john j. sbrega - the japanese surrender

8/22/2019 JOHN J. SBREGA - The Japanese Surrender

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The Japanese Surrender: Some Unexpected Consequences in Southeast AsiaAuthor(s): John J. SbregaSource: Asian Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Sep. - Oct., 1979), pp. 45-63Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172947 .

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T h e Japane se Surrender:S o m e Unexpected Consequencesin Southeas t A s i a

JOHN J. SBREGA

ne of the most significant actors dominatinghe course ofevents n SoutheastAsiaafter the Japanese urrendern August1945was the presenceof very argeandstillunconquered apanese orces nvariouspartsof the region.Thesuddenandunexpected ermination fhostilitiesfollowingthe decision o usethe atomicbombsignalled hestart of a grimraceto liberate he Japanese-occupiederritories.Al-thoughhistorians ontinue o debate the wisdomof that decisionandthe consequentdestruction f Hiroshima ndNagasaki,he connectionbetween those events and thesubsequent truggles onductedby indig-enous nationalistmovements n the Far East has been lessappreciated.Inplanningoperations o bringaboutthe finaldefeat of Japanandits acceptanceof the Allieddemand orunconditional urrender,hemilitary trategistswereconfrontedwiththe unhappy-andpoliticallyunacceptable-assessmenthatoverone million casualtieswould be theAlliedpriceto invade heJapanesehome islands inOperationsOLYMPIC,ubsequently enamedMAJESTIC,ndCORONET).Heavy olls were alsoanticipatedn securing he preliminaryacticalpositions necessary o launch he finaloperations.Even hen,victorywasnot assured.For the frustrating rospectwas that the Japanesegovernmentwouldmoveto more securestrongholds n the mainland,like Manchuria, ndprolonghostilities ndefinitely.

45


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Thedetermined apanese esistance ncountered hroughout hewarconsistentlyaffectedAlliedmilitaryplanningn awaynot foundinthe European heater.PrimeMinisterWinstonS. Churchillwarned heBritishChiefsof Staff: "All we have seen of the Japanese howsthatthey fightto the death to an extent not equalledby any otherracepossessingmodernweapons."'At the 1944 OCTAGONConference,PresidentFranklinD. Rooseveltalsoexpressedhis concernabout the"fanatical apanese enacity,"' and recounted or the British he recentAmerican xperienceat Saipan,whereJapanese oldiersandcivilianschose suicide rather han surrender.Otherexamples, uch asTarawaand Iwo Jima,provided hockingpreviewsof whatlay aheadwhen theattemptwas madeto invade he Japanesehomeland.Suddenly, he successfuldevelopmentof a workablenuclearwea-pon presentedanalternative o so costly aninvasion.Criticswho inretrospectdenouncethe decision o use the atomicbomb againstJapan ose sightof the situation n mid-1945,and focus insteadon thetraumaof subsequentpostwardevelopments.Thehorrorsof HiroshimaandNagasaki, s Secretary f WarHenryL. Stimson ateraffirmed,"savedhundredsof thousandsof Americans,British,andJapswhowould haveperished f the invasion hat we weresettingon foot hadtaken place."3On August 20, 1945, six days after the official announcement thatJapanhadacceptedthe termsof the PotsdamDeclaration, he SupremeCommander f theJapaneseArmybroadcasta bitterstatementwhichemphasized he point that the homelandandManchuria, s well asotherJapanese-occupiedreas,werestill '"unchallenged."espitethedecisionto surrender,his statementcontinued,"the dignityof theImperialNippon Armyremains upreme."4The fact wasthat the sud-den, unexpectedend of the warhadstrandedmillions of Japanesetroops n largely ntactunitsthroughout he FarEast,includingSouth-east Asia. Eventhoughthe Philippines adbeenretaken,some44,000Japanese roopswerestill in the islandsat the end of the war.Thisestimatecompareswith 55,000 in Thailand plus 90,000 Thaitroops),60,000 in Burma,110,000in Indochina,100,000 throughout he man-datedislands, 116,000 in Malaya,and over490,000 in the NetherlandsEast Indies.Manyof theseunits,bewilderedby the Tokyo govern-ment's nexplicablecapitulation o Allieddemands,held positionsofgreatstrength,and werecapableof continuinghostilities ndependentlyand for a long time.

Forexample,the attitudeof the Japanese orces in Burma eflected


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TheJapanese Surrender 47

this inability to comprehend the imperial order to lay down their arms."They do not consider that they have been defeated and say so quiteopenly," warned MaberlyE. Dening after returningfrom the surrenderceremonies at Rangoon, Dening, who was the British political advisorto Lord Louis Mountbatten, relayed his own concern that "the situationis still fraughtwithdanger."5Thecommander f British roops n China,General Sir Eric C. Hayes, attending the surrenderproceedings at Nan-king on September 9, reported that law and order in eastern China"de-pends almost entirely on the Japanese, and when they are disarmed onecannot help wondering what will happen." The British Ambassador inChina,Sir Horace Seymour, sharedHayes' anxieties. "The situation de-scribed by GeneralHayes must indeed be unique in the history of war-fare," Seymour observed. "Publicorder (in Nanking, Shanghai,Tientsin,and elsewhere) was... beingmaintained entirely by the powerful andundefeated Japanese Army."6Similar conditions prevailed throughout the Southeast Asia Com-mand (SEAC), where Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander(SACSEA) apparentlyhad no other choice but to utilize Japanesetroops for policing duties in order to preservelaw and order. He re-mained alert not only to the short-runimplications of such expedients,but also to the myth-making potential inherent in the absence of deci-sive Allied military action againstJapanese forces throughout the FarEast. In a letter to GeneralDouglas MacArthurshortly after the Japanesenotice of surrender,Mountbatten declared:'

I am surethatyourviewscoincide withmine,namely,that it willbe the greatestmistake o be soft with the Japanese.The fact thatyou have beenprevented rom nflicting he crushing ictorywhichOLYMPIC nd CORONET ndoubtedlywould haveproduced,andthat I havebeenpreventedromcarrying ut ZIPPER ndMAIL-FIST(Malaya-Singapore,EI)will, I fear,enable he Japaneseleaders o deludetheirpeopleinto thinking hey were defeatedonly by the scientistsand not in battle,unlesswe canso humblethemthat the completeness f defeat is broughthometo them.Normally am not a vindictiveperson,but I cannothelpfeelingthat unlesswe reallyaretoughwith all the Japaneseeaders heywillbe able to build themselvesup eventually or anotherwar...Althougheveryonemust be delightedat the earlytermination fthe war,neverthelessI cannot refrain romexpressingmy feelings


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48 Asian Affairs

to you on realizingthat the tremendous operations that you wereto command will not now take place.

Mountbatten had good cause for concern, since most of the areasallocated to his command were still under Japanese control as of August14, 1945. SEAC orces faced the taskof disarminghe Japaneseandre-occupyingMalaya, he NetherlandsEastIndies, Indochina,Thailand,andmuch of Burmaurgently,rather hanby planned tagesthroughaseriesof gradualmilitaryoperations. n SoutheastAsia, the politicalramifications f the unexpected erminationof the warrapidlybecameapparent.

IIInvirtuallyevery country,the Allies encountereda left-wingnationalistpolitical-military ssociationaspiringo independence.Some of themhadreceiveddirectencouragementrom the Japanese; ndfor all of them,the shattering xperienceof thePacificWarhaddestroyedmost of theunderlying tructureof Western olonialismandexplodedthe myth ofwhitesupremacy.In Malaya, he startling arlytriumphof the Japaneseexacerbatedthe marked ocialcleavageshathistoricallydivided he country.NativeMalays endedto welcometheJapaneseas a means of ridding hem-selvesof economic dominationby the ethnicChinesepopulation.Toescapethe resultantpersecution f both MalaysandJapanese,manyofthe Chinese led to the safetyof thejungle.Therethe moremilitantChineseCommunist lement formed he nucleus of the resistance, heMalayanPeople'sAnti-Japanese rmy(MPAJA).Andwhilenot all suchChineserefugeeswereCommunists,hey universally ntertainedanti-Japanese,pro-MPAJAympathies.

DespiteanagreementwithMountbatten o fightthe Japanese nreturn or SEACsupplies, he MPAJAmaintained ssentiallya defen-siveposture throughout he war.In the euphoriaof the Japanese ur-render,however,Communistpropagandistsonvincedmuch of the popu-lationthat the MPAJAdeservedmost of the creditfor defeating he in-vaders.Thispropaganda ampaign ucceeded or a numberof reasons,including he lack of outsidecommunications,he Allied failure oundertakeany significantmilitaryactivity n Malayapriorto the abrupt


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end of the war, and the long delay preceding the Allied reoccupation.Meanwhile,the MPAJA maneuveredskillfully to consolidate its positionand sought to transformlingeringanti-Japanesesentiment into a moregeneralxenophobia. Under wartime Japanesetutelage, political aware-ness among the Malayanpopulation had increased substantially. Retreat-ing from their own initial ambitions of aggrandizementto a more realis-tic policy of "Asia for the Asians," the Japanesehad encouragedthenationalist aspirationsof the Malayswhile simultaneously fanning anti-Westernientiment. Thus, under quite different influences and motiva-tions, the two major segments of the population in Malaya anticipatedan end to prewarcolonial ties.

Before SEACjurisdiction and British authority could return, theCommunistleaders Lai Teck and Chin Peng conducted a brutal cam-paignof retribution againstthe Malayanelement of Japanesesympa-thizers. The Malaysretaliatedin kind, both for reasons of self-defenseand also out of determination to avoid falling againunder the Chineseeconomic yoke. In this escalating process, the distinction betweenChinesewho were Communists and Chinese in general was blurred, justas the entire Malayanpopulation-not simply the collaboratingelement-became targets of the militant Communists.After stockpiling arms and ammunition in jungle caches, Lai Teckfinally agreedto cooperate with the SEAC occupation forces. EachMPAJAguerrillareceived money, a ration of rice, the promise of em-ployment, British medals, and a copy of Mountbatten's speech at theformalreoccupation ceremony. Chin Peng, the second-rankingCommu-nist leader, was flown to London to receive the Order of the BritishEmpireand to lead the Malayan contingent in the Victory Parade.It isa matter for speculation as to what might have happened if the planned,gradual iberation of Malayathrough Operations ZIPPER and MAIL-FIST had taken place, or if SEAC occupation forces had been able toSarrivemore promptly. There can be little doubt, however, that in theinterval between the Japanesesurrender and the Allied return, the fusehad been lit to ignite another 15 years of upheaval in Malaya."Similarly,social disorder in the Netherlands East Indies at the endof the war promoted political agitation for the redressof prewargrievances. During the war, the Japanesehad set free many politicalprisonersdetained by the Dutch, including such nationalist leadersas Sukarnoand Mohammed Hatta, who in return agreedopportunistic-ally to collaborate in the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere pro-gram.Tokyo initially treated the NEI as Japanese territory, apparently


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in hope of creatinga significantbargainingounterfor use in ultimatepeacenegotiations; upposedly, he Americans nd their allieswereeagerlyanticipating compromiseunderstandingwithJapan.ButAlliedmilitarysuccessesgradually orcedJapan o modify thisposition;and underJapanese upervision, ndonesians ssumedmore and morepoliticaland economicautonomy-somethingwhich Dutch colonialpolicy hadconsistentlythwarted. n September1944, Tokyo promisedeventual ndependence orthe NEI;andduring he Summerof 1945,they established he socalledInvestigatingCommittee or the Prepara-tion of Indonesia's ndependenceo planfor this development.ThusJapanesepolicy deliberately ontributed o whatAnthonyReidhascalledthe "newfoundsolidarityof established ndonesian eaders."With he paceof events n August 1945,however,SukarnoandHattaaccelerated heirplans.Afternotifyingthe Japaneseoccupationcommanders f theirintentions,the two nationalist eadersproclaimedthe IndonesianRepublic ust threedays followingthe unexpectedTokyo capitulation.Thereafter, fatefulperiodonce again ntervenedbeforethe prewarcolonialpowercould set in motion any meaningfulprogram f reoccupation.TherelativelyuntestedJapanese orces nthe NEI(notwithstanding ome notable Alliedinroads,particularlynNewGuinea)openly supplied he Indonesianswith armsandpermittedthe nationalists o assumeadditionaladministrativeunctions, ncludingthe replacementof Japanese orcesguardingDutchmilitaryandcivilianinternees.9Sukarnogavesome indicationof the extent of his expansionistdreams or a "Pan-Indonesia"n July 11, 1945. "Ihave neversaidthatIndonesia omprisesonly those areas hat were ruledby the Dutch,"he declared o the sympathetic nvestigatingCommittee for thePreparation f Indonesia's ndependence."When look at the islandssituatedbetween Asia andAustralia,andbetween the Pacificand In-donesianoceans,I understandhey are meantto form a single entity."'0Thisambitiousrhetoric,reflecting tronganticolonial entiments,pointedto a postwarcollisionnot only with the Dutch,but with otherWestern olonialpowersaswell.Dutch officialsattempting o reassertcolonialcontrol over theNEIsufferedthe frustration f tragicallyuncontrollable ircumstances;logisticaldifficulties,Alliedshipping hortages,SEACprioritiesnBurma,war exhaustion n Europe,andthe determinedJapanese e-sistancehad all combined o thwart he promptreturnof the Dutch totheir slandempire.To complicatemattersfurther, he slow andpiece-


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meal liberation of Holland by the Allied forces in Europe had hinderedthe organization of comprehensive civil-military reoccupation teams.Many important colonial administrators and other key officials re-mained in German-occupiedareas of Holland until the end of the warin Europe.Dutch leadersrepeatedly voiced their displeasureat the apparentlack of Anglo-Americanresponsivenessto their needs. On May 25, 1945,Dutch Colonial Minister HubertusJ. van Mook (who was alsoLieutenant Governor General of the NEI) requested "urgentaction"from the US State Department, both to bringDutch marines to theUnited States for trainingbefore undertakingthe liberation of the NEI,

and also to transfer Dutch troops and civil affairspersonnel to the NEIgovernment-in-exileat Brisbane, Australia, for necessary preparationsbefore actually undertakingto administerliberated areas. "Both proj-ects are of the highest importance for the future of the Kingdom," vanMook explained. He complained about the "unexpected slowness" infreeing Holland completely from Germaninfluence. Since 1940, theColonial Ministerpointed out, all Dutch shippinghad been placed atAllied disposal;and he emphasized the "grievouslosses" inflicted onthe Dutch Navy duringthe early stages of the war. Thousands ofvolunteers awaitingduty in the Far East now clogged Dutch ports;and van Mook warnedthat "the Netherlands government cannot pos-sibly acquiesce in this state of affairs."'1 In London, Dutch PrimeMinisterP. J. Gerbrandy expressed similarconcerns, going so far as torecommend that the Pacific WarCouncil be revived to explore Dutchneeds.1" The Dutch predicament continued in the chaotic conditionsthat followed the Japanesesurrender. More than a month after thesurrender,the Dutch Minister for OverseasTerritories,J. H. A. Loge-mann, was still lobbying for protection of Dutch colonial concerns."In view of the very different war records of the Dutch and the Frenchin Southeast Asia," Logemann argued, "Javashould have a muchhigher priority than Indochina... if necessary, the release of ten tofifteen thousand men from the Far East should be delayed so that themaintenance of law and order could be ensured until the arrivalof anadequate number of Dutch troops."'3Actually, London and Washington-for different reasons-wel-comed the reintroduction of the Dutch presence in the Far East. TheUnited States chose to interpret the wartime Dutch pledge, broadcastby Queen Wilhelminaon December 6, 1942, about developing self-government in the NEI as a stabilizing influence in the postwar Pacific;


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while the Britishattempted o shield their ownimperial oncernsbychampioning he returnof anotherWestern olonialadministration.H. FreemanMatthews,at the StateDepartment, orwarded an Mook'scomplaints o the State-War-Navy oordinatingCommitteewith theobservation:"TheDepartment f State considers hat it is politicallydesirable hat the Netherlandshouldparticipaten the liberationofthe NetherlandsEastIndiesto the fullest extent permittedby militaryconsiderations."14 n earlierStateDepartmentmemorandum e-mindedPresidentRoosevelt hat the Frenchhad not givensimilarguarantees bout anenlightened olonialpolicy after the war. "TheStateDepartmentperceivesno politicalobjectionto Netherlandsparti-cipation n SEAC," his memorandumxplained,"except n so far as itmay have a bearingon French participation."'5s Similarly, the Britishprovided assurances of their support. The Dutch learned that the For-eign Office "strongly favors closer association"'" with them in Far East-ernaffairs;and Churchill romisedGerbrandy: I will not lendmyselfto any trickery to deprivethe Dutch of their territories.""' Ironically,on the same day as the Nagasaki bombing, Mountbatten concluded de-tailed arrangementsfor Dutch civil-militarycollaboration in SEAC withPrinceBernhard,he Commander-in-Chieff the DutchForces.a'8

Alliedassurances otwithstanding,he alreadydeteriorating itua-tion in the NEIworsened apidlyafter the Japanese urrender.TheDutch determinationo reassert mperialauthorityclasheddirectlywithIndonesianaspirationsorindependence,which had been carefullynourishedby the Japanese ccupationforces. TheDutchgovernmentknew little aboutwhat hadgone on in the NEI during he war,andgreatlyunderestimatedhe strengthof this awakened ndonesianna-tionalism.Growing oncern or a colonialpartner'sroubles ed theBritish o abandon heirpreviouscaution.InOctober1945, the For-eignOfficeprepared draftstatementforMountbatten, mphasizingthat "whilehe has no wish to intervene n the politicalaffairsof theNEImore than is necessary,..,. he cannotrecognizeany authoritynotapprovedby the sovereignpower;nor canhe tolerateso longas he isresponsible or the NEI,anyactivitiesor agitationwhichmightbedetrimental o the securityandorderlyadministration f the terri-tory."'9 Two months ater,the Chiefof the ImperialGeneralStaff,GeneralSirAlanE.Brooke,underlinedBritishanxietyabout the NEIby travellingo a Singaporemeetingwith Mountbatten.Theircom-muniquecalled for "a more active(SEAC)policy forIndonesia."20But like Malaya, he situation n the NEIafterAugust 14, 1945,vir-


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tually ensured an active indigenous resistance to Westernefforts to re-impose prewarcolonial controls.

IIIA somewhat similarstory unfolded in Indochina. The fall of metropoli-tan France had exacerbated the problems of the French colonial ad-ministration in Indochina. From 1940 to 1945, the GovernorGeneral,Admiral Jean Decoux, struggledto negotiate a course through Japanesedemands, Thai ambitions, Allied requirements, Vichy stipulations,French imperial interests, and indigenous aspirations.Unlike Malayaand Indonesia, the Japaneserefrainedfrom assertingovert control inIndochina until the military coup of March9, 1945; but in practice, theFrench colonial administrationenjoyed only nominal independenceduringmost of the war.Gaullist plans regarding he postwar status of Indochina neverseriously contemplated any course other than complete restoration ofcolonial control. Foreshadowingplans to create a French Common-wealth of Nations, the BrazzavilleConference in February 1944 an-nounced: "The aims of the work of civilization accomplished by Francein the colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any possibility of evolu-tion outside the French bloc of empire." The French AmbassadortoChina,General Zinovi Pechkoff, provided assurancesshortly thereafterthat Indochina, as a member of the proposed commonwealth, wouldenjoy a certain amount of economic autonomy. "She will establishcommercial relations with her neighbors," Pechkoff stated, "and espe-cially she will cultivate a bosom friendship with China."21During the war, Indochina had much greater importance as a poli-tical problem in interallied relations than as an area of actual militarysignificance. Unlike the circumstances in the NEI, where Allied militaryefforts had at least begun successfully (in New Guinea), military opera-tions to reconquer Indochina were still in the planning stage. Eventhese early conceptualizations, moreover, had heightened tensionsamong the Allies. For example, the apparently simple decision as towhat military theater would incorporate Indochina erupted into anAllied cause celebre. After the Japanesemilitary coup, FranceimploredWashingtonto send aid to the resistance forces there, as AmbassadorHenriBonnet underlined "the importance and the urgency of the situa-tion."'2 Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius prepareda draft state-ment pledging Americansupport to the resistance in Indochina "subject


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to currentandplannedPacificoperations."Roosevelt,however,dis-missed hisproposedannouncement s "inadvisable."23Meanwhile,he BritishChiefsof Staff, who weresympathetic othe French,had sufficientaircraft o aidanti-Japaneseorces n Indo-china,but "themanpower hortage ules out suchplans."'24 he Presi-dent finallyauthorized he use of Americanairpower here on March29,butby then the hopeless,unaidedresistancehadcollapsed.A few dayslater,Stettiniusexplained o Bonnet: "Alliedresourcesmust be con-centratedon andemployed n attainingour mainobjectives."'2s tPotsdam, he 16thparallel mergedas the line of demarcationbe-tween SEACandthe ChinaTheater or purposesof accepting heJapanese urrender.AmericanAmbassadoro ChinaPatrickJ. Hurleycharacterizedhe fateful selection of the 16thparallelas "purelyanexpedientoperationalmatter."'' Some30 years ater,Mountbattendismissed hat historicboundaryas "crazy."'27Onceagain, he use of the atomic bomb and the unexpectedendof the war aborted he militaryoperationsdesigned o absorb hecountryalong gradualines commensuratewith Alliedresources.Thefailureof the Allies to reoccupyIndochinammediately,and thus en-sure an orderly transfer of authority from the unconquered Japaneseforces,set in motion a fateful chainof events.LikeMalaya, he de-layed processof reoccupation trengthenedhe positionof anindige-nous, leftistmilitarymovement.Orderlygovernment anished nAugust1945. GeneralPhilippeLeclercand Vice AdmiralThierryd'Argenlieu eceivedappointments sCommander-in-Chieff theFrenchForces n SEACand GovernorGeneral, espectively;butFrench orcescould not get to Indochina rommetropolitanFrancequicklybecauseof the sameproblemsbesetting he Dutch.

Consequently,Mountbattendispatcheda unit underMajorGeneralDouglasD. Gracey o Saigon.Graceyarrived n September13;but by then, EmperorBao Dai hadabdicatedand the independentDemocraticRepublicof Vietnamhad beenproclaimedby PresidentHo Chi Minh.A deadly nterregnum adonce morehindered he goalsof the victoriouspowers.TheJapaneseArmy,undefeated n battle,representedhe only stabilizing orce n Indochina.Mountbatten riedto make the best of a badsituationby authorizing apanese roopsunderFieldMarshalTerauchi o maintainorder.The French,of course,refused o admitanydiscussionof their intention to re-establish heirprewarauthority n Indochina.Butit was a claim that they could notimmediately mpose.28


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The Japanese Surrender 55

Despite their avowed desire to withdraw as soon as possible, theBritish experienced great difficulty in extricating themselves fromIndochina. Repeated clashes between local French contingents andelements of the League for the Independence of Vietnam (the VietMinh) caused Gracey to suspend the official sanction for both sides toshareoccupation responsibilities with SEAC. Annamite villageswereburned and the local population suffered from the systematic searchesconducted in attempts to eliminate what Gracey describedas "pocketsof resistance areas."Meanwhile,the growing French forces, sympatheticto the clamoring demands of French civilians for retribution againstthe Annamites, carried out brutal operations of their own. Mountbattensoon saw that the indefinite presence of a special British unit would berequired even after the main British force (Special Operations Execu-tive Force 136) had been withdrawn. Mountbatten explained: "Thereis no doubt that (British) personnel are, at the moment, doing impor-tant work, especially in so faras the settlement of ex-guerrillaforcesis concerned.""29

The mushrooming Britishrole in Indochina alarmed some percep-tive observers. General WilliamSlim, for example, worried about the un-compromising French attitude, as well as the graveimplications ofBritish involvement in reimposing European colonial power in Asia."The real and underlying dangeris that the situation may develop sothat it can be represented s a WestversusEastsetup,"Slim,a Britishwartimecommander n Burma, autioned he BritishChiefsof Staff."I need not point out howextremelydangeroushismaybe."30Thatpatternof confrontationhad, n fact,alreadybeen establishedn theabsenceof phasedmilitaryoperationsallowing or the gradualibera-tion of Indochinaby the Allies. Suchoperationswerebarely n theplanningphasewhenJapan urrendered.OnJanuary1, 1946, Graceyandd'Argenlieu inallyreachedagreement n March as the date forthe terminationof SEACresponsibilitiesn Indochinan favorof theFrenchascendancy."3 hreedecadesof virtuallyuninterrupted ostili-ties followed.

Duringandimmediatelyafter the war,Britishand AmericanpolicytowardThailanddifferedmarkedly.TheBritishgovernment on-sideredThailandanenemy,while the RooseveltAdministrationmain-tained that it was an enemy-occupied territory.32 The lessons of the1941-42militarydefeats n SoutheastAsia had beenindelibly m-pressedupon the British.Londonwantedmore thanfriendlyassurancesfrom the postwarBangkok overnment oncerningmutualdefense


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arrangements,speciallyalongthe Thai-British orderrunning hroughthe strategicKraIsthmus."Inviewof the probabledevelopmentofmodernwarfare,"he BritishChiefsof Staff declared n a 1945 mem-orandumwhich carrieddisturbingmplications,"it would not be practi-cal to restrict he facilitieswhich we require o somespecialarrange-ments in the KraIsthmus."33Earlier, he military eadership adar-guedthat "HisMajesty's overnmenthouldavoidusinganyformofwordswhichmight,by freeinterpretation, erogate romour freedomto obtain our minimum trategical equirements."34oreignSecretaryAnthonyEdenreinforced hispositionby explaining hatthe Thaishad"betrayed"British riendshipn collaboratingwithJapan,and"like other countries n like case, 'theymustwork theirpassagehome.' ,"s WartimeBritish ilenceaboutpostwarThailandbotheredAmerican officials. Ambassador John G. Winant, for example,pointed out that "the absence of a statement of British intentions withrespect to Thailand is causing considerable inconvenience to my gov-ernment."36 But the British remainedpassiveto persistent Americanefforts to elicit a clear declaration of British support for a free and in-dependent Thailand after the war. In April 1945, the WarCabinet de-cided:37

Muchwill dependon the measuresSiamtakes to contributetowards he expulsionof the Japanese romSiamese erritoryand towards he ultimatedefeatof Japan;and on herreadiness(a) to makerestitution o HisMajesty's overnmentand theirAllies for the injurydone to them inconsequenceof Siam'sasso-ciation withJapan,and(b) to ensuresecurityandgood neigh-borlyrelations n the future.As was so often the case in BritishFarEasternpolicy, colonialconcernsplayeda dominantpart n shapingBritishattitudes.Imperialsecurityrequiredassurances bout the KraIsthmus hatextended be-yond mere protestationsof Thaigood will. Inaddition,the Britishrealizedat an earlystagetheimplicationsof reoccupying olonial

areasat a time of widespreadood shortages, uchaswereexpectedat the end of the war.H. L. Sanderson,Directorof Rice at the Ministryof Food, warned n January1945: "Assoon as the Asiaticrice consum-ing countriesare iberated, hey will requireverylarge mportsof rice,and it willbe disastrousf ourre-entry nto them coincideswithashortage of essential foodstuffs.""3 This forecast added another dimen-


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sion to the importance of postwar controls over Thailand. "Owingtothe lack of incentive and transport difficulties, the Siamese (rice) sur-plus is believed to have dropped to little more than the prewarone of1.5 million tons," British economic experts observedin December 1944."As the position in Indochinais similar,and in Burma much worse, theimportance of the Siamesesurplushas greatly increased."39

Theabruptend of thewar n this case inflicted a differentkind ofhardship n the Allies.Theproblem ocused on food suppliesratherthan the difficultiesof occupation despitethe presenceof 55,000Japanese roopsand90,000 armedThais).The failure o implementoperationalplanswhich wouldhave ncorporatedThailand-and,ofcourse,control over the essentialThai ricesupply-in the Alliedsphereat a comfortablepacemeantthat anenormouscrisisawaited he West-ernpowerswhenever heydidmanage o reassert olonialauthority.Afterthehumiliatingmilitarydefeatssufferedat thehandsof the Japa-nese and the correspondingoss of prestige, he returning olonialpowerscould not afford he additional omplicationsassociatedwithsevere ood shortages.Consequentlyhe British,althoughaware hatthe Americanswould nterpretdemandson Thailand"assavoring freparations,"40ameto viewthe matter n connectionwith the Thais"working heirpassagehome."ThesubsequentThai-BritishreatyofDecember1945 requiredhe Thais o make available o the BritishRiceUnit in Bangkokanyexistingsurplusof riceup to 1.5 milliontons,plusall futurehome-grownuppliesbeyond domesticneedsuntil Sep-tember1, 1947. TheUnitedStatesmonitoredthesenegotiations,butintervenedonly to influencean amelioration f the termsaddressingpostwar ecurityarrangements, hichoriginallywere "inrealityde-signed o secure for HisMajesty's overnment, f not a protectorateoverSiam, hen at leastsomespecialmilitarypositionorrights."TheThaidelegationat thesetalks,whichwere heldin Singapore,nsistedonassuranceshat the termsrepresentedhe minimumBritishdemands.Infact, the Thaigovernment ad been disposed o regardhe treaty pro-posalsas "tantamount o an ultimatum.""

IVIn summary, he momentousdecisionto use the atomicbombset offanotherkind of chain-or rogue-reactionthat entailed arreaching,unintendedpolitical consequencesn SoutheastAsia.The bomb didbringaboutanabrupt ermination f hostilities withJapan;but this,in turn, precludeda processof gradual eoccupationby the Alliesin


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plannedcampaigns f liberation.Thesuddendemands or occupationforcesthroughout he Far East exceeded the capacityof alreadystrainedAllied resources.This nabilityto digest iberatedareas n measuredncrements,including he overriding eed to establish he legitimacyof Allied mili-taryand civilianpersonneln maintainingnternalorder,meantthatindigenouspoliticalassociationswithleftist tendencies, n most casesarmedandunderthe spellof the powerfulJapanese hetoricof auton-omy, remainedunabsorbed nd outside Alliedcontrol.Thesegroupsimmediatelysoughtto implement heirpolitical aspirations.The inter-val between the unanticipatedTokyo announcement f surrender ndthe time it took the Allies to assume he overwhelming urdensof re-occupation provided these political movements with a priceless oppor-tunity, which they exploited in ways that had enormous significancefor the stability of the postwar world.

Ironically, the continuing historical debate has not sufficientlyaddressedthis crucial consequence of the use of the atomic bomb in1945. Moral dilemmas and even the military necessity of employingnuclear weapons to force Japan to surrenderremain-properly-open tovalue judgments. But another important dimension has thus far beenless appreciated: the indirect military consequences of the atomicbombs elsewhere in the Far East. This is not to suggest that the Alliesshould not have employed every means availableto end the waragainstJapanasquicklyaspossible.Rather, t is the purposeof thisessayto point out thatthe unintendedresultsof Hiroshima ndNaga-sakishould be included n anyre-examination f the problem.Whilethe decision to use the atomic bombdid not by itself "cause" hetragicFarEasternepilogue o WorldWar I, that decisionunintention-ally contributed o the complex patternof circumstances hat led tothe politicalturmoilandmilitaryconflictsthat in some caseshave con-tinued for three decades.

NOTES1. Churchillmemorandum,"OperationANAKIM,"May 8, 1943, COS(T)8,enclosed in COS(43)281(0), June3, 1943, CAB80/69, PublicRecordOffice,London.(Hereinafterreferred o asPRO.)2. Minutesof the FirstPlenaryMeeting OCTAGON),September 13, 1944, en-closed in COS(44)875(0), October9, 1944, CAB80/88, PRO.


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3. Stimson to Colonel John S. Muirhead,December12, 1947, HenryL. StimsonPapers,Box 135, SterlingLibrary,YaleUniversity,New Haven,Connecticut.In arevealingdescriptionof the 1945 perspective,Churchill onfirmed that "there neverwas a moment's discussionas to whetherthe atomic bomb should be used or not.To averta vast, indefinitebutchery, o bring he war to an end, to givepeaceto theworld, to lay healinghandsuponits torturedpeoples by a manifestationof over-whelmingpower at the cost of a few explosions, seemed,afterall our toils andperils,a miracleof deliverance." ee WinstonS. Churchill,Triumphand Tragedy(Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1953), p. 639. There s no substantiationoffered forthe grotesquechargeby GabrielKolko: "Thewar had so brutalized he Americanleadersthat burningvastnumbersof civiliansno longer posed a realpredicamentby the Springof 1945." See hisPoliticsof War:The World nd United States For-eignPolicy, 1943-1945 (New York:Vintage, 1968), p. 539. Morerationally,GaddisSmith has concluded: "All that can be said with assurances that the menwho de-cided to dropthe bomb actedconscientiouslyandwith a senseof responsibility ormankind n so far as they wereable..." See his superbstudy,AmericanDiplomacyDuringthe Second WorldWar, 941-1945 (New York: JohnWileyandSons, 1965),pp. 157-160.

4. Text of Domei broadcast, nclosed n GeneralSir Ronald C. Penneyto Mount-batten, August 20, 1945, RonaldC. Penney Papers, older 5/12, King'sCollegeCentrefor MilitaryArchives,London.(Hereinafter eferred o as Penney Papers.)5. MaberlyE. Deningto JohnSterndaleBennett(FarEasternDepartment,For-eign Office), August31, 1945, Penney Papers, older5/18.6. Sir HoraceSeymour,BritishAmbassadoro China enclosingreportbyGeneralSir Eric C. Hayes, September13, 1945), to Foreign SecretaryErnestBevin,September18, 1945, FO 371.46214, F 7930/186/10, PRO. The statistical nforma-tion may be found in RudolphA. WinnacherWarDepartment) o Stimson,Novem-ber 12, 1946, StimsonPapers,Box 153;Penneymemorandum,n.d. (afterAugust 14,1945), Penney Papers, older5/9; CCS300/2, "Estimateof Enemy Situation-1944,"November18, 1943, enclosed n COS(43)791(0),Pt. III, March8, 1944, CAB80/77, PRO;First Sea Lord AndrewB. Cunninghammemorandum,COS(45)268(0),October 17, 1945, CAB80/97, PRO. See also folder "GuamConference,"Tab3,n.d., RecordGroup332: "Wedemeyer iles,"Box 2, WashingtonNational RecordsCenter, Suitland,Maryland.Hereinaftereferred o asWNRC.)7. Mountbatten o MacArthur,August16, 1945, Penney Papers, older 5/11.Mountbattenremainedconvinced hat he hadpreservedorder n SoutheastAsiabyassigningpolicingand othersecurityresponsibilitieso the Japanese. Author'sinterview with LordMountbatten,August 2, 1973, London.)8. A detailedanalysisof events n Malayaas well as in each of the othercoun-tries to be consideredfalls outsidethe scope of this study. Rather, t is the intentionof this essayto point out some of the regionalproblemsassociatedwith the abruptterminationof the war and to underline he internal elementsof conflict that ex-isted to influence the courseof postwarevents in eachcountry.The author s grate-ful to the British andMalaysianmbassies or providingvaluableresearchassistancein the preparationof anunpublished1969 researchpaperon the Malayan"Emer-gency," 1948-60. For more on the wartimesituation in Malaya, ee RalphBunchememorandum,Document#28, to O. B. Gerig,February5, 1945, RecordGroup59:GeneralRecords of the Departmentof State:Recordsof HarleyNotter (hereinafterreferred o as Notter Files), folder "Documents#1-#30," Box 3, NationalArchives,Washington,D.C. (hereinafter eferred o as NA); H. Furbermemorandum,"BritishMalaya,"n.d. (February1945?), RecordGroup43: Records of InternationalConferences,Commissions,Expositions,andCommittees:WorldWar I Confer-


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ences, folder "BriefingPapers or Stettinius,"Tab3, Box 4, NA: COS(45)511(0),August 4, 1945, CAB80/96, PRO;folder "Reoccupationof Malaya,"n.d., AIR 23/2353, Records of South East AsiaCommand,PRO.During he early 1930s, LaiTeck attendedCommunist raining eminars n Hong Kong sponsoredby Moscow.Oneof his compatriotsthere was NguyenAi Quoc, who laterchangedhis nametoHo ChiMinh.In late 1947, LaiTeck, head of the MalayanCommunistPartyand apossibledouble agent, appears o have abscondedwith the MCP's reasury.ChinPengthen becameheadof the Party,and is rumoredstill to be carryingon revolu-tionaryactivitiesalongthe Thai-Malayan order. Thereare,of course,numerouspublishedworks on the postwarhistoryof Malaya.For one of the later studies,see Boon KhengCheah,"SomeAspectsof the Interregnumn Malaya 15 August-3 September1945)," Journalof Southeast AsianStudies,March1977, pp. 48-74.9. COS(45)595(0), September29, 1945, CAB80/97, PRO;John Hickersonmemorandumof conversationwith Dutch CounselorJonkheer H. F. L. K. van

Vredenburch,October22, 1945, RecordGroup59: Filesof John Hickerson,folder "Memoranda f ConversationsApril-December 1945," Box 2, NA; AmryVandenbosch State DepartmentPolicy PlanningStaff) memorandum,"Nether-lands EastIndies," T-108, September18, 1942, Notter Files, folder "T Does 101-129," Box 39, NA; US Congress,SenateCommitteeon ForeignRelations,ADecadeof AmericanForeignPolicy (Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1950), pp. 798-804; MalaysianDepartmentof InformationServices, ndonesianIntentions TowardsMalaysia KualaLumpur: 1964); F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton,and B. R. Pearn,Survey of InternationalAffairs, 1939-1946: The FarEast, 1942-1946 (London: OxfordUniversityPress ssuedunder the auspicesof the RoyalInstituteof InternationalAffairs, 1955), pp. 74-83. Reid describes he solidarityfosteredamongthe three rivalelites-nationalists, Muslims,andPamong-Prajaanaristocracyn transitionto a bureaucracy)-by the Japanese n his article,"TheJapaneseOccupationandRivalIndonesianElites: Northern Sumatra n 1942,"Journalof Asian Studies,November1975, pp. 49-63; see also Oey HongLee,"British-DutchRelationsand the Republicof Indonesia,"AsianAffairs(London),February 1976, pp. 35-53; VishalSingh,"TheColonialBackgroundof IndonesianPolitics,"InternationalStudies,January-March 976, pp. 1-14;Joyce C. Lebra,"TheSignificanceof the JapaneseMilitaryModelfor SoutheastAsia,"PacificAffairs,Summer1975, pp. 215-229; Robert J. McMahon,"Anglo-AmericanDiplo-acy and the Reoccupationof the NetherlandsEastIndies,"DiplomaticHistory,Winter1978, pp. 1-28; GeorgeM. Kahin,"IndonesianPoliticsandNationalism," nWilliamL. Holland, ed., AsianNationalismand the West New York:Macmillan,1953); author's nterviewwith HenriWarmenhovena civilian nternee in the NEI,1942-45), February15, 1978, Richmond, Virginia.Warmenhoven, rofessorofPolitical Science at VirginiaCommonwealthUniversity,stressedtwo crucialpoints:(a) Dutch war exhaustionpriorto the demandsof reimposing mperialauthorityinthe NEI;and (b) Dutch ignoranceof conditions in the NEI duringthe war,es-peciallythe widespreadanti-Dutchsentiment that had developedthereby 1945.10. As quoted in MalaysianDepartmentof InformationServices,Backgroundto Indonesia'sPolicy TowardsMalaysia KualaLumpur: 1964), p. 20.11. HubertusJ. van Mook to ActingSecretaryof StateJosephC. Grew, May 25,1945, RecordGroup59, DS 740.0011PW/5-3045,NA.12. Prime MinisterGerbrandy's equestis referred o in Churchill o ForeignSecretaryAnthony Eden,June2, 1945, PREM3-221/7, PRO.13. COS(45)584(0), September21, 1945, CAB80/97, PRO;COS(-5)595(0),September29, 1945, CAB80/97, PRO.


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14. Matthews to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, May 30, 1945,Record Group 59, DS 740.0011PW/5-3045, NA.15. John Morgan (Division of Northern European Affairs, State Department)to Roosevelt, March 22, 1945, Record Group 59, DS 740.0011PW/3-2245, NA.16. John Sterndale Bennett memorandum, April 16, 1945, PREM 3-221/7,PRO.17. Churchill to Eden, June 2, 1945, PREM 3-221/7, PRO.18. Mountbatten memorandum of conversation with Prince Bernhard, en-closed in COS(45)526(0), August 9, 1945, CAB 80/96, PRO.19. COS(45)589(0), October 3, 1945, CAB 80/97, PRO.20. COS(45)683(0), December 11, 1945, CAB 80/98, PRO.21. For a report of the Pechkoff press conference, April 25, 1944, see Seymourto Eden, May 1, 1944, FO 371.46210, F 2960/186/10, PRO. See also unsignedState Department memorandum for the President, n.d. (late January 1945?),Record Group 43, folder "Vincent," Box 8, NA; William Raymond Ludden (US

Consul, Kunming) to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, October 5, 1942, RecordGroup 59, DS 893.00/1488, NA; FE(40)103, December 28, 1940, CAB 96/1,PRO; FE(41)6, January 1, 1941, CAB 96/2, PRO; James W. Masland, Jr.,memorandum, "The Political Status of French Indo-China," T-60, September 3,1942, Notter Files, folder "T Does 37-66," Box 31, NA; author's interview withSir Nevile Butler, June 25, 1973, London; War Cabinet memorandum, "JapaneseIntentions in Indo-China," WP(41)154, July 6, 1941, CAB 66/71, PRO; WM(41)66,July 7, 1941, CAB 65/19, PRO. For the complete record of British policy deci-sions, memoranda, and events in Southeast Asia from November 1940 to December1941, see the records of the Far Eastern Committee in CAB 96/1-4, PRO.22. Bonnet memorandum, March 12, 1945, Record Group 59, DS 740.0011PW/3-1245, NA. For more on these March events, see the papers of Charles W.Taussig, Box 52, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. (Herein-after referred to as FDRL.)23. See Stettinius to Roosevelt, March 16, 1945, Record Group 59, DS740.0011PW/3-1745. Roosevelt's response is enclosed in the attached letter toStettinius from Admiral William B. Leahy, dated March 17, 1945.24. Air Chief Marshal Sir CharlesPortal (Air Chief of Staff) memorandum,COS(45)236(0), April 14, 1945, CAB 80/93, PRO.25. Stettinius to Bonnet, April 4, 1945, Record Group 59, DS 740.0011PW/3-1245, NA.

26. Hurley described the surrender arrangements at Sino-American Staff MeetingNo. 73, August 15, 1945, "Wedemeyer Files," Folder "G-mo's Mins, Vol. II," Box 4,WNRC; see also Hurley to President Harry S. Truman, August 10, 1945, RecordGroup 59, DS 740.0011PW/8-1045, NA.27. Author's interview with Mountbatten, August 2, 1973, London. Mount-batten maintained that the fateful demarcation emerged only from the two-folddesire to appease Chiang Kai-shek and to pay tribute to the ideas of the late Ameri-can President.28. See US Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, 12 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office,1971); R. S. Menys (Foreign Office) memorandum, December 23, 1946, RecordGroup 59: Files of H. Freeman Matthews, folder "Memoranda 1946," Box 2, NA;John Hickerson to James Bonright (US Consul, Paris), February 4, 1947, RecordGroup 59: Files of John Hickerson, folder "Personal-1947," Box 8, NA; corres-pondence-memoranda in PREM 3-178/2, 178/3, and 180/7, PRO; Great Britain,Foreign Office, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Con-


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flict, 1945-1965 (London:HerMajesty'sStationeryOffice, 1965); author's nter-view with Mountbatten,August2, 1973, London. GeneralGracey'sofficial titlewas "Commander f AlliedLand Forces and Headof a ControlCommission nIndo-China."29. See Mountbattenmemoranda, nclosedin COS(45)627(0), October 17,1945, CAB80/97; COS(45)660(0),December20, 1945, CAB80/98; both in thePRO. See also OSSmemorandum,October 10, 1945, RecordGroup226: Recordsof the Office of StrategicServices,XL 20319, NA; andOSSmemorandum,October 14, 1945, XL 20863, NA; for accounts of the developingsituationinIndochina.Mountbatten's eportof his talks with Leclercto expedite the movementof French nfantryfrom Marseilless enclosed in COS(45)619(0), October 13,1945, CAB80/97, PRO.The Frenchrequestfor Spitfireaircraftand the BritishChiefs'approvalmay be found in COS(45)244, October4, 1945, CAB80/50; andCOS(45)617(0), October 13, 1945, CAB80/97, PRO.30. Slimmemorandum,COS(45)607(0), October9, 1945, CAB80/97, PRO.31. Forthe negotiationsconcerning he Britishwithdrawal, ee Mountbatten,FinalReport to the CombinedChiefsof Staff by the SupremeAllied Commander,South EastAsia, 1943-1945, Vice-Admiral he LordMountbattenof Burma(London: His Majesty'sStationeryOffice, 1951); and GreatBritain,ForeignOffice,Documents Relatingto BritishInvolvement n the Indo-ChinaConflict,pp. 8-9, 54-55.32. See Sir AlexanderCadogan PermanentUnderSecretaryof State for For-eign Affairs)memorandum,November12, 1944, and John SterndaleBennettmemorandum,February23, 1945, both enclosedin FO 371.46566, F 1196/1196/40, PRO; FE(45)31, July 10, 1945, CAB 96/5, PRO;FE(45)32, July 11, 1945,CAB96/5, PRO;OSSmemorandum,"Developmentof ThaiCooperationwithJapan,"June 9, 1942, OSS R&A#552, NA; JamesW.Masland,Jr., memorandum,"Political Status of Thailand,"Notter Files, folder "T Docs 37-66," Box 31, NA;State Departmentmemorandum o the NetherlandsLegation(describing ndirectdeclarationsof waron the Alliesby Bangkok throughthe SwissLegation),February17, 1942, RecordGroup59, DS 711.92/31, NA. As of January30, 1942,the United Statesstill had not receivednotice of the Thai declarationof war.SeeAdolph A. Berle,Jr.,memorandum f conversationwith Swiss MinisterCharlesBruggmann, anuary30, 1942, RecordGroup 59, DS 711.92/40, NA.33. British Chiefs of Staff memorandum,"Post WarStrategicArrangementsnSiam,"enclosed in FE(45)18 (restricted), April5, 1945, CAB96/5, PRO;COS(45)31(0), January 12, 1945, CAB80/90, PRO.34. C. R. Price(Vice Chiefs of Staff) to Victor Cavendish-BentinckFarEasternDepartment,ForeignOffice), December4, 1943, CAB79/68, PRO;JIC(43)497(0),December3, 1943, andCOS(45)296(0), December4, 1943, CAB79/68, PRO.35. Edenmemorandum,"PolicyTowardsSiam,"WP(44)72, February3, 1944,PREM3-159/6, PRO.36. Winant o Eden, August 18, 1944, enclosed in FE(44)7, February3, 1944,PREM3-159/6, PRO.37. WM(45)49,Secretary'sStandardFile (SSF, or Confidential), April 23,1945, CAB65/52, PRO;FE(44)20, April25, 1944, CAB 96/5, PRO.38. SanderSonmemorandum,"Restoration of RiceProduction n andProcure-ment of Rice for Countriesat PresentOccupiedby the Japanese,"FE(E)(45)1,January9, 1945, CAB96/8, PRO.39. EconomicAdvisoryBranch ForeignOffice andMinistryof EconomicWar-fare)memorandum,"Changesn SiameseEconomy," enclosed in FE(E)(44)4,December21, 1944, CAB96/8, PRO.London later informedWashington:"If


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Siam were to be allowed these involuntary hoarded stocks at the present scarcityprices, the proceeds would bring Siam's existing holdings of gold and foreign ex-change to three times their present level. Even at half that price they would bedoubled. In either event, Siam would end the war in an incomparably better finan-cial position than any of the other countries which were in a position to offer moreserious resistance to the aggressors. His Majesty's government feel very strongly onthis point." See G. H. Hall memorandum, "Policy Toward Siam," FE(M)(45)7,September 6, 1945, CAB 96/9, PRO.40. FE(45)5, July 13, 1945, CAB 96/5, PRO.41. For detailed accounts of Thai-Anglo-American relations and the evolvingThai-British Treaty, see OSS memorandum, "Thailand's Relations With GreatBritain in the Strategic Upper Malay Peninsula," August 27, 1945, OSS R&A#2954, NA; COS(45)212, September 12, 1945, CAB 80/50, PRO; COS(45)235,September 27, 1945, CAB 80/50, PRO; FE(0)(45)6, February 27, 1945, CAB 80/50,PRO; A. L. Moffat memoranda, September 24-29, 1945, Record Group 59, DS741.93/9-2445 through 741.93/9-2945, NA; OSS memorandum, October 10, 1945,XL 23084, NA; State Department aide-mimoire, October 9, 1945, enclosed inAmbassador Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, October 12, 1945, FO 371.46566,F 8238/1196/40, PRO; COS(45)653(0), November 12, 1945, CAB 80/98, PRO;OSS memorandum (tracing Bangkok instructions to Thai delegation at Kandy,Ceylon), December 16, 1945, XL 30932, NA; unsigned, undated memorandum,"Future Status of Thailand," Record Group 43, Briefing Book, Box 2, NA: COS(45)692(0), December 20, 1945, CAB 80/98, PRO; John Carter Vincent to DeanAcheson, October 25, 1945, Record Group 59, DS 711.92/10-2545, NA; Achesonto Charles W. Yost (in Bangkok), December 22, 1945, Record Group 59, DS 711.92/12-2245, NA; A. L. Moffat memorandum, August 28, 1946, Record Group 59:Files of John Hickerson, folder "1946 Files," Box 3, NA.