kegley chapter 9
TRANSCRIPT
Chapter 9: Alliances, Arms Control, and the Balance of Power
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Realist Road to Security Assumptions and Policy Recommendations
Realist Policy Prescriptions Premises
Prepare for war: If you want peace, prepare for war.
Remain vigilant: No state is to be trusted further than its national interest.
Avoid moralism: Standards of right and wrong apply to individuals, but not states.
Remain involved and actively intervene:
Isolationism is not an alternative to active global involvement.
Protect with arms: Strive to increase military capabilities; fight rather than submit.
Preserve the balance of power: Do not let any other state or coalition become dominant.
Prevent arms races from resulting in military inferiority with rivals:
Negotiate agreements with competitors to maintain a favorable military balance.
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Alliances Two or more states combine military
capabilities; formal agreements to coordinate behavior
Increase deterrence Increased defense capabilities Allies don’t ally with enemies
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Realist Criticisms of Alliances (1 of 2)
Can increase capabilities of aggressive states
Provoke formation of counter-alliances Can draw in otherwise neutral states Must try to control behavior of allies Today’s ally may be tomorrow’s enemy Foreclose options
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Realist Criticisms of Alliances (2 of 2)
Reduce adaptability Eliminate bargaining advantages that come
from ambiguity Provoke fears of adversaries Entangle states in disputes of allies Stimulate envy of states outside
the alliance Preserves existing rivalries But alliances can still be useful
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Balance of Power
Peace most likely to be maintained when military power is distributed so that no single power or bloc can dominate
An ambiguous concept Weakness invites attack, so countervailing
power must be used to deter potential aggressors
Size principle: competing alliances are roughly equal in power
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Rules for an Effective Balancing Process
Stay vigilant—identify potential threats and opportunities
Seek allies when you cannot match the armaments of an adversary
Remain flexible in making alliances Oppose any state that seeks hegemony Be moderate in victory
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Criticisms of Balance of Power Theory
The theory’s rules are contradictory It assumes that policymakers possess
accurate, timely information about other states
The tendency of defense planners to engage in worst-case scenario planning can spark an arms race.
It assumes that decision makers are risk averse
It has not been effective
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Alternatives to Balance
of Power Hegemonic Stability Theory A concert of great powers
• Common sense of duty • Normative consensus is fragile
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The Causes of War
Realism-systemic; anarchic nature of the system
Capitalism and War Free Trade and Peace
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State Level and Sub-State Level Theories of War
Regime Type Expected Utility Theory Aggressive States Imperialist States Nationalism War as a Diversion
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Individual Level Theories
Human Aggression Theory of Natural Selection
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Individual Leaders: Madmen and Megalomaniacs
Will to power of Adolph Hitler Misperceptions “The Fog of War”
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Disagreement About Three Different Main Causes
Causes as permissive conditions: reasons why war is possible: especially prominent in realist theory.
General sources of conflict: also known as the underlying causes of war. This notion of cause is found in many theories at the systemic and state level.
Causes as decisions to initiate war, especially prominent at the state and individual levels.
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Arms Control 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM) SALT I and SALT II The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty The Campaign to Ban Landmines
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Limits to Arms Control Skeptics say it only works where it is
not needed. Some weapons may help prevent
wars, but increase destructiveness.
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Arms Agreements Arms control vs. disarmament Bilateral agreements Multilateral agreements Possibilities for cooperation are low
• Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Caging the Nuclear Threat: The Negotiated Control and Reduction of Deployed Strategic U.S. and Russian Warheads
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Balance of Power Models
Unipolarity• United States just after World War II• United States now?
Bipolarity• United States/Soviet Union 1949–1989• NATO–Warsaw Pact• Extended deterrence
Multipolarity
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Future Multipolarity? United States China Russia European Union Japan Brazil India
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A Power Transition in the Global Hierarchy
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Web Links Center for Nonproliferation Studies (
CNS) Federation of American Scientists International Relations and Security
Network NATO
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