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1111thth International Pragmatics Conference International Pragmatics ConferenceMelbourne, 12-17 July 2009Melbourne, 12-17 July 2009

Default Meanings, Salient Default Meanings, Salient Meanings, and Automatic Meanings, and Automatic

EnrichmentEnrichment

Kasia M. JaszczoltKasia M. Jaszczolt

University of Cambridge, U. K.University of Cambridge, U. K.http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

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Panel Panel Salient MeaningsSalient MeaningsKasia Jaszczolt and Keith AllanKasia Jaszczolt and Keith Allan

ProgrammeProgrammeSession 1Session 1

Kasia Jaszczolt (Cambridge)Kasia Jaszczolt (Cambridge)Introduction: Default meanings, salient meanings, and automatic Introduction: Default meanings, salient meanings, and automatic enrichmentenrichment

Rachel Giora Rachel Giora et al.et al. (Tel Aviv) (Tel Aviv)‘‘Salient and nonsalient meanings in context: Salient and nonsalient meanings in context: Interpreting metaphors and literals by adults diagnosed withInterpreting metaphors and literals by adults diagnosed withAsperger’s syndrome’Asperger’s syndrome’

Eleni Kapogianni (Cambridge)Eleni Kapogianni (Cambridge)‘‘Graded salience effects on irony production and interpretation’Graded salience effects on irony production and interpretation’

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Session 2Session 2

Keith Allan (Monash)Keith Allan (Monash)

‘‘Graded salience: Probabilistic meanings in the lexicon’Graded salience: Probabilistic meanings in the lexicon’

Jiranthara Srioutai (Chulalongkorn, Bangkok) Jiranthara Srioutai (Chulalongkorn, Bangkok)

‘‘Semantic representation of expressions with past-time Semantic representation of expressions with past-time reference:reference:

Evidence from English-Thai and Thai-English translation’Evidence from English-Thai and Thai-English translation’

Michael Haugh (Griffith)Michael Haugh (Griffith)

‘‘Intention(ality), action, and default implicatures’Intention(ality), action, and default implicatures’

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DefaultsDefaults

‘…‘…it is apparent that some implicatures are it is apparent that some implicatures are induced induced onlyonly in a special context (…), while in a special context (…), while others go through others go through unlessunless a special context is a special context is presentpresent (…).’ (…).’

Horn (2004: Horn (2004: 4-5)4-5)

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Propositional defaults Propositional defaults (default interpretations of utterances)(default interpretations of utterances)

e. g.e. g. Grice’s GCIs 1975Grice’s GCIs 1975 Rhetorical structure rules of Rhetorical structure rules of Segmented Segmented

Discourse Representation TheoryDiscourse Representation Theory (SDRT, Asher (SDRT, Asher and Lascarides, e.g. 2003) and Lascarides, e.g. 2003)

Constraints of Constraints of Optimality Theory PragmaticsOptimality Theory Pragmatics (e.g. (e.g. Blutner 2000; Blutner and Zeevat 2004)Blutner 2000; Blutner and Zeevat 2004)

Automatic, subdoxastic enrichment of Recanati’s Automatic, subdoxastic enrichment of Recanati’s truth-conditional pragmaticstruth-conditional pragmatics (2002, 2003, 2004) (2002, 2003, 2004)

Cognitive defaults, social, cultural and world Cognitive defaults, social, cultural and world knowledge defaults of knowledge defaults of Default Semantics Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2009a, b; Srioutai 2004, 2006)(Jaszczolt 2005, 2009a, b; Srioutai 2004, 2006)

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Defaults: A mixed bag?Defaults: A mixed bag?

(1)(1) Some (Some (→d→d not allnot all) of her lectures are inspiring.) of her lectures are inspiring.

(2)(2) The coffee spoon (The coffee spoon (→d→d spoon used for stirring spoon used for stirring coffeecoffee) is dirty.) is dirty.

(3)(3) The coffee is warm. (The coffee is warm. (→d →d not hotnot hot) )

(4)(4) Alex enjoyed (Alex enjoyed (→d →d readingreading) the book. ) the book.

(5)(5) You are digging your own grave. (You are digging your own grave. (→d →d causing causing harm to yourselfharm to yourself))

(6)(6) Everybody (Everybody (→d →d invitedinvited) is coming to the party.) is coming to the party.

(7)(7) The temperature fell below 0 degrees Celsius and The temperature fell below 0 degrees Celsius and ((→d →d as a resultas a result) the rails contracted.) the rails contracted.

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Sub-propositional defaultsSub-propositional defaults

Levinson’s (2000) presumptive meanings (GCIs)Levinson’s (2000) presumptive meanings (GCIs)

(8)(8) bread knifebread knife →d→d knife used for cutting breadknife used for cutting bread

(9)(9) kitchen knife kitchen knife →d→d knife used for preparing knife used for preparing food, food, e.g. choppinge.g. chopping

(10)(10) steel knifesteel knife →d→d knife made of steelknife made of steel

(11)(11) a secretarya secretary →d→d a female onea female one

(12)(12) a road a road →d→d hard-surfaced onehard-surfaced one

(13)(13) I don’t like [garlic]. I don’t like [garlic]. →d→d I dislike [garlic]. I dislike [garlic].

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‘…‘…hypotheses about meaning are entertained hypotheses about meaning are entertained incrementally – as the words come in, as it were.’ incrementally – as the words come in, as it were.’

Levinson (2000: 5)Levinson (2000: 5)

some some →d→d ? ?

a nanny a nanny →d→d ? ?

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Defaults in the lexicon:Defaults in the lexicon:

Nonmonotonic reasoning in processing of the lexicon Nonmonotonic reasoning in processing of the lexicon

Default inheritance, defeasible logical form (Asher Default inheritance, defeasible logical form (Asher and Lascarides 1995, Lascarides and Copestake and Lascarides 1995, Lascarides and Copestake 1998)1998)

Abductive inference in the lexicon (Pustejovsky Abductive inference in the lexicon (Pustejovsky 1995)1995)

Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 2003)Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 2003)

Formulae for nonmonotonic (probabilistic) inference Formulae for nonmonotonic (probabilistic) inference (Allan 2009)(Allan 2009)

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• Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 2003)Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 2003)

‘‘[M]ore salient meanings – coded meanings foremost on[M]ore salient meanings – coded meanings foremost on

our mind due to our mind due to conventionality, frequency, familiarity, or conventionality, frequency, familiarity, or

prototypicalityprototypicality – are accessed faster than and reach – are accessed faster than and reach

sufficient levels of activation before less salient ones. sufficient levels of activation before less salient ones.

According to the graded salience hypothesis, then, coded According to the graded salience hypothesis, then, coded

meanings would be accessed upon encounter, regardless ofmeanings would be accessed upon encounter, regardless of

contextual information or authorial intent.’contextual information or authorial intent.’

Giora (2003: 10) Giora (2003: 10)

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Monotonic and nonmonotonic inference Monotonic and nonmonotonic inference in the lexiconin the lexicon

(14)(14) Harry prefers lamb to goat.Harry prefers lamb to goat.

(15)(15) Jacqueline prefers leopard to fox.Jacqueline prefers leopard to fox.

Uncountable animal Uncountable animal product-ofproduct-of

+>+> meat-of meat-of

+>+> pelt-of pelt-of

(adapted from Allan 2009: 9)(adapted from Allan 2009: 9)

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Localism/globalism debateLocalism/globalism debate

?? Defaults pertain to entire propositions/ Defaults pertain to entire propositions/ sentences/events/situations of discoursesentences/events/situations of discourse

?? Defaults pertain to words or phrasesDefaults pertain to words or phrases

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(14)(14) It isn’t likely that the match will be cancelled: It isn’t likely that the match will be cancelled: it’s certain.it’s certain.

Geurts (2009: 59)Geurts (2009: 59)

(15)(15) If the chair sometimes comes to the department If the chair sometimes comes to the department meetings that is not enough; he should come meetings that is not enough; he should come always.always.

Geurts (2009: 60), after Levinson (2000: Geurts (2009: 60), after Levinson (2000: 205)205)

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Default baseDefault base

(16)(16) John’s book is good.’John’s book is good.’

?? +> the one he read, wrote, borrowed…+> the one he read, wrote, borrowed…Levinson (2000: 37)Levinson (2000: 37)

vs. ‘Chomsky’s book is about grammar.’vs. ‘Chomsky’s book is about grammar.’

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Pragmatic inference and defaults should be Pragmatic inference and defaults should be construed as construed as

operating on a unit that is adequate for the case at operating on a unit that is adequate for the case at hand, hand,

ranging from a morpheme to the entire discourse.ranging from a morpheme to the entire discourse.

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?? ‘…although ‘…although localismlocalism and and defaultismdefaultism aren’t aren’t wedded to each other, there is a natural affinity wedded to each other, there is a natural affinity between the two.’between the two.’

?? ‘…defaultism is a lost cause.’ ‘…defaultism is a lost cause.’

Geurts (2009: 59)Geurts (2009: 59)

what is ‘defaultism’?what is ‘defaultism’?

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Default reasoning reflects salience, Default reasoning reflects salience, common sense, and probability. common sense, and probability.

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Automatic interpretations?Automatic interpretations?

‘…‘…default reasoning is reasoning that contains at default reasoning is reasoning that contains at least one defeasible step, and what that is can be least one defeasible step, and what that is can be described intuitively as follows. When you take described intuitively as follows. When you take such a step you do not think, ‘Everything is OK, such a step you do not think, ‘Everything is OK, so I’ll take this step’. Rather, you just take it so I’ll take this step’. Rather, you just take it unless you think something might not be OK.’ unless you think something might not be OK.’

Bach (1984: Bach (1984: 40).40).

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Defaults and nonmonotonic reasoning in Defaults and nonmonotonic reasoning in logic logic

and computational linguisticsand computational linguistics

From Humboldt, Jespersen and CassirerFrom Humboldt, Jespersen and Cassirer

Reiter’s (1980) default logic :Reiter’s (1980) default logic :

A:BA:B CC

C can be concluded if A has been concluded and C can be concluded if A has been concluded and B can be assumed (and not B cannot be proven)B can be assumed (and not B cannot be proven)

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Salience and defaultsSalience and defaults

? ? Salient meanings: contextually triggered, unlike default Salient meanings: contextually triggered, unlike default meaningsmeanings

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Salience and defaultsSalience and defaults

Salient meanings: contextually triggered, unlike default Salient meanings: contextually triggered, unlike default meanings.meanings.

‘‘The criterion or threshold a meaning has to reach to be The criterion or threshold a meaning has to reach to be considered salient is related only to its accessibility in considered salient is related only to its accessibility in memory due to such factors as memory due to such factors as frequency of use or frequency of use or experiential familiarityexperiential familiarity.’ .’

Giora (2003: 33)Giora (2003: 33)

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Towards a definition of defaults:Towards a definition of defaults:

?? Default interpretations are more frequent, Default interpretations are more frequent, common interpretations.common interpretations.

(14)(14) Kate and Leonardo acted superbly in Kate and Leonardo acted superbly in Revolutionary Revolutionary RoadRoad..

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?? Default interpretations are interpretations that Default interpretations are interpretations that arise automatically, subdoxastically.arise automatically, subdoxastically.

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Processing of scalar termsProcessing of scalar terms by children and by children and adults:adults:

‘‘These developmental findings do not favour one account These developmental findings do not favour one account over another because both could explain it. From the over another because both could explain it. From the Default perspective, it could be claimed that scalar Default perspective, it could be claimed that scalar inferences become automatic with age and that our results inferences become automatic with age and that our results are simply revealing how such inference-making matures. are simply revealing how such inference-making matures. In contrast, Relevance Theory would suggest that children In contrast, Relevance Theory would suggest that children and adults use the same comprehension mechanisms but and adults use the same comprehension mechanisms but that greater cognitive resources are available for adults, that greater cognitive resources are available for adults, which in turn encourages them to draw out more pragmatic which in turn encourages them to draw out more pragmatic inferences.’inferences.’

Noveck (2004: Noveck (2004: 307).307).

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Default SemanticsDefault Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005, 2009a, b): (Jaszczolt 2005, 2009a, b):

Default interpretations are automatically producedDefault interpretations are automatically produced

interpretations. They are interpretations. They are defaults for the context and fordefaults for the context and for

the speakerthe speaker..

Cf: Cf:

‘‘What is foremost on one’s mind need not necessarily beWhat is foremost on one’s mind need not necessarily be

foremost on another’s.’ foremost on another’s.’ Giora (2003: 37)Giora (2003: 37)

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?? Defaults are predictable from directionality of Defaults are predictable from directionality of

communicative acts (emergentcommunicative acts (emergent intentionality, intentionality, Haugh 2008)Haugh 2008)

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Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2009a,b)Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2009a,b)

Methodological globalismMethodological globalism

Until the exact length of the unit that gives rise to Until the exact length of the unit that gives rise to automatic interpretation is experimentally automatic interpretation is experimentally identified, it makes sense to adopt a identified, it makes sense to adopt a methodological move that these interpretations are methodological move that these interpretations are post-propositional.post-propositional.

Automatic components in the construction of Automatic components in the construction of primary meanings primary meanings

Main meaning intended by the Model Speaker and Main meaning intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee is construed recovered by the Model Addressee is construed with the help of cognitive defaults (CD) and social, with the help of cognitive defaults (CD) and social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults (SCWD).cultural and world-knowledge defaults (SCWD).

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