administrative law reviewer

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMASFaculty of Civil Law

JURISPRUDENCE ON ADMININSTRATIVE LAW,

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

SUBMITTED BY:

BONTUYAN, Diwa RafaelDE GUZMAN, Aljon

DE LEON, Girlie Venus DELOSO, Omar

HIZON, Kenneth James Carlo HIZON, King James Carlo MALANG, William RusselMARANAN, Maica Maris

MATIBAG, Marc Justin BasilMEDINA, Eilyn

PULLANTE, Irish RosanneSILVA, Juan Karlo

(2A Faculty of Civil Law)

SUBMITTED TO:Atty. Enrique Dela Cruz

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAWA. General PrinciplesB. Quasi-Legislative PowersC. Quasi-Judicial PowersD. Exhaustion of Administrative RemediesE. Judicial Review

II. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERSA. Public OfficeB. Eligibility, Qualifications & Disqualifications C. De Facto OfficersD. Commencement of Official Relations (Appointments/Elections)E. Next-in-Rank RuleF. TransferG. ReinstatementH. DetailI. ReassignmentJ. ProhibitionsK. Midnight AppointmentsL. Liability of Public OfficersM. Tenure and Term of OfficeN. ResignationO. Disciplinary Action and Preventive SuspensionP. Recall

III. ELECTION LAWS

A. General PrinciplesB. Party-ListC. Absentee VotingD. Certificate of CandidacyE. Pre-Election RemediesF. Election PropagandaG. Appreciation of BallotsH. CanvassingI. Pre-Proclamation ControversyJ. Post-Election RemediesK. Failure of ElectionL. Execution Pending Appeal

Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique Dela Cruz 2

BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA, PULLANTE, SILVA


M. Election Offenses

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW




ADMINISTRATIVE LAW1

I. General Principles

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, et al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, et al.

G.R. No. 164171, 20 February 2006, EN BANC (Ynares-Santiago, J.)

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA), through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued Executive Order No. 156 (E.O. 156) providing for the prohibition regarding the importation into the Philippines, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles. Respondent Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., et al. who are members of the Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles filed this action to seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Sec. 3.1., Art. 2 of E.O. 156. Allegedly, E.O. 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 156 is unconstitutional

HELD:

Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.

To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:

1 Case digest format : UST Law Review Style Guide Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique

Dela Cruz 4BONTUYAN, DE GUZMAN, DE LEON, DELOSO, HIZON Kenneth & King, MALANG, MARANAN, MATIBAG, MEDINA,

PULLANTE, SILVA

The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.


(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and(4) It must be reasonable.

E.O. 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both constitutional and statutory bases. Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly determined. As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed, and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.

E.O. 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid.

R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.

The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7227 specifically states that the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special Economic and Freeport Zone as "a separate customs territory The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their capital in a business climate with the least governmental intervention.

This delineates the activities that would have the least of government intervention, and the running of the affairs of the special economic zone would be run principally by the investors themselves, similar to a housing subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect their representatives to run the affairs of the subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines.

The Court held that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp. As held in United BF Homeowners Association v. BF Homes, Inc.




The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.

The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.

LUPO LUPANGCO, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-77372, 29 April 1988, FIRST DIVISION (Gancayco, J.)

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 10 which orders that no examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. Additionally, any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions.

Petitioners Lupangco, et al., all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) this complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the said resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

The RTC declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the



It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare for the examination.


enforcement of Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are coequal bodies.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over resolutions of the PRC

2. Whether or not PRC can lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, etc. three (3) days before the date of examination

HELD:

1. Petition GRANTED.

2. Petition DENIED.

RTC has jurisdiction over the questioned PRC resolutions

There is no specific provision in Presidential Decree No. 223 (the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission), that provides that the orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court.

The case, note-worthily, was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution PRC is within the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. It is well settled in-our jurisdiction that the acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Regional Trial Court.

The PRC cannot prohibit the examiners

The Court believes that the resolution is unreasonable. The resolution provides that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare for the examination.

The purpose of the resolution is praise-worthy, however, Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. By all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.




BIAK-NA-BATO MINING CO. v. HON. ARTURO R. TANCO (Sec. of Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources)

G.R. Nos. 34267-68, 25 January 1991, SECOND DIVISION (PARAS, J.)

Jose Moldero, Saturnino Moldero, Miguel Moldero and Manuel Dirige, appeared to have located 170 mining claims in hinterlands of the Cordillera Mountains. The land covered by the mining claims is adjacent and surrounds the mining properties of Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. The said 170 mining claims were divided into four (4) groups:

1. NAGASAT Group with 42 claims; 2. MUGAO Group with 40 claims3. LUCKY STRIKE Group with 40 claims; and 4. BUMABAG Group with 48 claims

Several transactions were executed by Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines Association and Mountain Mines, Inc. In said transactions the two corporations acquired the different mining claims belonging to the four groups, NAGASAT, MUGAO, LUCKY STRIKE and BUMABAG. Meanwhile, BalatocLubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. engaged the services of Mining Engineers to explore and develop the mining area; for its pre-war exploration and development.

After the war, Balatoc Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc. reconstituted their corporate records before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The reconstitution proceedings filed by Balatoc Lubuagan Mines, Inc. over 42 lode claims known as Nagasat Group and 40 lode claims known as Mugao Mining Group.

The Bureau of Mines after due hearing and notice issued the corresponding orders of reconstitution and 88 mining claims of Mountain Mines, Inc. and 82 mining claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. claim maps, lists of mining claims, option agreement, deeds of sale, power of attorney and other documents were reconstituted.

Bernardo Ardiente, Emilio Peralta, Mario Villarica, Anastacio Canao and Salvador Ellone located several claims covering a wide area of vacant, unoccupied and unclaimed land of the public mineral lands. The land covering the mining claims is adjacent to the patentable mining properties of the Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. Biak-na-Bato Mining Co. was created as a partnership in accordance with law. The abovenamed locators each executed a Deed of Transfer of Mining Rights assigning, transferring and conveying to the petitioner the mining claims covered by the aforesaid declarations of location.

Subsequently, Biak-Na-Bato Mining Co. filed with the Bureau of Mines the application for lease and a petition for an order of lease survey of the aforementioned mining claims. However, it received a notice of the letter of the Director of Mines refusing to issue the order of lease survey because the areas



As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities


covered by the mining claims were allegedly in conflict with the four (4) groups of mining claims purportedly owned by the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain mines, Inc.

Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company filed its separate protest with the Bureau of Mines questioning the reconstitution proceedings and claiming that the two (2) deeds of sale over the 88 lode claims in favor of Mountain Mines, Inc. and the other two (2) deeds of sale over 52 lode claims of Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. were fake, fictitious or manufactured.

The Director of Mines promulgated a decision against Biak-Na-Bato Mining Company. Allegedly, the Balatoc-Lubuagan Mines, Inc. and Mountain Mines, Inc., have a better right to the 170 mining claims of about 1,520 hectares located at the Cordillera Mountains. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines. . ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the Director of Mines should be accorded with respect and finality

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this Court, are bound by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which is not present in this case at bar.

There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has been defined or construed to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

EURO-MED LABORATORIES PHIL. v. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS (represented by its Governor, HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS)G.R. No. 148106, 17, July 2006, SECOND DIVISION (CORONA, J.)

The Province of Batangas through its various authorized representatives of the government hospitals, purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from Euro-Med Laboratories. The province has an unpaid balance of P487,662.80. The purchases were evidenced by invoices duly received and signed by defendants authorized representatives, upon delivery of the merchandise listed in said invoices. Under the terms and conditions of the aforesaid invoices, the Province of Batangas agreed and



The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may


covenanted to pay Euro-Med, without need of demand, its obligations in the above-enumerated invoices on various terms indicated therein.

Euro-Med made several demands for the province to pay its accountabilities, including setting up several dialogues with the provinces representatives, but these proved fruitless. Despite repeated demands, the province has failed and still fails to comply therewith. A complaint was consequently filed by Euro-Med. On the other hand, the province alleged that some payments it had already made.

Province of Batangas moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioners money claim was lodged with the Commission on Audit (COA). The RTC dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commission on Audit has primary jurisdiction to the case

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice. This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although petitioners collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances surrounding petitioners claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COAs jurisdiction.

Euro-Meds money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of respondents public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local Government Code provisions on supply and property management and their implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA pursuant to Section 383 of said Code. Petitioners claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants.

Hence, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioners complaint.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010G.R. Nos. 192935, 07 December 2010, EN BANC, (Mendoza, J.)



The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.

Equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose


On July 30, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III signed Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1) establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All PTC can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions

Barely a month after the issuance of E.O. No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers 2. Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

HELD:

1. Petition DENIED.2. Petition GRANTED.

E.O. No.1 does not violate the Principle of Separation of Powers

The allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.

There is a violation of the Principle of Equal Protection of Law




The Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

However, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. Applying these precepts to this case, E.O. No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration.

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.

The Court is not convinced that although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to

expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations since it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)



When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.

MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government, thus, its properties which are owned by the Republic are exempt from Real Estate tax.


Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903 ("MIAA Charter"). The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with the City of Paraaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.

The City Treasurer issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings in the event MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA said that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since the real owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines. Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use and public service, the ownership of these properties remains with the State and that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the payment of real estate tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MIAAs airport lands and buildings are exempt from real estate tax

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Moreover, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or controlled (GOCC) corporation as any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. Thus, MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.

There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There must be express language in the law




empowering local governments to tax national government instrumentalities. This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Accordingly, the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. CITY TREASURER and CITY ASSESSOR of the CITY OFMANILA

G.R. No. 186242, 23 December 2001, THIRD DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.)

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) owns 2 parcels of land (Katigbak property & Concepcion-Arroceros property). Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease.

The City Treasurer of Manila sent a letter to GSIS President informing him of the unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002. GSIS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining and injunctive relief before the Manila RTC. Accordingly, the Katigbak property is in the name of GSIS but it has been leased to and occupied by the Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) which has been paying any realty taxes that may be imposed on the subject property. On the other hand, the Concepcion-Arroceros property is partly occupied by GSIS and the MeTC of Manila. Thus, the GSIS should not be ordered to pay the said tax delinquencies

The RTC dismissed GSIS petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not GSIS is exempt from the payment of real property taxes

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

Based on Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1146, and RA 8291 (GSIS Act of 1997), GSIS is exempt the agency and its properties from all forms of taxes and assessments, inclusive of realty tax. However, under the LGC of 1991 or RA 7160, there is a withdrawal of tax exemption privileges in Sec. 193 of the LGC, and the special provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes.

However, the subject properties under GSISs name are owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the enhancement of the system. This particular property arrangement is



GSIS is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government. GSIS capital is not divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS, has no members to speak of. The subject properties under GSISs name are owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the enhancement


clearly shown by the fact that the disposal or conveyance of said subject properties are either done by or through the authority of the President of the Philippines.

It is worth-mentioning that the Concepcion-Arroceros property, was transferred, conveyed, and ceded to this Court. This fact only illustrates the nature of the government ownership of the subject GSIS properties. GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential and vital function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to perform if social security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch.

IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTION IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATTY. MARCIAL MAGSINO, et al.

A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, 14 December 2010, EN BANC (Corona, C.J.)

While the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Feliciano Bautista (Pres. Bautista) was in Zamboanga, then Executive Vice President, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Atty. Vinluan) and his group called for a special meeting of the Board of Governors two days before the scheduled election of the regional Governors.

In the election held in the Greater Manila Region, Atty. Manuel Maramba (Atty. Maramba) won the election presided over by then outgoing Greater Manila Region Governor Marcial Magsino (Gov. Magsino). However, his opponent, Atty. Elpidio Soriano (Atty. Soriano) did not accept the results, but instead filed an election protest claiming that the election was void since there were non-delegates of the Quezon City Chapter who were allowed to vote. The Group of Atty. Vinluan granted the protest and declared Atty. Soriano as the Governor of the Greater Manila Region. This was questioned before the Court.

With regard to the election in the Western Visayas Region, it was Atty. Erwin Fortunato (Atty. Fortunato) who obtained the highest number of votes. It was also clear that it was the turn of the Romblon Chapter, to which Atty. Fortunato belongs, to represent the Western Visayas Region based on the rotation rule. However, his opponents, Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Atty. Aldon) and Benjamin Ortega (Atty. Ortega) claim that the rotation rule in Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws is not mandatory but only directory.

In the Western Mindanao Region, the electoral contest between Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic (Atty. Marohomsalic) and Atty. Benjamin Lanto (Atty. Lanto) showed that it was Atty. Marohomsalic who obtained greater number of votes. However, Atty. Lanto questioned the validity of the nomination of Atty. Marohomsalic and claimed that it was only his nomination which is valid. Without conducting any proceeding, the group of Atty. Vinluan proclaimed Atty. Lanto as having been duly elected on the ground that the nomination of the Atty. Marohomsalic, was contrary to the will of the Lanao del Sur Chapter. Atty. Marohomsalic brought the matter to the Court.



The rotation rule must be strictly implemented as it will determine the order in which each chapter will be representing a region, although it might also be waived by the chapter next in rotation by not nominating a candidate for Governor during the election.

The rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors. However, it is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor


Aside from the determination of the winners during the election in the different Regions, it was also claimed that Atty. Vinluans group disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP by deciding on issues without authority and therefore should be appropriately sanctioned.

In resolving the issues, the Court formed a Special Committee (Committee) tasked to investigate the case and to come up with its recommendations. The Committee found out that it was Atty. Maramba who should be declared as the representative of the Greater Manila Region and Atty. Fortunato for the Western Visayas Region. On the other hand, it recommended a special election for the Western Mindanao Region. It also found that the acts of Atty. Vinluans group caused disunity and disagreements in IBP and defied the lawful authority of Pres. Bautista.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Atty. Maramba is the duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term

Whether or not Atty. Fortunato is the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term

Whether or not there is a need for a special election in the Western Mindanao Region

Whether or not the acts of Atty. Vinluans group constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned

HELD:

Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The government of a Chapter is vested in its Board of Officers composed of nine (9) officers, namely: the President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and five (5) Directors who shall be elected by the members of the Chapter at the biennial meeting on the last Saturday of February, and shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from the first day of April following their election and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

Atty. Maramba is the duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region

During the election duly presided over by then outgoing Greater Manila Region Gov. Magsino, it was Atty. Maramba who garnered the highest number of votes among the delegates compared to Atty. Soriano, 13 votes to 12 votes. The argument that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken. The Committee considered the situation then involving the Quezon City Chapter (QC Chapter) as not a proper case for the election of additional delegates by the Board of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates as the number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the Chapters delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an election. Thus, and as rightly determined by the Committee to which the Court subscribes to, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was presided over by Atty. Vinluan was a nullity on three grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano already lost the election. Second, the special election conducted by the Vinluan Group was illegal because it was not called nor presided by the regional




Governor (Atty. Magsino). Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his election as such would violate the rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires to be strictly implemented.

Atty. Fortunato is the duly elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region

The election of Atty. Fortunato was upheld since he obtained the highest number of votes among the three candidates for the position and also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of Governors. On account thereof, the Court is convinced that the contentions of Attys. Aldon and Ortega cannot prosper. After all, the Court already upheld per its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586 that the rotation rule under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors. More so, when the concerned chapter invoked its right thereto as in the case of Atty. Fortunato who came from the Romblon Chapter which was next in the rotation. Atty. Fortunato did not only come from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the said position, but also got the highest number of votes among the candidates that included Attys. Aldon and Ortega. As the election was presided over by then outgoing Governor Raymund Mercado, the Court finds no cogent reason as well to reverse the findings of the Committee insofar as upholding the election of Atty. Fortunato is concerned.

There is no need for a special election in the Western Mindanao Region

In the regular election, there is no dispute that the voting delegates of IBP Western Mindanao Region voted into office Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter as Governor for the 2009-2011 term. In its Report, the Committee declared that the nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region, thereby sustaining the position of Atty. Marohomsalic and, in effect, the validity of his nomination by Atty. Macalawi.

While the Committee points out that six chapters in the region are entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact remains that not one of them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks during the election. Neither did any one of them challenge the nominations of the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on the order of rotation.

By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived its turn in the rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. They too are deemed to have waived their turn in the rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a candidate from among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter.

The rotation rule is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the election regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence. Thus, Atty. Marohomsalic cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The order of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and compelling circumstances.




The acts of Atty. Vinluans group constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned

The Committee declared that the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Vinluans group which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the future.

It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that (a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that (a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In the case at bar, such canons find application.

In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court agrees, that (t)he actuations of Atty. Vinluans group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluans overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule. Indeed, said actuations of Atty. Vinluan and his group were grossly inimical to the interest of the IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as lawyers. They all deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well the trust bestowed on them for the high positions that they previously held.

While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of their positions in the IBP, this can no longer be done as their terms as Governors already expired, especially on the part of Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado. However, in the case of Atty. Vinluan, as former EVP of the IBP he would have automatically succeeded to the presidency for the term 2009-2011 but now should not be allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of the Committee, he has clearly manifested his unworthiness to hold the said post. On account thereof, Atty. Vinluan is thus declared unfit to assume the position of IBP President. Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed to run as national officers to prevent such similar irregularity from happening again.

II. Quasi-Legislative Powers

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District of Cotabato), et al. v.HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS (Executive Secretary), et al.G.R. No. 96754, 22 June 1995, EN BANC (Mendoza, J.)




Republic Act 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) was passed by the legislature which calls for a plebiscite to be held in the various provinces in Mindanao. Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region in the plebiscite. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Collectively, these provinces make-up the so-called Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429, for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao for the provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region. Chiongbian, et al., representatives, alleged that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because:

(1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and;

(2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. Also, according to them, the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

ISSUES:

Whether or not R.A. 5435 is unconstitutional

HELD:

Petition DENIED.

The purpose of R.A. No. 5435 is to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it.

Looking back in our countrys history, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City. Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.



While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the


The Court further held that While non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. In such case, There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for.

LORENZO M. TAADA, et al. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, Executive Assistant, et al.G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, EN BANC (Escolin, J.)

Lorenzo Taada, et al. question some presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders which took effect without being published in the Official Gazette or in newspaper of general circulation. They, accordingly, invoke the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern.

Taada, et al. also adds that based on the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, they seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is mandatory

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

Tuvera, et al. contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

The Court has ruled in a long line of its decisions that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.



The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all.


The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process.

SMART TELECOMMINICATIONS v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSIONG.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003, FIRST DIVISION (Ynarez-Santiago, J.)

The National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000. The circular provides among others that the Public Telecommunication Entities (PTEs) must:

(1) provide a grace period for subscribers when their billing statements are not received within the 30 day period of each billing cycle and during said grace period they are prohibited from disconnecting their service,

(2) not charge for calls diverted to voice mailbox or similar facility, (3) verify the identification and address of each purchaser of a prepaid SIM card which will be

valid for 2 years, (4) update subscribers of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call and (5)

reduce the unit of billing from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse.

The NTC also issued other circulars:5.) directing cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators and SIM card dealers to strictly

comply with the requirement of presentation and verification of identity and address of prepaid SIM card costumers,

6.) ordering to deny acceptance to customers using stolen units, share information on stolen cellphone units with other networks and require existing prepaid costumers to register..

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (Piltel) filed against NTC, et al. an action for declaration of nullity of the Memorandum Circulars with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Allegedly, the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry.



The rule under our jurisdiction is only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its


Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications (Smart), Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies shall apply

HELD:

Petition DENIED.

The rule under our jurisdiction is only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function.

It is well-settled that if what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 116356, June 29, 1998, FIRST DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)

The Davao Pilots Association filed a complaint for sum of money against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (Eastern). The case was about two (2) years of unpaid pilotage fees.

Eastern Shipping Lines disputed the claims against them. They dispute the the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1088 (EO 1088). Moreover, allegedly, the case falls within the purview of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).

Briefly, Eastern argues for the application of the PPA Circular instead of being guided by EO 1088 because the pilotage fees prescribed under the former is lower than that by the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the EO 1088 should prevail over the circulars issued by the PPA in case of conflict

HELD: Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique


PULLANTE, SILVA

Following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Laws, because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."


Petition GRANTED.

Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. TORRESG.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992, EN BANC (Grio-Aquino, J.)

Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) is engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers. Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres (Torres) issued Department Order No. 16 suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers (DH) going to Hong Kong.

Moreover, the order states that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. Consequently, POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30 providing for guidelines for the processing and deployment of DHs to Hong Kong; Memorandum Circular No. 37 for the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

PASEI filed a petition for prohibition praying that the Court will annul the DOLE and POEA circulars. Allegedly, the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive

ISSUE:

Whether or not the circulars are unconstitutional

HELD:

Petition DENIED.

Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by the growing complexity of the modern society. More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.



The questioned circulars are shown to be a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and


The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents.

The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons"

The questioned circulars are shown to be a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

RENATO C. CORONA (in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs), et al. v. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 111953, 12 December 1997, EN BANC (Romer, J.)

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 which provides for rules governing pilot conduct and pilotage fees and services. PPA-AO-03-85 requires pilots to acquire licenses and to train for seven (7) months in two (2) ports as probationary pilots. After such, they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness. Later on, PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued which limited all appointments to harbour pilot positions to a term of one (1) year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority.

United Harbor Pilots Associaton and the Manila Pilots Association through Capt. Alberto C. Compas (Compas) questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 in the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.

The Office of the President, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona opined that the exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation or interference of property rights without due process. Moreover, according to Corona, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area.

ISSUE: Based on the Outline of Cases of Atty. Enrique


PULLANTE, SILVA

The license of the pilots is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.

However, the rule is where the rule is procedural, or merely legal opinions, or even


Whether or not the circulars are unconstitutional

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

United Harbor Pilots Association questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to the SC. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.

As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with establishment standards." A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 119761, 29 August 1996, FIRST DIVISION (Vitug, J.)



When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. But, when the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given


The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, manifested it will classify Champion, Hope and More cigarette brands manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune) as foreign brands. According to the World Tobacco Directory, the same are listed as foreign companies. However, subsequent to this action, Fortune changed the name of Hope to Hope Luxury and More to Premium More effectively removing them from the foreign brand category.

Republic Act 7654 was enacted amending provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Accordingly:

Sec. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes. - xxx (c) Cigarettes packed by machine. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed below based on the constructive manufacturer's wholesale price or the actual manufacturer's wholesale price, whichever is higher: (1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the exportation of which is not authorized by contract or otherwise, fifty-five (55%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack. (2) On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five percent (45%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93) which reclassifies cigarettes. Thus, More, Hope, and Champion are classified as locally manufactured bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Subsequently, the Commission of Internal Revenue assessed Fortune Tobacco for an ad valorem tax deficiency of P9,598,334.00.

Fortune appealed. However, the Court of Tax Appeals upheld the position of Fortune and adjudged that the reclassification of Champion, Hope and More were defective given that they were not currently classified and taxed at 55% pursuant to Section 1142(c)(1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7654. Hence, the deficiency ad valorem tax assessment issued on Fortune was cancelled for lack of legal basis.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not notice and hearing are necessary before RMC 37-93 can be enacted2. Whether or not RMC 37-93 should be published before it takes effect

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing.

On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its ap

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