Introduction

Viscount Castlereagh spent the majority of his time on the continent between January 1814 and February 1815, attempting to secure a lasting peace with the Allied Powers as the senior representative of the British government.1 This is an evaluation of how far the Secretary of Sate for Foreign Affairs secured the aims of the Cabinet, and to what effect his actions at the negotiations had in achieving these aims.

Castlereagh departed for the continent with a clear set of instructions that included many territorial requisites outlined in a meeting of the Cabinet on 26th December 1813.2 As the negotiations progressed however, Castlereagh’s perception of British Policy in the negotiations over territorial adjustments to Poland and Saxony differed from other members of the British Government. The minister, who prior to October 1814, had aligned himself directly with the interests of the Prince Regent, Prime Minister, and Secretary of State for War, appeared to have developed his own vested interest in the fate of central Europe.3 When did this change occur? And to what extent Castlereagh’s actions were borne from a his greater perspective of how to achieve important British aims.

The focus of the topic is that of a British perspective. This will help to comprehensively support the notion that Castlereagh consistently acted within the interests of his government and, despite acting against the wishes of his government at the end of 1814, helped to secure lasting peace in Europe and allow Britain to consolidate its status as an international hegemonic power.4 The importance of the Russian, Prussian, Austrian and French ministers in the negotiation process cannot be understated and an appreciation their influence on Castlereagh’s thoughts and actions will not be absent, but will be discussed in a secondary nature.

This concentrated British focus gives this evaluation a unique nature, and better establishes that Castlereagh’s endeavours on the continent amounted to a success for the British Government. Castlereagh’s role at the negotiations was largely criticised by contemporaries, and a failed attempt to redeem his reputation by Lord Robert Cecil in 1862, meant that he was generally viewed with ignominy in the nineteenth century.5 The publication of his correspondences, Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers, of Viscount Castlereagh in 1853, by half brother Charles Stewart also failed to improve this perception, as there was ‘little historical explanation or analysis through its twelve volumes.’6 The perception of Castlereagh, and the other ministers at Vienna, was therefore of reactionaries who intended to re-establish the old order of the eighteenth century.7 Indeed Castlereagh was an easy target for contemporary and

1 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh, (London, 1976), p. 132 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 13, National Archives (Kew), [FO 193/1]. 3 H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), P.122.4 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 537. 5 S. R. Graubard, ‘Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe’, Journal of British Studies 3.1 (1963), p.79. 6 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh, (London, 1976), p.3.7 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 576.

later liberals, who exaggerated the juxtaposition between Canning, the liberal, and Castlereagh, the reactionary.8

The most significant work in changing this perception of Castlereagh was C.K Webster’s The Congress of Vienna (1919). Webster, writing with close analysis of the correspondences between Lord Liverpool, Castlereagh and the Earl of Bathurst in the Foreign Office Continental Records, argued that the successful conclusion of the Polish and Saxon issues was ‘very largely due to the energy, fitness and diplomatic skill of the British minister.’9 H. Nicholson’s The Congress of Vienna: A study in Allied Unity (1946) followed Webster’s methodological approach, providing a useful narrative of the negotiations using the wide selection of sources transcribed in Webster’s British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921).

Consequently the perception and reputation of Castlereagh has improved significantly throughout the twentieth century, as historians have invested greater effort into understanding the complex nature of the Congress negotiation process. Henry Kissinger, for instance, advocated the successful diplomacy of Castlereagh and Metternich in the post-Napoleonic era in A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the problems of peace 1812-22 (1954). Kissinger depicts an analogous relationship between Castlereagh and Roosevelt whose states at the time of peace, were ‘on the periphery of world politics with a tradition of isolation, were similar in marrying the concept of equilibrium to that of collective security.’10

Castlereagh’s pursuit of equilibrium is central to this evaluation. The ministers wanted to create a balance of power in Europe, but it was perhaps the postulation of an idealist and became over calculated in regard to the Polish and Saxon issues.11 Historians have often considered the importance of the notion of the balance of power in Castlereagh’s actions at Vienna. P. Schroeder has ostensibly argued that balance of power politics failed, and that ‘under the lead of the hegemonic powers’ the ministers returned to practices of political equilibrium.12 In order to establish a lasting peace, Castlereagh, as a representative of one of the two hegemonic powers, had to participate in these critical central European discussions.

Castlereagh, up until November 1814, had secured the majority of British aims since his great success at the Treaty of Chaumont, and this more delicate area of the negotiations caused a divide between him and the Cabinet. The complications of the Polish and Saxon arrangements almost led to the crisis of war, and resulted in a secret defensive alliance between France, Austria and Britain on the 3 January 1815.13 The threat of war against Russia and Prussia illustrated a clear disregard by Castlereagh of the interests of the Cabinet, Parliament and the British public.

8 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh, (London, 1976), p.11.9 C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1937), p. 119. 10 Q. Wright, ‘Review: A World Restored, Kissinger’, The American Historical Review 63.4 (1958), pp. 953-54 11 H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), P.155.12 P. W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of power?’, The American Historical Review 97.3 (1992), p704.

13 P. W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of power?’, The American Historical Review 97.3 (1992), p702.

The investigation intends, in the two opening chapters, to illustrate Castlereagh’s complete alignment with the aims of his Cabinet in the first two phases of the peace negotiations. Chapter one, ‘Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont’, illustrates Castlereagh’s immediate success on the continent as he secures military partnership amongst the Allies for an extended period. ‘Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of Paris’ further indicates that the Secretary of Sate for Foreign Affairs pursued terms that agreed with both government and public sentiments, particularly after Bathurst informs him of Wellington’s findings in Southern France. The Peace of Paris successful ended any chance of peace with Napoleon directly and forced his abdication at Fontainebleau 11 April 1814.14 Thus by the summer of 1814 the British government was quite satisfied with the state of negotiations in Europe.

The next phase of the negotiations resumed as the plenipotentiaries congregated at Vienna in September 1814. Nicholson states that ‘a whole month had been wasted by these acrimonious festivities’.15 Yet evaluating Castlereagh’s expectations of the running of the Congress and how he attempts to direct it is critical to understanding how he becomes so embroiled in the Polish problem. His regular correspondence with Wellington demonstrates how his perception of this issue changed, and the difficulties he faced in negotiating with Alexander I of Russia. This chapter, ‘Castlereagh and Poland’, identifies what Castlereagh perceived were the central problems to cementing a lasting peace on the continent. Castlereagh moved away from his position of ‘natural mediator’ and began to seek an alliance against Russia from the other Allies.16 By the end of October 1814, the British Cabinet wanted to follow a more isolationist policy.

The final chapter highlights the growing concern of the Government over the Polish issue at the negotiations. ‘Disobedience and fear of war’ presents this concern through the correspondences between Castlereagh and Lord Liverpool, Prime Minister. Although the plenipotentiaries come to a settlement over Poland, the British government feared the developing tension over the Saxon territories, whilst being preoccupied with the continuing war with America.17 It is in this final, and most precarious stage of the negotiations at Vienna where Castlereagh acts against the will of the British government. At this point it is imperative to understand why he chose to threaten war against Russia and Prussia in the secret alliance with France and Austria. This final chapter will demonstrate that Castlereagh had to resort to such serious measures in order to secure some of the most important territorial aims of the British Government. Thus this final chapter of the evaluation will reject any notion that Castlereagh acted without the interests of the British Government and public in mind at this stage of the Congress, and that his greater perspective on the situation, allowed him to secure peace on the continent and the majority of the criteria outlined in the Memorandum of the Cabinet 26th December 1813.

This study, as it has already been eluded, will concentrate primarily on the correspondences between the senior officials of British Government. The communication network between the Cabinet, namely Bathurst and Liverpool, and 14 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 508.15 H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), P.117.16 H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), P. 169.17 N. Thompson, Earl Bathurst and the British Empire 1762-1834 (1999), p. 83-4.

their ministers and generals on the continent, Castlereagh and Wellington in particular, was very efficient. Liverpool and Bathurst took charge of the domestic discussions of British foreign policy while Castlereagh was on the continent, and Bathurst took on the added responsibility of administering all the dispatches from the ministers in Europe.18

The majority of primary material has been selected from collections of these regular communications. The General Correspondence before 1906: Continent Conferences (FO 139) and Continent Conferences: Delegation Archives (FO 92) are both incredibly useful collections of Foreign Office Records, which include the correspondences, memoranda and protocols between the ministers in Europe and the British government in this period. Individual dispatches will illustrate Castlereagh’s thoughts and actions from Vienna, and also indicate the response and wishes of his government over the important issues at Congress.

It is essential that dispatches from other correspondences be utilised in this evaluation, which help to further understand Castlereagh’s motives and intentions. Thus dispatches between Castlereagh and Wellington, and other officials, will increase the depth of analysis over central issue of Poland and Saxony. Letters from volumes of Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry (1853) and Supplementary Despatches, Correspondences and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington (1862) allow for a greater perspective and understanding of the regular communications over the state of Europe and the negotiation process.

These sources hold the primary significance to this evaluation, as they will best help to understand to what extent Castlereagh followed the aims of British government at Vienna. Parliamentary and public opinion is often hugely influential on the formation of Government policy and aims, and Lord Liverpool and the Prince Regent we aware of their importance. Indeed there was less privacy in Government and increasing scepticism of its policies, as publications and pamphlets such as Tory Quarterly, Whig Edinburgh, Radical Westminster and The Times became more popular and influential over the opinion of politicians and the public.19 Evidence of this nature may be used to understand why the Government formulated and insisted that Castlereagh follow certain aims more emphatically than others. It will therefore be used as supplementary evidence to illustrate that Castlereagh secured the most important aims of his Government, and shared the understanding of their importance to the domestic populace.

There is little requirement for this evaluation to focus on Parliamentary debates and discussions. First although Castlereagh held the position as Leader of the House of Commons after Spencer Perceval’s assassination in 1812, he had a weakness of speaking in parliament.20 This is one of the primary reasons for his less than favourable reputation that existed through his lifetime and in the nineteenth century. Castlereagh’s correspondences illustrate a more sophisticated articulation of his actions. Furthermore Castlereagh’s extended absences from England meant that there a few Commons debates from this period where Castlereagh is present. Liverpool’s 18 N. Thompson, Earl Bathurst and the British Empire 1762-1834 (1999), p. 72.19 D. Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815-1885 (London, 1969), p.75.20 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh, (London, 1976), p.7.

earnestness for Castlereagh to return in early 1815 was because he required the Leader of the Commons for other upcoming issues.21 Finally, it is significant to note that the British desire for peace in December 1813 was universal, and Bew illustrates that the opposition could do little as Castlereagh departed for the continent; he cites Whig MP, Sir Robert Heron, to indicate that the opposition had consent for the discretion of the Cabinet ministers in these important negotiations.22 Corrections

In some respects this evaluation follows a similar methodological approach to the works of Webster and Nicholson, without been effected by a post World War perception of ‘balance of power’, which Graubard criticised.23 Thus whilst this evaluation endeavours to credit Castlereagh for securing the most important aims of the British government, it will recognise the reasons for the isolation policy of the Cabinet. It is additionally necessary to understand the wider context and aims of the other European powers, as Schroeder does, and that the lasting peace and equilibrium of hegemonies achieved at Vienna amounted to something revolutionary rather than reactionary.24 This study attempts to resist the heavy focus on Castlereagh’s character and personal psychology that is seen in biographical histories, and focuses on a British perspective predominantly, thus avoiding the complexities of the discourse of the works on wider European history of this period of negotiations.

The incidental consequence of this study’s British focus is that an exploration of the aims of Russia, Prussia, Austria and France at the Congress is not possible, and the evaluation can only mention the intentions of these powers in relation to British aims. An evaluation to what extent Britain achieved the abolishment of the slave trade is also absent from this study. This was a popular issue in British politics because of public opinion and the organised pressure from Wilberforce; it had become a serious aim of the government, who made agreements of abolition with Portugal, Sweden and Denmark between 1810-14.25 The reason for excluding this aim from the analysis is twofold. First, this agreement was an attached provision to the general treaty, and is therefore not seen in the The Times newspaper 15th July 1815 publication of the Treaty of Vienna.26 The most contentious provisions of the treaty were the territorial arrangements and the rights of sovereignty of states. Second the anti-slavery campaign was universally recognised in Britain as a paramount aim of foreign policy, but it generally ‘differed sharply from other objectives of British foreign policy during this period’.27 Therefore it is best to treat this complex issue separately, and not let in further complicate the evaluation of Castlereagh’s actions during our period.

The study also fails to evaluate the entire aspect of British arbitration at the Congress of Vienna, as it relates to Castlereagh specifically. Wellington replaced the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Vienna in February 1815, but by this stage all the major issues had been resolved and Wellington and the other British ministers responsibility 21 Hurd, D. Choose Your Weapons: The British Foreign Secretary – 200 Years of Argument, Success and Failure (London, 2010), p. 34.22 Bew, J. Castlereagh: From Enlightenment to Tyranny (London, 2011), p. 330-1. 23 S. R. Graubard, ‘Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe’, Journal of British Studies 3.1 (1963), p.79-81.24 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), pp. 580-2.25 Reich, J. ‘The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna – A Study in English Public Opinion, The Journal of Negro History 53.2 (1968), pp.129. 26 The Times, 15 Jul. 1815, p. 1.27 Reich, J. ‘The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna – A Study in English Public Opinion, The Journal of Negro History 53.2 (1968), pp.129.

was ‘with the orderly arrangement of minor affairs.’28 The evaluation of the entire process at Vienna is therefore not necessary for the evaluation in question, and therefore is only a minor limitation. There is also little need to focus on the consequences of Napoleon’s march from Elba and his defeat by the Seventh Alliance at Waterloo in July 1815, as the negotiations over this issue were presided over by Wellington, whose military success at Waterloo gave him and the Prussians the advantage at the negations at the Second Peace of Paris.29 Consequently this study has chosen to use the wider context to help further understand the British aims at Vienna, and although the analysis of some of the wider issues lack development; the evaluation will succeed in a more focused analysis of Castlereagh’s actions over the 14-month period of negotiations, and demonstrate that the minister acted to achieve the aims of his government throughout.

IR theory – world of events, big players etc.World of agency, the individual – but not against one another, more the individual agency.

Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont

Memorandum of 26th December

The Foreign Secretary did not begin his continental journey without prior instruction, and the details of these instructions are of particular interest to outlining what the Prince Regent, Prime Minister and the Cabinet expected of Castlereagh at the continental negotiations. The memorandum of the 26th of December includes certain criteria that the Cabinet wanted Castlereagh to fulfil, additional instructions and a memorandum for Maritime Peace.30 The memorandum, written by Castlereagh, finalised the aims of the Cabinet after six weeks of ministerial conference.31 This source is significant for two reasons. First, it states aims of the British government in relation to both shared continental peace and security, and securities specific to Britain herself. Second, the memorandum helps to contextualise the thought process of the Cabinet, and how they perceived the situation in Europe.

The most important aims of the Cabinet come first in the memorandum, and unsurprisingly they are of specific interest to British security. Put simply the Cabinet desired the restriction of French maritime power ‘within due bounds by the effectual establishment of Holland, the Peninsula, and Italy in security and independence’.32 Evidently the maritime security of Britain, by weakening a competitor is beneficial to the financial, commercial and military global hegemony of Britain. The memorandum for Maritime Peace helps to reiterate the importance of this securing this aim. Webster

28 H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), P. 193.29C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1937), p. 137.30 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1913, Foreign Office: Continent Conferences: Delegation Archives (henceforth F.O. Cont.), The National Archives (henceforth TNA), FO 139/1.31 H. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), p. 65.32 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

believes it can be considered as part of the overall document, and that it was probably of more interest to some of the ministers than the details of the continental settlement.33 Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was a critic of Castlereagh and has suspicions over extended European negotiations and involvement.34

The details of the continental settlement was of utmost importance to Castlereagh however, who would have to secure certain territories to ensure British security and maritime freedom. The memorandum instructs that Britain must obtain the ‘absolute exclusion of France from any establishment on the Scheldt, and especially Antwerp’; secure Holland with ‘a barrier under the House of Orange’ including Antwerp; and that Spain and Portugal be ‘independent under their legitimate sovereigns’ with a guaranteed protection against future French attack.35 These aims were achievable but the barrier for Holland would require sacrifice, particularly as the allies had accorded Napoleon territories in Belgium at this point of their peace negotiations.36

The Cabinet appreciated this, and Castlereagh is instructed to state that Britain ‘is willing to purchase it by a double sacrifice, by cession to both Holland and France.’37 Although the document states that this objective is ‘most deeply interesting to all the Allies’, the exclusion of the French Navy from this region would benefit Britain above all others.38 Similarly the memorandum of Maritime Peace also states that Britain their colonial concessions were for the ‘welfare of the continent’ and that they would not retain colonies ‘for their mere commercial value’.39 The Cabinet perceived themselves as the ‘lynch pin’ of the continental alliance, and therefore felt that they appeared ‘moderate and unselfish’.40

The memorandum is in fact selfish in relation to their allies. The most significant multilateral aim of the British government outlined in this memorandum is for a continued alliance after the war that includes ‘defensive engagements with mutual obligations’ to resist future French expansion.41 The document indicates that it is hard to stipulate what territories would be conceded, without knowing if France will be reduced ancient limits, and that if Britain’s three aims are not secured then it will ‘preserve her colonial conquests as a counterpoise to the dominion of’ France.42 Indeed other continental arrangements relating to Italy and Germany are included but are ‘not made conditions sine quibus non’.43 The memorandum states that the Cabinet affords the allies powers of mediation over a German settlement.44 This vague instruction is noteworthy, as it illustrates the naivety of the British ministers, and a 33 C. K. Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921), n.1 p.123. 34 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.65: J. Bew, Castlereagh: From Enlightenment to Tyranny (London, 2011), p. 330.35 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.36 ? 37 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

38 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.39 Memorandum for Maritime Peace, Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.40 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.6841 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.42 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.43 C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1937), p. 16.44 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

possible reason for Castlereagh’s embroilment in the Saxon and Polish issues (as discussed in chapter 3).

The memorandum therefore offers an insight into the Cabinet’s perception of themselves in relation to foreign affairs. The aims set out in this document certainly do ensure British security, and there is even an instruction to declare peace with the United States.45 As Webster and subsequently Nicholson have observed, these aims may be unrealistic and based on inadequate information on the main objectives of the other allies.46 The focus of the ministers appears to concentrate on their wider international hegemony and not the aims of their allied ministers. Indeed the memorandum states that securing the freedom of Spain and Holland ‘may justify to the British public and the allies so great an exertion on the part of Great Britain’.47 Despite this, the memorandum is essential to understanding the aims of the British government at the end of 1813. The primary instructions to safeguard the Scheldt and Antwerp, to secure Holland as a barrier and to emancipate Spain and Portugal from French influence, have been identified and Castlereagh’s attempts can be discussed.

Finally it is worth highlighting some British interests that are not included in the memorandum, and how they may be important in the overall assessment of Castlereagh’s agency in successful British negotiations. The memorandum, for instance, does not include any instructions in negotiating an agreed abolishment of the slave trade. Organised pressure from figures like Wilberforce, and a British public ‘fanatically determined’ for France to give up the salve trade meant that it was a central aim of Lord Liverpool’s cabinet.48 That said, historians have argued that the cabinet viewed this as separate and complicated issue.49 Castlereagh was thus free from this contentious issue, and faced little resistance from the opposition on his departure for Basle; Bew highlights even a Whig MP, Sir Robert Heron, stated that the pressing continental matters should be left to Liverpool’s cabinet at this time.50

Another noteworthy omission from Castlereagh’s instructions is over the dethronement of Napoleon, which was another imperative desire of his cabinet and the British public.51 The memorandum, then, does indicate Castlereagh’s primary objectives for securing Britain’s security and an extended alliance against France. The missing objectives, and perhaps the more contentious ones, are not entrusted to Castlereagh at this point. Castlereagh had to negotiate both with his own government and the allied ministers in March 1814, as France’s future monarch became central to the discussions of the Peace of Paris.52 Thus, upon his departure to Basle to meet Metternich in early 1814, the foreign secretary had ‘remarkably free hand’.53 Castlereagh was never able to secure the aims of the Cabinet’s memorandum in complete seclusion from Napoleon’s influence; such was the nature on-going war

45 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.46 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 14: Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 68.47 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.48 J. Reich, ‘The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna – A Study in English Public Opinion, The Journal of Negro History 53.2 (1968), p. 129: W. Hinde, Castlereagh (London, 1981), p. 21649 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 68: Riech The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna’, p. 129.50 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 331.51 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 18.52 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 86-91: Webster 36-753 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 65.

with France. By March 1814, however, Castlereagh orchestrated an opportunity to secure the majority of his government’s wishes, whilst adhering closely to the instructions of the memorandum, at Chaumont. This was to be ‘Castlereagh’s first great diplomatic achievement.’54

The maritime rights secured at Langres protocol

The Treaty of Chaumont

The Treaty of Chaumont, signed on March 9 1814, assured many of Britain’s primary objectives at a point when allied victory was practically assured.55 The treaty was significant for two reasons. It ensured the continued commitment of each party to the alliance against France, at a point when Castlereagh seriously feared its disintegration.56 Next the terms of the treaty and its context in the war meant that the allies could escape from frustrating and complicated negotiations for peace with Napoleon’s minister Caulaincourt at Châtillon. Finally, and most significantly for Castlereagh, the treaty fortified Britain’s position amongst the allies and made them indispensable to the coalition.57 The treaty, and its importance to securing British aims, has been modern historians collectively, who describe it as one of Castlereagh’s grandest achievement.58

A co of the Treaty, and its three secret articles are enclosed in a letter from Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool on March 10 1814, where the foreign secretary asserts in confidence that the treaty ‘will have the most decisive and beneficial influence’ in the allied union against France.59 The first two parts of the Treaty, ‘Traité Defensif’ and ‘Traité d’Alliance’, essentially agree the continued support of the alliance by Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia in the war against France.60 Article XVI in the treaty of defence concerns the duration of the alliance against France, and this is the first instance where Castlereagh secures on of the aims outlined in the memorandum of December 26 1813.61 As Bew translates, the articles states that the Defensive Alliance has been agreed for a period of twenty years that intends to ‘maintain the equilibrium of Europe’, ensure the independence of its states, and prevent the invasions which for ‘so many years have desolated the World’.62 This agreement between the allies secured one of the Cabinet’s most desired aims, and Castlereagh therefore can be rightly credited for obtaining it.

54 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 81.55 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh (London, 1976), p. 209.56 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 70.57 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 502.58 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 32: Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 81: Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 208: Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, p. 501. 59 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, Foreign Office: General Correspondences before 1906: Continent Conferences (henceforth F.O. Cont. Con.), TNA, FO 92/3.60 Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.61 Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.62 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 370.

Castlereagh also managed to secure most of his government’s territorial aims in the ‘Articles Séparés et Secrets’.63 The agreement secures the independence of Spain and Switzerland, within their ‘anciennes limites’, with the former ruled by Bourbon Ferdinand VII.64 Castlereagh therefore had effectively secured the independence of the peninsula states ‘under their legitimate sovereigns’, which is outlined as one of the key aims of the memorandum of 26 December.65 Less importantly; Italy would become an arrangement of independent states, and a confederated Germany would be created.66 These did still align with his instructions however, and can be considered as a success. The secret articles also indicate that Castlereagh ensured the independence of Holland under the Prince of Orange; a key security for his government.67 This success must be quantified in relation to the concessions and fiscal reimbursement that he agreed to.

The despatch of the 10 March 1814 additionally includes a ‘Most Secret’ letter to Lord Liverpool, where Castlereagh explains the financial memorandum attached to the Treaty of Chaumont.68 As Castlereagh writes, the treaty necessitated considerable subsidiaries on Britain behalf, paying a total of five million pounds to her allies in order to continue the war with France.69 Britain will also supply 150,000 troops to the war effort.70 This was considerably more than the other allied parties, and even Castlereagh remarks, in a letter to Mr. Hamilton, that Britain effectively supplies 300,000 men after paying the financial subsidiary, which is equal to the combined total of Prussia, Russia and Austria.71 The substantial commitment is believed to secure the agreement over the Holland settlement, and the reasons for Britain’s extra financial burden.72 In this note Castlereagh requests that Liverpool quickly puts this before parliament so that the treaty can be ratified.73 The Finance Accounts for Great Britain and Ireland for the financial year that ‘ended 5th Jan 1815’, indicate that Britain paid Austria and Prussia £972,222, and Russia £1.25 million and £500,000 for their fleet, thereby honouring the Chaumont agreement.74 Thus, Castlereagh, gained the support of parliament for this sacrifice, and guaranteed Britain’s most important territorial security in Europe.

The foreign minister’s jubilance at the Treat of Chaumont is evident, as he writes to Liverpool that he feels he has ‘exceeded’ his instructions in relation to financial

63 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.64 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.65 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.66 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.67 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.68 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.69 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.70 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.71 Castlereagh to Mr Hamilton, March 10th 1814, 72 T. Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results (Abingdon, 1998), p. 2973 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.74 ‘Finance Accounts of Great Britain and Ireland; Also, Accounts of Increase and Diminution of Salaries, &c. In the Public Offices of Great Britain, Session 8Novemebr – 12 July, 1814-1815’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons and Command, Vol VIII, (digitised by Google http://bit.ly/1pcth9L)

subsidiary.75 Castlereagh ensured a ‘precaution’ that Britain can choose to honour the treaty in ‘either men or money.’76 Here, Castlereagh’s appreciation of British public opinion can be observed, as he allowed his government to choose to substitute money for manpower if public and parliamentary opinion disputes military involvement in the war. The treaty as also meant that Britain arrived at the negotiation ‘table as an equal combatant.’77 This is a significant moment in the course of the war and for the negotiations, particularly with faltering agreements at Châtillon, and Castlereagh illustrates its significance to Britain in a letter to the under-secretary of the foreign office, William Hamilton.78 The letter is less formal than Castlereagh’s despatches to Liverpool or Bathurst, and can therefore be seen to be a better reflection of his sentiments. Castlereagh writes that he ‘was determined not to play second fiddle’ at Chaumont, and trusts that the British subsidiaries will end doubt that Britain has less claim to ‘have an opinion on continental matters’.79 Interestingly, Castlereagh’s feelings indicate that he must have felt that Britain had an inadequate claim to discuss the terms of peace prior to this. For that reason Castlereagh did excel himself at Chaumont, securing British influence in future negotiations when his fellow Cabinet ministers were ignorant of their stock falling in the alliance.80 In securing this, and the three key terms of the memorandum, Castlereagh had, as he put it, negotiated ‘an extraordinary display of power’ on behalf of his government.81

The despatch of the 10 March 1814 certainly supports the notion that Castlereagh adhered to his instructions during his first months of negotiation, and that he was ‘content to safeguard Great Britain’s immediate interests’ at Chaumont.82 The letter to Hamilton of the same day suggests that he was extremely satisfied with the achievement. One must also consider the signals for future issues in the negotiations, as although the Treaty of Chaumont outlines an agreement for a confederated Germany, there is no mention of Poland.83 Chapman argues that this was a missed opportunity for Tsar Alexander to secure Russia’s territorial desires in Poland.84 Castlereagh’s attitudes towards this issue will be discussed in chapter three, but it is worth noting this omission because it may reflect the foresight of Castlereagh to avoid this issue when securing Britain’s primary aims, or his naivety of the magnitude of this problem.

Overall Castlereagh’s actions at Chaumont amount to a diplomatic triumph. He succeeded in restoring the alliance and the pursuit of peace, something that Metternich had actively threatened to abandon through frustration at Châtillon.85 Castlereagh’s work to secure plans to protect Holland, and to liberate the peninsula

75 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.76 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.77 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 346. 78 R. Jones, The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914 (Waterloo, 1983), p. 57.79 Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton, March 10th 1814, Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers (henceforth C. C.), (ed.) Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonderry (London, 1853) (henceforth Vane Collection), Exeter University Library (henceforth EUL), V. IX, p.33580 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.6881 Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton, March 10th 1814, C.C. (ed.), Vane Collection, EUL, v. IX, p.33582 F. G. Marcham, ‘Castlereagh: The Balance of Power in Europe’, Current History 27 (1954), 340.. 83 Chapman, The Congress of Vienna, p. 29-30.84 Chapman, The Congress of Vienna, p. 29-30.85 Jarrett, M. The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon (London, 2013), p. 57.

states of Bonaparte rule was also approved by his government. A letter from Earl Bathurst to Castlereagh, 19 March 1814, confirms this approval and instructs Castlereagh’s next actions.86 Bathurst states that the Prince Regent ‘entirely approves’ of the treaty and will immediately prepare the ratifications of the treaty.87 The War Secretary also indicates the indignation of the Prince Regent towards France and Caulaincourt, and that any continued delay in the negotiations at Châtillon will result in Britain rescinding its colonial offerings to France.88 Britain’s current position on the continent, already made stronger in the Treaty of Chaumont, had improved immeasurably with Napoleon’s capture on 9 March.89 Britain therefore could afford to be more forceful, and Castlereagh’s next objective was to secure the peace of France as part of the alliance.

Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of Paris

Orders to abandon negations at Châtillon

It was Alexander, however, who acted decisively and entered Paris as leader of the victorious allied forces on the 31 March.90 Castlereagh remained at Dijon and wrote to his government about his view of the peace arrangements from there.91 The allied powers had to agree upon who was suitable to rule France. During these months four options had arisen: Napoleon could remain on the throne but with his Empire reduced, France could be ruled under a regency of Marie Louis, Bernadotte could reign, or Louis XVIII could be resorted.92 The British government supported the restoration of the Bourbons; and Liverpool, Bathurst and the Earl of Buckinghamshire even met with Louis XVIII, while in exile in England.93 A letter from Castlereagh to Liverpool of 22 March indicates his doubts about supporting the Bourbon cause strongly.94

The despatch includes two memorandums; one from Baron de Vitrolles requesting the allies stop negotiations with Napoleon and support the Bourbon cause, and another by Metternich asserting that French public allegiance was not to the Bourbons.95 At Chaumont, Castlereagh probably thought Napoleon was the most suitable option, despite the public outcry this would cause in Britain.96 Yet Napoleon’s re-proposal, offered by Caulaincourt at Châtillon on 15 March, was absurd in its terms, and therefore effectively ended these negotiations.97 As this letter illustrates, Castlereagh, now believed that the Bourbons were the suitable option but was hesitant, wanting to make sure that Britain was perceived ‘as the ally and auxiliary of the continental 86 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.87 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.88 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.89 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.82.90 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 38.91 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 87-88. 92 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.53. 93 Thompson, Earl Bathurst, pp.73-494 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3. 95 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.96 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 504.97 ibid.

powers’ rather ‘than as charging herself chief’ and imposing Louis XVIII upon the French people.98 Nicholson attributes Castlereagh’s attitude to the Pitt doctrine, but this may well be presumptuous.99

Historians have consistently continued Webster’s perception that Castlereagh was Pitt’s protégé, and Dallas more recently supports this notion.100 Graubard feels that this perception is largely unchallenged, and contends that Castlereagh’s notion of a European balance of power is inherited from eighteenth century figures such as Burke and Vatell.101 It is hard to discern directly from this despatch what the origins of Castlereagh’s views are. What is more significant is that he and Metternich, while at Dijon, did not feel that the French people were ready to support a Bourbon government. Castlereagh, on the value of this letter, appears to be at odds with the view of his Cabinet on this issue. When the foreign minister receives information from Bathurst 26 March, which contradicts opinion held at Dijon, he realigns himself with the British government and supports Louis XVIII’s restoration. 102

Bathurst’s despatch to Castlereagh first indicates that inhabitants of Bordeaux have ‘assumed the White Cockade’ of the Bourbon House, and also instructs Castlereagh to terminate the negotiations at Châtillon.103 This knowledge has been obtained in correspondence with Wellington, whose letter of the news is enclosed. Bathurst writes that the general insists ‘the sentiments manifested at Bordeaux to be general throughout that part of the country’, and more significantly that Wellington’s instructions to Marshal Beresford, also enclosed, highlight that British forces offered ‘no encouragement to the people to adopt this proceeding.’104 This news relieved Castlereagh’s anxiety over this issue, and he gave a dinner on 28 March at Dijon, to celebrate the restoration of Louis XVII to Metternich, Stadion, Hardenberg and other representatives of the allied powers, including Holland and Spain.105 Castlereagh’s letter suggests that he was unaware of the progress of the British military in Southern France, as the Bathurst letter, also written on the 22 March, reports events that took place on 12 March in Bordeaux.106 Bathurst’s communication should be credited, as he was also principally concerned with British militarily engagement with the United States.107 It was important to relay this information to Castlereagh after the events in Southern France had become publically known.

The news that Bourbon support had swelled in Southern France was published in The Times on 25 March, which stated that two ‘deputies from the Royalists’ had landed in Falmouth to report the news.108 One of these messengers reportedly proclaimed that

98 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.99 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 87. 100 G. Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo (London, 2001), pp. 43-48. 101 Graubard, ‘Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe’, pp. 86-7.102 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 89. 103 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.104 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.105 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 89.106 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.107 Thompson, Earl Bathurst, p. 78.108 Times, 25th March, 1814.

‘Now, the White Flag and the Old British Union are flying amicably together.’109 The author of the article champions the Bourbon cause and refers to the enemy, Napoleon, as the ‘villain.’110 A solution, where Napoleon remained on the French throne, had therefore become an impossibility. The British public, as confirmed by this newspaper article, would not tolerate this outcome and this sentiment even extended to attempting to negotiate peace directly with Bonaparte.111 The sentiment of the public and the government’s frustration explain the instructions given by Bathurst to Castlereagh in the letter of 22 March. Bathurst states that the cabinet believes that the delay to the Châtillon negotiations can be ‘solely ascribed to the French government’ and orders Castlereagh, on behalf of the Prince Regent, ‘to use your utmost efforts with the Allied powers to break of the negotiations.’112 Wellington’s news from Southern France helped to ease Castlereagh’s worries over the future of the French throne, and meant that he could help to secure the desired outcome for Britain.

Castlereagh role in the Peace of Paris

Castlereagh’s agency in obtaining this outcome for Britain was minimal though. Alexander was the only senior allied official in Paris between the 1st-6th April, a crucial period, where the Tsar helped Talleyrand to restore the Bourbon monarchy.113 With Châtillon abandoned and his views now aligned with that of the British government and public, Castlereagh had no obvious reason to hesitate. Nicholson observes that Sir Charles Stewart, who had accompanied Alexander to Paris, wrote to Liverpool to express his concern for Castlereagh’s absence because of the advantage it gave Russia in the negotiations for the upcoming Paris treaty.114

As it transpires Britain did not suffer as a result of this absence. The Peace of Paris, signed on the 30th May, ensured peace with France and cemented the territorial agreements published in the Treaty of Chaumont.115 Thus Britain had ensured the security of the territories outlined in the memorandum of 26th December, apart from Hannover.116 Castlereagh’s principal work to achieve the aims of his government had been achieved at Chaumont. As the correspondences illustrate Castlereagh, his government and the British public shared a desire restore the Bourbons when the allies entered Paris on 31 March. Conversely Alexander was not sure of his preferred candidate, and the first week of April was period of tension and uncertainty in Paris.117 Castlereagh was wary of Alexander, and Schroeder argues that perhaps this explains his delayed journey to Paris.118 This is mere speculation however, and it is hard to 109 ibid. 110 ibid. 111 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 47.112 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.113 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 86.114 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 86.115 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.87.116 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.87.117 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 506118 ibid.

know why Castlereagh avoided direct negotiation with the Tsar. The foreign secretary had certainly been less influential at Paris than in Chaumont, but his loyalty to the orders of his government was unwavering, and he had still succeeded in fulfilling their aims. Unlike Paris, Castlereagh was to have a more influential role at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, as he attempted to negotiate with Alexander, the other allied ministers, over the settlement of central Europe.

Castlereagh and Poland

Castlereagh’s proposal for negotiations

The next two chapters analyse Castlereagh’s actions and experience at the Congress between September 1814 and February 1815, and attempts to understand, from his correspondences to the British government and Wellington, whether his involvement in the Polish and Saxon settlements were driven by personal motives or his continued efforts to secure British territorial aims in central Europe. There was an interval between Alexander’s to London in the summer of 1814, and the beginning on the Congress in October, during which Castlereagh considered how the Congress might progress.119

The correspondence between Castlereagh and the British government have been illuminating thus far, and will continue to provide a significant insight into Castlereagh’s actions in the continental negotiations. This chapter approaches the foreign minister differently and concentrates on extracting Castlereagh’s own perception of his role at Vienna, and his primary concerns. His despatches to Wellington are therefore also important to this understanding, as the general was ‘the confident in many respects of Castlereagh’s feelings.’120 ….

Castlereagh’s initial expectations of the Congress are outlined in a letter to Wellington on 7 August 1814, where he states that the allied ministers believe the Congress will take place on the 1st October, shortly after Alexander’s arrival on 27 September.121 As a result Castlereagh expects that the allied ministers will ‘have time to discuss the more difficult matters’ prior to the assembling of the Congress, having already agreed upon the simpler matters.122 This remark is particularly interesting because Castlereagh had essentially agreed upon all British territorial securities. The ominous difficulty in question was the Polish settlement, which Alexander had postponed until he had returned to Russia after his trip to England.123 Castlereagh’s recognition of this issue meant that he could attempt to prepare for it. He is anxious about Russian aggrandisement, and stresses to Wellington that ‘it is equally important to Prussia, 119 Webster, Congress of Vienna, pp. 50-51. 120 Derry, Castlereagh, p. 171. 121 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76. 122 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76.123 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 106.

Holland, and Hanover, that a Russian dependency should not be established’ in this part of Europe, which in this case is Denmark.124

Castlereagh’s anxiety over the Polish issue may perplex, considering that the majority of his cabinet would happily adopt an isolationist policy; due to their concerns over the American war and tax reduction and debt.125 Indeed British aims had been agreed at Chaumont and cemented at Paris, and Liverpool’s cabinet had to address the suffering economy and find employment for 300,000 demobilised soldiers upon their return to England.126 There is an assertion by historians that Castlereagh, due to his early success, now strove to ‘play the part of impartial mediator in the settlement’.127 This view can be substantiated by Castlereagh’s early correspondences from Vienna.

A despatch to Liverpool on the 22 September 1814, illustrates that Castlereagh did perceive himself as a mediator, who could contribute to the organisation of the proceedings.128 Castlereagh encloses a memorandum, ‘unofficially and confidently’, to the Prime Minister that should be read ‘rather as a throwing out of ideas than containing a formal opinion.’129 The unofficial nature of this memorandum can be firstly observed from the pencilled corrections of the documents, and can thus be viewed to reflect the thought process of the foreign minister.130 Castlereagh believes that ‘no effectual progress can be made in business’ until some plan of the proceedings is made; and proposes that France and Spain, in addition to the allied powers, should negotiate the important matters of the settlement because these six countries are ‘most considerable in population and weight.’131 Not only does this memorandum show that Castlereagh believes that he has some authority in dictating the organisation of the congress, but that he believes that the allied powers should be inclusive in agreeing the territorial settlements in Europe.

Baron Humboldt also drew up a memorandum, which excluded Spain and France, and this was chosen instead of Castlereagh’s, until challenged by Talleyrand on the 30th September.132 Castlereagh does inform Liverpool of this possibility, commenting that the allied powers ‘feel equal jealousy of admitting France to either arbitrate between them or to assume any leading influence.’133 He even highlights his own efforts to mediate this situation by endeavouring ‘to effect a confidence of sentiment between the French and allied ministers.’134 Castlereagh obviously felt that a conciliatory approach was necessary, but was unfortunately in the minority.135 He adds a note to his memorandum stating that he disagrees with the exclusive right for the four allied

124 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76.125 Shroeder, The transformation of European Politics, pp. 520-521.126 Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone, p. 38.127 Marcham,. ‘Castlereagh’, p. 334.128 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.129 ibid. 130 Castlereagh memorandum, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.131 ibid. 132 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 222.133 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.134 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.135 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 222.

powers to arbitrate, and asserts that France and Spain should be treated as ‘friendly and not hostile parties.’136

As these despatches illustrate, Castlereagh had started to assume a new role prior to the opening of the Congress. He believed himself to be a mediator between the parties, and this would become increasingly significant after Talleyrand rejected Humboldt’s proposals and increased the formal negotiating committee to eight powers, that would include France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden.137 Agreeing territorial settlements would now necessitate the agreement of eight parties, each of whom had their own territorial demands and ambitions in Europe. Castlereagh wanted to create equilibrium in Europe based on ‘a mechanical expression of the balance of forces.’138 As the negotiations faltered throughout October, it became clear that Alexander would resist this.

Russian influence over Polish settlement

Castlereagh’s fundamental obstacle to successfully mediate the Polish settlement was Alexander, and the pair had engaged in a number of contentious meetings at the end of September 1814.139 Alexander proposed to support plans for Poland independence that included ceding some Polish territories to Russia.140 During their discussions the emperor asserted that by liberating Poland and granting it a constitution he was acting with moral duty.141 Castlereagh could offer little resistance to Alexander’s claims for the reason that the British public opinion would support this outcome in Poland.142 Alexander could afford to resist any objections to his proposals, particularly as his forces were still travelling through Europe.143

Castlereagh’s frustration with the Russian attitude to the Polish increased throughout October. In a letter to Wellington on 25 October, he expressed his exasperation at the degeneration of the negotiations and the possibility of war.144 He writes that he hopes that the powers ‘might have enjoyed some repose…but the tone and conduct of Russia have disappointed this hope and forced upon us fresh considerations.’145 Here, Castlereagh demonstrates his frustration with the Tsar’s position over Poland. This significantly supports Nicholson’s notion that Castlereagh’s own position over Poland changed because of Russia.146 As mentioned, Castlereagh had been ‘anxious’ about the Russian Emperor’s attitude at Vienna as far back as August.147 However, this anxiety and transformed into an insurmountable obstacle, as this letter indicates.148

136 ‘Note annexed to the Protocol of the 22nd of September’, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.137 Webster, Congress of Vienna, pp. 65-66.138 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, p. 276.139 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 169.140 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna, p.100.141 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 169.142 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna, p.101.143 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 519. 144 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 145 ibid. 146 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 128.147 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76.148 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173.

The prospect of Russian aggrandisement necessitated Castlereagh to consider other methods for creating a balance of power in Europe.

The foreign minister anticipated that if Russia could not be persuaded over Poland, that the other allies would seek territorial compensation. Castlereagh’s duty at the conference was to ‘avoid accidents’ and to ensure a balance of power that his government had paid for with subsidiaries and colonies.149 His government, due to Castlereagh’s assurances in September that he could mediate between the powers, expected this balance to be settled without serious difficulty. As mentioned the Tsar had a strong reputation with the British public, and Castlereagh’s superiors in government did not recognise the danger of Russian aggrandisement.150 Castlereagh however, expresses his strong concerns to Wellington throughout October, that the consequences of the Polish settlement could endanger the security of Holland.

Russian expansion in Poland, Castlereagh believes, will encourage Austria and Prussia to come ‘pressing in other directions’ territorially.151 Castlereagh astutely appreciates that Bavaria might have to expand into Dutch territory as a consequence of this, and comments that this ‘is less liberal, in a territorial point of view, to the House of Orange, than can be wished.’152 Importantly Castlereagh recognises that this would aggrieve the Dutch, a close ally of Britain, but views this as a ‘secondary danger’.153 This eventuality is placed in context of Britain’s major aims and thus illustrates Castlereagh’s continued concern to follow the wishes of his government. He explains to Wellington that an enlarged Bavaria, a ‘higher military power’, would protect better against future French aggression in these territories and thus preserve the security of the Low Countries.154 Castlereagh, therefore, still recognises ‘our first object’, and this focus remains in place despite continued frustration with the other ministers.155

Castlereagh’s exasperation is not limited to Alexander in his letter of 25 October, as he illustrates the difficulty in working with Talleyrand to resist Russian demands.156 Kissinger is correct in observing that Castlereagh misunderstood what the other powers conceived a balance of power to be; for them it meant ‘a reconciliation of historical ambitions’ in some areas of Europe.157 Castlereagh sees minor territorial grievances as ‘subordinate’ to establishing a peaceful balance of power in Europe, while he reports that Talleyrand argues with other states over the Saxon and Neapolitan issues ‘at the expense of the more important Poland.’158 At the beginning of October Castlereagh had been unable to change Alexander’s mind on the Polish issue, despite their strong friendship.159 At the end of October he had also lost patience

149 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 448. 150 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 173.151 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142152 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142153 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142154 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142155 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142156 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 157 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, p. 276.158 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 159 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, p. 268.

with Talleyrand; and relays to Wellington that his considerations for alliance in the outcome of war.160 What is most interesting is that even Castlereagh’s considered alliances are still weight against their suitability to ensuring British securities in Holland. Castlereagh recognises the likely possibility for an alliance between France, Austria and Britain against Russia and Prussia, but comments that Holland and the Low Countries would then be dependant on France and not Prussia.161 They would be easily susceptible to ‘re-occupation by French armies’, which contradicts one of Britain’s major aims, and therefore Castlereagh asserts that Britain ‘ought not to risk so much upon French connection.’162

These letters highlight that Castlereagh primarily held the Russian Tsar accountable for the difficulty of these negotiations, but it also highlights that his desire to establish equilibrium was inhibiting his skills as a mediator. He had failed to influence the Tsar over Poland, and to press upon Talleyrand the importance of solving the Polish ahead of the Saxon and Italian settlements. Prussia did not fear to demand Saxon territories because they had no need to fear Russia, as Alexander and King Frederick of Prussia had loyal relationship.163 The lack of progress threatened war, and Castlereagh’s letter of 25th October illustrates his fear that this may affect the security of Holland. British aims remained at the forefront of Castlereagh’s concern in his attempts to establish equilibrium. However his assurances to Liverpool that he could mediate upon this outcome, expressed in his despatch on 22 September, had not come to any result. As the letters to Wellington show during October, Castlereagh was failing to affect the progress of these negotiations, despite his best intentions to safeguard British aims. Nicholson expresses the difficulty for historians to discern how they progressed, even though the ‘we possess almost all the documents in the case.’164 The possibility of another war was unacceptable to the British government, and Castlereagh was soon to be notified of this fact.

Disobedience and a fear of war

British isolationism

The British government informed Castlereagh of their growing concern regarding the polish issue in a despatch from Liverpool on the 28 October 1814. In this letter Liverpool orders the foreign secretary to refrain from challenging Russia on the Polish issue, pointing to the fact that Britain had more pressing preoccupations.165 To reiterate this sentiment in the British cabinet, the Prime Minister enclosed a 160 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 161 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 162 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 163 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 528.164 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 165.

memorandum, written by Vansittart, that highlights what the consequences of Castlereagh’s continued action might be.166 The instructions carried significant weight because Castlereagh played a more reserved role at the Congress hereafter.167 Castlereagh accepts his instructions, in a letter to Liverpool on 11 November, and explains to his superior that his actions were borne out of a continued desire to secure Britain’s principle aims for the congress.168

Liverpool writes to Castlereagh that it is ‘the impression of our other colleagues…that we have done enough on the question of Poland’, with the reasoning that because of the Russian position ‘no agreement respecting Poland can now be either creditable or satisfactory.’169 This view is substantiated in Vansittart’s memorandum, which commends Castlereagh’s attempt support ‘the endeavours of Austria and Prussia’, but contends that ultimately Britain had now ‘fully performed all that could be expected’ from them.170 Vansittart, as already stated, had a reputation for supporting isolationist policy in Europe.171 That said Castlereagh’s failure thus far in negotiating with the Tsar also clearly resulted in a loss of faith from Liverpool. Liverpool and the rest of his cabinet were preoccupied with the protracted war with America.172

The strain of the Anglo-American is one of the reasons for withdrawing from the Polish discussions asserts Liverpool; who writes that continued aggravation of Russia might result in their support of the American cause.173 The Vansittart memorandum instructs Castlereagh ‘to avoid irritating Russia’, as it may be regarded in Europe that Britain act out of ‘jealousy to Russia.’174 While Castlereagh attempts to counteract Russian aggrandisement in Europe, his government clearly intends preserve British international hegemony that follows an imperialist and maritime foreign policy. The two international hegemonies were Britain and Russia, and following Napoleon’s defeat, they both wanted to preserve their own supremacy over the other.175 As discussed in the first two chapters, Castlereagh had essentially ensured all Britain’s main securities by the Peace of Paris. Vansittart worries that the aggravation of Russia could cause them to reintroduce the question of maritime rights to the Congress, and therefore undermine this achievement.176

Conversely these letters do indicate that the British government took a simplified view of the Polish issue. Liverpool writes that Britain ‘should withdraw ourselves from the question altogether, and reserve ourselves for points on which we have a

165 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, Supplementary Despatches, Correspondences and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, (ed.) by his son The Duke of Wellington (London, 1872) (henceforth W. S. D.), Harvard University Library Online (henceforth HUL), v. IX, p.382. 166 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.167 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 103 : Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.168 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.169 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.170 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.171 Bew, Castlereagh, p.330.172 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.173 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.174 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.175 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 534. 176 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

more immediate and direct interest.’177 Similarly Vansittart argues that the future of Poland is ‘of no great political importance to us anyway.’178 Here, as Castlereagh points out in his letter to Liverpool on 11 November, is where a greater appreciation of the other allies is required.179 Castlereagh explains that he too was induced ‘to undervalue the importance attached by the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets to the polish question’; until it became clear, because of Alexander’s position, that the battleground for ‘negotiation would then turn upon Saxony.’180 The future of Saxony was of no immediate interest to the British government, and Castlereagh had even been granted permission to mediate of a German settlement before he departed England in December 1813.181

The reality of the Saxon issue would have implications to Britain however, and Castlereagh is at pains to explain this to Liverpool. If Prussia absorbed all of Saxony to compensate for the polish settlement, there was a possibility that a German League would cover and potential ‘expose’ the Low Countries.182 Thus, as Castlereagh, argues; by consequence the Polish issue could affect the security of Holland and the Low Countries, which amounts to a ‘particular interest’ of the British government.183 This observation is of paramount importance, as it illustrates that although Castlereagh’s perceptions of the Polish issue differed greatly to his Cabinet, he still believed that his actions were necessary to cement the securities he had achieved earlier in 1814. It suggests that Castlereagh was the only member of the British government, with the exception of perhaps Wellington who he had corresponded with regularly in October, knew that more work had to be done to achieve British aims.

Nevertheless the British government, as Liverpool’s despatch of 25th October illuminates, felt that Castlereagh had become embroiled in these negotiations and that required orders of restraint. Castlereagh even states that he became ‘more involved than 184I should have permitted myself.’ Perhaps, as Dallas argues, he became so central to the negotiations that he did not know how to retreat from the crisis.185 Significantly Castlereagh ends his correspondence with a warning that the peace ‘which we have so dearly purchased, will be of short duration.’186 War was not an option for Great Britain, and the government duly issued Castlereagh with his sternest instructions to date.

Alexander’s demands in Poland had created a deadlock in the negotiations by the 21st November.187 The strain this put on the Saxon negotiations has already been made clear. Bathurst wrote to Castlereagh on the 27 November to inform him of the sentiments of the Prince Regent, who ‘cannot contemplate the present state of

177 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.178 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.179 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.180 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.181 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.182 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.183 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.184 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.185 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.186 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.187 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 173.

Europe.’188 The War secretary relays that the Prince Regent ‘deeply laments the course which the discussions at Vienna have taken respecting Poland’, and ‘entirely approves of the firm and decided manner’ in which Castlereagh has attempted to resist Russian aggrandisement.189 The tone of Bathurst’s message seems to convey that the Prince Regent, who had a close relationship with Castlereagh, understood the difficulty of Castlereagh’s position at Vienna.190 George was also a European at heart and would have supported Castlereagh’s efforts until war threatened.191

For this reason the remainder of his message is all the more compelling. Bathurst paraphrases that His Royal Highness has ‘the most serious apprehensions of the consequences which would result from the renewal of war on the Continent under present circumstances.’192 The preoccupations of the British government have been indicated above, and need not be reiterated. The significance is that even those who share Castlereagh’s view for Europe, and appreciate his position in the negotiations, are now ordering him to withdraw from the Polish and Saxon issues. Bathurst’s final message, on behalf of the Prince Regent, is to explain the expectation that Castlereagh will aim ‘to prevent, by all the means in your power, so great an evil’ as war.193

These correspondences sufficiently illustrate that Castlereagh had lost the confidence in his government to reach a settlement over the Polish issue, and that they were prepared to command him to adopt a different approach to the negotiations. Castlereagh, as he himself admitted, had become too heavily involved and was endeavouring to achieve the ‘establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe’ that seemed an impossibility.194 From the end of November Castlereagh had to endeavour to prevent European war to follow his government wishes. Circumstance dictated the opportunity to continue to preserve British interests, with an entirely different course of action. Alexander had relinquished leader status by double-dealing over Poland, and subsequently lost Austrian trust.195 By the middle of December the Saxon Castlereagh understood that Poland was lost but that he still had an opportunity to save Saxony.196 In order to achieve this he would have to deliberately disregarded his instructions of his government, and threaten war against Russia and Prussia.

The Defensive Alliance January 1815

Castlereagh’s resistance to Prussian desires in Saxony came after Prussia had deserted Britain in their attempts to object to Russian plans for Poland; this action coincidently aligned with British public opinion, which had favoured Saxon independence since November.197 Talleyrand sufficiently enraged the Prussians with two notes on 19th and 26th December where he insisted that the dethronement of the Saxon king undermined

188 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6. 189 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.190 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 469.191 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 458.192 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.193 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.194 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.195 Marcham, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 340. 196 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 225. 197 Webster, Congress of Vienna, p. 107-8.

traditional principles of legitimacy.198 On the 29th December Hardenberg threatened war.199 Castlereagh wrote to Liverpool on the 1st January explaining these volatile developments, and illustrates his fruitless attempts to abate the Prussians.200

Castlereagh reports that the language of the Prussians ‘is very warlike, and strongly against yielding any part of Saxony, and that Humboldt actually refuses ‘to discuss such alternatives as might be proposed.’201 Prussia had supported Russian plans for Poland, and therefore would expect reciprocal support over Saxony, which explains their threatening attitude.202 The Prussians certainly gave the impression that they were prepared to go to war over this issue. The letter supports this and Castlereagh reports that the Prussians were ‘organising their army for the field…and are employed in fortifying Dresden’, and from this point onwards the Prussian Cabinet regard that an opposition to their annexation of Saxony ‘as tantamount to a declaration of war.’203

Although the British public desired an independent Saxony, this was subordinate to the priority to avoid war, and Castlereagh was well aware of the ‘impossibility’ for European hostilities from Bathurst’s letter of 27th November.204 The foreign secretary, as he has endeavoured to do throughout the continental negotiations, still explains to Liverpool how these new developments could affect British securities. In this case the military occupation of Saxony and presence ‘on the left bank of the Rhine has been extremely vexatious of late towards the Prince of Orange’s government.’205 The security of Holland was therefore endangered by Prussian militarisation and Castlereagh felt that this was a sufficient danger to ignore his instructions from London.206 It is significant to note that Castlereagh asserts that he attempted to pacify the Prussians and called their actions ‘most alarming’; he even suggested that because of their aggressive attitude ‘it would be better to break up the congress.’207 It is difficult to know if Castlereagh did truly attempt to pacify the aggressors before preparing alliances for war, or whether he sought to excuse his actions to ‘concert with the French and Austrian plenipotentiaries a Treaty of Defensive Alliance.’208 Regardless of this, and his justification for forming the alliance, Castlereagh had, for the first time since leaving Britain, deliberately flouted the orders of his government.

An alliance between Britain, France and Austria against Prussia and Russia was signed on the 3rd January 1815, with the invitation for the United Netherlands, Hannover and Bavaria invited to accede.209 The third article of the treaty ‘provided that an attack upon Hanover or the Low Countries would be regarded as an attack on Great Britain’ and the other signatories would support military resistance to Prussian

198 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 177.199 ibid. 200 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.201 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.202 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 528.203 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.204 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.205 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.206 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226. 207 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.208 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.209 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 535.

aggression in these territories.210 This was a significant agreement, as it illustrates that although Castlereagh was ignoring his overriding command to avoid war, his aims were still centred on securing the British securities that had been outlined by the Cabinet a year earlier. Castlereagh specifically indicates on the 1st January that he sought an alliance ‘confined within the strict necessity of this extraordinary case.’211 This comment indicates that he recognised that he continued to avoid aggravating Russia, as instructed by the despatch of 27th October, and that the treaty specifically related to Prussian military threats that had recently emerged.

There is some contention to who should be accorded credit for the Defensive Alliance of 3rd January, and Nicholson credits Talleyrand for this security.212 Kissinger however criticises historians for exaggerating Talleyrand’s role.213 Indeed Castlereagh writes that he planned to consult the other parties ‘as an act of imperative duty.’214 Certainly Hinde credits the foreign secretary for this tripartite alliance, as does Thompson.215 Castlereagh certainly had a central role to play, and undeniably defied the wishes of the Prince Regent, Liverpool and his government. Castlereagh was fortunate though, and his actions did not receive the negative reaction one might assume. Castlereagh writes to Liverpool on 5th January 1815, stating ‘I have every reason to hope that the alarm of war is over.’216 The treaty had effectively frightened Alexander, who knew that his military were exhausted from the war with Napoleon, and he subsequently betrayed Prussia.217 Prussia, as Castlereagh writes, then sought compromise and agreed to discuss ‘a suitable modification of the Saxon question.’218 This achievement and Castlereagh’s actions did not persuade the British government to the course of action taken, but Castlereagh does allude to what did; ‘our pacification with America.’219

As it transpired an Anglo-American peace was also signed, by coincidence, on the 3rd January.220 The relief of this extended war meant that Castlereagh’s actions were praised by Bathurst, and later approved by the Prime Minister.221 Metternich formally agreed the terms for the Saxon and Polish settlements on 28th January.222 The difficult issues had been resolved, and Castlereagh had had a varying degree of influence in this process. Liverpool, facing considerable pressure from the Whigs and the Radicals over British foreign policy, required Castlereagh’s presence before parliament assembled in February.223 Castlereagh’s duties at the Congress of Vienna was completed, and although in the final months of negotiations he actively defied the

210 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 178.211 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.212 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 177.213 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna, p. 267.214 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.215 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226: Thompson, Bathurst, p. 87.216 Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.217 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 535.218 Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.219 Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.220 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226.221 Thompson, Bathurst, p. 87.222 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 177.223 Derry, Castlereagh, p. 173

wishes of his government and threaten war, his letters indicated that his priority was always to ensure that British aims were achieved. In the end the Polish and Saxon issues were resolved fortuitously, with Castlereagh acting in line with the aims of his government until the last.