japan-china relations

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CHAPTER THREEJapan-Ch ina Relations

IntroductionN othing marks Japan's shift toward reluctant realism mere definiti\ely than the changing relationship with China.!Throughout the postwar period Japan main:ained a policy ofconstructive engagement toward Beijing. This strategy was establishedbyYoshida Shigeru. wh o predicted that Japan and the West would eventually \"lean China away from Moscow by providing an alternative todependence on the Soviet Union. In Yoshida's view, a prosperous Chinawould inevitably become friendly wi th Japan and the United States .2 Atthe core of his strategy was a faith in the principles of economic interdependence ,vith China and in Japan's own growing merclI1tile power.

Yoshida's approach was hotly debated between the pro-Taipei andpro-Beijing groups within the ruling LD P, bu t his assessment of Sinojapanese rclations was largf'ly prescient. Beijing began splitting withMoscow by the 19605, and shortlv after President Nixoi1's VISit t6 China.in 1972, the Japanese government normalized relalic5hs with the main=-land. With time , Sino-Japanese economic ties deepened, particularly3fter rhe Cold V/ar. Trade bet:\\een Japan and China grew from $18.2billion in 1990 to S62.-+ billion in 1996. Over the roughly the same pe riod, japan 's foreign direct investment into China expanded from $438million in 19t9 to S4.S billion in 1995. The consensus behind Yoshida'sforl1lub for China relations deepened, and confidence in a close Sinojapanese relationship shaped Japan's vision of a post-Cold War diplomacy in Asia.

But Y05.hida's predic.tions \vere only p3rtly correct. Greater trade, aid,and inwstment could no t fully insulate Sino-Japanese rebrions from therurbukllt dC\Tloplllt'nrs of the 1


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opened the prospect of tenserbilatera"l- reiation-s -\:)6:ause Japan andChina were no longer indirectly aligned against the Soviet Union. Thenthe shocks of the Gulf W,r and the collapse of the Japanese econOmicbubble undermined Japanese confidence. while the interruption of stable long-term LDP rule opened the Japanese foreign policy process togreater pluralism and unpredictability. An d eventually Chinese powerand anibition became more visible in Asia.

Th e impact of these changes was no t felt in the bilateral relationshipfor several years, however. Ironically, the crisis created by the. Chineseg_overnment's massacre of student protesters in Tienanmen Square in1989 created an artificial honeymoon in Sino-Japanese ties. After initially suspending yen loans to Beijir;g.1 in tandem with other Westernsanctions to protest the incident, Japan was sucked back in to the vacuu m created by China's international isolation a year later.lnJune 1991Tokyo resumed aid; China responded by inviting Emperor Akihito fora historic visit in 1992 while heaping praise on Japan's regional securityrole when the JSDF was dispatched to Cambodia for peacekeeping.Heartened by tllis ne w Chinese attitude. Japanese intellectual leadersbegan writing of the new "Asianization of Asia."

By the middle of the decade, however, the real impact of the collapseof the Cold War structure was being (elt directly in bilateral relations.Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and Foreign MillisterHata Tsutornu began setting a new tone the relationship ill 1993 when theypressed Beijing publicly for greater military t r ; l l l s p ; l r e n c y . ~ Subsequently,an angry Diet then forced the Foreign Ministry to slispend $75 millionin grant assistance after China ignored Jap:IIIl'


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The chapter concludes by examining the implications of this emerg:ing Sino-Japanese relationship for the US-Japan alliance.

The First Shock Wave: China's Nuclear TestsAid and SecurityAt the core of Japan's traditional policy of engagement toward Chinahas been foreign aid. China experts in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs often comment that Tokyo's bilateral economic assistance hasgrown from the "seed to the roots and the trunk" of bilateral Sino-Japanese relations. After opening contact \vith Beijing in 1972, th e UnitedStates was barred by legislation from providing aid to CommunistcoL1I1tries. This opened up an enormous role for Japan. Beginning withth e 1978 Japan-China Treaty of Friendship, Japan agreed to providelarge five-year loan packages to China.;'; By the 1990s these ye n loanpackages accounted for half of China's total economic assistance fromabroad. For Beijing, the yen loans were seen as mandator y reparationsto r Japan's subjugation of China during the war. In Tokyo , however,economic assistance ha d meaning as th e centerpiece of broader economic interdependence and as insurance against futLlre political or military confrontation. Beneath these diwrging views of economic

a s s i ~ t a n c e lay even broader gaps in each nation's assumptions about theother. These gaps were exposed by a series of nllck:lr n:plosiollS deepin th e Chinese in ter ior - the first shock ,,ave in Sino-Japanese relationsafter the Cold War.

Beijing Explodes Bombs . . . and Tokyo 5 ComplacencyMa y 15, 1995 , China conducted its forty-second underground ' nu

clear explosion in Lo p Nur, a remote desert arc'.l south of Mongolia.While the existence of Chinese nuclear weapons was h:lrdly shocking,th e timing of th e test stunned Tokyo, Prime Minister MuraY:1I1L1 Tomiichi had only just asked th e Chinese premier, Li Peng, for a moratoriumon testing during a visit to Beijing th e same month, reminding his Chinese hosts of the Japanese people's intense feelings about I1uclearweapons, If Japan's economic interdependence with China h:ld teeth,this was an .issue rh.at Jl1.:1ttered.But as it was. th e nuclear teSts provedjust ho w limited economic investment and years of yell 10:1l1s Jn d forCigll aid were as cOllstrJims al l Chinese miliLlry behavior. Illtkl'd, th eLOJl Nllr tc st gl'IH'r;lrcd :111 illt"i1S,' rkh:lt,' ill I,lJl;]ll :lholl{ wltl'tltn l'l'O-

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nomic tools should be used as sticks against China at all.-There was aconsensus within MOFA an d MITI that Japan should move from multiyear loan agreements to annual negotiations with China in order toincrease Japanese leverage, However, interrupting aid was seen by manyin the government as toO heavy a stick to use on China, even in response to nuclear testing.') On the other hand, since 1991 MOFA ha dbeen bound by an aD A charter that specifically required japan's aidpolicy to give full consideration of a recipient'S military expendituresan d the possible development, production, import, or export of rrussilesan d weapons of mass destruction, III This charter ha d been created precisely to demonstrate Japan's readiness to use aid as a strategic tool afterthe Cold War, bu t thus far it had been applied only to distant and no tterribly powerful Burma. Would it no w be applied to th e "root an dtrunk" of Sino-Japanese relations:MOFA went back and forth on this question after the Lo p Nur test,On May 15 Vice Foreign Minister Saito Kunihiko called in th e Chinesecharge Wu Dawei in Tokyo, and warned specifIcally that Japan's 1991aD A charter might require an aid cut-ofT in response to the Chinesetests, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei then backed of f from this threat intestimony to the Diet tWO days later. Howeve r, his suggestion that Japanwould not-and in fact could not-Lise aid to demand better behaviorfrom Beijing provoked a firestorIll from within an d outside of the government. The political pressure Oil K()no and MOFA was intense, Senior politicians fWIll all thre.c coalition p:uties were calling forsuspension of yen loans to punish Chil1


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~ o u l d constituJe_"interference....in_China's_imemal affairs" and pointingto japan's obligation to co ntinue paying reparations,"particularly on the50th anniversdry of the end of World War 11."15 Beijing's claim that theloans were no t j apan's to suspend further raised the ire of the LO P ViceMinister of Fo reign Affairs Hayashi Sadayuki warned the LO P that theye n loans we re still "the main pillar of japan's China policy.'>J(, Bu tMOFA-officiah also recognized that co ntinued Chinese nuclear testingmight leave littl e cholce but to reco nsider th e yen loan packages .

Th en on july 30, 1996, China set of f its last nuclear test at Lop Nu rand announced its readiness to j o in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(C TBT) . Th e immediate crisis passed . Th e ye n loans survived. However,japan's f.lith in th e po we r of ec ononuc interdependence and japanese OD A was badl y shaken. It was now clea r to the japanese publicthat China saw little o bligation (


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'. _ ............ .... . IJ I I I

. . ' -: .affinity-for Taiwan has not been operationalized in Japan's formal for- 'eign policy-Tokyo maintains a strict consistency in its "One China"policy-but the quiet Japan-Taiwan connection increasingly began toworry Beijing in the 1990s. 21

Finally, the political changes in Japan since 1993 have loosened theLDP's control of th e Far Right group.s that _ hampioned anticommunism during the Cold War. Though no t necessarily larger in numbers,these groups are in many respects less constrained. This vocal nationalism weighed heavily on those like Gotoda wh o were concerned aboutChinese behavior transforming the politics of Sino-Japanese relations inTokyo.

In short, ne w electoral rules and political realignment in Japan addeda further fluidity to the politics of diplomacy toward China-a fluiditythat surprised the Foreign Ministry and the Chinese in the attacks onforeign aid after China's !luclear tests and later allowed the cork to fallof f the bottle of u;ltionalisl11 during a dispute over some uninhabitedrocks less than lOt) l11iles off Okinawa.

Diaoyutai or Seukakll?In 1895 the Meiji governmcllt sent a ship from Okinawa to c:-;plore acollection of eight islands and reefs near Taiwan that were cdlec\ theSenkaku Islands in Japanese and the Oiaoyutai in Chinese. Th e ship re ported back that the islands were uninhabited and apparently 1I11chimedby Imperial Chim. III 1895, after Japan's victory over China in theSino-Japanese War, th e Meiji government issued a cabinet resolutionclaiming the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territorv. Th e islands appe;lredto have little importance and were even used for fighter bomber practice by the U.S. N;l\-Y during the occupation ofJapan after the \ v ~ H . Butthe islands took on ne w value in 1969 when UN geologists issued :I 1"(:'-port stating that considerable reserves of oil and natural gas might liearound them. With the prospect of oil reserves, Beijng formally anIloullced its ow n cLim to the Diaoyutai in 1970, arguing that Chinesevessels had first charred th e islands in 1534. Th e Japanese Foreign Ministry formally rejectcd this position, arguing that China had never established a presence al l the islands and pointing ou t that the UnitedSt,ltes had implicitly recognized Japanese sovereignty by transferring";ldlllinistr:ltivt' cOl1trol" over the isbnds with the return of Okinaw:I toJ1tW1 in 1'171.

While r h ~ ' diplolll.lh ill Ikijlllg ;111


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should no longer be Chin a's "puppet."25 B e 0 i ~ g n . Q . . t ~ c e i v e th e response it expeCted. Th e governri1enr\ spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secre_tary K , ~ i y a l 1 l a Seiroku, tolrl th e press on July 18 that there was somedanger of a diplomatic incident, but added:" I personally don't think weshould say this an d that about something being constructed legitimatelywith permission fi'om the a p a n e ~ e bndlord."2()

Emboldened by the hesitation in Tokyo and th e implicit SlI many in the LOp, the Right-wingJapan Youth Federation situation by placing a wa r memorial on the islands in August. September the group was allowed back to the islands to rep . hOllse. Th e Japanese Transport Ministry refused to officiaUy th e lighthouse, bu t it also claimed that the Rightists were the Ll\\', based on permission received from th e islands' It was. after all, Japanese territory, they maintained, an d Hong Kong increased, and there were even China. where the government usually attempted to taneous activities for fear that an anti-Japanese against the ruling COlllmunist Party.::>! Chinese ch panest' natiOO;llisIll were further fueled by Prime M. . . . . .....ashimoto's"personal" visit to the Yasukuni Wl r Memorial Shri"" ' July 29, De spite \\'arnings of "'serious damage" to Sino-Japanese relanons (rol11 Beijing, 11O\\'ever, the Japanese government did no t back down- indeed,the Maritime Safety Agency sent seventeen cutrl!rs to I'C'pc:1 protc 'st boatssent ti-om Taiwan and Hong Kong. Even MOrA otlici:ds wh o wereeager to prevellt further damage to bilateral n:Iarioll\ ICCOgllizcd thatstopping the Rightists from visiting the island would klvc giVCl1 legitimacy to Beijing's claims and weakened Japan's IIcgo[iaring position. Inany case, the ruling LOP would allow no backillg dowlI in the (Jce ofChint'se pressure, ~ l I l i n t e l l t i o n clearly si&nalcd ill th e party's 1


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88 Japan's Reluctant Realismstrengthening their bilater;l! :lIliance, Tokyo needed that reJffirl1l:niol1 toincrease its diplomatic le\'erage vis-a-vis Beijing, but it a l ~ o neededproof in the Senbku dispute that the United StJtes would not abJndonJapan after asking Tokyo co pb y a more active role in regional secu r i ty-a role thJt no w appeared likely to spark a Chinese backlash,

The Guidelines, Taiwan Theater Missile Defense,an d the New Defense DilemmaA Shift ill the 'Ji'ilateral StYllctllre of SeCllrity RelationsDuring the Cold War Sino-Japanesc securiry rt'lations wcre calculated almost t'Iltirely within till:' context of the US-Jlpan ;llll:ll1ce But whileJapJn's formal relations \\'ith Bcijing had to \\ait until a shift ill U.s. Chinapolicy in 1972, Tokyo cl e'l rly diverged from Wa shington a ll the LIuestionof whether China represc nted a military threat, If anything, the leg;l cy ofWorld \v!ar II convinced the Illajoritv of JlpJIlL'Se political leaders that ahostile relationship \vith Beijing was cOIltrar;; to Japancse interes ts,

Fear of entrapment in a U.S, military confrontation with C hina overTaiwan or Southea st Asia therefore led successivc Jlp;1I1CS e governmentsto deny full military coop er,,\1tion to U.S, forces , even asrl:lPJIl reco nstituted its own Self Defeme Forces,

Th e United StJtes squeezed an offi cial c:-;:pressioll of support fromJapan for the U,S, defense commitment to TJiwan ()Illy Ollcl'--in the1969 Nixon-Sata co mmull iquc-\vhen negotiating pressurL' to securethe return of Okinawa led the Japanese gO\'ernnwnt to concede that"maintaining-peace- in Taiwan region- is :lI sa all importallt elelllent in

, '1 ",,1 , "," d' I I '-Japan s n:ltlOna. S e C ~ l r - I r : " , " Lli)mg s reacno!) ,was pre ICta) y negative,and officials in MOFA Jnd the JDA spent the nex t decade retreatingfrom any hint of 1 CO ml1litlllent to helping Lkfend Taiwan, When theUnited States and Jap;l1l l1l'gotiJted th e first Guidelines for Defense Cooperation ill 1978 , \X/a shington tried again to loc k ill a co mmitment ofJlpanese support tor the l ~ e f c n s e ofTa iw;]1l and South Korea, However,Tokyo \\"as concluding a TrcJty o f Pcace ami Frinldsilip with Beijing atth e time and \'v'as 110t about to eldist for mi ss ions l t w o u l d provoke aChinese backlash , Th e U S - J J P ~ l I 1 Defense Cuidelil1es were completed'vvith det;)iiL'd ~ l g r e C I l l C l l t ' ) 011 bilatl'r,ll cooperation for the defense of thej:1P :l1lCSl' archipehgo agains t dircct ;lttack, but plallning for cooperationill rq.>;ion,11 c ( ) l l t i n ~ ( , 1 1 C i l . ' \ \\,IS kI t t(l!' ~ 1 1 l ( ) t h , T Lbv,

1:(11' [il ,' Ill(),r 1),11'1, h" "',',,,T. '.1. hhill!.C.[('11 (('!cLlrt'LI ,I,,!),III " ("onsciellI\


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90 Japan's Reluctant RealismBeij ing might no t fear an incrementalk st rengthened allianc e o r more::Ictive japanese security policy, Tokyo \\'::IS wrong,

The Difense Guidelines alld Taiwa.nThe changes in ja panese defellSe policy in the mid-l ()0()s-whileaIJrming from Beiji ng's perspective-followed a logical an d incremen tal progression from ja pan's previous approach to the alliance, Th e firststep ca me when Socialist Prime Ministe r Murayama approved revisionof japan 's basic force structure guidance, the 1")76 Nati o nal DefenseProgram Outline (NDPO), in November J995, Th e re visioll hac..l begununder Hosokavv'J in 19


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- --th e guidelines \v6-:dd- riot- exceed the geographic definition of ArticleVI of the Security Treaty, he was forced to resign by Prime MinistetHashimoto. Hashimoto ha d told the Chinese that there was no geographic definition, and the director general had made the mistake ofreminding the Diet that the government's standing interpretation ofArticle VI of the treary included Taiwan. I

From Tokyo's perspective, these attacks marked a change in China'spolicy toward the alliance. If China saw a reaffirl11t'd U.S.-Japan allianceas inimical to its interests-in COntraSt to Beijing's previous tacit sUPPOrtfor the alliance-then there was good reason to Ivorry about long-termChinese imentions. In addition, Beijing's demand that the guidelinesexclude Taiwan suggested that China views military action in the TaiII'an Strait's as an inrernalmatter with no bearing on Japanese security.While J;lpan mJintained a strict policy of recogniziIlg only on e China,the Chinese Jssenioll that a conflict ill the Taiwan StrJits had no regional implications lIas an unacceptable premise. Finally, it became clearIn' September 1 thJt l3eijing was focusing its pressure almost entirelyonJapan Jnd avoiding high-level criticism o f the guidelines ill relations"'ith the United States.n Th e efforts at transparency an d clarificationhad no t exactly led to confidence building.Theater Missile DifenseA I'ery silllibr dynamic was rt'peated in the debate over tht';1[(.:'r missileddt'nse (TMD).japJn first embarked on ajoint study of missile defenserequirements with the United States in 1994 afi:er several years of U.S.prodding for japJnese participation in this mJjor program. TMD,

. though costly and uncertain in terms of technical feasibiJity, had the suPpOrt ,:f jap ;mese ilkiustry, the JDA, and MOFA, as an ~ l 1 1 i a n c e - enhancer, a technologY-driver, and a buttress for the U.S. nllcle;lr det er rell[ against North Korcan :1I1d Chinese ballistiL' missiles. Like the Ddense Guidelines rt'l'iew,joinr work 011 TMD \\";lS seen ill Tokyo and WJshington ;IS stJbilizing :1Ild reinforcing the SCItLIS gu o ;lg;linst new threars; but Ollce again Beijing S:l\.V the dt'velopll1ellt as aillled :It u nd er mining Chinese security.

ConspicuoLls Chinese objections to japanese p:-micip:1tioll in TM Dbt'ga!l in 19


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The History Q u ~ s t i o n : losing Tractio_n .Jlllar Guilt as DiplomacyAt the base of th e po stwar str ucture of Sino-japanese relations lies thelegacy of the Sino-j apa ne se War of 1937 to 1945. The japanese yen loanprogram, the domestic political consensus on China policy, and even thecomplementary C h inese an d japanese security policies of the Cold Warera all rested on a common un d e rstanding that japan had to makeamends for the past. Th e war defined the legitimacy of the ChineseCommun i st Party, which ha d resisted th e Imperial ja p:lI1ese Army, andempowe red Beijing to pJ SS judgm ent on th e direCtion of po stwar j apan.When LO P leaders worshipped at the Yasukuni War Shrine or calledfor dramatic increases in defense spe nding, the Japane se media wo uldamplify Ch in ese c riticism to demonstrate the dangers of re lllilitari zati o n. Th e legacy of th e past ga\'t" BeUing a pO\wrful card in J ap an s do mestic debate. Beijing has been unwilling to yield that ca rd umil it canbe convinced militarism is ckad forever in j


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96 Japan 's Reluctant Realismconference th at the question o f japane se culpabilic,' for World WarII \\'as a m atter of pe rso nal in te rp reta ti on n

Th e Chinese pr ess :Illd premier Li Peng were highly c riti ca l of thejapanese gove rn m e nt's weak official apo logy on th e fiftieth anniver sa ry of th e en d of the 'vvar' because the debate re\'ea led suchmixed se ntiments


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98 Japan's Reluctant Realism iF' J U t ' i ~ . . ~Obuchi refused to yield O il the history question and won broad z

praise at ho me for his firm stand, Th e --4.salll ;md !viainiclll' and the moreconservative YOJllillri and Saillm' either rem :uned si len t or expressed support for the government 's po si tion, Many LOP politicians skipped thestate dinner held for Jiang, choosing instead to att end a speech by Korean Prime Mini ster Kil11,1ong Pi! in KYllshu at the same time , Even thebusiness leaders in th e japan- C hin a Bu siness Associat ion expressed support for the governm em s firm stand, The only notable dissen ter wasthe chairman of the japan Communist Part\', w ho expressed dissatisfacti'on with th e japan ese government 's statement on history during ameeting with Jiang that sy mb olized th e renewed ties between the twoco untries' Communist p;uties, Yet this Co m munist co nn ect ion onlyfurther reintorced the impression t h ~ H the Chinese leadership was outof tollch with contel1lpOLuy p ~ l l 1

Th e centerpien : that the foreign ministries had planned for the Sllmnllt still held impressl\'l' (oments, Tile J;q..lall-China joint D eclaration onl3uilding a Partnership of Friendship ~ l l l d C oo peratioll for Peace and Development contained Jll ~ l g r e e l l l e for up ro 390 billion yen for t\\'entyeight projects during thL' rem:li l1ll1g t \\'O years of the Fourth Yell LoanPackage, In additi on , Ob llchi e,'\p re sse d his deep remorse (!lall ,\CI) for "theser iou s distress Jnd dal1l:1ge that J1Pclll caused to tlw C hin es e peoplethrough its aggression against C hlll :l," 13ut Ob uchi stopped short of thehea rt fel t apolos'), (l) I1'dln) that jl ang h:lc1 wanted and that Kim Da e junghad received, It \Vas ollly olle \\'orc! , but its ab\ellce sp oke volumes,""

In the weeks before the slIIllmit. C hina sc holars in japan had ca lledfor a "new era 111 j Jpal1-ChinJ r e l J t i ~ , " : ; After the visit, as one C hi nascholar put it: " the tLlliition al pro-Chll1:1 school has b,,'Ci1 cLldicated byC hina s b e h a i O l ' ' '

The Declining Saliency of Economic ToolsIII the lludst o f ten siOllS over clolllestic politlcs, st'curiry policy, and hi srory, econolllic lllterdependellC c' bet\\'e en Chin,l ,lnd jap:lll remains apowerful force, According to MO E toed tLld e between tilt' two COUll- 'tries grew fi'0111 S1 billion in 1 l ) l ) ! ) ~ ~ to S()(J.2 billi o n in 1l) ()9'i'J whileJ:lp :lIlese foreign direct iJl\'estrnent int o China rose fi-om $43K million in

l ) ~ N to S-1-,S billi oll ill 1 )l)Sf," (ThIS !lumber fell to $1, 1 billion in, llJ l)?-jhl) Th ese economic :H-ti\'lti c' s h,l \'e created illlportJllt sine\\'s bc1\\l'l'11JIP;111 ,IIH1 l l i I L l tlLlr \\ ' l 'I ' , ' Iwt ill pl.l l'L' d l I r l n th e ( ~ ( ) I d \ V ~ I I .

'{,'I "\'l'll III hl'III"" 1l-i.lli') II', h l l ' l l l l " ~ ,I ' lI-;lI:t1 is ll\' l'J'. 1)l 's l)lr ,' rh e" ' I, I' '' I,ljl "I 1i'.I,k ,111\1 111\,"I I)Il'I \{ , III ,',' Id ;' 'time ha s come to initiate a comprehensive reassess ment of japan's :1ss istance to China, including discussions of whether or no t y el l credit s should be co minued,"( ,2 Within years , that \yarning became reality, In july 2000, MOFA establishcd a pri\',ne sector stud,;-' group to revi ew the yen IO,lll policy to China with ,In l' \'C to estJblishin g l l t 'W frolTle,,\'ork for the lo ans that \Vould 11la:-.:illlizl' ja p,mesl' leverage (bv sho rtenin g the duration of the loans, COl' e:-':;llllple) ,llld SUStalll SOl l1 e leve l of domestic political su p port for con tinuati o n :ll1 d re fol'lhing of th e 10;lns f ),\ That domestic support is prm'iIlg mo re difficult. however, W lth g rowi ng C hinese ll1iliury activitie


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~ o ;; .- g made in China."('/{ III 199H ja pan's investm ent in to C hina (excludingH o ng Kong and Tai wa n) was still hi ghe r than th at of th e United Statesor the European Uni o n, bu t ja panese busin ess lea ders ex pe c t that U.S.inves tment in to C hina \\ ill surpa ss japan 's in the future.!")

Finally, japanese eco nomic relations \Vith China ha ve been affecte dby ri valry at th e str ate g ic leve l. Th e j apan- C hina Econ o mi c A ssoc i a tionannu al bu siness executi\e fo ru m s in B eijing b egan to turn sou r in 1995w hen th e C hinese sid e \\ar ned that j apan 's sll spensio n of g:-ant aid afterth e nuclear tests would ha ve a negative im pact on japanese econ o micinterests in C hi n a . Li Peng told th e delegatio n headed by To yo ta ch air man Toyoda Soi chi ro that " th e d ama ge China rec eiv ed as a result o fja pan 's agg ressive w ar cann o t even be compared to j apan 's le vel ofa id .. ! " In 1Y96 th e Chinese side cl aim ed that japan 's nati o nali sm on theSenbku s "w o uld af fec t bu sine ss relati o ns."7 1 By the twe nty-fifth annive'rsa ry celebratioll o fjap aJ1-China bu sines ; ties in 1097, m e mbers o fth e Japanese de lega tio n e'xp ressed fru str ation to th e pre ss at th e he avyhand ed Chinese approa ch n ja panes e business exe cutives argue th :ltwo rkin g-l evel re lations \\" ith loc al auth o riti es o r b usinesses often proceed well, o nly to be ti-ustrated by decisio ns taken ill Beijing to reversej apanese advan ces fo r po liti ca l or stra teg ic reaso nsn

Th e ne t e ffect o f th ese changes o n ja p an's p o litical :l1ld eco no mic relationship w it h C hina is still un ce rtain. Orli c lals at th e ja p ;m-ChinaEconomic Associ ation maintain th at th e COlltLldi c ti o llS b e t\\een theChin ese C o nl111unist Parry's strategy of co ntail l lllgj ap,11I ;lJ1d th e desirefo r Jlpanese inves tmellt at th e lo ca l level canJ10t COIHlilu e. Eith er th eChinese sid e w ill emphasize th e str ,lt egic iss li es beClllse It h,ls confId ence' in the draw o f it s marke t, or C hin a 's eCOnOll1l C pro blellls w ill leadto a m o re co nciliato ry po sture to v" ard j apaJ1 in order to attr:l c t FO!.What these Sar1;'p. o ffici als ackn o w ledge IS th :H th l' e xperie n ces fro ll11995 to 1998 ha ve led to a co nve rgence o f npilli o llS on C hin:l in th ebu sine ss conullunity, th e governmeJ1t , academia , and th e l11 l' d ia . As on eexecLltive at the japan-C hin 'l Econ o mi c ASS(H i:ltioll pllt it: "N ow th atwe ha \ 'e com e to llllJnStand C hin ,l be tter , eV l'r yo llC reali zes th ,lt co un tr y 's im m ens e problem s an d p o ssibilities."n

Terms of EngagementFro m Be ijing's 1l1l Clt' ;1I tc'S ts in 1095 to ji;1I1 g Z Clll ill's hi story-ladenSllilllllI[ in Tok yo in 1 ()f)S , th e .!ap:li1 ese ap proa ch to ( : hiILl , hit -ed re It I Cf. lI ltk to\\ ' ,l rd :1 n i"l ,d i ' l l l . Thl ' pd l . l r .; t l u t h l ' ld thc Slrlldllrl' ofSl l lc ) l .q ).ll h" ( l , i l . l l ('I'. d 1, \. ll l l )I I ' II I 1,l. lc( il l ( { ( )I , I \\ .I r ,dl ('1" \1111

.-bled to a significant exte nt. japanese d O l 1 1 unhingedand fr0 111 b o th the Left and th e lZ.ight o f th e Die t fo rced an un pre cedellted suspension o f gr alit aid. japanese and Chinese securitypolicies stood in stark co ,ltradi c ti o n fo r the fir st time with the TaiwanStraits crisis an d th e guidelill es revi evv. Th e atrophying of elite t{es be tween the tw O cotilltri a Kcln 1 11rCl rep o rt wa rned in ILJ LJ 4 , th c Ill OS t troublin g nearterm th reat fro m C hin;l IS no t military or politica l at all, bu t rath e r the

th a t unbridled Chine se eco n o mi c g rowth co uld Cl use co mp eti t io n fo r en e rgy suppl y as well as increased po lluti o n and env ironm ental d e g r d a t i Fo r som e ti m e to co me , To kyo w ill ha ve to u seits O\\n fundi;lg to addl:ess th ese r n a l C hi n ese problem s as a matt e ro f j ap anese se lf-interest. ' ,C hina 's ex ce ssive reliance 011 po ten tiall y un sa fe nucl ear pow er plantsJnd foss il fuel s pr escilh ;1 p a rti cularl y se ri o us pr o bl e m fo r japan. Th ej.lp :l1l- C hiILl Encq..;y L :c hall ge Asso ciatio n l's til11ated 111 1993 thatC hi n ;] wo ul d requ l


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ll1spectJo n and co ntrol of China's future recycling programs (a nd togive greater legitima cy to japan's own troubled program)77In the 1ntation ofits commitments for 100\'t.' rill g tariff rates, .:Iilllination of trade restrictions, and improw ments ill its trade and economic sys tem s, should bendi t both japan and the glob'll econ0111\ significantly,"": Fo r japan, aChina outside of the WT O denies "lll c> an s for either WTO membersor China to resolve trade disputes bet\w':ll th em other th.ln to try to

b'l II .. ,ndo so latera Y, " cc>conomlc 1l1 -jap an-de spite increased hedg ing-is still bt' tting o n in th e globalterdependen ce ,lnd the peJceful integration of Chillaeconomy.

RivalryHoweve r, it is \\'hat is l l l ' \ \ in Sino-jap.lllese relation s since the end of the Cold War th.1t is Illost stri ki l l g -and th;lt is the pronounced rivalry and hedging th at have ell1erged si nce the.' mi dd le of the 19t)Os , Increas ingly, j apanese diplomac\' has been energized by th e effort to engage, constrain , and ou tm ant' u\ 'c'r C hina ill E a ~ t Asia, At fir st thc ]


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g l l i l h ' l i n C ; ! s Then in April IlJ J t3 Kyuma Fumio ma de th e first visit toChina by ;i jDA director general in eleven years,HI{ Other efforts toexpand di ree t 111 iI ita ry-t o- m iI i a ry talks have prove n less successful,primarily because of C hin ese res istance (tho ugh C hina did fmallyagree to an exchange of ship visits in October 20(0), As we will seein th e chapter o n multibteral d{ploma cy, th ese co nfrolltations in bihteral and l1lultilateral forums have continued, but japanese officialsstill view am ' Chinese engagement on security issues as a po si tive dewl o pl11 ent- e\'en if solutions are no t fo und ,

To kyo klS also pushed for other " l1linil atcral" forums to bring itsClse to China, After th e Chinese criticisms of th e U.S ,-japan Sec urityDechration in 1996 for examp le, japanese of fIcials and academicsbegan proposing a u. S ,-japall-C hilla trilateral dial og ue, In 1997 theLDP Foreign Poli cy Co mmi ssio n anu the / I-,(/ /Ii Shi"r!JIII/ editorialpages both c dl ed on th e gO\'erIlIllell( to initiate a trilateral, security

u l l l I 1 l i t \\'nh Was hin g ton Jnd 13eijing,X'; To kyo propo sed a trilateralnl ",'eting to the United States in September 1L)97, bu t Wa shin g ton wasca uti o us


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Japan's China Diplomacy and U.S. InterestsTh e p:merns of bilateral relatiollS that emerged in Japan s China policyin the mid to late 1YYOs are likely to continue for the foreseeable futur e, To begin with, th ey :Ire clt:arly th e result o t illstitutional and normative changes in Japan , In add {-ioLl , China sho \\'s no sign of rel enting011 its pursuit of expanded influ en ce in the reg lOn at the expense ofJapan, M o reo ver, Japan is not ye t f(.) rc ecl to choose bet\Veen its policiesot strateg ic r,ivalry and economic interdependence because China doesnot ye t pose all immediate military thr eat to Jap;l n that wo uld force apoli cy of containment or the "pursuit of relati\'e gains," And beca use thestrategic uncertainties w ith China are long-term iSS ll t'S, Japan has generaU:' bee ll able [(; avoid co nti-o ntation over more dangero lls short-termproblems \\ 'her e C hina is \\"lllillg to use fo rce, In T ~ l i \ V a n poli cy, for ex


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I I II

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tacti ca l changes in direction open gaps between the United States andJapan, which is in part wh y Beijing employs them ,

There will therefore continue to be fluidity in the U.S. and Japaneseapproaches to China, in spite of co 111111on strategic goals between Washington and Tokyo. Coordina.tion would be easier if the United Statesan d Japan hJ d a simple policy of containment, bu t China has two potential futures, and Washington and Tokyo should no t foreclose themore positive of those futures by crafting a strategy of containment justfor simplicity's sake. Instead, senior poli cyma kers in both countries mustrecognize that the United States and Japan are engaged ill a competition for power ,,\lith China as \,,,.ell as a game of engagement and integration. In that competition, the US-Japan alliance is a powerful asset,no t only in the military role of deterring co ntingencies, but also as adiplomatic asset to enhance negotiating leve rage . It is therefore in U.S.andJapanese interests to work harder to reduce the opportunities forChina to dri\'e Jny wedge in the alliance, That l11e;ms more ;lcti ve consultation, dialogue, an d coordination of policy on issues ranging fromW T O accession to arms control negotiations and multilateral diplomacy as it relates to China,

An d what if there is a change in Sino-U.S, relations? The dynamicsof Sino-Japanese relations since the Cold War are no t predictive of thefuture, bu t do suggest sever:-d outcomes, First, if the United States reve rsed its policy of forward engagement, it seems likely t1Llt Japanwould expand its active efforts to balance and constrain ChIlLI in compensation. While this would OCcur primarily in multilateral allc1 hilat,'r;lldiplomatic settings, there should be little doubt that Japan wo uld :llsostrengthen its unilateral military capab iliti c; to manage potential Chinese threats to Japan ese sea lanes and the home islands,

If the United States and China came into open conflict over Taiwan,on the other hand, Japan would [lce its nightmare scenario, Ultimately,the Japanese response would depend on the justness of th e fight. A unibtc'L1I provocltion of Chill;l by expanded u.s. support for Tliwaneseindependenn:. for eX;II11ple, would likely lead to Japallese efTorts to constrain the United St;ltes and wo uld leave open to question Japall ese sup port II I a contingency, On the other hanci , in the case of an unprovokedChinese use of force agaillSt Taiwan , Tokyo would be more likely tosupport :1 robust U.S. response, preferring diplomacy to force bu t ultiIlLltcly had;illiI 6)r(c. These ;lre obVIously subjectiw judglllell(S ill part,hUI it is ,'k;lr ti"OIII the imp act of Chinese miliur:' ,lCliollS Slllcr the(:nld \Xlir I1uI "I,q',!II', Jlllliri",d ,"ldlm,' d,ll', CIt'llliIl' ill rC'il,)II,,' 10 Ilewly

I ~ \ ~ \ , \

~ - -challenges, No matte r what the US respon se to a Taiwan contingency,therefore, it is sate to predict that Japanese constraints on military preparedness \,"ill be we akened,

Th e key is to avoid a confrontation in the Taiwan Straits in the firstplace. Closer U.S.-Japan coordination can contribute to that goal. TheU.S. policy on Taiwan is strategic ambiguity and "actical clari ty-that isto say, it is no t certain ho w the United States would respond to the useofforce by China, bu t it is clear that the United States has interests an dcould respond in a robllSt manner, if necessary. A strong US-Japan military :llliance reinforces that policy. Th e United States and Japan shouldbe clear that the alliance does no t exist to protect Taiwanese independence, bu t that the alliance is prepared to deter and if necessary defeatany ac tions rh,l( threaten the ,'ital interests of th e al1iance. A firm U,S.Japan alliance complicates and deters any Chinese consideration of thelise of force in the Straits Without provoking Chinese preemptive ac tion . At the sa me tillle, closer U.S.-Japan coordination on Taiwan issues(and closer US coordination with other al1ies as wt'lI, for that matter)has a ll1utmlly constraining effect th at helps to mitigate against dangerous changes Il1 the status quo, Th e United States exacerbated the Taiwan situation by first breaking its pledge to China and allowingPresident Lee Teng H ui to visit the United States an d later compensating with support for Beijing's !' T hree Nos" on Taiwan. By comparison,Japan has been ell- more consistent in its One China policy. A closer calibration of U.s. T a i \ \ ~ l ! 1 policy with allies like Japan might have avoidedthe unpredIctable and ultimately provocative nature of the U,S. approach to T:1I\\an in the 1990s,

I should be clear to U.s. policymakers that Japan is also no w playing;1 d l l ~ 1 gaille of hedging and political-economic engagement withChim, Sll1ce U.S.:in-d Japanese ac tions have more of all impact on eachside's respecti\'e China policies, each side should be working harder tocoordinare JPproaches. With time , economic integration ma y smoo ththe rough edges on C hina s relations wi th both (he United States an dJ:1p.lll, bu t rhar event is ! lo t ce rtain. Until it is, the United States w illha\'\.' to \\'ork ' \ 'ith J;lpall as a real strategic partner in th e region,
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