journal article understanding governance

8/7/2019 Journal Article Understanding Governance

1/34

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [EBSCOHost EJS Content Distribution - Current]

On: 24 November 2010

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 925797205]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-

41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

West European PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181

Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the ConstitutionMatthew Flindersaa University of Sheffield, United Kingdom

Online publication date: 09 September 2010

To cite this Article Flinders, Matthew(2005) 'Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution', WestEuropean Politics, 28: 1, 61 93

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/0140238042000297099URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000297099

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000297099http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdfhttp://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000297099http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181


2/34

Majoritarian Democracy in Britain:New Labour and the Constitution

MATTHEW FLINDERS

University of Sheffield, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT In May 1997 the British electorate voted a Labour government into officeafter 18 years of Conservative administration. This government has subsequentlyenacted a large number of constitutional reforms. However, a debate exists in relationto the degree to which, taken together, these reforms amount to a fundamental shift inthe nature of British democracy. This article utilises Arend Lijpharts work on patternsof democracy in order to provide a conceptual lens through which New Laboursconstitutional reforms can be analysed in terms of representing either a minor or majorshift from a traditionally majoritarian to more consensus-orientated system. The articleconcludes that, although significant, the actual degree of reform in Britain is less radical

than is commonly assumed: although New Labour is committed to far-reachingconstitutional reform in principle it has been far less committed in practice.

In May 1997 the British electorate voted a Labour government into office

after 18 years of Conservative administration. During its first term (1997

2001) the Labour government implemented a programme of constitutional

reform and continued this during its second term (2001 ). Two central

issues surround this reform process, the first being an empirical question

regarding the degree to which these reforms actually represent a far-reaching

shift in the nature of British democracy. The second issue focuses on the

conceptual and analytical tools available to understand the inter-relation-

ship between specific constitutional reforms at the micro-political level and

to what degree these may impact upon macro-political models or patterns of

democracy.

It is a contention of this article that the correlation between specific

constitutional reforms and the nature of democracy in a given country is

an empirical question rather than an assumed fact. Consequently, it is

possible for a government to embark upon an apparently wide-ranging

programme of constitutional reform with little actual commitment tochanging the nature of democracy what I refer to below as cosmetic

Correspondence Address: Matthew Flinders, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield,

Sheffield S10 2TY, UK

West European Politics,

Vol. 28, No. 1, 61 93, January 2005

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/0140238042000297099

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


3/34

reform. It is equally possible that a government may wish to shift the

balance of power within the constitutional configuration of a country to

some degree while still retaining control over core components and power

centres, such as the voting system and legislature moderate reform.Rarely, and usually in response to a major political crisis or incident, a

government may wish to embark upon a far-reaching reform process in

which the infrastructure of the constitution is amended in such a way that

power is either concentrated or dispersed in a manner which marks a stark

departure from the previous constitutional arrangement fundamental

reform.

These two issues (the former being empirical and the latter conceptual)

are of particular significance in relation to Britain since 1 May 1997.

From an empirical perspective there has been a rather nave assumptionthat the Labour governments constitutional reforms represent a funda-

mental reform of the British constitution and democracy. New Labour

ministers, who are keen to embellish achievements in order to both

demonstrate their democratic credentials and respond to critics who

suggest the government has not gone far enough, have vigorously

presented this position. For example, the former Lord Chancellor, Lord

Irvine (1998), has described the reforms as the most radical programme

of constitutional change since the Great Reform Bill of 1832. While it

may not be surprising that politicians seek to exaggerate their achieve-ments, more worrying is the fact that some observers and scholars have

assumed that the introduction of several pieces of constitutional

legislation does amount to a fundamental reform of British democracy.

Within Britain Wood (1999: 1) captures this position succinctly when he

notes, Yet for all the talk about Third Ways and Blatcherism, there is

a strand of Labour policy that is radical indeed its programme of

constitutional reform. While from mainland Europe Mair (2000: 34)

observes, New Labour is currently engaged in what amounts to a full-

blooded constitutional revolution, dragging the political system away from

an extreme version of majoritarian democracy towards a more institu-

tionally consensual model.

Although New Labours reforms have been documented extensively it is

possible to suggest that much of this analysis has been overly descriptive,

frequently normative and largely atheoretical. This lack of a body of

literature that offers conceptual or ideological depth is particularly

pronounced in light of the fact that a key criticism levelled at the Labour

government is the accusation that the constitutional reform measures have

been devoid of any clear statement of principles or underlying rationale.

Moreover, it is clear that although the Labour government has been willingto reform many aspects of the British constitution it has remained

unyielding in relation to demands to modify certain aspects of the

constitutional infrastructure. It is in explaining and understanding both

action and non-action in relation to constitutional reform in Britain that a

62 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


4/34

conceptually informed and theoretically robust analysis may be particularly

beneficial.

In order to provide depth (in terms of a conceptual and theoretical

framework) and breadth (in terms of a structure through which it is possibleto identify the inter-relationship between specific reforms) this article utilises

Lijpharts (1984; 1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensual

democracies. Lijpharts framework, it is argued, contributes a deeper

understanding and more fundamental analysis to the broader debate about

how the constitution and nature of democracy has altered in Britain since

May 1997. Furthermore, Lijpharts work is particularly appropriate in

relation to Britain for four interconnected reasons. First, Britain has always

been presented as an exemplar of the majoritarian model; indeed the terms

majoritarian model and Westminster model are frequently usedinterchangeably. However, and second, in Britain the period since 1 May

1997 is often portrayed as a critical juncture that challenges Lijpharts

characterisation of Britain as a majoritarian democracy. Third, Lijpharts

scholarship provides a conceptual framework through which the reform of

institutions, structures and to some extent cultures can be mapped in order

to understand the trajectory of a democracy and how it may be moving

along the axis from majoritarian to consensus (and vice versa) over time.

Finally, Lijpharts last analysis of developments in Britain examined the

period between 1971 and 1996. This article therefore represents a timelyopportunity to update and reflect on Lijpharts conceptual and empirical

work on patterns of democracy as it relates to Britain after two successive

Labour governments.

The core argument of this article is that although New Labour has

reformed the British constitution in many important ways this has not led to

a far-reaching shift in the nature of democracy. There has been significant

change but only in relation to the federalunitary dimension and this exists

in the shadow of parliamentary sovereignty (itself largely a euphemism for

executive power); paradoxically, the executiveparties dimension actually

reflects a concentration of power under New Labour. There has, therefore,

been no dramatic shift from a majoritarian to a consensual model of

democracy at the national level. The Westminster model continues to be the

default option in terms of democracy in Britain.

This article is divided into three sections. In the first section the Labour

governments programme of reform is briefly outlined. The second section

draws upon Lijpharts work. It synthesises his analytical framework on

majoritarianism and consensualism with an examination of New Labours

constitutional reforms. Analysing developments within the period 1997 to

2005 will provide a new data set, which can then be used to plot the locationof Britain on Lijpharts conceptual map of democracy after two successive

terms of Labour government. The final section reflects on the findings of the

research and evaluates its implications for the notion of New Labour and

the future of British democracy.

Majoritarian democracy in Britain 63

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


5/34

New Labour and the British Constitution

Although the British constitution is never static or immobile, viewed in

retrospect, the second half of the twentieth century was a period of unusualconstitutional quiescence. Compared with the fundamental and often

prolonged constitutional struggles of the nineteenth century, the latter half

of the twentieth century, with the exception of the European Communities

Act, can be interpreted as a period of relative constitutional serenity. This

extended period of inertia ended with the election of the Labour government

on 1 May 1997. The adjective New in relation to the British Labour Party

denotes the election of Tony Blair as leader of the party in July 1994 and the

subsequent modernisation of the party and its policies. A central aspect of

this modernisation process focused on the nature and operation of Britishdemocracy and the perceived need for far-reaching constitutional reform.

Despite the fact that several members of the Labour government were

constitutionally cautious, Tony Blair included, the 19972001 parliament

can be interpreted as an unprecedented window of opportunity in relation

to constitutional reform. The Labour Party was heavily committed to

certain reforms and its commitment to stay within the previous Con-

servative governments spending limits restricted policy development in the

social and economic sphere. As a consequence, the parliamentary timetable

could accommodate a large amount of constitutional legislation withoutintense competition within the cabinet for legislative space. (Consequently,

no fewer than 20 bills relating to constitutional reform were steered through

parliament during the first three parliamentary sessions.)

Although the constitutional reform project was by no means complete, it

was clear long before the 2001 general election that the Labour

governments priorities had changed. It was also likely that the second

Labour administration would be less ambitious while also having less time

to concentrate on constitutional issues. Labours second term was therefore

not expected to match its first term in relation to constitutional reform. This

would be the time for constitutional consolidation: to complete unfinished

business, attempt to provide some form of coordinated overview and

monitoring capacity, and allow the reforms to bed in (see Flinders 2004).

As expected, the early stages of Labours second term of office were

restrained: a high degree of constitutional fatigue had set in. This was due to

both international events (notably Iraq) and domestic policy pressures.

Morrison (2001) suggests that towards the end of the previous parliament

several senior members of the cabinet felt that constitutional reform had

taken up too much parliamentary and ministerial time. Moreover, surveys

and opinion polls suggested that the public failed to attach high politicalsalience to constitutional reform but were restless in relation to public

services. Crime, employment, health and education would therefore receive

priority during Labours second term. This contextual change in environ-

ment is critical in understanding the manner in which constitutional policy

64 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


6/34

has evolved during New Labours second term. During the first term some

form of devolution was irresistible due to a combination of popular

pressures. In many ways the constitutional pressures of the broader public

were satisfied to a greater or lesser extent. The second term agendaprioritised public services. Paradoxically, not only did this reduce the

saliency of constitutional issues but also the pressure on New Labour to

deliver on health, education, etc. created an environment that demanded a

strong executive. In spite of this the Queens speech on 26 November 2003

included two constitutional bills: the House of Lords Bill and the

Constitutional Reform Bill. However, unlike the Labour governments

previous constitutional reform measures, both these bills have faced intense

opposition and have aroused bitter criticism with regard to the Labour

governments approach to constitutional reform.There is a burgeoning literature on Labours approach to the constitution

that admirably charts the nature and implementation of these reforms (see

Hazell 1999; 2000; 2003). It is not the aim of this section to provide a

detailed outline of each reform (many will be reviewed in some detail below)

but only to provide a rough outline of how the constitutional terrain has

been altered in Britain under New Labour and provide a flavour of some of

the critical tensions, issues and anomalies surrounding the reform

programme. The main constitutional measures implemented by New

Labour are set out in Table 1.There can be no doubt that significant reforms have been implemented,

notably in the sphere of devolution, human rights legislation and central

bank independence. However, the manner in which these reforms have been

designed, announced and implemented has aroused a degree of disquiet,

T AB L E 1

N E W L AB OU RS M AI N C ON S T I T U T I ON AL M E AS U RE S AN D P ROP OS AL S ,

1 9 9 7 2 0 0 5

. Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997

. Scotland Act 1998

. Government of Wales Act 1998

. European Communities Amendment Act 1998

. Bank of England Act 1998

. Human Rights Act 1998

. Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998

. Regional Development Agencies Act 1998

. Greater London Authority Act 1998

. Registration of Political Parties Act 1998

. European Parliament Elections Act 1998

. House of Lords Act 1999

. Freedom of Information Act 2000

. Local Government Act 2000

. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000

. Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act 2003

. Constitutional Reform Bill 2003

. House of Lords Bill 2003


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


7/34

which has increased markedly towards the end of New Labours second

term of office. These concerns focus on three issues.

First, there has been no clear statement of the principles or rationale

underlying the process as a whole.Second, as Harlow (2000) notes, the whole reform programme has been

conceived in strictly Diceyan terms, which, theoretically at least, maintain

the core components of the Westminster model (parliamentary sovereignty,

a unitary state, ministerial responsibility to parliament, strong government,

etc.). Although the Westminster model has shaped and limited the reform

process, it is abundantly clear that several elements of New Labours

constitutional reform programme have actually undermined to some extent

core components of the model. It is suggested below that by seeking to

accommodate their consensual reforms within a majoritarian system thatpreserves executive dominance, the malleability of the Westminster model

has been exhausted. The result of this is that anomalies within the

constitutional infrastructure, many of which have existed for some time,

have become increasingly conspicuous.

The third tension surrounding New Labours constitutional reforms

stems from their apparent commitment to preserving core tenets of the

Westminster model while propounding a discourse which is far more

consensual and stimulates an expectation of far-reaching reform. The

divergence between New Labours discourse on constitutional reform andchange and the rather restricted nature of many of the reforms suggest that

New Labour may be committed to a more consensual model of democracy

in principle but is still wedded to a clearly majoritarian model in practice.

These three tensions are clearly inter-related and are to a degree mutually

reinforcing. Marquand (1999a) eloquently captured the combined result or

perception of this when he wrote,

It is very British, this revolution. It is a revolution without a theory. It is

the messy, muddled work of practical men and women, unintellectual

when not positively anti-intellectual, apparently oblivious of the long

tradition of political and constitutional reflection of which they are heirs,

responding piecemeal and ad hoc to conflicting pressures a revolution

of sleepwalkers who dont quite know where they are going or why.

The relationship between the notion of New Labour, with its vaunted third

way, and the contradictions within the programme of constitutional reform

will be further discussed below. The next section utilises Lijpharts work in

order to understand how British democracy has changed since 1997.

Patterns of Democracy

Lijpharts central thesis is that democratic systems can be placed on an axis,

which has majoritarianism at one extreme and consensualism at the other.

66 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


8/34

Most democratic systems, Lijphart suggests, can be located on a continuum

between these poles. The majoritarianconsensus contrast therefore forms

the foundation of Lijpharts framework. In the majoritarian model political

power is concentrated. This condensed power structure is generally nurturedby a winner-takes-all electoral system, an adversarial political culture and a

competitive party system based largely around two dominant parties. The

consensus model is commonly based around a proportional electoral

system, a consensual political culture and a party system involving a number

of parties. Lijpharts research suggests that, contrary to popular belief,

consensual systems do not commonly suffer from what Beer (1982) termed

pluralistic stagnation in which the decision-making processes become

overly complex leading to economic inefficiency. The difference between

majoritarian and consensual democracies is that the latter offer greateropportunities for participatory and deliberative democracy leading to higher

levels of public trust and fewer examples of extreme policy shifts.

A notable benefit of Lijpharts majoritarian and consensus models is that

they facilitate the creation of a conceptual map on which specific forms or

models of democracy can be located. In order to locate the political system

of a country along the majoritarianconsensus axis, two dimensions are

established (executiveparties and federalunitary) each involving five

characteristics. These two dimensions and ten characteristics (as set out in

Table 2 overleaf) form dichotomous contrasts in terms of majoritarian andconsensus models.

As noted above, the central argument of this article is that the

constitutional reforms enacted by the Labour government since 1 May

1997 do not amount to a significant shift in the pattern of democracy in

Britain. The reforms are more accurately interpreted as representing

moderate, and in some areas cosmetic, adjustments to what is still quite

clearly a majoritarian model of democracy. In order to validate this thesis it

is necessary to return to Lijpharts framework and examine how the New

Labour government has changed each of the ten variables. The results of

this assessment will allow an examination of the degree to which the

programme of constitutional reform as a whole has shifted British

democracy in relation to the executiveparties and federalunitary dimen-

sions and will therefore offer an indication of the trajectory of Britain in

relation to the majoritarian and consensual poles. The ten variables

employed by Lijphart are set out in Table 3 (p. 69), as are the contrasting

characteristics of ideal-type consensual and majoritarian systems. The

figures for each of the ten variables set out in columns four and five are

taken from Lijpharts 1999 book. The figures in the sixth column represent a

replication of Lijpharts work, derived using the formulae for the period19972005. The seventh column summarises the extent of change under New

Labour for each variable.

The remainder of this section attempts to explain how the data for the

period 19972005 were derived and calculated. After detailing developments


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


9/34

for each variable between 1997 and 2005 an attempt is made to chart the

evolution of British democracy during this period onto Lijpharts two-

dimensional conceptual map (see Figure 2, p. 85). The following sub-

sections relate to each of the ten variables set out in Table 3. Within a single

article it is only possible to provide a somewhat brief and rudimentary

review of developments in relation to each variable. The following text does,

however, provide detailed references in order to substantiate and underpin

the basic argument of each sub-section. The first of these relates to the party

system (V1).

V1 Party system

The first of the ten variables that characterise the majoritarianconsensus

contrast is the difference between single-party majority governments and

broad multi-party coalitions. In many ways the party system epitomises the

nature of power within any democracy and is a key variable for the

executiveparties dimension. Two-party systems are a central aspect of themajoritarian model of democracy. Lijphart employed the Laakso and

Taagepera (1979) index in order to gauge both the number of parties within

a system and their relative strength. In a two-party system with two equally

strong parties the effective number of parties is exactly 2.0; whereas in a

T AB L E 2

T W O D I M E N S I ON S AN D T E N C H ARAC T E RI S T I C S I N F ORM I N G T H E RE L AT I V E

C H ARAC T E RI S T I C S OF M AJORI T ARI AN AN D C ON S E N S U S M OD E L S OF

D E M OC RAC Y

ExecutiveParties Dimension1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive

power-sharing in broad multi-party coalitions.2. Executive legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive

legislative balance of power.3. Two-party versus multi-party systems.4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus

coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aimed at compromise andconcertation.

FederalUnitary Dimension1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralised government.2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative

power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions

that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own

legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of theirconstitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.

5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.

Source: Lijphart 1999: 34.

68 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


10/34

T AB L E 3

AU D I T I N G RE F ORM I N B RI T AI N U N D E R N E W L AB OU R: L I JP H ART S T E N V ARI AB L

Variable Majoritarian Consensus 19451996 1971199

V1. Party system Two party system Multi-party system 2.11 2.20 V2. Cabinets Single party majority cabinets Power-sharing multi-party

coalitions96.7 93.3

V3. Executive-Legislativerelationship

Dominant executive Executivelegislature balanceof power

5.52 5.52

V4. Electoral system Disproportional first-past-thepost system

Proportional representation 10.33 14.66

V5. Interest groups Informal pluralist interestgroup interaction

Co-ordinated and corporatistinterest group interaction

3.38 3.50

V6. Federalunitary

dimension

Unitary and centralised

government

Federal and decentralised

government

1.0 1.0

V7. Unicameralismbicameralismdimension.

Concentration of power in aunicameral legislature

Division of power betweentwo equally strong butdifferently constituted houses

2.5 2.5

V8. Constitutionalamendment

Flexible constitution that canbe amended by simplemajorities

Rigid constitutions that can bechanged only by extraordinarymajorities

1.0 1.0

V9. Legislativesupremacy

Legislature has the final wordon the constitutionality oflegislation

Legislation subject to ajudicial review of theirconstitutionality by a supremeor constitutional court

1.0 1.0

V10. Central bank Dependent on the executive Independent central bank 0.31 0.28

D1. ExecutiveParties 1.21 1.39 D1. FederalUnitary 1.12 1.19

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524


11/34

system where one party is stronger than another, with respective seat shares

of 60 and 40 per cent, the index score would be 1.6. This would support an

intuitive belief that the system was closer to a one-party system than one in

which the two dominant parties were equally balanced. Using this indexLijphart calculated that for the period 194596 (14 general elections) the

House of Commons scored 2.11 (1.99 lowest and 2.27 highest) therefore

indicating that Britain was essentially a two-party system. The general

election results for 1997 and 2001 are set out in Table 4 (opposite).

Replicating Lijpharts work using the data in Table 4 produces a mean

score of 2.13 on the index of effective political parties. This figure suggests

that Britain has remained very much a two-party system since the election of

New Labour in May 1997. This finding is supported by an historical

perspective (set out in Figure 1 below). Clearly the nature of the partysystem is to a great extent related to the balance of power within a

government (V2); the topic of the next sub-section.

V2 Cabinets

The second of the ten variables examines the breadth of representation from

different parties within the executive branch of government. The difference

between one-party majority governments and broad multi-party coalitions

encapsulates to a large extent the contrast between the majoritarianprinciple of concentrating power and the consensus principle of power-

sharing. Coalition theory offers three broad classifications that are pertinent

to this discussion: (1) minimal winning cabinets, winning in the sense that

the party in the cabinet controls a majority of parliamentary seats in the

lower house but minimal to reflect the fact that no other parties contribute

to the executive; (2) oversized cabinets, which do contain more parties than

are actually necessary for majority support in the legislature; and (3)

F I G U RE 1

S E AT S W ON , U K , 1 9 4 5 2 0 0 1

70 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


12/34

T AB L E 4

B RI T I S H G E N E RAL E L E C T I ON RE S U L T S 1 M AY 1 9 9 7 AN D 7 JU N

1997 General Election

Votes(millions)

Share of vote(%)

Seats won/%of seats won

Votes(millions)

Conservative Party 9.6 30.7 165/25 8.36 Labour Party 13.52 43.2 418/63.4 10.72 Liberal Democrat Party 5.24 16.8 46/6.9 4.81 Plaid Cymru/Scottish National Party 0.78 2.5 10/1.5 0.66 Other 2.14 6.8 20/3 1.81Total 31.29 100 659/100 26.37

Notes: Other: Ulster Unionist Party, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party, Social and Democratic Labour Party, elected as independents.Source: House of Commons Library UK Election Statistics 19452003, Research Paper 03/59, July 2003.

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524


13/34

minority cabinets, which do not enjoy the support of a parliamentary

majority (see Lijphart 1999: 9091).

Lijpharts analysis of British political history between 1945 and 1996

established that the British executive had been a minimal winning cabinetfor 93.3 per cent of this period and a one-party cabinet for all (100 per cent)

of this period resulting in a mean of 96.7 per cent. For the period between

1997 and 2005 New Labour has enjoyed a minimal winning cabinet with

parliamentary majorities of 177 and 165 after the 1997 and 2001 general

elections respectively. During 1996 and early 1997 the Labour Party had

been in negotiations with the Liberal Democrat Party regarding the creation

of a minority and oversized cabinet should the forthcoming general election

produce a hung parliament (see Ashdown 2000). However, with majorities

of this size and an adversarial political culture there have been few incentivesfor the Labour Party to form an oversized cabinet that included

representatives from other parties. Therefore one-party cabinet bolstered

by a large parliamentary majority has been the dominant (100 per cent)

form of government between 1997 and 2005. The figure of 100 per cent for

V2 suggests that on this variable Britain has become more majoritarian since

1997 rather than less. Indeed, increasing the period of analysis from 1996 to

2005 increases the mean figure from Lijpharts 96.7 per cent, to around 98

per cent. Paradoxically, then, V2 suggests a move not away but towards

greater majoritarianism during New Labours first two governments.This finding has a direct relationship with an increasing concern amongst

academics and parliamentarians that Britain has become increasingly

presidential under Tony Blair (see Foley 2000; Heffernan 2003; Burch and

Holliday 1999). Accordingly there is a burgeoning literature that suggests

that the prime minister has moved within the constitutional infrastructure

from being primus inter pares (the position in strict constitutional theory) to

Sartoris (1994) primus solus. While much of this literature exaggerates the

extent of change since 1997, there is a clear sense that the nature of

governance, and particularly the connections and relationships within the

core executive, have changed (for a review see Holliday and Burch 2004). In

light of this perceived greater concentration of power within the cabinet the

relationship between the executive and the legislature (V3) takes on added

emphasis. This will be the topic of the next section.

V3 ExecutiveLegislative Relationship

The third difference between majoritarian and consensual systems focuses

on the relationship between the executive and legislature the consensus

model being characterised by a more balanced relationship than iscommonly found in majoritarian systems where the executive is dominant,

largely through its control of the majority party in the lower house. After

reviewing the period 19451996 Lijphart characterised Britain as displaying

clear executive dominance. However, in the run-up to the 1997 general

72 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


14/34

election the Labour Party made parliamentary reform a central part of their

platform. In May 1996, the then shadow leader of the House, Ann Taylor

(1996), made a far-reaching New Labour, New Parliament speech to

Charter 88. Echoing the critical report on the state of parliamentarydemocracy published 20 years earlier by the Procedure Committee, she

committed the Labour Party to re-establish the proper balance between

parliament and the executive.

However, substantial reform of the House of Commons has been notably

absent from the Labour governments constitutional reform programme. A

Modernisation of the House select committee was established but this has

focused largely on the day-to-day management of the House of Commons

rather than broader issues concerning the relationship between the

Commons and the executive. After reviewing developments under NewLabour, Gregory (1999: 47) concludes that the government, despite its pre-

election promises, appears to have no appetite for any tangible modernisa-

tion of parliament which will alter the balance of power. This refusal on the

part of the Labour government to introduce reforms that would moderate

the dominance of the executive over and within the House of Commons led

to a serious confrontation between senior MPs and the Labour government

(see HC 300 19992000; HC 301 20002001; Cm 4737 2000).

Although the Labour government has made minor concessions, such as

the announcement by the prime minister in April 2002 that he would infuture appear before the Liaison Committee every six months, it has not

introduced measures which can be interpreted as far-reaching. Although a

degree of modernisation has taken place since 1997 it is crucial to

comprehend the difference between modernising parliament and parlia-

mentary reform. Richard Crossman (Hansard, 14 Dec. 1966) once

explained that there is a difference between modernisation and parliamen-

tary reform modernisation involved practical and procedural changes to

the day-to-day business of the House whereas parliamentary reform

involved a conscious decision by the executive and legislature regarding

the proper balance and distribution of power. Tony Wright MP (2000) has

outlined how the reforms implemented by Labour more sensible hours,

experiments with Westminster Hall, etc. may be examples of modernisa-

tion but they do not amount to real parliamentary reform. Indeed, the utility

of such modernisation will be minimal and in many ways undermined by the

lack of concomitant parliamentary reform. Without a change in the balance

of power within the House many of the reforms introduced under the guise

of modernisation may well represent subtle moves towards a more

majoritarian system. As one suspicious MP noted, We all know what

modernisation means . . . It is a euphemism for streamlining the House sothat a quantity of legislation can be got through as quickly as possible

(interview with the author, 9 Nov. 2000).

Measuring the relative power of the executive and legislature is clearly

problematic. The relationship between the two is frequently based upon


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


15/34

informal rules, procedures and negotiations that deny the employment of

methodological tools to gauge the executivelegislature relationship.

Lijphart adopts cabinet durability as his central measure of this relationship

(based upon the four criteria of changes in party composition, primeministerialship, coalition status and new elections). Using these criteria

Lijphart arrives at a figure of 5.52 on an index of executive dominance (the

highest score on a scale with a mean value of 3.32). The obvious question

asks to what degree this figure has altered, if at all, since 1 May 1997? The

answer is not at all. The period between 1997 and 2005 in Britain has been

one of secure minimal winning one-party cabinets with no changes in party

composition, no changes in the head of the government, no coalitions and

no forced elections. If anything, the dominance of the executive has

increased due to the large size of the parliamentary majorities enjoyed by theLabour Party in both parliaments (see Figure 1 above). The index score for

Britain (19972005) remains constant at 5.52. This result complements those

for V1 and V2 and suggests that, despite the consensual discourse, Britain

has not become any less majoritarian under New Labour. Clearly the

relationship between the executive and the legislature is dependent to some

extent on the electoral system (V4) this will be the topic of the next sub-

section.

V4 Electoral System

The electoral method within a polity forms both the keystone of the system

and generally ascribes a pattern or model of democracy. Majoritarian

systems generally employ single-member district plurality systems while

consensus systems typically operate through a proportional system. In

Britain the dominance of the executive in relation to parliament has always

been based on a disproportional electoral system that generally provides the

party winning the largest minority of votes with a large majority of seats in

the lower house of parliament. In 1997 the Labour Partys manifesto

contained a commitment to hold a referendum on the voting system for the

House of Commons. In office the government established a commission to

explore the options for voting reform in relation to the House of Commons.

In October 1998 this commission published its final report, which

recommended a hybrid combining single-member constituencies, using the

Alternative Vote, with a limited top-up of 1520 per cent of MPs (Cm

4090 1998). These proposals were opposed by the Labour government and

were not taken forward. By the 2001 manifesto the Labour Partys position

on electoral reform focused on a promise to review Britains experience with

new PR systems before proposing any changes to the electoral system forWestminster (see Constitution Unit 2004). The expected time for the review

was after the second round of elections in Scotland and Wales in 2003, but

no such review was announced and the position of the government at the

time of writing is that it is still considering when best to initiate a review so

74 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


16/34

it can be comprehensive (Hansard, 3 Dec. 2003) but this is unlikely to be

until after the next general election in 2005 or 2006.

The Labour governments ambivalence towards even opening up a debate

about altering the voting system for Westminster is possibly the starkestillustration of its commitment to maintaining a strongly majoritarian model

of democracy in Britain. Indeed, Lijphart notes that very few democracies

change from plurality to proportional systems or vice versa. New Zealands

change in 1996 therefore represents a rare example of far-reaching reform,

which marked the conscious choice by a political elite to move towards a

more consensual model of democracy. It is clear from the above that New

Labour has displayed very little enthusiasm in office for a move to a more

proportional electoral system for the national parliament. Moreover, under

New Labour the degree of electoral disproportionality, Lijpharts indexmeasure for this variable, has actually increased rather than diminished. The

mean index score, using the Gallagher index, for Britain (194596) was

10.33. This figure increased to 14.66 during the second half of this period

(197196). For the period 19972005 (analysing the general election results

for 1997 and 2001 as set out in Table 4 above) this figure increased to 17.06

(the mean of the two general elections in this period).

Implementing a change to the voting system to make it more proportional

would be likely to reduce executive power in terms of increasing the

likelihood of multi-party coalition governments (V2), distributing seats inthe House of Commons across a greater number of parties (V1), and,

altering the executivelegislature relationship (V3). That an incoming

government may renege on specific commitments to weaken or dilute the

dominant position of the executive in Britain is not wholly surprising.

The contradiction of New Labour stems from the fact that although it has

been willing to instigate more consensual reforms at the regional level it has

been adamantly opposed to stimulating a mature debate about introducing

similar reforms at Westminster. Consequently, elections to the Scottish

Parliament, Welsh Assembly and London Assembly have been established

using a proportional system (modified Additional Member System) and

fixed-term elections that makes the continued use of a plurality system for

Westminster increasingly difficult to justify. The next sub-section explores

Lijpharts fourth variable (V5) interest groups.

V5 Interest Groups

The fifth of Lijpharts variables (and the last of the five that together

constitute the executiveparties dimension) concerns the nature of the inter-

relationship between interest groups and the executive. The emblematicinterest group system of majoritarian democracy is competitive, pluralist

and uncoordinated. In contrast the consensus model is likely to display an

interest group system that is coordinated and compromise-orientated. This

latter model is commonly known as corporatism, which generally means


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


17/34

that interest groups are relatively large in size and small in number and tend

to be coordinated into national peak or umbrella organisations. These peak

organisations will enjoy privileged access to the executive, which leads to

comprehensive agreements that are binding on all parties.In assessing the corporatist (consensual) or pluralist (majoritarian) nature

of democratic systems Lijphart drew upon the research of Siaroff (1999).

The utilisation of Siaroffs work is problematic, however, for a number of

reasons. First, it covered only 24 of the 36 countries included in Lijpharts

study. Second, Siaroffs work covered the periods 196370 and 198390 and

was not therefore comprehensive in terms of covering the full period of 1945

to 1996. Despite these methodological concerns Lijphart accepted Siaroffs

five-point scale (theoretical maximum of four and minimum of zero) as an

appropriate measure of interest group pluralism. Using this scale Britain, ormore precisely the UK, was given an index score of 3.38 for 194596 and 3.5

for 197196. Given that the mean score for the 36 countries was 2.24, Britain

was placed very near the pluralist end of the spectrum, a result in line with

the broader acceptance of Britain as an archetypal majoritarian country.

Once again the question of change since 1997 becomes pertinent. The trade

union movement in Britain formed the Labour Party and a logical

hypothesis might suggest that the interest group pluralism score for the

period 19972005 would indicate a higher degree of corporatist style

interaction (see Taylor 1998).However, in terms of its relationship with the trade unions New Labour

has not implemented corporatist-style governing arrangements. As part of a

wider strategy to foster confidence with the private sector the government has

assiduously avoided adopting any policy instruments that may appear overly

corporatist. Trade unions were significantly under-represented in the raft of

policy reviews and task forces established by New Labour during the

beginning of its first term. Of the 449 individuals appointed to 30 leading task

forces and advisory bodies during New Labours first year in office only 26

(six per cent) were from trade unions compared to 129 (29 per cent) from the

private sector (Platt 1998). The fact that the Monetary Policy Committee of

the Bank of England (see below) was established in 1997 without a member

drawn from the trade union movement has also been seen as symptomatic of

a government that is committed to maintaining a somewhat arms-length

relationship with the trade unions. Even where apparently the government

has established tri-partite organisations, such as with the creation of the Low

Pay Commission in 1998, they have not included the government directly and

have formally been established as advisory rather than executive bodies.

Reforms have been implemented, such as the Employment Relations Act

1999 that provided for employee representation and union recognition. Butat the same time these reforms reflect a dilution of New Labours pre-

election commitment to far-reaching union recognition. The Employment

Relations Act, in particular, may well encapsulate the third way or

partnership approach of New Labour but cannot be seen as a decisive shift

76 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


18/34

in the nature of interest groupgovernment relations in Britain, especially

when weighed against New Labours retention of much of the previous

Conservative governments anti-union legislation and their rejection of the

European Unions proposed national level works councils.In essence, then, the election of New Labour in 1997 has not led to a

dramatic shift towards a more corporatist style of government. Despite the

implementation of minor reforms under the guise of partnership and apart

from the implementation of a statutory national minimum wage, New

Labour has remained fundamentally committed to maintaining the

relationship with the trade unions that it inherited from the previous

Conservative government. Undy (1999: 333) suggests that New Labours

industrial relations strategy is very much akin to neo-liberalism and during

its second term (2001 ) the relationship between New Labour and theunions became abysmal as tensions that had simmered throughout the

governments first term came to the fore.

In the wake of New Labours second election victory many frustrated

trade union leaders were keen to move away from the relatively placid

relationship they had enjoyed with the government. For New Labour the

electoral success of June 2001 reflected the publics confidence in the ability

of the Labour Party to manage the economy and as a result senior Labour

ministers reacted strongly against those public sector unions which voted to

take industrial action in 2002 and 2003. Strike action fuelled the suspicion ofthe trade unions that had always existed within the New Labour project and

has led to a further distancing of the trade unions from the party (see

Waddington 2003; Ludlam and Taylor 2003). As Charlwood (2004) has

suggested, this led to an increased degree of anti-Labour Party feeling within

the union movement and the election of a new generation of younger and

more explicitly militant union leaders.

There is, however, as with so many of the variables, a paradox in that

New Labours reforms have apparently stimulated a more consensual style

of politics at the sub-national level while adamantly resisting demands to

institute a similar model at the national level. In Scotland, for example, the

Scottish Trade Unions Congress (STUC) and the Scottish Executive have

agreed and signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which both parties

have explicitly agreed to adopt a joint working relationship (Scottish

Executive/STUC 2004). This includes six-monthly meetings between

Scottish ministers and officials of the STUC and an annual review of the

operation of the joint working arrangements, and formalised consultation

procedures for all policy areas and an agreement in relation to senior

appointments to public bodies.

It appears, however, that the election of New Labour has not resulted in asignificant shift in the relationship between interest groups and government

at the national level. Indeed, Charlwood (2004: 391) notes: New Labours

political strategy has been predicated on establishing distance from the trade

unions. Britain in 2005 is still, therefore, firmly located towards the higher


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


19/34

end of the Siaroff index of interest group pluralism with a score of 3.4. This

reflects a (very) slight move to the left under New Labour but signifies that

no fundamental change has taken place. However, one variable where

significant change has taken place under New Labour since 1997 relates tothe federalunitary dimension (V6). This will be the topic of the next sub-

section.

V6 FederalUnitary Dimension

The formal division of power between different levels of government forms

the sixth of Lijpharts ten variables and the first indicator on the federal

unitary dimension. Clearly the nature of inter-governmental relations within

a country has a clear relationship with both the majoritarian system (inwhich power is concentrated) and the consensus system (in which power is

dispersed). Britain has always been characterised as a highly unitary (non-

federal) and centralised country in which the governmental structures at the

local and regional level are clearly subservient to the national level and enjoy

no constitutionally entrenched rights or powers. Lijphart employs a fivefold

classification system in which Britain is assigned a federalism index score of

1.0 (on a scale with a maximum of 5 for a fully federal country such as the

United States). With a mean federalism index score of 2.3, this figure

designates Britain a fully unitary and centralised country with no variationbetween the two time periods (194596 and 197196) with which Lijphart is

principally concerned.

It is in relation to V6 that New Labours constitutional reforms do

represent a significant shift or reallocation of power within the British

polity. The creation of a Scottish Parliament with tax raising powers, a

Welsh Assembly and an Assembly in London, combined with the

governments plans to hold a referendum on elected regional government

in the North-East of England on 4 November 2004, represent a major

adjustment to the constitutional infrastructure.

The momentum behind devolution and the trajectory of developments

within a relatively short time makes it unlikely (though not impossible)

that a future government would seek to repeal any of the devolution

legislation. The Welsh Assembly, for example, is already campaigning for

increased powers in a manner akin to developments in other European

countries, like Spain, where regional devolution has created a snowball or

ratchet effect in which weaker regions seek to acquire the powers of more

autonomous regions (see Richard Commission 2004). The fact that New

Labour has created a quasi-federal structure within a constitutionally

unitary framework illuminates many of the tensions and anomalies that arethe topic of increasing disquiet within Britain. However, in terms of

employing Lijpharts index of federalism to Britain for the period 1997

2005 it is clear that an important change in the nature of British

democracy has taken place. From the index score of 1.0 for 194596, the

78 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


20/34

devolutionary reforms since 1997 have led to the creation of an

institutional structure somewhere between Lijpharts unitary and decen-

tralized category (2.0) and a semi-federal structure (3.0). The quasi-federal

nature of Britains federalunitary balance would therefore receive anindex score of 2.5, which takes it much closer to the mean score of 2.3 for

all 36 countries within Lijpharts study. However, the ambiguous nature of

New Labours approach to the constitutional reform becomes apparent

when the far-reaching reforms in relation to V6 are compared with the

cosmetic, and some might say majoritarian, reforms in relation to the

unicameralismbicameralism dimension. This will be the topic of the next

sub-section.

V7 Unicameralismbicameralism dimension.

The second component of the federalunitary dimension focuses on the

distribution of power within the legislature. The pure majoritarian model is

characterised by the concentration of legislative power in one single

chamber whereas the consensus model commonly involves a bicameral

legislature in which power is divided equally between two differently

constituted chambers. Most democratic systems employ an institutional

structure somewhere between these two extremes. The fact that Britain has a

bicameral parliament but unequal balance of powers between the upper andlower houses led to Lijpharts describing it as asymmetrically bicameral.

The House of Commons is the dominant chamber, with the House of Lords

powers being severely limited to the amendment and delay of non-fiscal

bills. Since the Parliament Act of 1911, when the powers of the Lords were

curtailed, Britain has been governed by a system of weak bicameralism.

Lijphart analysis up to 1996 uses three variables (bicameral versus

unicameral systems, symmetrical versus asymmetrical systems and con-

gruent versus incongruent systems) in order to derive an index of

bicameralism and thereby assign a score to each of the 36 countries in his

study. Using this system Britain receives an index score of 2.5 (on a scale

from 1.0 to 4.0 with the latter being strong bicameralism and the former

unicameralism). This score reflects Britains classification as a system of

between medium strength and weak bicameralism. In opposition New

Labour had made much of their commitment to remove the hereditary

members and make the House of Lords more democratic and representa-

tive a commitment that was included in their election manifesto (Labour

Party 1997).

The 1999 House of Lords Act duly removed all but 92 hereditary peers

from the Lords and was designed to be stage one of a reform process thatwould eventually lead to exclusion of the remaining hereditary peers when

reforms to introduce an elected component (stage two) were implemented.

And yet under New Labour there has never been a clear vision of the role,

responsibilities or composition of a reformed second chamber. This reflects


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


21/34

traditional tensions within the Labour Party that while committed to

abolishing the hereditary principle could not agree what to replace it with.

In November 2001 the governments proposals for stage two of reform

of the House of Lords were published in a white paper Completing theReform (Cm 5291 2001). The document proposed that only 120 (one-fifth)

of the reformed second chamber of 600 members should be elected by

proportional representation for a term of 15 years or possibly less. The

proposals received widespread criticism and 165 Labour backbenchers

signed an Early Day Motion supporting a wholly or largely elected second

chamber. Of particular significance was the rejection by the government of

the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords recommenda-

tion that the independent Appointment Commission should make all

appointments, even those representing the political parties. The govern-ments proposals maintained a critical source of party political patronage.

In May 2002, in an attempt to make progress on stage two of Lords

reform, the government supported the establishment of a Joint Committee

of both Houses. The committee published its report on 11 December 2002 in

which it put forward no fewer than seven options for the composition of a

revised second chamber from which both Houses could choose between in a

free vote (HL 17/HC 171 20023). In this vote the House of Lords chose a

fully appointed second chamber by 335 votes to 225, the House of

Commons rejected all the options for change. This has left the governmentsplans in disarray. The lack of any agreed position within the cabinet was

particularly apparent, with Tony Blair and Lord Irvine coming out strongly

in favour of a fully appointed second chamber and Robin Cook and several

other leading ministers at that time favouring an elected component. In

another surprise, 172 MPs, far more than expected, voted to abolish the

second chamber completely.

In May 2003 the Joint Committee, which had been reconvened to try and

find a way forward on Lords reform, issued a report in which it requested

that the government provide the committee with an indication of its current

thinking on the role and composition of a revised second chamber (HL 97/

HC 668 20023). The government published a rather blunt response in July

2003 in which it stated there is no consensus about introducing any elected

element in the House of Lords (HL 155/HC 1027 20023). This statement

did little to offer the joint committee any guidance on how it should proceed

and this situation was worsened when on 18 September 2003 the

Department for Constitutional Affairs published a white paper (the Labour

governments third on the topic) on reform of the Lords without any

advance consultation.

The white paper set out the governments intention to remove the 92remaining hereditary peers and create a statutory Appointments Commis-

sion. A bill to this effect was included in the Queens speech at the beginning

of the 20034 parliamentary session. The bill signals the governments

intention to proceed on the basis of a purely appointed second chamber. The

80 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


22/34

Labour governments gradual but consistent drift towards this position has

evolved since the 1993 Labour Party conference when, as shadow home

secretary, Tony Blair promised an end to hereditary peers sitting in the

House of Lords as the first step to a proper, directly elected second chamber.As leader of the party in 1996 Blair hinted during the John Smith Memorial

Lecture that in addition to elected members there may be room for people of

a particularly distinguished position or record. The Labour governments

white paper of January 1999 further signalled a change of emphasis as it

stressed that a revised second chamber must neither usurp, nor threaten, the

supremacy of the first chamber (Cm 4183 1999). This last quote takes us to

the heart of tensions surrounding New Labour and its reform of the British

constitution: a tension between the capacity of a government to implement its

policies and the participatory demands of constitutional reformers. TheLabour government has been committed to the latter in principle but to the

former in practice. On the Lijphart index of cameralism it is possible to

suggest that the removal of all but 92 of the overwhelmingly conservative

hereditary peers from the Lords under New Labour has actually increased

the asymmetrical nature of the balance of powers between the two houses.

Britain has, therefore moved from a system of medium to weak bicameralism

to one which could now be better described as simply weak bicameralism or

even a one and a half chamber system. The index score of cameralism has

therefore changed from the pre-1997 score of 2.5 to somewhere between 2.0and 1.5, producing a mean score of 1.75 for the 19972005 period.

In March 2004 the secretary of state for constitutional affairs announced

that a decision had been taken not to proceed with the House of Lords Bill

but that the government would return to the issue in its manifesto for the

next general election. The reason for this dramatic announcement was the

failure of the government to get the second constitutional bill of the 20034

parliamentary session, the Constitutional Reform Bill, through the House of

Lords. This will be the topic of the next sub-section.

V8/9 Constitutional Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review

In the vein of Lijpharts 1999 work, this sub-section examines V8 and V9

together due to the tight inter-relationship of these variables. Both these

variables concern the presence or absence of explicit restraints on the

legislative power of parliamentary majorities. The process for constitutional

amendment forms the first variable (V8), which is commonly understood

using the distinction between flexible and rigidconstitutions. In the former a

constitution can be changed by simple majority votes in the legislature while

in the latter the same amendment would require some form of extra-majority or super-majority (often involving both houses of the legislature).

The second variable (V9) concerns the presence of judicial review and the

existence of higher order laws which are deemed to be beyond the purview

or jurisdiction of politicians and are protected by the oversight of an


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


23/34

independent supreme court with the power to strike down or veto legislation

which is deemed unconstitutional when weighed against these fundamental

laws. Rigid constitutions tend to have more judicial review protection than

more flexible constitutions.Britain has always been characterised as a country with a flexible

constitution and a weak system of judicial review. In terms of constitutional

amendment an ordinary majority, thereby indicating complete flexibility,

can approve any legislative proposal brought forward by the government.

Moreover, in Britain the government still enjoys a great number of

prerogative powers, which can be deployed without parliamentary approval.

Indeed, in government New Labour has been very careful to protect the

malleability of the British constitution and has rejected calls to introduce

controls on many of the executives prerogative powers (HC 442 20034).On an index of 1.0 to 4.0 (with the former characterising systems in which a

simple majority was required to sanction a constitutional amendment

compared with super-majority greater than two-thirds in the latter) Lijphart

predictably ascribed Britain a score of 1.0 for the period 194596. Under

New Labour (19972005) this situation has not changed and a score of 1.0 is

returned in Table 3.

The unexpected announcement by the Labour government on 12 June

2003 of its intention to create a supreme court and establish an independent

appointments commission for judicial appointments suggests that asignificant change may have taken place in relation to V9. The role of the

lord chancellor as a member of the executive, legislature and judiciary had

for some time been the topic of disquiet. This had heightened since

incorporation of the ECHR that stipulates under Article 6 that a fair trial

must involve an impartial and independent judge (and not therefore a

member of the same government bringing the case). The ECHR factor

created a sense of urgency and reforms to the second chamber (in which the

highest judicial court sat) provided the opportunity to instigate a clearer

separation of powers.

Once more, however, the approach of New Labour failed to reflect the

inclusive style of politics that the government had suggested would underpin

its administration. The announcement was not preceded by any form of

consultation and was made without the availability of detailed plans. This

fuelled accusations that the government was acting in a high-handed manner

in relation to constitutional reform and, furthermore, doing so in a manner

devoid of any obvious appreciation of the implications that reform in one

area may have for other aspects of the constitutional infrastructure. (The

announcement appeared to take even some members of the cabinet by

surprise.)Although creation of a supreme court may suggest a move towards a

more consensual political system in which the power of the government is

restricted by various control mechanisms the situation in Britain is less clear.

The planned court will not have the power to veto legislation; indeed,

82 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


24/34

without an agreed written constitution the courts have little to bite on in

terms of gauging the constitutionality of government action or legislation.

The continuing relevance of the notion of parliamentary sovereignty has

been clear in relation to the arrangements for incorporating the nearestthing that Britain has to higher order laws the ECHR. When the

government incorporated the ECHR into British law in 1998 the procedures

for judicial review were carefully designed to maintain parliamentary

sovereignty. Consequently, the courts were not empowered to strike down

legislation that they deemed to be irreconcilable with the ECHR but simply

to issue a declaration of incompatibility. This does not annul the legislation

in any way but it would commence a procedure in which parliament was

invited to review the act and possibly revise the act in light of the courts

views. However, parliament is under no obligation to alter the legislationand is therefore free to judge the constitutionality of its own laws.

New Labours plans for a supreme court are therefore weaker than the

situation found in many consensual political systems due to the dominance

of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed the Lord Chief Justice,

Lord Woolf (2004), described the governments plans as second class due

to the fact that the proposals have been designed in such a way as to protect

the supremacy of parliament and therefore do not include the powers

commonly invested in supreme courts to strike down legislation. This raises

the question of the degree to which the creation of a supreme court withoutthe existence of a rigid constitution and the judicial capacity to veto

legislation amounts to a meaningful alteration of a political system.

Lijpharts classification once more facilitates an answer to this question as

he offers an index of judicial review strength that allows institutional

reforms to be measured.

An index score of 1.0 reflects no judicial review, whereas 4.0 indicates

strong judicial review. For the period 194596 Britain receives an index

score of 1.0 in light of the absence of either a codified constitution or

independent supreme court. Gauging the extent of reform in Britain is

problematic due to the fact that it demands a normative judgement on the

willingness of the executive not to invoke its reserve powers (parliamentary

sovereignty) but to rule according to an executive mentality that is willing to

cede power. In relation to the ECHR, for example, the government has

made it clear that a declaration of incompatibility will usually lead to a

revision of the legislation to bring it into line with the convention. It is also

reasonable to suggest that incorporation of the ECHR does amount to a

shift in power to some extent between the judiciary and the executive, which

will be augmented when the position of the lord chancellor is abolished and

a member of the cabinet no longer heads the judiciary. And yet the broadercontext of parliamentary sovereignty seems to eviscerate the very notion of a

supreme court as commonly understood. In light of this it seems appropriate

to suggest an index score that reflects a limited change in relation to judicial

review but retains a sense of the executives reluctance to formally


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


25/34

acknowledge this change. Britain has, therefore, moved from a country with

no judicial review to one somewhere between no judicial review (1.0) and

weak judicial review (2.0) in the period 19972005. This creates an index

score of 1.5 that intimates a shift towards a consensual system but within anoverall majoritarian structure. The next sub-section examines the final

variable (V10).

V10 Central Bank

The final variable concerns central banks and how much power and

independence they enjoy. The existence of a highly independent bank is a

central characteristic of a consensual political system; whereas tightly

controlled central banks fit into the logic of majoritarian democracy. Inorder to measure the independence of the Bank of England Lijphart used

the mean figure of the CukipermanWebbNeyapti (CWN) and Grilli

MasciandaroTabellini (GMT) indexes, which were both coded from zero

to one the lowest to the highest of independence. Scores of 0.30 and 0.32

on each respective index led Lijphart to assign an overall index score of 0.31

for the period 194596 against an overall mean score of 0.38.

However, V10 represents the second area where New Labour has

implemented significant reforms. Just five days after the 1997 general

election the chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced thegranting of operational independence to the Bank of England (BoE), later

formalised in the Bank of England Act 1998. The policy change gave the

BoE instrument independence in the sense that it was now free to pursue its

policy goals without interference from outside political pressures. However,

the Treasury still retains a degree of control over the formation of policy so

the reforms were limited to some extent and did not include goal

independence (Spiegel 1998). Moreover, Gordon Brown made it clear to

the House of Commons that the government would retain the right to over-

ride the operational independence of the bank in extreme circumstances.

While emphasising that he expected these reserve powers to be used rarely,

the opacity surrounding the governments criteria for intervention leaves

open the question of the true extent of the independence granted under New

Labour.

Once more it is necessary to try and gauge the difference between

theoretical capacity and practical politics within the British political system.

Although the conventions of ministerial responsibility to parliament and

parliamentary sovereignty prevent ministers abdicating complete responsi-

bility for functions and preclude governments from binding their successor,

in reality it is possible to suggest that it would be extremely difficult for anygovernment to seek to either override the Monetary Policy Committee or

repeal the legislation on which the BoEs independence rests. So while

reserve powers exist: their practical utility is heavily constrained. This

supports the contention that the Bank of England Act, and indeed the acts

84 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


26/34

on which devolution to Scotland and Wales are founded, may have a quasi-

constitutional force (see below).

The index score of central bank independence for Britain since the Bank

of England Act 1998 has increased from Lijpharts figure of 0.31 to 0.59(using the mean of the CWN and GMT indexes) therefore reflecting a

significant increase in independence. This reflects the fact that the Monetary

Policy Committee of the BoE does not require government approval in

making decisions, the BoEs statutory requirement to pursue monetary

stability, legal provisions which strengthen the position of the BoE vis-a` -vis

the government and the transfer of responsibility for banking supervision to

F I G U RE 2

T W O D I M E N S I ON AL C ON C E P T U AL M AP OF D E M OC RAC Y I N B RI T AI N

1 9 4 5 7 1 , 1 9 7 1 9 6 , 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 5 .

Notes: Figure 2 approximates Lijpharts two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy (1999: 255) with

updated data for the UK from 1997 to 2005. However, this point is only an approximation as data for the

UK has been updated, but data for all other countries used to calculate the precise point on the graph were

not available. Therefore, while the data for calculating the point 19972005 on Figure 2 uses UK data fromthis time period, it is in comparison with data from other countries using data between 197196. Following

Lijphart, the five variables on each of the clusters were standardised, so as to have a mean of 0 and a standard

deviation of 1. The signs were adjusted so that high values on each variable represented majoritarianism, thus

reversing the signs for the effective number of parties and all five variables in the federal-unitary dimension.

After averaging these standardised variables, the averages were then standardised so that each unit on the

two axes represents one standard deviation (Lijphart 1999: 247).


Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


27/34

a new Financial Services Authority in June 1998. This final revised variable

score facilitates the revision of Lijpharts conceptual map of democracy to

be re-drawn to include the period 19972005 (see Figure 2).

Lijpharts framework for understanding political systems offers avaluable tool for understanding how British democracy has been altered

by the constitutional reforms enacted by the Labour government since 1

May 1997. In addition to allowing scholars to gauge the actual extent of

change it also provides an overview of the changing constitutional terrain

and differences in emphasis between certain dimensions of change as

opposed to others. Figure 2 suggests that British democracy has changed

under New Labour but that this change has been one-sided. There has been

a clear shift along the federalunity dimension, reflecting devolution and an

increase in central bank independence. However there has not been anequivalent shift on the executiveparties dimension. On the contrary, the

change on this dimension suggests an increase or greater concentration in

executive power since 1997.

This conceptual diagram usefully illuminates and aids our understanding

of what observers, such as Marquand (1999b; 2000) and Mair (2000), have

described as the Blair paradox how can a government who has set in train

a great number of major constitutional reforms that involve the devolution

or transference of some degree of political power be seen, at the same time,

as having a strong centralising and controlling approach to governing whichconflicts with the centrifugal thrust of many constitutional reforms? The

next section seeks to explain this paradox and explore some of its

implications for the future of British democracy.

Explanations and Implications

After reviewing New Labours progress throughout the governments first

term and the early stages of its second term Beetham (2002: 401) and his

colleagues conclude, ministers are determined to hold onto all their

traditional powers at the centre and to reject, delay or frustrate

constitutional changes that would check or make transparent their exercise

of those powers. Indeed, it is clear from the analysis of Lijpharts variables

above that New Labour has taken great care to implement its constitutional

reforms, however precariously, within the traditional majoritarian structure

of British government. Consequently, Norton (quoted in Morrison 2001:

50910) astutely observes, they [New Labour] have taken the Westminster

model, the traditional constitution, and modified it, some would say

vandalized, and not actually replaced it with a new form of constitution. To

paraphrase the work of Mair (quoted above), there has been no full-bloodedconstitutional revolution and although New Labour may well be dragging

the political system away from an extreme version of majoritarian

democracy it is clearly not hauling it towards a more consensual model.

Crucially, there has been no discernible conception of an alternative

86 Matthew Flinders

Downl

oad

ed

By:

[

EBSCOHost

EJS

Content

Di

strib

uti

on

-

Current]

At:20

:5524

Novemb

er2010


28/34

constitution. New Labours constitutional reform project cannot be

interpreted as a fundamental paradigm shift.

There is, and has been for some time, a contradiction at the core of the

New Labour project. A contradiction focused on a principled commitment toa more consensual model of democracy but a practical awareness of benefits

offered to a governing party of majoritarianism, in terms of the capacity to

drive through change, control the political agenda and implement manifesto

commitments. In this respect there is little new about New Labour.

Moreover, as Flinders (2004: 138) has demonstrated at length, constitutional

reform has never been located clearly within the wider third way project

there seems to be very little constitutional cement in terms of a uniting

ideological or theoretical framework or statement. New Labour ministers

have often stated that there is no intention to begin from first principles(Lords Hansard, 21 June 2001). This fact may, in itself, suggest explanations

for both the governments commitment to a majoritarian system of

government while espousing a desire to move towards a more consensual

system; and the apparent inability to understand the impact of specific

reforms on the constitutional infrastructure as a whole.

Although the third way has complex theoretical roots it is clear,

paradoxically, that a central aspect of the concept and hence New Labours

governing strategy is focused on results rather than political philosophy. As

Finlayson (1999: 271) notes, Policy is legitimated not by ethical principlesbut by the truth of certain social

journal article understanding governance

Documents