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Republic of Kabinda

January 8, 2010 Committee Report on the Togolese Incident

Executive Summary

By order of Premier Joel Batila of the Republic of Kabinda, the January 8 Commission was formed to investigate the January 8, 2010 fatal attack on the Togolese football team en route to Cabinda from the Congo by bus. The members of the Commission are: Committee Member - Gabriel Homem: Republique du Kabinda, Minister of Internal Security Committee Member - Barrister Clement Chigbo – Republique du Kabinda Special Prosecutor Committee Chair – Dr. Jonathan Levy, Attorney for Republique du Kabinda and FLEC. Scope of Investigation: Events leading up to, during, and following the events of January 8, 2010. Question to be answered: 1. How did the events of January 8, 2010 transpire? 2. Who was responsible for the fatal outcome? 3. Why did elements of FLEC initially assume responsibility and then change their positions? 4. Actions by Angola and FLEC after January 8.

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5. Findings & Recommendations Who is FLEC FLEC is the Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda. There is only one FLEC. Many individuals and groups including Angolan agents have used the name FLEC as part of their disinformation campaign. An ongoing disinformation campaign traced to the Angolan government claims FLEC is weak and divided. This has not been the case. FLEC is strong and unified and has cells and youth brigades in every city, town and village in Cabinda. The press has been deceived by false front virtual FLECs and impersonators visible on the Internet but unknown inside Cabinda. Of these Angolan dupes, “Commandante” Lopes, Rodrigues Mingas and Rui Gabirro also known as “Mangovo Ngoya” stand out as the worst offenders. “Commandante” Lopes does not command anything other than a long stagnant website - cabinda.org. It is alleged that Lopes has been involved in immigration and asylum fraud in France by issuing so called Cabinda identity cards of his own devising and manufacture. His website serves to deceive the public and “squats” upon the legitimate rights of FLEC to that Internet domain. “The Rt Hon Mangovo Ngoyo Mwana Kabinda, so called, “Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cabinda and Member of the Regency of Cabinda,” is Rui Gabirro, a Portuguese citizen, son of Portuguese colonialists. Gabirro also styles himself by the delusional title “Duke of Cabinda” and has set up a fantasy operation called the Federation of Free African States, a fraudulent so called bank and a fake university. His Federal Republic of Cabinda “government” includes Rodrigues Mingas. Gabirro also sells passports, coins and stamps that are the lawful property of FLEC. Gabirro also infiltrated anti MPLA Angolan youth groups earlier this year and interjected himself as their spokesman following the Mingas example. Several anti Santos were then arrested in Luanda. Unfortunately, Lopes and Gabirro have cyber squatted on the two top level domains, Cabinda.org and Cabinda.net discrediting the cause of FLEC in the eyes of the press and public. FLEC is a stable organization with bases of operations in France and in the vicinity of Pointe Noire, Congo. FLEC is universally acclaimed within Cabinda as

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the only credible force for self determination. FLEC has self defense forces, cells, and youth brigades throughout Cabinda. FLEC and the struggle for Cabindan self determination has been the most sustained and long standing African self determination movement since 1963 and against all odds has fended off oil company mercenaries, Cubans, Portuguese, South Africans, MPLA, FNLN, and UNITA forces. Now FLEC stresses non violent conflict resolution and has a pending case with the African Union Commission regarding onshore oil and mineral resources. FLEC and Republic of Kabinda leadership does not want to see Cabinda turned into a bloody battleground as occurred during the Angolan civil war between UNITA and the MPLA. Even though FLEC has the ability to call for general strike and rebellion, it has deliberately refrained from doing so in order to spare the civilian population which barely survives under the Angolan neocolonial regime. FLEC’s current emphasis is on conflict resolution through international organizations, international law, refugee relief and education. FLEC is not a terrorist organization and condemns terrorism including the events of January 8. Events leading up to January 8 The build up to the African Cup Tournament was given little attention by FLEC. The testimony of Congolese Colonel Cosmas Nzaou indicates that unknown operatives at the Congo-Cabinda border crossing distributed leaflets prior to the January 8, 2010 warning of attacks. FLEC however was unaware of this and the Colonel indicates that the source of the leaflets may have been the Angolan secret police rather than FLEC. Africa Cup officials also warned all groups about using the border crossings yet the Togolese team bus nonetheless was routed through the border crossing by the Angolan authorities directly into an ambush. While FLEC does operate along the northern Congolese border, FLEC commandos usually stay clear of the heavily fortified border crossing. Clashes between FLEC and the FAA (Angolan Army) have taken place in remote regions of Cabinda during the past five years and not at heavily garrisoned towns in part to avoid civilian causalities. Almost all operations by FLEC since 2006 have targeted neocolonial activities involving resource extraction by the MPLA and its foreign contractors. Such incidents have been short and not sustained. Debriefing of FLEC leadership indicates there was no campaign to target the African Cup and that any leafleting campaign was not originated by FLEC. FLEC operations typically target MPLA FAA forces outside civilian areas. Aside from targeting the FAA, FLEC has also disrupted mineral and petroleum exploration after giving notice that such operations were illegal and would not be tolerated.

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The Events of January 8, 2010 African Cup organizers claim that participants were warned not to enter Cabinda by land crossings however but the existence of an Angolan FAA escort indicates the bus was coordinated and known to the FAA. The village of Tchikamba is an open area in the midst of FAA garrisons. A FAA mortar position is nearby. It is an extremely unlikely place for a FLEC operation. According to eyewitness accounts as the bus entered it was ambushed by armed men. A fire fight ensued with the FAA escort and the bus passengers suffered casualties before the attackers withdrew. After the attack there was apparently no effective FAA pursuit despite the alleged warnings distributed previously and apparent high state of alert existing in the area. It is undisputed that some well prepared armed group attacked the convoy which consisted of several military vehicles, the team bus, and outriders. At least three people were killed and eight were wounded. Aftermath of January 8 Within hours of the attack a relatively unknown individual, Rodrigues Mingas, took responsibility for the attack. Mingas in numerous well coordinated phone calls to the international press from a cell phone registered in France claimed to head something called FLEC Position Military or FLEC-PM. Mingas gave phone interviews and for a time placed material on the Internet including his own picture in a military uniform. The press by and large accepted Mingas as a legitimate representative of FLEC. There is no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that Mingas’ organization existed prior to the events of January 8 though Mingas claimed FLEC PM had been founded in 2003. Mingas had in fact been barred for several years from FLEC due to the MPLA association of his family in Angola. It is inconceivable that Mingas operating from France or even more implausibly from Angola on his own could have recruited and trained a military cadre in one of the most militarized sectors of Cabinda. Mingas claimed the attack was incidental in that “his forces” had no idea the bus was carrying the Togolese team and had thought this was a FAA convoy.

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Mingas gave the impression his group was patrolling the border region, saw a convoy in their binoculars and decided to attack it on the spot. Mingas then threatened further attacks during the Africa Cup Games. Mingas said his group had written two month prior to the attack to Issa Hayatou, the head of the CAF African Football Federation, to warn of impending trouble. There is no confirmation such a letter ever existed. FLEC PM was also unknown to former General Boma of the FLEC armed forces as well as the Commander of the Northern Front, Sabata, later betrayed and murdered at the hands of the Angolan FAA. Mingas and FLEC PM were also unknown to FLEC leadership abroad. Mingas however claimed to be the Secretary General of FLEC in his communiqués. Nothing more has ever been heard of FLEC PM. In January 2011 Mingas was arrested by French authorities on suspicion of terrorism, he was however released on January 18, 2012 after apparently being cleared of charges despite his public admissions. The French government came to the conclusion that is was factually impossible for Mingas to commit the acts he confessed to doing. Mingas has now been adjudged a poseur. Strange & Confused Claims by FLEC On January 10, 2011, former General Boma of FLEC announced an attitude of non violence during the remainder of the African Cup. He did not however clarify responsibility for the events of January 8 nor denounce Mingas. Following on the heels of Mingas’ provocation to the press, the grandson of the Chair made completely unauthorized statements to the press on behalf of FLEC. He stated that FLEC not Mingas was responsible for the attack. On or about January 12, 2011in a statement to the international press, Jean Claude Nzita denounced Mingas as an opportunist and claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of FLEC. Jean Claude Nzita was not an official of FLEC and was not authorized to make statements on FLEC’s behalf. His sole connection to FLEC was his familial relation to FLEC’s long serving Chairman. Jean Claude Nzita is a resident of Switzerland and has little if any dealing with FLEC in recent years. It is unknown what may have prompted his statement and impersonation of a FLEC official spokesman. Nonetheless, the international press reported his statements as credible. Coincidental with his grandson’s statement, the Chairman of FLEC claimed responsibility for the attacks. FLEC Secretary General Joel Batila however denied any responsibility by FLEC. The Chair however overrode Batila and claimed Batila was not fully informed. Batila did not however change his position.

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As if on signal, Rui Gabirro announced formation of a Republic of Cabinda government with himself and Mingas as ministers. Adding to the confusion, an unknown individual claiming to be the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Cabinda, Tiburcio Tati Tchingobo, denied responsibility but blamed other FLEC groups in Cabinda. All of this was aired in the international press. The press reported Tchingobo was part of the Federal Republic of Cabinda. An internal FLEC dispute arose and the Chair recanted any involvement by FLEC on January 14, 2011. The communiqué indicated that Mingas was a known Angolan agent and that FLEC PM was a pure fabrication. The communication however did not explain the obvious contradictions of such a statement. FLEC then indicated in a letter authorized by Batila that it would render all cooperation possible to FIFA in an investigation the incident. FIFA forwarded the offer to the African Football Federation which however did not respond further. Angolan Reaction The Angolan reaction has been significant and sustained – arrests and detentions of Cabindese within Cabinda and the Congo. The arrests began almost immediately after the incident and have continued unabated. The January 8 incident was a mere pretext for the arrests since many of the individuals arrested were not even associated with FLEC and were not in the vicinity of the attack nor plausibly could have any connection with it. Their only crime was alleged opposition to Angolan rule in Cabinda. Angola has also issued a so called “wish list” of FLEC leadership it deemed responsible for January 8 and wants them arrested as terrorists. Attempted coup d'état" In July 2010, FLEC's military chief of staff, Stanislas Boma, vice president Alexandre Tati, security chief Carlos Luembe, and foreign affairs minister Luis Veras without any apparent authority traveled to Luanda and subsequently declared the armed struggle at an end. The Chair repudiated the event after the fact however no explanation has ever been provided how the top four frontline FLEC officials were corrupted or authorized to go to Luanda. The renegade FLEC leadership was curiously not charged with any crimes in connection with January 8 raising even more questions. Nonetheless, these four individuals would logically have been responsible for the January 8 events if they had been committed by FLEC as Angola has alleged. The defection of course compromised all FLEC operations in Cabinda and its environs.

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Assassination of the FLEC Commanders FLEC Military Chief of Staff Pirilampo was kidnapped from the Congo, tortured, and murdered by the Angolans in March 2011. It is very likely he was betrayed by individuals within FLEC. This blow was followed by kidnapping, torture and murder of Northern Front Commandeer Sabato two weeks later under similar circumstances. The faction of Bomo and Tati in Luanda apparently had knowledge of the event. Since July 2011, at least a half dozen other FLEC officers have been kidnapped, murdered, or ambushed by Angolan forces including Vinagre, Buna Roi, Damas Makunda, Larry, Dominique Makoumbou and Razao. Treachery is suspected in all these cases as well. These cross border assassinations have been justified by Angola on grounds of the January 8 incident and a response to alleged terrorism by FLEC. Findings 1. The events of January 8 implicate the Angolan police and possibly the Congo DTC. The exact identities of the triggermen are unknown but they were not acting on orders from FLEC. 2. Mingas, Jean Claude Nzita and Gabirro did the bidding of the MPLA after January 8 by spreading disinformation and posing as legitimate represents of FLEC in a plot to implicate FLEC as a terrorist organization and justify the resulting Angolan rampage of murder and unlawful detention. These individuals have done great harm to FLEC and are indirectly responsible for the summary executions carried out by the MPLA post January 8, 2010. 3. The Tati and Boma faction have committed treachery against FLEC by defecting to the MPLA. The deaths of FLEC’s military commanders rest on their heads. 4. The position of the Chair indicates at best a fatal breakdown in communication at a crucial time and an inability to contain a major crisis. Recommendations 1. If FLEC is to survive it must institute strong internal security measures, it is unacceptable that its front line commanders are assassinated seemingly at will by the Angolans on the pretext of January 8.

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2. False FLECs must be rooted out and legally destroyed – Gabirro, Mingas, Lopes, and Nzita Mbemba Antonio must be prevented from falsely using the name of FLEC to provide disinformation, for profit and to collaborate with the MPLA. 3. So called ongoing negotiations with Luanda must cease while front line FLEC commanders are killed at will in violation of international law. 4. FLEC must act to repudiate the chain of unfortunate events spawned on January 8 by vocally drawing attention to the Angolan involvement in the deaths of innocent sportsmen to further the FAA campaign against FLEC. 5. Individuals implicated in this report should be called upon to explain their actions. If FLEC or former FLEC members collaborated with the Angolans on January 8 they must be exposed and brought to justice as well. 6. The events of January 8 should be investigated by an international organization. FLEC brings a charge of state sponsored terrorism against the government of Angola. The victims are Togolese, Cabindese and members of FLEC. 7. FLEC submits this report to the Peace and Security Commission of the African Union, Confederation of African Football, and the South African Development Community Organ on Defense and Security for further investigation and action. Submitted to Premier Batila: Levy Homem Chigbo January 20, 2012

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Copies for action to: Mr. MARTIN A. EWI ANTI-TERRORISM ANALYST PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT COMMISSION OF THE AFRICAN UNION P.O. BOX 3243 ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA Confederation of African Football Executive Committee 3 Abdel Khalek Sarwat Street El Hay El Motamayez, P.O. Box 23, 6th October City Egypt South African Development Community Organ on Defense and Security PO Box 0095 Gaborone, Botswana