intro to law reviewer 2012 (1)

7/31/2019 Intro to Law Reviewer 2012 (1)

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DAY1

OVERVIEWOFTHECOURSE(PowerpointPresentation)

THECONCEPTOFLAW

Positivelawsarethosethatmaybepromulgated,passed,adopted,orotherwiseposited

byanofficialorentityvestedwithauthoritybythegovernmenttoprescribetherulesand

regulations for a particular community or otherwise they are the written rules and

regulationsenactedbygovernment.

Natural lawis purportedlybasedonuniversallyacceptedmoralprinciples,"God'slaw,"

and/or derived from nature and reason. It is the unwritten body of universal moral

principlesthatunderlietheethicalandlegalnormsbywhichhumanconductissometimes

evaluatedandgoverned

Divinenaturallawrepresentsthesystemofprinciplesbelievedtohavebeenrevealedor

inspiredbyGodorsome othersupremeand supernaturalbeing.Thesedivineprinciples

aretypicallyreflectedbyauthoritativereligiouswritingssuchasScripture.

Humanlawemanatesfromhumanreasonprovidedthatit hasthefollowingrequisites:

Thelawmustbeameasureofthings,andsuchmeasuremustbecertain.Also,apersons

participation in eternal law is not perfect. It involves a certain level of mode and

individuality. This imperfection is mitigated by humanreason, such as providing legal

sanctions

LEGALPROCESS

Municipal lawis the national, domestic, or internallawof asovereignstatedefined in

oppositiontointernationallaw.Municipallawincludesnotonlylawatthenationallevel,

butlawatthestate,provincial,territorial,regionalorlocallevels.

International law is the body oflegalrulesgoverning interaction betweensovereign

states(Public International Law) and therightsanddutiesof thecitizensof sovereign

states towards the citizens of other sovereign states (Private International Law).

DworkinsInterpretativeTheory

A. RulesandPrinciples:TheIdeaofFit Legalinterpretation,when properlycarriedout,willrequirethe

makingofmoraljudgments

o Morality is intertwined with and will have a greatinfluenceontheinterpretationoflaws

Laws are rules not just confinedto the written codes,judicialdecisions and official documents or a mere product of power

struggles and politics. Rather, they are a reflection of an

underlyinggovernmentphilosophy.

o Govtphilosophy =moral principleson thepurposeofgovernment+relationsofthegovtandtheindividual

Moralprinciplesbehindthelawsthenserveasthebasisinfindinganswersforhardcases,ifthedirectsolutioncannotbefoundin

thewrittenlawsthemselves.

Howdoes one determine themoral principlesbehind the lawsbeingadoptedbyacommunity/groupofpeople?

o Bylooking atthe DEGREE OFFIT betweenthe moralprinciplesandlaws/rules

DEGREEOFFITismeasuredbylookingat:1. Logicalconsistencytotalconsistencyis

impossible, expression (through the

rules/laws) is the outcome of

consistency

2. Powertohelpprovidearationalecanexplain why most of the rules being

followed and adopted are the good

ones

B. Fittingthe4thAmendment(oftheUSA):PRIVACY USConstitution,4 thamendment:Rightofpeopletobesecurein

theirpersons,homes, papers, andeffects against unreasonable

searchesandseizures

o Searchforevidenceinoneshomerequirestheofficerstohaveasearchwarrantfortheofficerstogetone,

theyhavetopursuethejudgethattheyhaveprobable

causethatthe person tobe searcheddid commit the


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crime.Ifnosearchwarrantwasobtained,theevidence

collectedwillbetreatedtobeinadmissibleincourt.

Theprotectionofprivacyfitsthe4thAmendmento Itis amoral principlewhichplacesrestrictionson the

governmentinimplementinganti-criminalmeasures

o Privacy others maynot intrude (thehomes, papers,person/body) without the owners consent; right to

non-disclosureofinformationthatmaybeusedtoharm

theperson

o Restrictions may not be absolute, it should find abalance betweeneffectiveimplementationof the law

and respect for the r ights of the people by the

governmentandtheothercitizens

Caseinpoint:OlmstedvUnitedStates This case involved the wiretapping of a

suspected criminals phone by the

governmentwithoutasearchwarrant

Becausetechnologywasnotyetapparenttothosewhowrotethe 4

thamendment,they

only imagined physical intrusion as an

invasionofprivacy

The court decided that this was not av iolation because i t only served the

governmentagatheringofinformation,not

a direct physical invasion of the criminals

personoranyofhisproperty.

o BUT, in using the fit theory ofDworkin,we canconcludethat this

isaviolationofthe4th

Amendmento Because,again,thereare 2aspects

to privacy: physical and

informational

o More correct conclusion:wiretapping without a search

warrant is a VIOLATION ofthe 4th

Amendment

o Asasupportforthe4thamendment,therighttoprivacycan stillbe interpreted indifferentways. Some may

actually thinkthat wiretappingis a violation,but the

randomdrugtestingforemployeesisnt.Whileothersthinkthatprivacy stretchesto most,oralmostall the

intimatechoiceswemake,suchasusingcontraceptives

or not.Althoughthey areall varying perspectiveson

theconcept,theyarestilllogicallyconsistent,theyare

stillfittogivethe4thamendmentarationale.But,if

weare tomake a choice amongall,how are weto

choose?Atthispoint,MORALITYstepsin.

C. TheRoleofMorality Inchoosingamongthefitprinciples,onehastochoosewhichisthe

bestmorally.

Forexample,amorerestrictedprivacyprinciple(righttochoosetousecontraceptivesor getan abortion)maynot bemorallyupright, then

thebroaderprinciple(rightagainstintrusion),whichis moral,canbe

treatedaspartofthelaw.

Again, byhaving these principles,which provide a rationale to thewritten laws,we can actuallyconsult these principles if weare to

resolve hard cases whose answers cant be found directly in the

writtenlaws.

Todecidewhichoneismoralisanindividualchoice.Althoughacasehasbeendecidedincorrectly,itstillbearsthegoodfaithofthejudge

whowentthroughthe processof pickingout which ismoralor not,

consultinghisownvaluesatthat.

Itismorality,whichgivesthelawmoreauthorityandintegrity,morallawsare not justa product of coercion,authoritarianism or rather,dictatorship. It is a set of laws, which has been adopted by a

community because they believe that those laws stand for their

personalvalues.

D. TheChallengeofSkepticism Moral lawsare thosewhichhave themost roomfor disagreements

andsecond-guessing,andthisinvitesadeepskepticisminthelaw


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Although disagreement may weaken the fit principle of Dworkin(thattellsusthatwrittenlawsarebackedupbyprinciples),byleading

topointthatreallytherearenorightanswersonwhicheveryonecan

agreeon(becauseagain,moralchoicesaretobemadeindividually)o BUTDworkintellsusthat,itdoesntmeanthatweargueso

much, thatwecantarriveat acorrectanswer,thereisno

correctansweratall.

2kindsofskepticism:o Externalskepticismholdsthatthereisnothingobjectivein

the world which can make a statement about our moral

obligationstrueorfalse

It poses the possibility that everyone has their ownbiases,sonotonecansaythathisviewismoreaptthan

theother,becausetheirstandardsarenotthesame.

Simply put, there is no standard ruler for moralquestions as compared to the determination of

someones height (which uses the metric/English

system)

BUT,Dworkincountersthisquestioningbysayingthatmakingmoralchoicesarefarfromthemethodsofthe

objectiverealm,onedoesnotusearigidruler.Instead,

moralquestions and answers are as varied as those

individualswhoposethem

Makingmoraldecisionsdoesnothavetobebasedonfactswhichareperceivablebythe

senses

It is an exercise of REASON rather thanempiricaljudgments

BUT,BUT theauthortells usthat Dworkinsview stillhasloopholes,bettertoputitinawaythatinsteadof

moraldecisions not having a standard rule, itis the

modeofargument(ormodeofarrivingattheanswer)

whichisvarying

o Internalskepticism this view actually trashes thewholefittheoryofDworkin,ittellsusthattherearenoprinciples,

whichbackupthelaws.Lawsarejustaproductofaleaders

whims and will,mere exercise ofpowerby theone who

controlsthegovernment

That politics is unjust and oppressive, that the lawscoming fromthe government favor thosewho ruleit(thewealthyandthepowerful)

E. AssessingDworkin UnlikeAquinas,Dworkinthatdoesnotholdthatunjustrulesare

invalidlaws

UnlikeFuller,Dworkinbelievesthatlegalityofthelawsdoesnotobligethepeopletoactuallyfollow

o Locatesthefoundationoflawsintheintegrityofit His views, althoughitseemslike, does notgive the judgesthe

authoritytojustwhimsicallydecidethecases(becausehowthey

willresolveitwilldependentirelyontheirmoralbeliefs)rather,

thesejudgesarehighlyencouragedtolookattheotherdecisions,

because thesedecisions,especially ifthey decide asa majority,

reflects themoralityof a bigger population,the morality ofa

society.

Criticsassertthatitisfaultytolookatmoralityasthesourceofauthority of the law, rather there is a superior theory, Legal

positivismwhichposesamoreaptexplanation

LEGALPOSITIVISM

Thisviewrejectsthe traditionalnaturallawtheorythatgenuinelawsarenecessarilyjustlaws.

Thisviewalsorejectsthe necessarylinksbetweenmoralityand laws(rejectsDworkin)

A. JohnAustinsTheoryofLaw LawasaCommand

o Laws are laid down by the rulers (or a sovereignindependentpoliticalsociety),tobefollowedbythosewho

areunderthem.

Sovereigntycanonlybedefinedbypower,notbyanyotherstandardsuchasmoralityorjustice


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Though might does not make right, it can beimpliedthat(forAustin)mightmakessovereignty,

andso,mightmakespositivelaws

Noneedtothinkofthecommongood,notatallo Theselawsimposeobligationstothefollowers,andifthey

fail toabideby it,theywillfaceundesirableconsequences

(sanctions)

o Lawsareconsideredgeneralcommands Theydontstopattellingyoutodoaspecificthing

ataspecifictime,butittellsyoutoactinacertain

wayallthetime,continuously

o Divine laws: God creatures; Positive law: rulers followers,constituents

o Positive morality those rules accepted informally by agroupofpeople(i.e.club,organization)

o Though,notalltheviolationsoftheselawsmaynotamounttopunishment,theymayjustreceivealowlytreatmentfrom

theothermembersofthegrouporthesociety

o Austins theory answers the question What is law? asdistinguishedfromWhatoughtthelawbe?

o For our legal obligations, we owe allegiance not to thehigherbeingbeyondtheempiricalworld,buttotherulerof

theterritoryweoccupyinthisworld.

o CondemnsthenaturallawtheorythatifalawgoesagainsttheDivinelaw,itisnotbinding

It is an abuse of language, because this is allnonsense

If a person obliged by some positive law andviolatedsomeofitgoesbythisreasoning,judgesshould treat this as an inconclusiveness of

reasoningandshouldbepunished

Mayalsolead toanarchy,tyrannyandhostilitiesbecause traditionalnatural law is tooidealand

preachy

Morality is not entirely set aside, because thedecisionoftherulersinadoptingthelawsisstilla

reflectionofhisownmoralityandthemoralityof

thesocietyhebelongsto.Itsjustthatthetheory

tellsusthatnoindividualcanexempthimselffrom

the rule of law just because he believes that it

doesnotgowiththeDivineLaw.Becauseagain,in

obeyingthelawsofthesovereigntyoftheterritoryyouoccupy isdifferentfrom obeying theDivine,

whichisthesourceofallsovereignty.

B. AssessingAustin Clearcutexplanationinapproachingthenaturallawtheory Althoughitsaysyesandgivesreasonstoitsanswerstothequestion

If alawenforcedby thecourtsis contrarytomoralityandDivine

laws,is itstill validlaw?,thesereasons are not strong enough to

convincesomeonewhosaysno.

Thatthe adoption ofjust traditional lawmay invite anarchy is alsoquestionable,becausetheapplicationofalawtoasocietymaybetoo

practical;itcanberejectedbysometheorists.

o Moralprogressthroughtherejectionofunjustlawsmaybeachieved,butwhatAustinassertsisthattheremaybealot

of moral standards, which could inevitably amount to

confusion.

o TakenotethatAquinaslivedinamedievalworlddominatedbyjustoneChurch,while Austin livedin amodern world

withcompetingcreedsandbeliefs.

o Butthen again,moral argumentationmay actuallylead togenuinemoralprogress.

H.L.A.Hart:LawasPrimaryandSecondaryRules

Hartis consideredas oneof themost prominentpositivist criticsof

Austin

A. TypesofLegalRules ForHart,Austinprovidesforagoodstartforthepositivisttheoristsbut

histheoryisnotadequateenoughtocoverallkindsoflaws

o Itmaybegoodtocovercriminallawsandtaxlaws(becausetheselawsprohibitor commandsomeoneto act)butNOT


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forcontractlaw(whichempowersthepeople,assertsrights

andobligesthosewhohaveanestablishedduty)

Laws l ike the contract law are called power-conferringlaws

Although these rules can also be likened to acommand:they arewrittento alter somethingin

theworldratherthandescribeit.Itempowersthe

persontodosomethingthattheymaynotbeable

to do without the law. While command laws

changetheworld byrequiringthatpersonto do

something, otherwise he will face undesirable

consequences.

Declarationsofthesovereign(power-conferring)::Commandsofthesovereign(Commandlaws)

B. Legalobligation:GovernmentandGunman HartcriticstheanalogyofAustinthatforthepeopletofollow,tohave

asenseofmoralobligation,theyshouldbeinformedofthepossibility

ofapunishment,ofanegativeconsequencewhichcanhappenifthey

failedtoabide.Andthisapproach,asHarttellsusdoesnotdistinguish

thegovernmentfromagunman.

Foravictimofagunman,theobligationthatarisesfromthecommanddoesnotsourcefromanymoralconvictionthatifthevictimfollows,

heisdoingwhatisgoodforhimself,forthegunmanandforeveryone

else.But,heisabidingbythecommandsjustbecauseofthepossibility

ofanegativeconsequenceorapunishment(i.e.,torture,death).

Hart asserts that governments should differentiate itself from agunmanbecauseathreatenedfollowingdoesnotcreateanyobligation

atall(moral,legaletc). Todothat,Hartexplainstheideaofanobligationthroughtheideaofa

rule.

o Aruleexistsifgenerally: Peopleactinacertainway,AND People regard deviations from the way as

somethingtobecriticized

o Conditionis: Externalifitinvolvesoutwardbehavior

Internalifitinvolvestheattitudepeopletakeo Hart thinks that the attitude present in the people (that

deviationfromtheruleisareasontocriticizeaviolator)in

followingthe ruleis essentialbecausewithoutit,it isas ifthesepeople are justfollowingregularities/routineswhich

theycanperceive,thusthereisnoruleatall.

o Thereisaruleifthereisasocialobligationexertingpressureontheindividualtoactuallyabidebyit.

That wouldimprintvalue and importance totherule,tothe pointthatthefollowermayset aside

self-interesttogiveprioritytoit

o Notallsocietiesimposelegalobligationsbecausenotall ofthemhavelegalsystems.

I. PrimaryandSecondaryRulesPrimaryRules:Rulesthatimposesobligations.

Secondary Rules:Not consideredas unimportantbutratherin thesense

thatthey could notexist unless therewereother kindsofrules,namely,

rulesthatimposeobligations.

1strule-RuleofRecognition:Asocietywithlegalsystemthathasarulethatsinglesouttherulesthatimposeobligationsinthesociety.Therulehelps

peoplerecognizetheexistingrulesunderwhichtheywillbeheldofficially

accountable.

2ndrule-Asocietymusthaverulesthatspecifyhowlegallyvalidrulescanbechanged.Thiscouldhelp thesocietyadoptto thechangingconditionsby

makingitpossibletoeliminateoldrulesandenactnewones 3rd rule-A society must have rulesthatempowerspecificindividuals to

enforce andapply societyslegallyvalid rules. Thishelps society ensure

moreeffectivelytheobligationsitimposesonitsmembersaremet.

II. Legalsystem Asystem thatbringstogetherboth primaryand secondaryrules.In any

functioningsystem,thepeoplemustgenerallycomplywiththelegallyvalid

primaryrules,andpublicofficialsmustacceptthesecondaryrulesandthe

primaryrulesidentifiedbytheruleofrecognition.


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A unionof primary andsecondaryrules makesit questionable whetherinternational law, at least at the time the Nuremberg defendants

committedtheiratrocities,constitutedagenuinelegalsystem.

III. HartsViewofLegalSystem

Peoplecomplytorulesfromfearofpunishmentthatmightbeinflictedonthem.

People generallyperceivevalid primary rulesas commandbacked upbythreats.

Existence ofa legalsystem isa matter ofdegree, not anall-or-nothingaffair.Buttheabsenceofsecondaryrulescoveringtheenforcementofthe

primaryrulesseemstobearatherlargegap.

TrialoftheNurembergdefendantswasthebestfeasiblewaytopromotetheestablishmentofInternationalruleofLaw.

IV.

AssessingHart IdeaoflegalObligation:Todrawalinethathasgovernmentsoperatingby

secondary rules on the one side, and both gunmen and arbitrary

governmentsontheother.

HartssecondaryrulesareverymuchlikeFullersinnermoralityoflaw:bothHart and Fuller are providing accounts ofwhat is for a government to

operateundertheruleoflaw.However,Fullergoesontocontendthata

government abiding by his inner morality creates a prima facie moral

obligation to obey laws, while Harts resists the conclusion that a

government ruling through a system of primary and secondary rules

necessarilycreatesanysuchobligation.

HartsInternationalLaw

I. SourcesofDoubt

IsInternationallawreallylaw? Theabsenceofaninternationallegislature,courtswithcompulsoryjurisdiction,

andcentrallyorganizedsanctions haveinspiredmisgivings, at anyrate in the

breastsoflegaltheorists.

Theabsenceoftheseinstitutionsmeansthattherulesforstatesresemblethat

simple formof social structure,consisting onlyof primaryrules ofobligation,

which,when wefind itamong societiesof individuals,weare accustomedto

contrastwithadevelopedlegalsystem.

Internationallawnotonlylacksthesecondaryrulesofchangeandadjudicationwhichprovideforlegislatureandcourts,butalsoaunifyingruleofrecognition

specifying'sources'oflawandprovidinggeneralcriteriafortheidentificationof

itsrules.

Twoprinciplesourcesof doubtconcerningthe legalcharacterofinternationallaw:Botharisefromanadversecomparisonofinternationallawwithmunicipal

law,whichistakenastheclearstandardofwhatlawis.

o First.Lawasfundamentallyamatterofordersbackedbythreatsandcontraststhecharacteroftherulesofinternationallawwiththoseof

municipallaw.

o Second.Statesarefundamentallyincapableofbeingsubjectsoflegalobligation,andcontrastthecharacterofthesubjectsofinternational

lawwiththoseofmunicipallaw.

II. ObligationsandSanctions

Whatismeantbysayingofawholesystemoflawthatis'binding'?Theruleinquestionisavalidrule,andunderitthepersoninquestionhassomeobligation

orduty.Whetheronelegalsystemoranotherappliestoaparticularperson.

How can international law be binding? A question like this expresses doubtaboutthegenerallegalstatusofinternationallaw.'Cansuchrulesasthesebe

meaningfullyandtruthfullysaidevertogiverisetoobligations?'

One source ofdoubton thispointissimplythe absence fromthe systemofcentrally organized sanctions. This is one point of adverse comparison with

municipallaw,therulesofwhicharetakentobeunquestionably'binding'andto

beparadigmsoflegalobligation. Toarguethat internationallawis notbindingbecause ofitslack oforganized

sanctionsistacitlytoaccepttheanalysisofobligationcontainedinthetheory

thatlawisessentiallyamatterofordersbackedbythreats.Thisidentification

distorts the role played in all legal thought and discourse of the ideas of

obligationandduty

Itistruethatnotallrulesgiverisetoobligationsorduties;anditisalsotruethattherules,whichdosogenerallycallforsome,sacrificeofprivateinterests,and

aregenerallysupportedbyseriousdemandsforconformityandinstantcriticism


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ofdeviations. Yetonce wefree ourselvesfrom thepredictiveanalysis andits

parentconceptionoflawasessentiallyanorderbackbythreats,thereseemsno

goodreasonforlimitingthenormativeideaofobligationtorulessupportedby

organizedsanctions The sceptic may point out that there are in a municipal system, certain

provisionswhicharejustifiablycallednecessary;amongtheseareprimaryrules

ofobligation, prohibiting thefree useof violence,and rulesprovidingfor the

officialuse offorce asa sanctionfor theseand otherrules.If suchrulesand

organizedsanctionssupportingthemarein thissensenecessaryformunicipal

law,aretheynotequallysoforinternationallaw?

Theanswer totheargumentinthisformis tobefoundinthose elementarytruths about human beings and their environment, which constitute the

enduring psychological and physical setting ofmunicipal law. In societies of

individuals,approximately equal inphysical strength andvulnerability, physical

sanctionsarebothnecessaryandpossible.

Aggressionbetweenstatesis veryunlikethatbetweenindividuals.The useofviolencebetween statesmustbe public,and though thereis nointernational

police force, there can be very little certainty that it will remain a matter

betweenaggressorandvictim,asamurderortheft,intheabsenceofapolice

force,might.

Toinitiateawaris,evenforthestrongestpower,toriskmuchforanoutcome,which is rarely predictable with reasonable confidence. On the other hand,

becauseoftheinequalityofstates,therecanbenostandingassurancethatthe

combined strength of those on the side of international order is likely to

preponderateoverthepowerstemptedto aggression.Hencetheorganization

anduseofsanctionsmayinvolvefearfulrisksandthethreatofthemaddlittleto

the natural deterrents. Against this very different background of fact,

internationallawhasdevelopedinaformdifferentfromthatofmunicipallaw.

III. ObligationandtheSovereigntyofStates

Oneofthemostpersistentsourcesofperplexityabouttheobligatorycharacterofinternationallawhasbeenthedifficultyfeltinacceptingorexplainingthefact

thata statewhichis sovereignmay alsobe 'bound'by, orhave anobligation

under,internationallaw.

Theexpression'astate'isnotthenameofsomepersonorthinginherentlyor'bynature' outside the law; it is a way of referring to two facts: first, that a

populationinhabitinga territorylivesunderthat formoforderedgovernment

providedbyalegalsystemwithitscharacteristicstructureoflegislature,courts,

andprimaryrules;andsecondly,thatthegovernmentenjoysavaguelydefined

degreeofindependence. It is possible to imagine manydifferent forms of international authority and

correspondinglymany differentlimitations onthe independenceof states. To

recognizethattherearemanypossibleformsanddegreesofdependenceand

independence,is astep towards answeringthe claim thatbecausestatesare

sovereignthey'cannot'besubjecttoorboundbyinternationallawor'can'only

beboundbysomespecificformofinternationallaw.

Therulesofinternationallawareindeedvagueandconflictingonmanypoints,sothatdoubtabouttheareaofindependencelefttostatesisfargreaterthan

thatconcerningtheextentofacitizen'sfreedomundermunicipallaw.

Thequestionformunicipallawis:whatistheextentofthesupremelegislativeauthorityrecognized in this system? For international law it is: what is the

maximumareaofautonomy,whichtherulesallowtostates?

Thereisnowayofknowingwhatsovereigntystateshave,tillweknowwhattheformsofinternationallawareandwhetherornottheyaremereemptyforms.

Shouldconsidertheoriesofinternationallawknownas'voluntarist'ortheoriesof'auto-limitation.Theseattemptedto reconcilethe (absolute)sovereigntyof

states withthe existence ofbindingrules ofinternationallaw, bytreatingall

internationalobligationsasself-imposedliketheobligation,whicharisesfroma

promise.

Suchtheories are the counterpartin international law of the social contracttheories of political science. The latter sought to explain the facts that

individuals,'naturally'freeandindependent,werevetboundbymunicipallaw,

bytreatingtheobligationtoobeythelawasonearisingfromacontractwhich

thoseboundhadmadewitheachother,andinsomecaseswiththeirrulers.

Threefoldargumentagainstthevoluntaristtheoriesofinternationallaw.

1. Thesetheoriesfailcompletelytoexplainhowitisknownthatstates'can'only be bound by self-imposed obligations, or why this view of their

sovereignty should be accepted, in advance of any examination of the

actualcharacterofinternationallaw.

2. There is something incoherent in the argument designed to show thatstates, because oftheir sovereignty,can onlybe subject to orbound by

rules,whichtheyhaveimposeduponthemselves.


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o A statemay impose obligations on itself by promise, agreement,ortreaty is not, however, consistent with the theory that states are

subjectonlytoruleswhichtheyhavethusimposedonthemselves.

o In any society, whether composed of individuals or states, what isnecessary and sufficient, in order that the words of a promise,

agreement, or treaty should give rise to obligations, is that rules

providing for this and specifying a procedurefor these self-binding

operat1onsshouldbegenerally,thoughtheyneednotbe universally,

acknowledged.

o This most voluntary form of social obligation involves some rules,whicharebindingindependentlyofthechoiceofthepartyboundby

them, and this, in the case of states, is inconsistent with the

supposition that their sovereignty demands freedom from all such

rules.

3. Therearethe facts.We mustdistinguishthea prioriclaimjust criticized,thatstatescanonlybe boundbyselfimposedobligations,fromtheclaim

thatthoughtheycouldbeboundinotherwaysunderadifferentsystem,in

factnootherformofobligationforstatesexistsunderthepresentrulesof

internationallaw.

Adetailedscrutinyoftheclaimthatallinternationalobligationarisesfromtheconsent of the party bound, cannotbe undertakenhere but two clear and

importantexceptionstothisdoctrinemustbenoticed.Thefirstisthecaseofa

newstate.Whenanew,independentstateemergesintoexistence,itisbound

bythegeneralobligationsofinternationallawincluding,amongothers,therules

that give binding force to treaties. Here the attempt to rest the new

states'internationalobligationsona 'tacit'or 'inferred'consentseemswholly

threadbare.

Thesecondcaseisthatofastateacquiringterritoryorundergoingsomeotherchange,whichbringswithit,forthefirsttime,theincidenceofobligationsunderruleswhichpreviouslyithadnoopportunityeithertoobserveorbreak,andto

whichithadnooccasiontogiveorwithholdconsent.

IV. InternationalLawandMorality

Sometimesinsistencethattherulesgoverningtherelationsbetweenstatesareonly moralrules, is inspired by theold dogmatism, that any form ofsocial

structurethatisnotreducibletoordersbackedbythreatscanonlybeaformof

morality.

In theparticular case of international law, there are a numberof differentreasonsforresistingtheclassificationofitsrulesas'morality'.Thefirstisthat

statesoftenreproacheachotherforimmoralconductorpraisethemselvesorothersforlivinguptothestandardofinternationalmorality.

Characteristicsofsocialmorality:onewasthedistinctiveformofmoralpressurebywhichmoralrulesareprimarilysupported.Thisconsistsnotofappealstofear

or threats of retaliation or demands for compensation, but of appeals to

conscience,madeintheexpectationthatoncethepersonaddressedisreminded

ofthemoralprincipleatstake,hemaybeledbyguiltorshametorespectitand

makeamends.

Claimsunderinternationallawarenotcouchedinsuchtermsthoughofcourse,asinmunicipallaw,theymaybejoinedwithamoralappeal.

No doubtin the relationsbetween statesthere arehalfwayhouses betweenwhatisclearlylawandwhatisclearlymorality,analogoustothestandardsof

politenessandcourtesyrecognizedinprivatelife.

A more important ground of distinction is the following. The rules ofinternationallaw,likethoseofmunicipallaw,areoftenmorallyquiteindifferent.

Arulemayexistbecauseitisconvenientornecessarytohavesomeclearfixed

ruleaboutthesubjectswithwhichitisconcerned,butnotbecauseanymoral

importanceisattachedtotheparticularrule.

We conceive of morality as the ultimate standard by which human actions(legislativeOr otherwise)areevaluated.Thecontrastwithinternationallawis

clear.There isnothinginthe natureor functionof internationallaw,whichis

similarlyinconsistentwiththeideathattherulesmightbesubjecttolegislative

change;thelackofalegislatureisjustalack,whichmanythinkofasadefect

onedaytoberepaired.

Certainrulesareregularlyrespectedevenatthecostofcertainsacrifices;claimsareformulatedbyreferencetothem;breachesoftherulesexposetheoffendertoseriouscriticismandareheldtojustifyclaimsforcompensationorretaliation.

These,surely,arealltheelementsrequiredtosupportthestatementthatthere

existamongstatesrulesimposingobligationsuponthem.


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DAY2

PHILIPPINELEGALHISTORY:RELEVANTJURISPRUDENCE

CASES:

(ColonialSetting)Rubiv.ProvincialBoardofMindoro[39PHIL660]

Facts:

Thisisanapplicationforhabeascorpus, infavorofRubiandtheotherManguianes,who

wereallegedlydeprivedoftheirlibertybytheprovincialofficialsofMindoro. Rubiandhis

companionswere heldon the reservationestablished at Tigbao against theirwill,and

Dabaloswas heldunderthe custodyof theprovincialsheriffin Calapanfor having run

awayfromthereservation.

TheywereheldfollowingtheadoptionofResolutionnumber25oftheProvincialBoard,

authorizing the provincialgovernorto direct non-Christian inhabitants to takeup their

habitation on unoccupied sites selected by him in the interest of law and order.

FollowingtheBoardResolution,GovernorMorenteissuedan orderspecifyingtheareas

wherethe Manguianesshould stay. AnyManguianwho shall refuseto comply willbe

imprisoned.

ThebasisoftheBoardResolutionisSec2145oftheAdministrativeCodewhichprovides

thatprovincialgovernors,withtheapprovalofthedepartmenthead,maydirectthenon-

Christianinhabitantstotakeuptheirhabitationinunoccupiedpubliclandstobeselected

byhimandapprovedbytheprovincialboard.Thisresolutionwaspassedtoprotectthe

publicandtheforestswheretheyroamedandteachnon-Christianscivilizedways.

Issues:

1. Whetherornottheresolutionwasavaliddelegationoflegislativepower2. Whetherornottheresolutionamountedtoreligiousdiscrimination3. Whetherornottherewasdenialofequalprotectionofthelaws4. Whetherornottheresolutionwasreasonable

Held/Ratio:

Petitionersarenotunlawfullyimprisonedorrestrainedoftheirliberty.Habeascorpuscan,

therefore,notissue.

1. YES.Sec2145oftheAdminCodemerelyconfersdiscretionaryauthority(tothelocalofficials)astotheexecutionofthelaw.Anexceptiontothe generalrule,

sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to

delegate legislativepowersto local authorities. ThePhilippine Legislaturehas

hereconferredauthorityupontheProvinceofMindoro,tobeexercisedbythe

provincial governor and the provincial board. As officials charged with the

administrationof theprovince, andthe protectionof itsinhabitants,who but

theyarebetterfittedtoselectsiteswhichhavetheconditionsmostfavorablefor

improvingthepeoplewhohavethemisfortuneofbeinginabackwardstate?

2. NO.Thereisnodiscrimination,merelyaclassificationofinhabitantsaccordingtoreligious belief. The term "non-Christian" refers to natives of thePhilippine

Islandsofalowgradeofcivilization.

3. NO.Thepledgethatnopersonshallbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelawsisnotinfringedbyastatute,whichisapplicabletoallofaclass.Theclassification

musthaveareasonablebasisandcannotbepurelyarbitraryinnature.

4. TheManguianes,arenot free,ascivilizedmenare free,andthey arenot theequalsoftheirmorefortunatebrothers.True,theyarecitizens,withmanybut

notalltherightswhichcitizenshipimplies.Butjustassurely,theManguianesare

citizensofalowdegreeofintelligence,andFilipinoswhoareadraguponthe

progressoftheState.InsofarastherelationoftheManguianestotheStateis

concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting thelaw, and of the

executivebranchinenforcingit,areagainplain.SettlersinMindoromusthave

theircropsandpersonsprotectedfrompredatorymen, orthey will leavethecountry.It isno argumentto saythat suchcrimesarepunishedby thePenal

Code,becausethesepenaltiesareimposedaftercommissionoftheoffenseand

notbefore.Ifimmigrantsaretobeencouragedtodeveloptheresourcesofthe

greatIslandofMindoro,andits,asyet,unproductiveregions,theGovernment

mustbeinapositiontoguaranteepeaceandorder.Wastelandsdonotproduce

wealth.Wastepeopledo notadvancethe interest ofthe State. Illiteracyand

thriftlessnessarenotconducivetohomogeneity.TheStatetoprotectitselffrom

destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of

overwhelming necessityis allconvincing.Whenonly thevalidityof thelaw is


11/37

generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the

attention of the courts, the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the

Governmentintheaccomplishmentofitslaudablepurpose.

(WarPeriod)CoKimChamv.ValdezTanKeh[75PHIL113]

Facts:

PetitionofMANDAMUSofwhichpetitionerpraysthattheRESPONDENTJUDGE, DIZONof

thelowercourtbeorderedtocontinuetheproceedingsincivilcaseno.3012ofsaidcourt,

which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines

establishedduringtheJapaneseMilitaryoccupation.

ReasonsofDizonforREFUSALtotakeCOGNIZANCEofandCONTINUEtheproceedingsin

said case: That the PROCLAMATION issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Douglas

MacArthurhadthe effectofinvalidatingand nullifyingthe JUDICIALPROCEEDINGSand

JUDGMENTS of the courts of the Philippines establishedduring the Japanese Military

Occupationand thattheLOWERCOURTShaveno jurisdictionto takecognizanceofand

continue judicialproceedings pending inthe courts of theDEFUNCTREPUBLICOF THE

PHILIPPINES. Also, Judge Dizon claims that the GOVERNMENTS during the Japanese

occupationwereNOTDEFACTOGOVERNMENT.

History

OnJanuary2,1942,theImperialJapaneseForcesoccupiedtheCityofManilaandthenext

day, theirCommander-In-Chief proclaimed: theMilitary Administration underMartial

Law over the districts occupied by the Army.So far as theMilitary Administration

permits,all thelawsnow inforceof theCommonwealth,aswell, asthe executiveandjudicialinstitutions, shallcontinue tobe effectivefor thet imebeing asin thepast.all

publicofficials shallremainin theirpresentpostsandcarryon faithfullytheirdutiesas

before.

ThePhilippineExecutiveCommission,whichisacivilgovernment,wasformedwith Jorge

B.VargasastheChairman.HeissuedOrdersno.1andno.4orderingSC,CA,Courtsof

FirstInstanceandotherjusticestocontinuewiththeirsamejurisdictioninconformitywith

theproclamationoftheCommander-In-ChiefoftheJapanese.

October24,1944,GeneralDouglasMacArthurreleasedaproclamationthatpeopleofthe

Philippines arefree fromenemyoccupationand control;ExistinglawsandStatutesare

binding and THAT ALL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PROCESSES OF ANY OTHER

GOVERNMENTINTHEPHILIPPINESTHANTHATOFTHESAIDCOMMONWEALTHARENULLANDVOIDANDWITHOUTLEGALEFFECTINAREASOFTHEPHILIPPINESFREEOFENEMY

OCCUPATIONANDCONTROL

Issues:

1. Whetheror notthe judicialactsand proceedingsofthe courtsexistingin thePhilippinesunderthePhilippineExecutiveCommissionandtheRepublicof the

Philippinesweregoodandvalidandremainedsoevenaftertheliberationofthe

reoccupationofthePhilippinesbytheUnitedStatesandFilipinoForces

2. Whether or not the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by GeneralDouglasMacArthurhasinvalidatedalljudicialactsandproceedingspendingof

thesaidcourt

3. If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by saidproclamation,whether or not the present courts of the Commonwealthmay

continuethoseproceedingspendinginsaidcourtsatthetimePhilippineswere

reoccupiedandliberatedbytheUSandFilipinoforces,andtheCommonwealth

ofthePhilippineswasreestablishedintheislands

Held/Ratio:

WiththeforegoingConclusionsbelowitfollowsthatthe COURTSOFFIRSTINSTANCEof

MANILAhasJURISDICTIONtoCONTINUETOFINALJUDGMENTTHEPROCEEDINGSINTHE

CASES,ANDTHATTHERESPONDENTJUDGEOFTHATCOURT,HAVINGREFUSEDTOACT

ANDCONTINUETHESAIDPROCEEDINGS,WHICHTHELAWSPECIFICALLYENJOINSHIMTO

DO AS DUTY RESULTING FROM HIS OFFICE AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THAT COURT,

MANDAMUSISTHESPEEDYANDADEQUATEREMEDYINTHEORDINARYCOURSEOFLAW,

SPECIFICALLYTAKINGINTOCONSIDERATIONHEREININVOLVEDDOESAFFECTNOTONLY

HISPARTICULARCASEBUTMANYOTHERCASES.

ORDERINGHIMTOTAKECONGNIZANCEOFANDCONTINUETOFINALJUDGMENTTHE

PROCEEDINGSINCIVILCASENo.3012.


12/37

1. YES. Itis a legal truism inpolitical and international law that ALL ACTS andPROCEEDINGSoftheLEGISLATIVEandEXECUTIVEandJUDICIALdepartmentsof

aDEFACTOGOVERNMENTareGOODandVALID.

ThreeKindsofDEFACTOGOVERNMENT:

GovernmentdefactoinLEGALSENSE,isthatthegovernmentthatgetspossessionand controlof therightfullegalgovernmentandmaintains

itselfagainstthewillofthelatter.

Government de facto ESTABLISHED and MAINTAINED BY MILITARYFORCESwhoinvadeandoccupyaterritoryoftheenemyinthecourseof

warandwhichisdenominatedagovernmentparamountforce.

GovernmentdefactothatisESTABLISHEDasINDEPENDENTGovernmentbyinhabitantsof acountrywho riseininsurrectionagainstthe parent

state.

PHILIPPINESatthetimeoftheJAPANESEOCCUPATIONfallundertheSECOND

KINDofdefactogovernment.Thepowersanddutiesofdefactogovernmentof

thisdescriptionare regulatedin SECIII ofthe HagueConvention1907. The

authorityofthelegitimatepowerhavingactuallypassedintothehandsofthe

occupant,thelattershalltakeallstepsinhispowertoreestablishandinsure,

asfaraspossible,publicorderandsafety,whilerespecting,unlessabsolutely

prevented,thelawsinforceofthecountry.

Theycansuspendalllaws,makenewones,amendothersaslongasitwillstill

respectthemunicipallawsbuttherighttoASSEMBLY,BEARARMS,FREEDOMOF

THEPRESSandothersaresuspended.Inpractice,thelocalordinarytribunalsare

authorizedto continueadministeringjusticeandthe judgesandother judicial

officersarekeptintheirpost.

Inviewoftheforegoing,itisevidentthatthePhilippineExecutiveCommission,

which was organized by Orders No. 1, issued on January 23, 2942, by the

CommanderoftheJapaneseforce,wasaCIVILGOVERNMENTESTABLISHEDBY

THE MILITARY FORCES OF OCCUPATION AND THEREFORE A DE FACTO

GOVERNMENTOFTHESECONDKIND.

Thegovernments bythe PhilippineExecutiveCommissionandthe Republicof

the Philippines during the Japanese Military occupation being a DE FACTO

GOVERNMENT,itnecessarilyfollowsthattheJUDICIALACTSandPROCEEDINGS

ofthe courts ofJUSTICEof thosegovernments,whichare notof aPOLITICAL

COMPLEXION,wereGOODandVALIDandbyvirtueofthewell-knowprinciples

ofpostliminy,remainedGOODandVALID.

2. NO. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrasePROCESSESOFANYOTHERGOVERNMENTasusedintheaboveproclamation

ofGeneral ArthurMacArthur. Whether it isthe intentionof thegeneral to

annul andavoid thereby alljudgmentsand judicialproceedings ofthe courts

establishedinthePhilippinesduringtheJapaneseoccupation.

Thephraseprocessesofanyothergovernmentisbroadandmayrefernotonly

to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative aswell asthe

constitutionalprocessesoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesorothergovernmental

agenciesestablishedintheislandsduringtheoccupation.

Takingintoconsiderationthefactthataccordingtothewell-knownprinciplesof

international law all judgments and judicial proceedings of the de factogovernmentare GOODandVALIDbeforeand remainedso after theoccupied

territoryhad comeagainintothe powerofthe titularsovereign,it should be

presumedthatITWASNOTandCOULDNOTHAVEBEENtheINTENTIONofthe

General to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of

internationallaw.

The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that IT REFERS TO

GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES OTHER THAN JUDICIAL PROCESSES OR COUR

PROCEEDINGS for according to a well-known rule of STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION,a statute oughtneverto beconstruedto violatethe lawof

nationsifanyotherpossibleconstructionremains.

LOGIC: froma contraryconstruction,greatinconvenienceand public hardship

wouldresult for disputes orsuitsalready adjudged wouldhave tobe again

settled.

3. YES.Althoughintheory,theauthorityofthelocalcivilandjudicialadministrationissuspendedasamatterofcourseassoonasmilitaryoccupationtakesplacein

practice,theINVADERdoesnotusuallytaketheadministrationofjusticeintohis

ownhands,butCONTINUEStheordinarycourtsortribunalstobeadministered

bytheordinarytribunalssubstantiallyastheywerebeforetheoccupation.


13/37

The commander in chief of the Japanese military, at the time they were

occupying the Philippines, declared that all laws now in force in the

Commonwealth as wellas the executive andthe legislativeinstitutions,shall

continuetobeeffectiveforthetimebeingasinthepastandallpublicsofficialsshallremainintheirpresentpostsandcarryfaithfullytheirdutiesasbeforeand

when the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts continued with no

substantialchangeintheorganizationandjurisdictionthereof.

Taylor:A stateor othergovernmentalentity,upontheremovalof aforeign

military force, resumes its old place withits right and duties substantially

unimpaired.

LegalMaxim: Law onceestablished continues until unchangedby someby

some competent legislative power. It isnot changed merely by change of

sovereignty.

(PeoplePowerRevolution)Republicv.Sandiganbayan,Josephus[GR104768,

July21,2003]

Facts:

ThePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment(thePCGG),throughthe AFPAnti-

GraftBoard (theBoard),investigated reports of unexplainedwealth involvingMajor

General Josephus Ramas (Ramas), the CommandingGeneral of the Philippine Army

duringthetimeofformerPresidentFerdinandMarcos.Pursuanttosaidinvestigation,the

ConstabularyraidingteamservedasearchandseizurewarrantonthepremisesofRamas

allegedmistressElizabethDimaano.

Aside from the military equipment stated in the warrant, items not included in the

warrant, particularly, communications equipment, land titles, jewelry, and several

thousandsof cashin pesosandUSdollars, werealsoseized.In itsResolution,the AFP

Boardreportedthat(1)DimaanocouldnothaveusedthesaidequipmentwithoutRamas

consent;and(2)Dimaanocouldnotbetheownerofthemoneybecauseshehasnovisible

sourceofincome.

TheBoardthenconcludedwitharecommendationthatRamasbeprosecutedforviolation

ofR.A.3019,otherwiseknownastheAnti-GraftandCorruptPracticesActandR.A.1379,

otherwise known as the Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.

Accordingly, Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines(theRepublicorPetitioner)filedaComplaintagainstRamasandDimaano.

On18November1991,theSandiganbayandismissedthecomplaintonthegroundsthat

(1)thePCGGhasnojurisdictiontoinvestigatetheprivaterespondentsand(2)thesearch

andseizureconductedwasillegal.

Issues:

1. WhetherornotthePCGGhasthejurisdictiontoinvestigateandcausethefilingof a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth

underRANo.1379.

2. WhetherornotSandiganbayanerredindismissingthecasebeforecompletionofthepresentationofpetitionersevidence.

3. Whetherornotthepropertiesconfiscatedareillegallyseizedandinadmissibleinevidence.

a. WhethertherevolutionarygovernmentwasboundbytheBillofRightsofthe1973Constitutionduringtheinterregnum,(aftertheactualand

effectivetake-overofpowerbytherevolutionarygovernment).

b. Whether or not the protection accorded to individuals under theInternationalCovenanton CivilandPoliticalRights (Covenant) and

theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(Declaration)remainedin

effectduringtheinterregnum.

Held/Ratio:

1. NO.PCGGhasnosuchjurisdiction.ThePCGGcreatedtheAFPBoardtoinvestigatetheunexplainedwealthandcorrupt

practicesofAFPpersonnel,whetherintheactiveserviceorretired.IttaskedtheAFP

Boardtomakethenecessaryrecommendationstoappropriategovernmentagencies

ontheactiontobetakenbasedonitsfindings.ThePCGGgavethistasktotheAFP

Board pursuant to thePCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct

investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the

purposesofthisorder.


14/37

ThePCGG,throughtheAFPBoard,canonlyinvestigatetheunexplainedwealthand

corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories

mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have

accumulatedill-gottenwealthduringtheadministrationofformerPresidentMarcosbybeingthelattersimmediatefamily,relative,subordinateorcloseassociate,taking

undueadvantage oftheir public office orusing theirpowers,influence or(2) AFP

personnel involved in othercases of graft and corruptionprovided the President

assignstheircasestothePCGG.

Petitionerargues thatRamas wasundoubtedly a subordinateof former President

MarcosbecauseofhispositionastheCommandingGeneralofthe PhilippineArmy

and claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive ordersdirectly from his

commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President

Marcos.

WeholdthatRamaswasnotasubordinateofformerPresidentMarcosinthesense

contemplatedunderEONo.1anditsamendments.MerepositionheldbyamilitaryofficerdoesnotautomaticallymakehimasubordinateasthistermisusedinEO

Nos.1,2,14and14-Aabsentashowingthatheenjoyedcloseassociationwithformer

PresidentMarcos.

Itdoesnotsuffice,asinthiscase,thattherespondentisorwasagovernmentofficial

oremployeeduringtheadministrationofformerPresidentMarcos.Theremustbea

primafacieshowingthattherespondentunlawfullyaccumulatedwealthbyvirtueof

hiscloseassociationorrelationwithformerPres.Marcosand/orhiswife.

RamaspositionaloneasCommandingGeneralofthePhilippineArmywiththerank

ofMajorGeneraldoesnotsufficetomakehimasubordinateofformerPresident

MarcosforpurposesofEONo.1anditsamendments.ThePCGGhastoprovidea

primafacieshowingthatRamaswasacloseassociateofformerPresidentMarcos,in

thesamemannerthatbusinessassociates,dummies,agentsornomineesofformer

PresidentMarcoswereclosetohim.This,thePCGGfailedtodo.

Petitionerassertsthat thereis apresumption thatthe PCGGwas actingwithin its

jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that

Ramas wastruly a subordinateof the former President.However,the sameAFP

Board Resolutionbeliesthiscontention. Althoughthe Resolutionbeginswithsuch

statement,itendswiththerecommendationthatRamasbeprosecutedforviolation

ofRA 3019.Thus,althoughthe PCGGsoughtto investigateand prosecuteprivate

respondentsunderEONos.1,2,14and14-A,theresultyieldedafindingofviolation

ofRepublicActsNos.3019and1379withoutanyrelationtoEONos.1,2,14and14-

A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal topetitionerscase.EONo.1createdthePCGGforaspecificandlimitedpurpose,and

necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited

purpose.

Moreover,theresolutionoftheAFPBoardandeventheAmendedComplaintdonot

showthat thepropertiesRamasallegedlyownedwere accumulated byhim inhis

capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely

enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these

propertiesweredisproportionateto hissalaryandotherlegitimateincomewithout

showing that Ramasamassed them because ofhis close associationwith former

PresidentMarcos.

ThePCGG stillpursuedthiscase despite theabsenceof aprimafacie findingthatRamaswas asubordinateofformerPresidentMarcos.Thepetitionforforfeiture

filedwiththeSandiganbayanshouldbedismissedforlackofauthoritybythePCGGto

investigaterespondentssincethereis noprimafacieshowingthatEONo.1andits

amendments apply to respondents. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended

Ramas case tothe Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary

investigationofordinaryunexplainedwealthandgraftcases.

2. NO.Petitionerhasonlyitselftoblamefornon-completionofthepresentationofitsevidence.

First,thiscasehasbeenpendingforfouryearsbeforetheSandiganbayandismissed

it.Petitionerhad almost twoyearsto prepare itsevidence.However, despite this

sufficienttime,petitionerstilldelayedthepresentationoftherestofitsevidenceby

filingnumerousmotionsforpostponementsandextensions.TheSandiganbayangave

petitionermorethan sufficienttimeto finishthe presentationofits evidence.The

Sandiganbayan overlooked petitionersdelays and yet petitioner ended the long-

stringofdelayswiththefilingofaRe-AmendedComplaint,whichwouldonlyprolong

evenmorethedispositionofthecase.


15/37

3. YES.Theseizureoftheseitemswasvoid.Thesearchandseizurewarrantcouldnotbeusedasbasistoseizeandwithholdtheseitemsfromthepossessor.The

itemsshouldbereturnedimmediatelytoDimaano.

a. NO.Anindividual isnotboundby theBillof Rightsduringthistime.

However,theprotectionaccorded toindividualsunderthe Covenant

andtheDeclarationremainedineffectduringtheinterregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary

government were the supreme law because noconstitution limited the

extentandscopeofsuchdirectivesandorders.Withtheabrogationofthe

1973Constitutionbythesuccessfulrevolution,therewasnomunicipallaw

higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary

government.Thus,duringtheinterregnum,apersoncouldnotinvokeany

exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a

constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court

explainedinLetterofAssociateJusticeReynatoS.Puno:

Arevolutionhasbeendefinedasthecompleteoverthrowoftheestablished

governmentinanycountryorstatebythosewhowerepreviouslysubjectto

itorasasudden,radicalandfundamentalchangeinthegovernmentor

political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of

violence.InKelsen'sbook,GeneralTheoryofLawandState,itisdefinedas

thatwhichoccurswheneverthelegalorderofacommunityisnullifiedand

replacedbyaneworder...awaynotprescribedbythefirstorderitself.

ItwasthroughtheFebruary1986revolution,arelativelypeacefulone,and

morepopularlyknownasthe people powerrevolutionthattheFilipino

peopletorethemselvesawayfromanexistingregime.Thisrevolutionalso

sawtheunprecedentedrisetopoweroftheAquinogovernment.

Fromthenaturallawpointofview,therightofrevolutionhasbeendefined

asaninherentrightofapeopletocastouttheirrulers,changetheirpolicy

oreffectradical reformsin theirsystemofgovernmentor institutions by

force ora generaluprisingwhenthe legal andconstitutionalmethodsof

makingsuchchangehaveprovedinadequateoraresoobstructedastobe

unavailable.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a

revolutionarygovernmentboundbyno constitution.Noonecouldvalidly

questionthesequestrationordersasviolativeoftheBillofRightsbecause

there was noBillof Rights during theinterregnum. However, upon theadoptionoftheFreedomConstitution,thesequesteredcompaniesassailed

thesequestrationordersas contraryto theBillof Rights ofthe Freedom

Constitution.

Theframersofboth theFreedomConstitutionandthe 1987Constitution

werefullyawarethatthesequestrationorderswouldclashwiththeBillof

Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include specific

languagerecognizing thevalidityofthe sequestrationorders.Despitethe

impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment

excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the

Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section

26,ArticleXVIIIof the1987Constitution. Theframersofthe Constitution

werefullyawarethat absent Section26, sequestration orders would notstandthetestofdueprocessundertheBillofRights.

Thus,to rulethatthe BillofRightsof the1973 Constitutionremainedin

forceduringtheinterregnum, absent aconstitutionalprovisionexcepting

sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all

sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even

duringthe interregnumtheFilipinopeoplecontinuedtoenjoy,underthe

CovenantandtheDeclaration,almostthesamerightsfoundintheBillof

Rightsofthe1973Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure

government,assumed responsibilityforthe Statesgood faith compliance

withthe Covenant towhich thePhilippines is a signatory.UnderArticle

17(1)oftheCovenant,therevolutionarygovernmenthadthedutytoinsure

that[n]ooneshallbesubjectedtoarbitraryorunlawfulinterferencewith

hisprivacy,family,homeorcorrespondence.

TheDeclaration,towhichthePhilippinesisalsoasignatory,providesinits

Art ic le 17(2) that [n]o one shal l be arbi trar ily deprived of h is

property.AlthoughthesignatoriestotheDeclarationdidnotintenditasa

legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has


16/37

interpretedtheDeclarationaspartofthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesof

international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary

government was also obligated under international law to observe the

rightsofindividualsundertheDeclaration.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,

directivesandordersissuedbygovernmentofficerswerevalidsolongas

these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the

revolutionarygovernment.Thedirectivesandordersshouldnothavealso

violatedthe Covenantor theDeclaration.In thiscase,therevolutionary

governmentpresumptivelysanctionedthewarrantsincetherevolutionary

government did not repudiate it. The warrant,issued bya judge upon

proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The

warrantisthusvalidwithrespecttotheitemsspecificallydescribedinthe

warrant.

However,the Constabularyraiding teamseizeditemsnot includedin thewarrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team

confiscated items not included in the warrant.It is obvious from the

testimonyofCaptainSebastianthatthewarrantdidnotincludethemonies,

communicationsequipment,jewelryand landtitlesthatthe raidingteam

confiscated.Thesearchwarrantdidnot particularlydescribetheseitems

andtheraidingteamconfiscatedthem onits ownauthority.Theraiding

teamhadno legalbasisto seizetheseitems withoutshowingthatthese

itemscouldbe thesubjectofwarrantlesssearchandseizure.Clearly,the

raidingteamexceededitsauthoritywhenitseizedtheseitems.

Decision of the Court: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The

questionedResolutionsoftheSandiganbayanareAFFIRMED.

SEPARATEOPINIONS

J.VITUG(CONCUR)

A revolutionis defined byWestern politicalscholars asbeing a rapid fundamental and

violent domestic change in the dominant values andmyths of a society in itspolitical

institutions,socialstructure,leadership,andgovernmentactivityandpolicies.Arevolution

resultsinacompleteoverthrowofestablishedgovernmentandoftheexistinglegalorder.

NotableexampleswouldbetheFrench,Chinese,Mexican,Russian,andCubanrevolutions.

Revolution,it ispointed out,is to be distinguished fromrebellion, insurrection, revolt,

coup, and war of independence. A rebellion or insurrection may change policies,leadership,andthepoliticalinstitution,butnotthesocialstructureandprevailingvalues.

Acoupdetatinitselfchangesleadershipandperhapspoliciesbutnotnecessarilymore

extensiveandintensivethanthat.Awarofindependenceisastruggleofonecommunity

againsttherulebyanaliencommunityanddoesnothavetoinvolvechangesinthesocial

structureofeithercommunity.

Theeffectsoftherevolutionmaynotbecomparedingoodsubstancewiththoseofthe

great revolutions. While a revolution may be accomplished by peaceful means, it is

essential,however, thattherebean accompanyingbasictransformationin politicaland

socialstructures.TherevolutionatEDSAhasnotresultedinsuchradicalchangethoughit

concededly could have. The offices of the executive branch have been retained, the

judiciary has been allowed to function, the military, as well as the constitutional

commissionsandlocalgovernments,haveremainedintact.Itisobservedbysomeanalyststhattherehasonlybeenachangeofpersonalitiesinthegovernmentbutnotachangeof

structuresthatcanimplytheconsequentabrogationofthefundamentallaw.Theefficacy

ofalegalordermustbedistinguishedfromthequestionofitsexistenceforitmaybethat

theefficacyofalegalordercomestoalowpointwhichmay,nevertheless,continuetobe

operativeandfunctioning.

Theproclamationsissued,aswellasthe ProvisionalConstitutionenactedbytheAquino

administration shortly after being installed, have revealed the new governments

recognitionof andits intentionto preserve theprovisions ofthe 1973Constitutionon

individual rights. Proclamation No. 1, dated 25 February 1986, has maintained that

sovereigntyresidesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.It

hasexpressedthatthegovernmentwouldbe dedicatedto upholdjustice,morality and

decencyingovernment,freedomanddemocracy.ThroughProclamation2ofMarch1986,

thesuspensionofthewritofhabeascorpuswaslifted.AquinoissuedProclamationNo.3

asanacknowledgmentofthecontinuedexistence,subjecttoits exclusions,ofthe1973

Charter.

Atbottom,theBillofRights(underthe1973Constitution),duringtheinterregnumfrom26

February to24 March 1986 remained in force and effect not only because it was so

recognizedbythe1986PeoplePowerbutalsobecausethenewgovernmentwasboundby

internationallawtorespecttheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(proclaimingthat


17/37

basic rights andfreedomsareinherentandinalienable toeverymemberofthe human

family.Oneoftheserightsistherightagainstarbitrarydeprivationofonesproperty.)

Innumerouscases,theSupremeCourthasadvertedtotheenumerationintheUniversalDeclarationinupholdingvariousfundamentalrightsandfreedoms.

J.TINGA(CONCUR)

Apparently,themajorityadherestothelegalpositivisttheorychampionedbynineteenth

centuryphilosopherJohnAustin,whodefinedtheessenceoflawasa distinctbranchof

moralityorjustice.HeandtheEnglishpositivistsbelievedthattheessenceoflawisthe

simpleideaofanorderbackedbythreats.

OntheothersideisJusticePunosespousalofthenaturallawdoctrine,which,despiteits

numerousformsandvarieddisguises,isstillrelevantinmoderntimesasanimportanttool

in politicaland legal thinking.Essentially, it has afforded a potentjustificationof the

existing legal orderand the social andeconomicsystem it embodies, forby regardingpositivelawasbasedonahigherlawordainedbydivineornaturalreason,theactuallegal

systemthusacquiresstabilityorevensanctityitwouldnototherwisepossess.

Whilethetwophilosophiesarepolesapartincontent,yettheyaresomehowcognate.To

illustrate,theBillofRightsintheConstitutionhasitsoriginsfromnaturallaw.Likewisea

naturallaw documentis theUniversalDeclaration.In the case atbar,inthe ultimate

analysisbothjurisprudentialdoctrineshavefoundapplicationinthedenouementofthe

case.TheBillofRightsintheConstitution,theUniversalDeclarationandtheInternational

Covenant,greatdocumentsoflibertyandhumanrightsall,arefoundedonnaturallaw.

It was the unmistakable thrust ofthe Freedom Constitutionto bestow uninterrupted

operabilitytotheBillofRightsinthe1973Constitution.Foronething,thetitleitselfof

ProclamationNo.3whichordainedtheFreedomConstitution,aswellasone ofthevital

premisesorwhereasclausethereof,advertstotheprotectionofthebasicrightsofthe

people.Foranother,theFreedomConstitutionin Article1,Section1mandatesthatthe

BillofRightsandotherprovisionsoftheFreedomConstitutionspecifiedthereinremainin

forceandeffectandareherebyadoptedintotoaspartofthisProvisionalConstitution.

Ofcourse,evenifitissupposedthattheFreedomConstitutionhadnoretroactiveeffector

itdid notextendthe effectivityofthe BillofRightsin the1973Constitution,stillthere

wouldbenovoidinthemunicipalordomesticlawatthetimeasfarastheobservanceof

fundamentalrightsisconcerned.TheBillofRightsinthe1973Constitutionwouldstillbe

inforce, independently ofthe FreedomConstitution, orat leastthe provisionsthereof

proscribing unreasonable search andseizureand excludingevidencein violationof the

proscription.

Markedlydepartingfromthetypical,therevolutionarygovernmentinstalledbyPresident

Aquino was a benign government.It had chosen to observe prevailing constitutional

restraints. An eloquent proof was the fact that through the defunct Philippine

Constabulary,it appliedfor asearchwarrantandconductedthe questionedsearchand

seizure only after obtaining the warrant. Furthermore, President Aquino definitely

pledgedinher oathofofficeto upholdanddefendtheConstitution,whichundoubtedly

wasthe1973Constitution,includingtheBillofRightsthereof.


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DAY3

LAWINCONTEXT

Self-determination:ChallengestoExistingLegalRegimes

IndigenousPeoples,AncestralDomainandtheEnvironment

Cruzv.SecofDENR,[GR135385,Dec.6,2000]

Facts:

IsaganiCruzandCesarEuropa(thepetitioners)assailtheconstitutionalityofthefollowing

provisionsofRepublicAct8371,otherwiseknownastheIndigenousPeoplesRightsActof

1997(IPRA),anditsImplementingRules,onthegroundthattheyamounttoanunlawful

deprivationoftheStatesownershipoverlandsofthepublicdomainaswellasmineralsandother natural resources therein, in violationof theRegaliandoctrineembodiedin

Section2,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution:

(1)Section3(a)whichdefinestheextentandcoverageofancestraldomains,

andSection3(b)which,inturn,definesancestrallands;

(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral

domainsincluding inalienable publiclands,bodiesof water,mineraland

otherresourcesfoundwithinancestraldomainsareprivatebutcommunity

propertyoftheindigenouspeoples;

(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the

compositionofancestraldomainsandancestrallands;

(4)Section7whichrecognizesandenumeratestherightsofthe indigenous

peoplesovertheancestraldomains;

(5)Section8whichrecognizesandenumeratestherightsoftheindigenous

peoplesovertheancestrallands;

(6)Section57whichprovidesforpriorityrightsoftheindigenouspeoplesin

the harvesting,extraction, development or explorationof minerals and

other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral

domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous

peoplesfor thedevelopmentand utilization ofnatural resourcestherein

foraperiodnotexceeding25years,renewablefornotmorethan25years;

and

(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to

maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and

portionsthereofwhicharefoundtobe necessaryforcriticalwatersheds,

mangroves,wildlifesanctuaries,wilderness,protectedareas,forestcover

orreforestation.

Further,the petitionerscontendthatbyprovidingfor anall-encompassingdefinitionof

ancestraldomainsandancestrallandswhichmightevenincludeprivatelandsfound

withinsaidareas,Sections3(a)and3(b)ofIPRAviolatetherightsofprivatelandowners.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the relevant portions of the IPRA law being contested areunconstitutional

Held/Ratio:

1. NO.The constitutionalityofthe IPRALawwassustainedby thecourt.The SCdeliberateduponthematter,and afterthefirstdeliberations,theyvoted and

reacheda7-7vote.Theyconductedaseconddeliberationandthevotingagain

resulted in a 7-7 vote. As there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was

dismissed.Ancestraldomainsmaythusincludenaturalresources,whichisina

wayaviolationtheRegaliandoctrine.

SALIENTPOINTSOFTHESEPARATEOPINIONS:

VITUG,J:

ThepetitionseeksadeclarationbytheCourtofunconstitutionalityofcertainprovisionsof

RepublicAct No.8371, a law that obviously isyet incapableof exact equation inits

significancetothenationanditspeoplenowandinthegenerationsyettocome.Republic

ActNo.8371,(theIndigenousPeoplesRightsActof1997("IPRA"),isapparentlyintended

to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the rights of

indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national unity and


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development"andcommandstheState,"subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionand

nationaldevelopmentpoliciesandprograms,"toprotecttherightsofindigenouscultural

communitiestotheirancestrallandsinordertoensuretheireconomic,social,andcultural

well-being.

AmongtheassailedprovisionsinIPRAisitsSection3(a)whichdefines"ancestraldomains"

to embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprisinglands, inland waters,

coastal areas, andnatural resources " including "ancestral lands, forests, pasture,

residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and

disposableorotherwise,"overwhichindigenousculturalcommunities/indigenouspeoples

("ICCs/IPs")couldexercisevirtualownershipandcontrol.

IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains

covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would

comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-

governanceoverthecurved-outterritory.ThisconceptiselaboratedinSection7ofthe

lawwhichstatesthatthe"rightsofownershipandpossessionofICCs/IPstotheirancestraldomainsshall be recognizedand protected,"subsumed underwhichwouldencompass

theright of ownership(paragraph a);the right to develop, control and use lands

andnaturalresources,including"therightto negotiatethetermsandconditionsforthe

exploration ofnatural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,

environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and

customarylaws;"(par.b);therighttostayintheterritories(par.c);therighttoreturnto

their abandoned lands in case of displacement(par. d);the right to regulate entry of

migrants(par.e);therightto claim partsofancestraldomainspreviouslyreserved(par.

g);andtherighttoresolvelandconflictsinaccordanceprimarilywithcustomarylaw(par.

h). Concurrently, Section 57 statesthat ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the

harvesting,extraction, development or exploitation of anynatural resourceswithinthe

ancestraldomains."TheseprovisionsofIPRA,intheirtotality,are,inmyview,beyondthe

context ofthe fundamental lawandvirtually amountto anunduedelegation,if notan

unacceptableabdication,ofStateauthorityoverasignificantareaofthecountryandits

patrimony.

ArticleXIIofthe1987Constitutionexpressesthatall"landsofthepublicdomain,waters,

minerals,coal,petroleum,andothermineraloils,allforcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,

forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andothernaturalresourcesareownedbythe

State,"and,withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,shallnotbealienated."Itordainsthat

the"exploration,development,andutilizationofnaturalresourcesshallbeunderthefull

controlandsupervisionoftheState."

ThedecisionoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinCariovs.InsularGovernment,holdingthataparceloflandheldsincetimeimmemorialbyindividualsunderaclaimofprivate

ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the

application of the Regalian doctrine, cannot override thecollective wil l of the

peopleexpressedintheConstitution.Itisinthemthatsovereigntyresidesandfromthem

thatallgovernmentauthorityemanates.Itisnotthenforacourtrulingoranypieceof

legislationtobeconformedtobythefundamentallaw,butitisfortheformertoadaptto

thelatter,anditisthesovereignactthatmust,betweenthem,standinviolate.

KAPUNAN,J.:

Petitioners,ascitizens,possessthe"publicright"toensurethatthenationalpatrimonyis

notalienatedanddiminishedinviolationoftheConstitution.Sincethegovernment,asthe

guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos withoutdistinctionastoethnicity,itfollowsthatacitizenhassufficientinteresttomaintainasuit

toensure thatany grantof concessions covering thenationaleconomyand patrimony

strictlycomplieswithconstitutionalrequirements.Thus,thepreservationoftheintegrity

andinviolabilityofthenationalpatrimonyisapropersubjectofacitizen'ssuit.

Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of

ownershipoverancestrallandsandancestraldomainsbyvirtueofnativetitle.Theterm

"ancestral lands" underthe statute refers tolandsoccupied byindividuals,familiesand

clanswhoaremembersofindigenousculturalcommunities,includingresidentiallots,rice

terracesorpaddies,privateforests,swiddenfarmsandtreelots.Theselandsarerequired

tohavebeen"occupied,possessedandutilized"bythemorthroughtheirancestors"since

timeimmemorial,continuouslytothepresent."Ontheotherhand,"ancestraldomains"is

defined asareasgenerally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, includingancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,

worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural

communitiesbut towhich theyhad traditional access,particularly thehome ranges of

indigenouscultural communitieswho arestill nomadicor shiftingcultivators.Ancestral

domainsalsoincludeinlandwaters,coastalareasandnaturalresourcestherein.Again,the

samearerequiredtohavebeen"heldunderaclaimofownership,occupiedorpossessed

byICCs/IPs,bythemselvesor throughtheir ancestors,communallyor individuallysince

timeimmemorial,continuouslytothepresent."UnderSection56,propertyrightswithin


20/37

theancestraldomainsalreadyexistingand/orvesteduponeffectivityofsaidlaw"shallbe

recognizedandrespected."

OwnershipisthecruxoftheissueofwhethertheprovisionsofIPRApertainingtoancestrallands, ancestraldomains,and naturalresourcesare unconstitutional.The fundamental

questionis,who,betweentheStateandtheindigenouspeoples,aretherightfulownersof

theseproperties?

AproperreadingofCariowouldshowthatthedoctrineenunciatedthereinappliesonly

tolandswhich havealwaysbeen consideredas private,and notto lands ofthe public

domain,whetheralienableorotherwise.Adistinctionmustbemadebetweenownership

of landunder native titleand ownership by acquisitiveprescription against the State.

Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its

possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time

immemorial.The landisnot acquiredfromthe State, thatis,Spainorits successors-in-

interest,theUnitedStatesandthePhilippineGovernment.Therehasbeennotransferof

titlefromtheStateasthelandhasbeenregardedasprivateincharacterasfarbackasmemorygoes.Incontrast,ownershipoflandbyacquisitiveprescriptionagainsttheState

involvesaconversionofthecharacterofthepropertyfromalienablepubliclandtoprivate

land,whichpresupposesatransferoftitlefromtheStatetoaprivateperson.Sincenative

titleassumesthatthepropertycoveredbyitisprivatelandandisdeemednevertohave

been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title

underCarioappliesonlyto landsof thepublicdomainis erroneous.Consequently,the

classificationof lands of the public domain intoagricultural, forest or timber, mineral

lands, and national parks under the Constitutionis irrelevant to the application of

theCariodoctrinebecause theRegaliandoctrinewhichvestsintheStateownershipof

landsofthepublicdomaindoesnotcoverancestrallandsandancestraldomains.

TheIPRAprovidesthatindigenouspeoplesshallhavetherighttomanageandconserve

thenaturalresourcesfoundon theancestral domains,to benefit fromandshare inthe

profitsfromtheallocationandutilizationoftheseresources,andtonegotiatetheterms

andconditionsfortheexplorationofsuchnaturalresources.Thestatutealsograntsthem

priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of

anynaturalresourceswithin the ancestral domains. Before the NCIP can issue a

certification for therenewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease,or for the

perfectionofanyproduction-sharingagreementthepriorinformedwrittenconsentofthe

indigenouspeoplesconcernedmust be obtained.Inreturn, theindigenous peoples are

giventheresponsibilitytomaintain,develop,protectandconservetheancestraldomains

orportionsthereofwhicharefoundtobe necessaryforcriticalwatersheds,mangroves,

wildlifesanctuaries,wilderness,protectedareas,forestcover,orreforestation.

In addition to the means of exploration, development and uti lization of thecountry'snaturalresourcesstatedinparagraph1,Section2ofArticleXII,theConstitution

itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law,

allowsmall-scaleutilization ofnaturalresourcesby its citizens.Further,Section 6,Article

XIII, directsthe State,in thedispositionandutilizationofnaturalresources,to apply the

principlesofagrarianreformorstewardship.Similarly,Section7,ArticleXIIImandatesthe

Statetoprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermentothepreferentialuseofmarineand

fishingresources.C learly, Section 2,Article XII, when interpreted inview of the pro-

Filipino,pro-poorphilosophyof our fundamental law,and in harmony withthe other

provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,cannot be

construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization

ofnaturalresourceswithouttheState'sdirectparticipation.

ThechallengedprovisionsoftheIPRAmustbeconstruedinviewofsuchpresumptionofconstitutionality.Further,theinterpretationoftheseprovisionsshouldtakeintoaccount

thepurposeofthelaw,whichistogivelifetotheconstitutionalmandatethattherightsof

theindigenouspeoplesberecognizedandprotected.

MENDOZA,J.:

ThissuitwasinstitutedtodeterminetheconstitutionalityofcertainprovisionsofR.A.No.

8371,otherwiseknownastheIndigenousPeoplesRightsAct.Petitionersdonotcomplain

ofanyinjuryasaresultoftheapplicationofthestatutetothem.Theyassertarightto

seekanadjudicationofconstitutionalquestionsascitizensandtaxpayers,upontheplea

thatthequestionsraisedareof"transcendentalimportance."

Theonlyinstancewhereafacialchallengetoastatuteisallowediswhenitoperatesintheareaoffreedomofexpression.Insuchinstance,theoverbreadthdoctrinepermitsaparty

to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not

unconstitutionalbutitmightbeifappliedtoothersnotbeforetheCourtwhoseactivities

areconstitutionally protected.Invalidation of the statute "onits face" rather than"as

applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of

expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is

unconstitutional,courtswilldecreeonlypartialinvalidityunlesstheinvalidportionissofar


21/37

inseparable from the rest ofthe statute that a declarationof partial invalidity isnot

possible.

FortheCourttoexerciseitspowerofreviewwhenthereisnocaseorcontroversyisnotonlyto actwithoutjurisdictionbutalsoto runthe riskthat,in adjudicatingabstractor

hypotheticalquestions,its decisionwillbebasedonspeculationratherthanexperience.

Deprivedoftheopportunitytoobservetheimpactofthelaw,theCourtislikelytoequate

questionsofconstitutionalitywithquestionsofwisdomandisthuslikelytointrudeinto

thedomain oflegislation.Constitutionaladjudication,it cannot betoo oftenrepeated,

cannottakeplaceinavacuum.

Todecline,therefore,theexerciseofjurisdictionwherethereisnogenuinecontroversyis

nottoshowtimiditybutrespectforthejudgmentofacoequaldepartmentofgovernment

whoseacts,unlessshowntobeclearlyrepugnanttothefundamentallaw,arepresumed

tobe valid.The polestarofconstitutionaladjudicationwasset forthbyJusticeLaurelin

theAngaracasewhenhesaidthat"thispowerofjudicialreviewislimitedtoactualcases

andcontroversiesto beexercisedafterfullopportunityofargumentbythe parties,andlimitedfurthertotheconstitutionalquestionraisedortheverylismota,presented."For

theexerciseofthispowerislegitimateonlyinthelastresort,andasanecessityinthe

determinationofreal,earnest,andvitalcontroversybetweenindividuals.Until,therefore,

anactual caseis brought to testthe constitutionality of theIPRA, thepresumption of

constitutionality,whichinheresineverystatute,mustbeaccordedtoit.

PANGANIBAN,J:

Ourfundamentallaw mandates theprotection ofthe indigenouscultural communities'

right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to theprovisions of this

Constitution."I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples

(ICCs/IPs)maybeaccordedpreferentialrightstothebeneficialuseofpublicdomains,as

wellaspriorityintheexploration,developmentandutilizationofnaturalresources.Suchprivileges,however,mustbesubjecttothefundamentallaw.

Consistentwiththesocialjusticeprincipleofgivingmoreinlawtothosewhohavelessin

life,Congressinitswisdommaygrantpreferencesandprerogativesto ourmarginalized

brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be

respected.Ipersonallybelieveinaccordingeverybenefittothepoor,theoppressedand

the disadvantaged, in order to empower them toequallyenjoy the blessings of

nationhood.Icannot,however,agree tolegitimize perpetualinequalityof accessto the

nation'swealthortostamptheCourt'simprimaturonalawthatoffendsanddegradesthe

repositoryoftheveryauthorityofthisCourttheconstitutionofthePhilippines.

RA 8371,which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communitiesand indigenouspeoples,admittedlyprofessesalaudableintent.Itwasprimarilyenactedpursuanttothe

state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of

indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and

development."Thoughlaudableandwell-meaning,thisstatute,however,hasprovisions

thatrundirectlyafoulofourfundamentallawfromwhichitclaimsoriginandauthority.

Morespecifically,Sections3(a)and(b),5,6,7(a)and(b),8andotherrelatedprovisions

contravenetheRegalianDoctrinethebasicfoundationoftheState'spropertyregime.

Verily, as petitionersundauntedly pointout, fourhundred yearsof Philippinepolitical

historycannotbesetasideorignoredbyIPRA,howeverwell-intentioneditmaybe.The

perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by

conceding the nation's resourcesto their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more

privilegedsimplybecausetheyhavechosentoignorestatelaws.Forhavingchosennottobe enfoldedby statutes onperfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintaintheir

ownershipoflandsanddomainsbyinsistingontheirconceptof"nativetitle"thereto.It

wouldbe plaininjustice tothemajorityof Filipinos who have abidedbythe law and,

consequently,deserveequalopportunitytoenjoythecountry'sresources.

RespondentNCIPclaimsthatIPRAdoesnotviolatetheConstitution,becauseitdoesnot

grantownershipofpublicdomainsandnaturalresourcestoICCs/IPs."Rather,itrecognizes

andmandatesrespectfortherightsofindigenouspeoplesovertheirancestrallandsand

domainsthathadneverbeenlandsofthepublicdomain."Isay,however,thatsuchclaim

findsnolegalsupport.NowhereintheConstitutionisthereaprovisionthatexemptssuch

landsanddomainsfromitscoverage.Quitethecontrary,itdeclaresthatalllandsofthe

publicdomainandnaturalresources"areownedbytheState";and"withtheexceptionof

agriculturallands,alltheirnaturalresourcesshallnotbealienated."

In otherwords,the "owner" is notan individual. Rather, it is a tribal communitythat

preservesthepropertyforthecommonbutnonethelessexclusiveandperpetualbenefitof

its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition.This

concept,however,stillperpetuallywithdrawssuchpropertyfromthecontroloftheState

andfrom itsenjoymentby othercitizensof the Republic.The perpetualand exclusive

characterofprivaterespondents'claimssimplymakesthem repugnantto basic fairness

andequality.


22/37

Private respondentsand intervenorstrace their"ownership" of ancestraldomainsand

landstothepre-Spanishconquest.Ishouldsaythat,atthetime,theirclaimstosuchlands

anddomainswerelimitedtothesurfacesthereofsincetheirancestorswereagriculture-

based. Thismust be thecontinuing scopeof theindigenousgroups'ownershipclaims:limitedtoland,excludingthenaturalresourcesfoundwithin.

Section5,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution,provides:

"SEC.5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationaldevelopment

policiesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheir

ancestrallandstoensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing.

"TheCongressmayprovide forthe applicabilityof customarylaws governing property

rightsandrelationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain."

Clearly,therearetwoparametersthatmustbeobservedintheprotectionoftherightsof

ICCs/IPs:(1)theprovisionsofthe1987Constitutionand(2)nationaldevelopmentpoliciesandprograms.

Indigenouspeoplesmay havelong beenmarginalizedin Philippinepolitics andsociety.

This does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the

Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving

thempriorityintheuse,theenjoymentandthepreservationoftheirancestrallandsand

domains.Buttograntperpetualownershipandcontrolofthenation'ssubstantialwealth

tothem,totheexclusionofotherFilipinocitizenswhohavechosentoliveandabideby

ourpreviousandpresentConstitutions,wouldbenotonlyunjustbutalsosubversiveof

theruleoflaw.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law,Congress is effectively

mandating"reversediscrimination."Inseekingtoimprovetheirlot,itwouldbedoingsoattheexpense of the majority ofthe Filipinopeople. Such short-sighted and misplaced

generositywillspreadtherootsofdiscontentand,inthelongterm,fanthefiresofturmoil

toaconflagrationofnationalproportions.

Peacecannot beattainedby brazenlyand permanentlydeprivingthe manyin orderto

coddlethefew,howeverdisadvantagedtheymayhavebeen.Neithercanajustsocietybe

approximatedbymaimingthehealthytoplacethematparwiththeinjured.Norcanthe

nationsurvivebyenclavingitswealthfortheexclusivebenefitoffavoredminorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of

opportunities andprivileges thatare opento alland by preventingthe powerfulfrom

exploitingandoppressingthem.Thisistheessenceofsocialjusticeempoweringand

enabling the poor to be able to compete with therich and, thus, equally enjoy theblessingsofprosperity,freedomanddignity.

PUNO,J.:

IndigenousCulturalCommunitiesor Indigenous Peoples referto a groupof people or

homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on

communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually

occupied,possessed and utilized theirterritories underclaim of ownership sincetime

immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other

distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural

inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically

differentiatedfromtheFilipinomajority.ICCs/IPsalsoincludedescendantsofICCs/IPswho

inhabitedthecountryatthe timeofconquestorcolonization,whoretainsomeor alloftheirown social, economic, cultural and politicalinstitutions but whomay havebeen

displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their

ancestraldomains.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinctkind of ownershipover ancestraldomains and

ancestrallands.However,it should be notedthat ancestrallands arenot thesame as

ancestraldomains.

Ancestraldomainsareall areas belongingto ICCs/IPsheld undera claim ofownership,

occupiedorpossessedbyICCs/IPsbythemselvesorthroughtheirancestors,communally

or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when

interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a

consequenceof governmentprojectsor anyother voluntarydealingswith government

and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland

waters,coastalareas,andnaturalresourcesthereinandincludesancestrallands,forests,

pasture,residential,agricultural,andotherlandsindividuallyownedwhetheralienableor

not,huntinggrounds,burialgrounds,worshipareas,bodiesofwater,mineralandother

naturalresources.Theyalsoincludelandswhichmaynolongerbeexclusivelyoccupiedby

ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and

traditionalactivities,particularlythehomerangesofICCs/IPswhoarestillnomadicand/or

shiftingcultivators.


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Ancestrallands are lands heldby the ICCs/IPs underthe sameconditions as ancestral

domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely

occupiedandpossessedbutarealsoutilizedbytheICCs/IPsunderclaimsofindividualor

traditionalgroupownership.Theselandsincludebutarenotlimitedtoresidentiallots,riceterracesorpaddies,privateforests,swiddenfarmsandtreelots.

OwnershipoverthenaturalresourcesintheancestraldomainsremainswiththeStateand

the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and conserve them for future

generations, benefit and share the profits from their allocation and utilization, and

negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration for thepurpose of en

intro to law reviewer 2012 (1)

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