Methodological ShadowboxingMarxist Aesthetics :Lukacs and Adorno

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LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART

The supreme criterion of [Lukacs] aesthetics. . . rests onthe assumption that reconciliation has been accomplished,that all is well with society. . . . But the cleavage. theantagonism persists, and it is a sheer lie to assert that ithas been overcome . . . in the states of the Eastern bloc.The magic spell which holds Lukacs in thrall . . . is a re-enactment of that reconciliation under duress he hadhimself discerned at the heart of absolute idealism.

-Theodor W. Adorno. 1958

A considerable part of the leading German intelligentsia,including Adorno. have taken up residence In the 'GrandHotel Abyss' which I described in connection with mycritique of Schopenhauer as a beautiful hotel, equippedwith every comfort, on the edge of the abyss, of nothi-ngness, of absurdity. And the daily contemplation of theabyss between excellent meals or artistic entertainments,can only heighten the enjoyment of the subtle comfortsoffered. ' -Georg Lukacs, 1962

No intellectual wants to be called the dupe of a repressive

political system. No social critic wishes to be known as a self-serv-ing nihilist. Yet, beneath the sophisticated rhetoric, those are thenames being called in the passages quoted above. The polemicaltone of this exchange characterizes much of the discussionsurrounding LukacS Realism in Our Time'1

Soon after its publication

J. C. L. A. Vol. XI : Nos. 1-2: 1988.85

in German (1958) and English (1962) the book became a lightning rodfor hostile criticism. Thirty years later one wonders why. Fifteenyears after the leading antagonists died- Theodor W. Adorno in 1969and Georg Lukacs in 1971-one asks whether substantive issues wereat stake. And a hundred years after Lukacs was born (1885). onewonders whether his Iiterary-critical positions deserve to bereconsidered. I!

This article attempts to reassess Realism in Our Time Morespecifically. the article tries to uncover philosophical dimensions thathave been buried by partisan polemics. First the English-languagereception of Lukacs book will be reviewed. Then I shall summarizedisagreements between Lukacs and Adorno about the relative meritsof modernist and realist literature. Next I shall locate some bases forthe disagreements summarized. My focus will be on the methodo-logical categories of "worldview" (Weltanschauung-often translated as"ideology") and ..technique'- (Technik). The concluding section willpropos~ ways to handle problems in Lukacs methodology withoutabandoning his larger project of literary criticism.

Polemics and Dialogue

Lukacs work in aesthetics and literary criticism has had agradual but limited rec9ption in English-speaking countries. Most of hiswritings first appeared in German. By the time of his death in 1971, howe-ver, wholesale condemnations had become politically correct in EastGermany and politically fashionable among West Germanys New Left.During this time Ehrhard Bahr noted a "Lukacs-Renaissance" inEnglish-speaking countries.s It began with interest in Lukacs writingson literature. several of which were translated in the 1960s.4 In theearly 1970s attention shifted to his pol itical and philosophical writings,although the literary and aesthetic works continued to playa role.5 Publi-cation of Lukacs werke since 1963 and further translations into English6,have fed a steady trickle of scholarly studies.7 It remains to be seen whe-ther these studies will find their way into the mainstreams of English-language aesthetics and Iiterary criticism.

The prospects for a broad reception do not look promising.~Many factors have contributed to this situation. Perhaps the most obvious

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-,is narrow partisanship, which has been especially prominent in responsesto Realism in Our Time. One of the first reviews in English, for example,dismisses the book in Cold War language. Donald Davie identifies Lukacswith "the communist world" and says he is not "wholly frank" with "us,"After objecting to, unsubstantiated literary judgments, Davie concludeswithout evidence that many of these judgments "are surely juSt."9 Withthis apparently unwarranted concession the book has been written_ off.Comparing such a review with the noncommittal comments of Max Rieser10or the enthusiastic endorsement of Raymond Williams,ll one soon wonderswhether hidden agendas are blocking fruitful dialogue.

The hazards of narrow partisanship are clear from an exchangein Encounter in 1963. Much of the exchange concerns Lukacs' person andpolitics. Ad hominem arguments occur on all sides. The exchange beganwith George Lichtheim's harsh criticisms of Realism in Our Time,uLichtheim claims that habitual accommodation to Marxist-Leninism hasruined Lukacs' early promise and created an "intellectual disaster." Lukacshas provided neither "a genuine critique of modernity" nor "authenticdialectical Marxism." In fact, "he has failed altogether as a responsiblewriter, and ultimately as a man,"u Lichtheim's criticisms are arrogant,insensitive, and incorrect, according to George Steiner: "Lukacs is oneof the great literary critics of the 20th century," one who refused to"compromise with his aesthetic standards" despite the Party line.14, InAlasdair Macintyre's opinion, both Lichtheim and Steiner fail to see Lukacsas a "tragic figure, the tragedy springing from the forms of his ownthought."15 The rest of this exchange continues in a similar vein. Theresult is that readers confront conflicting and ill-founded pronouncementsabout Lukacs himself but learn little about the book under review andeven less about the central issues in It.

Example of partisan readings or misreadings are easily multi-plied. Harold Rosenberg suggests that much in Realism in Our Time"cannot be taken seriously." He consigns Lukacs to the camp of reactionarycritics.l6 Although seeming to take the book seriously, Susan Sontag findsin it little more 1han an objectionable "coarseness" and a "reactionaryaesthetic sensibility." Her postscript declares Lukacs incapable of "anintelligent involvement with the problems and objectives of 'modernism'in the arf1s."17Peter Demetz goes even farther, calling Lukacs a "I iteraryterrorist" whose Stal inist ideology bl inds him to the nuances of literary~

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texts. Realism in our Time is little more than a 'rearguard action" againstthe desires of younger writers in Communist countries.18

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Reviews such as these might raise important points. Their toneand manner suggest however, that discussion would hardly be worthwhile.At the same time one wonders why so many prominent intellectuals havebothered to review the book if it is as bad as some of them have sugge-sted. Lukacs seems to have hit raw nerves, eliciting partisan polemicsrather than genuine dialogue. This is loot to say that dialogue must beSHictly nonpartisan in order to be genuine. Lukacs' own writings providesome eloquent examples to the contrary. There are instances, however,where partisanship becomes so narrow that dialogue is cut off. Severalinstances occur in the reception of Realism in Our Time.

Fortunately more favorable comments have countered theseinstances.19 In addition several articles have taken the book seriouslyenough to test its methodology on specific literary works,20 examine itscategories,21 or note its corrective contributions.2\! Objections raised insuch articles tend to be discussable criticisms rather than polemical prono-uncements, Furthermore such criticisms provide important clues tophilosophical issues beneath partisan polemics. What is needed now, itseems,'is an attempt to follow those clues and to uncover philosophicaldimensions of Lukacs' controversial book.

My strategy is to enter this book through "Reconciliation underDuress:' the well-known review by Adorno from which I quoted earlier.Although highly polemical, Adorno's review does provide discussable criti-cisms, and it highlights philosophical issues. Having been read widelyin German and in English translation, "Reconciliation under Duress" hasbecome an important document in Western Marxist aesthetics.29 Perhapsit will help us recover philosophical dimensions of Realism in Our Time.To recover them, however, we must avoid merely using Adorno to attackLukacs or using Lukacs to refute Adorno. Each text must be used to readthe other. In this way we shall be able to note methodological basesfor their obvious disagreements and hidden agreements. Philosophicalissues will begin to emerge, and a philosophical reassessment will becomepossible.

Two objections could be raised to this strategy. One is that weneed to examine major philosophical texts in order to unders1and fully ".~

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'-.the philosophical issues in Adornos'review. We should be discussing Lukacs'two-volume Aesthetik'H and Adorno's unfinished Aesthetic Theory,25There is something to this objection. Yet an initial grasp of philoso-phical issues can be gained from comparing more topical writings wherephilosophers are addressing contentio~s questions. A second obje-ction might challenge the assumption that Adorno's review and Lukacs'book contain "hidden agreements" and "philosophical issues," In reply letme say that this assumption is no wild guess. Instead it is an hypothesisinformed both by the texts themselves and by several instructive compari-sons of Lukacsianand Adornian aesthetics.96 Such comparisons suggestthat beneath the heated rhetoric there is considerable philosophical agree-ment, and that the'actual disagreements are themselves anchored in philo-sophical considerations. Our next step is to examine the most obviousdisagreement, one concerning "modernism" and "realism" in literature.

Modernism and Realism

Adorno's review expresses forcefully his disagreement with Lukacs aboutthe relative merits of modernist and realist literature. Yet the nature andthe extent of this disagreement are not easily determined. According toFredric Jameson. the dispute has tangled historical roots extending to \~Seventeenth-century Querelle des anciens et des modernes. Furthermore"modernism" and "realism" are incommensurable categories.\17 Suchcomplexity, both historical and categorical, make it hard to discoverexactly what is under dispute and precisely where the disagreement beginsand ends. One could propose that Lukacs sets realism against modernism,whereas Adorno endorses modernism as realism. Given the complexityjust mentioned, however, such a proposal would be abstract. It wouldneed considerable elaboration to help us understand Adorno's disagree.ment, Let's begin instead with a summary of the two authors' conflictingdescriPtions of modernist and realist literature.

Lukacs distinguishes three main streams in twentieth-centuryliterature; modernism. critical realism, and socialist realism. Representa-tives of the three streams would be Franz Kafka, Thomas Mann, and MaximGorky, respectively. We may simplify Lukacs' descriptions ,9f thesestreams as follows. Modernist literature is bourgeois literature that ischaracterized by ahistorical angst in the face of monopoly capitalism.

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.'".,critical realism, although ideologically bourgeois, is a literature ofhistorical, sober optimism that does not reject socialism. Socialist realismis similarly historical and optimistic. Unlike critical realism. however, ituses a socialist perspective "to describe the forces working towardssocialism from the inside'. (RT 93/551). Whereas critical and socialistrealism can form a common front against the cold War, modernism inadver-tently supports the forces of destruction.

Adorno makes no secret of his hostil itY toward this mode ofclassification: "Operatlng reductively, imperiously distributing labels...,Lukacs sti II behaves Iike a cultUral commissar... No bearded Privy Counci-llor could pontificate about art in a manner more alien to it" (RD 153/253-254). Instead of exposing Lukacs' system at its foundations, Adornosubverts it case by ca se, with the following. results. Works called"modernist" by Lukacs are touted by Adorno as genuinely realistic works,in the sense that they provide "negative knowledge" of sociohistoricalreality (RD158-161 /259-262). The supposed "worldlessness" of modernart, for example, is the dialectical truth about socially induced alienation

~RD160-161/262). Works classified as "critical realisti" Adorno claimsto be less "realist" and more "modernist"than Lukacs thinks (RD 163/265,171-172/273-274). Adorno's comments on Thomas Mann are a case inpoint. Rather than rejecting the subjectivizing of time, as Lukacs argues,Mann's The Magic Mountain maintains ambivalence between objectiveand subjective concepts of time, according to Adorno. Towards so-called"socialist realism" Adorno's tactic is less indirect. He says socialistrealist works are historically out of date and technically regressive. Theirregressiveness originates in backward social forces of production (RD 163-164/265-266). Indeed, the procedures of socialist realism, like those ofLukacs book, are ideological coverings for oppressive featUres in Sovietsociety (RD 175-176/278-279). In effect Adorno is declaring socialistrealist works to be not only less modern but also Jess realistic than the"modernist" works that Lukacs seems to reject. Adorno arrives at thisdramatically different assessment not so much by challenging Lukacs'classifications as by subverting the system of classification. He retainsLukacsian labels but shifts their usage and meaning.

.This subversion adds semantic compl ications to the historical and

categorical complexity described earlier. Lukac's tidy system seemsshattered, his three labels replaced by Adorno's ever shifting usages.

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Beneath the surface, however, we can find a consistent pattern to Adorno'sdisagreement over the relative merits of modernism and realism. He consi-stently refuses to address matters of worldview, and he repeatedlyemphasizes formal or technical considerations. Before discussing themethodological bases for this pattern, let me illustrate its presence inAdorno's review. The illustration will expand our picture of the twoauthors' conflicting assessments of twentieth-century literature.

Adorno takes Lukacs to task for misinterpreting modernist Irtera-ture and, more broadly, modern art. Adorno rejects the claim, supposedlymade by Lukacs, that style, form, and technique are overemphasized inmodernist works-that these are "formal ist" works. Adorno replies thatsuch features are constitutive of art as art. They are the means throughwhich artistic objectivity is achieved. Lukacs mistake is this: "Insteadof recognizing the objective function of formal elements in the aesJheticimport (Geha/t) of modern art, Lukacs deliberately misinterprets them asaccidents, as arbitrary ingredients added by the over-inflated subject"(RD 153/253). And just as in general Lukacs misinterprets the formalelements in modern art, so in his specific evaluations Lukacs ignores formalelements in favor of the "content" (Stoff) and the "message" of indivi-dual works (RD 172/214).

Although Adorno's comments on Lukacs methods are often astute,one wonders whether Lukacs claim about "formal isms" has been fullyunderstood. Adorno fails to distinguish sufficiently between Lukacs'opposition to formalist literary criticism and Lukaos' actual assessment offormal features in modernist works of literature. The passage cited fromRea/ism in Our Time (see RD 153/253) concerns formalist criticism. Thepassage says little about formalism in the works themselves. Lukacs isinsisting here that the literary critic's 11'0deof classifcation not be derivedfrom purely formal problems. By giving primary attention to purely formalproblems the literary critic will ignore the specific character of the worksand writers to be classified. The stylistic differences. say, between JamesJoyce and Thomas Mann, both of whom use mono/ague interieur" are onesnot merely of form or technique but fundamentally of literary worldviews.The literary critic mu~t begin with the basic worldview (we/tanschau/icheGrund/age) rather than the formal or technical features of modernistliterature (see RT 17-19/467-469). Given what this passage actually says,Adorno's objectien seems wide of the mark.

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Perhaps it is Lukacs' emphasis on worldview that provokesAdorno's subsequent charge of "subjectivism". Adorno says Lukacs looksfor meaning (Sinn) that has been "arbitrarily superimposed" on literaryworks instead of the meaning that emerges through their formal elements(RD 153/253). Yet it is not clear that this charge is accurate. In keepingwith a methodological emphasis on worldview, Lukacs open his asses-ment of modernism by describing and attacking its views of human beings.society, and history. These views have drastic consequences, some ofwhich are formal. As a tendency unified at the level of worldview, moder-nism leads to the destruction of traditional forms and of "literary formsas such" (RT 45-46/499). Does this account look for meaning that hasbeen arbitrarily superimposed on literary works? It is hard to say, partly,because Adorno has ignored the. concept of "worldview". Instead ofelaborating his charge by examining this concept and its function inLukacs' book, Adorno simply repeats the charge under different guises.For example, according to Adorno, Lukacs fails to see that modernistworks have moved beyond their alleged solipsism (RD 160/262). Suchblindness arises from Lukacs' low esteem for literary technique and hisemphasis on "perspective," which Lukacs wishes to impose on worksfrom outside (RD 161-164/263-265). A later passage on realism showsthat Adorno's charge of "subjectivism" addresses Lukacs entire book, notmerely the sections on modernism. Part of Adorno's cure for Lukacsiansubjectivism would be a heavier emphasis on objective... technical factorsgoverning artistic production" (RD 173/275-276).

I think the pattern to Adorno's disagreement has been sufficientlyillustrated. The pattern rests on at least two methodological categories,namely Lukacs' concept of "worldview," which Adorno seems to ignore,and Adorno's concept of "technique," which Lukacs seems not to share.Whereas Luk<lcSdismisses modernism primarily because of its despairingworldview, Adorno dismisses socialist realism primarily because of itstechnical backwardness. Where as Lukacs' key to realism is the world-view presented, Adorno's key is the technique employed. Neither autho~wishes to divorce what is presented from how it is presented. Bothauthors think that literary works perform cognitive and ideological rolesin society. Nevertheless their assessments of twentieth-century literatureconflict. A difference in methodological categories seems central to this

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conflict. Examining the categories of worldview and technique shouldshed further light on the conflict, despite the complexities already notedin the concepts of "modern tsm" and "real ism".

Worldview

There can be no mistaking the centrality of "worldview" (Weltan-schauung) in Lukacs' book. It is a concept he explains, continually uses,and repeatedly emphasizes. There can also be no mistaking Adorno sdistaste for this concept. His review not only ignores LukGcs' explanationsbut also mocks "perspective" (Perspektive), a concept closely related to"worldview" (AD 153/253, 162.163}263-265). To understand the meaningand function of Lukacs' concept we need to examine his own writings.Initially Adorno's review will be of little help.

It has been claimed, sometimes as a criticism,.

that in principleLukacs' approach to literature is that of German Geistesgeschichte.28With respect to his emphasis on worldview this claim is surely correct,and it indicates fundamental continuities from The Theory of the Novelto Realism in Our Time.29 Yet the precise contours of Lukacs' concepthave a more recent history. They were forged in the 1930s when Lukacswas developing a Marxist-Leninist aesthetic amid debates about expres-sionism and socialist realism. In this context "worldview" became whatNichols describes as "a concept underlying almost all of Lukacas' pres-criptive, evaluative, and theoretical. statements about literature,"aoIIWorldview" turned into a central and complex category. It has threekinds of complexitY in Realism in Our Time.

In the first place Lukacs finds evidence of worldviews in manydifferent literary contexts. Not only do authors, readers, and criticshave worldviews, but also the worldview within the work need notcoincide with that of the author or recipients. Even characterswithin a novel may have diverse worldviews; having a distinct world-view is a mark of profound characterization.31 Because worldviewscan be found on so many sides of the literary situation, the concept'smeaning becomes multivalent and its usage complicated.

In the second place Lukacs does not clearly specify the mean-ing of "worldview". He proposes to use the term not in a "strictlyphilosophical sense," which he does not define, but in a broad way

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to indicate widely shared reactions to the main trends in recentworld history. In this way he can speak of one worldview under-lying the peace movment or underlying all contemporary realism, eventhough ne also notices many different worldviews in both move-ments.52 Such a broad description allows for multiple meanings. Attimes "worldview" seems to indicate a philosophical ontology oranthropology (RT 19-21 1469-472, 30-33 I 482-485). At othertimes basic experiences, attitudes towards life, or socio - political

stances are intended (RT 34-37 1486-490, 47-53 I 500-507, 70-82526-541). At still other times "worldview" is nearly equated withthe import (Gehalt) of a literary work (RT 47-53/ 500-507, 72--74529-531, 82-92 I 541-5501. Because the concept's general meaningis not clearly specified, several different defi'nitions are possible.These may be incompatible with one another.

Consequently, in the third place, Lukacs's usage of the conceptis complicated. VarietY of occurrences and multivalence of meaningmake it difficult to detect reliable criteria of application. Three pro-blems here are 1) how worldviews align themselves with literaryworks; 2) how worldviews are connected with other sociohistoricalphenomena; and 3) what is being criticized, the absence or theincorrectness of a particular worldview. In view of such complexity,

I now propose to reconstruct parts of the book's argument. Doingthis will enable us to determine the methodological significance of"worldview" while 'observing it in limited operation.

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Lukac's stated aim is to criticize modernism in order touncover contemporary possibilities for critical realism. his method isto contrast these literary trends with respcet to decisive "worldview-artistic problems" (RT 17/467). The hyphenated adjective (we/tanschau-lich-kuenstlerisch) already indicates that, no matter how worldviewand artistry are related, in this book they belong together. For theLukacsian critic formal considerations must flow from worldview con-cerns. The fundamental principles at stake in contemporary bour-geois literature are ones of worldview, not of mere technique. In aproper contrast between modern ism and critical realism, questions ofworldview must take precedence over ones of form (RT 17-19/467-469). "'jt.

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" Much later Lukacs proposes a method for analyzing theperspective in bourgeois literature (RT 59-71 / 514-528). First he claimsthat the crucial difference in perspective is whether or not socialism isrejected. Then he provides brief analyses of several works. The methCldof such analyses depends, he says, on examining lithe mutual relationbetween world view and artistic configuration (Gestaltung)." Here"worldview" signifies both 1) how th8 writer "consciously formulates" astance toward problems of life and society and 2) how the writer givesthese matters configuration (gestaltet) "instinctively and with artisticconsciousness." Lukacs adds that "profound contradictions" can obtainbetween the consicious formulation and the artistic expression(RT 71/528),For convenience let me label these two matters "worldview-1" and"worldview-2", Worldview-1 is the writers consciously formulated views,for example a writer's opinions on an upcoming election as these are statedin a letter to the editor of The New York Times. Worleview-2 is the stanceartistically presented in the literary work, such as a novel's general attitudetoward current electoral processes. Presumably Lukacs' method wouldinvolve careful comparisons among worldview-1, worldview-2, and the

total work under study,

Similar distinctions support Lukacs' earlier claim that the,

fundamental differences between Joycean and Mannian styles lie in the"literary worldview" intended, The fundamental differences are ones of"intention," he writes (RT 19/469). Lukacs says an intention is what takesshape in a literary work, The works intention need not coincide with theauthor's conscious intent or with the author's opinion about the work. Thedistinction implied here between intention and intent seems to resemblethe one between worldview-2 and worldview-1. This resemblance becomesclearer in Lukacs' subsequent elaboration of <'literary worldview" (dichte-rische Weltanschauung). He describes this concept with three cumulativephrases, The first phrase, /'the world pictUre (Weitbild) in the work,"corresponds to the intention that takes shape or worldview-2. Let's callthis the worldview In the work, The second phrase, "the writer's positiontoward this vision...about reality", covers the author's intent and cons-cious views and corresponds toworldview-1. Let's call this the worldviewof the writer. To these phrases Lukacs adds a third: ,'the evaluation of theworld picture grasped in this manner" (RT 19/469). Whose evaluation weare not told. It could be the writer's evaluation, in which case the second

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and third descriptive phrases overlap. Or t he evaluation could be thecritic'S stance toward the work, the critic's effort at bringing out theworldview of the work. In this case we could distinguish ulIVorldview-3:'the critic's stance. The most likely possibility. in my opinion, is that theevaluation in question includes both the writer's and the critics. Thispossibility would help explain the ease with which Lukacs uses non-literary statements by authors and critics alike to support his analyses ofthe worldview in modernist works. In any case a "literary worldview"includes all the elements indicated by Lukacs three phrases.

In addition, a literary worldview is the "essence" of aWork's "final import" (Wesen des letzten Gehalts), and a work's form is

"'the specific form. of this specific import" (RT 19/469). Lukacs'emphasis on ,worldview rather than on form or technique is a matterof priority rather than exclusion. Critics must not ignore form ortechnique, but they cannot properly understand a form unless theygrasp it as the form of a literary import whose crux is a literaryworldview. For Lukacs the contrast between modernism and criticalrealism rests on literary worldviews. These contain both the world-view in'literary works and the worldview of literary authors. Theworldview of literary critics might also be included.

Adorno's review dsoe not directly challenge Lukacs'concept of a literary worldview. Nor does Adorno explicitly criticize

lukacs' account of relations among worldview, import, and form.Instead, as we have seen, Adorno repeatedly charges Lukacs with

ignoring form or technique, overemphasizing the message or subject-

matter, imposing meaning on literary works, and failing to reach

their true import (Wahrheitsgehalt). Adorno does not argue that

"worldview" should not be methodologically central, or that makingit central must entail inattention to formal features, or that Lukacs

methods are inconsistent with his methodology. Although Adornohits some of Lukacs actual interpretations, he fails to reach the

central category in which they are anchored.

1his failure puts Adorno in an awkward position, for hisown categories look rather Lukacsian. Simply by inserting the cate-gory of worldview Lukacs could easily endorse many points that

Adorno intends as criticisms. Adorno insists that the critic recogni;z:e

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the "objective function" of formal elements in a work's"aesthetic import" (RD 153/253), Lukacs would agree, provided one seesa literary worldview as the crux of the work's import. Adorno says thisimport is not real in the same sense as social reality is; ar(s task is to imagethe essence (Wesen) of social realities (RD 159-160/260-261 ).Again Lukacscould concur: literary import is specifically literary, and a worK's ',ef/ec-tion" (Wiederspiegelung) Is of social reality's essence (Wesen), not ofof surface phenomena (Erscheinungen); but of course, Lukacs would add, a

.Iiterary worldview should guide the interpretation of a works reflection.Furthermore, just as Adorno thinks formal artistic laws are crucial to art'simaging, so Lukacs sees them as crucial to art's reflecting. Adorno seemsto be shadowboxing at the rr,ethodological level,

At this point we might decide that the entire dispute hingeson different literary preferences, which have their own ideological andpol itical-econornic supports. Yet such a decision w()uld be premature.What Lukacs means by "import" conflicts with Adornos meaning, andAdorno's understanding of artistics forms does not match Lukacs under-standing. Let me begin to indicate these differences by reconstructinganothe r part of Lukacs' argument.

We have seen that for Lukacs a literary worldview comprisesthe worldview in a Iiterary work, the worldview of the writer, and perhapsthat of the critic, A literary worldview is the crux of the import of aliterary work. At the center of such import in contemporary literature, he

.continues, lies a view of humanity (RT 19-21/469-472), Are human beings

essentially social and historical beings, as Aristotle suggests? Or are theyessentially asocial, ahistorical, solitary individuals thrown into being, asHeidegger supposedly claims? The contrast between realism and modernismboils down to a contrast between these two views, according to Lukacs.The second view characterizes modernist writers and works. This viewof humanity "must make itself felt in a special way in all areas of artisticconfiguration, and it must profoundly influence all principles of literaryform" (RT 21/472), The rest of Chapter One describes the ramifications ofexistentialist anthropology in modernist works: dissolution of personalityand of reality (RT 21-28/472-479); emphasis on pathology and distortion(28-33/479-485); a lack of perspective (33-40/485-492); and the prevalenceof a allegory (40-46/492-499),

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The three features just described help deflect some of Adorno'sobjections. Adorno says, for example,' that Lukacs should not expectindividuals to overcome social isolation by adopting a different stance(RD 1621263-264, 1651267). Here Adorno ignores not only Lukacs' attemptto locate the emphasis on isolation in a literary worldview but also hisclaim that such isolation arises from sociohistorical conditions, and hisspecific worry that modernist import and forms fail to expose these condi-tions. At the same time the three features of Lukacs' argument serve toindicate ,differences between Lukacsian and Adornian categories. ForLukacs the import of modernist works has at its heart an incorrect view ofhumanity. This literary worldview has profound formal ramifications. Butfor Adorno the import of modern ist works does not have any worldview atits heart. Nor does he consider import to be "form-determinative" (RT19/469). Part of the dispute about the merits of modernism stems fromincompatible methodologies. Although seeming to share categories suchas import and form, Lukacs and Adorno construe these categoriesdifferently because of contrasting emphases on vVorldview and technique.The contrast can be made clearer by considering Adorno's concept of"technique," which informshis charges of Lukacsian blindness to formal

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Technique

According to Adorno's book on Wagner, "the key to any andevery artistic import lies in artistic technique,"33 Adorno elaborates thisclaim in his Aesthetic Theory. After positing a "dialectical relation"between import (Gehalt) and technique (Technik), Adorno writes thattechnique is of "key importance" for interpreting art." "Technique aloneguides the reflective person into the inner core of art works, provided ofcourse he also speaks their language." Although there is more to art thantechnique, "substance (Gehalt) can (only) be extrapolated from the con-

crete application of technique."34 Adorno conceives of literary techniqueas something from which critics must elicit the import of a work. Techni-que is a central category in his literary-critical methodology.

Lukacs shares neither Adorno's concept of technique nor hisemphasis on it. Lukacs own approach to "technique" is implicit in hisparenthetical distinction between "inner -artistic form'- and "technical

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form" (RT 53/507). An explicit statement occurs in his '1954 article on"Art and Objective Truth."s5 There Lukacs objects to the tendency toidentify technique and form. a tendency which he considers bourgeoisand subjectivistic. Technique is the artist's acquired ability to realizeartistic ends. It is merely "a means for expressing the reflection of realitythrough the alternating conve~sion (gegenseitige Umschlagen ineinander)of content (Inhalt) and form," Far from giving the critic a key to ar.tisticimport, technique itself can be correctly understood only in itsdependence on the dialectical nexus of reality. content. and form.Interpreters who isolate technique remove it from the "objective problemsof art." Interpreters who emphasize technique obscure the more profoundproblemsof artistic form.S 6 Perhaps. then. we may summarize as follows.Whereas an Adornian critic would try to elicit a work's import from itstechnique a Lukacsian critic would try to explain how a technique isdetermined by the work's import and by problems of' content and form.The -Lukacsiancritic would give lower priority to technicaJrnatterS. In factLukacs easily draws lines between lIessential problems of art" and"technical details of artistic technique.I'S7

Lukacs' approach to "technique" helps clarify the contrast hefinds between two uses of monologue interieur. For James Joyce, sayslukacs. this is not merely a Iiterary technique but the "inner form" of hiswork. For Thomas Mann. however. monologue interieur is a meretechnique, one whose use is governed by formal principles of the tradi-tional epic (RT 17-18/467-468). For Lukacs himself, Mann's use is of theproper kind. since Mann does not inflate a mere technique into an essen-t ial form. Lukacs seems to assume that what is proper for the Lukacsiancritic is also proper for the literary artist, For Adorno. however, Lukacs'approach to technique is reactionary. It amounts to "nullifying thedevelopment of the technical forces of production and canonically reins-tating older forms that are intrinsically outdated" (RD 162/264).

Adorno's objection here implies not only'a different approachto technique but also a nonLukacsian concept of "form". Two traits ofthis concept bear directly on the question of technique. In the first place.Adorno views artistic forms as techniques that have solidified at a certainstage in the development of artistic materials. Form, he says. is "theimprint of the human hand in an art work.""Form is "the mark of social

99

labour.s8 Although 'Adorno distinguishes forrn from technique, heseesmuch greater continuity between them than Lukacs does. In the secondplace, Adorno thinks problems of form inhere in artistic materials as thesedevelop, and he discusses such problems in terms of the "logic" ofindividual works.S8 Lukacs, by contrast, thinks problems of form areinherited from traditional genres and styles, and he discusses suchproblems in terms of the real "lawfulness" (Gesetzmaessigkeit) that isreflected by forms. ConsequenHy Lukacs has much less enthusiasm forformal experimentation. Adorno calls form a "sedimentation" of content,thus implying that as society changes so artistic materials.. techniques,and forms must also change. Lukacs calls form the "highest abstraction"of content, thus implying that as the laws of reality remain valid over longstretches of history so do -the appropriate artistic forms. which mustgovern the use of techniques..o For Adorno formal innovation is a libera-ting. p.roductive force in critique of the dominant mode of production. ForLukacs traditional forms are valid ways of reflecting the dominant mode ofproduction. .

Such differences concerning technique and form spill over:into the category of "import". The critic who elicits literary import froma work's technique is dOing something different from the critic who showsthat a work's import essentially determines the wOrk's form and therebyalso its technique. This difference in literary-critical methods is anchoredin two different concepts of "import". Both concepts concern the manner.in which works present social reality, and both concepts provide over-arching standards of literary criticism. Yet the two concepts are i.ncompa-tible. Perhaps their incompatibility can best be seen by describing thetheory of artistic production that each concept implies. Adorno'scategory of "import"implies that the artist's social experience.. which isprimarily unconscious, interacts with artistic materials and techniques.If the experience is sufficiently deep, and if the materials and techniquesare suffiently advanced, then works will result whose import penetratesthe reified facades of contemporary society,H Lukacs' category impliesthat the artist's social consciousness avails itself of various forms. If thisconsciousness is sufficiently correct, and if the forms are sufficientlylawful and appropriate, then works will result whose import properlyreflects the essence of reified life in contemporary society. Adorno'scategory of "import" implies very little about the conscious ideology of

'100

~.

the author. Lukacs, however, leaves little doubt thai the' correctness corin correctness of social consciousness is a matter of explicit stances.Even though he emphasizes the worldview in the work, his entire apProach.makes central to Import the writer's conscious views-"worldview~"1" or.

the worldview of the writer. -

Here very few changes occur between Lukacs' articles in the1930s and Realism in Our Time, The following passage from "Narrate orDescribe ?" could easily have been repeated in Lukacs' account of contem-porary real ism:

A writer's worldview is merely the synthesized total of thewriter's experiences, raised to a certain level of gene'raliza-tion. For the writer the significance of worldview is _ that;'as' the basis of correct feel ings and correct thinking, ayvorldvievy providE:!sthe basis for correct writing ...Without a,worIdview a writer. cannot narrate correctly,'cannot contruct a correct, well-organized, multifaceted, andcomprehensive epic composition.u . .

-

· This emphasis on the writer's woridview helps generate thescarcely veiled threat when Lukacs says the persisten use of nonrealisticteohniqueshas deep roots in the lives of certain Soviet writers. Having acOrJect worldview suddenly becomes a matter of life and death."'s For theLukacsian critic the writer's worldview seems to be the most importantcomponent in a literary worldview, which itself is the key to interpretingliterary import and arl other literary phenomena.

Even if Lukacs did not consider the writen worldview mostimportant, however, his emphasis on literary worldview would generatea problematic approach to literary import. Adorno registers some of theproblems without pinpointing their source. By eliciting import fromtechnique in his own literary criticism, Adorno offers a partial correctionto Lukacsian methods. By emphasizing technique in his critique ofLukacs, however, Adorno obscures the methodological source of problemsin Lukacs' approach to literary import. These problems do not result fromLukacsian bl indness to form or technique. Instead they stem from whatAdorno vaguely identifies as inadvertent subjectivism (RD 1531253). Moreprecisely put, the main difficulties arise from a double expectation that

.. literary import originates in the knowing subject and that this subject~\-

101

~

102

~.,W,tf;\i,s.ag~...J Marx.jst-L!3ninism~$ 'emphasls~ oIT~worldVieW ma'de if easy fdr,r..ulqjcs to-transfer oonnotations of the nine'feenth~c-entu~'f S'e~fch'lntb 'his

Marxist.Lenirnst aesthetics. .The categorY"'{lf ::w6rlCfvievv'(' aided this

transfer. -The '>cat~gory embooJres a 'nin9teen'th'-cen'fUryt'ekpe6'tafi80'thatmeal}jf1gcc;l"ltI~timateLy b-atfGUBC. in.,!the ,.,piatemfctr- st)bject~ speciflcallY'in

.the,subjeet1s(gICDbaLGutloo~. ",.-4, r-!,' "~:,, N~'

,".1.("

"'''(\?

J',

~.I 'c~ 1 ~;.n;.. "Of':'. S'..-:t, I( r'(.' :J nCif'. \t~: Q~)f~~h! ('1; v r"

.f fJf:.1+ 1"\/0

,", ; ,', t, Ad~~rp c~pe~.~9l sD~re}~ii~lexp;~t~tiofl. In .fact hi$\' GODoept(of t~c,hn~<il~.? 9aQ);>~ ,~e~~y~~, a1 ty,r;>~GaI,t~i3'11.tieit~t~~MUfY{\:pn(j:ept, 80d:his

!3mp1t)?S~~PI1I~~c~p.i-qHe&,afbq.e !r~pd,-~ ia,rej~tioJ1 ~~T,,-Jy <!ttel11Pt')to, loc~tethe ultimate source of meaning in the ePl:tn~mjf, ,~,yb~ct"lIjTttuSr, i~,d_ssurprising that Adorno's own aesthetics displays problems similar to those

in ,L\1kacsl~'approach lto 1ft~fary '1mfiort 'Th;i fact' shoulamake us waryof straightfQrward solutionS0 Nevertheless' ghouli:l 'like to describe! Sblrleproblem's'in Lukacs' methodology arid propose solutions 'that ~tespecf themalo. ooncerns of RelJlism' in'ONr Time. -. "

',.( ~

IC~

Problems and Propos~ls1. I :-;::')f~1 :::L;: ... !

I," "Three p'iobh~ms stanaoui in:tuk'acs' etnphasiS on' lit~rary

wbrldVrew~!aritl'f1'isapproach:to'1itef'ary. import. . '1)' thsuftioient attention-is"glven'. to tYdw a' -wbr1<!S frhportHs connected' itvv'itl1'its actual 'socialfuntfons. I 2)' cHi5t~rrc>9raphic judgments'--'b'ecome 'schef'r1aticVan& '~ague.3') [),ivers~ crfteda 'of e\'taiua-ti-Onare-fea8ded-t-o;I'rIe-te'm~fKs-of 961}jectiveworldV~g.'LA:drtWrtel:ll'{n_this"list)!. i'~hself'- schema'tic !antl 'Va'gue\; itshdtJid be ~b'cumen1e!d' ir'( detail. "'Given-the' une~ef\ reb~pfi'drY'dfIRea/ism.

tn 6L1r'TiMe,'trmw~vijt,811tMink a"relcned'ta$kf'is''1rl6're urgent,c namely addticaf' ~rdt,trationc'Of'Lt:Jkacs' methodc:Hogy~ ~i'mtend itd'-propas~ theDegittningsv~ 'Such ~n ap~\'o~riat1on.: My- Pfbp(Jsal's will i-d'<!Jress the

th'rM t>fobIEfms'just 'Ii~ted. 1>ut I'hOP~'td~'\1o-id 'sifrrjlaiprob1'ems1!in' ,iRdbrno'sa~siti~iibs. f'J

,; l:': ,: c I \i' ,1'" (1

.'''ct, F :>ILj .

.1 (lUitlL::1; (~ll :i I J11.. 1'!'1 \.,j:tJi"

If, (II; 'I ~,1., (1As.-lhave triad,to sh,ow,,)t-herei,is,a,metIWdgloQJicql basis

tOJ(1)he,dis{)ute between Luk(jGS aJ;1,dAdoroo,) over th~ r~la\i~e m~(its ofr!3al,itSm!3nqr(lQP~rn iSR'"

,iThis 9iiSis )<fil!l)Je se~n ,in c;pnfl,i~tiL1g. ~f\1phasesQi\ M\lQrJdv.1~w]t.8I:1!;h~(!cl.1(1iqwe.. ~PlPlr~€!s ,t,h,att ~ot~jlqiffer~nt t.qp,proachesto import and form. At bottom the dispute and its basi~ ,_C,li>'{)Q~m,tQe~wa'{s

'-103

./-ill-in which authentic. autonomous works of literature give us knowledge ofthe sociohistorical totality. That some works provide this knowledge,and that dOing so is a primary task of art, are not points ofdisagreement between Lukacs .and Adorno. Nor are several, relatedassumptions: !hat.artistic autonomy is.a precondition for such knowledge;that some works are authentic; and that there is a sociohistorical totality,however fragmentary its surface may seem. A complete assessment of thedispute would have to examine these shared assumptions and their linksto a questionable totalizing of reification.4.6 My own assessment will bemore modest. It will focus first on the limits of ideology critique in themanner of Lukacs and Adorno.

According to Dieter Kliche and Peter Biirger, the assumptionsshared by Lukacs and Adorno lead them to emphasize ideology critique{it the expense of functional analysis. Both Lukacs and Adorno look forimport but overlook how literary works actually function in their institu'"tional settings. Kliche argues that both authors restrict their attention tohow supposedly authentic autonomous works disclose alienation and(possible) disalienation. This restriction does injustice to art's own"functional process of renewal and expansion.H Biirgermakes a similarpoint. He claims that neither authm says much about the -functions ofart works in the bourgeois institution of art. By "institution of art"Biirger means the conditions regulating commerce with works of a certainkind in a given society or social class. During the nineteenth century.he argues, the relative independence of bourgeois art from other socialsubsystems went had in hand in hand with the increasingly apoliticalimport of individual works. In the twentieth century. however, a "self-cr.iticism" of bourgeois art has been provided by the historical avantgarde(primarily Dadaism, early Surreal ism. and the Russian avant-garde after:1917). This self-criticism has shown bourgeois art to be a social institu-tion whose principle has beco:ne tha social ineffectualness of autonomousworks. Lukacs and Adorno say little about functions because the doctrineof autonomy. which was central to the bourgeois institution of art, isalso central to their aesthetic theories. Instead of analyzing Institutionalfunctions that decide a work's social effects or lack of effect. bothauthors are led by the doctrine of autonomy to derive such effects from.the import of works in themselves. Ideology critique comes at the oxpenseof functional analysis.4.B ;

7'

104

,

Kliche and Barger see correctly, , think, that a.morefunc-'tiona' approach must be provided in order to appropriate ideology critique(j la Lukacs and Adorno. But I would not want to lose fruitful insightswhen pruning ideology critique for functional analysis. Thereat leasttwo ways in which pruning could go awry. The first would be to keepfunctional analysis separate from criticism of technique and import.Although ideology critique in the grand manner tends to ignore th~specific functioning of the works criticized, purely functional analysisquickly loses its methodological justification. Functional analysis requiresmethods for determining which works deserve analysis. If such methodsare I)ot to become arbitrary, then attention must be given to the 'iechnicalstatus and intrinsic importance of the works to be analyzed. Furthermore;as Adorno stresses, technique and import provide reliable clues to th~institutional functions of various works. A second mistake, in my opinion~would be to el iminate dimensions of ideology critique that transcend thebourgeois institution of art in its current form. A strength of Lukacsmethodology lies in its attempt to connect ideology critique with a morecomprehensive social ontology and philosophy of history. Of cours~, onecan hardly deny that Lukacs' actual literary criticism often overshootsthe mark. Without the attempt to make broader connections, however,both ideology critique and functional analysis might well become systema-tically crjppled and hist9rically short-sighted. A special strength ofAdorno's approach is its attentiveness to the culture industry. In fact hehas provided significant functional analyses of so-called papular art.Without such attention to this dominant institution the functions ofbourgeois works might be misread. In addition there might be no adequatetheory for indigenous and transitional artforms outside the .immediateorbit of late capitalism. Despite the limitations of what Lukacs andAdorno have achieved, functional analysis should not be separated fromideology criti que, nor should the breadth of such critique be abandoned.

2. The breadth of .Realism in Our Time may be seen in itsconcern for the direction and historical significance of contemporaryliterature. Pressure for pol itical effectiveness has not curtailed this concern,nor has the relativism of special ists deterred Lukacs from mapping largesociohistorical trends and patterns. The Hegelian sweep of his approachturns up important insights. Nevertheless his central category needs tobe recast. "Worldview" cannot bea sensitive historiographic barometer,

105

-~-?r.i,t~:""~Y':'a~~,lx ,f~,s~~ th~~e )~mrte~t'C.sq{\I,~1s,?~tm~as~~e,'7i'~nt.The first

~c~le proyid~s a 'perio~,zati19n, a vv.~y of ~!el ~£RJHrtQ large-sq~~d(Wffi;;oRrp'~~c,esses '~at, dopot recur: T~.e sel~}?n~ p~il')ts .'0 ty.p:ical (1~raqi9on~1 ~f

:p-~~~i5. to 'f.'hich 9?!ODq, ty,p,W~1 -Y'rws ~~o.Y.~r,IIj,Etan~;,,~8~I~tY()!~iXM~e!~~w:!-b-tl~rs m,ig~.t;jP'l.n dlst!n<;t-hist9~i.cfl ~~!~~. T~~rit1i~q~Rale ,,~eQiM-er~~pp~i~torica~, ,signifi,9an~e o~, sP,E(~ifiPt conHH~utip~~ qvyithin1"(i~otJpcWt4rWjnsittution: One exafDplef of,Lukpcs~'1 fu~ion oCRurs, i~ his aCf.o4D~.6~,f6'r'itica( realism.

JHe ,ildentlfles' c'rhica'l, realisnr in thfee diffe[elJt,.wa.y~

Wit~out Inot,in~ the! ,jdif~~r'~)n\,ki~t~~\?f ju)dg:,~eg~~i,~e)i~~T~~i~~9.. , 9{}tiC~1real'l~ i~a uniqu~, a~~L potrn~~~IIy.,;?rb~d ~trearn i~r. t~ent\~~~~~ntur.'(t~erature. ~It I:, a~s~\,'a".~on~,nuou~, 1J~?:~ar(~r~~iti~nJdla~n%.f~o~f~e ~a,~.\¥

nl~ete~~I~h centu~y.,< ,And it !s a;more or le~s .no~~~tlve ~ontr!~~tl~~ ":"_ItRJnco'ritemporary ~our9;~ol~~i5eratur~l.,$uc~,fusing, of dis!inc~ sorts of. judg-menfs ul1derlies~ot only the' much-maligned "c0ltservatism" ot,Lukaesian~rlticlsm ~u~al,so ~he' !~p~~ci\s}<3~ of_ his, hisi~r!<?waphic ;~ethod,

ltott-le . fusion were' dissolved. '''w~rld\;liew'' ~O'uld ~(?ioggOe~be.. the umbreHa under-whicl1 all,lnistoriograf)fHc judgmentsiare('~a6een;€crIi,dis.tinct:)elciboraflOt1s iw~retl1Ven' t~ th,e 'th~ee_ scales' 'of'-mea~uremenk

"asealvin Se~rveJd' .~~~~~6POS~?',i9 then more p~~~1~elih.iS\eodSgraph'~'::J,~~~?ments'wbuld be' facilitated. Seer%ldargues tfrat Hlst~ylc1rlisof art anHliteratUre shoUld distingu'rsh syhc1\rbhicpe'rTods. ""pefttttI)Mc" worldviews~and d'iachrohic 'sfyfes. {'his "cnMirnHit!Jh Vliould"p'errrM'cbmi:>ar~HivEf judg',;'mentsabOut the .'/cUrreht' milieu~' tPckHtrahaV' ma'rrtx; J~u'i/:j iI~verit~"I zirhportl~of artistic phehoWTena.50 Withfn"~PcarEifuHY dEHim'it'ed'perrbdtH~'l1istorTE~dbuld note n'1an9dist~cr \IV()rldt)l~Wshaviflg 1ra'ditidnalahtecM~ht$. I:¥he"Itfstorian- eou1d a~O" a!:fs~ss usrj&ci~i6I1coWtr'ibUtionsl'1'\Nithirr' that" p'eh6Cfwitl1'oLiFprejLldging'the'ir alignmEfnt'witH iedi'stjnct\~vcfrldvievVS:" If'Jprdp~d~ '.

lInked With technical critielsmahdfuricti6na1' a'nalys'is; "sUcr?a ihultidirf1en!~)slional nis'toriography e'could ran't6ora~e c;6ml:he~engiveV' ~pl:Jtoa6fMs witl'i'conside'(al~>'le fle~ib1lity and 'prE~cis'ion~'L These' wo'Jj(j l)'efrUtHLI

.conilnua~t

tjons of.,LukaQs~1r::;onJri.b.utiQ:llsml;Ji~dl!opal cla.~~if,i~~ionp ,and,. assessments

V\!o,l,Jl,d"bey,omem9re..,t~r;1tcni~~",an,c;I,Iexac~,., as ,.Acj<uno ,vvishec;l'h~m,W'J~e.)but ,L~kacs'" GQnq~rJ1,fof, th~ ,hl)rQc'IQ"fU,Hne,w9I.1h:Jnot i,mmJgrat~i)N ,t./;tejII,GraQcltI'<;>,\!31Al;>y,ss"U,")here, if] ,FP(r,f,qr~,Jre nigl;H i~ ,qb~e,(yed,in wtpi(:;o,apcovyp,arei!;Jray.,..

"-","II '"-oJ) ,~" 1"'11,"" i''''I;II,:

31ITha.col1't€ems ,0tdid:aol(IJgy cfitique are 11'1escapably nor.1imat Lve,.

','FtJe trow!vle-€I"genius sf ,Luk;ac~,'and Adortro has,be.ooa reftlsal->It0J

106t

-' divorce artistic norms from the larger sociohistorical process. I say"troubled" because this refusal has helped generate serious difficulties.Emphasizing worldview, Lukacs tends to derive other norms from that ofideological correctness. This tendency supports an obvious depreciationof the import. form, and technique of "modernist" works. In addition,lUkacs'system of classifying literature cannot help being broader thanis warranted by real differences among works even at the ideologicallevel. Adorno. for his part, also tends to have an overriding norm, despitehis more evident striving for finely-tuned evaluations. Emphasizingtechnique, Adorno tends to derive other norms from that of technicalprogressiveness. This tendency supports an obvious depreciation of"realist" forms as well as a remarkable exaggerating of the political effec-tiveness of "modernist" works. Furthermore, Adorno provides nothingclose to the classifications warranted by continuities and patterns even atthe level of technique. He gives us unrepeatable, exemplary treatmentsof preselected works

Such tendencies might incl ine one to dismiss normativeaesthetics altogether. This is in fact what Peter Burger seems to havedone. According to Burger. Lukacs and Adorno posit norms that are tiedto artistic autonomy. But an attack on autonomy by the historical avant-garde has made it impossible to posit val id norms for works of art. Beingbound to the development of art itself, post-avant-garde aesthetics mustmove from normative critique to functional analysis.~ 2 Burger seems tohave dismissed the labor of normative aesthetics by radicalizing theconnection between artistic norms and the sociohistorical process. Thisdismissal is peculiar, however. because it relies on another type of norm.namely that of historical effectiveness. One could question, of course.whether the historical avant-garde actually did destroy the possibility ofpositing valid norms for works of art. Even if the attack was effective.there would be no obvious reason why the historical effectiveness of aspecific artistic movement should be ta"-en as the norm whereby normativeaesthetics is invalidated.

More fruitful than dismissing normative aesthetics. it seemsto me. would be to develop a more complex constellation of norms thanLukacs or Adorno provides, Perhaps the historical avant-garde has inadver-tently helped make possible normative complexity rather than simple

1Q7

.-~

anormativity. I envisage evaluations that employ a variety of normswit~out deriving these from one another. Such norms could includetechnical innovativeness, formal depth; aesthetic originality, social impor-tance, and political effectiveness. Tentative judgments concerning histo-rical significance could also be made, but always in conjunction withevaluations according to a wide variety of norms. A similar conditionwould be placed on judgments concerning the direction in which a workor tendency is headed. An aesthetic theory would have the task ofspell ing out the contents of such norms.

If this were done in connection with specifc analyses ofliterary and artistic phenomena, and if no one norm were made original oroverriding, then we could circumvent some of the problems noted earlier.Certainly one style, movement, or type of work could no longer be m3dethe standard whereby all others are found deficient. A work with formaldepth, for example, could be judged historically insignificant. So too, atechnically innovative work could be deemed politically ineffective. Nongwith functional analysis and multidimensional historiography, co-:1:J'exnormativity in aesthetics could help us appropriate the contributions ofLukacs and .t>.dorno Their monolithic criticisms of "modernism" and"real ism" would be shattered, but the thrust of their critiques could bemaintained.

Notes and References

1. Georg Luk£i9S, Realism in OurTime: Literature and the ClassStruggle, trans. John and NeckeMander, Preface by GeorgeSteiner (New York: Harper &Row, 1964); first published underthe title The Meaning of Contem-porary Realism (London: Merl inPress, 1962). The book originatedin lectures given at the DeutscheAkademie der Kuenste in January

108

1956 and repeated several times inPoland, Italy, and Austria. Thebook's German title-Wider denmissverstandenen Realismus (Ham-burg: Claassen Verlag, 1958)-hasbeen replaced with the originaltitle-"Die Gegenwartsbedeutungdes kritischen Realism"-in GeorgLukacs, Essays ueber Realismus,Probleme des Realismus I, Werke,Vol. 4 (Neuwied: Luchterhand,

> :1971),pp. 457-603. Internal cita-tions will be from Realism in OurTime, followed by the paginationin Georg Lukacs Werke, Vol. 4.thus: (RT 17/467). The translation,which is unreliable, has been freelymodified or replaced.

2. An earl ier version of this paper waspresented at the Lukacs Symposiumheld in Montreal on October 10-12,1985. I wish to thank CakvinSeerveld and Nicholas Wolterstorfffor their helpful comments andBruce Voogd for his researchassistance.

3. Ehrhard Bahr. "Die angelsaech-sische Lukacs-Renaissance. "Text+Kritik, no. 39/40 (October 1973),PD.70-75.

4. In addition to Studies in EuropeanRealism, which was published in1950, Bahr mentions the followingtranslations: The Historical Novel(1962); The Meaning of Contempo-rary Realism (1962/1964); Essays onThomas Mann (1964/1965); andGoethe and His Age (1968jI969).The first date in parenthesis indic-ates the British edition; the secondindicates the American edition.

5. Literary and aesthetic writingstranslated in the early 1970s includeSolzhenitsyn (197.0/1971); Writerand Critic, and Other Essays (197011971; selected chapters from

Probleme des Realismus); and TheTheory of the Novel (1971). Fortwo divergent assessments in theearly 1970s of Lukacs' life andwork see George Lichtheim, Lukacs(London: Fontana/Coil ins. 1970)and Ehrhard Bahr and Ruth Gold-schmidt Kunzer, Georg Lukacs (NewYork: Frederick Ungar, (1972). Twomore recent accounts are by G.H R.Parkinson, Georg Lukacs (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1977) andMichael L6Wy, Georg Lukacs: FromRomanticism to Bolshevism, trans.Patrick Camiller (London: New LeftBooks. 1979)

6. Two other translations importantfor understanding Lukacs'aestheticsar~ Soul and Form (1974) andEssays on Realism 1980/1981; addi-tional chapters from Probleme desReal ismus). Two partial transla-tions from Lukacs' aesthetics haveappeared in The New HungarianQuarterly (NHO): "Introduction to

a Monograph 011Aesthetics." NHO,no. 14 (Summer 1964), pp. 57-72(introductory chaPter of Aesthetik:Die Eigenart des Aesthetischen,Werke, Vals. 11 and 12. 1963); and"The Philosophy of Art," NHOno. 47 (Autumn 1972), pp. 57-87(Chapter 1 of Heidelberger Philo-sophie der Kunst, Werke, Vol. 16.1974).

7. Among books discussing Lukacs'

aesthetics, let me mention three. A

109

useful summary, albeit lackingcritical focus, has been given byBela Kiralyfalvi, The Aesthetics ofGyorgy Lukacs (Princeton: Prince-tOn University Press, 1975) Anexcellent historical-critical analysisis contained in Eugene Lunn,Marxism and Modernism: AnHistorical Study of Lukacs, Brecht,Benjamin and Adorno (Berkeley:University of California Press,1982). For a thorough discussionof The Theory of the Novel seeJ.M. Bernstein, The Philosophy ofthe Novelr Lukacs, Marxism, andthe Dialectics of Form (Minnea-polis: University of MinnesotaPress, 1984).

8. Nevertheless some important artic-les have appeared, including severalin G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., GeorgLukacs: The Man, His Work andHis Ideas (London: weidenfeld andNicolson, 1970). See also AgnesHeller, "Lukacs.s Aesthetics." TheNeW Hungarian Quarterly, no. 24(Winter 1966), pp. 84-94; VeraMaslow, Lukacs' Man-CenteredAesthetics, "Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 27(June 1967): 542-552; Silvia Federici,"Notes on Lukacs' Aesthetics,"Telos, no. 11 (Spring 1972), pp. 141-151; Nicolae Tertulian, "Lukacs'Aesthetics and Its Critics," Telos,no. 52 (Summer 1982), pp, 159 167;and Agnes Heller, "Lukacs' Later

110

Philosophy," in Lukacs Revalued(London: Basil Blackwell, 1983);pp.177-190.

'9. Donald Davie, "Co-existence inLiterature," New Statesman 65(February 15, 1963): 238.

10. MaxRieser, Review of Lukacs Widerden missverstandenen Realismus,Journal of Aesthetics and ArtCriticism 21 (1962-1963): 219-220.

11. Raymond Williams, Review ofLukacs' The Meaning of Contem-porary Realism, The Listener 69(February 28, 1963): 385.

12. George Lichtheim, '0An IntellectualDisaster," Encounter 20 (May 1963)5: 74-80.

13. Ibid., p. 80.

14. George Steiner, "In Respect ofGeorg Lukacs," Encounter 20 (June1963) 6: 92-92.

15. Alasdair Macintyre, in "The Caseof Georg Lukacs: On G90rge Lich-theim's Controversial Article,"pp. 91-92, Encounter 21 (August1963) 2: 91-96. These pages containother responses by Roy Pascal,John Cumming, alld Geoffry Carnell,as well as a rejoinder by Lichtheim.

16 Harold Rosenberg, "The ThirdDimension .of Georg Lukacs,"Dissent 11 (Autumn 191:>4):404-414.

17., Susan Sontag, " The Literary'Criticism of Georg Lukacs,"in Against Interpretation, andOther Essays (New York: Farrar,Straus & Giroux, 1966), pp 82-92.

18. Peter Demetz, "The Uses of Lukacs,"The Yale Review 54 (Spring 1965):435-440.

19. In addition to the review byRaymond Williams, see Jack Lindsay,

"A Note on Georg Lukacs," Mean-jin Quarterly 23 (1964): 196-198;and Gerald Graff, 'Lukacs in theAmerican University," New Hunga-rian QuarterlY, no. 47 (Autumn1972), pp. 136-143.

20. Norman Fruchter, "A RealistPerspective," Studies on the Lett 4(Spring 1964) 2: 110-134; LaurenceLerner, The Triumph of Scylla:Lukacs Theory of Realism, "Encou-nter 49 (August 1977) 2: 36-49.

21. Stephen G. Nichols, Jr., "GeorgLukacs: The Problems of DialecticalCriticism," Contemporary Literature9 (1968): 349-366.

22. Andrew K. Kennedy. "Lukacs andModern Literature," CriticalQuarterly 21 (Winter 1979) 4:53-60.

23. Theodor W. Adorno, "ErpressteVersoehnung. Zu Georg Lukacs:'Wider den missverstandenen Reali-smus' ," Der Monat 11 (November

...

1958): 37-49. Republished inAdorno's Noten zur Literature /I( Frankfurt Suhrkamp, 1974 ),pp. 251-280. Translated by Rodney

Livingstone as "Reconciliationunder Duress" in Aesthetics andPolitics,ed. Ronald Taylor (London:NLB,1977; Verso, 1980), pp. 151-176. Internal citations will be fromthis trnslation, followed by thepagination in Adorno's GesammelteSchriften, Vol. 11, thus: (RD 151'251). Occasionally I have modifiedor replaced the translation byLivingstone.

24. Georg Lukacs, Aesthetik: Die Eige-nart des Aesthetischen, Werke,Vols. 11 and 12 (Neuwied: Luchter-hand, 1963).

25. Theodor W. Adorno, AesthetischeTheorie (1970), 2ded., Gesamme/teSchriften, Vol. 7 (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1974); translated asAesthetic Theory by C. Lenhardt(London; Routledge & Kegan Paul,1984). Citations will be from theLenhardt translation, followed bythe pagination in GesammelteSchriften, Vol. 7, thus: AestheticTheory, p. 304/317.

26. In addition to the items cited innotes 46-48 below, see AgnesHeller, "Lukacs and the HolyFamily," Telos, no 62 (Winter 1984-1985), pp. 145-153.

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27. Fradii: Jameson, uReflections inConclusion," in Aesthetics and

,Politics, pp.196-213.

28. Cf. Steven D..Martinson, "'Wo dieWege sich scheiden': Georg Lukacs'Case against Modernism," Forumfor Modern Language Studies 17(1981): 1825.

29. Some of these continuities arepointed out by Fredric Jameson,

"The Case for Georg Lukacs," inMarxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories ofLiterature (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1971), pp.160-205.

30. Nichols, p. 354.

31. As Nichols indicates, Lukacs deve-loped his approach to the world-views of literary characters in "Dieintellektuelle Physlognomie deskuenstlerischen Gestaltens" (1936),

: Werke 4: 151- 96; translatad, withomissions, as "The IntellectualPhysiognomy in Characterization"in Georg Lukacs, Writer and Critic,and Other Essays, ed, and trans.Arthur D. Kahn (New York: Grosset& Dun lap, 1970), pp. 149-188.

32.. This approach is not obvious inRaalism in Our Time because th&translation omits Lukacs' Prefaceand Introduction. See. however,Werke 4: 463.467.

33. Adorno, Versuch ueber Wagner(1952), in Gesammelte Schrifthn,

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Vol. 13 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971),p.119.

34. Aesthetic Theory, p. 304/317.

35. "Kunst und objektive Wahrheit"(1954), in Werke 4: 607-650; trans-fated, with omissions, as "Art andObjective Truth," Writer lmd Critic,pp. 25-60.

36. Werke4: 639-641; Wiiter and Critic,pp. 58-60. Cf. PP. 9-10 ,and 20-22in the Preface to Writer and Critic.

37, Werke 4: 641: Writer and Critic,p.60.

38. Aesthetic Theory, P. 207:216.

39. Aesthetic Theory, p. 203-210/211-219.

40. See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory..

p. 209/217. and Lukacs, Werke 4:

632: Writer and Critic, pp. 50.51.

41. For 'an elaboration, see LambertZuidervaart. Refractions: Truth inAdorno's Aesthetic Theory, docto-ral dissertation. (Toronto, 198,),pp. 62-78, 173-175.

42. "Erzaehlen' oder beschreiben ?"Werke4: 229; "Narrate or Describe,"Writer and Critic, p. '143 ( mytranslation).

43. See Werke 4: 234--242. This sectionhas been omitted in Write andCritic.

44. Nichols, p. 361.

45. This summary of the history andmeaning of "worldview" is basedon two unpublished papers by AIWolters, "'Weltanschauung "in thehlistory of Ideas; Preliminary Notes"and on the idea of Weltanschauungand Its Relation to Philosophy"(July 1985).

46. In Der Streit mit Georg Lukiics, ed.Hans-Juergen Schmitt (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1978), see BurkhardtLindner, "Der Begriff der Verding-lichung und der. Spielraum derRealismus-Kontroverse" (PP. 91-123) and Peter V. Zima, "Dialektikzwischen Totalitaet und Fragment"pp. (124_172).

47. Dieter Kliche, "Kunst gegenVerdinglichung: Beruehrungspunkteim Gegensatz von Adorno undLukiics," in Materialien zur aesthe-tischen Theorie Theodor W.Adornos:Konstruktion der Moderne, ed.

'~

Burkhardt Lindner and W. MartinLuedke (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979),pp. (219-260).

48. Peter Barger , Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw, witha Foreword by Jochen Schulte-Sass(Minneapolis: University of Minne-sota Press, 1984), pp. 6.14, 20-2783-88.

49. Calvin Seerveld, "Towards a Carto-graphic Methodology for Art Histo-riography," Journal of Aestheticsand Art Criticism 39 (Winter 1980-1981): 143-154.

50. Ibid., p. 49.

51. Lukacs, "Preface" (1962), TheTheory of the Nove/, trans. AnnaBostock (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press,1971), p. 22.

52. Burger, pp. 86-87.

Associate Professor of Philosophy,Calvin College,Grand Rapids, Michigan (U.S.A.)

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