jurisdiction - case digest - j. mendoza

8/10/2019 Jurisdiction - Case Digest - J. Mendoza

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JUSTICE MENDOZA CASE DIGESTS

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JURISDICTION

MTCJURISDICTION

FRANCEL REALTY v. CA

22 Jan. 1996

Facts: P, a subdivision developer, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R in the MTC.In its complaint, P alleged that R failed to pay monthly amortizations despite demands to updatehis payments and to vacate the premises. The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction, holding that the case was cognizable by the HLURB.

Issue: Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the complaint?

Held: No. While generally speaking an action for unlawful detainer falls within the original andexclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, this case is a not simply an unlawful detainer case. This case

involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D.No. 957, which controversy is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB. The HLURB has jurisdictionnot only over complaints of buyers against subdivision developers but also over actions filed by

developers for the unpaid price of the lots or units.

VDA. DE CRUZ v. CA

4 Mar. 1999

Facts: P filed an unlawful detainer case against D with the MTC. D claimed ownership over the

disputed land.

Issue: Was the MTC ousted of its jurisdiction, considering the question of ownership was

raised?

Held: No. After the enactment of B.P. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an

ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon theissue of ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved

only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

RTCJURISDICTION

VINZONS-CHATO v. NATIVIDAD

2 Jun. 1995

Facts: P, a revenue officer, wrote the Commissioner of the BIR to reconsider her decision totransfer him to another revenue district. With his letter unacted upon, P filed with the RTC acomplaint for Injunction against the Commissioner.

Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to entertain Ps complaint?

Held: No. Under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appealto the Civil Service Commission. The RTC judge should dismiss the action for failure of P toexhaust administrative remedies.

REPUBLIC v. CA

30 Oct. 1996

Facts: P owned several hectares of land which the government took pursuant to theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). A dispute on the proper valuation of Ps

land was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who sustained the


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initial valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines. P filed a Petition for Just

Compensation in the RTC, sitting as a special Agrarian Court. The RTC dismissed its petition onthe ground that P should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform AdjudicationBoard (DARAB), before recourse to it could be had.

Issue: Was the dismissal proper?

Held: No. Under 57 of R.A. 6657, the Special Agrarian Courts, which are the Regional TrialCourts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of justcompensation of just compensation to landowners. Furthermore, the DAR is an administrative

agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain. The valuation ofproperty in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested inadministrative agencies.

NATIONAL STEEL v. CA

2 Feb. 1999

Facts: P filed a complaint against D. P, however, failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees.

Issue: Should the complaint be dismissed?

Held: No. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the

RTC may allow P in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration ofthe applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If P fails to comply with this requirement, Dshould timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the

latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by Pwill be considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor.

SUMMARY PROCEDURE

ODSIGUEV. CA

233 SCRA 626 (1994)

Facts: P, as co-owner and assignee of subject land, sent a demand letter to D to vacatepremises. The letter was delivered by the barangay captain who, in a sworn affidavit, stated thathe tried to deliver the letter to D but D refused to receive it. P brought a suit for unlawful detainer.

D said that the jurisdictional requirement of formal demand was not complied with because theaffidavit of the barangay captain had no evidentiary weight absent any hearing. The MTC, RTCand CA decided in favor of P.

Issue: Whether jurisdictional requirements were properly complied with.

Held: Yes. The affidavit by P stated that demand letters were personally handed to D but Drefused to receive them. The affidavit is entitled to great respect absent anything to the contrary.The Rules on Summary Procedure provide for the submission by parties of affidavits and position

papers and enjoins courts to hold hearings only where it is necessary to do so to clarify factualmatters.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

APPEAL

OBUGAN V. PEOPLE

244 SCRA 263 (1995)


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Facts: P was accused in two criminal cases of violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act. Pwas found guilty. 14 days after promulgation of decision, P filed a motion for reconsideration.Afterwards, P also filed an urgent motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered

evidence. The motion for reconsideration was denied but the motion for new trial was granted.The judge however affirmed his decision after trial de novo.

Issue: Whether the 15-day period to appeal should be counted from the date of promulgation ofthe original decision subject of the motion for new trial, deducting the time the motion waspending, or from the time a new judgment was rendered.

Held: The period to appeal should be counted from the time of the rendition of the newjudgment. The mere grant of the motion for new trial operates to vacate the original judgment.

The original judgment is set aside and the case is reversed to its original status before judgment.

MOSQUERAV. PANGANIBAN

258 SCRA 473 (1996)

Facts: A, B, C, D, E, F were initially charged with frustrated homicide before the Provincial

Prosecutor. After the preliminary investigation, it was changed to less serious physical injuries.

Subsequently, the former information was reinstated by the RTC upon motion for reconsiderationof the private prosecutor. Appellants contended that because the direction and control of criminal

prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, a motion for reconsideration which the privateprosecutor filed without the conformity by the public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not preventthe order of dismissal from becoming final.

Issue: Whether the action by the trial court was proper.

Held: Yes. Private respondent through prosecutor has the right to intervene as he had neitherinstituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. The right of offendedparties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has always been

recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so shouldplace the accused in double jeopardy. Every court has the power and the duty to review and

amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error ordefect therein. In the present case, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the privateprosecutor who, as already discussed, has the legal personality to do so.

ARRESTS

PEOPLE V. NAZARENO

260 SCRA 256 (1996)

Facts: A and B were found guilty of the murder of X. Both claimed that their arrests without

warrant were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the arrest was unlawful due to the fact that it was done without a warrant.

Held: No. From the records presented, it was shown that A and B waived objections based onthe alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges

against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured whenthey voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. If objections based on this ground arewaived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise

valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error.

DEATH PENALTY


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PEOPLE V. REDULOSA

255 SCRA 279 (1996)

Facts: A and B were accused of kidnapping for ransom and murder and were sentenced to

death. The case was brought to the Supreme Court on automatic review. A then filed an "UrgentMotion to Withdraw Appeal."

Issue: Whether the action was proper.

Held: Yes. The action was proper only because of the decision of A to continue his case as an

appealed case. However, as appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealedone, so does he have a right subject to the approval of this Court to terminate the appeal bywithdrawing it.

The death penalty imposed was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua in view ofArt. III, 19 (1) of the Constitution, which took effect on February 2, 1987. While this case wasbrought to the Court for automatic review as required by Rule 122, 9 of the Rules of Court, the

case ceased to be in this Court by virtue of such Rule.

INFORMATION

OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR V. CA348 SCRA 714 (2000)

Facts: The provincial prosecutor filed with the RTC an information charging A, B, C, D and tenother individuals with murder and multiple frustrated homicide which was based on a joint affidavit

by individuals claiming to be members of the New People's Army. A, B, C and D challenges theinformation filed on the ground that in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder,the provincial prosecutor disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed

rebellion. The RTC denied the motion and ruled that the power to determine what crime to chargeon the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public prosecutor. The CA,however, while agreeing with the trial court, nevertheless found the prosecutor to have gravely

abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that the evidenceadduced showed that the crime committed was rebellion.

Issue: Whether the prosecution, even before the start of the trial, can be ordered to change theinformation which it had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminaryinvestigation shows that the crime committed was not murder with multiple frustrated murder but

rebellion.

Held: No. It was improper of the CA to consider the record of the preliminary investigation as

basis for the finding that the provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion when suchrecord was not presented before the RTC and therefore, was not part of the records of the case.It is the public prosecutors who should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be

initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. Hence, a municipal judge has no legal authority todetermine the character of the crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence presentedsupported prima facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He has no legal authority

to determine the character of the crime and his declaration upon that point can only be regardedas an expression of opinion in no wise binding on the court.

JUDGMENTS

PALU-AY V CA

293 SCRA 358 (1998)


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Facts: A was charged with frustrated homicide. He was however found guilty by the RTC judge

of serious physical injuries. The RTC judge found that A had no motive to do harm and that in allprobability, A accidentally pressed the trigger.

Issue: Whether the basis for the judge's decision would render the decision null and void.

Held: No. Within the issues made out by the parties, a court can find out what it thinks

happened. A judge is free to decide on the basis of probability. He can make his assessment ofthe truthfulness of the testimonies aided by his own knowledge and experience.

POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN

LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ

243 SCRA 497 (1995)

Facts: X filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for

immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against A, mayor of Santa Fe. The caseswere filed at the office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The Ombudsman directed that A be chargedwith attempted rape in the RTC. The case was assigned to P, a provincial prosecutor. P after

preliminary investigation only filed an information for acts of lasciviousness. The Ombudsman

cited P for contempt and suspended P for six months.

Issue: (a) Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on theProvincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution.

(b) Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to cite for contempt and whether

the suspension was valid.

Held: (a) Yes. The ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31

of the Ombudsman Act allows designation of investigators and prosecutors. When a prosecutor isdeputized he is under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. He is subject to the powerof the Ombudsman to direct, review, reverse or modify his decision.

(b) Yes. The Ombudsman Act gives the office the power to punish for contempt, in accordancewith the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties. The

preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of the same may not behampered.

ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ

244 SCRA 286 (1995)

Facts: The Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum and orders requiring A, an accountant

and B, a record custodian, to produce all documents in connection with his investigation of ananonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EconomicIntelligence and Investigation Bureau had been illegally disbursed. A and B claimed that military

and diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnelof the EIIB.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman's act was proper although the complaint in this case wasunsigned and unverified.

Held: Yes. The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "inan form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Likewise, 26 (2) of RA 6770 providesthat the Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form

concerning an official act or omission. The general investigation in the Ombudsman's office isprecisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty,malicious and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and expensive

trials.


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ORDERS

WASHINGTON DISTILLERS, INC V CA

260 SCRA 821

Facts: RTC judge X, to search the premises of X Company, issued a search warrant. A

Company filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds that the RTC had nojurisdiction to issue a search warrant and there was no probable cause for issuing the searchwarrant. RTC judge Y, who had been designated assisting judge, granted the motion. On appeal,

the CA ruled that an assisting RTC judge does not have the authority to quash the search warrantissued by another RTC judge acting in his capacity as executive judge.

Issue: Whether a judge may revoke the orders of another judge.

Held: Yes. A judge may revoke the orders of another judge in a litigation subsequently

assigned to him. The fact that a judge was the executive judge is not material, becausejurisdiction is vested in the court, not in him as executive judge. Applications for search warrantare made to the executive judge only for administrative purposes. Hence, an assisting judge was

competent to resolve the motion seeking to quash the search warrant.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

GOZOS V TAC-AN

300 SCRA 265 (1998)

Facts: A, B, C, D and E were accused of killing X. The prosecutor, after conducting apreliminary investigation, filed an information charging the five with murder. The RTC judge,

however, conducted his own preliminary investigation and decided to issue a warrant of arrestonly for A.

Issue: Whether the judge's action was proper?

Held: No. The Rules of Court specifically enumerates the persons authorized to conductpreliminary investigations, and an RTC judge is not one of those authorized to do so. To justifyhis orders, the judge invoked Article III section 2 of the Constitution. However, this provisionshould be distinguished from a preliminary investigation. The determination of probable cause for

the issuance of such orders of arrest is vested in the courts, but the conduct of preliminaryinvestigations is entrusted to the executive branch, with the exception of inferior court judges.

ORDER OF TRIAL

PEOPLE V ROMULO GUTIERREZ

302 SCRA 643 (1999)

Facts: A was charged with murder. He initially pleaded "not guilty" but later moved for

modification of the order of trial. The RTC denied A's motion for a modification of the order of trial.

Issue: Whether the RTC judge's action was proper?

Held: Yes. The Rules of Court does not require a change in the order of trial but only allows it inthe discretion of the court. This can be seen on the use of the permissive "may." In this case,

there was no basis for reversing the order of trial as the burden was on the prosecution to provethat it was the accused who committed the act.


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UNJUST CONVICTION

PEOPLE V. DRILON

233 SCRA 5 (1994)

Facts: A and B were convicted of murder and two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Xand wounding his wife and son. A appealed and the CA acquitted A on the ground that the

prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between A and B. A now filed a claim under RA 7309 sec3 which provides for the payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused,convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. It was

denied because there was basis for finding him probably guilty.

Issue: Whether or not under RA 7309, the mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a

crime that he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself as required by law.

Held: No. What the law requires is that the claimant must be unjustly accused and convicted.

To say that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the manner of his convictionrather than of his innocence. The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquittedis not itself proof that the previous conviction was unjust.

COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS

OLIVAS VS. OMBUDSMAN

239 SCRA 283 (1994)

Facts: P retired from the AFP. Shortly thereafter, anonymous letters were sent to the PCGGcharging him with violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Unexplained Wealth Act.P was informed by BPI that a freeze order had been issued covering his current and savings

account. The letters were referred to the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Boardthat the PCGG had created.

Issue: Whether P may be compelled to file a counter affidavit notwithstanding the fact that nocomplaint or affidavit has been filed against him.

Held: No. It is incumbent upon the PCGG as complainant to reduce the evidence it has intoaffidavits before the respondent should be required to explain. It must be noted that the generalpower of investigation of the PCGG consists of 2 stages, criminal investigation and preliminary

investigation

CIVIL PROCEDURE

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

NATIONAL STEEL v. CA

2 Feb. 1999

Facts: In a complaint filed by P against D, P sought the execution in his favor of a deed ofassignment of shares of stock. The docket fees paid by P, however, were not based on the valueof the shares of stock sought to be recovered.

Issue: Did P pay the right amount of docket fees?

Held: No. This is an action for the recovery of personal property, the main purpose of which isto regain the ownership and possession of the said shares of stock. Accordingly, P should paydocket fees based on the value of the shares of stock and the amount of damages he seeks to

recover. Under Rule 141, 7(a) as it stood at the time of the filing of the complaint, docket fees for


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ordinary civil actions should be based on the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated

value of the property in litigation.

ORDER OF DEFAULT

VILLAREAL v. CA

17 Sept. 1998

Facts: P et al filed a Motion to lift an order of default. The motion alleged that P et al wereresidents of the US which local newspapers do not reach and that they did not know about the

case filed against them until well-meaning friends informed them about the matter. The motionalso alleged that P et al have absolutely no knowledge, much less any hand, in the incidentfalsely imputed to them

Issue: Did the motion to lift an order of default follow the requirements in Rule 18, 3?

Held: No. Under Rule 18, 3, a motion to lift an order of default must allege with particularitythe facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect which caused his failureto answer. The motion must show that the defendant has a meritorious defense or that something

would be gained by having the order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is not

accompanied by affidavits of merits, it may be properly denied. The allegation that P et al haveabsolutely no knowledge, much less any hand, in the incident falsely imputed to them does not

meet this requirement. Such allegation is a conclusion rather than a statement of facts showing ameritorious defense.

PETITION FOR RELIEF

TENEBRO v. CA

7 July 1997

Facts: D filed a petition for relief from judgment. In his petition, D claimed he was deprived of

due process. The court rendered a decision, not only on the issue of due process, but also on themerits of the case.

Issue: Did the court err in considering the merits of the case in a petition for relief fromjudgment?

Held: No. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only inexceptional cases because, as a rule, a final judgment should not be disturbed where a partycould have appealed or availed himself of another remedy. Accordingly, a court may validly

consider the equities of a case in order to determine whether there is a compelling reason forsetting aside the decision. That is why Rule 38, 3 provides that a petition for relief from judgmentmust be accompanied by an affidavit of merit containing the facts constituting the petitioners

good and substantial cause of action or defense.

COUNTERCLAIM

FRANCEL REALTY v. CA

22 Jan. 1996

Facts: P, a subdivision developer, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R in the MTC.The MTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; nonetheless, it awarded Rs

counterclaim for damages.

Issue: Can the MTC make such an award?


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Held: No. Since it has no jurisdiction over the case, the MTC cannot grant Rs counterclaim for

damages.

FLETCHER CHALLENGE v. CA

20 April 1998

Facts: P filed a complaint against D. D filed an answer with counterclaim. Later P filed a

pleading in which they asked for the dismissal of the complaint that they had filed and for thedismissal of the counterclaim filed against them on the ground that, being an ancillary remedy, acompulsory counterclaim cannot stand by itself. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the

counterclaim.

Issue: Was the dismissal of the counterclaim valid under the circumstances?

Held: Yes. The rule is that the counterclaim may not be dismissed if defendant objects, unlessit can be independently considered by the court. Here, however, D made no objection and so the

RTC validly dismissed the same. At any rate, D are without a remedy because under Rule 12, 2,the dismissal of the counterclaim is without prejudice to its filing as a separate action.

INJUNCTION

OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC. V CA

319 SCRA 444 (1999)

Facts: Lessor X filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees A, B, C and D for failure to pay

the increased rent which the RTC granted. X then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ ofexecution specifically against A and E enterprise (a privy to the contract of lease between X andA). E enterprise filed an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which the

RTC granted. On appeal, the CA declared the writ of injunction as null and void.

Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring as null and void the writ

of preliminary injunction.

Held: No. The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, itcannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy ofa party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment inthe main case, citing thereon the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party

concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous andappeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. In the present case, the RTC issued awrit of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment, in spite of the fact that the

right of E to occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent.Having no clear legal right, E's plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court.

EJECTMENT

LUCIO SAN ANDRES V. CA

6 Dec. 1996

Facts: P, before filing an ejectment suit against D, sent the latter a letter, demanding that a

formal contract of lease between P and D must be executed immediately otherwise D would beconsidered intruders of the property from which he can be ousted. A suit for ejectment was laterfiled. The case reached the CA which dismissed the complaint. The CA held that no demand to

vacate had been made by P before bringing the ejectment suit.

Issue: Was the ejectment suit preceded by a proper demand to vacate?


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Held: No. An action for ejectment is subject to the requirement of Rule 70 2 of the Rules of

Court concerning the need for a demand to be made before the lessee may be considered adeforicant, unlawfully withholding possession from the owner of the land. The demand must beeither to pay the rents or to comply with the terms of the contract, as the case may be. But the

letter of P makes neither demand on D. Instead, the letter demands the execution of a new leasecontract on the theory that the old lease agreement had been terminated. However, the oldagreement was not, in fact, terminated.

OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC. V. CA

319 SCRA 444 (1999)

Facts: Lessor X filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees A, B, C and D for failure to paythe increased rent which the RTC granted. X then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of

execution specifically against A and E enterprise. E enterprise opposed the motion on the groundthat it was never impleaded nor included as part defendant in the ejectment case.

Issue: Whether judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon defendants in the suit butalso against those not made party thereto.

Held: Yes. A judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit

but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are: a) trespassers, squatters or agents ofthe defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; b) guests or other

occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; c) transferees pendente lite; d)sub lessee; e) co-lessee; or f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.In this case, E enterprise admitted that it was the actual occupant of the leased premises and has

been authorized by A to pay the rents for and in its behalf.

LIMPO V CA

333 SCRA 577 (2000)

Facts: The RTC judge issued a writ of execution levying 2 parcels of land owned by X.

Subsequently, a writ of possession was issued ex parte commanding the sheriff to place Y inpossession of the properties after X was unable to redeem them. X contended that she was never

furnished a copy of Y's petition for issuance of a writ of possession, nor given a notice of thehearing. Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her and had no authority to issue a writof possession.

Issue: Whether a writ of possession may be issued of ex parte.

Held: Yes. What was filed, as a petition for issuance of writ of possession, was in substance

merely a motion, as Y actually sought just the execution of the final decision rendered in herfavor. Such motion could be made ex parte.

GARNISHMENT

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. V CA

326 SCRA 18 (2000)

Facts: W charged H with attempted parricide. H and W entered into a compromise agreement

with respect to the civil aspect of the case. Upon failure to comply with his obligations, a Noticeof Garnishment was issued by another RTC branch to Company X, H's employer. The notice ofGarnishment remained partially unsatisfied as evidenced by the two checks paid by Company X.

Issue: Whether W can validly seek to obtain satisfaction of the writ of execution againstCompany X, H's employer.


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Held: No. Garnishment proceedings are the means by which the judgment creditor seeks to

subject to his claim the property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third person. Suchproceeding must be had in the trial court that has jurisdiction over the suit in which the judgmentcreditor prevailed.

PARTIES

SANTIAGO LAND DEV. V. CA

267 SCRA 79 (1997)

Facts: P, as assignee of the mortgagor, filed action against the mortgagee D to enforce analleged right to redeem. Pending this action, D sold the property to X. Consequently, X filed amotion to intervene. P opposed the motion stating that X's interest was a mere expectancy. Trial

court allowed the intervention.

Issue: Whether the action of the court was proper.

Held: No. While D may have legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, its interest astransferee pendente lite is different from that of an intervenor. D asserts that the rules are

interchangeable and that it is erroneous to insist on the application of Rule 3 20 solely. The

purpose of Rule 12 2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party toprotect his interest and the court incidentally to settle all conflicting claims. The purpose of Rule 3

20 is to provide for the substitution of the transferee pendente lite precisely because he is not astranger but a successor-in-interest of the transferor, who is a party to the action. As proper party,a transferee's title to the property is subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation

and is in no better position than the vendor in whose shoes he now stands.

SAMANIEGO V AGUILA

334 SCRA 438 (2000)

Facts: The Office of the President granted the exemption from the coverage of the "Operation

Land Transfer Program" the land owned by X. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petitionquestioning the decision of the Office for failure to implead the Office of the President, as they

should be considered as indispensable parties.

Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be considered as an indispensable party andmust therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules.

Held: No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination canbe had of an action without that party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such

an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that thecourt cannot proceed without their presence. "Interests" within the meaning of this rule, shouldbe material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from a mere

incidental interest in the question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party isone who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest on thesubject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of

pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the case at bar, the failure toimplead the Office of the President does not warrant the dismissal of the case as such isconsidered as a pro forma party.

INTERVENTION

LIMPO V CA

333 SCRA 577 (2000)


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Facts: In a case questioning the legality of a writ of possession issued ex parte, spouses H and

W filed a motion for leave to intervene as the new owners of the parcel of land being litigatedupon as such land was foreclosed and sold to the spouses as the highest bidder. The motion wasfiled only after the appeal in this case had been submitted for resolution.

Issue: Whether the intervention is proper at the late stage of this case.

Held: No. Intervention may be granted only its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice therights of the original parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed "before rendition of judgmentby the trial court." After trial and decision in the case, intervention can no longer be permitted.

Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal without unduly delaying the disposition of the case andprejudicing the interest of the parties.

MISJOINDER/NONJOINDER

HEIRS OF ASUNCION V. GERVACIO

304 SCRA 322 (1999)

Facts: A case for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land was filed against X. Although X

in his petition to the SC failed to implead Y and Z as private respondents, Y and Z filed a Motion

with Leave to File Comment and/or Intervention, presented arguments in support of thequestioned orders, and specifically referred to themselves as private respondents.

Issue: Whether failure to implead is a ground for dismissal of an action.

Held: No. The Rules provides that the misjoinder/non joinder of parties is not a ground fordismissal of an action and that parties may simply be dropped or added by order of the court,either on motion of the parties or on its own initiative. In the present case, it was upon the

initiative of Y and Z that for all intents and purposes they have been joined as respondents.

PRETRIAL

BEMBO V. CA

250 SCRA 404 (1995)

Facts: The RTC declared D in default for failure to appear in pretrial conference. The CAreversed the decision finding that notice to re-set pretrial was not given to parties, but only to the

counsels who were informed that a "hearing" was scheduled.

Issue: Whether notice was sufficient.

Held: Yes. The discretion and authority of the respondent court to declare private respondent indefault after it failed to appear at the pretrial is clear from 2 of Rule 20 and the CA, without a

clear showing of grave abuse of this discretion, should not have annulled the default order.Moreover, the sufficiency of the written notice of pretrial is irrelevant where the evidence showsthat the counsel and the parties actually knew of the pretrial. Counsel of D admitted that a copy of

the order resetting the pretrial conference had been served on him and that he notified D of thisdate. Nor was the notice given defective for referring to a "hearing" rather than to a pretrial. Ahearing as known to the law is not confined to a trial but embraces the several stages of a

litigation. It does not preclude pretrial.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. V CA

326 SCRA 18 (2000)

Facts: X filed a complaint for damages against Company Y. By way of a counterclaim,

Company Y prayed for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The RTC then


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required the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and scheduled the pre-trial conference.

Counsel A, on behalf of X's counsel, Counsel B, file an "Urgent Motion for Resetting " of the pre-trial conference on the ground that Counsel B was on sick leave. Company Y was declared as indefault on the ground that no medical certificate had been attached to the motion. The court

allowed X to present her evidence ex-parte.

Issue: Whether Company Y should be declared as in default for their failure to file their pre-trial

briefs at least three days before the pre-trial conference.

Held: No. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for postponement of pre-trial, the court

must take into account the following factors: a) the reason for the postponement, and b) themerits of the case of the movant. In this case, there is no showing that Company X, in asking forthe resetting of the pre-trial conference, sought merely to cause unjustifiable delay in the

proceedings. Also, the presence of another lawyer from counsel's law firm during the scheduledpre-trial conference negates any suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard of the rules on thepart of the petitioners.

CAUSE OF ACTION

MERALCO V. CA

271 SCRA 417 (1997)

Facts: D supplies P with electricity. Upon billing, P refused to pay until D informs P of the basisfor the purchase power adjustment costs. D sent a notice of disconnection to P for failure to paythe bill. P sought to enjoin D from disconnecting electric supply. D claimed that the trial court

had no jurisdiction, and that the Bureau of Energy was the proper forum. The trial court dismissedthe case.

Issue: Whether dismissal was proper.

Held: No. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. P was not invoking the

jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electriccompanies," but the regular court's power to adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which

are legally demandable and enforceable. What P demanded from D was only the basis uponwhich the latter had computed the purchased power adjustmentit is not a matter that in any waypertains to BOE's supervision, control, or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates . . .

PHILSEC V. CA

274 SCRA 102 (1997)

Facts: A Co., a foreign corporation, with Y, a non-resident, undertook the obligation of X,Filipino, to B Co. For breach of contract, A Co. sued B Co., a domestic corporation, before a UScourt. While this was pending, B Co. filed a case before RTC Makati for sum of money for

damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against A Co., where it reiteratedits counterclaims. A Co. sought the dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, and that thelitigation before the US court was proper forum. The trial court and the CA dismissed the action

for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether action by lower courts was proper.

Held: No. The trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case was justifiable under theprinciple of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule

16 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case basedon this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered a matterof defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction


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on this ground, it should do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special

circumstances" require the court's desistance.In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the

pleadings filed by A Co. in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of

the plaintiffs (B Co.) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (X) is a Filipino, and thatit was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the object of the transaction underlitigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that X was not a party in

the U.S. case. It was error for the CA and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over A Co. and Ycould not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served byextraterritorial service. Rule 14 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons

on a non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where,among others, "the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines."

COMETA V. CA

301 SCRA 459 (1999)

Facts: P filed an information for Falsification of Public Document against D. The case waseventually dismissed. Following the dismissal of the criminal case, D filed a complaint formalicious prosecution against P. P moved for its dismissal for supposed failure to state a cause

of action and failure to implead indispensable parties. P's motion was denied.

Issue: Whether the denial of the motion was proper.

Held: Yes. The pivotal consideration to determine the proper statement of cause of action iswhether the facts pleaded and the substantive law entitle plaintiff to a judgment. A complaint is

sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may bevague and indefinite, for, in such case, the recourse of the defendant is to file for a motion for abill of particulars. Pleadings should be liberally construed. A court, dealing with a motion to

dismiss an action for malicious prosecution, has only to determine whether the allegations of thecomplaint, assuming them to be true, entitle the plaintiff to a judgment.

WRIT OF POSSESSION

VACA V. CA234 SCRA 146 (1994)

Facts: For the failure of H and W to pay their mortgage obligation to the Bank, the mortgage was

extrajudicially foreclosed and the property was sold to the Bank as highest bidder. The one-yearredemption period expired. A new TCT was issued to the Bank after cancellation of TCT in thename of the spouses. However despite demands, they refused to turn over possession. The

spouses filed a separate action to annul the mortgage. The writ was eventually issued orderingspouses to turn over possession to the Bank.

Issue: Whether issuance of the writ of possession was proper.

Held: Yes. The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot

bar the issuance of the writ of possession because the same is a ministerial act of the trial courtafter title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. Deferments of issuance of thewrit are justified only under equitable circumstances where the obligation ceased to be ministerial.

VENUE

GESMUNDO V. JRB REALTY

234 SCRA 153(1994)


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Facts: P and D entered into a lease contract where the parties stipulated that "the venue for all

suits, whether for breach hereof or damages or any cause between the lessor and the lessee,and persons claiming under each, being the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City." Pfiled a suit for damages because D terminated the lease. D moved to dismiss on the ground that

the venue was improperly laid in the RTC of Makati, contrary to the terms of their contract.Issue: Whether venue was proper.

Held: No. Stipulations limiting venue are valid and binding between contracting parties. It isclear from the parties' contract that they intended to limit the venue of all suits between the lessorand the lessee, and those between parties claiming under them, regardless of their residence.

This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided by in Rule 4, 2(b).The terms can not be construed to merely provide an additional forum because the parties madeit plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each other.

WRIT OF ATTACHMENT

OATE V. ABROGAR

241 SCRA 659(1995)

Facts: By virtue of an action against D, P succeeded in having a writ of attachment issued over

the property of D. Records showed that there was no prior service of summons and complaint.The deputy sheriff already served D notices of garnishment and sought their implementation. D

claimed that jurisdiction was not properly acquired.

Issue: Whether issuance of writ of attachment was proper.

Held: No. A writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon thedefendant. However, it has been ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until

jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore it is required that when the properofficer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should besimultaneously made. The Rules do not require that issuance of the writ be kept a secret until it

can be enforced. Otherwise in no case may the service of summons on D precede the levy onattachment. To the contrary, Rule 57 13 allows the defendant to move to discharge the

attachment even before any attachment is actually levied upon. Since the attachment was invalid,any examination of the property attached thereof is also invalid.

SUMMONS

LITTON MILLS v. CA

15 May 1996

Facts: P filed a complaint against D Corp. for specific performance. Ds counsel move to dismissthe case and quash the summons on the ground that D was a foreign corporation not doing

business in the Philippines, and as such, was beyond the reach of the local courts. Ds counselcontended that the fact of Ds doing business must first be proved before summons can beserved in accordance with Rule 14, 14.

Issue: Must the fact that a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines be proved firstbefore summons can be served?

Held: No. A court need not go beyond the allegations in the complaint to determine whether ornot a defendant foreign corporation is doing business for the purpose of Rule 14, 14. The

allegation that D ordered soccer jerseys from P and for this purpose D caused the opening of anirrevocable letter of credit in favor of P is a sufficient allegation that D was doing business in thePhilippines.


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VALMONTE V. CA

252 SCRA 92 (1996)

Facts: H and W are foreign residents, but H maintains a law office in the Philippines as memberof the Philippine bar. Y filed for a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentalsagainst H and W. Y sent summons to the office of H who received it only insofar as H was

concerned. H maintained that he had no authority to accept the summons on behalf of W. H filedan Answer with Counterclaim. W did not file an Answer. RTC refused to declare W in defaultbecause summons was not properly served.

Issue: Whether service of summons was proper as to W.

Held: No. W is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on hermust be in accordance with Rule 14 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines,must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general

circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of thesummons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address ofthe defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. Service under the

third mode in this case is not proper because like the first two, it must be made outside the

Philippines. The service to H cannot be considered a valid service of summons on W because itwas not made upon the order of the court.

HAHN V. CA

266 SCRA 537 (1997)

Facts: P sued D for alleged breach of a Deed of Assignment. In P's complaint, he alleged that Dwas a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Service of summons was made to

the DTI. D moved to dismiss the case claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction overcase since D was not doing business so the service to DTI was improper. The trial court deferredresolution of motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether summons was properly served.

Held: Yes. For purposes of having summons served on a foreign corporation in accordancewith Rule 14 14, it is sufficient that it be alleged in the complaint that the foreign corporation isdoing business in the Philippines. A determination that the foreign corporation is doing business

is only tentative and is made only for the purpose of enabling the local court to acquire jurisdictionover the foreign corporation. This determination does not foreclose a contrary finding shouldevidence necessitate it.

MACAPAGAL V. CA

271 SCRA 491 (1997)

Facts: D issued a check to P. The check was dishonored upon presentation. P sued D fordamages. Summons was served at the law office of the counsel of D. D claimed that the service

was improper. Thus, jurisdiction was not acquired over him. Trial proceeded where P won.

Issue: Whether service of summons proper.

Held: Yes. The object of summons is to inform the defendant in an action commenced againsthim directing him to answer the complaint within the reglementary period and giving notice that

failure to answer shall result in judgment by default. Although D now claims that he did notauthorize counsel or the latter's law office to receive the summons for him, the fact remains thatthe petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the same law office in his behalf. Petitioner

did not take action against the lawyers for their unauthorized representation until after 8 years


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and only because the CA stated that D's failure to file an administrative complaint against the

lawyers showed that he did not feel genuinely aggrieved by the actions of the law firm.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

APA V. FERNANDEZ

242 SCRA 509 (1995)

Facts: P filed case for squatting against A, B and C. A, B and C moved to suspend theirarraignment based on the pendency of a civil case among the same parties regarding ownership

of the subject land. In the civil case, A, B and C sought to nullify the partition and cancel the TCTin P's name. P argued that the issue was only physical possession, so the issue of ownership inthe civil case was not a prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether the civil action justified suspension of criminal proceedings.

Held: Yes. P claimed the right to possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership isthus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in thecriminal case must be suspended in the meantime. Surely, if A, B and C are co-owners of the lot

in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as much entitled to the use

and occupation of the land as are P and his family.

CONTEMPT

PACIFIC BANKING v. CA

13 Oct. 1995

Facts: The RTC rendered a decision in favor of A and issued a writ of execution against B. B

filed a petition for certiorari with the SC and the SC issued a temporary restraining order orderingrespondents to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing such writ of execution untilfurther orders from this Court. Eventually the SC dismissed the petition. Four days thereafter,

respondents tried to enforce the writ of execution.

Issue: Should the SC cite the respondents for contempt of court?

Held: Yes. The respondents knew that there was an existing TRO issued by the SC. While thepetition, in which the TRO was issued, had been dismissed by the SC, the fact was that it was not

yet final and executory and the TRO had not yet been lifted at the time respondents tried toenforce the lower courts writ of execution. The TRO was expressly made effective until furtherorders from this Court, which means that it was not automatically lifted upon the dismissal of the

main case. However, there is no basis for holding the Clerk of Court guilty of wrongdoing incertifying that D failed to file a record on appeal, since this was a matter of record.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEV'T CORP. V. UNION BANK

334 SCRA 443 (2000)

Facts: Judge A denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the collection

suit filed by P. Judge B replaced Judge A. P, through new counsel, filed an ex-parte Motion toResolve Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Judge B granted the motion. P moved forexecution of Judge B's order which has become final. Judge A was re-assigned to the case. He

denied the motion for execution citing as basis his earlier order denying motion for summaryjudgment.

Issue: 1. Whether Judge A acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.


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2. Whether the case was proper for summary judgment.

Held: 1. Yes. A trial court cannotapart from reconsidering its decision, granting new trial orallowing a relief from judgmentreview much less set aside a decision on the merits. Such

power pertains exclusively to the appellate courts. Judge B's resolution granted all reliefs prayedfor by P in the collection suit. It disposed of all issues and constitutes a judgment on merits.Judge A's order denying motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order that did not finally

dispose of the case. An interlocutory order is always under the control of court and may bemodified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. It isimmaterial that the judge who exercises such powers is different from the one who issued the

rescinded or amended order. Judge B had authority to review prior interlocutory orders of thecourt as he did when, in response to a new motion by P, he granted motion for summaryjudgment even though previously denied by Judge A.

2. Yes. Under rule 35 1 and 3, a summary judgment is proper where, upon motionfiled after the issues had been joined and on the basis of the pleadings and papers filed, the court

finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact except as to amount of damages. Agenuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. While the recordsshow that no hearing was conducted by judge B before he resolved the motion for summary

judgment, in proceedings for summary judgment, the court is merely expected to act chiefly on

the basis of what is in the records of the case. The hearing contemplated in the rules is not derigueur as its purpose is merely to determine whether the issues are genuine or not, and not to

receive evidence on the issues set up in the pleadings.

EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS

REPUBLIC V. TACLOBAN CITY ICE PLANT

258 SCRA 145 (1996)

Facts: The PCGG resolved that TCIP substantially proved ownership of Price Mansion. Thisresolution was affirmed when the Republic brought the sequestration case of Price Mansion

before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan declared that Price Mansion beremoved from the list of "ill-gotten wealth." Thereafter however, UBC filed a Motion for

Intervention claiming that Price Mansion was sold to it by TCIP. Sandiganbayan refused toresolve the motion stating that it has already lost jurisdiction over the case when it declared thatPrice Mansion was not ill-gotten wealth.

Issue: Whether action by Sandiganbayan was proper.

Held: No. It behooved the Sandiganbayan to conduct a hearing to determine the truth of UBC's

claim. For whether the Price Mansion had been acquired by the UBC is a question that was notdecided in the Sandiganbayan's final order declaring it to be not to be sequestered. The Rulesprovide that as to the effect of court judgments or final orders in any other litigation between the

same parties or their successors in interest, is that deemed to have been adjudged in a formerjudgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually andnecessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

SUPPLEMENTAL/AMENDED PLEADING

SUPERCLEAN SERVICES V. CA

258 SCRA 265 (1996)

Facts: P won as lowest bidder to provide cleaning services for D. D refused to enforce thecontract between them. P filed for mandamus. However, a year passed without the petitionbeing resolved such that P, in view of supervening events, sought a change in the relief prayed.

Through a Supplemental Complaint, P claimed damages for lost profit. D argued that the action


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was prohibited as it was tantamount to a change in cause of action which was prejudicial to D's

interests.

Issue: Whether Supplemental Complaint should be allowed.

Held: Yes. The so-called Supplemental Complaint by P should simply be treated as embodyingamendments to the original complaint or P may be required to file an amended complaint. The

change in the relief sought was necessitated by a supervening event which rendered the firstrelief sought impossible of attainment. There will be no unfairness or surprise to privaterespondent, because after all D will have a right to file an amended answer and present evidence

in a support thereof.

CONSOLIDATION

ALLIED BANKING CORP. V. CA

259 SCRA 371 (1996)

Facts: P and D are parties to a back-to-back loan transaction. P filed a case for collectionagainst D for his failure to comply with obligations. However, on a separate civil action, D filed a

case for accounting against P to determine the amount of his obligation. Case for accounting was

dismissed on the basis of litis pendentia.


Held: No. Litis pendentia merely requires that there be another pending action, not a prior

pending action. Dismissal is allowed if one of the actions would be the better vehicle to ventilatethe issues between the parties. In this case, there are countervailing considerations which makedismissal of D's suit inequitable. The fact that one case was already partly tried should not justify

the refusal of the trial judge to consolidate the cases because the evidence already submitted bythe plaintiffs in the first case could be submitted as part of the evidence in the second case,without further need of retaking the testimonies of the witnesses, in view of the fact that both

cases involve the same parties, the same subject matter and the same issues. The rules ofconsolidation should be liberally construed.

MOTION TO DISMISS

HAHN V. CA

266 SCRA 537 (1997)

Facts: P sued D for alleged breach of a Deed of Assignment. In P's complaint, he alleged that D

was a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Service of summons was made tothe DTI. D moved to dismiss the case claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction overcase since D was not doing business so the service to DTI was improper. The trial court deferred

resolution of motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether action by trial court was proper.

Held: Yes. Rule 16, 3 authorizes courts to defer the resolution of a motion to dismiss until afterthe trial if the ground on which the motion is based does not appear to be indubitable. The

records dealt with factual issues which were not clear as to whether some allegations correspondto the proof. The trial court properly deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss and thus avoidedprematurely deciding a question which requires a factual basis, with the same result if it had

denied the motion and conditionally assumed jurisdiction.


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MOTION FOR NEWTRIAL

REYES V. CA

6 Feb. 1997

Facts: D was charged for falsification of deeds of sale of 4 parcels of land. D pleaded not guilty.Prosecution proceeded to present evidence and soon rested its case. Presentation of evidence

by defense was re-set for 6 times. D was absent for 3 times. D's counsel was absent 5 times.Due to these absences, D was deemed to have waived right to present evidence. Trial courtfound D guilty. D hired new counsel who filed Motion for New Trial before the CA.

Issue: Whether Motion for New Trial should prosper.

Held: Yes. It was counsel's absences more than D's which appear to be the cause for thedefense's failure to present its evidence. Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty,the negligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice

petitioner's constitutional right to be heard.

MODES OF DISCOVERY

DELA TORRE ET AL V. PEPSI298 SCRA 363 (1998)

Facts: P, et. al, holders of 349 Pepsi crowns, tried to claim prizes from D who refused to deliver.Trial court consolidated the 8 complaints for specific performance and damages. P claimed right

to litigate in forma pauperis. Written interrogatories were sent to P to determine status as pauperlitigants. Trial court suspended proceedings until documents on status of P were completed. Pdid not serve their answers. Trial court dismissed case for failure to make discovery. CA

affirmed.


Held: No. Generally, orders of the court do not affect ongoing process of discovery between

parties, unless the same expressly so provides. However, the interrogatories were on ancillarymatters, not directly related to the main issues in the suit. The failure to answer by P was due tomisapprehension of scope of trial court's order which suspended proceedings until documentswere completed. The dismissal was a drastic sanction for an excusable mistake.

FORUM SHOPPING

DE DIOS v. CA

19 June 1997

Facts: The CA denied a motion for extension of time within which to file a petition for certiorarifor violation of Circular No. 28-91, because the certification against forum shopping was executednot by the petitioner himself but by petitioners counsel.

Issue: Does the requirement of Circular No. 28-91 for a certification against forum shoppingapply to petitioners motion for extension?

Held: No. Under this circular, such certification is required in every petition filed with the SC orthe CA. Obviously, a motion for extension is not the petition spoken of in this provision. While

such certification may be attached to a motion for extension and, in such a case, may beconsidered as compliance with the rules even if none is attached to the petition subsequentlyfiled, the reverse does not follow.


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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. GORDON

298 SCRA 736 (1998)

Facts: D was apprehensive of his removal as SBMA Chair due to the change of administration.

D filed a petition for prohibition to prevent his ouster, saying that he had a fixed term. Hisappointment was eventually cancelled by the President. Instead of pressing for his Motion forTemporary Restraining Order, he filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Petition. D then filed a case in

RTC Olongapo. P filed a case for forum shopping and contempt against D based on Rule 7 5 ofthe Rules. The SC granted the Notice of Withdrawal without prejudice to the contempt petition.

Issue: Whether P was guilty of forum shopping.

Held: No. Forum shopping consists filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same

cause of action, simultaneously or successively, to obtain a favorable judgment. In this case, noadverse decision was rendered against D by the SC for which he thought proper to institutesecond action at the RTC. This is a situation where the party realizes his mistake because the

court in which he brought his case had no jurisdiction. However, D should have at leastapologized to the SC and explained the need to re-file without awaiting the resolution on theirNotice of Withdrawal of Petition. But, the purpose of citing one in contempt is preservative more

than punitive, so the SC overlooked the lapse.

MELO V. CA

318 SCRA 94 (1999)

Facts: D mortgaged a parcel of land to P to secure a loan. Due to failure of D to pay, the

mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and P was the highest bidder. P filed a Petition for Ex-Parte Issuance of a Writ of Possession. As counter-petition, D filed a complaint for injunctionagainst P. P moved to dismiss D's action based on forum shopping and failure of private

respondent to attach a certification of non-forum shopping to the complaint. D amended complaintby including the certification.

Issues: 1. Whether D's action was tantamount to forum shopping.2. Whether there was substantial compliance with the rule requiring submission

of certification of non-forum shopping together with initiatory pleadings.

Held: 1. No. The petition for Ex-Parte Issuance of a Writ of Possession that P filed involved adifferent cause of action from the complaint for injunction filed by D. P sought possession of the

subject property, whereas D sought to enjoin them from consolidating title over the same. P'saction is founded on Act No. 3135, Sec. 7, which gives the purchaser at a public auction the rightto have possession of the property sold to him during the redemption period even if eventually

they do not succeed in consolidating their title to it. D's action is based on RA 337, Sec. 78,which gives a mortgagor the right to redeem the property sold at foreclosure sale within one yearthereof. D can oppose P's action to obtain possession of the property while trying to prevent

them from consolidating title in a separate case. The decision in one is not conclusive of theother.

2. No. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure

to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that P is not guilty of forumshopping. Otherwise, we would have an absurd situation where the parties themselves would bethe judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of the rule. Compliance with the

certification against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of forumshopping itself. Nor can subsequent compliance with the requirement excuse a party's failure tocomply in the first instance. Unless condoned by the Court due to compelling reasons, non-

compliance is inexcusable. Thus, there is a difference in the treatmentin terms of imposablesanctionsbetween failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of theprohibition against forum shopping. The former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without


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prejudice, of the complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground for summary

dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt.

APPEALS

IDANG v. CA

14 Jul. 1994

Facts: In an action for recovery of possession of land, the RTC rendered a judgment in favor ofP. On review, however, the CA reversed the decision. P did not appeal but instead, brought an

ejectment case against R.

Issue: Was filing an ejectment case against R the proper remedy?

Held: No. The validity of the CA decision cannot be collaterally attacked. P should haveappealed from that decision but he did not. Neither did he bring an action for the annulment of the

judgment against him.

COCO-CHEMICAL v. CA

19 Nov. 1996

Facts: P filed a complaint against D. The case was dismissed. Ps counsel filed a notice of

appeal which stated that it was being filed on behalf of W. For this reason, as W was not a partyto the case, D moved to dismiss the appeal. Ps counsel opposed the dismissal of the appeal andexplained that the error was due to inadvertence. The RTC dismissed the appeal.

Issue: Was the dismissal proper?

Held: No. It is obvious that the error was due to inadvertence on the part of Ps counsel.Although counsel was negligent in failing to discover the errors before signing the notice, hisnegligence should be considered excusable considering that the title of the case and its number

as well as the name of the court were correctly stated in the caption of the notice of appeal andno prejudice would be caused by the allowance of the appeal, while real prejudice would be

caused to P by its disallowance.

DE DIOS v. CA

19 Jun. 1997

Facts: Ps motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Department of Agrarian ReformAdjudication Board (DARAB) was denied in a resolution received by P on July 31. On August 9. P

moved for an extension of 15 days, until August 24, within which to file a petition for certiorari inthe CA. On August 23, P filed his petition, denominated as one for review by way of appeal bycertiorari. In a resolution, however, the CA denied the motion for extension on the ground that

the petition for certiorari which P intended to file was not the proper remedy.

Issue: Was the CA correct in denying the motion for extension on this ground?

Held: No. The CA was rather hasty in concluding that P was going to file a petition for certiorarisolely on the basis of Ps allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have

reserved judgment on the matter until it had actually received the petition especially consideringthat Ps motion for extension was filed well within the reglementary period for filing a petition forreview. As it turned out, what P actually filed was a petition for review which complies with all the

requirements for such petition.

VILLAREAL v. CA

17 Sept. 1998


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Facts: On April 20, D filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a decision. On August 10, the RTCissued an order denying said Motion. On August 16, a photocopy of the said order was served.On August 21, D received the duplicate original copy of the order. On the same day, D filed a

notice of appeal. The RTC denied due course to Ds appeal, holding that it was filed out of time.

Issue: From which date should the period for filing an appeal be counted: from August 16, or

from August 21?

Held: August 21. It cannot be from August 16, when D was given a mere photocopy of the

courts order. Such copy lacks assurance of its genuineness, considering that photocopies caneasily be tampered with, for the purpose of enabling D to determine whether or not to appeal and,if they do so, what issues to raise on appeal. The RTC, therefore, should have given due course

to Ds appeal.

PACIFIC v. CONCORDIA

20 Nov. 1998

Facts: A judgment was rendered by the RTC ordering D to pay damages to P. D filed a notice of

appeal. Subsequently, however, the decision was modified by the RTC with respect to the award

of damages and the amounts thereof. D did not appeal the modified decision.

Issue: Should D have filed another notice of appeal when the original decision, from which it hadappealed, was modified?

Held: No. D did not have to file another notice of appeal, having given notice of its intention toappeal the original decision. To be sure, the modified decision substantially amended the originaldecision. But Ds failure to appeal from the modified decision did not render its prior appeal from

the original decision ineffective. Both decisions ordered D to pay damages to P although indifferent amounts. It is also undisputed that D seasonably appealed from the original judgment.

ABELLERA V. CA

326 SCRA 485 (2000)

Facts: P won an unlawful detainer case against D. On appeal, the RTC held 7 clarificatoryhearings wherein the parties presented additional evidence. The RTC reversed the MTC ruling. Pargued that the RTC committed an error when it conducted a trial de novo, which should not have

been done.

Issue: Whether the RTCs decision should be set aside because it conducted a trial de novo.

Held: No. Indeed, although the RTC should decide cases on appeal on the basis solely of therecord of the proceedings in the MTC and other courts of equal rank, nonetheless, the principle of

estoppel may bar a party from questioning the reception of additional evidence. P is estoppedfrom claiming that the RTC acted in excess of jurisdiction as she herself participated in the trial denovoand she questioned the courts authority only after the RTC ruled against her.

APPEALPAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE

AYALA LAND, INC. V. CARPO

345 SCRA 579 (2000)

Facts: P brought action to quiet title against D. P won. D appealed. CA dismissed the appealsince, as per computation, D was P5.00 short of the correct amount of the required docket fee.

Issue: Whether the CA erred.


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Held: Yes. Rule 41 4 must be read in relation to Rule 50 1(c) such that despite thejurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docket fee, the appellate court still has discretion torelax the rule in meritorious cases. With the exception of 1(b) which refers to failure to file

notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed by the Rules, the groundsenumerated in Rule 50 1 are merely directory ("may"). Failure to pay the required docket feesmay be excused where appellant was ready and willing to pay the correct amount from the start,

but was unable to do so due to the error of an officer of the court, i.e., the clerk of court, incomputing the correct amount.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

MERALCO V. CA

271 SCRA 417 (1997)

Facts: P did not assign the trial court order dismissing its complaint which had become final and

executory as error in its brief before the CA. D thus argues that that in itself became final. D alsoargues that the order became final because the motion seeking reconsideration was filed the dayafter the expiration of the extension was granted.

Issue: Whether the order of the trial court became final and executory.

Held: No. The April 30 order did not become final because, although the motion seeking itsreconsideration was filed a day after the expiration of the extension, the last day, June 23, fell ona Sunday. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration could be filed the next day. A judgment

becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration. The September 17order of the trial court, declaring its April 30 decision final and executory, has no effect because infact P filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The timely filing of the motion for reconsideration

prevented the decision of the trial court from attaining finality.

REPUBLIC v. CA

9 Jul. 1998

Facts: G (for Government) filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the decision of the RTC.The motion did not have attached to it proof that a copy thereof had been served on the adverseparty, D. However, a copy of the motion was sent to Ds counsel the day after the motion hadbeen filed. The RTC denied the motion for giving been filed without proof that a copy thereof had

been served on the adverse party. The CA upheld the RTC decision.

Issue: Should the motion for reconsideration be allowed?

Held: Yes. Considering the question raised in the appeal of G and the amount involved in thiscase, the CA should have considered the subsequent service of the motion for reconsideration to

be a substantial compliance with the requirement in Rule 15, 6. The demands of substantialjustice were satisfied by the actual receipt of said motion. Indeed, as much as possible, casesshould be determined on the merits, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.

LITIS PENDENTIA

COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC V. AMIN

260 SCRA 122 (1996)

Facts: P filed a complaint for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against Aand B. The case was filed in Cebu. R, as insurer of A, filed a case against P before the RTC ofMakati. P filed a motion to dismiss the Makati case due to pendency of the Cebu case.


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Issue: Whether or not there is litis pendentia.

Held: Yes. All the requisites for litis pendentia are present. For litis pendentia to be a ground fordismissal of an action, the following requisites must be present:

1. identity of parties2. identity of rights asserted and identity of relief prayed for3. the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would later on amount to

res judicata.The fact that the position of the parties was reversed does not negate the identity of the partiesfor the purpose of litis pendentia.

CERTIORARI

REPUBLIC V. CA & TRADERS ROYAL BANK

322 SCRA 81 (2000)

Facts: The trial court dismissed the Republics complaint for collection of sum of money.Republic filed its notice of appeal 12 days beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The appealwas dismissed and Republics motion for reconsideration was denied. Instead of appealing under

Rule 45, Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, 60 days after receipt of the denial of

the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the petition should be allowed to prosper.

Held: No. The proper remedy was to appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45. Apparently, the Republic resorted to special civil action for certiorari because it hadfailed to take an appeal on time. But this special civil action cannot be used as a substitute for anappeal that has been lost. There is no showing in this case of any extraordinary circumstance that

may justify a deviation from the rule on timely filing of appeals. Anyone seeking exemption fromthis rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist.

The doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial

justice cannot be invoked here. The failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period isnot a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of

jurisdiction over the appeal.

CERTIORARI TREATED AS PETITION FOR REVIEW

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES INC. V. CA

268 SCRA 597 (1997)

Facts: P filed an action for sum of money against D in RTC Pasig. RTC rendered a decisionordering D to pay. D filed a notice of appeal. Later on however D moved for the dismissal of theappeal on the ground that the judgment was already satisfied. P however filed with the RTC a

motion for the execution of judgment. It alleged that no money had actually been remitted to it. Dfiled a motion for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed. Petition for certiorari with the SCwas filed. P urges that petition for certiorari be dismissed outright because what P should have

done is a petition for review under Rule 45 and that certiorari should not lie because there was nograve abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held: The SC, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the

interest of justice, may decide to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,especially if it has been filed within the reglementary period for the same.


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TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER

ALJEMS CORPORATION V. CA

March 28, 2001

Facts: P sued D for the payment of his share in their joint venture. The case was referred to acommissioner. P complained that the commissioner did not observe the mandatory requirements

of the Rules. P contended that instead of merely interviewing the parties, the commissionershould have subpoenaed witnesses who could enlighten her under oath and she should haveconducted a hearing.

Issue: Whether the commissioner committed an error by merely basing her report on herinterview of the parties.

Held: Yes. Rule 32 3 and 5 of the Rules clearly indicate the necessity for a formal hearingand the swearing of witnesses; otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual questions

that arise in the course of the examination of the accounts. For this purpose, the witnesses mustnecessarily be sworn in and offered for cross-examination. This would not be possible if thecommissioner merely interviews the parties. What 3 authorizes to be limited is the scope of the

proceedings before the commissioner, but not the modality thereof. The requirement for the

commissioner to hold a hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due process.

EVIDENCE

RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE

TENEBRO v. CA

7 Jul. 1997

Facts: During trial, D and his counsel were always absent. The RTC allowed P to present itsevidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of P which later became final and

executory. D filed a petition for relief from judgment. D contends that his failure to appear at thehearing of the case was a ground for considering him to have waived the right to cross-examine

Ps witnesses, but not his right to present evidence.

Issue: Is Ds contention meritorious?

Held: No. D waived not only the right to cross-examine Ps witnesses but also his right topresent evidence as a necessary consequence of his repeated failure to appear at the hearingsof his case. D could not be found at his given address and utterly neglected to let the court and

his counsel know of his whereabouts.

ADMISSION OF GENUINENESS

ENGR. MERCADO v. CA

12 Jul. 1994

Facts: A, charged with estafa, did not question the genuineness of his signature on the receiptgiven to the witness. He did not deny the claim of witnesses, made in his presence, that he

signed the receipt himself.

Issue: Is A deemed to have admitted the genuineness of the signature?

Held: Yes. The SC upheld the RTCs finding that A did not question the genuineness of thesignature on the receipt. What A was questioning was not the signature itself but a marking that

appeared on top of the signature, which he alleged was only superimposed on the receipt.


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BEST EVIDENCE RULE

DE GUZMAN v. CA

7 Aug. 1996

Facts: The RTC admitted Exhibit C in evidence although it is a mere photocopy of the letter sent

by P to R. However, the cause of the unavailability of the original letter was without bad faith onRs part and the due execution of the same was proven during trial.

Issue: Could Exhibit C be admitted in evidence?

Held: Yes. It appearing that the execution and the loss of the original document have been duly

proven, the introduction in evidence of a photocopy thereof was proper. It is settled that if theoriginal writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of itsexecution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a

recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witness.

WITNESSES/EXPERT WITNESS

PEOPLE V. BAID336 SCRA 656 (2000)

Facts: A was found guilty of the crime of rape against V, a mental patient diagnosed as havingschizophrenia. The prosecution presented V as a witness. A argued that Vs testimony should not

have been given credence since V is a schizophrenic. A also questioned on appeal thequalifications Vs attending psychiatrist who was presented by the prosecution as an expertwitness.

Issues:(1) Whether V should be disqualified as a witness.(2) Whether A could question the qualifications of an expert witness on appeal.

Held: (1) No. Notwithstanding her mental illness, V showed that she was qualified to be a

witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perception to others.Thought she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim during hertestimony, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering fromschizophrenia. Otherwise, she was candid, straightforward, and coherent, and it has been settled

that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.(2) No. A did not raise any objections to the expert witness qualifications in the trial court

and he even cross-examined her. Objections not timely raised are deemed waived (Rule 132

36). The fact that the psychiatrist was hired by Vs family to give expert testimony did not by thatfact alone make her a biased witness. The problem of credibility of the expert witness and theevaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose

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