Journal of Theoretical and PhilosophicalPsychologyEmotional Education for Personal Growth in the EarlyYearsJosé Víctor Oron, Sonsoles Navarro-Rubio, and Elkin O. LuisOnline First Publication, March 5, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000150

CITATIONOron, J. V., Navarro-Rubio, S., & Luis, E. O. (2020, March 5). Emotional Education for PersonalGrowth in the Early Years. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Advance onlinepublication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000150

Emotional Education for Personal Growth in the Early Years

José Víctor OronUniversity of Navarra and UptoYou Foundation,

Pamplona, Spain

Sonsoles Navarro-RubioUniversity of Navarra

Elkin O. LuisUniversity of Navarra and Institute of Health Research of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain

This article offers a proposal related to early childhood emotional education. It is in linewith Erikson’s (1959) ideas surrounding psychosocial development and his theory ofattachment and social referencing, Bridges’ (1932) emotional development scheme, andRogers’ notion related to “acceptance” of emotional complexity toward healthy develop-ment. This proposal is reinforced with approaches from Winnicott (1986) and Kohut(2009), who demonstrate that children’s emotional education is indeed a process ofself-consciousness development through interaction with their primary caregiver(s). Theseapproaches demonstrate that early childhood emotional education is really a process relatedto children’s development of self-consciousness through interaction, or lack thereof, withtheir primary caregiver(s). We coin our approach “emotional integration,” which is con-ceptualized as a response to the dominant “emotional regulation” narrative. While emo-tional regulation focuses on behavioral and structured routines for facing diverse emotionalsituations, emotional integration is centered on interpersonal relationship improvements indifferent emotional contexts. For the emotional regulation approach, the child regulates herbehavior depending on the primary caregiver’s reactions. In emotional integration, the childacquires certain dispositions toward the self, starting from her interaction with her caregiver.In small children, caregiver behavior certainly has a determining role. For the emotionalregulation approach, the caregiver tries to solve possible problems in behavior, whereas foremotional integration, the caregiver seeks to develop inner processes of personal growththrough the child’s interaction with the other.

Public Significance StatementThis study offers a new proposal regarding children’s emotional education and is basedon Erikson’s psychosocial development, attachment theory, and social reference,Bridges’ emotional development, and Rogers’ notions, alongside Winnicott and Ko-hut’s approaches. It points toward a kind of interaction between the infant and hisprimary caregiver that focuses on emotional integration instead of emotional regulation,which allows for the infant’s formation of self-consciousness and healthy emotional growth.

Keywords: emotional education, education, early childhood and emotional develop-ment

X José Víctor Oron, Institute for Culture and Society,Mind-Brain Group, University of Navarra, and UptoYouFoundation, Pamplona, Spain; X Sonsoles Navarro-Rubio, Institute for Culture and Society, Mind-BrainGroup, University of Navarra; X Elkin O. Luis, School ofEducation and Psychology, University of Navarra, andInstitute of Health Research of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain.

Some preliminary ideas of this article were presented

in the “Home Renaissance Foundation, InternationalConference on the topic of A home: a place of growth,care and wellbeing” of The Royal Society of Medicine,London, England, November 17, 2017.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Elkin O. Luis, School of Education and Psy-chology, Edificio Ismael Sánchez Bella, Universidad deNavarra, Campus Universitario s/n, Pamplona, Navarra31008, Spain. E-mail: eoswaldo@unav.es

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

Journal of Theoretical andPhilosophical Psychology

© 2020 American Psychological Association 2020, Vol. 2, No. 999, 000ISSN: 1068-8471 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000150

1

Human development literature considerschildhood the fundamental stage for educationaldevelopment. Those early years generally focuson acquiring healthy routines through which thechild regulates her own behavior through inter-actions with her primary caregiver (Sander,1977). This article, however, takes a differentposition by exploring an educational alternativethat starts with the knowledge of the child’sdirect reality and its effect on development dur-ing the rest of the maturation processes that takeplace in infancy (Blair & Razza, 2007), whichare relevant for later stages of the life cycle(Bodrova, 2008).

In the following text, we introduce the au-thors of reference for this proposal at the sametime that we outline our proposal, specificallyfocusing on children’s personal development.This development is understood as a state ofinterpersonal improvement resulting from ini-tial processes of intrapersonal integration in in-fancy (including emotional, cognitive, andmoral aspects). These processes lead to a ma-ture state that flourishes depending on the rela-tionships established between infants or be-tween infants and adults.

To better understand our proposal, let us firststart with the example of a common familysituation between a mother and her 2-year-oldchild that requires resolution. The child is play-ing, and her mother stops the play to feed her atthe established time. The child starts to cry andthrows a tantrum. What is the parent to do inthis situation? Two typical solutions immedi-ately arise: (a) Let the child play and forget thefood, or (b) make the child eat and forget theplay. This second option admits two variations:(2.1) The mother does not pay attention to thechild’s cries, but rather focuses on feeding. Thisgenerates some tension, but the mother wins.(2.2) The mother interacts with the child’s emo-tional state and starts playing with him to calmhim down and then moves on to feeding him.

From our point of view, these three optionsall have something in common. In each, theyface a problem that could be summarized asfollows, “The child needs to learn certain rou-tines, but refuses,” which necessitates resolu-tion. In our view, focusing on solving the prob-lem is an educational mistake that emerges fromthese two options (three alternatives). It is easyfor a mother to conceptualize the situation as a“struggle of wills”; the child wills to continue

playing, and the mother wills him to eat becauseshe is focused on the child’s resistance andemotional state evidenced in crying. With thiscase as an explanatory framework, we developan alternative intervention proposal, which wepresent initially and then, at the end of thearticle, more specifically regarding the situationin question.

Erikson’s Proposal of Developmentin the First 2 Years of Life and His

Attachment Theory

In 1963, Erikson pointed out that, in the first2 years of life, children have certain experiencesthat engender in them an attitude of either basictrust or mistrust (Erikson, 1963). If children feelthat their caregiver—usually their parent(s)—recognizes and satisfies their essential needs,they grow up with a basic sense of trust. But ifthey find that their needs are not met, or thatonly some of them are (e.g., only the physical,but not the psychological ones, such as playing,caressing, etc.), then they lean more towarddistrust that manifests itself in the type of carethey lacked. Both basic trust and basic mistrustexist on a spectrum and can be measured.

Undoubtedly, contemporary psychology con-tinues to develop attachment theory after con-firmation of its original formulation in the1970s and 80s (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970;Bowlby, 1982). A child’s emotional attachment,with which he or she feels safe and protected byher primary caregiver(s), enables her to surveythe world under the paradigm of exploratorycuriosity (Carson, 2012; Domhardt, Münzer,Fegert, & Goldbeck, 2015; Glaser, 2014; Hong& Park, 2012; L’Ecuyer, 2014).

The impact that childrens relationship withtheir caregivers has on themselves is now wellunderstood and supported by evidence. Indeed,many have found that it affects children’s con-siderations of the world and their emotionalstates (Atzil et al., 2017; Bornsteina et al., 2017;Morales et al., 2017; Pratt, Goldstein, Levy, &Feldman, 2017; Zhang, Chen, Deng, & Lu,2014); it also helps to forms children’s “per-sonal premise system” (Berghout Austin, God-frey, Weber, Martin, & Holmes, 1991) and evenaffects their brain structure (Silk, Redcay, &Fox, 2014) and epigenome (Provençal &Binder, 2015), which is clearest in pathologicalcases (de Rosnay, Cooper, Tsigaras, & Murray,

2 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

2006; Pelaez, Virues-Ortega, Field, Amir-Kiaei,& Schnerch, 2013).

In keeping with authors such as Pittman, Kei-ley, Kerpelman, and Vaughn (2011), we pro-pose a consideration of the possibility of com-plementarity between these two models.Bowlby’s, 1982 model offers Erikson’s modelinclusion of various secure and insecure attach-ment representations that have implications forthe implementation of interpersonal strategiesin life cycle stages that follow childhood; on theother hand, Erikson’s model offers Bowlby’smodel diverse social contexts for each develop-ment stage, in which various secure representa-tions can be generated. In addition, we discoverthat, to understand anything, we must first referto the child’s relationship with her primary care-giver. This implies that the child trustingly as-sumes whatever her primary caregiver presentsto her. For instance, if the person in chargehands a ball to a child, she holds the ball in arelationship of trust and will not see the ball asa hostile object. The child projects onto objectsthe relationship of trust or mistrust she has withher primary caregiver, thus engendering con-crete relational styles. This social interactiondefines the type of access the child has to theworld, even when she is alone.

A dynamic of trust causes the child to per-ceive novelty with astonishment and awakensher desire to learn new things, whereas a dy-namic of mistrust causes the child to perceivenewness with a certain suspicion and insecurityand causes her to immediately search for newways to feel protected and safe. Therefore, wecan initially conclude that the child’s meaningand intentional approaches are related, and afteraccepting this premise, we define two differentprocedures for approaching reality as follows(Figure 1).

A relationship of trust between the primarycaregiver and child promotes an approach of

wonder, which encourages the child to searchfor knowledge and promotes her will to learnbecause she feels secure. A relationship of mis-trust between the primary caregiver and childpromotes a control approach, engendering fearin the child and a search for ways to masterreality toward self-protection because the childdoes not feel safe. Secure attachment results inthe child relinquishing the need for control; forexample, children who live in secure attachmentdo not exert control over their peers but insteaddevelop close relationships with them (Park &Waters, 1989).

In short, the following three aspects not onlyrepresent meeting points between these two the-ories but also serve as arguments for our pro-posal. First, the life cycle period (childhood)described by both proposals gives similar im-portance to the caregiver; on the one hand,Bowlby, 1982 and Ainsworth understood thecaregiver as determinant in the establishment ofsecure versus insecure relationships, where, onthe secure end of the spectrum, the infant feelscared for and assisted, which allows her toexplore their reality. This is certainly compara-ble to Erikson’s description of caregivers’ careand assistance as oriented toward trust or mis-trust in the infant. Second, the development ofthe way in which the infant understands hersurroundings results from the desire to explore/learn or search for situational control; both are aresult of the caregiver’s attachment style (theresult of attachment history) with regard to thechild, which causes the infant to project thisstyle in future relationships. In short, the care-giver determines the way in which the infantinterprets new environments of greater socialcomplexity. Third, and probably most impor-tant, both authors recognize that the attachmentstyle and the psychosocial transfer produced inthe relationship (between caregiver and infant)have interpersonal results that feed the child’sbeliefs about the self, others, and the world.This has serious implications for the way inwhich the infant relates in the future.

Social Referencing Theory

In the 1980s, psychology literature began toexplore the power of the affective bond betweenchildren and their primary caregiver(s), show-ing how children learn a particular view of theircontext depending on how their mother or father

Confident rela�onship

Wonder approach

Searching for knowing

Mistrust rela�onship

Control approach

Searching for security

Figure 1. Two personal relationship styles related to twoways of approaching reality. See the online article for thecolor version of this figure.

3EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

understand the world, as well as in terms of thequality of the relationship(s) between them.Children understand the emotional meaning ofaffection that their primary caregivers showthem not as a mere modulator, but as an aid oran impediment that permits or hinders theirdevelopment (Tronick, 1989).

Going deeper into this idea, researchers havefound that communication in early childhoodfundamentally relates to the child-caregiver-object visual triangle, by which children learnthe meaning of reality and which also guidestheir behavior based on their primary caregiv-ers’ facial expressions. This phenomenon hasbeen coined as “social referencing” (Walden &Ogan, 1988).

Trevarthen (2005) took up attachment theo-ries, arguing that it is not just a matter of feelingsafe but also the basis from which a child gets toknow the world and assigns meaning to reality.Therefore, the infant’s behavior is not a mere“reflection or mirror” of brain motor processesbut rather the result of emotional–sympatheticnegotiation (Trevarthen, 2005, p. 59). In otherwords, intersubjectivity constructs meaning andemotional experience (Trevarthen, 2005, pp.66–71). This meaning jumps across the inter-generational divide (Trevarthen, 2005, p. 61),which is why the author propounds that it “goesbeyond concerns with” (Trevarthen, 2005, p.71) the search for well-being, regulating activityand stress levels.

Accordingly, we can uncover the importanceof constructing meaning from an interpersonalencounter with language (emotional in thiscase; Trevarthen, 2005, p. 71). More explicitly,it first corresponds to the interpersonal encoun-ter as a source of significance, which conse-quently enables an emotional state. This inter-personal encounter requires both the child andprimary caregiver’s bidirectional intentions, aswell as the latter’s emotional expression. Thisencounter condenses for the child her emotionalexperience.

Studies on social referencing also reveal that,for human beings, the social sphere is not justthe environment in which learning takes place;it is not another modulator just because learninghappens in that context. That explanation lacksconsistency because, beyond it, the socialsphere provides meaning. As we know, to helpa young child learn a new language, someonemust be present (Kuhl, Tsao, & Liu, 2003);

otherwise, the child treats isolated sounds asnoise and finds them to be meaningless. Foryoung children, things are not what they are inthemselves; instead, their meaning is taken or“borrowed” from adults’ emotional reactions.This is the most obvious basis of social refer-encing in situations of ambiguity (Klinnert,Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1986; Mireault etal., 2014; Pelaez, Virues-Ortega, & Gewirtz,2012), although it could be argued that mostthings that appear for the first time are largelyambiguous. Another important issue is that so-cial referencing does not just provide emotionalmeaning to the world of objects or events butalso does so for other people (Feinman &Lewis, 1983) assuming the emotional meaningthat an adult’s emotional state gives off (Murrayet al., 2008; Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tid-ball, 2001; Repacholi & Meltzoff, 2007).

As a whole, it is encouraging that socialreferencing gives meaning to objects, events,and personal relationships. This issue is gainingrelevance in neuroscience because meaningemerges as a result of these processes (Clark-Polner & Clark, 2014). When the caregiver andchild share an intentional activity (staring ateach other, singing together, etc.), both brainsexperience bidirectional synchronization in thefrontal region (Leong et al., 2017). All thisinfluences the brain’s configuration such that apredetermined or default mode of thinking may/can be created for understanding the world, aworldview or a belief system.

Drawing conclusions from Erikson—includ-ing attachment and social referencing theory—all this seems to lead to the fact that children donot neutrally access the world; rather, they proj-ect the quality of their relationship with theircaregiver onto the world, as well as the meaningthat their caregiver assigns to a shared object.Children learn the meaning of reality throughthe emotional expression that their primarycaregiver exudes. We could say that the parentor primary caregiver “lends” his mind to thechild, clarifying that, in this case, we understand“mind” as the sense in which he understands theworld. This equates to saying that the childknows the world through the representation herparent or primary caregiver offers her; hence,the child “acts with her primary caregiver’smind.” The following figures collect and sum-marize the ideas presented earlier (Figures 2).

4 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

When faced with novelty in a situation, suchas when a primary caregiver shows somethingnew to a child, she will instantly react by staringat her caregiver to glean the meaning of the newobject. Then, in accordance with the quality ofthe relationship (attachment theory and Erik-son’s idea of the trust–mistrust spectrum) andthe emotional meaning that the caregiver givesto the object (social referencing), the child as-signs meaning and significance to the object asreflected in the emotional experience therein.The world as a whole, and any one object inparticular, initially holds no meaning for thechild. Consequently, the child finds meaningthanks to the quality of the personal relationshipwith her primary caregiver (as Erikson and at-tachment theory points out) and thanks to herprimary caregiver’s emotional expression inlight of the object (as social referencing tellsus).

Before applying this proposal to emotionaleducation, we turn to better understanding howemotional development occurs, and, to do so,we rely on Bridges’ research as well as Rogers’reference to acceptance of reception. Herein, wewill add other authors who encompass and givemeaning to these theories when applied to thechild’s inner self so that she might grow throughcreativity rather than an established emotionalregulation regime.

Psychological and Emotional Development

For authors such as Mahler, Pine, and Berg-man (2018), an infant’s psychological develop-ment can be understood sequentially in threephases as follows: (a) normal autistic phase

(first weeks to first month after birth). Althoughthe relationship between a newborn and hisenvironment is minimal, he responds to (inter-nal or external) stimulation instinctively, whilethe caregiver meets his physiological needs,which outweigh psychological ones. (b) Normalsymbiotic phase (2 to 5 months): The infantmust adapt to the environment that surroundshim through his caregiver, as his rudimentaryself is not sufficiently structured to face thevarious environmental demands. M. S. Mahler(1974) referred to this phenomenon as symbio-sis, that is, a fused state or interdependent psy-chobiological bond between the caregiver andinfant that supplements the infant’s rudimentaryand undifferentiated self. (c) Separation–individualization phase (5 months to 2 years):The infant shows a growing ability to recognizeothers, especially his caregiver, to graduallyinspect the world and move away from thecaregiver perspective through two interrelatedprocesses—separation, which entails intrapsy-chic awareness of separation, and individualiza-tion, which allows for the infant’s distinctiveand unique individuality to emerge.

These three phases reveal that processes ofbiological and psychological birth are differentover time. While biological birth implies greatercircumscription and speed in terms of the phys-iological acts involved, for psychologicalbirth—or the separation–individualization pro-cess, as Mahler’s psychological developmenttheory called it—intrapsychic acts become evi-dent later and are slower to develop (Ritvo,2018). Thus, the separation–individualizationprocess is another way of saying that the childgradually acquires awareness of the self (whichhe obviously does not know how to accountfor). However, contrary to Mahler’s consid-eration, and supported by studies with evi-dence from intrauterine stages, fetuses with adeveloped brainstem show psychological actsdirected to action outside of mere reactivity(Delafield-Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013; De-lafield-Butt & Trevarthen, 2015). Thus, webelieve that elements of a proto-self are al-ready present in intrauterine stages.

Regarding infants’ emotional development atthe age of two, there are four relevant aspects toconsider (Greenspan, 2007a): (a) The child’sconnection to her caregivers is characterized bya balance between basic dependence and auton-omy, between initiative and capacity for self-

MAIN MAIN CAREGIVER CAREGIVER CHILD CHILD

OBJECT / WORLD OBJECT / WORLD

A�achment / Erikson A�achment / Erikson

Meaning Meaning Social referencing Social referencing

Figure 2. Relationship between Erikson’s attachment the-ory and social referencing theory.

5EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

organization at the behavioral level (“crawlers”who go get what they want; Sroufe, 2005;Theisen & Erikson, 2007); (b) the mood andfeelings that predominate are more diversified,organized, and stable, together with greater per-formance of tasks associated with recognition ofemotions compared with emotional perspective-taking tasks (Downs, Strand, & Cerna, 2007;Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011); (c) regard-ing the variety, depth, and adequacy of feelings,the presence of feelings such as security, curi-osity, and the need for exploration is evident.Likewise, the child tends to experience self-reference (the child incorporates “the self” intolanguage), possessiveness (“mine”), and nega-tivism (“no” to whatever he does not want).Fear also often arises in situations where thecaregiver momentarily detaches (Groh, Fearon,van IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Ro-isman, 2017; Malik & Marwaha, 2018); (d) atthis stage of development, the presence of emo-tional states expressed in the infant’s behavior,play, and verbalization is observed through de-velopment of the capacity to organize behaviorin more complex causal chains that demonstrateher interests and pleasures (Tomasello & Car-penter, 2007). The child expresses themes oflove, curiosity, exploration and protest, anger,denial, and jealousy, all in an organized way.Toward the end of the second year, capacitiesemerge that integrate themes that reflect love–hate and passivity–activity polarities, and thechild’s first symbolic capacities also emerge(Greenspan, 2007b). All of these milestonesdemonstrate the child’s gains in terms of ex-pressiveness in her emotional repertoire.

In line with these states of emotional polarityand contrary to common belief, authors such asKatherine Bridges (1932) postulated that, whenwe are born, we lack all basic emotions (joy,sadness, fear, disgust, and anger) and only in-herit a capacity for basic excitability. Bridgesassumed that we are able to recognize thechild’s differentiation of two emotional situa-tions if she uses different bodily expressions.That is, if something disgusts, scares, or hurtsher, and she demonstrates the same bodily re-action, we can assume that she does not yetdistinguish between disgust, fear, and pain.Bridges observed that, at birth, children reactwith the same corporal expression to everyevent. Soon after, however, they learn to differ-entiate unpleasant from pleasant situations, but,

in that development stage, their differentiationand emotional knowledge displays itself as asimple duality between the pleasant and un-pleasant. For example, a child displays the samecorporal expression after being satiated or afterfeeling her mother’s caress because she cannotyet distinguish them. To varying extents, otherauthors also followed Bridges’ approach (Cam-pos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Jack, Garrod, &Schyns, 2014). From it, we can conclude that achild must learn what an inner emotional stateis, which she discovers through social relation-ships.

As Bridges’ research developed, she foundthat a baby learns to distinguish different un-pleasant situations more clearly and preciselythan pleasant ones because her expressive cor-poral repertoire becomes more specialized ac-cording to diverse emotional situations. To theextent that children relate everything they haveexperienced and learn about emotional diver-sity, their ability to differentiate and identifyemotional situations will emerge, and their de-velopment/growth will simultaneously takeplace, meaning that, integration, differentiation,identity, and growth occur together throughchildren’s emotional reality. Camras (2011)summarized this idea as follows: “The data sug-gest that as development proceeds, infants re-sponses become differentiated, and their inte-gration during an emotion episode will reflectcontextual factors as much as the identity of theemotion” (Camras, 2011, p. 142). A similarprocess occurs with the development of bodilyand verbal languages; children achieve a rela-tively high level of bodily expressiveness, al-though their verbal expression remains at sim-ple duality (good and bad). Just as childrendevelop expressive bodily capacity, they mustundergo the same process in the verbal realm,although of course the existence of languageopens up more complicated processes (Lewis,2007).

Toward an Educational Proposal

To offer an emotional education proposalcentered on the family, we will start by connect-ing Erikson’s attachment and social referencingtheory with Bridges’ and Roger’s theories.

In short, a state of basic trust permits infantsto initiate on a path of differentiation in a waythat is much more in line with reality because

6 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

they do not approach reality with excessivecaution. Amazement does not seek to controlbut rather to learn about and assume reality as itis. We could say that amazement facilitates aninvoluntary—but at the same time intentional—approach and respectful knowledge of theworld. “Involuntary intentionality” seeks toknow (intentional), but without trying to control(involuntary). On the other hand, a situation ofbasic distrust leads infants to approach theworld from an attitude of suspicion rather thanamazement; their search for knowledge willtherefore be intentional as they try to learnabout and assume reality in order to control itand feel safe. Thus, in the end, basic trust pro-motes an encounter with reality as it is, settingaside any intention of changing it, which is verydifferent from an attitude of basic mistrust.

As the identification path goes forward, it isimportant to note that emotions are not a mereaffective reaction to stimulus, but rather a crys-tallized or condensed version of a whole bodily,intentional, emotional, social, and cognitive ex-perience. Emotion is defined, therefore, as acondensed version of the understanding ofone’s personal experience within the world anda social network (Jack et al., 2014).

As previously indicated, a child identifies andgives meaning to reality in terms of the rela-tionship she has with her primary caregiver. Achild uses her primary caregiver’s behavioralreactions to identify the emotional meaning of avariety of events or situations.

Studies in psychotherapy, such as the onesfrom Rogers (1961), have revealed that adultswho developed in an atmosphere of mistrust donot recognize feelings as their own, nor can theyconceptualize that these feelings are due tosomething happening in them. From their pointof view, feelings are provoked externally andoccur internally, but they do not possess them assuch. Because this kind of person does notrecognize himself as in possession of anything,he obviously cannot accept even the slightestresponsibility or change, taking a defensive po-sition and assigning blame elsewhere. Theseadults face their emotional world by going onthe defense and constantly trying to control theirfeelings.

Certainly, Rogers spoke from the perspectiveof adult therapy, but he outlined necessary ele-ments for a healthy life, which can be extendedto the entire life span. We would also argue that

healthy living involves recognizing feelings asone’s own and not as merely awakened “fromthe outside.” When recognizing emotions forwhat they are, a person is thus able to takeresponsibility for his actions and then act on thematter.

On the contrary, Rogers pointed out thatwhen someone feels welcomed and experiencesa trusting relationship, he gradually discoversthat emotions do not simply occur or take placeinside one’s self, but that they belong to him. Hebegins to consider them as signals that refer tothe complexity of personal life and, throughthem, can discover the world of meaning andlived reality, while recognizing his own experi-ences through, quite often, conflicting feelings.

In this case, emotions no longer need to becontrolled. They are fine as they are, withoutneed for modification or manipulation, that is,on their own, because they speak to the com-plexity of one’s life and, starting from them, onecan grow in autonomy. Denying or controllingan emotion literally prevents growth and self-knowledge, which leads to situations that do notalign with reality. The point is not to control butrather to assume and accept emotions to under-stand and learn about one’s self and reactions.

In adult therapy, upon uncovering complex-ity, the patient discovers that emotional realityitself compels him take a personal position inhis life, which enables him to face the largerquestion of what kind of person he wants to beor become. The answer to this question is foundthrough defining the type and quality of inter-personal relationships therein. Rogers made itclear that a patient cannot undergo this processbefore establishing a diminished climate of in-terpersonal reception, which permits the patientto accept and recognize his complex reality.This requires that the patient be capable ofperceiving that the therapist admits his emo-tional reality without trying to change or modifyit. This reception enables the patient to embraceand be open to his complexity and reality, with-out which growth is impossible. This briefsketch outlines a dual perspective in terms ofemotional education that coincides with twodominant approaches concerning the emotionalsphere, that is, emotional regulation focused oncontrol and emotional integration focused onreception.

One of them can be identified as “emotionalregulation,” which is the prevailing approach

7EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

(Gross, 2014; Vohs & Baumeister, 2011). Thewidespread use of the term “self-regulation”makes it clear that many consider it the domi-nant term for human development proposalsand the objective of education, as part of aterminological universe that coincides in its ab-solute reference to the “self.” It undoubtedlyrests on the psychological process of the will,which reveals a powerful “self” that dominatesthe environment and seeks to be independent(Burman, Green, & Shanker, 2015). Emotionalregulation has typically been developed in thearea of problem resolution or avoidance since itis used as one of the various behavioral strate-gies to prevent certain stimuli or control certainbehavior (Lengua, 2002). As a whole, this pro-posal seeks to identify in order to control; itaims to identify emotion and to channel it when-ever it is considered disruptive. Following thisidea, emotions happen within the person, but arealways meant to be external to subjectivity be-cause an external stimulus is thought to controlthe emotion. Thus, emotion is not to be con-fused with a veridical perception obtainedthrough encounters with the external world.Moreover, it often proposes an elimination ofthe given stimulus, or, when that is not possible,practitioners of this approach are meant to de-velop psychological resources to increase dis-tance relative to the stimulus.

When presenting Erikson’s attachment andsocial referencing theories, the importance ofthe intention’s quality comes to fore. Thus, it isimportant to pay attention to the intentionalityof emotional regulation. In the family environ-ment and with children, this approach to emo-tional control takes place with the control ofstimuli and internal reactions while the stimulusis present. The mentality with which the situa-tion and the associated intentionality is ad-dressed corresponds to “problem-solving,”which sees everything prestimuli as fine andeverything poststimuli as a new situation thatcauses trouble, which requires intervention tosomehow recover the previous stability. Thiskind of education is aimed at avoiding prob-lems, in the face of which the previous balanceis sought. In this way, everything appears to bein order, but focusing on education aimed atproblem avoidance (e.g., a tantrum at the super-market) does not amount to educating for de-velopment.

The question here is not whether emotionalregulation is useful for solving problems. Infact, Lengua’s work (2002) demonstrates itsshort-term utility. Rather, we intend to reflect onwhether emotional regulation’s intentional ap-proach fosters children’s growth, which implieslearning the internal complexity of emotions,welcoming them and facing up to one’s per-sonal situation beyond the problem itself.

The approach to emotional education dis-cussed herein—namely, emotional regulation—ignores the complex way in which emotionsemerge, as described earlier and as Bridgespointed out because it attributes emotion to astimulus and assumes Erikson’s model of basicmistrust, which leads the person to seek to con-trol of her surroundings. Bridges helped us un-derstand that emotion does not arise throughstimulation because a stimulus’s significancedepends on the child’s cognitive, social, andexperiential development, and, without knowl-edge of that complex process, the reason for abehavior remains known (e.g., the reason be-hind a tantrum in the supermarket). Emotionalregulation also contradicts Rogers’ indicationsbecause a child does not recognize what he orshe has not accepted and will only accept it ifher primary caregiver first demonstrates accep-tance.

The alternative approach, coined here as“emotional integration,” follows Erikson’s lineof basic trust and considers the emotionalworld’s complexity in accordance with Bridges,along with Rogers’ growth process and socialreferencing theory. Accordingly, emotions arethe concentration or crystallization of a state inlife at a specific moment. With trust, one isamazed by lived and unknown emotional reali-ties, but one does not feel the need to controlthem because one does not perceive the worldas hostile. This approach to emotional reality ismuch more respectful because it asks after whatis happening in one’s self and the reason for thesame: “Why is this happening?”

The desire to control emerges from a per-ceived threat rather than from a feeling of won-der. An approach starting with wonder allowsus to understand by respecting our surroundingreality because it lacks any manipulative im-pulse. In this way, we discover the nuancedaspects of an emotion, as well as what gave riseto it. In the end, an approach starting from theperspective of control prevents and impedes

8 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

understanding. Reconciliation of an educationbased on emotional regulation and an educationaimed at emotional integration is not advisable.Philosophically speaking, these positions are“contrarias pero no contradictorias” (meaningthey are contrary, but not contradictory posi-tions; Altarejos, 2004). They are “contrary” be-cause one excludes the other, but they are “notcontradictory” because both, rooted in very dif-ferent frameworks, give rise to human proactiv-ity.

For emotional integration, emotions do notconstitute whims and are not driven by stimuli;following Bridges’ proposal, certain caregivingand interpersonal relationship styles explain thepredominance of some emotions and not othersin specific situations. From this perspective, wedo not seek to solve problems, but rather rely onemotions to help us discover the complexity ofa person’s situation, giving way to the growthassociated with self-knowledge. The key isgrowing and getting to know oneself better be-cause emotions, on the one hand, open the waytoward self-knowledge, but, on the other hand,propel us toward taking a position whose exe-cution requires a more global consideration andacceptance of the situation at hand.

In Rogers’ psychotherapeutic proposition, theterm “acceptance” appears as the necessary psy-chological experience that initiates a path to-ward personal growth (Rogers, 1961, pp. 17, 82,133). There is no way to bridge or avoid such anexperience, without which the person becomesblocked (Rogers, 1961, p. 122). Acceptancerepresents personal growth both at the begin-ning of this process and in later stages, which isunderstood in the key of acceptance in the ser-vice of the self’s growth. Thus, the goal goesfrom fixing the problem to seeing it as an op-portunity for personal growth (Rogers, 1961, p.150).

Acceptance necessarily implies staving offthe immediate desire to change reality as re-ceived because there are contrary dynamics in-volved throughout (Rogers, 1961, p. 21). In-stead, it implies assuming reality “as it is”without pretending to fix anything (Rogers,1961, p. 115). Feelings that thwart acceptancerepresent fear of one’s self (Rogers, 1961, p.52).

The acceptance process is relational ratherthan individual. In fact, acceptance itself is pre-ceded by the therapist’s acceptance (Rogers,

1961, p. 86); we could say that the therapist’sacceptance opens up the possibility of acceptingone’s self (Rogers, 1961, p. 133) and entails adisposition toward the acceptance of others(Rogers, 1961, p. 86). If the therapist acceptsthe patient, then a true growth-enabling rela-tionship will emerge (Rogers, 1961, pp. 34, 62).This relationship will be extended to the factsbecause they will be considered inimical (Rog-ers, 1961, p. 25). The social triangle found inearly childhood then resurfaces, but instead ofinvolving the caregiver-child-object, it becomesa therapist-patient-fact triangle. Although Rog-ers moved in the field of adult therapy, webelieve that because he focused on personalgrowth, his ideas can be extended to the non-therapeutic realm as related to early childhooddevelopment.

Bearing in mind attachment and social refer-encing theories, together with Erikson’s healthydynamic of trust and Rogers’ idea that we needto believe in the acceptance of emotional real-ity, the most coherent emotional education pro-posal corresponds to emotional integration be-cause it takes place in a climate of acceptance,amazement, appreciation, and intensification ofsocial relationships according to the child’sneeds. This approach does not seek control, butrather looks for acceptance in the complexity ofinterpersonal relationships.

Just as a child needs her primary caregiver tointroduce her to the outside world, the same istrue of her inner world. A child’s emotionalworld initially surfaces as an enigma to the childherself, but if the primary caregiver accepts heremotional reality in an environment that safe-guards the interpersonal relationship, then shecan calmly approach her own emotional realityin a dynamic of wonder and openness to gettingto know herself and growing in self-knowledge.Instead, if the primary caregiver reacts to achild’s emotional situation as if it were a mis-fortune or something in need of regulation(which usually happens when we seek to avoidproblems), she will perceive her emotional sit-uation as negative and disruptive and as some-thing that needs to be controlled or eliminated,preventing self-knowledge and acceptance ofreality.

If emotions originate in the complexity ofsocial interaction and the multidimensional de-velopment that Bridges (and others like Barrett,2017) demonstrated, then only amazement (and

9EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

not fear or shock) from the primary caregiverand the dynamics of emotional integration helpthe child grow in the knowledge of that com-plexity. Namely, if the primary caregiver getsclose to his child by trying to negatively imposeupon the child’s emotional reactions, he willneither be able to access the complex world ofthe child’s reality, nor will the child progressbecause she will seek control through conflictjust as her primary caregiver does. The pairreacts with fear or suspicion toward reality,impeding their mutual relationship and personalgrowth.

Yet, when it comes to a child’s emotionalworld, if the primary caregiver takes up anapproach of knowledge, wonder, and dialogueto find out what is really going on (when thechild is old enough), the child will assume thatsame approach and she will grow in self-knowledge. Successful interpersonal encountersare not possible through control, as a child thatis frightened by her reality, because her care-giver is also fearful, tends to hide and minimizeherself to avoid her primary caregiver’s rejec-tion.

Thus far, these two approaches can be sum-marized as follows (Figure 3):

In approaches related to emotional integra-tion, the primary caregiver exudes confidencewhen faced with the child’s emotional state;from there, he approaches the child’s innerworld with wonder. This, in turn, encouragesthe child to wonder and wish to discover moreof her inner reality. Eventually, then, the childwill master inner complexity. Regarding emo-tional regulation approaches, the primary care-

giver displays mistrust in the face of the child’semotional state. Consequently, the child ap-proaches her inner world with suspicion, whichleads the child toward controlling her inner re-ality, and thus impedes learning.

Winnicott and Kohut: Two Psychoanalystsin Defense of Emotional Integration

Winnicott (1986) clearly stated that, at birth,the child’s foremost task is to form an image ofher mother and of herself. Both images areformed in the same process (pp. 31, 33, 50,130–131), which is done thanks to emotionalintegration (p. 28). Therein, feelings are expe-rienced on their own (p. 82), and the newbornchild is an active and creative agent (pp. 28,40–49, 144). If the child does not perform saidintegration, she will possess a false image ofherself (p. 33). From the moment of birth, thechild begins to endure constant frustration (p.22) because the reality that her mother is anindependent entity is imposed on her and con-trasted with a second principle—the satisfactionof needs. This game is fundamental (pp. 62–63). The mother’s behavior should be such thatshe always demonstrates acceptance in the faceof the child’s diverse reactions. If the motherdoes not show this unconditional acceptance,the child will not be able to integrate a diversi-fied emotional range, nor form a good image ofherself or of her mother (p. 94) because thechild needs to accept both as contrasting ten-dencies and will only do so if the mother doesso (pp. 87–88, 95). For this reason, the mother

Mother shows Mother shows confidence confidence

before the child’sbefore the child’s emo�onal state emo�onal state

Child will Child will approach with approach with wonder to his wonder to his inner world inner world

Child wants to Child wants to know know

Child will learn Child will learn inner inner

complexity complexity

Mother shows Mother shows distrust before distrust before

the child’s the child’s emo�onal state emo�onal state

Child will Child will approach with approach with suspicion and suspicion and

doubt doubt

Child wants to Child wants to control /master control /master

Child will not Child will not learn inner learn inner complexity complexity

EMOTIONAL INTEGRATION EMOTIONAL INTEGRATION

EMOTIONAL REGULATION EMOTIONAL REGULATION

Figure 3. Two emotional education approaches. See the online article for the color versionof this figure.

10 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

is meant to abandon exclusive focus on behav-ioral control (p. 120).

Winnicott realized that it is better to under-stand development starting from birth in termsof identity than as a game of competing forces(Winnicott, 1986, p. 26), whereas Kohut com-pleted this idea by proposing that both healthyand pathological development are understood ina much more holistic way if we focus on the “Ior me” (self). Kohut overcame Freud’s proposalof the “ego” as a place that reconciles andbalances these forces (Kohut, 2009, pp. 41, 70–71, 75).

Kohut (2009) argued that understanding theself as a conglomerate of tensions or drives(drive is the term he used) sets up a pathologicalsituation. He argued that the child is born intotrust, and the primary caregiver confirms ordenies that trust (p. 119). When denied, theperson will end up being a “bag of drives” as aresult of empathy failures (p. 122). When themother interacts with the child, this interactiondoes not involve a mere balance of forces, butrather the formation of the self (p. 75); thecaregiver’s reflection of what he perceives in-fluences how the child is able to understandherself (p. 76). If the caregiver presents thechild with a game of tensions that balance orchannel into concrete behavior—either pleasingor correcting (p. 79–81)—the child forms anunderstanding of herself as reflected in thatgame. The child needs to form an image ofherself as a self beyond a mere interplay offorces, but the child will do so only if she has anoverall joyful experience (p. 81). Such an expe-rience originates in the emotional experiencethat the caregiver transmits, with the tone of hervoice and through other means (p. 86), to thechild in everyday interactions (pp. 179–180).

Fundamentally, feelings arise as result of in-teraction (p. 87). Kohut also insisted that we notfocus on conflict, but rather on the self (p. 95,130). A sole focus on the forces in play fails torecognize that this game of forces is not thecause of bad experiences, but rather the effect ofprevious disintegration of the self (pp. 104–105, 116, 122). In addition, focusing on themand seeking their equilibrium entails corneringthe child into a pathological structure that is farfrom the creative and joyful experience of theself that the child needs to develop healthily (p.134).

Theory in Practice

Returning to our example of the child whowants to play and the mother who wants thechild to eat, a third option based on our educa-tional proposal emerges when the mother stopsto think, “What is my child experiencing?”From birth, whenever a child faces a problem,she cries. She does not know the cause; shemerely detects a problem and cries. Crying islike “sounding an alarm bell” to which the care-taker responds and tries to fix the situation. Thechild discovers that crying translates into a re-quest for help. In our case, the child wills toplay and sees that what she wants is not comingto fruition. This is called frustration. Feelingfrustrated in that context is a new experience forthe child. The child does not know what to dowith this frustration; in fact, she does not evenknow that this experience is called “frustration.”She only notices his discomfort associated withfrustration and “sounds the alarm bell,” askingfor help with her cry.

The mother must ask herself, “How can Iunderstand this situation?” If she understandsthat the child is experiencing frustration, shecan focus on relating to the child so that thechild learns to use frustration as an opportunityfor growth. Frustration often comes up in life,and it is more important to learn how to channelfrustration toward growth than it is to set uproutines around meals. If the mother uses thechild’s frustration to improve the interpersonalrelationship between them, the child will repli-cate this dynamic in the future.

Following Kohut’s proposal, we focus on the“self” and not on the qualities of the self. Thatis, we focus on the person who cries and not onthe cries of the person. The child then discoversthat her mother is focused on her and not on herbehavior. Obviously, learning that lesson takestime. After discarding Solutions 1 and 2, howmight the mother intervene? The third optionconsists in the child discovering that her cryingdoes not separate her from her mother and thather mother continues to interact with her as ifshe had not cried while feeding her. At thebehavioral level, the third option and Option 2.2are very similar. In fact, the child will likely failto not notice any difference between the two,but the mother notes the difference. In the thirdoption, the mother knows that the crying is nota problem, nor does she attempt to impose her

11EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

will. The situation is not understood as a “strug-gle of wills,” but rather as a request for help andshe relates to her child as someone asking herfor help. In Case 2.2, the mother understandsthe situation as a “struggle of wills”; the childwants to impose her will, and the mother has tojuggle it all to achieve her end. The mothertherefore notes the difference, which is reflectedin her experience of stress, as Situation 2.2 ismuch more stressful and exhausting.

This article awakens many philosophical top-ics specifically about the formation of self-awareness, human action, and the integration ofexperience. We have eschewed a philosophicaldebate to focus on children’s lived experience,instead of asking adults to understand children’sworld through adult philosophical categories.

On a philosophical level, the issue of theintegration of experience can be placed along aspectrum. On the one hand, we find authors thatstart from the distance between the self and theworld and seek to integrate experience, for ex-ample, Helm and Goldie (2006), Hume andHume (2014), and Kant (2008). On the otherhand, others are closer to a unified interpreta-tion, such as the Gestalt theory (Metz-Göckel,2015) or Whitehead and Griffin (1978) whostart from the internal relationship.

On the one hand, we would like to set asidethe debate about the emergence of the self be-cause it is a very slow process that begins inutero (Delafield-Butt & Gangopadhyay, 2013;Delafield-Butt & Trevarthen, 2015) and comesto a close in adolescence (Erikson, 1968). But,on the other hand, we believe this article con-tributes to the philosophical debate regardingquestions that even a toddler somehow asksafter, such as, “What do I feel? Who am I? Whois the other? And how do I interact with mycaregiver(s)?” In reality, they are all the samequestion. That is, the child answers them all atthe same time—without forgetting that the childdoes not respond directly to these questions, butrather acquires a general, basic disposition com-mon to all these questions that emerges duringthe maturation process.

This position is confirmed in psychoanalysis(Kohut, 1977; Winnicott, 1986) as its startingpoint is not the distance between the self and theworld, and therefore integration is not seen as aproblem to solve; rather it starts with the rela-tionship between the mother and the child as aunit (M. S. Mahler, 1974). Thus, relational in-

tegration is assumed as the starting point, andexperience confirms or denies that assumption.Confirmation of relational integration occursthrough the integration of the child’s experienceand action within the preexisting caregiver–child relationship.

Another philosophical debate that underliesthis article revolves around the term intention-ality. John Wilson (1972) studied various au-thors and unraveled the existing controversyover this term in the field of emotions. Hebelieves the debate surrounding intentionalityneeds to clarify how the subject is understood,his activity and the object itself. In addition, headds the question of whether every emotionalsituation is intentional (in regards to an object)or if the possibility of unintentional emotionalstates also exists. For his part, Goldie (2000, pp.16–36, 62–71) indicates that intentionality at-tributed to emotion depends on how emotionalreality is understood since, if we accept thatunderstanding of a reality is implicit in emo-tional experience, the emotion’s intentionalitycould come from one of its constituent elements(the understanding implicit in the emotion) andnot necessarily from the emotion in itself.

Resolving this debate goes far beyond thelimitations of this article, although it certainlyreveals that the emotional value of an objectdoes not reside in the object, but rather in theinterpersonal, child–caregiver encounter sur-rounding an object. In addition, as Kohut indi-cated, in the child’s emotional experience, theobject to be understood is the child herself andnot simply an outside reality. The child is information at the same time that she forms herunderstanding of the world and of herself, and itis difficult to separate these understandings.This greatly complicates the issue of intention-ality because, historically, discussion of inten-tionality usually focuses on considering an ob-ject as external.

In addition to this complexity, it should beadded that emotional experience is not closed,but rather is highly sensitive to reworking, evenin adults, as Scruton studied in relation to aes-thetic experience (Scruton, 1983, pp. 138–152).This is because meaning and value is first de-termined through an interpersonal relationship,such that, as interpersonal relationships evolve,it is to be expected that meaning and value alsochange.

12 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

Conclusion

As Bridges and social referencing theory pro-pose, emotions do not result from one stimulus,but rather derive from life’s complexity. AsRogers proposed, we can only understand ourcomplexity by accepting it. As Erikson and at-tachment theory suggest, the child can onlyaccept what her mother or primary caregiveraccepts. Social referencing reveals that the childunderstands reality (including her own reality)in accordance with her primary caregiver’s un-derstanding of that same reality. As Winnicot(1986) proposed, only when the primary care-giver integrates the child’s emotional situationscan she also integrate them. As Kohut pur-ported, nothing less than the construction of theself is at stake.

Good early childhood emotional educationinvolves the caregiver welcoming the child’semotional reality at a personal level, which al-lows the child to develop an adequate innerdisposition. Said caregiver uses everyday situa-tions to communicate personal acceptance ofthe child, while teaching her how to live in ahome without losing sight of the fact that thecaregiver is ultimately teaching the child whoshe is (the self). We call this proposal “emo-tional integration” because its key point in-volves integrating emotional reality for the im-provement of personal relationships.

References

Ainsworth, M. D. S., & Bell, S. M. (1970). Attach-ment, exploration, and separation: Illustrated bythe behavior of one-year-olds in a strange situa-tion. Child Development, 41, 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1127388

Altarejos, F. (2004). Self-regulation and integration:Two proposals in the education of affectivity (D.Goleman and Tomás de Aquino). Studies on edu-cation, 7, 45–66.

Atzil, S., Touroutoglou, A., Rudy, T., Salcedo, S.,Feldman, R., Hooker, J. M., . . . Barrett, L. F.(2017). Dopamine in the medial amygdala networkmediates human bonding. Proceedings of the Na-tional Academy of Sciences of the United States ofAmerica, 114, 2361–2366.

Barrett, L. F. (2017). How emotions are made. Lon-don, United Kingdom: Macmillan.

Berghout Austin, A. M., Godfrey, M. K., Weber, C.,Martin, C. A., & Holmes, L. B. (1991). The rela-tionship between security of attachment and thedevelopment of a personal premise system of re-

lationships and expectations for peer interaction.Early Education and Development, 2, 214–226.http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15566935eed0203_4

Blair, C., & Razza, R. P. (2007). Relating effortfulcontrol, executive function, and false belief un-derstanding to emerging math and literacy abil-ity in kindergarten. Child Development, 78,647– 663. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01019.x

Bodrova, E. (2008). Make-believe play versus aca-demic skills: A Vygotskian approach to today’sdilemma of early childhood education. EuropeanEarly Childhood Education Research Journal, 16,357–369. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13502930802291777

Bornsteina, M. H., Putnicka, D. L., Rigo, P., Es-posito, G., Swaind, J. E., Suwalskya, J. T. D., . . .Venutib, P. (2017). Neurobiology of culturallycommon maternal responses to infant cry. Pro-ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ofthe United States of America, 114, E9465–E9473.http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1712022114

Bowlby, J. (1982). Attachment and loss (2nd ed.,Vol. 1, Attachment). New York, NY: Basic Books.

Bridges, K. M. B. (1932). Emotional development inearly infancy. Child Development, 3, 324–341.http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1125359

Burman, J. T., Green, C. D., & Shanker, S. (2015).On the meanings of self-regulation: Digital hu-manities in service of conceptual clarity. ChildDevelopment, 86, 1507–1521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12395

Campos, J. J., Campos, R. G., & Barrett, K. C.(1989). Emergent themes in the study of emotionaldevelopment and emotion regulation. Develop-mental Psychology, 25, 394– 402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.25.3.394

Camras, L. (2011). Differentiation, dynamical inte-gration and functional emotional development.Emotion Review, 3, 138–146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073910387944

Carson, R. (2012). The sense of wonder. Madrid,Spain: Encuentro.

Clark-Polner, E., & Clark, M. S. (2014). Understand-ing and accounting for relational context is criticalfor social neuroscience. Frontiers in Human Neu-roscience, 8, 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00127

Delafield-Butt, J. T., & Gangopadhyay, N. (2013).Sensorimotor intentionality: The origins of inten-tionality in prospective agent action. Developmen-tal Review, 33, 399– 425. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2013.09.001

Delafield-Butt, J. T., & Trevarthen, C. (2015). Theontogenesis of narrative: From purposeful move-ments to shared meaning-making. Frontiers inPsychology, 6, 1157. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01157

13EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

de Rosnay, M., Cooper, P. J., Tsigaras, N., & Murray,L. (2006). Transmission of social anxiety frommother to infant: An experimental study using asocial referencing paradigm. Behaviour Researchand Therapy, 44, 1165–1175. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2005.09.003

Domhardt, M., Münzer, A., Fegert, J. M. J., & Gold-beck, L. (2015). Resilience in survivors of childsexual abuse: A systematic review of the literature.Trauma, Violence and Abuse, 16, 476–493. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1524838014557288

Downs, A., Strand, P., & Cerna, S. (2007). Emotionunderstanding in English- and Spanish-speakingpreschoolers enrolled in head start. Social Devel-opment, 16, 410–439. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00391.x

Erikson, E. H. (1959). Identity and the cycle of life:Selected papers. Psychological Issues, 1, 5–165.

Erikson, E. H. (1963). Childhood and society (2nded.). New York, NY: Norton.

Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis.New York, NY: Norton.

Feinman, S., & Lewis, M. (1983). Social referencingat ten months: A second-order effect on infants’responses to strangers. Child Development, 54,878–887. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1129892

Glaser, D. (2014). The effects of child maltreatmenton the developing brain. The Medico-Legal Jour-nal, 82, 97–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0025817214540395

Goldie, P. (2000). The emotions: A philosophicalexploration. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Greenspan, S. I. (2007a). Great kids: Helping yourbaby and child develop the ten essential qualitiesfor a healthy, happy life. Retrieved from http://ovidsp.ovid.com/ovidweb.cgi?T�JS&PAGE�reference&D�psyc5&NEWS�N&AN�2007-08601-000

Greenspan, S. I. (2007b). Levels of infant-caregiverinteractions and the DIR model: Implications forthe development of signal affects, the regulation ofmood and behavior, the formation of a sense ofself, the creation of internal representation, and theconstruction of defenses and character structure.Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psycho-therapy, 6, 174–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15289160701657662

Groh, A. M., Fearon, R. M. P., van IJzendoorn,M. H., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J., & Roisman,G. I. (2017). Attachment in the early life course:Meta-analytic evidence for its role in socioemo-tional development. Child Development Perspec-tives, 11, 70–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12213

Gross, J. J. (2014). Handbook of emotion regulation.New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

Helm, B. W., & Goldie, P. (2006). The emotions: Aphilosophical exploration. The Philosophical Re-

view, 111, 132–135. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-1-132

Hong, Y. R., & Park, J. S. (2012). Impact of attach-ment, temperament and parenting on human devel-opment. Korean Journal of Pediatrics, 55, 449–454. http://dx.doi.org/10.3345/kjp.2012.55.12.449

Hume, D., & Hume, D. (2014). A treatise of humannature. In D. F. Norton & M. J. Norton (Eds.), Theclarendon edition of the works of David Hume: Atreatise of human nature, Vol. 1: Texts. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00032872

Jack, R. E., Garrod, O. G. B. B., & Schyns, P. G.(2014). Dynamic facial expressions of emotiontransmit an evolving hierarchy of signals overtime. Current Biology, 24, 187–192. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.11.064

Kant, I. (2008). Critique of pure reason. New York,NY: Willey Book Co. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11654-000

Klinnert, M., Emde, R. N., Butterfield, P., & Cam-pos, J. J. (1986). Social referencing: The infant’suse of emotional signals from a friendly adult withmother present. Developmental Psychology, 22,427–432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.22.4.427

Kohut, H. (Ed.). (1977). The termination of the anal-ysis of narcissistic personality disorders. The res-toration of the self (pp. 1–62). Chicago, IL: TheUniversity of Chicago Press.

Kohut, H. (2009). The restoration of the Self. Chi-cago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226450155.001.0001

Kuhl, P. K., Tsao, F.-M., & Liu, H.-M. (2003). For-eign-language experience in infancy: Effects ofshort-term exposure and social interaction on pho-netic learning. Proceedings of the National Acad-emy of Sciences of the United States of America,100, 9096–9101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1532872100

L’Ecuyer, C. (2014). The wonder approach to learn-ing. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 764.

Lengua, L. J. (2002). The contribution of emotional-ity and self-regulation to the understanding of chil-dren’s response to multiple risk. Child Develop-ment, 73, 144–161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00397

Leong, V., Byrne, E., Clackson, K., Georgieva, S.,Lam, S., & Wass, S. (2017). Speaker gaze in-creases information coupling between infant andadult brains. Proceedings of the National Academyof Sciences of the United States of America, 114,13290–13295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702493114

Lewis, M. (2007). Early emotional development. InA. Slater & M. Lewis (Eds.), Introduction to infantdevelopment (2nd ed., pp. 217–224). Oxford,United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

14 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

Mahler, M. S. (1974). Symbiosis and individua-tion. The psychological birth of the human in-fant. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 29,89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00797308.1974.11822615

Mahler, M. S., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (2018). Thepsychological birth of the human infant: Symbiosisand individuation. London, United Kingdom:Routledge. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429482915

Malik, F., & Marwaha, R. (2018). Development,stages of social emotional development in chil-dren. Treasure Island, FL: StatPearls Publishing.Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK534819/

Metz-Göckel, H. (2015). Gestalt theory. Dialogueand Universalism, 25, 21–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du201525482

Mireault, G. C., Crockenberg, S. C., Sparrow, J. E.,Pettinato, C. A., Woodard, K. C., & Malzac, K.(2014). Social looking, social referencing and hu-mor perception in 6- and-12-month-old infants.Infant Behavior and Development, 37, 536–545.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2014.06.004

Morales, S., Brown, K. M., Taber-Thomas, B. C.,LoBue, V., Buss, K. A., & Pérez-Edgar, K. E.(2017). Maternal anxiety predicts attentional biastowards threat in infancy. Emotion, 17, 874–883.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000275

Moses, L. J., Baldwin, D. A., Rosicky, J. G., &Tidball, G. (2001). Evidence for referential under-standing in the emotions domain at twelve andeighteen months. Child Development, 72, 718–735.

Murray, L., de Rosnay, M., Pearson, J., Bergeron, C.,Schofield, E., Royal-Lawson, M., & Cooper, P. J.(2008). Intergenerational transmission of socialanxiety: The role of social referencing processes ininfancy. Child Development, 79, 1049–1064.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01175.x

Park, K. A., & Waters, E. (1989). Security of attach-ment and preschool friendships. Child Develop-ment, 60, 1076–1081. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1130781

Pelaez, M., Virues-Ortega, J., Field, T. M., Amir-Kiaei, Y., & Schnerch, G. (2013). Social referenc-ing in infants of mothers with symptoms of de-pression. Infant Behavior and Development, 36,548–556. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2013.05.003

Pelaez, M., Virues-Ortega, J., & Gewirtz, J. L.(2012). Acquisition of social referencing via dis-crimination training in infants. Journal of AppliedBehavior Analysis, 45, 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jaba.2012.45-23

Pittman, J. F., Keiley, M. K., Kerpelman, J. L., &Vaughn, B. E. (2011). Attachment, identity, and

intimacy: Parallels between Bowlby’s and Erik-son’s paradigms. Journal of Family Theory andReview, 3, 32– 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2589.2010.00079.x

Pratt, M., Goldstein, A., Levy, J., & Feldman, R.(2017). Maternal depression across the first yearsof life impacts the neural basis of empathy inpreadolescence. Journal of the American Academyof Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 56, 20–29.e3.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2016.10.012

Provençal, N., & Binder, E. B. (2015). The effects ofearly life stress on the epigenome: From the wombto adulthood and even before. Experimental Neu-rology, 268, 10–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.expneurol.2014.09.001

Repacholi, B. M., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2007). Emo-tional eavesdropping: Infants selectively respondto indirect emotional signals. Child Development,78, 503–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01012.x

Ritvo, S. (2018). The psychological birth of the hu-man infant. Symbiosis and individuation. By Mar-garet S. Mahler, Fred Pine, and Anni Bergman.New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975. 308 pp. ThePsychoanalytic Quarterly, 45, 620–645. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1976.11926782

Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston,MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Sander, L. W. (1977). The regulation of exchange inthe infant caretaker system and some aspects of thecontext-content relationship. In M. Lewis & L.Rosenblum (Eds.), Interaction conversation andthe development of language (pp. 133–156). NewYork, NY: Wiley Press.

Scruton, R. (1983). Freedom and custom. Royal In-stitute of Philosophy Lecture Series, 15, 181–196.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00009056

Silk, J. S., Redcay, E., & Fox, N. A. (2014). Contri-butions of social and affective neuroscience to ourunderstanding of typical and atypical develop-ment. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 8,1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2014.02.002

Sroufe, L. A. (2005). Attachment and development:A prospective, longitudinal study from birth toadulthood. Attachment and Human Development,7, 349–367. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616730500365928

Theisen, S., & Erikson, E. H. (2007). Childhood andsociety. The American Catholic Sociological Re-view, 12, 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3707421

Tomasello, M., & Carpenter, M. (2007). Sharedintentionality. Developmental Science, 10, 121–125. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00573.x

Trevarthen, C. (2005). Stepping away from the mir-ror: Pride and shame in adventures of companion-ship. In C. S. Carter, L. Ahnert, K. E. Grossman, S.Hardy, M. E. Lamb, & S. W. Proges (Eds.), At-

15EMOTIONAL EDUCATION FOR PERSONAL GROWTH IN INFANTS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.

tachment and bonding: A new synthesis (pp. 55–84). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tronick, E. Z. (1989). Emotions and emotional com-munication in infants. American Psychologist, 44,112–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.44.2.112

Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2011). Handbookof self-regulation. New York, NY: The GuilfordPress.

Walden, T. A., & Ogan, T. A. (1988). The develop-ment of social referencing. Child Development, 59,1230–1240. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1130486

Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., & Peterson, C. C. (2011).Sequential progressions in a theory-of-mind scale:Longitudinal perspectives. Child Development, 82,780–792. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01583.x

Whitehead, A. N., & Griffin, D. R. (1978). Processand reality an essay in cosmology of Edinburgh

during the session 1927–28. New York, NY: TheFree Press.

Wilson, J. (1972). Motivation and morality. Journalof Moral Education, 2, 25–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305724720020104

Winnicott, D. W. (1986). Home is where we startfrom. Essays by a psychoanalist. London, UnitedKingdom: Penguin books.

Zhang, M., Chen, X., Deng, H., & Lu, Z. (2014).Infant behavior and development identifying theinteraction of maternal sensitivity and two sero-tonin-related gene polymorphisms on infant. InfantBehavior and Development, 37, 606–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infbeh.2014.06.009

Received May 28, 2019Revision received October 29, 2019

Accepted January 27, 2020 �

16 ORON, NAVARRO-RUBIO, AND LUIS

Thi

sdo

cum

ent

isco

pyri

ghte

dby

the

Am

eric

anPs

ycho

logi

cal

Ass

ocia

tion

oron

eof

itsal

lied

publ

ishe

rs.

Thi

sar

ticle

isin

tend

edso

lely

for

the

pers

onal

use

ofth

ein

divi

dual

user

and

isno

tto

bedi

ssem

inat

edbr

oadl

y.