kamma in the milindapañha

Kamma in the MilindapañhaAuthor(s): James P. McDermottSource: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1977), pp. 460-468Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/598629 .

Accessed: 17/04/2013 02:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

American Oriental Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal ofthe American Oriental Society.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 162.105.141.193 on Wed, 17 Apr 2013 02:02:31 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aos

http://www.jstor.org/stable/598629?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


KAMMA IN THE MILINDAPANHA

JAMES P. MCDERMOTT

CANSIUS COLLEGE

A number of the issues raised by King Milinda in the Milindapaitha deal with the consistent interpretation of the principle of kamma and the clarification of Buddhist merit

theory. Although the Milindapaiha is considered authoritative in Theravadin circles,

Nagasena's answers to some of these questions move beyond the canonical position. This

paper deals with the development of merit theory and the concept of kamma beyond the

stage depicted in the Sutta Pitaka as evidenced by Nagasena's responses.

A NUMBER OF the questions and dilemmas raised

by King Milinda in the Milindapaiha concern the related ideas of merit and kamma. Nagasena's answers to King Milinda draw heavily from the Pali Pitakas, and in general may be seen to follow the Theravadin tradition, hence the acceptance of the Milindapanha by Theravida as authoritative. Nonetheless the compiler of the Questions of Milinda was not concerned merely with pur- roting the sayings attributed to the Buddha. He was not a bhanaka (repeater); but, as I. B. Horner notes, "was also perfectly at liberty to take what he liked from literature outside this."1 There is evidence, for example, to suggest that the compiler of the Milindapanha was acquainted with at least some of the Sarvastivadin corpus of literature. As one example of such Sarvastivadin influence on the Milindapaiha's compiler, I. B. Horner refers to Miln 268, 271, where certain aspects of the principle of kamma come into play in the discussion. There "Nagasena uses a tenet of Sar- vastivadin teaching when he assures the King that neither iaksa [space] nor nibbana is born of cause, kamma or chemical change. This is a tenet according to which iakasa as well as nibbana is asamhskrta, unconstructed, unstructured or un- compounded, whereas in Theravada teaching nibbana alone occupies this category."2 In addition

1 I. B. Horner, Milinda's Questions, SBB, Vols. XXII-XXIII (London: Luzac, 1963-1964), Vol. I, pp. xxix-xl.

2 Ibid., p. xviii. It should be noted, however, that there is little indication of influence in the composition of the Milindapaiha so far as the most distinctive contributions of Sarvastiviida to karma theory are concerned. These contributions include: 1) its analysis of "complete karma" into prayoga, maula karmapatha, and prslha

to such influences, folk religious ideas and cults seem to have had significant impact on the thought of the Milindapafha.3 In any case, in a number of instances Nigasena's ideas concerning kamma and related matters move beyond those of the Tipifaka. Thus it will be the purpose of this paper to consider the contribution of the Milin- dapanha to Buddhist merit-theory and to the understanding of the principle of kamma.

Several of Milinda's questions concern the meri- toriousness of certain acts which in one way or another happen to result in suffering. For example, Milinda questions how the meal given by Cunda the Smith could be counted among the most meritorious acts possible, as is stated at D 11.128, and yet have resulted in a disease in the Buddha

so as to provide for a mechanism to make belief in the effectiveness of repentant attitudes compatible with belief in the inevitability of retribution for good and evil;

2) the Vaibhasika positing of a distinction betwee in-

formative (vijnapti) and non-informative (avijiiapti) kar-

ma, and the existence of an intermediary, the possession (prapti) of an act to explain the operation of the principle of karma; and 3) the opposing Sautrantika affirmation that intentional impulses (cetand = karma) perfume the

psycho-physical series of aggregates which is man, thereby causing a subtle series of transformations which cul- minate in a state of reward or retribution-again an explanation of the mechanism through which karma operates. For a detailed treatment of these views as described in the AbhidharmakoSa and the Karmasiddhi- prakarana, see James P. McDermott, Developments in the Early Buddhist Concept of Kamma/Karma, Princeton

University Ph.D. dissertation (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1971), pp. 201-224.

3 On the impact of such influences on the Milinda-

paiha's interpretation of kamma, see below.

460



MCDERMOTT: Kamma in the Milindapafiha

which led to his death. In response Nagasena explains that the meal which Cunda provided was fresh, properly prepared, and nutritive-in short the food was good. Since this was indeed the case, the intention behind the gift was clearly good. Therefore no fault belongs to Cunda.4 Rath- er, the Buddha became ill only because of pre- existing weakness in his own body. It must not be supposed, however, that this weakness was a result of any bad kamma accumulated by the Buddha. Rather, there are other causes operative in the world in addition to kamma; and the Bud- dha's illness must be attributed to one of these.

The response of Nagasena here is similar to that given to a question concerning the effects which arise when the Buddha preaches the dhamma.5 Milinda notes that the Buddha is supposed to be all-compassionate. How is this view to be reconciled with the suttanta account describing the great issue of blood which came from the mouths of sixty monks when they heard the Buddha's discourse using the "Mass of Fire" simile?6 In other words, Milinda's dilemma concerns how suffering can appear to result from a meritorious act, such as the teaching of the dhamma. Since the Buddha teaches out of good will, it is to be expected that only good should come from his discourses. Thus Nagasena explains the issue of blood as a result of the natural weakness of the afflicted monks, rather than as a result of the Buddha's words. This case differs from that of Cunda's meal, however, in that the pre-existent weakness of the afflicted monks was a fruit of their own past kamma, whereas in the case of the Buddha's illness, the origin of the affliction was purely physical. Thus the Buddha's words, rather than being the cause of the issue of blood, merely provided an appropriate occasion for the monks' kamma to work itself out.

Essentially the same understanding of causal relationships occurs at Miln 185-186. In this instance Milinda is concerned to know how, in the light of the Buddha's injunctions against in- juring others, corporal punishment can ever be considered appropriate, as Nagasena contends the Buddha did consider it to be under certain circumstances. Nagasena answers: "He who is kil-

4 This episode is recounted in detail at D II.126ff, and again at Ud 81ff. Milinda's question and Nagasena's response are to be found at Miln 174-175.

5 See Miln 164-167. 6 This account is at A IV.128-135.

led, O great King, is not killed on the approval of the Tathagata, (rather) he is killed because of what he has done himself."7 Corporal punishment is thus always believed to be the result of the criminal's own kamma. Since the cause of th3 punishment lies with the punished individual himself, no fault accrues to the Tathaigata for having recommended corporal punishment as an acceptable means of restraint. From such dilemmas it becomes clear that not every relationship which appears to be causal is properly classified as so being. And, indeed, in many instances, what could be considered as cause from a western point of view, is from the Theravadin point of view but one circumstance among the many necessary for the true cause-in this case, kamma-to work itself out. Nagasena uses a simile to clarify the point:8 Suppose someone should give the members of a crowd some ambrosia to drink, and one member of the group should become ill and die after drinking it. His death, Nagasena maintains, results not from the ambrosia, but from a case of bad digestion. Hence the donor derives no demerit from his act.

A more problematic case is that of King Ves- santara.9 Vessantara gave his wife and children to a Brahman, thereby causing the children great anguish. Milinda's question, then, is whether such an act of charity is not excessive. Can an act which makes others suffer in this way lead to happiness and a heavenly rebirth? Nagasena holds that it can, for Vessantara's gift indicates that he has relinquished all desire for personal pleasures such as his family had brought to him. Moreover, no gift is too great for one who is truly worthy. Nonetheless, cannot Vessantara be ac- cused of lack of consideration, or even of cruelty, so far as his treatment of the children is concerned ? Nagasena claims not. His argument is twofold. First, Vessantara knew that he would get his children back, and thus he was sure that no real harm would result from his gift.10 Nagasena's

7 The Pali reads: "Yo so maharaja ghatiyati na so tathagata.nam anumatiya ghatiyati, sayapbatena so ghatiyati." See Miln 186.

8 Miln 167. 9 His story is found in the Vessantara Jataka: V.

Fausboll, ed. The Jdtaka, Together with Its Commentary, 7 vols. (London: Triibner & Co., 1877-1897), No. 547, vol. VI, pp. 479ff.

10 One is reminded of the case of Abraham and Isaac in the Old Testament.

461



Journal of the American Oriental Society 97.4 (1977)

second reason is more satisfactory from a Buddhist point of view. He argues that the children's anguish arose only because of their own inability to understand the action of their father. Had they realized that the Brahman was a field of merit worthy of such a gift, they would have been happy to have played a role in their father's act of charity. Thus their suffering derived from their own ignorance, rather than from any mis- deed of their father. In the final analysis, they may be said to have suffered because of their own kamma. What Nagasena has done in this and the preceding lessons is merely to have made clear to the outsider, namely King Milinda, the applicability, even in certain difficult cases, of the principle that men are the heirs of their own deeds, and do not suffer because of the actions of others. The idea itself is not new; rather what is new to the Buddhist literature is merely the intricacies of the specific examples which are discussed.

Milinda is also concerned about the possibility of ascribing to departed ancestors gifts given in this world. When one ascribes (adisati) such a gift to the deceased, he wants to know, do they obtain any benefit as a result?" In his response Nagasena disagrees with the view accepted as orthodox by Tissa at Kvu VII.6. Nagasena holds that some of the departed can obtain benefit through having charitable acts ascribed to them. However, there are others who can receive no benefit regardless of what is done in their names. The latter group includes those who have arisen in Niraya; those who are born as animals, or in heaven; and three of four classes of petas. The three classes of petas which are beyond help are: 1) the vantasika, those which feed on vomit; 2) the khuppipdsa, those who are tormented by hunger and thirst; and 3) the nijjhdmatanhika, those who are consumed by thirst (or craving). The remaining group of petas, those who are able to live off the gifts of others, are the paradattupajivi. In maintaining this view, Nagasena has taken a middle position between that of the Pali theologians, such as Tissa, who reject any notion of transfer of merit so-called, and the uncritical popular view which is represented by the Petavat- thu. The Petavatthu makes no clear class distinction between the four kinds of petas. And, indeed, in at least two instances in the Petavatthu, there are indications that petas which are described as

11 For the question and Nagasena's response, see Miln 294ff.

"khuppipisa" (tormented by hunger and thirst) may benefit from donations which are made in their names.l2 Thus we would find in Nagasena's position an attempt by the author of the Milin- dapaiha to mediate the two extreme positions. In holding that the ascription of merit can be effective in some cases, he, like the author of the relevant portions of the Mahdparinibbdna Sutta, has been influenced by the common practice of making offerings (dakkhina) in honor of, or for the benefit of the deceased. This popular lay Buddhist practice can be linked to the Vedic sraddha, for it was Buddhist practice not to upset existing traditions when well-established custom was not antithetic to Buddhist teaching.l3 But in making a technical distinction between the various classes of petas in his application of the notion, our author has transcended the folk level of the belief. In applying the notion only to the paradattupajivi, he has compromised with those who totally reject the concept, or so it would seem. For Nagasena admits only a very limited number of the departed to be capable of being aided by having gifts ascribed to them. In all other cases the only profit which results from a gift is that which accrues to the actual donor.

It would seem that the Questions of Milinda is representative of yet another step in the direction of the Mahayana notion of the transfer of merit in the true sense of the word. For Nagasena speaks not only of the ascription of charitable acts to others-the general pattern in the Tipita-

12 The instances in question are Pv 1.11 and 11.2. In these passages the petas are described as "khuppipasa" at Pv 1.11.2 and 11.2.2, respectively.

13 In this vein, the Buddha is recorded as listing among the conditions necessary for the welfare of the Vajjian confederacy action in accordance with the ancient in- stitutions and continuance of the old rites and offerings (D II. 74-75). -On the link between merit transferenc3 and Vedic grdddha, see Bimala Churn Law, The Buddhist

Conception of Spirits (Law's Research Series, Pub. no. 3; London: Luzac & Co., 1936), pp. 8-9 and 106. Writes Law: "According to the Hindu idea the gifts are to be made to a Brahmin in person or even to a substitute for a Brdhmana, and the merit depends upon the number of people fed and clothed on behalf of the spirit. The fruit of the deeds is transferred to the spirit. In the Hindu grdddha, some articles of food and clothing are of course offered directly to the spirit, but they must be given away to a deserving man in order that the desired results may be produced" (p. 106).

462




ka-but also of the possibility of sharing (sam- vibhajati) good deeds (kusala):14

Whoever gives a gift, undertakes moral practice, and holds the Uposatha observance, he becomes joyful, gladdened, .. .thrilled; his joy arises again and again. The good (kusala) of him who is of joyful mind in- creases more and more. As in a well filled with much

water, O great King, water might enter at one point and issue forth from another; and though issuing forth, it arises again and again, and it is not possible to exhaust it-just so, great King, kusala in- creases more and more. And, great King, if for a

century a man were to turn over (dvajjeyya)15 the good (kusala) he had done, being repeatedly turned over, good (kusala) arises again and again. And it becomes

14 According to T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary (London: Luzac, 1966), s.v., the term 'kusala' refers to good deeds, skill, virtue, merit, etc.

15 Both I. B. Horner, Milinda's Questions, Vol. II,

p. 127, fn. 1; and T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, SEE, Vols. XXXV-XXXVI (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890-1894), Vol. II, p. 155, fn. 2 find the verb 'auajjeti' to be ambiguous in this context.

'Avajieti' has two clusters of meanings: 1) to think about, reflect (upon), consider, advert to, incline (the mind), etc. 2) to turn over, incline, upset, bend. It is also worth

nothing that the verb 'dvajjati', from which 'dvajjeti' is a causative formation, carries among its meanings 're-

move', 'pour out', 'convert', 'transfer'. See PED, s.v. and V. Trenckner, A. Critical Pdli Dictionary, continued by Dines Anderson, Helmer Smith, and others. Work in progress (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1924-), s.v. PED notes that the commentaries sometimes gloss 'dvajjeti' with 'parind- mefi', meaning 'to procure for (others)'. Thus, in the

light of the context it does not seem far fetched to understand the term as meaning 'pour out', or 'turn over to (others)' in this instance. Miss Horner's fn. suggests this as a possible meaning, and notes that it finds support in the phrase "sharing with whomever he wishes." In her translation of the text, however, Miss Horner uses the technical meaning from the Abhidhamma, namely 'advert to' to translate the term. Rhys Davids, how-

ever, translates it as 'transfer to others'. While agreeing that this is the apparent meaning, I have attempted to maintain some of the ambiguity of the original through the use of the phrase 'turn over', which can be inter-

preted to mean either 'turn over to others'-as I have taken it-or 'turn over (in the mind)', which is nearer to the rendering of Miss Horner.

possible for him to share his good (kusala) with whomever he wishes.16

Thus Nagasena holds that a surplus of merit (kusala) can be directed to others for their benefit, just as water can overflow the well which is its source. By transferring good deeds in this way, one is tapping a never-ending source of merit.

Gifts can be ascribed to certain of the departed, and become theirs in reality through the perform- ative action of the ascription; kusala can be shared with others. But can the demerit accruing from bloody deeds, etc., also be shared with those who had no actual part in the deed ?17 This is another question which Milinda asks of Nagasena, who then proceeds to explain that evil deeds-those which are akusala-cannot be shared in the same way as can good deeds. Although there is no indication in the Pali canon that evil acts can be ascribed to innocents, thereby resulting in demerit for them or less blame for the perpetrator, Miln 295-296 contains the first explicit statement in the authoritative literature that there can be no sharing or transfer of demerit. We may assume that this idea was not new with the authors of the Milindapafiha, but that it was tacitly held even by those who believed in the transfer of merit so-called. The belief that individuals were the heirs to their own deeds was too firmly en- sconced to allow of the conflicting notion that a man could assign his demerits to another, or even that another could take some of them upon himself. An evil deed cannot be shared with one who has neither consented to it nor participated in it. How is this the case? Virtue is more far- reaching than vice, Nagasena explains.18 For, if a man gives gifts and lives in righteousness, he becomes blissful. Because bliss rules his heart, his goodness develops still further. As Nagasena indicated with his image of the well with a never ending source, the more a man gives away the merit from the good deeds he has done, the more his goodness grows. For, to share one's merit with another is itself a meritorious act. In con- trast, a person who does wrong later becomes remorseful, or so Nagasena maintains. As a result, the evil doer retreats from his evil, and it does not prosper. That such an explanation is original with the authors of the Questions of Milinda

16 Miln 297. 17 Miln 295-296. 18 For the reasons, see Miln 296-297. Cf. Miln 83-84.

463




remains a possibility which cannot be proved. Nonetheless, its appearance here is the first in the extant literature.

At Miln 84, Nagasena gives an additional argument in support of his case: The amputation of a limb may be sufficient retribution for a crime, but even so small a deed as the gift of a bunch of flowers to the Buddha will prevent one's downfall for 91 eons. Since the fruits of good and evil are so disparate, clearly demerit (apuiiia) must be a trifle in comparison with merit (punna).

A further objection is raised by Milinda.19 He maintains that those acts which ripen more quickly must be considered the more powerful, just as a more skillful physician will cure his patients more quickly than will one who is less skilled. In response to this kind of argument, Nagasena contends that the analogy is inapplicable. The kamma of him who is akusala is experienced here and now because it is blameable. Criminals merit

punishment; and thus decrees establishing pen- alties have been promulgated. On the other hand, no one ever decreed that moral habits, or acts of charity should be rewarded. Were it to be so decreed, however, this would be fitting; and then the results of kusala would be experienced in this life. In the meantime, kusala, although stronger, is to be experienced only in a future state. An underlying assumption of Nagasena's point would appear to be that the truly meritorious act is more difficult for men to recognize than is the wicked deed.

In several contexts Milinda raises the question concerning whether the greater demerit (apuiha) accrues to him who knowingly (jdnanto) or to him who unknowingly (ajinanto) does an evil deed (pdpakamma).20 Somewhat unexpectedly, Nagasena declares that his is the greater demerit who commits an evil act unknowingly. At first

glance this view seems inconsistent with the recur-

ring Buddhist definition of kamma as cetand (intentional impulse, or drive). Evil done unwittingly cannot be considered intentional, or so it would seem. However, Nagasena gives an illustration which would seem to go a long way toward clarifying his meaning: If two men take hold of a red hot iron ball, the one knowingly and the other unwittingly, it is the latter who is the more seriously burnt. In both cases we may assume

19 See Miln 293-294. 20 Miln 84 and Miln 158, for example.

that the ball was taken intentionally. The one individual is ignorant of the temperature of the ball. Thus it is to be supposed that he seizes it less carefully, with a stronger grasp, and that he is more severely burnt for this reason. As the illustration is set up, the only difference between the two men who grasp the ball is that one of them is ignorant of its true nature. It is precisely this which results in his being burned more severely To extrapolate from this illustration, one would suppose that Nagasena has no intention of re- jecting the notion that the moral quality of an act is determined primarily by the intentional drive (cetand) behind it. Rather, his point would seem to be the very Buddhist notion that action taken apart from knowledge of the true nature of things is without merit.

The question remains, however, whether to generalize from Nagasena's illustration in this way is to understand him properly. Thus, in another context Milinda questions the consistency of a statement he attributes to the Tathdgata with the opinion held by Nagasena. Nagasena maintains that he who unknowingly takes the life of a creature stores up very strong21 demerit. Milinda cites as being opposed to this dictum a statement made by the Tathdgata when he was regulating the Vinaya: "There is no offence for him who does not know."22 Nagasena sees no basic contradiction between the two statements cited by Milinda. Rather, he holds that both are acceptable because their referents are different. In support of this view, Nagasena refers to a distinction delineated at Vin V. 116. He notes:

There is, great King, an offence with acquittal depending on awareness (sannidvimokkha); there is an offence with acquittal not depending on awareness. (With respect to) understanding that offence with acquittal depending on awareness, it was said by the Blessed One: "There is no offence for him who does not know."23

21 The comparative 'balavatara' is used here. 22 "Andpatti ajanantassa." As I. B. Horner, Milinda's

Questions, Vol. I, p. 222, fn. 3 notes, the actual phrase quoted by Milinda appears in the Old Commentary, rather than in the Vinaya in the narrow sense of the word.

23 Miln 159. The precise meaning of the term 'san- ndvimokkha' is somewhat uncertain. I have rendered it by 'freedom (from offence) depending on awareness'. Rhys Davids, Questions of Milinda Vol. I, p. 224, fn. 3 admits he is unclear as to the exact meaning of the compound. However, he tentatively renders it 'without

464




However, Nagasena clearly puts the taking of life in the category of those acts in which awareness is not a mitigating factor. Milinda is correct in his suspicion that this move is not in accordance with the Vinaya rulings concerning the taking of life, for the applicability of the Vinaya's distinction between offences in which awareness counts as a factor for acquittal and those in which it does not appear to be limited to relatively minor breaches of monastic discipline. Moreover, it would seem that the tentative interpretation we have given to Naigasena's illustration of the red hot ball is of little value in solving the dilemma as presented here. Rather, we must conclude that Nagasena's position is really quite different from the usual canonical position. Nagasena holds that serious demerit accrues to anyone who takes the life of another, even when this is done without awareness and, hence, by implication, unintention- ally. Nagasena, then, here appears to repre- sent the view that the actual physical act is of greater ethical significance than is the thought, motive, or intention behind it. In this he has moved away from the distinctively Theravada Buddhist notion.

the co-operation of the mind'. I. B. Homer's treatment of the entire passage, based on comments by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, is informative: "There is, sire, the (type of) offence in which (contemporary) awareness counts (as a factor) for acquittal, and there is the (type of) offence in which (contemporary) awareness does not count (as a factor) for acquittal. It was in reference to that (type of) offence, sire, in which (contemporary) awareness counts (as a factor) for acquittal that the Lord said: 'There is no offence for one who does not know.'" This is more an interpretive paraphrase than a translation, however. For Miss Homer's reasoning behind this

rendering of Miln 159, see Milinda's Questions, Vol. I, p. xlviii. On 'saiiiidvimokkha' the Milinda-Tikd, ed. Padmanabh S. Jaini (London: Luzac for P.T.S. ,1961), p. 29 comments: "Sanfinavimokkho ti safiniya bhavena

5pattibhivato vimokkho sannavimokkho. Sacittakapat- ti ti attho. No saiiidvimokkho ti safifiyabhlvena apat- tibhSvato no vimokkho, no safinivimokkho acittikapatti ti attho." That is: "Saiidvimokkho means freedom from offence (i.e., acquittal) depending on awareness. 'Free- dom depending on awareness' means an offence (which is an offence only) with cognizance. No safiidvimokkho means freedom from offence not depending on awareness. 'Freedom not depending on awareness' means an offence (which is an offence even) without awareness."

With this in mind, NAgasena's ultimately un- satisfactory attempts to make his views appear equivalent to those accepted in the canon can perhaps be explained as an effort on the part of the authors of the Milindapanha to avoid being charged by their fellow Buddhists of disseminating false views. In any case, we have here an indication that the definition of kamma as cetand and what follows upon it was maintained within Bud- dhism at times with difficulty; for Nagasena, like Tissa's opponents in the Kathavatthu, did not believe in the universal desirability of maintaining the unwavering stress on 'cetana' in this definition.24

A number of the problems which trouble Milinda concern the existence of other causes in addition to kamma. E. W. Hopkins notes that the Questions of Milinda considers it "an erroneous extension of the true belief when the ignorant (Brahmans and Buddhists) declare that 'every pain is the fruit of Karma' (136 and 138)."25 Hopkins considers the stance adopted by the Milindapaiha to be a modification of the doctrine of kamma which is original to it. This is not the case, however; for even in the Samyutta and Anguttara Nikayas seven causes of feeling, or sensation (vedana), in addition to the effect of kamma are listed.26

One of the special concerns of Milinda with respect to the variety of causes operative in the universe concerns the splinter from Devadatta's rock which struck the Buddha, thereby drawing his blood. How is the pain which the Buddha experienced as a result to be explained? Naga- sena precedes his answer by noting that there was in the Tathagata no feeling due to the maturing of kamma, or to the stress of circumstances. Any discomfort which he felt was the result of one, or of a combination, of the other six causes of feeling (vedana).27 For it was only after he had

24 See James P. McDermott, "The Kathdvatthu Kam- ma Debates," JAOS, Vol. 95.3.

25 E. Washburn Hopkins, "Modifications of the Karma Doctrine," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, N.S. Vol. XXXVIII (1906), p. 586.

26 See S IV. 230-231; A V.110; A II. 87-88; and A III.131. The relevant passages in the Milindapaiha are at Miln 134ff and Miln 303.

27 Wind (vata), bile (pitta), phlegm (semha), the union of the humours of the body (sannipdta), change of season (utuparindma), and treachery (upakkama) or through sudden attack (opakkamika)-as in the case of a blow

465




burned up all his past demerit and transcended moral cause that the Buddha has attained en- lightenment. As the Milinda-Tikd notes: "Beings which kamma oppresses, these beings experience pain (dukkhi vedand) born of the fruit of kamma. But those beings which ward off cause (kdrana), of them this saying is false."28 Therefore the Tathdgata's injury by the rock splinter can no more be attributed to past kamma than the fact that a rock thrown into the air falls back and lands on the ground can be attributed to the past kamma of the earth. But as Milinda observes,29 having been caused by a rock splinter, the Bud- dha's wound cannot be explained in terms of the standard non-kammic causes. If the wound is not the result of kamma, what other explanation can be given for its origin? Nagasena answers that, when the rock was crushed, it fell in a chance direction (animittakatadisd).30 To Nagasena's mind, in the Buddha's case, at least certain events occur by chance, or by happenstance. Thus in order to maintain his view that the Buddha is one who has overcome all moral shortcomings, Naga- sena has given up strict unwavering adherence to the more traditional understanding of the universal applicability of kamma. Here, perhaps for the first time in Buddhism, we are confronted with the suggestion that in at least certain specific instances suffering may arise as a result of chance. Even if chance is an acceptable explanation only in the case of the Buddha's cut-and, to be sure, specific instances of the applicability of the concept in other situations are lacking-acceptance of Na- gasena's interpretation undermines any sense of universal justice as being operative through the principle of kamma; for as Nagasena interprets the case in point, the Buddha is not responsible for his own suffering.

At Miln 51, I. B. Horner has discovered what she considers to be a new application of the term 'kamma'. She writes:

with a stick (MilnT 26). The various illnesses which the Buddha contracted at one time or another in his career are thus to be attributed to causes in this group.

28 MilnT 26. 29 Miln 181. 30 On 'animattakatadisd' see Trenckner, Critical Dic-

tionary, s.v. The compound literally means 'in quarters where signs are not made (beforehand)'. It is partic- ularly significant that Milinda chooses to explain the injury in this way as opposed to ascribing it to treachery (upakkama).

With the expression "conditioned by craving is kamma," tanhdpaccayd kammam, (Miln. 51), we have what I believe to be another innovation and certainly a departure from any formulation of the Paticcasamup- pad I have yet met in the Pali Canon. In none of the various contexts where it is given there is kamma ever a term or link in the series; yet in this Miln. passage the activity of the five senses and the mind begins all over again from kamma, and no end to the series is to be seen. Kamma must mean therefore something like ignorant volitional action, or, perhaps more probably, actions .... The use of part only of the formula, as here, is certainly not without a parallel.... The introduction of a term so utterly new to the Wheel of Conditional Genesis as is kamma is a novelty, however.31

In support of Miss Horner's suggestion as to the meaning of the term 'kamma' in this context, it may be noted that in this partial formulation of the formula of dependent origination or conditioned genesis, the term 'kamma' occupies that place in the formula usually filled by 'upddana', that is 'grasping' or 'attachment'. The change in terminology has a negligible effect on the meaning of the formula, however, especially since the formula is cited in its more traditional form on both the preceding and succeeding pages.32

At several points in the Milindapaiha there are indications of concession to, or adoption of, popular belief at the expense of a more strictly correct doctrinal position. Two examples found in the extended image of the Buddha's bazaar33 are directly concerned with matters of kammic reward. The first of these is the suggestion that Nibbcna is to be counted among the rewards available for purchase in the Buddha's bazaar using kamma as the purchase price. This represents a popular move to qualify the polarity between the goals of Nibbdna and better rebirth within the round of samsdra.34 The second involves the statement that some pay for the blessings in the Buddha's bazaar with vows of righteousness, some by ob- serving the Uposatha service, and others with little (appamatta) acts.35 From the distinction

31 Horner, Milinda's Questions, Vol. I, p. xlv. 32 See Miln 50 and 52. 33 The image begins at Miln 341. 34 I have dealt with this point in detail elsewhere.

See James P. McDermott, "Nibbana as a Reward for Kamma," JAOS, Vol. 93.3, pp. 344-347.

35 See Miln 341.

466




which is here made between vows of righteousness and observance of the Uposatha, on the one hand, and little (appamatta) acts, on the other, it would seem that the author of the passage at hand considered vows of righteousness and the Uposa- tha observance to be of relatively great merit. In the case of the former this seems quite under- standable, since strict adherence to such vows would ipso facto entail the accumulation of good kamma. However, from the strict canonical point of view it is somewhat more difficult to understand why the observance of the Uposatha service should count so heavily as currency in the Bud- dha's bazaar.

At the Uposatha ceremony the chapters of the Samgha recited the Patimokkha rules from the Vinaya; and the Dhamma was expounded. On the day of the Uposatha ceremony laymen would sometimes take upon themselves Uposatha vows. That is to say, they would undertake to observe the eight silas (virtues) for the day.36 Although the observance of such vows and the exposition of the Dhamma are in themselves meritorious, it must be noted that with respect to the Uposatha days such practices were largely ceremonial. Being thus limited by ritual forms, and to specific days, it might be expected that the moral force of such observances would be conceived as very limited. However, since the Uposatha acts are contrasted with little (appamatta) acts, this does not seem to be the case. How is the presence of such a notion to be explained? The answer is similar to the explanation for the presence in the Mahdparinibbdna Sutta and elsewhere in the Mi- lindapaiha of the belief that laymen may ac- cumulate good kamma by means of thiipa-ven- eration. That is to say, this is another example of popular folk belief in the efficacy of ceremony and ritual per se.

In at least one instance, however, the Milinda- pafiha resists modifying its understanding of kamma in response to popular folk belief. Specifically, one may point to Nagasena's reponse to Milinda's question at Miln 150f concerning the usefulness of parittis, or protective charms recited to kee) away harm. Milinda refers to several Suttas and Jdtakas as providing allegedly useful protective formulas, then questions the consistency of belief in their efficacy with acceptance of the Buddha's statement that man cannot escape his evil kamma,

36 On the Uposatha see PED, s.v.

or free himself from the snares of death.37 Naga- sena answers that the protective charms do work, but only for certain individuals. He goes on to explain that when a parittd fails, it is for one of three reasons. It is either 1) because of lack of faith in the charm, 2) because of the counter- effect of various defilements, or 3) due to the action of kamma. In other words, protective formulas are effective only for those individuals who deserve to be protected under the specific circumstances at hand. The operation of parittds is hence subsumed under the more general principle of kamma. The author of the Milindapaiha passage has adapted the popular belief in charms to fit consistently with the operation of kamma, which in this case remains paramount.38

Kamma continues to be effective within the locus which defines individual existence, even though there is no being (satta) which actually passes from one life to the next. Does this mean that in some sense deeds (kamma) may be said to pass from one life to the next? Men are not freed from their deeds, even by death; but can these deeds in themselves actually be said to remain? In part this seems to be the thrust of a question raised by Milinda at Miln 72. Th3 king asks: "Reverend Nagasena, a good or bad deed is done by this name and form: where do these remain?"39 Nagasena responds: "Those deeds would follow it, great King, like a shadow that never leaves it."40 However Milinda presses the point. He wants to know if such deeds can be pointed out as existing in a particular place. Nagasena declares that they cannot; and Milinda requests an illustration.

"What do you think about this, great King? Is it possible to point to the fruits of trees which have

37 Milinda refers specifically to the Jewel Sutta, the Khandaka, the Peacock, the Crest of the Banner, the AAtandtiya, and the Pirittd of Angulimdla.

38 This point becomes of particular significance when considered in relation to Buddhist Tantrism, where it is held that karma can be circumvented through the use of charms or spells (mantras).

39 The Pali reads: "Bhante Nagasena, imina namaru- pena kammar katami kusalarm va akusalarh va, kuhim tani kammini titthantiti."

40 Nagasena's response is reminiscent of Dh 2, where it is said that "if a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness (sukha) follows him like a shadow that never leaves him."

467




not yet produced fruits, saying: 'The fruits are here or there'?" "No indeed, venerable sir." "Just so, great King, while the continuity (of life) is uninter: rupted, it is not possible to point to these acts, saying- 'These acts are here or there.'"41

The implication of Nagasena's illustration seems to be that once done, deeds continue to exist only through their potential to modify the continuity of life. The act (kamma) itself does not pass from one state to the next. Nonetheless, its potential cannot be prevented from actualizing itself in due time. It is in this sense alone that deeds may be considered to follow a man like an un- shakable shadow.

In the foregoing we have noted that while generally accepting the canonical understanding of kamma, the Milindapaniha has not been slavish in parroting the canonical view at every point. In some instances it has attempted to clarify matters which remain hazy in the suttas. Such is the case in its treatment of questions concerning how meritorious actions can sometimes appear to cause suffering, and in its consideration of the transfer

41 Miln 72.

of merit. In the latter instance the extreme positions are mediated, and conflicting canonical passages rationalized by being applied to different categories of beings.

In other cases we have seen the Milindapaiha go off in directions less acceptable from a strict Theravadin viewpoint. In such divergences it sometimes shows agreement with the unanalytic folk belief, and at others maintains ideas set forth by such schools as the Sarvastivada. Two examples of the way in which the Milindapaiiha diverges from canonical doctrine in the direction of folk belief are worthy of note once again as most important. The first of these is in its in- sistence that serious demerit accrues to him who takes the life of another, even when the agent is unaware of what he is doing. And second, there is the suggestion that in some instances suffering can result from chance. Since the Milindapaiha seems to have originated in a cultural context different from that in which the canonical Pali texts were written, it is not surprising to find such divergences from the Theravada norm in its understanding of the principle of kamma and merit theory.

468



kamma in the milindapañha

Documents