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Jordan in the Eye of the StormContinued U.S. Support Necessary with Ongoing Regional Turmoil

By Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Mokhtar Awad June 2014

Jordan in the Eye of the StormContinued U.S. Support Necessary with Ongoing Regional Turmoil

By Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Mokhtar Awad June 2014

1 Introduction and summary

5 Jordan’s response to regional changes and internal challenges since 2011

9 Jordan’s response to Islamist movements

20 Recommendations for U.S. policy in Jordan

25 Conclusion

28 Endnotes

Contents

1 Center for American Progress | Jordan in the Eye of the Storm

Introduction and summary

Jordan sits at the heart of a region facing increasing turmoil. To the north, the civil war in Syria rages on unabated; so far, it has sent more than 600,000 Syrians into Jordan.1 The war in Syria has motivated Islamist extremists—some of whom are receiving financial, ideological, and political support from certain countries and pri-vate individuals in the Persian Gulf—to use Jordanian territory to recruit and send militants into battle against the Assad regime.

To the east, Iraq’s unresolved conflict is becoming increasingly intertwined with the Syrian civil war, adding to Jordan’s immediate security woes. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict—as well as the collapse of the latest round of peace talks—has contributed to a sense of uncertainty regarding Jordan’s long-term future. These unfavorable regional dynamics are straining Jordan’s already fragile economic, social, and political conditions.

In the face of these considerable challenges, Jordan’s government remains resil-ient and adaptable but heavily dependent on outside support to survive. Despite repeated predictions of collapse, Jordan’s monarchy has avoided the chaos experi-enced in Syria and Iraq, and it has deftly coped with the political currents emanat-ing from the 2011 uprisings that spread across the region. Jordan’s monarchy has stuck to its playbook of managing limited change from above. It has made only slight moves and gestures toward political and economic reform, while keeping close tabs on challenges to its political legitimacy and working aggressively to contain internal security threats generated by the regional turmoil.

Jordan remains one of the United States’ closest, most reliable, and most trusted partners in the Middle East, and the country requires help to address the spillover effects of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The support needed most urgently is continued security cooperation, including intelligence sharing, surveillance, and military equipment to help Jordan manage serious security threats. In addition, continued and increased humanitarian aid for refugees is essential. The United States should work with partners in the region and Europe to help Jordan deal with growing energy and water crises that are exacerbated by the high numbers of


refugees. Finally, the United States needs to continue to urge Jordan’s government to implement a pragmatic program for long-term political and economic reform. Such a reform program is essential to help Jordan manage the demographic, social, and economic pressures that threaten to undermine its long-term stability.

Similar to other governments in the region, Jordan faces political and security challenges emanating from a range of Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Unlike in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, however, the Muslim Brotherhood is not banned in Jordan, and the monarchy has worked to include the Muslim Brotherhood in political life. The regime has also worked to co-opt Islamist forces and neutralize their threat to Jordan’s power structure.

Jordan has a number of Salafi and jihadi movements that have been galvanized by conflicts in the region. Many have channeled their energy and resources toward the civil war in Syria. But their enduring presence poses several questions regard-ing Jordan’s long-term stability, as well as about the long-standing ideological crosscurrents now affecting Jordan and the Middle East as a whole.

This report is based on a series of interviews conducted in Jordan in March. The Center for American Progress talked to a wide range of leaders within the govern-ment and actors involved in political movements and civil society, including those in Islamist movements. This study is part of a four-country research project conducted by CAP in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Syria—four countries experiencing diverse security, political, and economic dynamics. One specific objective of this research project is to examine how different countries are responding to the Arab uprisings that began in 2011, as well as the growth and evolution of political Islamist groups—including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists—over the past three years.

Key findings of this research in Jordan include:

• The current Jordanian system will endure, but pressure from external threats

is mounting and putting a strain on the fragile body politic. Syrian refugees’ presence is further exacerbating domestic demands for political and economic reforms. Syria’s descent into chaos may discourage Jordanians from revolution, but it does not seem to be stemming the tide of discontent among Jordanians about the current economic and political system. Syrians in Jordan now amount to nearly 10 percent of the country’s population, which could further destabilize the demographic makeup of a country carefully balanced between the ruling minority of native-Jordanian East Bankers and majority Palestinian-origin West Bankers.


• The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is recalibrating its strategy with an eye

toward building coalitions in the face of a regional tide against Islamists. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, or JMB, is now seeking to build alliances with Jordan’s tribes and other segments of society in order to quietly foment dissent against the monarchy and pressure it to implement reforms. While the JMB remains perhaps the largest force in the country’s political opposition, it does not currently pose a threat to Jordan’s traditional power structure.

• Jordan’s Salafi landscape is slowly evolving, but Salafi jihadists are emerging

as the most imminent strategic and security threat to the current system of

government. Syria’s civil war has served as a lifeline to Jordan’s Salafists. They benefit from an injection of cash from certain sources in Persian Gulf countries and the freedom to undertake the kind of charity work that Salafists have used in other countries to grow their support base. The Salafi jihadists’ active fighting role in Syria has catapulted them to prominence. Their cadres, which have now been inspired by nearby revolution and jihad, will ultimately set their sights on the Jordanian regime.

Recommendations for U.S. policy include:

• Continued support for Jordan in response to the Syria conflict. The United States already provides significant assistance to Jordan, but Jordan will require additional support to meet the needs of the more than 600,000 Syrian refugees already in the country. To this end, the United States should leverage its substan-tial humanitarian assistance portfolio to motivate the Persian Gulf countries to use more of their considerable oil wealth to help the Syrian refuges living throughout Jordan. The United States should also make available high-end intelligence and surveillance capabilities to help the Jordanian military better manage its border.

• Increased intelligence cooperation on the evolving nature of Islamist ideolo-

gies to counter violent extremism. The United States and Jordan should work together to formulate an analytical effort that tracks the evolution of ideology among various Islamist groups, particularly in light of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The United States should also enhance ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism in Jordan through support for at-risk youth, messaging that counters extremist narratives, and building Jordan’s capacity to undertake these efforts. The proposed $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund announced by President Barack Obama in May could be particularly beneficial in helping Jordan deal with the problems of extremism.2


• Support for inclusive political and economic reform. The United States should continue to urge Jordan’s government to implement a realistic but serious pro-gram of political and economic reform. This program should include continued efforts to develop political parties, increase press freedom, and finalize electoral law reform. The United States should work with Jordan and other donors to encourage investment in projects that deal with strains on Jordan’s infrastructure and help create jobs. It should also renew a five-year aid package that is due to expire later this year. However, the United States should add incentives to ensure that additional assistance serves as a bridge to long-term economic reforms that create jobs rather than fostering continued dependency.

In recent years, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has withstood repeated shocks to its system. Massive refugee flows, strain on the economy, and new forms of Islamist extremism have threatened Jordan’s stability. Through it all, Jordan has persevered, and U.S. military, humanitarian, and economic assistance have been key ingredients of its success. Going forward, however, Jordan will need to under-take meaningful reforms. Only through more inclusive politics and an economy weaned of aid dependence can Jordan put itself on a stable and sustainable path over the long term.


Jordan’s response to regional changes and internal challenges since 2011

Jordan has weathered regional pressures for decades, including the millions of Palestinian refugees from successive Arab-Israeli wars and the Iraqi refugees who have arrived over the past decade. But the country faces new and unique pres-sures from the civil war in Syria, with more than 600,000 Syrian refugees straining Jordan’s fragile infrastructure, economy, and political system. When the wave of popular protests swept across much of the Middle East in 2011, new questions arose about the viability of Jordan’s political and economic system.

Similar to most other countries in the region, Jordan witnessed street protests. But its movements were muted in comparison to what transpired in Egypt and Tunisia. The government used the same playbook it has used in the past: It announced a modest, incremental pathway for political and economic reforms and slow-rolled their implementation.3 The security services worked aggressively to prevent any possible security threats. Unlike in Egypt and Yemen, they played this role quietly and remained loyal to the regime.

The following factors have shaped Jordan’s response to the underlying pressures that have driven the Arab uprisings.

Unity among the ruling elites

The unity among Jordan’s ruling elites is perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the country’s continued security and the limited changes it has experienced in the more than three years since the start of the Arab uprisings. As one minister in Jordan’s current government explained, “It is a stable regime in Jordan—the important things are under the regime, and it has things under control. The opposition can come and go, but the regime stays the same. There is a strong authority—the military and the intelligence, and the prime minister is monitored by the king.”4 There was no split between the ruling authorities and the leaders of the internal security services, unlike in other countries in the region. “What makes us different is that we have a military and intelligence that stays in the background—we have professionals here,” the minister added.5


Negative perceptions of Arab uprisings

A second factor that took the wind out of the sails of major political and economic reform in Jordan was the turmoil and uncertainty witnessed in other countries. This was especially true for conservative East Bank Jordanians, many of whom argued against major political reforms. These reforms, they claimed, could open the door to the destructive turbulence that has characterized some of the Arab uprisings.6 These arguments gained credence as Syria descended into civil war and the political transition in Egypt experienced many problems. Reform slowed in Jordan, explained one former government minister:

Because of the impact of what happened in the region. The Muslim Brotherhood lost their support. … People said maybe these people are not the model for change, maybe they are not the success story they were claiming to be. So what happened in Egypt played a role. Syria played a role because people said we should not rock the boat so we don’t end up like that.7

This view—that Jordan does not want to take the reform risks that other coun-tries have—is broadly shared. Some opposition voices argue that the Jordanian government has cynically used this as an argument to delay even modest reforms. One activist from an Islamist movement maintained, “The regime exploited the waterfall of blood in Syria and the refugees. Either accept the status quo here in Jordan or we will end up like Syria, the regime said.”8

Lack of coherent political opposition

A third factor that explains the limited changes inside Jordan since 2011 is the lack of an organized opposition that presents a compelling alternative to the current governing system. The political opposition’s weakness is partly due to the lack of a long-term vision that challenges the current order. Some Jordanians find faults in the current system, but few have been able to articulate a substitute that a meaningful number of Jordanians find persuasive. A current government min-ister explained the failure of popular protests to produce any major shifts. “The problem is just like in Egypt—the non-Islamists had 130 different heads, a lot of them were just kids propelled by emotions,” the government minister said. “When they grew up, American consumerism was what drove them—they did not know political life.”9


Political party life in Jordan is nearly nonexistent and lacks deep roots in Jordanian society. The government allowed the founding of political parties in 1992 follow-ing a 36-year ban, and there are nearly 30 registered political parties today.10 Here, the most important divide is between conservative stalwarts who support the traditional order in Jordan and a group of more than two dozen reform-minded independent parliamentarians in a coalition called “Initiative” who demand politi-cal reform.11 But none of these parties have broad grassroots support, and many of them serve as little more than patronage networks. Jordan’s King Abdullah II has publicly outlined the need for Jordanians to create political parties based on ideas representing a broad ideological spectrum.12

Jordan’s lack of a vibrant political debate is related in part to a strong focus on economic problems and the basic needs of ordinary people—a vicious cycle in the country’s political economy. For years, Jordanian political forces have not presented strong alternatives for governing the country and growing the economy. As a consequence, people have grown increasingly cynical about the possibility that political forces can change their lives. One former member of parliament from the Islamic Action Front—the political wing of the JMB—explained that most ordinary people today are disengaged from formal politics, saying, “People do not want to work with us. They don’t want politics. People want to eat and the economic situation is terrible.”13

Endemic economic challenges

The economic problems that Jordan faces are exacerbated by spillover effects from Syria’s civil war, which place further strains on the country. Many Jordanian voices do not see long-term sustainability for the current economy. The country has high levels of debt and dependency on foreign aid, and it has not mapped out a strategy to create jobs for its next generation. “There is high debt, and this is due to failed policies. Jordan did not take advantage of its resources and instead became dependent on foreign aid,” said one Islamist opposition activist.14 A wide range of interlocutors also pointed to economic mismanagement—connected with poor governance and insufficient attention to the problem of corruption—as a long-standing challenge in Jordan.15

Current government officials and opposition figures both believe economic chal-lenges will remain central to Jordan’s debate as it moves forward. As one leading Salafi voice argued, “Jordanian citizens are living in poor economic conditions, and they are tired of protests and empty slogans. So they are looking for alternatives and


to pressure government in order to bring about positive change.”16 Figures serv-ing in the current government acknowledge that the economy is a very political issue—indeed, that the two are deeply intertwined. A current minister said, “Some people say that whomever takes economic decisions—this is a political issue. Economic reforms mean tough decisions that affect people’s lives. … For people to trust these economic reforms, they need a politician they can trust.”17

Moving forward, many Jordanians express the view that unless Jordan keeps all of its key societal and political factions intact, it runs the risk of experiencing the neg-ative consequences seen in other countries. “I think we cannot transition without every faction feeling that it is a partner. … In Jordan, we came up with this initia-tive to save Jordan from the fate of other Arab countries,” said one Islamist opposi-tion leader.18 One of the key elements of Jordanian society is the Islamists—and Jordan has carved out its own path to deal with its various Islamist voices.


Jordan’s response to Islamist movements

Islamists have figured prominently in many of the Arab countries gripped by upris-ings since 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its Tunisian equivalent, Ennahda, rose—and fell—from power in the turmoil of the past three years. In both countries, Salafi movements have played a role in the narrative arc of transition, at times as a partner to the Brotherhood and at other times as a competitor. In Syria, Salafi jihadists have emerged as some of the most potent fighters on the battlefield. The struggle over political Islam has turned bitter in the Persian Gulf, souring regional relations between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

In Jordan, political Islamist movements have figured prominently at crucial junc-tures in the kingdom’s political history. But their actions have remained largely within monarchy-sanctioned boundaries. This is no accident of history—the regime has worked hard for years to co-opt Islamist forces. While the road has not always been smooth, the Hashemite monarchy has largely managed to neutralize the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the Jordanian power structure. Unlike Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, Jordan does not feel the need to ban the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, it has at times worked to incorporate the Muslim Brotherhood into political life. By any measure, Jordan’s Salafi communities are not the largest nor the most organized in the region, but the more radical elements have been galvanized and strengthened by the wars in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, the Syrian theater has become the epicenter for Jordan’s jihadists. As these elements’ capability and organization grow, they could pose a more direct challenge to Jordan’s stability.

Jordan’s long-standing strategy of co-opting the Muslim Brotherhood endures

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps the largest and most organized force in the country’s political opposition. As such, it was—in theory—well posi-tioned to ride the initial wave of protests that broke out in 201l. When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt’s 2012 parliamentary and presidential elec-tions, some predicted a windfall for their Jordanian counterparts. But the JMB was


not able to capitalize on these events in either case. Much of this failure can be attrib-uted to the fundamental dynamics described above, which helped inoculate Jordan against the uprisings that swept the Arab world. However, an important part of the answer lies in the unique history of and relationship between the monarchy and the JMB, as well as the latter’s internal divisions and vulnerability to events in the region.

Looking at the JMB as Jordan’s most organized opposition force reflects the broader dynamics that have shaped the country’s politics and the monarchy’s approach to political competitors. The most visible competition can be seen in the strained relationship between the elite from the East Bank and those from the West Bank, who originated from Palestine.

‘A special relationship’

For decades, the JMB has cultivated a “special relationship”19 with the Jordanian monarchy. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere in the region, the JMB has maintained close ties to the monarchy since its registration as a charity orga-nization in 1946.20 The JMB has played a major but episodic role in bolstering the monarchy’s legitimacy. When Jordan battled Palestinian leftists in the early 1970s—in what later came to be known as Black September—the JMB remained on the sidelines, electing not to back the Palestinian fighters. For this, the govern-ment handsomely rewarded the group, and its charity and educational infrastruc-ture flourished.21 The Islamic Center Charity Society, or ICCS—the backbone of this infrastructure and the JMB’s patronage system—eventually acquired more than $1.5 billion in assets by the mid-2000s.22

The mood soured in the 1990s, however, when the JMB rejected Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel and the Jordanian monarchy supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq.23 The government moved to contain the Muslim Brotherhood, replacing the board of the ICCS.24 Two decades later, the JMB struck a defiant stance once again, emboldened by the Arab uprisings and their brethren’s rise to power in Cairo.25

Despite this uneven historical relationship with the JMB, the monarchy has resisted pressures from the Persian Gulf and elsewhere to ban the Muslim Brotherhood. The special relationship remains intact—a fact the Jordanian authorities are quick to assert. As one government minister explained, “The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has always been a partner. It is the Jordanian


approach. … We accommodated them—we did not give them a drop of fuel to burn us with. They thought they had won, but they were wrong.”26 Another figure close to King Abdullah II observed:

You cannot compare the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia with Jordan. In Egypt and Tunisia, they have been working underground and are not part of the political fabric. They have been imprisoned and banned. In Jordan, it is completely different. They have been a part of the system and society.27

The struggle to remain relevant

For its part, the JMB finds itself captured by this relationship with the state. The JMB struggles to remain relevant, as its political wing—the Islamic Action Front, or IAF—has boycotted general and municipal elections since 2007. The move-ment has done so to protest electoral laws, which it claims were designed to limit its electoral representation, but the boycott has failed to pressure the government to amend these laws. The JMB now seeks to build alliances outside parliament and to quietly and carefully encourage dissent. At the same time, it is careful not to challenge the monarchy’s legitimacy directly. Turning away from the legislature, the group, according to one JMB leader, has elected to “work through the people” and “work with Jordanian society.”28

As part of this strategy, the JMB aims to forge common ground with some conser-vative East Bankers and tribes on sensitive issues. As an IAF Shura Council mem-ber explained, “Today we agree with tribes and other sectors that want the same goals.”29 This leader elaborated, saying, “The Islamic movement is no longer alone; we have several partners that agree on political issues. We replaced the type of partners we work with. We used to ally with political parties, but now our partners are big tribes and other figures, we have movement in the Bedouin areas. They are the biggest opportunity [for us].”30

This approach leaves the JMB with modest political impact. Its core demands remain reforms that would allow it to legislate with a degree of freedom if it were to return to parliament. It is calling for changes in the electoral law, rallying around populist causes related to the economy, and protesting cuts in subsidies and ris-ing government debt. A leader in the IAF’s Shura Council explained, “The JMB is not in opposition to the regime, but rather to some of its policies. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood is not in constant opposition. … This is different from political parties who oppose for the sake of opposition.”31


Internal divisions and dissent

Disagreements and divisions within the JMB’s ranks—over strategy, leadership, and vision—have further weakened its position. A group of mostly East Bank Muslim Brotherhood members and other Islamists formally broke off to found the Islamic al-Wasat Party in 2001.32 In 2012, mostly East Bank Muslim Brotherhood members founded the Zamzam Initiative to encourage political participation and emphasize the JMB’s Jordanian character.

The dominance of East Bankers in these splinters and disagreements is signifi-cant. The JMB has long struggled to identify itself as a national actor. But the predominance of Jordanians of Palestinian descent and Palestinians in the JMB’s ranks has long created tensions with the country’s ruling East Bank elite, who not only fear an Islamist rise to power but also a dominant political role for the country’s majority Jordanians of Palestinian descent. The East Banker-led rumblings inside the group, as well as their Jordan-first rhetoric, raise questions about the JMB’s true Jordanian character.

The JMB has reacted defensively to the emergence of these factions. Party lead-ers often dismiss al-Wasat as agents of the regime and have threatened Zamzam Initiative members with internal trials. Indeed, they expelled the Zamzam Initiative’s three leading figures from the JMB.33 Tellingly, one Shura Council member dismissed them as “Islamist décor.”34 Some in the leadership view these divisions as part of a state conspiracy to weaken the JMB. According to a former IAF member of parliament, “There are Islamist parties that were started by the state … to be an alternative to the Brotherhood. … [The] government cannot combat religion directly, but it has to contain and manage religion in a way that fits it.”35

Leaders of the Zamzam Initiative and even al-Wasat are at pains to clarify that there are no core ideological differences between their movements and the JMB. The major difference remains the East Bank-West Bank split. One al-Wasat leader stressed that the key difference between his party and the JMB is that “[al-Wasat] is not part of the international Muslim Brotherhood … [it] is a part of our nation, the Jordanian issue is central for us.”36 To underscore the East Banker Jordanian nature of al-Wasat, he added, “I am from … a big and powerful tribe.”37 The leaders of these JMB splinter groups are also specifically at odds with the current JMB leadership. Speaking of the current JMB leadership’s failures, one Zamzam Initiative leader elaborated:


[They] have a failure in understanding reality. [They] are unrealistic. … The regime succeeded in showing that the Muslim Brotherhood is made up of Palestinians. Indeed, the East Jordanians are the most important factor for change in Jordan. … [JMB] cannot lead a wide national current. Zamzam tries to go beyond that.38

It will be difficult for the JMB to ignore these dissident voices. Al-Wasat benefited greatly from the JMB’s decision to boycott the last election, capturing a plurality of seats in the 2013 parliamentary elections. Having ceded its political position in the legislature to al-Wasat, the traditional JMB leadership now finds itself pitted against the Zamzam Initiative in a competition to reach out to Jordan’s powerful East Bank and tribal constituencies. The JMB may find itself at a disadvantage in this contest as it struggles against popular perceptions that the JMB represents Palestinians—and that they do so at Jordan’s expense.

Trouble in the neighborhood

The JMB has been affected by the rise and fall of Islamist movements in the region. The Middle East is in the midst of an intense struggle for power and influence among many countries. Richer, more internally cohesive countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are contending for influence among less wealthy and internally divided countries, such as Jordan and Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood’s status remains a main point of contention between countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have effectively declared war on the group through support for the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood member and former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and through Saudi Arabia’s classification of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.39

The JMB leadership sees itself as a victim of this perceived regional war against the Muslim Brotherhood. As one JMB leader put it, “They want to end the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, since [Egyptian] King Farouk [(1936–1952)] they have been trying. So where are those who fought the Muslim Brotherhood, and where is the Muslim Brotherhood now?”40 In this regional war, Saudi Arabia is viewed as the primary antagonist. A JMB leader explained, “The Saudis are trying to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood because the Muslim Brotherhood wants liberation [of Palestine], jihad [against Israel], and unity. They also want to be the sole representatives of Islam.”41


The July 2013 coup that ousted former Egyptian President Morsi has put addi-tional pressure on the JMB. One Islamist activist argued, “After the coup, it was apparent that Jordan was one of the countries that had previous knowledge of the coup and played a role in preparing for the coup. … This created a split between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.”42 The activist went on to explain that relations between the regime and the JMB have been heavily influenced by these regional trends, but both camps have chosen not to escalate the issue. A close observer of Islamist movements noted that the blow to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood paralyzed the JMB. “The Muslim Brotherhood do not have a plan or a vision. … They do not know how to deal with the crisis in Egypt.”43

Some in the JMB are holding out hope that regional dynamics could still tilt in their favor. A JMB leader remarked, “When it comes to the situation in Jordan today … what if the coup fails in Egypt? What if the Muslim Brotherhood return to rule in Egypt? What if revolution in Syria succeeds? So should Jordanians just look at the current stage or what is to come?”44 Taking a longer-term view, this Islamist leader framed the recent events in Egypt as a temporary setback, arguing, “These were coups against Islamist movements and some say Islamism is retreat-ing. This is just temporary. For a revolution to reach its goals, it needs a few years. The street in Egypt is still active.”45

Many JMB leaders claim that Saudi Arabia’s campaign to contain the Muslim Brotherhood and the coup in Egypt will strengthen Salafi jihadists and other strands of Islamic extremism. One JMB leader warned, “Islam will remain. It is either moderate or extremist. If you weaken the person that represents modera-tion, then there will be extremism.”46 A similar sentiment was echoed by another JMB leader who said, “The U.S. led a war against terror without defining what ter-rorism is. … Who has an interest in mixing Al Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood? ... This will lead to more extremism in the future.”47

Mounting challenges posed by Jordan’s Salafists

Salafists are increasingly prominent in the Jordanian political and religious land-scape. The civil war in Syria is a major driver of the resurgence of Salafi ideology in Jordan, serving as a rallying cry and recruitment tool for Salafists of all stripes. Salafists in Jordan range from nonviolent apolitical quietists who pledge loyalty to the monarchy to some of the world’s most determined and violent jihadists. These communities have enjoyed substantial growth in Jordan since the 1970s due in


large part to the connections that Jordanians have made while studying and work-ing in Persian Gulf countries.48 Violent Salafi jihadists in particular pose a strategic risk to Jordan’s political and security future as the movement not only readily adopts violence, but also cannot be neutralized by incorporation into a political system that it rejects and deems apostate.

Conservative Salafism

There are three notable currents present in Jordan’s Salafi landscape. The first is a quietist conservative current carried on by the followers of notable 20th century scholar Nasiruddin al-Albani, an Albanian national who resettled in Jordan in 1979 and died there two decades later.49 Al-Albani’s brand of Salafism rejects “political partisanship and political parties” and affirms the authority of Jordan’s monar-chy.50 Followers of this conservative current reserve their harshest repudiations for Salafi jihadists, who they reject as “takfiri”—fellow Muslims who are denounced as apostates —and condemn as modern-day “khawrej”—those who went against the Caliph Ali and are condemned by Muslims as deviants.51 These Salafists do not pose a direct challenge to the monarchy, and the authorities largely leave them alone. They have undermined other Islamist currents by declaring their political aspirations to be corrupt, including those of the JMB.

Reformist Salafism

The second current is the so-called reformist Salafism, which has more defined political aspirations and a focus on changing society and laws to abide by Islamic Sharia. The group emphasizes charity work and is currently enjoying a period of revival, largely due to the crisis in Syria. The movement, which is the driving force behind Jordan’s al-Kitab wal-Sunnah Association charity, has been flooded with millions of dollars—mostly from the Persian Gulf—in recent years to reinvigorate its educational and charity infrastructure.52 It now operates eight field offices that reach tens of thousands of families in need.53 Al-Kitab wal-Sunnah was founded in 1993 by a group of Salafists who came to reject conservative Salafism over its fail-ure to condemn American intervention in the first Gulf War.54 Al-Kitab wal-Sun-nah included many Salafi jihadists early on, but relations soured between the two after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the jihadists were expelled from the group.55


The reformist Salafists’ emphasis on charity work is often mistaken for political quietism. As one reformist Salafi leader clarified:

We care about all things, including politics. When we say we do not work in politics, this does not mean leaving politics alone. When the right environment comes, we will participate if we see there is a benefit in doing so. The security clampdown prohibits us.56

Salafi reformists disagree with conservative Salafists over the latter’s loyalty to Jordan’s king. One leader of al-Kitab wal-Sunnah explained, “The state likes this kind [conservative Salafists], because they have no political agenda or reform role nor do they look at what is going on in the street … and so they have the freedom to do what they want.”57 He further explained that the relationship between the two currents is tense and unlikely to be repaired. “Their way has allowed for cor-ruption. They live in ivory towers.”58

Reformist Salafists consider their movement to be an alternative to the JMB. A reformist Salafi sheik observed, “People no longer trust the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood dragged people into mazes and … disappointed peo-ple. So people look for alternatives—something that can balance regional issues with local issues and a balanced approach to reforms. Then people will flock to us.” However, the sheik noted that the movement is still taking shape and that it has in fact begun to quietly consider organizing politically, saying, “Salafists do not yet have a clear program. … If Salafists take care of their message, then thou-sands will flock to them.”59

Salafi jihadists

The third current is a violent strand of Salafi jihadism. For years, Jordan has served as the world’s “reservoir” of jihadi ideology.60 Some of the most promi-nent ideologues hail from Jordan, most notably Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who has been described as “the most influential living Jihadi Theorist.”61 The jihadists are a minority among Jordan’s Salafi community. The Palestinian character of their early leadership hampered their ability to recruit from a wider segment of Jordanians.62 Indeed, rallying around the “Palestinian effect” has long been a “primarily motivational mechanism” for jihadists.63 To expand their influence, leaders of Jordan’s jihadi movement started trying to recruit more East Bankers at the turn of the 21st century.64


This effort has been successful. Among the most notable leaders of the Jordanian Salafi jihadi movement today is Mohamed al-Shalabi, widely known as Abu Sayyaf. Abu Sayyaf and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—who was the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq until his death in 2006—were recruited in part because of their East Bank tribal origins.65 Today, Abu Sayyaf boasts of recruiting thousands of Jordanian youth from East Bank communities and the tribes of his hometown, Ma’an. These Salafi jihadists, drawn from the most traditional quarters of Jordanian society, not only oppose the monarchy but also consider it to be an apostate enemy.

Unlike their reformist counterparts, the Salafi jihadists in Jordan lack formal orga-nization and a robust network of charity and patronage. Instead, the jihadi current has been riding on a wave of popularity fueled by the conflicts in neighboring Iraq and Syria. Abu Sayyaf explained that the “social presence” of Salafists is in good shape after “people saw how we helped the oppressed [Syrians].”66 The physical sacrifices of the Jordanian Salafi jihadists allow them to accrue popular sympathy without having to actually help people.

Some inside the movement have also recognized the mistakes of what they describe as “the Iraqi experience”67 that saw Jordanian al-Zarqawi instigate a brutal sectarian war and alienate many Muslims. They express concerns that something similar is underway in Syria. The jihadi message has different leaders for different consumers and is well spread across Jordan. On one end, men such as Abu Sayyaf can attract tribal youth and engage in simple, populist rhetoric to encourage them to fight. On the other end, men such as Dr. Eyad al-Qunaibi win support from the educated class. Al-Qunaibi is a soft-spoken, U.S.-educated intellectual who is well versed in English and has more than 100,000 followers on Twitter.68 He was cited as a “marja”—an inspiring religious reference69—by Dr. Sami al-Uraydi, the senior cleric of al-Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. 70 Al-Uraydi is also a Jordanian.

For Salafi jihadi leaders such as Abu Sayyaf, the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan underscores the futility of political participation as a means to achieve their goal to establish Islamic law. Abu Sayyaf opined:

The [JMB] didn’t get close to the red lines like the head of the state. When we would sit down and talk with them, we would ask how are you different from the others? They would say, ‘We have a policy of gradualism, our goal is the head of the regime, but we have to start from the base and work up.’ But in reality nothing changed.71


The Jordanian government has initiated programs in the past to “contain jihadist ideology,” but its efforts will likely be overshadowed by current regional dynamics that allow the funneling of funds from the Persian Gulf through Jordan to extrem-ist groups in Syria such as al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL.72 Jordanian security officials say that these Salafi jihadi groups are “monitored”73 and merely number in the few hundreds. However, as the conflict drags on in Syria—and as recruiters such as Abu Sayyaf continue to funnel young men across the border—the grip that Jordan’s security services claim to have is coming increasingly under question, and some worry about the impact that those who return from Syria’s civil war may have on Jordan’s stability.

Potential long-term challenge from Salafists to Jordan

For now, Jordan’s Salafi jihadists are focused on other conflicts. This preoccupa-tion elsewhere, as well as their rejection of politics, may give the deceptive impres-sion that jihadists are not concerned with Jordan. This may, in part, be due to the relative tolerance and degree of freedom the Jordanian government affords jihadi ideology and fighters focused abroad.74 However, as a current Jordanian govern-ment minister acknowledged, “The Salafi forces are not visible on the political scene. It is working on the ground because of poverty there. It is a major dormant force in Jordan—the danger is that it is not visible, like a political iceberg.”75

Salafi jihadists make no effort to hide that if and when they secure victories in Iraq and Syria, they will turn their attention to Jordan. This fact makes the jihadi community a credible future threat to Jordanian stability as hundreds of embold-ened Jordanian fighters return home from the Syrian battlefield. Thus far, they have enjoyed a wide degree of freedom and movement: The black banners of Al Qaeda fly freely in some cities, especially in tribal Ma’an, and security forces seem incapable of—or unwilling to—confront the increased public profile of the Salafi jihadists. Abu Sayyaf said:

Today, we consider that our most important duty [repeated twice] is to remove these regimes. I talked many times before that the regime that rules in Jordan is an apostate [regime] that we must remove. But this is tied with ability and capability. When we become capable, this regime will not be left alone. … They [intelligence services] would interrogate us and we would tell them this. They know what we think.76


Although attention must be paid to Jordanian fighters returning from Syria, the ambitions of Salafi jihadists in Syria remain a concern.

For Abu Sayyaf, the next step would be to establish an Islamic state in Syria that would serve as a new base for Islamists.77 They could then use this base as a foun-dation to focus their attention on Jordan and their highest enemy, Israel.78 Abu Sayyaf warned, “If the youth take over Syria they will not leave Palestine for it is the highest goal and the Holy Land.”79


Recommendations for U.S. policy in Jordan

Jordan remains one of America’s closest and most reliable—indeed, most trusted—partners in the Middle East at a time of great regional uncertainty and change. Top officials in Jordan’s government recognize the high level of support and coordination that the United States provides. As one official in the royal pal-ace acknowledged, “We are very comforted by U.S. support—Washington under-stands 100 percent the impact the crises have had on Jordan.”80 Jordan enjoys broad support in the executive branch and strong bipartisan support in Congress, and the Obama administration has worked with Jordan to meet the range of the challenges it faces as a result of regional and internal pressures.

Moving forward, U.S. policy needs to focus on three areas: the immediate security threats posed by the crisis in Syria, the longer-term challenges posed by Islamist forces operating inside Jordan, and the longer-term opportunities for Jordan’s political and economic reform. The United States has done a good job on the first of these focus areas, but the constantly shifting situation inside Syria requires an ability to adjust to new factors. The two other focus areas are very much inter-linked, and the United States needs to work with a wider range of Jordanian lead-ers to help the country stand on its own and adapt to changes.

Continued support to Jordan in response to the Syria conflict

Jordanian officials give U.S. policy on Syria mixed reviews. They are critical of what they see as reluctance on the part of the Obama administration to act decisively regarding the civil war in Syria. One minister serving in Jordan’s government said, “The impression in Jordan is that Americans are very hesitant. … The policy of the U.S. has to be announced clear and understandable.”81 But Jordanian officials remain reticent when it comes to deeper engagement in the form of overt assistance to the Syrian opposition from Jordanian territory. Instead, they are focusing on inoculating Jordan from the sizable spillover of the Syrian conflict. The United States already provides significant assistance to help Jordan shoulder this burden. Some of the key areas in which Jordan will require additional long-term support include:


• Leveraging additional humanitarian and infrastructure assistance. There are more than 600,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan—a number some expect to grow to between 800,000 to 1 million by the end of this year.82 Syrian refugees already constitute 10 percent of Jordan’s population.83 The opening of a new camp in Azraq—which can hold up to 130,000 additional refugees—is an important step.84 But 80 percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan live outside the camps in host communities.85 These refugees are taxing Jordan’s education and health services, as well as its electricity, transportation, and water networks. Jordan recently requested an additional $4.3 billion over the next three years to manage the spillover of the Syrian crisis.86

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Syria, having provided more than $1.7 billion in aid to date.87 Of this, the United States has provided more than $268 million to meet the immediate humanitar-ian needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan.88 The United States should leverage this assistance to motivate the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf to increase their direct humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan. More importantly, the United States should encourage Persian Gulf states to bolster budget sup-port to the Jordanian government in order to help mitigate the long-term strain the Syrian crisis has imposed on the kingdom’s infrastructure and social services.

• Increasing border control. The Jordanian military is stretched thin as it defends the wide stretch of desert along the Syrian border. A government minister out-lined the elements of the problem, saying:

The Jordanian armed forces are now doing the job of both the Jordanians and Syrians. The Syrians are not doing their job. Factions in Syria are engaged in human trafficking, weapons, and drugs smuggling , and it is draining Jordan’s budget. The biggest drain on our budget is energy spend-ing—the second is keeping Jordan secure and safe.89

To help meet Jordan meet this challenge, the United States should continue its efforts to steadily increase its assistance to the kingdom’s armed forces and security services to help ease the burden on troops deployed along the border. This assistance could include additional intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance capabilities.


Increased intelligence cooperation on the evolving nature of Islamist ideologies to counter violent extremism

For decades, the United States and Jordan have worked closely together on security and intelligence operations inside the country, across the Middle East, and even in places as far flung as Afghanistan.90 The nature of this cooperation has largely focused on defending both countries against immediate security threats and thwarting terrorist plots.

The rapidly evolving situation in Syria and its spillover effects in Jordan and other neighboring countries present another long-term challenge for the United States and Jordan. These ideologies are inspiring a new generation of youth to engage in conflicts in ways that could ultimately undermine security and political stability in the Middle East. Jihadi networks have successfully exploited the Syrian civil war, and some of the most influential opinion leaders in this movement are based in Jordan. To date, the United States and Jordan have been reactive to the emerging security threats from Islamist terrorist networks. Such reactions are necessary but insufficient to address the issue. Two steps should be taken:

• Conduct academic and intelligence analyses on the evolving nature of Islamist

political ideology. The United States and Jordan should work together to for-mulate an analytical effort that closely tracks the evolution of ideas and ideol-ogy among various Islamist groups. The two countries have done a strong job of countering terrorist plots and heading off immediate threats, and they could extend this joint effort to include long-term analysis that focuses on the evolving nature of the Islamist ideological debate—particularly in light of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

• Enhance efforts to counter violent extremism. In many countries around the world, including Jordan, the U.S. Department of State has worked with partner countries to implement programs aimed at countering violent extrem-ism as part of the United States’ strategic approach to counterterrorism. These efforts include providing alternatives for individuals who are most at-risk of being radicalized, messaging that counters violent extremist narratives, and increasing partners’ capacity to undertake these efforts. The $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund proposed by President Obama in May—if approved by Congress—should dedicate more resources to addressing the evolving nature of Islamist ideologies.


Support for inclusive political and economic reform

The United States must continue to urge Jordan’s government to implement a prag-matic and realistic—but nonetheless serious—program for political and economic reform. Such a reform program is essential to help Jordan manage the demographic, social, and economic pressures that could undermine its long-term stability.

Over the past decade, the United States has made many statements about the need for political reform in the region. But opposition forces in partner coun-tries, including Jordan, have exploited the gap between these statements and the actual policy. One leading Islamist opposition voice in Amman underscored that Washington’s actions did not keep pace with its stated commitment to democracy:

I looked a lot at the U.S. policy of democratization. This was based on a noble reading; they looked at the fact that most of those who hit the towers [on 9/11] were Saudis. And so they came to the conclusion that repressive societ-ies is where terrorism spreads. But America didn’t continue on this track. It changed in 2005 [the Muslim Brotherhood’s parliament victory in Egypt] and 2006 [with Hamas].91

The United States can help Jordan avoid the instability experienced in places such as Egypt and Syria by closing this gap and helping reform the political and eco-nomic systems, thus making it more inclusive in its governance and helping the country foster a more open economy that creates jobs. Some of the steps that the United States and Jordan can take in this area include:

• Support political party development and other political reform initiatives. Jordan’s political system lacks viable political ideologies organized into political parties. Some of the traditional political party development tools have not had a major impact, and part of the challenge is the lack of coherent political thinking regarding concrete policy proposals to improve the lives of ordinary Jordanians. Nongovernmental organizations in the United States and Jordan should con-tinue their efforts to support current members of Jordan’s parliament, as well as others not currently in politics, to develop coherent political party platforms that address the problems ordinary Jordanians are experiencing.

In addition to political party development, Jordan should loosen restrictions on press freedom and conclude the years-long debate on electoral law reform by implementing measures that would encourage the development of coherent political parties. These political parties need a wide reach based on ideas rather than on tribes or particular sectors of society.


• Work with Jordan to outline a long-term effort for economic reform that

encourages job growth. Jordan’s efforts to implement an International Monetary Fund program have taken steps to deal with macroeconomic imbal-ances, but the overall effort does not provide much room for fiscal flexibility. The United States should work with Jordan—and other countries that provide support to Jordan—to encourage investment in projects that deal with strains on Jordan’s infrastructure and help create jobs. This long-term plan means that Jordan will require continued and predictable international assistance.

To this end, the Obama administration should work to fulfill its pledge to renew the five-year aid package and the accompanying memorandum of understand-ing reached between the United States and Jordan in 2008. 92 The agreement provided for a total of $660 million in foreign assistance and is due to expire later this year.93 The new memorandum of understanding between the United States and Jordan should link conditions for assistance to economic reforms within Jordan to grow the economy and create jobs. The next phase of U.S. aid to Jordan should prioritize decreasing Jordan’s overall dependence on outside assistance and help Jordan create a path toward self-sustainability.

The private sectors of both Jordan and the United States have an important role to play in helping Jordan create a new economic model that stands on its own.


Conclusion

Jordan remains a key U.S. partner and cornerstone of stability in the Middle East. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has weathered repeated storms in recent years, from the wars in the bordering countries of Iraq and Syria to the deepen-ing regional turbulence of the Arab uprisings. These external forces have threat-ened Jordan’s stability through massive refugee flows, an increasing drain on the economy, and the rise of new, virulent strains of Islamist extremism. Through it all, Jordan has remained resilient. Unity among its ruling elites, negative perceptions of events in the region, and the lack of a coherent opposition to the monarchy have made the country resistant to change. But the cracks in the kingdom’s armor are becoming more apparent.

The United States has already done much to support Jordan, and President Obama has underscored U.S. resolve to help Jordan remain an anchor of stability. To this end, the United States should use its sizable package of humanitarian aid to leverage additional assistance from the Persian Gulf to help Jordan deal with its Syrian refugee population and the strain it is producing on Jordan’s infrastructure and economy. It should also make available high-end intelligence and surveil-lances capabilities to help the Jordanian military better manage its border.

Over the longer term, the United States and Jordan should deepen their shared analytical effort to understand the evolution of Islamist ideology and to better man-age the violent extremism likely to emerge. Perhaps most importantly, the United States should continue its support for meaningful long-term political and economic reform. Only through more inclusive politics and an economy weaned of aid dependence can Jordan build up the resilience required to manage future external shocks and the internal socioeconomic pressures the kingdom will inevitably face.

But change does not come easily to Jordan. The factors that have insulated the kingdom against the tumult gripping the region may well hinder efforts at more measured reforms. The extreme dependency on external sources of support to


manage short-term crises have often closed off pathways to the political and economic reforms necessary for Jordan to achieve long-term sustainable security. As one former government minister said, “The basic problem is what kind of Jordan do we want? There are now two answers. The King sometimes gives both answers.”94 If Jordan is to remain a bulwark of regional stability, it must give a clearer answer to this question.


About the authors

Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia. Katulis has served as a consultant to numerous U.S. government agencies, private corporations, and nongovernmental organizations on projects in more than two dozen countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, and Colombia. From 1995 to 1998, he lived and worked in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Egypt for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Hardin Lang is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on U.S. national security and multilateral affairs, Middle East policy, and the role of Islamists in the region. He comes to CAP with 18 years of experience in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and stabilization, including a 12-year career with the United Nations. Most recently, Lang was a senior fellow in the international security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mokhtar Awad is a Research Associate with the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress. His work focuses on Islamist groups, Middle Eastern politics, and U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Prior to joining CAP, he was a junior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has been published in Foreign Policy and The Washington Post.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank CAP Policy Analysts Ken Sofer and Peter Juul for their edits to this paper.


Endnotes

1 Humeyra Pamuk, “Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey exceeds 600,000: Turkish official,” Reuters, October 21, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-syria-crisis-turkey-refugees-idUSBRE99K04O20131021.

2 David Nakamura,” Obama lays out new approach to foreign policy in second term,” The Washington Post, May 28, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-wants-to-set-up-new-5-billion-counterterrorism-fund/2014/05/28/c5ee3362-e662-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html.

3 Courtney Freer and Shadi Hamid, “How Stable Is Jordan? King Abdullah’s Half-Hearted Reforms and the Challenge of the Arab Spring” (Doha, Qatar: Brookings Doha Center, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/jor-dan%20hamid%20freer/10_jordan_hamid_freer.pdf.

4 Current Jordanian government minister, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 6, 2014.

5 Ibid.

6 Jeffrey Goldberg,” The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/?single_page=true.

7 Former Jordanian government minister, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2014.

8 Islamist activist, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 8, 2014.


10 Ibtissam al-Attiyat, Musa Shteiwi, and Suleiman Sweiss, “Building Democracy in Jordan: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life, and Democratic Elec-tions” (Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/dem_jordan/upload/Jordan_country_report_English.pdf.

11 Khaled Neimat, “Senators mull joining MP-led reform initiative — Hamarneh,” The Jordan Times, December 10, 2013, available at http://jordantimes.com/senators-mull-joining-mp-led-reform-initiative----hamarneh.

12 Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring.”

13 Former Islamic Action Front member of parliament, interview with authors, Zarqa, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

14 Islamist activist, interview with authors.


16 Jordanian Salafi leader, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 11, 2014.


18 Zamzam Initiative leader, interview with authors, Am-man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

19 Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, “The ‘Islamic Solution’ in Jordan: Islamists, the State, and the Ventures of Democracy and Security” (Amman, Jordan: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq, 2013), p. 43, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10360.pdf.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Mohammad al-Fodeilat, “How Jordan’s Islamists Came to Dominate Society: An Evolution,” Al-Monitor, Sep-tember 10, 2012, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2012/09/jordan-muslim-brother-hood-islamists-salafists-sufis.html#.

23 Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “The Crossroads of Mus-lim Brothers in Jordan,” Global Research in International Affairs Center, March 4, 2010, available at http://www.gloria-center.org/2010/03/escobar-2010-03-04/.

24 Nathan J. Brown, “Jordan and Its Islamic Movement: The Limits of Inclusion?” (Washington: Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace, 2006), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_74_brown_final.pdf.

25 David Schenker, “Down and Out in Amman: The Rise and Fall of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, October 3, 2013, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139982/david-schenker/down-and-out-in-amman.


27 Royal Hashemite Court representative, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

28 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2014.

29 Former Islamic Action Front member of parliament, interview with authors.

30 Ibid.

31 Islamic Action Front Shura Council member, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

32 Asharq al-Awsat, “History of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood Part Two,” December 30, 2005, available at http://www.aawsat.net/2005/12/article55268387.

33 Taylor Luck, “Muslim Brotherhood expels three over ‘Zamzam’ initiative,” The Jordan Times, April 21, 2014, available at http://jordantimes.com/muslim-brother-hood-expels-three-over-zamzam-initiative.


35 Ibid.

36 Al-Wasat Party leader, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 11, 2014.

37 Ibid.

38 Zamzam Initiative leader, interview with authors, Am-man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/us-syria-crisis-turkey-refugees-idUSBRE99K04O20131021



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http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/jordan%20hamid%20freer/10_jordan_hamid_freer.pdf



http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/?single_page=true



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http://www.idea.int/publications/dem_jordan/upload/Jordan_country_report_English.pdf

http://jordantimes.com/senators-mull-joining-mp-led-reform-initiative----hamarneh

http://jordantimes.com/senators-mull-joining-mp-led-reform-initiative----hamarneh

http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10360.pdf

http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10360.pdf

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2012/09/jordan-muslim-brotherhood-islamists-salafists-sufis.html



http://www.gloria-center.org/2010/03/escobar-2010-03-04/

http://www.gloria-center.org/2010/03/escobar-2010-03-04/

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_74_brown_final.pdf

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_74_brown_final.pdf

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139982/david-schenker/down-and-out-in-amman



http://www.aawsat.net/2005/12/article55268387

http://jordantimes.com/muslim-brotherhood-expels-three-over-zamzam-initiative

http://jordantimes.com/muslim-brotherhood-expels-three-over-zamzam-initiative


39 Rania El Gamal “Saudi Arabia designates Muslim Broth-erhood terrorist group,” Reuters, March 7, 2014, avail-able at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-saudi-security-idUSBREA260SM20140307.

40 Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leader, interview with authors.


42 Islamist activist, interview with authors.

43 Jordanian academic, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 8, 2014.


45 Ibid.

46 Member of the Shura Council of the Islamic Action Front, interview with authors.


48 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Salafi Movement in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2) (2000): 219–240.

49 Rumman and Hanieh, “The ‘Islamic Solution’ in Jordan.”

50 Ibid., p. 19.

51 Ibid., p. 312.


53 Sarah Hasselbarth, “Islamic Charities in the Syrian Con-text in Jordan and Lebanon” (Beirut, Lebanon: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/10620.pdf.


55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors, Am-man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

61 William McCants, “Militant Ideology Atlas” (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), avail-able at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/up-loads/2012/04/Atlas-ExecutiveReport.pdf.

62 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors, Am-man, Jordan, March 10, 2014.

63 Thomas Hegghammer and Joas Wagemakers, “The Palestine Effect: The Role of Palestinians in the Trans-national Jihad Movement,” International Journal for the Study of Modern Islam 53-3-4 (2013): 281–314.

64 Jordanian political analyst, interview with authors.

65 Ibid.

66 Abu Sayyaf, interview with authors, Amman, Jordan, March 7, 2014.

67 Ibid.

68 @EYADQUNAIBI, Twitter, available at https://twitter.com/EYADQUNAIBI (last accessed June 2014).

69 Minbar Alansar, “The White Lighthouse, our creed and doctrine, an interview with Dr. Sami al-Uraydi,” October 21, 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVR1kwEmFh4.

70 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Sheik Sami al-Uraydi: Portrait of a Jordanian cleric who serves as a senior religious authority for the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch,” available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20623 (last accessed June 2014).

71 Abu Sayyaf, interview with authors.

72 Rana al-Sabbagh, “Jordan faces growing Salafist-jihadist threat,” Al-Monitor, February 4, 2014, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02/jordan-faces-salafist-jihadist-threat.html#.





77 Ibid.



80 Royal Hashemite Court representative, interview with authors.


82 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “2014 Syria Regional Response Plan: Jordan” (2014), available at http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/docs/syria-rrp6-jordan-response-plan.pdf.

83 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Rela-tions” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014).

84 Rana. F Sweis, “New Refugee Camp in Jordan Tries to Create a Community for Syrians,” The New York Times, May 30, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/middleeast/new-refugee-camp-in-jordan-absorbs-flood-from-syria.html?_r=0.

85 Ibid.

86 Elizabeth Dickinson, “To host ever more refugees, Jordan wants extra cash – no strings attached,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 2014, available at www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0528/To-host-ever-more-refugees-Jordan-wants-extra-cash-no-strings-attached.

87 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Syria,” available at http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria (last ac-cessed June 2014).

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-saudi-security-idUSBREA260SM20140307

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-saudi-security-idUSBREA260SM20140307

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https://twitter.com/EYADQUNAIBI

https://twitter.com/EYADQUNAIBI

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVR1kwEmFh4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVR1kwEmFh4

http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20623

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02/jordan-faces-salafist-jihadist-threat.html



http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/docs/syria-rrp6-jordan-response-plan.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/docs/syria-rrp6-jordan-response-plan.pdf

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/middleeast/new-refugee-camp-in-jordan-absorbs-flood-from-syria.html?_r=0



http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0528/To-host-ever-more-refugees-Jordan-wants-extra-cash-no-strings-attached



http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria


88 Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations.”


90 Tom A. Peter, “CIA killings in Afghanistan spotlight Jordan as key US intelligence partner,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0106/CIA-killings-in-Afghanistan-spotlight-Jordan-as-key-US-intelligence-partner


92 Sarah Wheaton and Mark Landler, “Obama Promises New Aid to Jordan in Refugee Crisis,” The New York Times, February 14, 2014, available at http://www.ny-times.com/2014/02/15/us/politics/syria-is-expected-to-be-main-topic-as-obama-meets-with-king-of-jordan.html; Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations.”

93 Ibid.


http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0106/CIA-killings-in-Afghanistan-spotlight-Jordan-as-key-US-intelligence-partner




http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/us/politics/syria-is-expected-to-be-main-topic-as-obama-meets-with-king-of-jordan.html




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