreplacetrucksandbagsoffoodwithM-PESAorEquityBankdigitaltransfers;andontheprivatesectorsidetotestoutwhetherthepooranddispersedpopulationsofthearidandsemi-aridregionsofKenyaareapotentiallyprofitableclientbase.Forthemostpartrelationsbetweenthetwosidesarecontractual,andinthatsensenotmuchdifferentfromanaidagencycontractingalocaltransportertocarryfoodtoadistributionsite.Theexistenceofathrivingprivatesector(e.g.thegrowingcoverageofmobilemoney)insomedisaster-hitareashasspurredthehumanitariancommunitytoinnovate,andcontractswiththeseprovidersarehelpingtosubsidisetheexpansionoftheprivatesectorfurtherintoremoteareas.Butitisnotclearhowsustainablethatexpansionwillbeifprofits–independentofaidcontracts–donotfollow.
Therearealsoreasonstobeoptimistic.Changingtechnologyandinnovationssuchasthebankagentmodelmeanthatthepriceofestablishingabusinesspresenceandexecutingtransactionsisfalling.Thereisalsoafairdegreeofbullishthinkingabouttheeconomyofthearidandsemi-aridregions,basedonmineraldiscoveries,improvingtransportandopportunitiestofurthercommercialiselivestockowningasthedemandformeatinKenyagrows,meaningaprofitableclientbasemaybeontheway.Nevertheless,thoughbothEquityandSafaricom,totakethetwomainplayersasanexample,havemadecontributionsin-kindtotheongoingexperiments,thereisstillaneedtoclarifysharedandunsharedobjectivesbetweenthetwocommunitiesinordertoensurethebestpossibleoutcomesforfuturecrisis-affectedpeople.Atthemoment,fromwhatthestudy
teamheard,thedialogueinthisareaismostlyadhocanddispersedamongmanydifferenthumanitarianactorsandmanydifferentprivatesectoractors.
3.1.3 Keeping abreast of technological advances – and not just conceptuallyOnthefinancialservicesandinformationtechnologyside,thepotentialforotherhumanitarian(orhumanitarian-related)productstoreachdisaster-affectedpopulations,suchascropandlivestockinsurance,healthservicesandimprovedmarketinformation,hasonlyjustbeguntobeexplored.Theseareotherareaswhereadeeperdialoguebetweenthehumanitarianandtheprivatesectors–apartnershipthatgoesbeyondadhoccontractualarrangements–maybevaluable.OnelessonfromtheregionalCashLearningPartnership(CaLP)teamandechoedinotherinterviewsistheimportanceofhavingthe‘backoffices’ofhumanitarianagencies–thefinance,logistics,accountingandITdivisions–fullyengagedindialoguewithprivatesectorpartners.Accordingtoexperts,thereisnoshortageofhumanitarianprogrammestaffwhocanconceptualiseatechnologicalsolutiontoaproblem,butbottlenecksareovercomeandrealprogressismadewhentherespective‘backoffices’aretalkingtoeachother.3.1.4 Livestock as a business – linking humanitarian action with the livestock marketInterventionsduringthedroughtperiodthatattemptedtoadapttoandsupportthelivestockmarketdemonstratedthepotentialforfuturehumanitarianresponsestrategies.Inthefuture,pastoralistswouldseetheweatherforecast(ontheirmobilephones),destockandselltheirstill-healthyanimals,banktheirmoneywithamobilebankingagentandbuymoreanimalswhenconditionsimprove.LivestockassociationsandtradersconfirmedwhatFAOdescribedasagrowingunderstandingoftheneedtotransformlivestockrearingfromatraditionalculturalpracticeintomoreofabusiness.Accordingtothesestakeholders,pastoralistsunderstandtheeffectsofchangingclimateandareincreasinglytakingstepstoprotecttheirlivelihoodsbymanagingtheirherdstomitigatetherisksofmorefrequentandseveredroughts,investinginpasture,destockinginatimelywayandsoon.Thegovernmentismakinginvestmentsthatwillhelp,suchasabattoirsinLokichokio(completed)andIsiolo(underconstruction)thatwillallowforslaughterandpreservationclosertopastoralists.Improvedtransportroutesareessentialtointegratingthelivestocktradewithgrowingnational
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andglobalmarkets,suchasSaudiArabiaandYemen,wheredemandisstrong.Thecombinedeffectsoftheseinvestmentscouldtransformhowpastoralists,tradersandhumanitarianagenciesrespondtofuturedroughts.
3.1.5 Expanding the scope and understanding of corporate social responsibilityDialoguewithbanksandtelecomscompaniesontheirworkinhumanitarianactioncouldbepartofalargerdiscussionabouthowcompaniesdeploytheircorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)resources,andhowtheymightbeusedintheserviceofhumanitarianneeds.Thereisagrowingawarenessof,andcommitmentto,CSRamongprivatesectoractorsinKenya.Thepracticeofestablishingcorporatefoundationsalsoseemstobetakinghold.Mostofthediscussionisaboutrespondingwithcashorin-kinddonationsinreactiontoaparticularevent.TheSafaricom–KRCSpartnershipbegunwithK4Kisagoodmodelforhowanestablishedpartnershipcanbeputintoactionquicklywhenanewdisasterstrikes.FollowingtheWestgateattack,themodelwasre-establishedwithin48hours,allowingsubstantialfundstoberaisedbutalsoshowinghowcorporateexpertisecouldbedeployedinacrisis.Nevertheless,seniornationalandinternationalhumanitarianactorscomplainedthatthereislittleappetiteforpartnershipsinwhichtheprivatesectorinvestsitsskillsorresourcesinpreparednessactivities,orinmorelaboriousandlonger-termpost-disasterrecoveryandresilience-building.
ConfirmingthefindingsofmanystudiesonglobalCSRincentives,Nielsen,theglobalinformationandmeasurementcompany,describedhowitscommitmenttocontributingtoKenya’ssocialanddevelopmentneedswasamajorincentiveforKenyansreturningfromthediasporatojointhecompany.WFPandNielsen,whichhavenegotiatedaglobalcorporatepartnership,havebeenexploringhowNielsen’sexpertiseincollectingandanalysingsurveydatamightbeusedinKenyainconjunctionwithvulnerabilityassessmentmappingandbeneficiarytargeting.Buildingthistypeofmorein-depthpartnership,whilealsocontinuingtogrowcorporatesectorgiving,couldhelpKenyabettermanageandfunditshumanitarianchallengesinthefuture.3.1.6 Connecting global private sector partnerships to national humanitarian effortsThereareanumberofglobalprivatesectorpartnershipswithhumanitarianagencies,butveryfewappeartohavereachedKenya.Manylocalstaffwere
onlypassinglyaware,ifatall,oftheiragencies’globalpartnerships,andmosthumanitarianintervieweeshadlittleornoknowledgeofexistinginitiativesforpublic–privatepartnerships,suchastheWorldEconomicForum’sDisasterResourcePartnershiportheFritzInstitute’sworkthroughGlobalHand.OthersexpressedtheviewthatthepartnershipsservedHQinterestsanddidnotproviderealaddedvalue–orresources–atthenationallevel.Anothercomplaintwasthatthetermsofthepartnershipsnegotiatedatthegloballevelweretooinflexibletobeusefulinalocalcontext(e.g.ratesforconsultancyservices),andthatHQunitswerecontrollingthepartnershipswithaviewtomaintaininggoodrelationswithpartners,butwerenotprovidingsupportfortheverylabour-intensiveworkofbuildingmeaningfulpartnershipsatthenationallevel.Wheresimple,transferablediscountshadbeennegotiated(forexamplewithMaerskshipping),agencieswereabletotakeadvantageatthelocallevel.
ThereisgrowingmultinationalinterestandpresenceinKenya,andthestudyteamdidfindsomegoodexampleswhereglobalpartnershipshadpaidlocaldividends,suchasWFP’sMasterCardpartnershipsettingupcashtransferpaymentsystemsusingdebitcards.Asahumanitarianandregionalhubwithagrowingmultinationalpresence,Nairobimaybeagoodplaceformakingaconcertedeffortonthepartofhumanitarianagenciesandtheirglobalpartnerstotranslatethesepartnershipsintomeaningfulactioninthefield.
KenyahasaGlobalCompactNetwork(GCN)withover65members.TheCEOofSafaricom,BobCollymore,isontheUNGlobalCompactBoard.TheKenyanNationalAssociationofManufacturers(KAM)providesthesecretariat.TheKenyaGCNhasfocusedonbusinessethicsandaddressingcorruption.Ithasnotsofarhadaparticularfocusonhumanitarianissues,butmembersoftheinternationalcommunitycoulduseKAMasastartingpointforengagingbusinessassociations.
3.2 Future prospects
KRCS,asfirstresponder,anditsprivatesectorpartnersgiveKenyaastrengththatmanycountriesatasimilarstageofdevelopmentdonothave,suggestingthatKenyawillbeabletohandlesmalltomediumcriseswithlittleoutsidesupport.Ifthereisafurtherseriousdroughtinthenextthreeyears,thereisagoodchancethatimprovedweatherforecasting,
�0 Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
mostlyfromprivatesectorsources,willprovidebetterwarning,andmobilephonenetworkswillbeusedtorelaymoreaccuratemessagesingoodtimetothosewhoarevulnerable.Buttheexpansionofcashtransfersandexperimentstokeepmarketsopenwillhaveonlylimitedextracoverage,andtheinternationalcommunitywillstillneedtoprovideamajorfinancialcontribution.WhetherKenyangovernmentsystemswillbebetterthanin2011dependsinpartonwhetherthenewplanningsystemsunderpreparationaremoreinclusivethantheirpredecessors.
Inthelongerterm,Kenya’shumanitarianfutureishardertogauge.TheVision2030aspirationisforthecountrytoreachmiddle-incomestatusand,asseveralintervieweestoldtheresearchers,nottorelyonexternalassistance,especiallyforfood.TheKenyaneconomyhasthepotentialtogrowquickly,boostedbyoilrevenues.TullowOilhassofardiscoveredreservesof300mbarrels,andthereistheprospectofmore.Thedevelopmentoftransportcorridorsthroughdrought-proneareas,particularlytheLamu–SouthSudan–EthiopiaTransportCorridor,andthespreadof
Thepillarsofhumanitariansuccessformiddle-incomecountrieswithstrongprivatesectorengage-ment,scoredfrom1(littleprogress)to5(achieved)withtrendsteady(=),positive(+),ornegative(–)
�.Government-ledpreparednessplann�ngsystemthatincludetheprivatesector,supportedbybestavailableforecastsandstockpiles/calldowncontractswithsuppliersatpre-agreedratesScore:�=Newambitiouspoliciesareinplacebutcurrentsystemsareunder-developedandtherearefurthermanagementandbudgetuncertaintiesasaresultoftheunfinished/untestedgovernmentdevo-lutionprocess.Privatesectorconfidenceingovern-mentdeliveryislow.
�.Capac�tytof�nanceacr�s�sresponseeitherthroughincreasedtaxrevenuesorborrowingScore:�=ThereisareasonableprospectthatKenyawillbeabletoborrowonthefinancialmarketsinthenextfewyearsandtoraisemoretaxorborrowlargesumsdomesticallyincrisis.
�.Transportsystemthatsupportshumanitarianresponseincrisis-proneareasScore:�+Transittimeshaveimprovedinthelast3yearsbutthereisalongwaytogoontheroadsandport(andabarelyfunctioningrailway).However,therearegoodprospectsoffurtherimprovement.
�.Platformsforprov�d�ngcr�s�ssupportpaymentstovulnerablepeoplewheretheyliveScore:�+KenyaisaleaderinAfricaonthemovementofmoneyandbankingforthepoor.
ThereisencouragingprogressthroughM-PESA,EquityBankandothers,thoughtheroll-outofcoverageisslowingasitmovestowardspoorer,moreremoteareas.
�.Res�l�entmarkets,includingamarketculture,incrisis-proneareasScore:�=Thereareencouragingexperimentsunderwayindrought-affectedareasforbothlive-stockandagriculturemarkets,buttheseareonasmallscale.Greaterattentionisneededtotransportsystemsandtothelonger-termcommercialisationoflivestockinpastoralistareas.
�.Agrow�ng,educatedm�ddleclasswillingtocontributetocrisisresponseandholdhumanitarianactorstoaccountScore:�+Thepublicisincreasinglyeducatedabouthumanitariancrisesandhasdemonstratedawillingnesstogivegenerously.KRCSistrustedbythepublicasthefirstresponderforsmalltomediumcrisesandisheldtoaccountbythepublicandthemedia;nosimilartrustandaccountabilityexistsbetweenthepublicandthegovernmentwhenitcomestocrisisresponse.
�.Popularcommun�cat�onsystemsthateducateand�nformonhuman�tar�an�ssuesinadditiontocrisisreportingScore:�=Largemediaconcentrateoncrisisreporting,withtheprovisionofhumanitarianeducationandcrisisinformationlimitedtosmaller-scale,subsidisedinitiativesofagencieslikeUNICEFandBBCMediaAction.
Box 3: Outline assessment of Kenya’s current progress towards managing its own large-scale humanitarian crises
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bankingwillbringopportunitiesforamoremarket-basedarableandlivestockeconomy.Asdroughtsbecomemorefrequentpastoralists’viewoftheirherdsassymbolsofprestigeratherthanaswealthtobemanagedisgraduallychanging.Whereasnowthearidandsemi-aridareascontributemarginallytoKenya’sGDP,inthefuturethatshouldchange,andwithitthepoliticalattentiontheseregionsreceive.
Asamiddle-incomecountry,Kenyashouldbeabletoraiseresourcesdomesticallyoroninternationalmarketstomeetthecostsofdroughts.Increasingaccesstocashtransfersdeliveredthroughtheprivatesectorwillfurtherreducetheneedforfoodaid.Inthisscenario,theprivatesectoristhesourceofextrawealthandresilience,forexamplethroughcommercialisationofthelivestocksectorinthearidandsemi-aridlands,reducingoravoidinghumanitariandisastersandprovidingthedeliverymechanismforthemainreliefeffort,with
internationalhumanitarianagenciesincreasinglyplayinganadvisoryrole.Forthistransitiontoworksmoothly,thegovernmentwillneedtoplayaguidingrole,helpedbytheinternationalhumanitariancommunityandinvolvingtheprivatesectorinplanninginamuchmoresystematicway.Butthereisamoredifficultscenario,wheredroughtsbecomemorefrequent,pastoralistscommercialiseonlyveryslowly,thegovernmentisnotabletoprovideleadershipondroughtmanagement,rapidpopulationgrowthcontinuesandextrawealthinthearidlands,particularlyoilrevenues,fuelsconflict,leadingtoachangedbutnotimprovedhumanitariansituation.
Box3(opposite)providesaroughassessmentbythestudyteamofwhereKenyacurrentlyisonthepathtomanagingitsownlarger-scalecriseswithmorelimitedexternalhelp,andsuggeststhecurrentdirectionoftravel.Itisnotcomprehensiveandisintendedtostimulatedebate.
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4 Opportunities and options
Thisstudyhastackledabroadsubjectinarelativelyshortperiodoftime.Thefollowingsuggestionsandrecommendationsarethereforemadewithacommensuratedegreeofcircumspection.TheyarealsomadeagainstabackgroundwhereKenyanswanttotakemoreresponsibilityformanagingtheirownhumanitariancrises.Thisshouldmeanagrowingrolefortheprivatesector.
4.1 Taking advantage of changing markets
Takinggreaterresponsibilityformanaginglargerhumanitariancriseswillrequireencouragingmarketstofunctionduringdroughtsandexploringnewwaystotransferresourcestopeoplemadevulnerablebycrises.Currentlydonorsaresupportingawiderangeofexperimentsintheseareas.Theseshouldcontinue,butwithstrongercoordinationtoensurethatthebestaretakentoscalequickly.Thisprocesscanbestbecoordinatedbythegovernment,workingcloselywiththeprivatesectorandinternationaldonors.
Atpresentdonorsaresubsidisingtheprivatesectortoconductsomeoftheseinitiatives,suchastheHSNP.Itwasbeyondthescopeofthisstudytomakerecommendationsonthescaleofsubsidiesjustified(e.g.forincreasinggeographicandpopulationcoverageorforcreatinginsuranceproducts)totakethebestoftheexperimentstoscale,butthiswarrantscarefulassessment.TechnologychangesmeanthatfirmslikeSafaricomaremakingcommercialdecisionstoinvestinpreviouslyunprofitableareas,sosubsidieswillnotalwaysbenecessary.
Withthespreadofprivatesector-facilitatedcashtransfermechanismstothearidandsemi-aridlands,theneedforfoodandnon-foodinputsfromdonorsshoulddecline.FoodtransporterswillworkincreasinglyforshopownersinsteadofNGOs.Preparednessplanningforthenextdrought,however,needstobeintensified,especiallyforthearidlandscoveredbyphase2oftheHSNP.Thegovernment,
WFPandtheHSNPdonorswillneedtoreachanagreementsoononthelevelsoffoodandcashinputslikelytobeneededduringthenextdrought.
Astheeconomyofatleastpartofthearidandsemi-aridlandschangeswithsignificantnewinvestments(e.g.byforeignoilcompanies,butalsowithnewwaterandtransportlinks),itwillbeimportantforthehumanitariancommunitytoengagethelargerprivatesectorinvestorstosensitisethemtohumanitarianissuesandbuildtherelationshipsthatwouldbeneededinacrisis.TullowOilandWorldVisionarealreadydoingsomeworktogetheraroundLodwar.
4.2 Procurement and transport
Thedonoragencies,whichprovidelarge-scalefoodandnon-foodinputsduringadrought,mostlyhaveestablishedcontractsthatcanbescaledupintimesofcrisisatpre-agreedrates.ThestudyfoundlessevidenceoftheKenyangovernmentoperatinginthisway(e.g.tosetuparrangementsforwaterbowseringtoavoidbeingoverchargedinacrisis).Thereisscopetotightenthisuptodeliverbettervalueformoney.
AmajoreffortisbeingmadetoimprovetransportthroughoutEastAfrica,whichshouldspeedupthetransittimesforreliefitemsandreducecosts.ThebiggeragencieslikeWFP,whichaccountsfor4%ofthetrafficthroughMombasaport,arenotcurrentlymuchengagedwithplannersoftransportinvestmentinEastAfrica,andshouldensurethattheirvoicesareheard.Wedidnothaveachancetostudyindetailtheopportunitiesforsupplyingmorereliefitemsfromwithintheregion,butwithtransportlinksimprovingtheopportunitiestopurchasefoodandhigher-valuenutritionalsupplementswillgrow.
4.3 Devolution
DevolutioninKenyaisamajorchangebeingimplementedquickly.Authorityandresources
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–includingforimportantaspectsofemergencypreparednessandresponse–arebeingdevolvedfromthenationalgovernmenttocountyauthorities.Thecomplexityoftheprocessanditspotentialimpactonhumanitarianactionshouldnotbeunderestimated.Withresponsibilitiesstillunclearandlocalsystemsuntested,Kenyarisksbeinglesspreparedifthenextdroughtcomessoon.Thatsaid,devolutionandthecreationofcountyandsub-countystructuresisanopportunitytoreshapedroughtmanagementtoincludetheprivatesectorinplanning,particularlythemobilephonecompanies,banksandtransporterswhichwillbeincreasinglyinvolvedinresponse.Thisinteractionmightalsohelptoaverttheintroductionofnewcounty-levelpermitsorfeesthatcouldmakethemovementofreliefitemsmoredifficult.TherewillbeausefulrolefordonorstoplayinsupportingthenewCountyDisasterManagementCommitteesastheytakeshape,andencouragingprivatesectorinvolvement.
4.4 Making the most of popular support in crises
Kenyahasseenveryencouragingresponsestoappealsforhumanitarianassistancefromboththeprivatesectorandprivateindividuals.Thiswillhelpasittakesmoreresponsibilityformanagingitsowncrises,butthereisscopetoraisemorefromthepublicandprivatesectorusingthenetworksthatKRCS,Safaricomandothershavedeveloped.TheKenyanprivatemediacoulddomoretohelpthesecampaigns.AtpresentsomeoftheKenyanmediaseesitselfasresponsibleonlyforreportinghumanitariancrises.Otherpartsofthemediaaretransmittinghumanitarianinformationtohelppeopleaffectedbycrises.Betterhumanitarianinformation–onwhatisneededtoavertandrespondtocrisesandwhoisresponsibleforwhatinthehumanitariansystem–willalsoprovidetheinformationKenyansneedtoholdtheirgovernmentandhumanitarianagenciestoaccount.
Forthelongerterm,ifKenyaistomanageitsownhumanitariancrisesanddevelopthearidandsemi-aridlandsinwaysthatreducetheriskofhumanitariancrises,theprivatesectorwillhavetoplayalargerroleindeliveringeconomicgrowthandsustainingmarkets,anddeliveringreliefsuppliesandcashwhendroughtsoccur.Thegovernment
hassetoutagoodvisionandstrategy,butwithalotforthepublicsectortodeliver.ThegrowingeconomicpotentialoftheASALsandthedynamismofpartsoftheKenyanandinternationalprivatesectorneedtobeexploitedfullytodeliveronthisvision.Partsofthebusinesscommunityarealreadyengaged,butothersareunlikelytogetinvolvedwithoutaconvincingcasethattheirparticipationinpreparednessandresponsewillimprovetheirprofits.Thisstudysuggeststhattheelementsofsuchacasearethere.Theinternationalhumanitariancommunitywillbeabletobringbestpracticefromothercountries,andKRCShasthelocalstandingwiththeprivatesectorandthepublictohelpgovernmentandbusinessassociationsinthistask.
4.5 What does this mean for international humanitarian coordination?
Excellentpreparednessworkwasundertakenbeforethe2013election,includingsomewithinputfromtheprivatesector.Ethnicproblemssurfacemostlyduringelections,buttherisksremainsubstantialevenwhenelectionsarenotnear.Resourcesforsomeinternationalhumanitarianorganisationshavedeclinedsubstantially,butagenciessuchasOCHAshouldretainthekeypoliticalrelationshipsthattheyhavedevelopedandencouragethebusinessandNGOcommunitiestocontinuetheirmonitoringofethnicviolenceandhumanrightsabuses.
Thegovernment’sagendafortheASALsismovingtolonger-termdevelopmentasameansofavertinghumanitariancrises.SotherewillbeaneedfortheUNhumanitarianagenciesandotherstoworkevenmorecloselywiththeWorldBankandothersengagedonthatagenda,aswellasbusinessassociations,perhapsstartingwithKAM,whichalsoleadsontheGlobalCompact.Theseeffortsshouldbuildontheprivatesectorengagementstrategiesandprocessesbeingundertakenbymajorhumanitarianagenciesattheheadquarterslevel.Asthisproceeds,staffinthefieldshouldbeconsultedonwhatpartnershipswillworkbestforthem,andgivenaclearsteeronhowbesttotakeadvantageofthesepartnerships.Thatis,international,nationalandlocaleffortstobuildpartnershipsshouldtakeplacesimultaneouslybutnotinparallel;theymust
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continuouslyreturntotheneedsofcrisis-affectedpeopleandaidagenciesservingthemontheground.Whiletherearemanyopportunitiesforlinkingupaidagenciesandbusinesses,thetimeandresources
neededtobuildpartnershipsinthefieldshouldnotbeunderestimated,particularlyincountriessuchasKenyawherethetraditionalhumanitariansectorisbeingsubstantiallyreduced.
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Annex 1IntervieweesAbdallaRashidAgolla HeadofProgrammes,IslamicReliefWorldwide
RobertAllport AssistantFAORepresentative
TitoArunga NationalAgricultureValueChainOfficer,FAO
NicholasCox RegionalAdvisor,USAID/OFDA
SimonDenhere RegionalProcurementOfficer,WFP
IsabelleD’Haudt ECHO
EJEsekon‘psc’(K) ManagingDirector,LodwarWaterandSanitationCompanyLtd.
AhmedAbdelgadirGalal CountryDirector,IslamicReliefWorldwide
MeganGilgan RegionalEmergencyAdviser,UNICEF
AbdiGodana BusinessGrowthandDevelopmentManager,EquityBankIsiolo
NoorGodana DeputyNDMACoordinator,Isiolo
AbbasGullet SecretaryGeneral,KenyaRedCrossSociety
EmmanuelGunei TurkanaRehabilitationProgramme
DuncanHarvey KenyaCountryDirector,SavetheChildren
CherylHarrison Coordinator,ProgrammeInnovations,WFPKenya
GlenHughson CALPFocalPoint,CashLearningPartnership
DavidKamau HeadofSub-Office,WFPLodwar
LisaKaranja RegionalDirectorPrivateSectorandCivilSociety,TradeMarkEastAfrica
DavidKipkamei DeputyCountyCommissionerIsiolo
EmmanuelKisangauand NDMA,TurkanaCounty
MarkEkaiLokaito
HumphreyKisembe Economist,ShippersCouncilofEasternAfrica
GabrielKitenga GroupHeadofTaxandPublicPolicy,EastAfricanBreweriesLtd
MfainaKibala FAO,Lodwar
PatrickLavandhomme DeputyHeadofOffice,OCHA
PeterLochuch Childfund,Turkana
BensonLong’or Oxfam,Turkana
JosephLosuru Chair,DistrictLivestockMarketingAssociation,Lodwar
RaoufMazou Representative,UNHCR
ValerianMicheni DroughtInformationManager,NationalDroughtManagementAuthority
KennedyMohochi ChiefOperationsOfficer,KenyaAssociationofManufacturers,KAM
CharlesMukunya KenyaCommercialBank,Isiolo
NelsonMunyi ACP,NationalDisastersOperationsCentre(NDOC)
EsterMuriuri GeneralManagerAgribusiness,EquityBank
OnesmusMutio BusinessDevelopmentManager,YuCash
JudyNemaisa HeadofAdvocacyandCommunications,KenyaPrivateSectorAlliance(KEPSA)
JosephNg’ang’a KenyaProgrammeOfficer,IFAD
VictorNgei ManagingDirectorSpecialProjects,NationMediaGroup
MaguNgumo GeneralManagerQTV,NationBroadcastingDivision
SteveNsubuga RegionalLogisticsOfficer,WFP
�0 Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
JoyceNyabogaand BBCMediaAction
CarolMorgan
BernardNyatuga ProgrammeOfficer,WFPKenya
JobKNyorsok BusinessGrowthandDevelopmentManager,EquityBank,Lodwar
AnneO’Mahoney CountryDirector,CONCERNWorldwide
PaulOmanga CropsProductionOfficer,FAO
ByronOnyango Safaricom
ImmaculateOtieno Manager,SafaricomFoundations
KarenPeachey BritishRedCross,EastAfricaRegionalDirector
ChrisPorter,DFID
MarcelRudasingwa HumanitarianCoordinatorandUNICEFRepresentative
DeborahSaidy DeputyRegionalDirector,WFP
DavidStanton DeputyHeadTMEA
PhilipK.Tarus DeputySecretary,MinistryofDevolutionandPlanning
AllanM.Waititu Director–ICT,ProjectsandInnovations,EquityBank
DwightWatson ManagingDirector,SouthAfrica&SubSahara,Nielsen
GabriellaWaaijman DeputyHeadofOffice,OCHAEastAfrica
NicholasWasunna DirectorProgrammeDevelopment,WorldVision
AnthonyWeru SeniorProgrammesOfficer,KEPSA
Director MinistryofLivestock,Turkana
Focus Group DiscussionMembers,PrivateTransporters’Association,Lodwar
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Map of the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya
Annex 2
Source:TheWorldBank,2012.
�� Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: Kenya case study
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