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Constructing a complex world: The frontiers of international relationstheory and foreign policy-makingMatthew J. Hoffmannaa Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, University ofDelaware,

To cite this Article Hoffmann, Matthew J.(2003) 'Constructing a complex world: The frontiers of international relationstheory and foreign policy-making', Asian Journal of Political Science, 11: 2, 37 57

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Asian Journal ofPoliticalScience Volume 11Number 2 (December 2003)

Constructing a ComplexWorld: TheFrontiers ofInternational Relations Theoryand Foreign Policy-making1Matthew J. Hoffmann

The relevance of international relations theory hinges on the ability of theorists topredict, or at least understand theseminal events of any era. Unfortunately, thevastmajority of international relations theorists were overwhelmingly surprised by theen d ofthe Cold War and thediscipline's response to 9/11 hasalso been characterisedby significant confusion. The international relations discipline has had a difficulttime providing concepts and frameworks that facilitate understanding or evenaddressing thediscontinuous and non-linear change that rare events like the end ofthe Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 potentially engender. How ever, evengiven this failing, thecorrect concern is not if theory is relevant, but which theory isrelevant. Policy-makers need to look to thefrontiers of international relations theoryfor approaches that embrace dynamism and change social constructivism andcomplexity theory.

IntroductionT he relevance of international relations theory hinges, fairly or unfairly,on the ability of theorists to predict, or at least understand the seminalevents of any era something they have, at times, failed to do. As twooutstanding examples, the vast majority of international relations (IR) theoristswere overwhelmingly surprised by the end of the Cold War and the discipline'sresponse to 9/11 has also been characterised by significant confusion. Theseseminal events unveiled the painful fact that the IR discipline has a difficulttime providing concepts and frameworks that facilitate understanding, explaining,predicting, or even addressing the discontinuous and non-linear change thatdisruptions or rare (whether small or large) events like the end of the Cold War

Matthew J. Hoffmann, Ph.D., isAssistant Professor at the Depar tment ofPolitical Scienceand International Relations, University of Delaware, USA.


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38 Asian Journal of Political Scienceand the terrorist attacks of 9/11 potentially engender. This crucial lacuna issymptomatic of the discipline's larger difficultly dealing with a critical aspect ofglobal politics: change.

Of course, we are far from alone in our inability. Social science in generalhas yet to come to grips with the effects of rare events, and I would hazard toclaim that the non-linear effects of disruption are a blind spot for science writlarge.2 I do not fault our discipline for failing to predict the tragic events of 9/11(though our track record for other, seemingly more predictable events like theend of the Cold W ar are a stinging indictment of traditional approaches), b ut ourinability to describe and explain how these events might emerge and how theyaffect w orld politics is a larger proble m . In addition, as Rosenau lame nts, no t onlydid we, as a discipline, miss the end of the Cold War, we also missed theopportunity to learn from our mistakes. Instead we proceeded...analytically as we always have, as if the end of the Cold War either had neverhappened or was inconsequ ential...we have yet to be jolted by the end of the Co ld Warand the probabilities are that we never shall be.3

Is IR theory, therefore, irrelevant to the practitioner? 4 IR theorists need toprovide general understanding of world politics in order to be relevant conce ptions of wo rld politics tha t facilitate good policy-making. Th e record of IRtheorists, given that criterion, has been mixed at best. Further since the end of theCold War, scholars and practitioners alike have roundly criticised traditional IRtheo ry app roache s for their inability to exp licate world politics. How ever, it is tooeasy to dismiss the relevance of IR theo ry for th e practice of foreign policy easyand misguided.The international relations theorist and the foreign policy practitioner havealways been at once intimately connected and at odds. The theorist studiespractitioners' actions as "data". The practitioner prepares for her career in thetheorists' classrooms. There is often mutual disdain, with practitioners decryingivory tower aloofness and irrelevance while theorists condemn shortsightednessand ill-conceived actions; yet some individuals have successfully played bothroles. Even given the obvious connections between the two, the question of therelevance of IR theory for the practice of foreign p olicy is enduring and oft askedbecause IR theory has, at times, failed to adequately account for important events.On e rece nt analysis of CIA forecasting by D avid Brooks pu ts the blam e for "reallylamentable errors" on the "social scientist's mentality". 5In contrast, let me suggest that we can safely stop asking the relevancequestion . In the in trodu ctory essay to this special issue James Rosenau con tendsthat "We are all theorists" and he is, of course, correct. Even the mostharde ned, detail oriented, empirically gro unde d analyst or diplom at is a theorist,i f only implici t ly, with ideas about how actors behave and how the worldworks. As Alexander George clarifies, "in employing a strategy, policy-makersrely on assumptions, often tacit assumptions, about the strategy's general


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requirements and logic."6 This is not to say that relevance is an irrelevantquestion. Certainly the translation of theory into practice is far from directand IR theorists too often produce abstract and jargon-laden work that isdifficult to apply. However, even given the misgivings of practitioners andobservers, w e should not ask if IR theory is relevant, but rather which IR theoryis relevant?

The latter question has, in fact, always defined the foundation of relevancedebates because practitioners and observers too often conflate IR theory writlarge with specific IR theories they dislike or find useless. While Brookscondemns the "social scientist 's mentality" as a whole, close inspection revealsa more specific target rational choice and perhap s neorealism.7 The relevancedebate usually turns on the type of IR theory discussed the particular brandof "social scientist 's mentality" prevalent in the academy and policy world.George 's list of practitioner grievances with IR theory remo val of judg em ent,quantif icat ion that reduces complex pol i t ical phenomena to numbers, andtheories that "assume that all state actors are alike and can be expected tobehave in th e same way in given si tuat ions " 8 actually mirror intra-disciplinecritiques of traditional IR theory (rationalist, materialist theories like neorealismand neoliberalism).

The important question thus becomes which set of tacit assumptionsshould practitioners be using. According to George, IR theorists:.. . perform a useful, indeed a nec essary, task by developing betterconcepts an d conceptualframework s, which should assistpolicy-makers in orienting themselves to the phenomenaand the problems with w hich they must deal.9

Given th e events of the last two decades, if IR theorists h op e to be releva ntin a way that leads to well-conceived policy they must be able to satisfactorilytheorise change and disruptive events a requirement that forces us beyondtraditional IR approaches. Perhaps if scholars and practitioners continue to usetraditional IR theories th at cann ot accou nt for rare events and change, IR theoryshould be irrelevant. However, traditional IR theories do not exhaust thepossibilities for practitioners. Policy-makers need to look to the frontiers of IRtheory for approach es tha t embrace d ynamism and change social constructivismand complexity theory. Taken together, these approaches provide a frameworkfor studying world politics that facilitates un derstandin g change and the impa ctof disruptive events, putting to rest the question of whether IR theory isrelevant by demonstrating ho w IR theory is relevant.

In this article, I first elaborate on the justifications for adopting a different,bu t very relevant IR theory perspective, com menting on th e problem of disruptiveevents and the nature of change. Following this, I discuss how complexity theoryand social constructivism deal with these challenges. Finally, I outline a policyrelevant research agenda that will foster understanding of a particular rare event,9/11, and its aftermath.


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40 Asian Journal ofPolitical ScienceJustifying a Jailbreak: W hy a New Set of Tacit Assu mptions isNeeded10According to Rosenau, a theoretical jailbreak entails "an unremitting effort tobreak out of the conceptual jails which the study of world politics is deemed tobe incarcerated."11 The challenges presented by rare events and the overarchingdilemma of change highlight the need to break from traditional rationalist,materialist IR theories like neorealism and neoliberalism.

The Problem of Rare Events12To be clear, the problem for practitioners is not that IR theorists failed topredict the end of the Cold War and 9/11. The problem is that traditional IRapproaches cannot readily incorporate these events into their explanatoryframeworks and therefore cannot explain how these events affect the evolutionof political relationships a fundamental concern for practitioners. A majorstumbling b lock is traditional IR theo ry's co nception of world politics in linearand mechan istic ways, rather than as non-linear and com plex. This fundam entalconception of the natu re of world politics hinders our ability to conceive of andunderstand the ensuing change from disruptive events and it leads to concernsabout policy irrelevance.Linear models, still dominant in international relations, have difficultyincorporating sensitivity to rare events. King, Keohane, and Verba (KKV), themo st widely read arbiters of scientific m etho ds in political science (and prop one ntsof a linear mo del), 13 advise separating out systematic and stochastic co mp onen tsof phe nom ena and concen trating on studying the large systematic pattern s inessence ignoring the effects of initial conditions and random events.14 Theyargue that

...knowing what happened on a given occasion is not sufficient by itself. If we make noeffort to extract the s ystematic features of a subject,the lessons of historywill be lost, andwe w ill learn nothing about w hat aspects of our subject are likely to persist or to berelevant to future events or studies.1 5

In contrast, Rosenau cogently asks us to consider when events that do notconform to the systematic features should be considered fundamental (and thereforewo rthy of con sideration) or insignificant (and therefore easily dismissed as randomnoise).16 Consider the end of the Cold War. Did Pope John Paul II 's specialinterest in obtaining human rights and ultimately freedom for the Poles initiatethe creation of a context within which the demonstrations that swept throughEastern E urope be came possible?17In one sense, this example sounds absurd. Who argues that the Cold Warwould still be in force if the Pope were not Polish? Almost nobody. Few if any of


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us would even think t o consider this a serious research project. But tha t is exactlythe poin t. W e act as if the Cold W ar was a stable fixture of political life, wh en inhindsight it is readily ap paren t th at at critical points it was highly unstable.18 Theelection of a Polish Pope was likely considered a stochastic occasion in KKV'sterminology a small event that did not influence the systematic patterns of theCold War. However, in hindsight and using a different perspective (discussedbelow ) it may be possible to see how this small change or even t could have ripplesthrough the global system, ultimately contributing to a breakpoint change like theend of the Cold War.

Unfortunately, we cannot "see" the ripples with traditional approaches toIR. Indeed, these approaches classify small or rare events as random, su i generis tothe Cold War, or other topics under investigation, and in so doing devalue theirimportance. We have been taught to peel away random effects and look fordeeper systematic, substantive patterns when in fact rare events and disruptionscan systematically have large impacts.19 Put differently, we can learn a great dealabout "big theoretical questions", such as the likelihood of war, the changes inpolarity in the international system, and the evolution of terrorism and responsesto it am ong o ther qu estions, by systematically looking at th e effects of disruptions.

This is no t to argue th at every detail matters. R ather, at critical points, smalldifferences or rare events can have large effects on the patterns of politics. Theanalytic "trick" is to identify points in a system whereby disturbances can haveexponential effects on the direction of the system, and also to explore howdisruptions, changes in every day behaviour, can alter the very context of asituation. Traditional IR theory approaches, how ever, too often ex plicitly theorisethat events are equal to the sum of their parts (linear), and that the effects ofrandom events disperse and disappear.20 This denies the notion that "random"events could significantly alter "systematic" patterns.

The Problem of ChangeThe failure of traditional IR theory to understand rare events is troublesome notbecause these events are crucial in and of themselves. Rather this failing istroublesome because the failure to understand rare events is symptomatic oflarger failures explaining change.Let me begin with the dilemma of change by stating what may be obvious,but rarely discussed explicitly explaining change is an inherently theoreticaland relative, rather than empirical, enterprise. Explaining change is theoreticalbecause claiming to explain change implies that the theoretical perspectiveemp loyed can conceive of observed variation in po litical "things" (actors, behaviours,relationships, etc.). This is a relative claim becau se perspectives are com pared interms of conceivable variation.The world is always changing if change is merely the banal notion of analtered state of affairs. Thus every theory can explain change at some level


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because, paradoxically, the ability to explain change rests on what a theory holdsconstant. Even neorealism, the theory most criticised for not understandingchange, can of course explain some changes. Neorealism can explain France'schanging alliance behaviour in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries because it fallswithin the parameters of possible behavioural variation given the static notion ofbalance of power and the security dilemma. A theory recognises change byreferring to what it holds constant.

Criticising a theory for its inability to explain change is really a claim thatobserved behaviour falls outside the limits of possible variation that the theoryposits. However, where should we put our limits on possible political variation?Where should we look for generalisations? The two questions are equivalent, forgeneralisations represent limits on variation. What we choose to generalise about our static claims about how the world works represents the limits that wepu t on political change. O f course, there are m ultiple options available for settingour limits. The key question for practitioners is where is it most relevant to placeour limits? What can policy-makers safely assume to be stable and what shouldthey consider to be dynamic?

Braudel gives us a potential typology of levels of generalisations in histhinking on the forms of change.21 He sees change occurring at levels of: Imm edia te events and daily life Con jectural trend s th at span decades Th e long duree tha t spans across centuries.

Each of these levels represents a potential place for a theory to place itslimits on possible variation a level for generalisation. All political theories m ustallow th e im me diate events of daily life to vary. For instance, wh ile realism h oldstha t balancing behaviou r is likely it can conceive of variation (and th us change) instates' daily behaviour within these parameters. Balancing behaviour is static,while particular historical balances are variable.Most theories hold conjectural trends or the long duree constant and thenanalyse variation and change within these parameters. The classic example of thisis realism. Ruggie has elegantly shown that realism cannot explain the changefrom medieval times to modern international relations after the Treaty ofWestphalia.22 Realism ca nno t do this, because its generalisations are found in th elong duree of modern, anarchical international relations. It takes anarchy as aconstant and anarchy thus (partially) defines the param eters within which variationis conceivable. If there is variation outside these parameters (a non-anarchicsystem or a differently anarchic system], realism cannot explain it the theorycannot explain the change.23 Similarly traditional IR theory as a whole wassurprised by the en d of the Cold Wa r, because such a change fell outside the scopeof possible change allowed by these theories. When a theory holds a particulararrangement constant, theorists are not likely to anticipate change in thosearrangements.


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Most international relations theories place their generalisations at one ofBraudel's levels they generalise, or hold constant, some aspects of substantivepolitics and can thus explain change in the lower levels. They freeze particularnotions of important actors (states usually), political relationships (the securitydilemm a for instance), and beh aviour into generalisations. A good deal of valuablework has been done in this manner. However, such generalisations leave thesetheories vulnerable to missing change that flows from rare events. If the theoryignores rare events [because it cann ot "see" anomalies), it may be ignoring eventsthat have the potential to alter the substantive political conditions held constant a recipe for surprise and accusations of irrelevance.

Fortunately, Braudel's levels do not exhaust the possibilities for the formsof change. There is a fourth level above the long dure e; that of fundam ental socialproce sses. At this level, all th e "things" of politics (actors, relationsh ips, b eha viou r)become conceivably variablewhat is instead held constant are fundamentalsocial processes. I favour such perspectives with a wider conception of possiblevariation because such theories do not generalise about political "things" (actors,relationships, and behaviour) that are inherently dynamic and subject to theinfluence of rare even ts. Traditional IR theo ry defines inh erently variable p oliticalpatterns and relationships as constant artificially.24 In contrast, perspectives thathold fundamental social processes constant and allow politics to vary are, bydefinition, more p repared to handle changes observed in politics. W he n confrontedby an ever changing world and (according to some) a world confronted withaccelerating change, an ap proach t ha t allows for wider generalisation will be mo reuseful for scholars and practitioners alike.25

Jailbreak Justified?This analysis suggests the need for IR theories that recognise the constancy ofdynamism a necessary realisation when confronted with disruption and rareevents. The substantive patterns of politics are reinforced by events and they canbe changed by events. The key is tha t whe n w e identify substantive patterns w eare only identifying the surface results of more fundamental processes. Unlessboth scholars and practitioners understand the underlying processes neither canknow which events will change known patterns and which will reinforce knownpatterns. Without a jailbreak, scholars will fail to understand the world, andpractitioners will fail to enact "good" policy.

Breaking Out to the Frontiers of IR Theory: Constructivismand Complexity TheoryGiven the challenges of rare events and change, the solution is not to abandon IRtheory. Instead, we should choose a new set of "tacit assumptions" to drive


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scholarship and pol icy. Social construct ivism and complexi ty theory arecomplementary IR approaches that provide similar fundamental social processes.In addition, they very explicitly account for rare events and change. In thissection, I briefly discuss the two perspectives and their social processes beforeexamining how they meet the challenges of rare events and change.

Social ConstructivismSocial constructivism is no t a singular discourse.26 However, constructivists, withdiverse beliefs about the world, have in common a philosophy that "the mannerin which the m aterial world shapes and is shaped by hum an action and interactiondepends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the materialworld."27 There is a world of meanings and knowledge as well as an objective,material world. This intersubjective w orld a world of shared know ledge w hereobjects require human agreement to exist is where the important "action" ofworld politics takes place and it is inherently dynamic.

Constructivist theory approaches world politics by linking actors and theirintersubjective context, describing th e m utual constitution of actors (their identities,interests and behaviours) and social structures (norms and institutions}. Mutualconstitution is a fundamental social process that posits that actors create socialstructures through their actions and interactions, while, in turn, social structuresinfluence who actors are, what they want, and what they do. Change is inherentin this perspective and the notion of mutual constitution puts all the parts ofsocial life in motion. Agents are dynamic, as their wants, actions, and evenperceptions are affected by the changing (sometimes slowly) context in whichthey find themselves (their intersubjective environment constitutes them).Structures are also dynam ic as the rules of the game and institutions are instantiatedonly by the actions and interactions of the agentseven status quo or robuststructures require continual action in their reproduction. Constructivism thusprovides a perspective that recognises change in substantive political conditionsby holding constant a fundamental social process.Social norms play a central, causal role in constructivism and a good deal ofwork has surround ed th e em ergence and evolution of norm s a crucial aspect ofconstructivism's approach to both change and rare events. Finnemore and Sikkink'sproposed norm life cycle explores these norm dynamics through three linkedstages: emergence, cascade, and internalisation.28 Norm emergence begins with acatalyst a norm entrepreneur. Norm entrepreneurs are actors that, dissatisfiedwith their social context, advocate different ideas about appropriate behaviourfrom organisational platforms that give their ideas credence. These normentrepreneurs work to persuade other actors to alter their behaviour these"suggestions" can represent rare or disruptive events (discussed in greater detailbelo w). W he n a "critical mass" of actors has accepted th e new ideas as approp riate,the n F innemore and Sikkink claim that a norm has emerged.29 Following em ergence,


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the nascent norm cascades throughout the system.30 Here we see the rare eventor disruption transforming the substantive political conditions. The final stage inth e cycle is internalisation. Th e norm becom es taken for granted, and conformancewith its dictates is no longer (or rarely) questioned. 31 There is now a new set ofpolitical conditions (ready for the next rare event to change them).

Complexity Theory32Constructivism is not the only fundamental social process available for IRtheory. Complexity theory contains another process, complex adaptation, that,wh ile resemb ling mu tua l constitution , arose from a vastly different intellectuallineage.33 Complexity theory is a product of interdisciplinary problem solving.Scholars from such diverse disciplines as economics, physics, genetics, ecology,and computer science found that the problems they were encountering hadsome broad similarities. As John Holland notes, "We are learning ... that themechanisms that mediate these systems [a variety of complex systems] aremuch more alike than surface observations would suggest."34 Essentially thesescholars were confronted with systems where the interaction of actors causesthe emergence of complex, irreducible macroscopic behaviour/structures. Onekey aspect of these systems is tha t actors interact or coevolve with the environm entin which they exist and also with the other actors in the system to continuallyreproduce the environment or system. In this way the systems evolve to"nowhere".35 Complexity theory is a theory of processthe process of complexadaptation at work in complex systems, whether they are immune systems,economies, ecosystems, societies, or political systems.

Complex adaptation (CA) is a feedback process between adaptive actorsand a dynamic context. It proceeds in clear stages: Ada ptive actors are defined by internal rule mo dels or schema.36 These rulemodels represent the actor's internal (or subjective) understanding of theworld around them. The rule models encapsulate the experience of theactor and they drive actor behaviour. With the rule models, the actorsperceive and define their situation, predict the consequences of action, andact. In most applications of adaptive actors, the rules are behavioural, butthey can also represent identities, interests and goals. Th e actions tha t adaptive actors und ertake and the interactions in wh ich

they participate reproduce/alter their context. Macro patterns, or socialstructures, self-organise or emerge from th e actions and interactions of th eactors. In complex adaptation, macro patterns are discussed as emergentproperties of the system.37 Th e actors' conte xt is no t passive, howev er. In a com plex adaptive system,as in mutu al con stitution, the contex t influences actors' internal rule modelsthrough co-evolutionary processes. W hen some actors change their behaviour


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46 Asian Journal of Political Sciencethis alters the context for the other actors. A new context "forces" actors toalter their rule models as the context determines what rules, goals andinterests are appropriate. Adaptive actors are always trying to "fit" withtheir con text. Wh en their rules (or subjective understandings) are a ppropriatefor their context, the actors fit and are successful. When their rules do notfit, the actors are not successful.

Ad aptation in this re vo lut ion ar y process is facilitated by evaluations ofactor behaviour. This can take place in two ways. In some treatmen ts of CA, actors are endow ed with hard-wired,unchanging rules, and evolution is at the population level. In otherwords, actors that have rules that do not fit with the context areselected out of the population. This is similar to natural selection. In other treatmen ts individual actors evaluate their own behaviour

and rule models and can alter their own rule models. This is morerelevant for a discussion of mutual constitution. Actors evaluateoutco me s, or th e results of actions and assess the "fitness" of their rulemodels.38 Internal rule models are strengthened, weakened, changedor kept in relation to the evaluations. Macro patterns produce d by actor actions and interactions do mo re thanconstrain potential actions; they beco me incorpo rated, throu gh th e evaluationprocess, into the actors' rule mod els.39 In this way, an actor's con text shapesher internal rule modelsher interests, identity, and behaviourwhile theactor's actions feedback and affect her context.

Substantive political change is again inherently conceivable with this con stantfundamental social process.

A New PerspectiveBoth theories provide frameworks that dynamical ly l ink actors ' internalunderstandings with an evolving context. Such perspectives can account for bothrare events and the linkage between disruptions and major changes in substantivepolitical conditions because the disruptions are endogenous to the frameworks entrepreneur's suggestions and actors' actions. The linkage between actor andcontext at the heart of these perspectives explains how the rare events can changesubstantive political patterns. Agents act on the basis of rules. Their actions andinteractions affect the social context. Of course, this description of the norm lifecycle (NLC) and CA is abstract with some jargon (I am an IR theorist after all).However, frameworks are always simplified and therefore abstract. They shouldbe judged, not on their simplicity or complexity, bu t instead on how m uch we canlearn from using them and on how practitioners can use the m to analyse policy


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choices. I contend tha t the N LC /CA approach provides both scholars and policy-makers with a very relevant approach to disruptive events, change, and foreignpolicy in general.

Meeting the Challenge of R are E vents and ChangeConstructivism and complexity theory are prepared for disruptive events andchange because they expect disruptive events and change. They tell us thatalthough we cannot predict the disruptive events (even large ones), we canunderstand their impact if we understand the underlying dynamics of thesystem the fundamental social processes. Understanding disruptive eventsand the change tha t accomp anies them is a ma tter of treating the m as stimuli toa system of interacting, adaptive actors. The canonical representation of thisdynamic in the complexity theory literature is the sand-pile model used toillustrate the edge of chaos idea a metaphor readily applicable to the NLCprocess as well.40

Complexity theorists discuss complex systems as existing on the edge ofchaos there is enough dynamism to keep these systems far from equilibrium,but not so much that they lurch into chaos. These are self-organised criticalsystems in that patterns at the aggregate level emerge from the interactions ofmultiple, autonomous actors at the micro level. The sand pile metaphor describesthis by positing dropping grains of sand onto a table (one at a time). Eventually asand pile emerges from the dropping grains and with each successive grain(stimulus to th e system or a small or rare disruptive even t), sand will cascade andthe pile will be changed. Sometimes the cascade is small, other times the cascadeis catastrophic. The size of the cascade (the magnitude of the effects of thedisruption) is dependent upon the state of the sand pile the connections andinterconnections of the individual sand grains.Implicit in the NLC are the same defining characteristics of a self-organisedcritical system. The suggestions of the norm entrepreneur (broadly conceived tobe ideas and/or actions) are the dropping sand grains. An entrep reneu r's suggestionsrepresent a stimulus to a population of interdependent, adaptive actors and thisstimulus potentially catalyses a number of different responses: No change the actors are resistant to the stimulus, contin ue theirbehaviour and the current social patterns and relationships continue

unchanged. Limited cascade some actors change their behav iour, bu t their alteredbehaviour is insufficient to significantly alter the current social patterns andrelationships. Substantial cascade some (or many) actors change their behaviou r, andtheir al tered behaviour t ransforms the current social pat terns andrelationships.


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48 Asian Journal ofPolitical ScienceSubstantial cascades could signal normative/institutional breakdown (if thecurrent social pattern is structured by a stable norm) or normative emergence (ifthe current social pattern is norm contestation or lack of a norm). The size of thenorm cascade or change the spread of a norm to the wh ole population and thelength of time a norm remains in force and the stability of existing norms/patterns is depe nden t upo n the connections and interconnections of the actors aswell as the characteristics of the stimulus itself (how clearly communicated,normative value, power of the entrepreneur, significance of the rare event).Understanding the relationships among the grains of sand relationshipscharacterised by social construction and complex adaptation is the crucial steptowards understanding the impact of the disruptive event. Thus, by understandingthe NL C/C A process at work in a system, it is possible to trace and understand theeffects of a dropped grain the election of a Polish Pope or the tragic events of

9/11. Indeed, with this perspective, it is entirely possible to trace a path betweenthe ascension of John Paul II and the end of the Cold War. The Popeentrepreneurially works for change, convincing various actors to alter their rule-models and th us their behaviour. W hen a critical mass alter their behaviour, th ecascade of change alters the emergent authority relations within Poland andbetween Poland and the Soviet Union. A small change or event can have ripplesthroug h the NL C/C A process and ultimately contribute to a breakpo int changelike the end of the Cold War.Both constructivism and complexity theory are theories of fundamentalsocial processes that allow substantive politics to vary. The substantive patternsare always considered to be dynamic and potentially variable.41 Neither the NLCnor CA assumes stability in any political relationship or actor. It is process thatdefines constructivism and co mp lexity theory, no t specific substantive informationabout the topics being studied and because the processes incorporate shocks tothe system (small or large), they are well suited for explaining world politics andacting within world politics.

Meeting the Challenge of ForeignPolicy R elevanceThe majority of the discussion to this point has focused on how constructivismand complexity theory can account for both rare events and change (as well as theneed to do so). The explicit policy relevance of this approach is two-fold. First,constructivism and complexity theory provide a useful general understanding ofworld politics the context of foreign policy. Social constructivists, especially,are explicitly concerned with the ways in which social structures fundamentallyshape the very conditions for foreign policy and action. So at the most generallevel, social constructivism provides insight on: Ho w actions will be received, given a particular configuration of socialstructures explicating interactions.


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Matthew J. Hoffmann 4 9 Ho w actions influence the configuration of social structures explicatingthe evolution of social structures. Ho w social structures pu t bou ndaries on actions explicating the constraints

on and the evolution of actors.These are especially crucial concerns when policy-makers of interest areagents of powerful states that have the largest capacity to influence interactionsand social structures. Constructivism provides a way to conceive of the constraintsand opportunities that policy-makers face in a dynamic fashion.Second, the ma nner in which social constructivism and complexity theoryprovide a general understanding that incorporates rare events and change makes these approac hes relevant for specific policy analysis. Th e processes of CAand the N LC are useful beyo nd explaining rare events and norms in the abstract.This approach can examine an y stimulu s to a system of interacting actors like

foreign policy initiatives. A significant p roble m for policy choice is un derstan dingpotential impacts of the policy alternatives. How will an initiative be received?What type of cascade will i t engender, if any? The NLC/CA perspective is apowerful tool because it is explicitly concerned with the propagation of effectsfrom a stimulus. The d ropping grains of sand in the comp lexity theory me taph orare not restricted to rare, "exogenous shocks" to a system. States are en trepren eursas well, with foreign policy initiatives/actions being the suggestions. The NLC/CA approach provides practitioners with a powerful tool for analysing how thesuggestions will be received what impact a policy is likely to have, given thedominant social structures, and the adaptive actors with which the state isinteractin g. .Wh en a policy is considered, th is framewo rk com pels pra ctitione rsto assess: Th e norms currently in place Th e rule models of the othe r actors Th e fit of the suggestion (policy) with those norm s and rule mo dels Ho w adaptive actors will react and how these interactions will alter thesocial context which influences subsequent policy-making.

By tracing, or at least considering the NLC/CA process, scholars andpractitioners alike can better assess the ramifications of policies if they arelikely to achieve their goals, and ho w the y influence the con text of world politics.

Breakout Achieved?When confronted with a crisis point, a rare event like 9/11, or a simple foreignpolicy initiative, IR theory is ham pere d b y its reliance on su bstantive theo rising.Does th e even t match k nown patterns? Is it an anomaly? Does an event or foreignpolicy initiative signal the breakd own of pattern s, or the co ntinuation of patterns?


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50 Asian Journal of Political ScienceThese are the wrong questions, at least from a constructivist/complexityperspe ctive. Th ey force us to focus on invariant relationships of political variables,rather than the processes tha t produc e, reinforce, and change those relationships.These questions m ake IR theory less relevant for practitioners, w hile also hinderingour ability to explain world politics. Constructivism and complexity theoryinstead preach reliance on fundamental social process for explaining worldpolitics. Such an approach accepts the inherent dynamism of world politics.Such an approach can account for rare events and analyse how change affectsworld politics. Such an approach makes IR theory relevant for the practice offoreign policy.

The 9/11 Crisis and Its Aftermath: Thoughts on a Policy-Relevant Research AgendaJus t as justifying a jailbreak is m ore d ifficult th an asserting the n eed for o ne,claiming policy relevance is easier than demonstrating it. In this section I brieflyoutline how constructivism and complexity theory can be applied in a policy-relevant research agenda aimed at a specific rare event: 9/11.What can I say about the impact of 9/11? Everything has changed andnothing has changed.42 Does 9/11 signal a watershed in global politics? It isprobably too early to tell . From an NLC/CA perspective, 9/11 is a shock to thesystem it is a grain dropping on the metaphorical sand pile. 43 The quest ionbecomes: does the shock reinforce or alter patterns? How large a cascade andwhat changes can we expect from the events of 9/11? The answer to thesequestions is the inevitable and utterly unsatisfying, it depends. It depends onwhat aspects of world politics one looks at. It depends on how the complexadaptive and norm life cycle process plays out how adaptive actors atdifferent levels utilise (and up date) their rule m odels to decide on th e cou rse ofbehaviour. It depends on how these behaviour and interactions self-organiseinto aggregate patterns. This is not an empirical study so I do not yet haveanswers to these questions. However, I can sketch out a potential researchagenda that could answer these questions from a constructivist/complexitytheory perspective. Such a research agenda would encompass three kinds ofstudies: case studies, quantitative analysis, and simulation modelling.First, the tenets of constructivism and complexity theory can be used tostructure in depth case studies that trace the impact and propagation of 9/11 andother events. This would entail describing the rule models of adaptive actors,tracing their interactions with other adaptive actors, in the context of the NLC,and assessing the patterns that emerge through this interaction. Numerouspossibilities for specific topics are readily apparent: No rms of terrorism: Trace the coevolution betw een terrorist organisations(strategies and behaviour) and the states that pursue them (strategies and


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behaviour) in the aftermath of 9/11, paying particular attention to hownorms emerge from the actions of these co-evolving agents and how thosenorms influence their behaviour.44 Mu ltilateralism versus Unilateralism: Case analysis using rule mo dels andth e comp lex ad aptive process could assess w he the r a pa t tern ofmu ltilateralism will be reinforced or altered by th e aftermath of 9/ 11 . Haveth e entrepren eurial suggestions and actions mad e by th e US in the aftermathof 9/11 altered the social structures at the foundation of world politics?How will future initiatives influence the balance between multilateralismand unilateralism? US dom estic fallout: norm life cycle and com plex adaptive analysis couldassess ho w no rms of security/liberty will be reified or altered in th e aftermathof 9/11 by focusing on the rule models of decision-makers within the USand their interactions and behaviour.

All of these are case studies that can trace the ripple effects mentionedabove, assessing ho w a disruption prop agates throu gh a comp lex system of adaptive,interacting actors and how altered or reified political relationships emerge. Forpolicy-makers, such information p rovides general knowledge abo ut the con text offoreign policy initiatives, as well as specific information about the effects ofparticular policies.Beyond cases, there is the possibility for quantitative analysis. Onecharac teristic of self-organised critical systems is th at th e cascades follow relativelywell-understood, general patterns called power laws.45 Power laws are knownacross the physical and social sciences and they essentially are inverse proportionrules large cascades only occur rarely. Earthquakes and city sizes there arethousands of small earthquakes/cities and very few large ones are commonexamples of phenomena that follow specific power law distributions. If worldpolitics is a complex, self-organised system w e should see a num ber of power lawdistributions as well. Post-9/11 research along these lines could follow a num berof avenues and possibilities: Size of terrorist attacks: It is possible to assess wh eth er the mag nitudeand frequency of terrorist attacks follows a power law distribution giving us some indication of the dynamics of the process that produceterrorist attacks. Protest events: Power law distributions may be evident in protest behaviou rthat has arisen in response to the US expanded approach to the war onterror. Moves toward war with Iraq have been the stimulus to cascades ofprotests around the world the frequency and magnitude of which mayfollow power law distributions. Societal ripple s: It may be possible to assess w he th er the social cascadesfol lowing ter ror i s t a t tacks or t e r ror i s t a ler t s fo l low power lawdistributions. Essentially attacks or alerts become stimuli for cascades


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52 Asian Journal of Political Scienceof beha vioura l changes along a nu m be r of dimension s (marriage,inves tment , consumpt ion) .

Power law analysis gives us a way to quantifiably approach and recognise theresults of complex adaptive systems' responses to disruptions.Finally, the metho dology mo st associated with c omp lexity theory is the toolof agent-based mod elling.46 This is a computer-modelling tool that can be used tosimulate complex systems of autonomous, interacting individual agents. Theobjective is to ascertain how individual behaviour self-organises into emergentpatterns. The utility of the computer-modelling endeavour is the ability to clearlyspecify individual behaviour and interactions and simulate the e mergent phen om enatha t results. Mod elling can fruitfully com plem ent case study analysis. Th e m odelscan be used to explore fundamental (often abstract) processes of adaptation,which inform case analyses. In turn, the lessons learned in the case studies caninform further modelling efforts. Any of the case studies mentioned above couldbe examined in a modelling framework as well. Evolution of security norm s: It is possible to mo del how , and un der whatconditions a disruption catalyses intersubjective no rm emergence in a systemof adaptive, interacting actors, and how a disruption can catalyse normdissolution and change.47 Co mp etition of security/liberty: A similar mod el could captu re th e USdomestic norm competition that the 9/11 attacks catalysed. Resilience to shocks: It should be possible to mo del the interplay of socialand infrastructural systems in the wake of a disruption. In other words,

model the adaptive process of a social system after a disruption to theinfrastructure (bridge or building is destroy ed). Such a mod el could help usto understand what makes some social systems resilient and others rigid(and thus breakable) in the face of disruption.Each of these models begins with the fundamental social processes of theNLC and CA and then simulates how that process unfolds in specified situations.Thus w e can explore the patterns that em erge from a disruptive event we canexplain change.

Caveats and ConclusionsIR theory will never have all the answers for foreign policy-making. The tworealms have vastly different goals and face wildly different constraints. Yet,the two wil l always be inter twined. Again the quest ion is not whether IRtheory is relevant for practitioners, but which IR theory is most relevant. Inthis essay, I claim that in part the discourse of irrelevance surrounding IRtheory stems from practitioners' familiarity w ith and reliance upon inappropriate


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IR theories . If practitio ners tu rn to the frontiers of IR theo ry, to constructivismand complexity theory, they may find that IR theory has much to offer.How ever, thou gh I am an advocate of this approach , I try not to be blind in myfaith. Analysis using constructivism and complexity theory is not a trivialendeavour, nor are the pol icy-payoffs from adopting such an approachguaranteed. As such, before concluding, let me note a few caveats.Caveat #1: Neither constructivism nor complexity theory is really atheory of world politics in the traditional sense. Precisely because they aretheories of fundamental social process, they are inherently empty of politicalcontent. Thus an NLC/CA approach itself relies on some analysis of thesubstantive patterns of world politics. Though I have painted a dichotomy ofapproaches between substantive theorising and process theorising in order tomake the case for a radical change, it is clear that fundamental processes aloneare not the answer. Neither constructivism nor complexity theory can a prioriidentify the key actors or relationships of world politics. This information needsto come from outside constructivism and complexity theory. This is not anenormous problem because once one "cuts in" to world politics with the NLC/CA framework, it is possible to explain how the key actors and dynamics ofpolitics evolve over time.

Caveat #2: The N LC /CA approach requires diverse meth ods and a mou ntainof details. By holding less constant, this approach puts much of world politics inmotion and in play a necessarily more complicated analytic challenge. Inaddition, full analysis require s a recursive process betw een theorising, case analysis,and comp utat ional /q uanti tat ive modell ing. I t is bet te r un dertaken by aninterdisciplinary team, often, than it is by individual researchers of course thisis not necessarily a drawback.Caveat #3: Even with the added complexi ty of this approach, there arelimits to what can be learned. In particular, this approach is not designed forpoint-predict ion. The NLC/CA approach could not have predicted the 9/11events, nor can it predict the implications of policy initiatives. However, i t isnot clear that policy-makers need IR theory for predictions. It is perhaps moreimportant that IR theory provides a solid understanding of the context fromwhich events emerge and the range of possible impacts of policies.These caveats notwithstanding, the construct ivist /complexi ty theoryapproach does provide a conceptual framework, a set of assumptions about theworld (again often tacitly held) that will lead to better policy-making. Theapproach has the potential to explain and manage change in a more sophisticatedfashion than any traditional IR theory approach. With NLC/CA, there are noanomalies, substantively speaking, (unless th e fundam ental social process is wron g);there are only stimuli to interacting agents. Constructivism/complexity theory isthe most promising approach to understanding the impact of disruptive eventslike 9/11 on the patterns, relationships, and actors of world politics. Preciselybecause constructivism and complexity theory treat those patterns as inherentlyvariable and they readily inc orpora te disruptive ev ents into their analysis, it is the


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54 Asian Journal ofPolitical Science

best tool available for explaining change and exploring the cascades of 9/11 aswell as the implications of foreign policy initiatives those that we see now andthose that are yet to come.

Notes1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual M eeting of theInternational Studies Association in Portland, Oregon. I would like to thank A lice Baand Ronald Crelinsten for comments on earlier drafts. In part, this research wassuppor t ed by a Biocomplexity grant awarded to the Cente r for the Study ofInstitutions, Population and Environmental Change at Indiana University (Grant #SES0083511).2 See Maureen T. Hallinan, "The Sociological Study of Change: 1996 PresidentialAddress," American Sociological R eview, Vol. 62 (February 1997), pp. 1-11. Inaddition, the United States National Science Foundation has recognised a generalfailure to understand change and the impact of rare or extreme events and hasinit iated a grant programme enti t led: "Multidisciplinary Research into Crit icalInfrastructure and Related Systems - Mitigation, Preparedness, Response andRecovery Regarding Disasters and Other Extreme Events."3 James N. Rosenau, "Signal, Signposts and Symptoms: Interpreting Change andAnomalies in World Politics," E uropean Journal of International R elations, Vol. 1(1995), pp. 1-11. See also, James N. Rosenau, Along theDomestic Foreign Frontier(Cambridge: C ambridge University Press, 1997), C hapter 2.4 For more on this question, see Joseph Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening? InternationalRelations T heory and the Problem of Policy Relevance," Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 113 (Spring 1998), pp. 43-62.5 David Brooks, "The Elephantiasis of Reason," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 291 (January-February 2003), p. 35.6 Alexander George , Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. xviii.7 Brooks, "The Elephantiasis of Reason," p. 35.8 George, Bridging the Gap, pp. 7-10.9 Ibid.,p. xxiv.10 On conceptual jailbreaks, see James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: ATheory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).11 Ibid.,p. 22.12 Parts of this section are adapted from Matthew Hoffmann and John Riley, "TheScience of Political Science: Linearity or Complexity in Designing Social Inquiry,"New PoliticalScience, Vol. 24 (June 2002), pp. 303-20.13 See ibid. for an explanation of KKV 's reliance on a linear worldview.14 Gary King, Rob ert O. Keohane, and Sidney V erba, Designing Social Inquiry: ScientificInference in Qualitative R esearch Design (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1994).15 Ibid.,p. 63, emphasis in original.


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Matthew J.Hoffmann 5516 Rosenau , "Signals, Signposts, and Sym ptoms ."17 Rosen au discusses this exam ple in Jam es N. Rosenau, "Many Da mn ThingsSimultaneously: Complexity Theory in World Affairs," in Tom Czerwinski andDavid Alberts (eds.),Com plexity, Global Politics, and N ational Security (Washington,D C : National Defense University, 1997).18 John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,"International Security, Vol. 17 (Winter 1992/3), pp. 3-58.19 Of course, this does not have to be the case. The reverse could even happen: bymarking an event as non-systematic a researcher may be highlighting the criticaldifference the event played in the overall outcome. Unfortunately this is clearly notKKV's intention. Their advice to the researcher is to peel or strip away the non-systematic process so that the systematic processes causal effect can be inferred.20 For an interesting take on th e pitfalls of "sum of their parts" thinking, see RobertJervis, System E ffects: Com plexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1997).21 Both Rosenau and Ruggie discuss Braudel's formulation of change found in OnHistory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). See Rosenau, Along theDomestic-Foreign Frontier and John Rugg ie , " In t e rna t iona l S t ruc tu r e andInternational Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in Ernst-Otto Czempieland James N. Rosenau (eds.), Gbbal Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington:Lexington Books, 1989) . See a lso , Er ic Hel le iner , "Fernand Braudel andInternational Political Economy," International Studies Notes, Vol. 15 (Fall 1990).22 John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Tow ard aNeorealist Synthesis," in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1986).23 Alexa nder W en dt has dem onstra ted the pitfalls involved in holding the effects ofanarchy constant. See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It,"

International Organization, Vol. 46 (1992), pp. 391-425; and Alexander Wendt,Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999).24 Of course, most IR theorists wou ld agree tha t patterns and theories are alwayspotentially variable. However, the mode of substantive theorising makes it difficultto "see" changeas has been readily demonstrated in Rosenau, "Signal, Signposts,and Symptoms."25 Ratio nal choice is anoth er such fund am enta l social proce ss, bu t its focus onequilibrium makes it more restrictive and less able to handle change.26 See Em anuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Grou nd: Constructivism in W orld Politics,"European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3 (1997), pp. 319-63; JeffreyCheckel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," World

Politics,Vol. 50 (January 1998), pp. 324-48; and Jeffrey Checkel, "Why Comply?Social Learning and European Identity Change," International Organization, Vol. 55(2001), pp. 553-88.27 Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground," p. 322 .28 M artha Finnem ore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International No rm Dynamics andPolitical Change," International Organization, Vol. 52 (Autumn 1998), pp. 896-905.29 Ibid.,p. 901.


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56 Asian Journal of Political Science

30 Ibid., p. 902.31 Ibid., p. 904.32 For an accessible introd uctio n to com plexity theo ry, see Mitch ell W aldro p,

Complexity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) and Stuart Kauffman, At Homein the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).33 For argum ents on the need for political science to move tow ard a com plexity theoryf ramework, see John Lewis Gaddis , "History , Science, and the Study ofInternational Relations," in Ngaire Woods (ed.), E xplaining International R elationsSince 194 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Steven Bernstein, Richard NedLebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, "God Gave Physics the EasyProblems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World," E uropean Journal ofInternational R elations,Vol . 6 (March 200 0), pp. 43-76; and Hoffmann and Riley,"The Science of Political S cience."34 John Holland, "Complex Adaptive Systems," Daedalus,Vol. 121 (W inter 1992), p. 17.35 See John Holland, Hidden Order (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Com pany,1995) and Holland "Complex Adaptive Systems."36 See Holland, Hidden Order. Schema is a familiar ter m in political sciencesee Yu enFoong Khong, Analogies at W ar (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) butit is used slightly differently here. Holland's formulations are reminiscent of andcompatible to similar ideas drawn from psychology: knowledge structures. See JeanPiaget, Biology and Know ledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); JeanPiaget, The Deve lopment of Thought:E quilibration of CognitiveStructures (New York:Viking Press, 1977); Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind (New York: Simon andSchuster. 1985); and Roger Schank and Robert Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals andUnderstanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures (Hillsdale: LawrenceErlbaum A ssociates, 1 977).37 Em ergence is an oft deba ted and imprecise conce pt. For an introd uctio n to

emergence and emergent processes, see John Holland, Emergence: From Chaos toOrder (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 1998).38 Agen ts are not always or even usually treate d as unitary. W he n dealing wit h meta-agents (agents composed of other agents) sub-agents within the agent do theevaluation. For instance environmental groups evaluate the outcome of negotiationstha t the Un ited States participates in.39 Th e evaluation stage of com plex adapta tion is crucial. A t this stage, agents altertheir rule mode ls, wh ich is th e key for und erstan ding ho w ideas beco me aningrained part of internal rule models. In addition, however, this stage adds variationin a popu lation of agents, because different ag ents may have different evaluationprocesses, and different criteria for fitness.40 Th e edge of chaos has been used to describe CA in num erou s places; see e.g.Waldrop and Kauffman. The sand pile model and the notion of self-organisedcriticality arose from the work of Per Bak. See Per Bak, How Nature Works: TheScience of Self-OrganizedCriticality (New York: Springer, 1996); and Per Bak, ChaoTang and Kurt Wisenfeld, "Self-Organized Criticality," Physical R eview A, Vol. 38(1988) , pp. 364-74. For political science applications of Bak's ideas see, GregoryBrunk, "Why Do Societies Collapse: A Theo ry Based on Self-Organized Criticality,"Journal of Theoretical Politics,Vol. 14 (2002); and Gregory Brunk "Self-OrganizedCriticality: A New Theory of Political Behavior and Some of its Implications,"


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Matthew J. Hoffmann * 57

British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31 (2001), pp. 273-92.41 Of course, constructivists and complexity theorists recognise anomalies, bu t onlyf ro m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f c o n t e x t d e p e n d e n t , h i s t o r ic a l l y p a t h - d e p e n d e n trelationships and structuresnot from the standpoint of the theory itself. This is af ine point , b ut an impo r tant one, because i t is th is d i f ference tha t a l lowsconstructivists and complexity theorists to recognise change.42 This frust ra tion was e loquent ly d iscussed in the in t roduct ion to the recentsymposium in World Politics on the af termath of 9 /11. See Harold James,"Introduction," World Politics, Vol. 55 (October, 2002), pp. 1-3.43 This is, of course, not intended to belittle the tragedy of the e vent in any way.44 This topic is currently under investigation by Jarret Brachman, a graduate studen t atthe U niversity of Delaware.45 For mo re on po we r law analysis see Brunk, "Self-Organ ized Criticality"; Ro bertAxtell, "Zipf Distributions of US Firm Sizes," Science, Vol. 293 (2001), pp. 1818-

20; William J. Reed, "The Pareto, Zipf and Other Power Laws," E conomic Letters,Vol . 74 (2001) , pp . 15 -19 ; Pe r Bak and Maya Paczusk i , "Complex i ty ,Contingency, and Criticality," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol.92, No. 15 [1995), pp. 6689-96; and Lars-Erik Cederman, "Modeling the Size ofWars: From Billiard Balls to Sandpile," American Political Science R eview, Vol. 97(February 2003), pp. 151-170.46 An in-depth introdu ction to agent-based modelling is beyo nd the scope of thispape r. For a good introduction, see Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation:Agent-Based Mod els of Competition and Coopera tion (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1997); Lars Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in World P olitics: How S tates andNations Develop and D issolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); andJoshua Epstein and Robert Axtell, Grow ing Artificial Societies: Social Science from theBottom Up [Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).47 For a model that attem pts to address a similar concern, see M atthew J. Hoffmann,"Entrepreneurs and the Emergence and Evolution of Social Norms," in ChristophUrban (ed.), Proceedings of the Agent-Based Simulation 3 Conference (Ghent: SCSEurope, 2002), pp. 32-37.

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