inthe united states court of appeals for the district …...uscacase#20-5143 document#1845144...

USCA Case #20-5143 Document #1845144 Filed:06/01/2020 of 46

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (CRIM. NO. 17-232)

(THE HONORABLE EMMET G. SULLIVAN)

No. 20-5143

In the United States Court of Appealsfor the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEFFORJUDGE EMMET G. SULLIVAN

INRESPONSETO MAY 21, 2020 ORDER

INRE MICHAEL T. FLYNN,

Petitioner

A.B ETH W ILKINSON

K OSTA S. S TOJILKOVIC

R AKESH N.K ILARU

W ILKINSONW ALSH LLP

2001 M Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 847-4000

[email protected]

Counselfor Judge Sullivan


TABLEOF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ............................................................................................... iii

Introduction.............................................................................................................. 1

Factual Background................................................................................................ 4

A. In2017, The Government Charges Mr. Flynn With MakingMaterially False Statements And He Admits His Guilt ................4

B. InLate 2018, The Government And Mr. Flynn ReaffirmHis Criminal Conduct, And Judge Sullivan Finds ThatMr. Flynn Made Materially False Statements................................ 6

C. In2019 And Early 2020, Mr. Flynn Alleges BradyViolations; The Government And Judge Sullivan ConfirmThat The False Statements Were Material ................................... 11

D. InEarly 2020, Mr. Flynn Submits A Sworn AffidavitContradicting His Prior Sworn Statements .................................. 13

E. InMay 2020, The Government Contradicts Its PriorRepresentations To The Court And Moves To Dismiss...............14

F. Judge Sullivan Establishes A Process For Deciding TheGovernment’s Motion ....................................................................... 16

Reasons for Denying the Petition........................................................................ 17

I. Mr. Flynn Can Secure The Relief He Seeks Without Mandamus. .......18

II. Mr. Flynn Has Not Shown A Clear And Indisputable Right ToRelief Under Rule 48................................................................................... 21

A. This Court’s Precedents Do Not Preclude Judge Sullivan’sAssessment Of The Government’s Motion..................................... 22

B. The Unique Facts Of This Case Raise Plausible QuestionsAbout The Presumption Of Regularity Afforded ToProsecutorial Decisionmaking ......................................................... 27

i


III. Mandamus IsNotWarranted BecauseThis Court Would Benefitfrom Judge Sullivan’s CarefulEvaluationOf The Case.........................29

A. Judge SullivanHas Adopted A SensibleProcess ForEvaluatingThe SubstantialQuestionsPresentedHere..............29

B. DenyingMandamus Facilitates EfficientResolutionOfThis Case............................................................................................33

Conclusion...............................................................................................................36

ii


* Cheneyv. U.S.DistrictCourt,

542 U.S.367 (2004).............................................................................17,18,29

CASES

Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,346 U.S.379 (1953).........................................................................................21

Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963)............................................................................................. 6

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32 (1991)..................................................................................... 33, 34

Cutter v. Wilkinson,

544 U.S. 709 (2005)........................................................................................... 3

Dhiab v. Obama,

787 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................ 18

Ex parte Fahey,

332 U.S. 258 (1947)......................................................................................... 17

Ex parte Rowland,

104 U.S.604 (1881).........................................................................................18

Greenlaw v. United States,

554 U.S. 237 (2008)......................................................................................... 30

Herring v. New York,

422 U.S. 853 (1975)......................................................................................... 30

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 762 (2020)....................................................................................... 30

* Authoritiesuponwhichwe chiefly rely aremarkedwithasterisks.

TABLEOF AUTHORITIES

iii

*Page


Page

Cases—continued:

* In re al-Nashiri,791F.3d71(D.C. Cir. 2015)................................................................4, 19, 21

Inre App. of Fed. Bureau of Investigation for anOrder Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, Inre,No. BR 13-158, 2013 WL 12335411(FISA Ct. Dec. 18, 2013).............31, 32

In re Khadr,

823 F.3d 92 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 17

Inre Richards,213 F.3d773 (3dCir. 2000)......................................................................19, 21

Inre Stone,940 F.3d1332 (D.C. Cir. 2019)......................................................................19

In re United States,

345 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................... 19

Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell,

512 U.S. 821 (1994)......................................................................................... 34

Jin v. Ministryof State Sec.,557 F.Supp. 2d 131(D.D.C. 2008)...............................................................32

NeonatologyAssocs., P.A. v. Comm’r,293 F.3d128 (3dCir. 2002) (Alito, J., inchambers)...................................30

Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris Inc.,

287 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................ 19

Rinaldi v. United States,

434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam) .............................................................. 23, 28

Rochev. EvaporatedMilkAss’n,

319 U.S.21(1943)...........................................................................................18

iv


Page

Cases—continued:

* UnitedStates v. Ammidown,497 F.2d615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)................................................23, 24, 25, 26, 30

* UnitedStates v. Fokker Servs. B.V.,818 F.3d733 (D.C. Cir. 2016)................2, 3, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33

* UnitedStates v. Saena Tech Corp.,140 F.Supp. 3d 11(D.D.C. 2015) .....................................................29, 30, 33

UnitedStates v. Shaffer Equip.Co.,11F.3d450 (4thCir. 1993)............................................................................34

United States v. Hamm,

659 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (en banc) .................................... 20

United States v. Hyde,

520 U.S. 670 (1997)......................................................................................... 26

UnitedStates v. Matthews,

11F.Supp.2d 656 (D.Md.1998).................................................................31

United States v. Mullet,

868 F. Supp. 2d 618 (N.D. Ohio 2012) .......................................................... 31

United States v. Robinson,

587 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ................................................................ 25, 26

United States v. Sineneng-Smith,

140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020)..................................................................................... 32

Will v. United States,

389 U.S. 90 (1967)........................................................................................... 36

Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et FilsS.A.,481U.S. 787 (1987)...................................................................................34, 35

Young v. UnitedStates,315 U.S. 257 (1942).........................................................................................23

v


STATUTES AND RULES

18 U.S.C. § 401............................................................................................. 16, 33

18U.S.C.§ 402...................................................................................................33

18U.S.C.§ 1001...............................................................................................4, 6

28 U.S.C.§ 463...................................................................................................17

Fed.R.App. P.21(b)(4).....................................................................................17

Fed.R.Crim. P.:

Rule 11.............................................................................................................25

* Rule48...................................................3, 14,15,19,20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29

D.C.R.Prof’lConduct 3.3 (2015).......................................................................4

D.D.C.LocalCiv. R.

D.D.C.LocalCrim.R.57.26(a)...........................................................................4

MISCELLANEOUS

Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Designation of Timothy J.Shea to Serve as Acting Administrator for the DEA(May 18, 2020) <perma.cc/P98M-5D8Z>...................................................15

Rule11(d)(2)(B)..............................................................................................14

Rule42.......................................................................................................16,33

Rule42(a)(2)...................................................................................................35

Rule1.1(a).......................................................................................................31

Rule7(o)..........................................................................................................31

vi

Page


Page

Miscellaneous—continued:

Thomas Ward Frampton,Why DoRule 48(a) Dismissals

Require “Leave of Court”?, 73 Stan. L.Rev. Online

(forthcoming2020) <perma.cc/AJF6-XNS2>...........................................22

Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,

93 Va. L. Rev. 853 (2007)............................................................................... 33

Leon R. Yankwich, Increasing Judicial Discretion in

Criminal Proceedings, 1 F.R.D. 746 (1941) ............................................... 22

vii


INTRODUCTION

Theuniquefactsof this casewarrantevaluationby the trial judgebefore

any reviewby this Court.

It is unusual for a criminaldefendant to claim innocenceand moveto

withdrawhisguilty pleaafter repeatedlyswearingunderoaththat hecommit-

ted the crime. It is unprecedentedfor an ActingU.S. Attorney to contradict

the solemnrepresentationsthat career prosecutorsmadetimeandagain,and

underminethe districtcourt’s legalandfactualfindings,inmovingonhis own

to dismiss the charge years after two different federal judges acceptedthe

defendant’splea.

ThesereversalspresentedJudgeSullivanwithseveralsubstantialques-

tions. Was herequiredto grant the government’spost-pleamotionto dismiss,

and reversehis findingsthat Mr. Flynn’s false statementsto the FBIabout

his contactswithRussiawere material,without any inquiry into the facts set

forth in,and surrounding,the government’sfiling? What implicationswould

dismissalhaveonMr.Flynn’sseparatefalsestatementsto the Departmentof

Justiceabouthiswork for Turkey,whichwere part of his plea agreementbut

notaddressedinthe government’smotion? Do the facts here providereason

1

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to questionthe “presumptionof regularity”that ordinarily attachesto prose-

cutorialdecisions,UnitedStatesv. FokkerServs.B.V.,818F.3d733, 741(D.C.

Cir.2016)? Andwhat,ifanything,shouldJudgeSullivando aboutMr.Flynn’s

swornstatementsto the court,whereherepeatedlyadmittedto the crimeand

to the voluntarinessof his guilty plea, only to now claimthat he never lied to

the governmentandwas pressuredandmisledinto pleadingguilty? Because

the partiesbeforehimnow support the same relief,JudgeSullivanturnedto

an approachused by federal courts across the country, as well as district

courts in this Circuit: He appointedanamicus to presentcounterarguments,

and set a briefing schedule giving the government and Mr. Flynnthe last

word.

The questionbefore this Court is whether it should short-circuitthis

process,forbidevena limitedinquiry intothe government’smotion,andorder

that motiongranted. The answer is no. Mandamusis an extraordinaryrem-

edy that shouldbe denied where the district court has not actually decided

anything. The government’smotion is pending before Judge Sullivan and

could well be granted, so Mr. Flynn can obtain the exact relief he seeks

throughordinary judicial process.

2

USCA Case #20-5143 Document #1845144 Filed: 06/01/2020 Page11of 46

Moreover,JudgeSullivan’sconsiderationof the government’smotionis

not clearly foreclosedby Rule48 or this Court’sprecedents,as would be re-

quired to justify mandamus. The government’smotionacknowledgesthat

Rule48doesnot requireJudgeSullivanto serveas a mererubberstamp. And

while thisCourtobservedinFokkerthat separation-of-powersprincipleslimit

a judge’s role in reviewingthe government’schargingdecisions, it also ex-

plained that different separation-of-powersconsiderationsmay exist where

the district court alreadyaccepteda plea and was proceedingto sentencing.

Finally,the unusualfactsof this caseraiseat leasta plausiblejudicialquestion,

anticipatedby Fokker,whether the presumptionof regularityfor prosecuto-

rialdecisionsis overcome.

Mr.Flynn’scase has garneredconsiderableattention. But that is no

reason to resolve it outside the normal judicialprocess. This is a “court of

review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson,544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).

The questionspresentedshouldbe resolvedby the district court in the first

instance. If Judge Sullivan’sdecision is anythingshort of what the parties

sought, this Courtwill have an opportunityto reviewit,withoutwritingon a

blankslate.

3


al-Nashiri,791F.3d71, 81(D.C.Cir.2015), the petitionshouldbe denied.

to a one-countcriminalinformationcharginghimwithmakingmateriallyfalse

statements,inviolationof 18 U.S.C.§ 1001. Dkts.1, 16.1 Inconjunctionwith

theplea, the governmentsubmitteda statementofoffensetothedistrictcourt.

Dkt. 4. Likeall the government’sfilings,this submissionwas madepursuant

to the Rulesof ProfessionalConduct,whichrequireaccuraterepresentations

to the court. See D.D.C.LocalCrim.R.57.26(a);D.C.R. Prof’lConduct 3.3

(2015). Mr.Flynnalsosignedthe statement,declaring“underpenaltyof per-

jury that it is trueand correct.” Dkt.4 at 6.

ments. Two involvedlies Mr.Flynntold to the FBI,in a January 24, 2017

interview,regardinghis contacts with Russiaand other countries regarding

U.S.foreignpolicy. Id.at 2–5. The remainingstatementsinvolvedlies to the

Becausethereis no reasonfor this Courtto “enterthe fray now,” Inre

A. In 2017, The Government Charges Mr. Flynn With Making

Materially False Statements And He Admits His Guilt.

On December1,2017, Mr.Flynnwaivedindictmentand pleadedguilty

The statementof offenserecountedthree sets of materiallyfalse state-

1 Allcites to “Dkt.”are to the districtcourtdocket.

FACTUALBACKGROUND

4


DOJ, in documentsMr.FlynnfiledonMarch7, 2017,aboutwork that he and

his consultingfirmdidfor Turkey. Id.at 5.

Mr.Flynn’splea agreementincorporatedthe statementof offense,and

inconsiderationfor his guilty plea the prosecutorsagreednot to chargehim

furtherfor that conduct. Dkt.3 at 1–2. Ina sectionof the agreementbinding

only on the parties,Mr.Flynnagreedto “forgo the right to any further dis-

covery or disclosuresof informationnot already provided”at the time of his

plea. Id.at 6.

DistrictJudgeRudolphContrerastookhis initialplea. JudgeContreras

placedMr.Flynnunderoath,confirminghisunderstandingthat “if youdo not

answer my questionstruthfully,you could be prosecutedfor perjuryor mak-

ing a false statement[.]” Dkt.16 at 4. Mr.Flynnthen confirmedthat he had

“sufficienttimeto consultwith[his]attorneys”andwas “satisfiedwiththeser-

vices that they have provided.” Id.at 6.

At this hearing, the government representedthe basis for its charge.

Amongother things,the governmentclaimedthat “thedefendantmademate-

rial false statements and omissions during an interview with the [FBI]on

January 24, 2017” regardinghis interactionswith Russia,id.at 14; that “[a]t

5


the timeof the interview,the FBIhadan open investigationinto Russia’sef-

forts to interferein the 2016 presidentialelection,”id. at 14–15;and that “on

March7, 2017, the defendantfiledmultipledocumentswith[DOJ]… pertain-

ingto a projectperformedby himandhis companyfor the principalbenefitof

the Republicof Turkey” where “the defendant made materially false state-

ments and omissions,” id. at 17. The governmentalso provideda detailed

descriptionof why each statementwas materiallyfalse. See id.at 15–18.

Mr.Flynnagreedwith the government’srecitation,andthat he“infact

[did]what the governmenthas statedthat it can prove at trial[.]” Id.at 19.

Mr.Flynnthenconfirmedhisguiltof “makingfalsestatements,inviolationof

18U.S.C.§ 1001,”afteragreeingthat heunderstoodthe proceedingsanddid

nothaveany questions. Id.at 30.

B. InLate2018, The Government And Mr.FlynnReaffirmHis

CriminalConduct, And Judge Sullivan Finds That Mr.Flynn

MadeMateriallyFalseStatements.

Shortlyafter the entryofMr.Flynn’sguiltyplea,thecasewas randomly

reassignedto Judge Sullivan. Dkt.9. Thereafter,Judge Sullivanentereda

standingorderadvisingthegovernmentof itscontinuingobligationto provide

exculpatoryevidenceto Mr.Flynnpursuantto Bradyv. Maryland,373 U.S.

83 (1963). Dkts.10,20.

6


Hemadeclear that the timingof sentencingwas upto the parties,andthat he

hadnointention“tomicromanagewhat’sgoingonwiththe partiesinthis case

vis-à-viscooperation.”Dkt.40 at 9. Whenthepartiesjointly reportedthat the

casewas ready for sentencing,JudgeSullivanreferredit to the ProbationOf-

fice for presentenceinvestigation.MinuteOrder (Sept.19,2018).

sentencingmemoranda. Thegovernment’smemorandumreiteratedthat Mr.

Flynn’s false statements in both the January 2017 FBI interview and the

March2017 DOJ filings were “material”under § 1001. Dkt.46 at 2–4. Mr.

Flynn“d[id]not take issue”withthe government’sdescriptionof his offense.

Dkt.50 at 7. But his memorandumcontained“additionalfacts regardingthe

circumstancesof theFBIinterview”allegedto be “relevantto the Court’scon-

siderationof a just punishment.” Id.at 7–8.

colloquy. As Judge Sullivanexplained:

Judge Sullivanpresidedover his first status hearingon July 10, 2018.

A full year after Mr. Flynnoriginally pleadedguilty, the parties filed

As a result,the December18,2018sentencingturnedintoa secondplea

The Court takes its responsibility here today, as always, very se-

riously.

Mr.Flynn’s briefingconcerned the Court, as he raised issues that

may affect or call into question his guilty plea, and, at the very

least, maybehis acceptanceof responsibility.

7


As such, the Court concludes that it must now first ask Mr.Flynn

certain questions to ensure that he entered his guilty plea know-

ingly, voluntarily, intelligently,andwith fulsome and satisfactory

advice of counsel.

I cannot recall any incident in which the Court has ever accepted

a plea of guilty from someone who maintained that he was not

guilty, and I don’t intendto start today.

Dkt.103 at 7.

After beingplaced under oath again, Mr.Flynnconfirmedthat (1) he

did not wishto “challengethe circumstances”surroundinghis FBIinterview;

(2) by pleadingguilty he would be givingup “forever”his right to challenge

that interview;(3) he knew at the time of his interviewthat lyingto the FBI

was a crime;and (4) he was “satisfiedwiththe servicesprovidedby [his]at-

torneys.” Id.at 7–9. Mr.Flynnalso disclaimedany relianceon revelations

that certainFBIofficials involvedinthe interviewwerebeinginvestigatedfor

misconduct. Id.at 9.

JudgeSullivantoldMr.Flynnthat hecouldmoveto withdrawhis guilty

plea, that hecouldtake a breakandconfer further withhis attorneysin a pri-

vate room,andthat he couldget a secondopinionfromanindependent,court-

appointedattorney on whether to withdraw his plea. Id. at 8–10. Despite

these offers, Mr.Flynnpersistedinadmittinghis guilt a secondtime under

oath:

8


THE COURT: Mr. Flynn, anything else you want to discuss withme about your plea of guilty? This is not a trick. I’m not trying to

trick you. If you want some time to withdraw your plea or try to

withdraw your plea, I’llgive you that time. If you want to proceed

because you are guilty of this offense, I will finally accept your

plea.

THEDEFENDANT:I wouldliketo proceed,YourHonor.

THECOURT: All right.Becauseyouareguilty of this offense?

THEDEFENDANT:Yes, Your Honor.

Id.at 15–16. Only after theserepeatedoffers and colloquiesdid Judge Sulli-

van accept Mr.Flynn’sguilty plea to makingmaterially false statementsto

the government. Id.at 16.

Consistentwithhisusualpractice,JudgeSullivanofferedto further de-

laysentencingtogiveMr.Flynnthe fullbenefitof hisongoingefforttoprovide

substantialassistanceto the government. Id.at 30–31. Judge Sullivancau-

tioned Mr. Flynnthat “the sentence the Court imposes today, if sentencing

proceeds,may not be the sentencethat youwould receiveafteryour coopera-

tion ends.” Id. at 31. As Judge Sullivanexplained, “It could be that any

sentenceof incarcerationimposedafteryour further cooperationis completed

would be for less timethan a sentencemay betoday. I can’t makeany guar-

antees,but I’mnot hidingmy disgust,my disdainfor this criminal offense.”

Id.at 33.

9


To get a fullunderstandingof the pleaagreementstruckby the parties,

Judge Sullivanalso askedthe governmentwhether it haddeclined to prose-

cute Mr.Flynnfor other chargeableconduct,includingwhether Mr.Flynn’s

conduct “rises to the levelof treasonousactivity on his part[.]” Id.at 35–36.

Thegovernmentrespondedthat this was a “seriousquestion”that itcouldnot

answer on the spot. Id.at 36.

After a recessto allow Mr.Flynnto confer with his counsel about the

timingof sentencing,Judge Sullivanexplainedthe reasonfor his earlier in-

quiry, clarifyingthat he had asked about “other potentialoffenses for the

purposeof understandingthe benefit, if any, that Mr.Flynnhas receivedin

the pleadeal,”but “wasn’tsuggestinghe’scommittedtreason.” Id.at 40. The

governmentconfirmed,after having reviewedthe applicablestatute, that it

hadno basis to suspectMr.Flynnof treason. Id.at 40–41.

ThedefensethenacceptedJudgeSullivan’soffer to delay sentencingto

allow Mr.Flynnto completehis cooperation. CounselcitedUnitedStates v.

Rafiekian,Crim.No.18-457(E.D.Va.), whereMr.Flynnwas expectedto tes-

tify at trialas a governmentwitness. JudgeSullivangrantedthe requestand

postponedsentencing. Id.at 47–48.

10


C. In2019 And Early2020, Mr.FlynnAlleges BradyViolations;

The Government And Judge SullivanConfirmThat The False

Statements Were Material.

Mr.Flynnhirednewcounsel inJune2019. Dkt.87. Beforeenteringan

appearance,counselwroteto the AttorneyGeneralandDeputyAttorneyGen-

eralto requesta “reviewof the entireFlynncase for Bradymaterialthat has

notbeenproducedandprosecutorialmisconductwrit large.” Dkt.122-2at 2.2

OnJuly 9, 2019,the Rafiekiancourtunsealedfilingsindicatingthat Mr.

Flynnwouldnot be testifying. Thepartieshere nonethelessagreedthat Mr.

Flynn’ssentencingshouldbedeferreduntilat least after the Rafiekiantrial.

Dkt.97 at 2;Dkt.98 at 11.

Mr.Flynnthenrequestedfifty categoriesofdocumentsandinformation

fromthe governmentandaskedfor dismissalof the prosecutionbasedonpur-

ported Brady violations. See Dkts. 111, 116, 124, 144-1. The government

characterizedthesemotionsas an“extraordinaryreversal”inMr.Flynn’spo-

sition,notingthat hewas nowclaiminginnocence“despitehavingadmittedhis

On2 counsel’s first appearance inthe case, Judge Sullivan disclosed that

several years earlier, she had sent him a copy of her book, Licensed to Lie,

with the inscription: “Judge Emmet Sullivan, to allthose who seek, hallow, and

do Justice. With the greatest respect and gratitude for your honorable ser-

vice ….” Dkt. 94 at 3. Neither party objected to Judge Sullivan’s proceeding

with the case. Id.

11


guilt,under oath,beforetwo federal judges[.]” Dkt.131at 1–2. Further,Mr.

Flynnhadalreadydeclinedto withdrawhispleainlightof theFBImisconduct

investigation.See supraat 8–10.

After substantialbriefing,JudgeSullivandeniedthe motions. Dkt.144.

Ina 92-pageMemorandumOpinion,JudgeSullivanexplainedthat mostof the

requestedinformationwas not“relevantandmaterial”to Mr.Flynn’soffense

or sentencing,id.at 16–17,57–72;that other informationwas alreadyprovided

to Mr.Flynn,didnot exist,or was notwithinthe government’spossession,id.

at 22–57;andthat “[e]venifMr.Flynnestablisheda Bradyviolation,”dismis-

sal would be “unwarranted”because“[t]he remedy for a Brady violation is

retrial,not dismissal.” Id.at 92. Judge Sullivanalso found again,as a legal

andfactualmatter,thatMr.Flynn’sfalsestatementsto the governmentwere

material. See id.at 49–53.

InJanuary 2020, the governmentfileda supplementalsentencingmem-

orandum,reiteratingitsrepresentationsaboutMr.Flynn’sguilt. SeeDkt.150

at 5–14. Thegovernmentagainassertedthat “thiscase isabout multiplefalse

statementsthat the defendantmadeto variousDOJentities.” Id.at 5; see also

id.at 9, 12–13,17 (explainingbasesfor materiality). The governmentrecom-

mendedthatMr.Flynnbesentencedto 0 to 6 monthsinprison,notingthat he

12

USCA Case #20-5143 Document #1845144 Filed: 06/01/2020 Page21of 46

hadcommitteda “serious”offense, in a positionof “public trust,” that under-

mined “[t]he integrity of our criminal justice [system, which] depends on

witnesses telling the truth. That is preciselywhy providingfalse statements

to the governmentis a crime.” Id.at 2, 26, 31.

innocentandwouldfile a supplementalmotionon that basis. Dkt.151at 16.

Insupport,hesubmitteda declarationsigned“underpenaltyofperjury.”Dkt.

160-23at 12. This declarationcontainsnumerousstatementsthat contradict

Mr.Flynn’searlier swornstatementsand representationsto the court, also

madeunder penaltyof perjury. Mr.Flynnasserted:

Mr.Flynnthenmovedto withdrawhis guilty plea,claimingthat hewas

D. InEarly 2020, Mr. Flynn Submits A Sworn Affidavit

Contradicting His Prior Sworn Statements.

Mr.Flynnfiledhis supplementalmotiononJanuary 29,2020. Dkt.160.

• That he pleaded guilty because of “sudden and intense time pres-

sure,” id. at 5, and “intense pressure from the Special Counsel’s

Office, which includeda threat to indict my son,” id. at 8—notwith-standinghis prior testimony that he pleaded guilty becausehe was

guilty “andfor noother reason,”Dkt.16at 30;

• That he had toldhis priorcounsel“numeroustimes that I didnot lie

to the [FBI],” Dkt. 160-23 at 10, notwithstandinghis earlier testi-mony that hewas satisfiedwith their services inadvisinghim toplead

guilty, and his refusal of Judge Sullivan’soffer to confer with inde-

pendent counsel;

13


• That he had wanted to withdraw his guilty plea prior to his second

plea colloquy, Dkt. 160-23at 9–10, despite rejectingJudge Sullivan’s

offer to do just that; and

• That “[i]n truth, I never lied,” and that “the truth is I am innocent of

thesecharges,” id.at 11, despitehavingrepeatedlyadmittedthe false

statements offense.

Inresponse,Judge Sullivanfurther continuedsentencing. MinuteOr-

der (Feb.10,2020).

The motions to withdrawthe guilty plea havenot beendecided. Judge

Sullivanhas yet to receiveany declarationsfrom Mr. Flynn’sprior counsel;

questionMr.Flynnunder oath about the withdrawal, see Fed. R. Crim.P.

11(d)(2)(B);or assesshiscredibilityregardingthe claimsinhisdeclaration.

E. InMay 2020, The Government Contradicts Its Prior

Representations To The Court And Moves To Dismiss.

OnMay 7, 2020, the government’sleadprosecutorfileda noticeof with-

drawal. Dkt. 197. Later that day, the government filed a motion under

FederalRuleof CriminalProcedure48(a) to dismiss the informationagainst

Mr. Flynn, with prejudice. Dkt. 198. After spendingmore than two years

claimingthat Mr.Flynn’s“falsestatementsto the FBIon January 24, 2017,

were absolutelymaterial,”Dkt.132 at 10, the governmentnow claimedthat

any lies by Mr.Flynninthe same interviewwere“not … material,”Dkt.198

at 2.

14


Severalaspectsof thegovernment’sfilingarenotable. First,the motion

acknowledgesthat a Rule48(a)dismissalrequiresleaveof the court. Id.at 10.

While the governmentargued that the court’s discretionwas “narrow” and

“circumscribed,”id., it did not argue that the court lackeddiscretion alto-

gether. The motion also spans 20 pages of largely factual argument

supportingthe request, confirmingthat the governmentwas not askingthe

court to exercisea ministerialfunction.

Second,the only attorneywho signedthe motionwas TimothyShea,the

then-ActingU.S. Attorney,who has since left that post. See id.at 20; Press

Release,Dep’tof Justice,Designationof TimothyJ. Sheato Serve as Acting

Administratorfor the DEA (May 18, 2020)<perma.cc/P98M-5D8Z>. The

motiondidnotexplaintheabsenceofany lineprosecutors,includingthosewho

hadpreviouslyprosecutedthe case. Nor did it contain any declarationsor

affidavits from witnesses with personal knowledge supporting the govern-

ment’snew factualrepresentations.

Third,the motiondoesnotmentionMr.Flynn’sMarch2017 falsestate-

ments to DOJ relatingto his work for Turkey,which were describedin the

statementof offenseandwererelevantconduct for his guilty plea.

15


Fourth, the government has not moved to withdraw any of its prior

pleadingsinthe case, includingits sentencingmemoranda,or any of the rep-

resentations it previously made in open court regarding the purported

materialityof Mr.Flynn’sfalsestatements.

F. Judge Sullivan Establishes A Process For Deciding

The Government’s Motion.

Giventhe absenceof adversarialbriefingon the issuespresentedby the

government’smotion,JudgeSullivanexercisedhis“inherentauthority”to ap-

point former prosecutor and retiredfederal district judge John Gleeson as

amicus. Dkt. 205. Judge Sullivanappointedhim“to present arguments in

oppositionto the government’sMotionto Dismiss,”and“addresswhetherthe

CourtshouldissueanOrderto ShowCausewhy Mr.Flynnshouldnotbeheld

incriminalcontemptfor perjurypursuantto 18 U.S.C.§ 401, FederalRuleof

CriminalProcedure42, the Court’sinherentauthority,andany other applica-

ble statutes,rules,or controllinglaw.” Id.3

3 Judge Sullivan had previously denied leave to file briefs to certain

would-be intervenors and amici. See, e.g., Dkt. 25 (denying leave to file “LetterRegarding the Plea”); Dkt. 32 (denying leave to file “Emergency Motion to

Intervene … on Behalf of all Americans”); Dkt. 69 (denying leave to file “Ami-

cus Curiea [sic] Brief Supporting Dismissal Due to Want of Federal

Jurisdiction”). When Judge Sullivan issued these orders, the questions now

before the district court had not arisen and the would-be intervenors and amici

were seeking to address unrelated issues of their own choosing.

16


Ina separateorder, Judge Sullivanset a briefingschedule,guarantee-

ing Mr. Flynnand the governmentthe last word. Minute Order (May 19,

2020). Theschedulepermittedadditionalpotentialamicito seek leavetoweigh

inonany sideof the issues,andagainprovidedMr.Flynnandthe government

the rightto respond. Twodays later,Mr.Flynnfiledthis mandamuspetition.

After this Court orderedJudgeSullivanto file a response,see Fed.R.App.P.

21(b)(4),the AdministrativeOfficeof the U.S.Courtsauthorizedhimto retain

counselunder 28 U.S.C.§ 463. See Ex parteFahey,332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947)

(a mandamuspetitionhas “the unfortunateconsequenceof makingthe judge

a litigant,obligedto obtainpersonalcounsel”).

To date, Judge Sullivanhas not receivedany of the requestedbriefs

fromthe parties and court-appointedamicus or madeany factual findingsor

legaldeterminationsinconnectionwiththe government’smotionor the possi-

bility of contempt. Throughout the proceedingsbelow,neither party moved

to recusehimnor soughta judicial reassignment.

REASONSFORDENYINGTHEPETITION

“Mandamus‘is a drastic andextraordinaryremedy reservedfor really

extraordinarycauses.’” InreKhadr,823 F.3d92, 97 (D.C.Cir.2016)(quoting

17


Cheneyv. U.S.DistrictCourt,542 U.S.367, 380 (2004)). Mandamusisappro-

priate only where: (1) the petitionerhas “no other adequate meansto attain

thereliefhedesires”;(2)the petitionershowshisrightto the writ is “clearand

indisputable”;and(3)the court,“in the exerciseof its discretion,” is satisfied

that the writ is “appropriateunder the circumstances.” Cheney,542 U.S. at

380–81(quotationomitted).

Mr.Flynncannot satisfy any of these conditions.

I. MR. FLYNN CAN SECURE THE RELIEF HE SEEKS WITHOUT

MANDAMUS.

There is no basis for “directingthe district court to grant” the govern-

ment’smotionto dismiss (Pet.1)beforethe district court has consideredand

decidedit. Mandamusis an inappropriatevehiclefor resolvinga pendingmo-

tion.

“[T]he generalprinciplewhich governs proceedingsby mandamusis,

that whatevercanbe donewithouttheemploymentof that extraordinaryrem-

edy, may not be done with it.” Ex parteRowland,104 U.S. 604, 617 (1881).

Mandamusisnot to be“usedas a substitutefor the regularappealsprocess,”

Dhiabv. Obama,787 F.3d563, 568 (D.C.Cir.2015)(quotingCheney,542 U.S.

at 380–81),lest it “thwart the Congressionalpolicy againstpiecemealappeals

incriminalcases,”Rochev. EvaporatedMilkAss’n,319U.S.21, 30(1943). See

18


Inreal-Nashiri,791F.3d71, 78(D.C.Cir.2015)(“Mandamusis inappropriate

inthe presenceof an obviousmeans of review:direct appealfromfinal judg-

ment.”).

As Mr.Flynnappearsto concede,mandamusis evenmoreinappropriate

whereno rulingshavebeen issuedat all. See Pet.28 (arguingthat mandamus

relief is available“froma denialof the dismissalof a count or case” (quoting

Inre UnitedStates, 345 F.3d450, 452 (7thCir. 2003)));see also Inre Stone,

940 F.3d1332,1340–41(D.C. Cir. 2019) (denyingmandamusbecause“[i]t is

the trialcourt andnot this court”that should“engageinthe initialconsidera-

tion” (quotationomitted));Republicof Venezuelav. PhilipMorris Inc.,287

F.3d192, 198 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (denyingmandamus“beforethe district court

hasacted”). Nothingdiffersinthe Rule48 context. Onthe contrary,the Third

Circuit denied a similar requestfor mandamuswhere a district court sched-

uled a hearingon a Rule48 motionrather than immediatelygrantingit. See

Inre Richards,213 F.3d773, 787 (3dCir. 2000) (notingthat the trial judge

“shouldhavethe opportunityto considerandissueitsorder”).

ThesesettledprinciplesresolveMr.Flynn’spetition. JudgeSullivanhas

notruledon the government’smotionto dismissor any issuesregardingcon-

tempt. Ifeither issue is resolvedunfavorablyfor Mr.Flynn,he can pursue

19


reviewin this Court. See, e.g., UnitedStatesv. Hamm,659 F.2d624, 625 (5th

Cir.UnitA Oct. 1981)(enbanc)(reversingdistrictcourt’sRule48 rulingafter

judgment). Andifsuchcircumstancesarise,this Courtwillbebetterequipped

to evaluate the issues with the benefit of any determinationsJudge Sullivan

may make.

The fact that Judge Sullivanhas decidednothingyet distinguishesthis

Court’sdecisionto grant mandamusin Fokker. There,the district judge had

“rejected”the government’seffort to excludetime fromthe SpeedyTrialAct

clock ina deferredprosecutionagreementbecause“theprosecutionhadbeen

too lenient inagreeingto,andstructuring,the DPA.” 818 F.3dat 737–38,740.

ThisCourtgrantedmandamusbecausethat decisioncreatedimmediatecom-

plicationsfor the government: If it tried the defendant or secureda plea, a

deferredprosecutionwouldno longerbe available,and if the governmentlet

the speedy trialclock run,itmightbe unableto prosecutethe defendant. See

id.at 749.

Becauseno decisionhas beenmadehere,Mr.Flynndoes not face any

comparableharm. Indeed,his petitionlargelyelides the “no other adequate

means”criterion. SeePet. 27–28. To the extentMr.Flynn,who has beenre-

leased on his own recognizancethroughout the proceedings,Dkt. 5, claims

20


harmfrom the pendency of his criminalcase, that does not suffice. See, e.g.,

BankersLife& Cas.Co. v. Holland,346U.S.379, 383 (1953)(“[E]xtraordinary

writscannotbeusedas substitutesfor appeals,eventhoughhardshipmayre-

sultfromdelay.”(citationomitted));al-Nashiri,791F.3dat 80 (sameincapital

case).

Mr.Flynnlikewiseerrs inseekingmandamuson the basisthat further

proceedingsin the district court “willsubject [DOJ]to sustainedassaultson

its integrity.” Pet. 28. Judge Sullivanhas not disparagedDOJ’sintegrity in

any way. Andalthoughthe governmenthas attackedthe investigationof Mr.

Flynn,it has notassertedany misconductby the career prosecutorswho pre-

viously oversawthe case. Inany event, given the serious allegationsin Mr.

Flynn’smostrecentswornstatement,furtherproceedingsinthe districtcourt

will ensure the integrityof the judicial processand serve the public interest.

SeeRichards,213 F.3dat 788.

II. MR. FLYNN HAS NOT SHOWN A CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE

RIGHT TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 48.

ThisCourt “cannotusemandamusto remedyanythingless thana ‘clear

abuse of discretionor usurpationof judicialpower.’” al-Nashiri,791F.3dat

82 (quotingBankersLife, 346 U.S. at 383). Thedistrict court’sconsideration

of the Rule48 motiondoes not approachthis standard.

21


A. This Court’s Precedents Do Not Preclude Judge Sullivan’s

Assessment Of The Government’s Motion.

Thegovernmenthasacknowledgedthat district courts retainsomedis-

cretioninadjudicatingRule48(a) motions. Dkt.198at 10. For good reason:

Thatpositionaccordswiththe rule’stext andhistory,as wellas its interpreta-

tionby thisCourt.

Under Rule48, the governmentmust seek “leaveof court” beforedis-

missingan indictmentor information—acommandarisingfromthe Supreme

Court’sguidance. Beforethe adoptionof the FederalRulesof CriminalPro-

cedure,judges expressedfrustrationthat the commonlaw “compelled[them]

to grant the dismissalof an indictment”even when there was evidencethat

prosecutorialmotives “savoredtoo muchof favoritism.” Leon R. Yankwich,

IncreasingJudicialDiscretionin CriminalProceedings,1 F.R.D.746, 752

(1941). TheversionofRule48 submittedto theSupremeCourtpreservedthat

“unqualifiedauthorityto nolleprosa case without consentof the court.” See

Thomas WardFrampton,Why Do Rule48(a)DismissalsRequire“Leave of

Court”?, 73 Stan. L. Rev. Online (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 8)

<perma.cc/AJF6-XNS2>(quotingMem.of the Sup.Ct. to Adv.Comm.,June

10,1942). TheCourt questionedthat approach,see id.,citinga decisionhold-

ing that the government’sconfessionof error “does not relieve this Court of

22


the performanceof the judicial function,” Young v. UnitedStates, 315 U.S.

257, 258 (1942);see id. at 259 (notingthat the public interestis not solely en-

trustedto “the enforcingofficers” of the law, but “to our considerationand

protectionas well”). Ultimately,the ruleincorporatedthe “leaveof court”re-

quirement.

That requirement “obviously vest[s] some discretion in the [district]

court.” Rinaldiv. UnitedStates,434 U.S.22, 20 n.15(1977)(per curiam)(em-

phasisadded). InUnitedStatesv. Ammidown,497F.2d615 (1973),this Court

addressedthe scopeof the district court’sRule48 discretioninthe contextof

evaluatinga plea. The rule, the Court explained,does not require“the trial

court to serve merely as a rubber stamp”;it must be satisfiedthat dismissal

“adequatelyprotectsthe public interest.” Id.at 622 (quotationomitted). To

overridethe government’srecommendation,a trialjudge“mustprovidea rea-

soned exercise of discretion” that advances “one or more of the following

components:(a) fairness to the defense, such as protectionagainst harass-

ment;(b)fairnessto the prosecutioninterest,as inavoidinga dispositionthat

does notservedueandlegitimateprosecutorialinterests;(c)protectionof the

sentencingauthority reservedto the judge.” Id. Ammidownobservedthat

23


unopposedRule48(a) motions shouldordinarily be granted. Id. But it pre-

serveda districtjudge’s responsibilityto evaluatethose motionswherethere

are questionsabout whether dismissalserves “legitimateprosecutorialinter-

ests,” and sentencingis underway. Id. Ammidownremains the law in this

Circuitand district courts must followit.

ThisCourt’sdecisioninFokkerlikewisedoesnot compelJudgeSullivan

“to grant the government’smotionto dismiss”automatically. See C.A.Order

(May 21,2020). LikeAmmidown,Fokkerdidnotariseinthe Rule48 context,

but rather analogizedto that rule inaddressingdistrict courts’ authority to

rejectgovernmentmotionsto defer timeunder the SpeedyTrialAct.

TheDPAcontext informsFokker’sholding. That case focusedon a dis-

trict court’s interferencewith decidingwhether to commenceprosecution—a

matter “at the core of the Executive’sduty to see to the faithfulexecutionof

the laws.” 818 F.3dat 741(quotationomitted). Becausethose decisions“lie

squarelywithinthe kenofprosecutorialdiscretion,”thisCourt concludedthat

courts have no power “to deny a prosecutor’sRule 48(a) motion to dismiss

chargesbasedon a disagreementwith the prosecution’sexerciseof charging

authority.” Id.at 742.

24


As Fokkeracknowledged,the separation-of-powersconsiderationsmay

bedifferentoncecasesmovepast “pendingcharges.” Id.at 744. Indeed,Fok-

ker expresslycontrastedthe issue itwas resolvingwith “a court’s reviewof a

proposedpleaagreementunder Rule11of the FederalRulesof CriminalPro-

cedure,” which implicates “the Judiciary’s traditional power over criminal

sentencing.”Id.at 745. While a court cannot reject a plea becauseof “mere

disagreement”with“chargingdecisions,”id.,decisionssurroundingpleas in-

volve “markedlydifferent” considerationsbecausethey implicatethe courts’

Article IIIfunction: A plea is a request for the district court to “enter[] a

judgment of conviction,whichin turn carries immediatesentencingimplica-

tions.” Id.at 745–46. Inother words,whenthe governmentpresentsa guilty

plea,it asks the court to announcethat there is a good faith basis to findthat

the defendantdidwhat the governmentsays he did, andpunishhimfor it.

Fokker’s and Ammidown’s analyses of plea considerations do not

squarely address the separationof powersbalancein this context. The gov-

ernment’s request is not merely for the district court to enter an order

acceptinga plea,but to dissolvetwo findingsof guilt by two different judges.

Cf. UnitedStates v. Robinson,587 F.3d1122,1133(D.C.Cir.2009)(“[I]itisno

triflingmatter to allow a defendantto withdrawa guilty plea ‘[a]fter [he]has

25


sworninopencourt that heactuallycommittedthe crimes,after he hasstated

that he is pleadingguilty becausehe is guilty, after the courthas founda fac-

tual basis for the plea, and after the court has explicitly announcedthat it

accepts the plea.’” (quotingUnitedStates v. Hyde,520 U.S.670, 676 (1997)).

The government’srequestfor dismissalhere thus overlaps in time with “the

sentencingauthority reservedto the judge.” Ammidown,497 F.2d at 622.

Indeed,the government’smotionwas only possible because Judge Sullivan

deferredsentencingat Mr.Flynn’srequestseveraltimes.

That the separationof powers balance may be different here than in

Fokkerand Ammidowndoes not meanthose decisionslackpersuasiveforce,

or that the district court can ignorethem inexercisingwhatever limiteddis-

cretion it has. The point is that the district court’s considerationof the

government’s motion is consistent with Rule 48 and does not “def[y] this

Court’sbindingprecedent.” Pet.1. Especiallywhere,as here,a casepresents

issuesof first impressioninthe Circuit,thelegalsystembenefitsfromallowing

the districtcourt to exerciseitstraditionalrole.

26


B. The Unique Facts Of This Case RaisePlausible Questions

About The PresumptionOf Regularity AffordedTo

ProsecutorialDecisionmaking.

The recordbeforethe district court raisesat least a plausiblequestion

whether the centralpremiseof Fokker’sdeference to the government—the

“presumptionof regularity”that applies to prosecutorialdecisions, see 818

F.3dat 741—couldbe overcome. While the district court may well conclude

that there is insufficientbasis to overcomethe presumption,itserves neither

the interestsnor the appearanceof justice to foreclosethe districtcourt from

even consideringthat question.

The relevantfacts are set forth indetailabove. For severalyears, the

governmentrepresentedto the district court,acrossmultiplecourt filings and

appearances,thatMr.Flynnwas guilty of makingmateriallyfalsestatements.

As recently as January of this year, the governmentmaintainedthose repre-

sentations. And Mr. Flynnrepeatedly affirmed his guilt, under oath and

penaltyof perjury,despitebeinggivenmultipleopportunitiesto disclaimit. It

was not untilthis year thatMr.Flynn,andthen the government,toldthe dis-

trict court that its finding of guilt should be reversed and that the

government’sprior solemnrepresentationswere legallyandfactuallyuntrue.

27


That the governmentfiled a “lengthy motionand exhibits” supporting

dismissaldoesnotconclusivelyestablishthat it “actedproperly.” Pet.21. The

lengthof the government’smotionsuggests that its reversalwas not an eve-

ryday occurrence. The circumstancesof that filingare also unusual. Itwas

signedby the ActingU.S. Attorney alone,with no line prosecutorsjoining; it

featuredno affidavitsor declarationssupportingits many new factualallega-

tions; it was not accompaniedby a motionto vacate the government’sprior,

contrary filings and representations;it citedminimallegal authority insup-

port of its view on materiality; and it did not mention the March 2017

statementsregardingMr.Flynn’sworkforTurkeythatwererelevantconduct

for his guilty pleaandincludedinhis statementof offense,butwereunrelated

to hisJanuary 2017FBIinterview.

Whether these circumstancescould constitute “clear evidence” over-

comingthe “presumptionof regularity,”Fokker,818F.3dat 741, is a question

that has notbeenfully briefedor decidedinthe district court. A findingthat

the “Government’slater efforts to terminatethe prosecutionwere … tainted

with impropriety,”Rinaldi,434 U.S. at 30, cannot and should not be lightly

made. For now, it sufficesto say that the unusualdevelopmentsin this case

28


provideat least a plausible“reason to question” the “bona fides” of the gov-

ernment’s motion, Fokker, 818 F.3d at 747. As this Court’s precedents

envision,Judge Sullivancan—andarguably must—considerthose issuesbe-

foregrantinga motionto dismiss.

III. MANDAMUSIS NOT WARRANTEDBECAUSETHIS COURT

WOULDBENEFIT FROMJUDGE SULLIVAN’S CAREFUL

EVALUATIONOF THE CASE.

The Court should exercise its discretion to deny mandamus. See

Cheney,542 U.S.at 381. As just explained,one of the Rule48 questionspre-

sented here raises substantial legal questions, and another is factbound.

Theseare the types of questionssuitedfor the “regular… process”of factual

andlegaldevelopmentinthe districtcourt. Id.at 380–81.

A. Judge Sullivan Has Adopted A Sensible Process For

Evaluating The Substantial Questions Presented Here.

The process Judge Sullivanhas established,includingthe appointment

ofanamicus,willpermithimto fully considertheissues,andwillaidthisCourt

as well if further reviewbecomesnecessary. The governmentandMr.Flynn

currentlyarealignedinsupportofdismissal,withnobodypresentingtheother

side of the complex and importantRule48 questionsraisedby that request.

Because“[t]heCourt cannot bean advocate,”someoneelse must fill the void

createdby this breakdowninthe adversarialprocess. UnitedStatesv. Saena

29


TechCorp.,140F.Supp.3d 11,19(D.D.C.2015)(Sullivan,J.). Insuchcircum-

stances, appellate courts often appoint an amicus to ensure sound

decisionmaking. See, e.g. Fokker, 818 F.3d at 740; Ammidown,497 F.2dat

618;Holguin-Hernandezv. UnitedStates,140S. Ct. 762,765 (2020);Greenlaw

v. UnitedStates,554 U.S.237, 243 (2008);see also Herringv. New York,422

U.S. 853, 862 (1975)(presentationof bothsides of an argumentis “[t]hevery

premiseof our adversary systemof criminal justice”); NeonatologyAssocs.,

P.A.v. Comm’r,293F.3d128,131(3dCir.2002)(Alito,J., inchambers)(allow-

ing amicus brief and noting that “opposingviews promote[]sound decision

making”). There is no principledreason to precludedistrict courts—which

alsoexerciseArticleIIIpower—fromdoingthe same.

Indeed,districtcourtshaveappointedandinvitedamiciinothercriminal

cases. Inthisdistrictalone,numerousjudges (includingJudgeSullivan)have

engaged in the practice.4 Even a cursory review shows that other district

4 See, e.g., United States v. Church, Crim. No. 95-173, Dkt. 49 (D.D.C.

Dec. 19, 1995) (Kessler, J.) (appointing ACLU “sua sponte … to participate in

the pleadings on defendants’ motion to dismiss” indictment); United States v.Clarke, Crim. No. 06-102, Dkt. 410 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2009) (Bates, J.) (inviting

Federal Public Defender to file amicus brief regarding costs for Rule 15 dep-

ositions); United States v. Jackson-White, Crim. No. 13-91 (D.D.C. July 21,

2013) (Berman Jackson, J.) (minute order) (appointing Federal Public De-

fender “as an amicus curiae concerning the matters raised inthe government’s

30


courtsaccept amicusbriefs in criminalmattersas well.5 Theseexamplescon-

firmJudgeSullivan’spower to appointanamicushere.

Contraryto Mr.Flynn’ssuggestion(Pet.11),the local rulesdo not bar

this practice. The district court’s civil rules “governall proceedings in the

UnitedStatesDistrictCourt for the Districtof Columbia”and allow for the

participationof amici. See D.D.C.LocalCiv. R. 1.1(a),7(o). Even separate

fromthose rules,“federaldistrictcourts possessthe inherentauthorityto ap-

pointamicicuriae[.]” InreApp.of Fed.Bureauof Investigationfor anOrder

motion to correct sentence”); United States v. Pitts, Crim. No. 19-49 (D.D.C.

July 30, 2019) (Sullivan, J.) (minute order) (appointing ethics counsel as amicus

to address “appropriate referrals for discipline” of prosecutor for acknowl-

edged misrepresentations); United States v. Suggs, Crim. No. 07-152 (D.D.C.

Nov. 6, 2015) (Huvelle, J.) (minute order) (appointing Federal Public Defender

as amicus to address government’s contention that defendants lack standingto challenge certain evidence).

See,5 e.g., United States v. Arpaio, Crim. No. 16-1012, Dkt. 243 (D. Ariz.

Oct. 4, 2017) (granting amicus briefing on scope of President’s pardon power);

United States v. Matthews, 11F. Supp. 2d 656, 663 (D. Md. 1998) (evaluating

amicus briefing on First Amendment implications of prosecution); United

States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (evaluating amicus

briefing on intersection of Hate Crimes Prevention Act and Religious Free-

dom Restoration Act); United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Crim. No. 14-

175, Dkt. 952 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2018) (inviting California Attorney General to

submit amicus brief addressing potential criminal liability under state law);

United States v. Vargas, Crim. No.13-6025, Dkt. 55 (E.D.Wash. Oct. 18, 2013)

(inviting Electronic Freedom Foundation to submit amicus brief to address

defendant’s motion to suppress).

31


Requiringthe Prod.of Tangible Things,No. BR 13-158,2013 WL 12335411,

at *2 (FISACt.Dec. 18, 2013). See also Jin v. Ministryof State Sec., 557 F.

Supp.2d131,136(D.D.C.2008)(same).

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Sineneng-

Smith,140S. Ct.1575(2020),doesnotcall the practiceintoquestion. See Pet.

7–8. That case rejectedthe NinthCircuit’seffort to overridethe parties’ad-

versarialpresentationof issues by appointingthree amici to address issues

neitherparty contemplated. 140 S. Ct. at 1578. The Court did not question

the useof appointedamiciwhenthe adversarialprocessbreaksdownbecause

the partiesarealigned. Infact, the Court’sopinioncontainedan appendixof

exampleswhereithadadoptedthat approach. Id.at 1582–83.

There is also no merit to Mr. Flynn’s implication(Pet. 29-30) that the

district court’s appointment of retiredJudge Gleeson suggests he will rule

against Mr.Flynn. Someone needs to fill the adversarialgap to ensurefull

considerationof the issues,and a former prosecutorandfederal judge is well

positionedto do so. Inany event, Judge Sullivan’srecordshows that he will

not blindly accept Judge Gleeson’s recommendations. Ina criminalcase be-

foreJudge Sullivan,the governmentand defendantswerealignedin support

of a DPA,andno onewas “takingtheotherside.” UnitedStatesv. SaenaTech

32


Corp.,Crim.No.14-66,Dkt.38 at 39(Nov.14,2014). JudgeSullivanappointed

anamicusknownfor hisskepticismof DPAstoaddressthe districtcourt’srole

andinapprovingtheagreement,6

thenrejectedtheamicus’s“toobroad”argu-

ments in ultimatelyagreeingwiththe governmentanddefendant. See Saena

Tech, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 34; see also Fokker, 818 F.3dat 747 (citingJudge

Sullivan’sdecisionwithapproval). Thus,JudgeSullivan’sactionsherearenot

a meritspreview.

B. Denying Mandamus Facilitates Efficient Resolution Of This

Case.

Denyingmandamusalsomakessense becauseit wouldallowthisCourt

to consider all the legal issues presentedby this case at once, rather than

piecemeal,ifsuchconsiderationisevennecessary.Regardlesshowthis Court

resolvesthe Rule48 issue,questionsremainwhetherMr.Flynnshouldbesub-

ject to any sanctionpursuantto statute,the FederalRules,andfederalcourts’

inherentauthorityto disciplinethose who fail to tell the truthunderoath and

obstructjustice in the courtroom. See 18U.S.C.§§ 401–402;Fed.R.Crim.P.

42; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,501U.S. 32, 41–44 (1991) (upholdingcourt’s

See6 BrandonL. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,93 Va. L.

Rev. 853, 922, 936 (2007) (arguingthat DPAsallow prosecutorsto “step[]far

outside of their traditional role” and “a federal judge need not accept a ‘fait

accompli’deferralagreement”).

33


inherentauthorityto punish“acts which degradethe judicial system, includ-

ing … misleading and lying to the Court” (quotations omitted)). This

factboundinquiryinvolveswell-establishedArticleIIIpowers,andthedistrict

courtshouldbepermittedto addressit inthe first instance.

Thecontemptpoweris “settledlaw”that “isessentialto the administra-

tion of justice.” Youngv. U.S. ex rel. Vuittonet FilsS.A., 481U.S. 787, 795

(1987). Itspringsfromthe court’sArticleIIIresponsibilityto protect its es-

sential functions, includingpreservingthe integrity of courts and the truth-

seekingprocess. See Int’lUnion,UnitedMineWorkers of Am. v. Bagwell,

512U.S.821,831(1994). Underthisinherentpower,“a courtmayissueorders,

punishfor contempt,vacate judgmentsobtainedby fraud, conduct investiga-

tions as necessary to exercise the power, bar persons from the courtroom,

assess attorney’sfees, and dismissactions.” UnitedStates v. ShafferEquip.

Co., 11F.3d450, 461(4thCir.1993).

To beclear, a contemptfindingor sanctionagainstMr.Flynnmay prove

unwarranted.Ifthe representationsinhisJanuary 2020 declarationare true,

they present attenuatingcircumstancesfor his prior, contrary statements.

Butthe natureandextentof Mr.Flynn’sreversalsunderoath—fromwhether

34


heliedto the governmentin JanuaryandMarch2017, to whether hewas co-

erced into pleading guilty, misled by his former attorneys, or improperly

dissuadedfrom withdrawinghis guilty plea in 2018 when Judge Sullivanof-

feredthat option—raisequestionsthat any judgeshouldtakeseriously. They

thus providea basis for invokingthe district court’sauthorityto “conductin-

vestigationsas necessary.” Id.7

* * *

Week after week, this Court addressesall manner of legal questions

aidedby factfindingandlegalanalysisfromthe abledistrictjudgesinthisCir-

cuit. In this unusual case, one of those long-tenuredjudges appointedan

amicusto enhancehisability to performthoseprecisetasks inthe nearfuture.

Becauseour judicialsystemispremisedon the notionthat adversarialpresen-

tationof theissuesleadsto betterdecisions,andbecausenodecisionshaveyet

7 Contrary to Mr. Flynn’s suggestion (Pet. 11–17), Judge Sullivan’s ap-

pointment of an amicus to brief the contempt power is appropriate. Because

contempt implicates core Article IIIpowers, “Courts cannot be at the mercy

of another Branch in deciding whether [contempt] proceedings should be ini-tiated.” Young, 481 U.S. at 796. That is why the Federal Rules explicitly

authorize the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate contempt. See

id.; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2). Judge Sullivan’s amicus order is more

restrained: It does not appoint Judge Gleeson to prosecute any contempt

charge, but merely to address whether initiating a contempt proceeding here

would be appropriate, and gives Mr. Flynn the last word on the question.

35


beenmade,theCourtshouldholsterthe“potentweapon[]”ofmandamus,Will

v. UnitedStates,389 U.S.90, 107(1967),andallow JudgeSullivanto evaluate

the government’smotionto dismiss inthe first instance.

J UNE

Thepetitionshouldbedenied.

1,2020

CONCLUSION

36

Respectfullysubmitted.

By:/s/ BethA.Wilkinson

B ETHA. W ILKINSON

K OSTAS.S TOJILKOVIC

R AKESHN.K ILARU

W ILKINSONW ALSHLLP

2001M StreetN.W.

Washington,D.C.20036

(202)847-4000

[email protected]

Counselfor Judge Sullivan


follows:

32(f)andCir.R.32(e)(1),the briefcontains7,787wordsincompliancewiththe

lengthlimitationin Fed.R.App. P.21(d)(1).

ingMicrosoftWordin14-pointCenturyfont.

D ATED

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCEWITH TYPEFACE AND WORD-COUNT LIMITATIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(g), the undersigned hereby certifies as

1. Exclusiveof the exemptedportionsprovidedinFed.R. App. P.

2. Thebriefhasbeenpreparedinproportionallyspacedtypefaceus-

: J UNE1,2020

/s/ BethA. Wilkinson

B ETHA. W ILKINSON


memberof the Bar of this Court,certify that, on June 1,2020, I electronically

filed the foregoingwith the Clerk usingthe Court’s electronic filing system.

As all participantsinthe caseare registeredwiththe Court’selectronicfiling

system,electronic filing constitutesserviceon the participants. See Fed.R.

App. P.25(c)(2)(A);Cir.R.25(f).

D ATED

CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE

I, Beth A. Wilkinson, counsel for the Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan and a

I further certify thatallpartiesrequiredto be servedhavebeenserved.

: J UNE1,2020

/s/ BethA. Wilkinson

B ETHA. W ILKINSON

inthe united states court of appeals for the district …...uscacase#20-5143 document#1845144...

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