interview with george habash - on the the future of the palestinian national movement (1985)

8/12/2019 Interview with George Habash - On the the Future of the Palestinian National Movement (1985)

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p U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A L I F O R N I A P R E S SJ O U R N A L S I G I TA L ( U B . I S H

G e o r g e H a b a s h : T h e F u t u r e of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n N a t i o n a l M o v e m e n tA u t h o r ( s ) : G e o r g e H a b a s hR e v i e w e d w o r k ( s ) :S o u r c e : Journal of Palestine Studies V o l . 1 4 , N o . 4 ( S u m m e r , 1 9 8 5 ), p p . 3 - 1 4P u b l i s h e d b y : University of California Press o n b e h a l f o f t h e Institute for Palestine Stu diesS t a b l e U R L :http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537117A c c e s s e d : 0 6 / 1 2 / 2 0 1 2 2 0 :5 4

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INTERVIEW

George H a b a s h : The Future ofthe Palest inian NationalMovementDr. George Habash, the General Secretary of the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine, was interviewed bytheJournalin Damascus on May14, 1985. The interview is one in a seriesofJPS interviews with leadingfigures in the Palestinian national movement.JPS:Following its departure from Beirut in1982 thePLOsplit into twocurrents:one isdescribed byobservers as moderate is led by Yasir Arafat and seeks apolitical settlement incoordination with Jordan andSyria;the other is described asradical enjoys Syrian support andseeks torevive the policy ofarmed resistance.Do youagreewiththis analysis Howdoyouassess the potentialofboth currentsgiven prevailingP alestinian Arab andinternational conditionsHabash:Before answering, I would like to poin t ou t an im portan t issueoverlooked by the question; namely, that these two major currents on thePalestinian scene do not date from the period following the departure fromBeirut in 1982 but, rather, have been in existence for many years. Thisdivision, or distinction, is as old as the Palestinian revolution. Since theearliest days of post-1948 Palestinian national action, there has been aconflict between the movement's two main wings: the rightist wing,representing national bourgeois policy in the revolution, and the leftistwing, representing the policy of the working and popular classes. The' Please note the interview was conducted before the recent fighting for control of Sabra, Shatila andBurj al-Barajnah eruptedEd.


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4 JOU RNA L OF PALESTINE STUDIES

distinction may be observed at most, if not all, the major milestones in thehistory of the revolution and the PLO.It is true that this distinction did not reach the point of division or afinal break, as is now the case, but it is also true that the c urren t state of thePalestinian revolution is a logical and natural result of these past distinctionswhichandthis is mostimportantreflect the division and contrastsamong the various social and class forces that constitute the Palestinenational liberation movement.Here too I should add that the relationship between these two currentshas passed through periods of tension and periods of detente depending onthe circumstances and the events we faced. The central issue, however, isthat despite everything, the Palestinian revolution maintained its internalunity in the face of the dangers which threatened it, especially in the faceof the Zionist onslaught on Beirut which sought to liquidate the revolutionin its entirety.The point to be emphasized is that before Beirut, our differences withthe Palestinian right took place against a national background. Unity and

struggle were practiced within the same national framework. The newfactor after Beirut, however, is that the dominant rightist current in thePLO began to show its readiness to adapt itself to American conditions.This became clear in its wishy-washy approach to theReagan initiative. Inaddition, there was an opening up to the Egyptian regime, and close tieswere forged with the Jordanian regime. This began to threaten the militantnational identity of the PLO and signaled the readiness of this current toabandon both the exclusivity of Palestinian representation within theframework of the PLO and the essence of the PLO's national covenant,which calls for return, self-determination and the creation of an independent state.Th is somewhat lengthy introduction is meant to make clear certain factswhich some information agencies have tried to cover up in an attempt toportray the Palestinian conflict as temporary and the result of regionalfactors whose effect and influence on Palestinian decision-making began togrow following the departure from Beirut.While acknowledging the role and influence of these factors, we cannot

ignore the core of the problem w hich, as already no ted, lies in the departureof certain segments and groups within the PLO from the course of thePalestine national liberation movement and their adoption of a policy ofconcession and surrender which will place them in the enemy camp. Thepolicy is dictated by several factors, the most important being their


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6 JOUR NAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

On the other hand, instead of the weight of Arab influence being on theside of the PLO in its relations with Jordan, King Hussein has been able tostrengthen his alliance withHusni Mubarak; the PLO is now subjected tothe combined pressure of Jordan and Egypt, which seeks to deprive it of itsremaining cards, as demonstrated by the Mubarak initiative which wentbeyond King Hussein's own well-known initiative.Therefore, it is clear that the option chosen by the rightist leadershipwill lead only to forcing the PLO into more crises and dead ends. Theseleaders will no t succeed in reaching a political accord guaranteeing ev enthe minimum legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.As for the other current inside the Palestinian revolution, one ought toexamine its activity and development. Despite the difficulties facing itsstruggle, this current has open horizons and is seeking to acquire enoughstrength to enable it to continue the revolution until the nationalobjectives and aspirations of our people are achieved.On the Palestinian level, there has been a mass departure from therightist current following the signing of the Amman accord. There is alsobroad national and trade union opposition to this accord and a substantialrallying around the forces opposed to it.

On the Arab level, despite the difficulties which the Arab liberationmovement currently faces, one can see signs of revival in that movement,what we m ight call early signs of the com ing of revolutionary change in theArab homeland. These signs have become clearer in Lebanon through thevictories of the Lebanese National Resistance Front, in the Sudan and inthe bread unrest throughout N orth Africa.On the international level, the depth of the progressive current on thePalestinian scene reaches the heart of the Socialist camp, led by the SovietU nio n, as well as the n ational liberation movem ents througho ut th e w orld.This international front, with whom the rightist current has neglected tomake alliance, cannot but support the national rights of the Palestinianpeople and its ongoing revolution.In short, we rely on the historic and strategic alliances of the revo lution,whereas the other party seeks new alliances in the enemy camp. Their only

concern is to deprive the PLO of all its cards in preparation for itsabsorption by the Jordanian regime and its transformation into a reactionarycaricature in the service of US objectives.The fate of these two currents is clear and c anno t be obscured by prese ntentanglements or problems.


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HABASH

JPS: Do you believe there is room forreconciliation between the two broadcurrents on thePalestinian scene and onwhat foundationsHabash:Based on my answer above, I believe tha t the rightist curr ent,misnamed the mode rate curren t, will no t abandon its political op tionuntil the very end. This current is a captive of its class affiliations andpresent alliances and shows no signs of backing away, especially since thisoption has become the basis of personal gambles which cannot easily beabandoned if the present leadership remains. Furthermore, in view of theproblems created by the policy of the deviationist leadership inside thePLO, we cannot accept the continued domination of the rightist currentand the influence of its symbols after all the pain and suffering it has causedour people and revolution, even if we assume that they might abandon theAmman accord under the pressure of the crisis they face today. This is whywe have called for linking the struggle to abrogate the Amman accord withthe struggle to abrogate the policy and the symbols produced by that accord.It is on this basis that the Palestine National Salvation Front wasproclaimed.

What should be emphasized in this context is that the more thedeviationist leadership becomes embroiled in US schemes, the more ourmasses and their national forces will abandon it. We are confident that thisleadership will leave the ranks of the PLO isolated and divested of allpopular backing or support. We, in turn, are presently engaged in speedingup the process of mass and national disillusionment with this leadership.This leads us to another essential point, namely, that the remote chance

of a meeting between the two currents does not, and should not, in anysense mean that chances of achieving Palestinian national unity in the faceof imperialist designs are also remote. This unity will one day be achieved.It will include the broadest sectors of our people, and will exclude onlythose who bargained away our national rights and the gains of our peopleand our revolution.JPS: Do you inthe Salvation Front consider yourselves asubstituteforthe PLO?How do youconceive ofrebuilding theinstitutions and therole ofthe PLO?Habash:W e in the Palestine N ational Salvation Front do n ot considerourselves a substitute for the PL O. W e have emphasized this fact more th anonce, as we did in the documents which established the Salvation Front


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itself. In this respect, we proceed from a firm belief in the necessity of thereturn of the PLO to its national line so that it can remain a frameworkuniting the Palestinian people and acting as its sole legitimate representative.Contrary to the propaganda and information campaign waged against usby rightist and reactionary elem ents, we are the ones who are most attac hedto this major accomplishment of the Palestinian people and we shall resistall attempts to abandon it or to present it on a silver platter to reactionarycircles, as has been done by the rightist leadership. Th is leadership violatedthe principle of the unity of Palestinian representation within the framework of the PLO w hen it signed the A mm an accord and accepted Jordanianparticipation in such representation.

Ou r conc ern is reflected in the docum ents of the S alvation F ront, wh ichare designed to be a temporary framework to restore the PLO to its nationa lline. We have affirmed in several instances our adherence to the PLO andto safeguarding its national line. Our rejection of any substitute or parallelformulas has often been stressed.As for the second part of the question, we believe th at a battle m ust nowbe waged to isolate the deviationist Right in order to prepare to restore thePLO to its national line. This requires the widest possible mobilization ofnational forces opposed to the policy of deviation and its symbols so that itmay be possible to speak of rebuilding the institutions of the PLO onnational and democratic foundations.We are not about to create a new role for the PLO. When we speak ofrestoring it to the national line, we mean restoring it to its national role as

outlined by the resolutions of its national and legitimate councils, the lastof which was held in Algeria. This is a role which derives from the PLO'sidentity as a natio nal liberation m ovem ent opposed to imperialism, Zionismand reaction.Then again, we do not intend to create new institutions for the PLO.We are simply working to rebuild existing institutions, such as theExecutive Committee, the Central Council and the National Council, ondemocratic foundations which guarantee collective leadership, reject hegemony and grant an active and influential role to the Palestinian democratic

and progressive forces. In other words, we shall work to implement theorganizational programs approved by the PLO in successive nationalFor a full text of the National Salvation Front's political program, see Documents and Source Materialin current issue ofJPSEd.


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HABASH

councils. Their implementation has been obstructed by the domination ofthe deviationist leadership and their monopoly on the decision-makingprocess.JPS: How do youconceive of thestrategy ofPalestinian a ction in the comingstage?Habash: The strategy of Palestinian action in the coming stage revolvesaround a central axis: the adoption of a policy of armed struggle and theescalation of that struggle against the Zionist enemy.We are still living in a stage characterized by a clear imbalance of powerto the advantage of the enemy. T his means, apriori that it is impossible towrest even a minimum of legitimate Palestinian national rights, let aloneachieve the implementation of a stage-by-stage strategic program forPalestinian national struggle.

Therefore, until it is possible to say that we are capable of achievingthese rights, escalating armed struggle against the Zionist enemy is requireduntil the enemy is forced to retreat, as happened in Lebanon. Armedstruggle, as we understand it and in accordance with our conception of apeople's war, is the most developed form of struggle waged by revolutionaryforces. It implies the total support of the masses which have been mobilized,organized and trained . Every citizen has the op portunity to resist o ccup ationby all available m eans. Theories of armed struggle hav e be en pu t to t he testmore than once and their scientific character has been demonstrated. Theexperience of the heroic resistance in Beirut in 1982 constitutes proof ofthis. The Lebanese example has been, and will remain, an example for usall.

Defined in this manner and as clarified by experience, armed struggle isclosely linked with all other forms of strugglediplomatic, popular,intellectual and political. Although it is the highest form of all, and themost effective against the enemy, it is closely linked in a complementarymanner with the other forms such that no single type of struggle can beignored.On the other hand, escalation of Palestinian popular struggle should belinked to and com plemented by its Arab dimension through strengtheningcoordination and alliances with groups inside the Arab liberation movement and with patriotic Arab regimes. The struggle against the enemy hasnever been just a Palestinian-Zionist conflict, despite the importance andcentrality of the Palestinian factor. It is, rather, an Arab-Zionist conflict,


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which calls for the mob ilization of all the resources of the A rab na tion. Th isis why we have always attached great importance in Palestinian nationalaction to the question of alliances with the Arab liberation movement, inall its forms.In this context, the Lebanese arena occupies a unique place inPalestinian strategy. The struggle with the Zionist enemy in Lebanon isopen and clear. We still have a military presence to fight the enemy and toprotect the security of our camps in the face of Zionist attacks.I am not revealing secrets when I say that we in the Palestinianrevolution are incomparably better off today on th e Lebanese scene tha n wewere a year ago or more. We are in the process of developing our role in fullcoordination with the Lebanese national forces and with Syria, so thatPalestinians can have sufficient room for maneuvering without beingprovoked on the one hand, and without returning to thepre-1982 situationon the other.Furthermore, the Jordanian arena, with its particular geographical anddemographic characteristics relative to the Palestinian presence, has special

importance within this strategy. We base our analysis on the necessity ofcreating a base of support for the Palestinian revolution in one of thecountries adjacent to occupied Palestine. We accord Jordan top priority inthis respect. In addition, as we formulate a strategy for Palestinian action inthe coming stage, we cannot but think of a close alliance with Syria, whichplays a central role in countering US designs in the area and in blocking itsway, whether in Lebanon or in the Arab world in general.On the international level, we have a set policy, the essence of which

is to m aintain a close strategic relationship with th e Socialist bloc countriesled by the Soviet Union, with liberation movements and with communist,democratic and progressive parties throughout the world.Our alliances on the Palestinian, Arab and international levels are whatwill ensure the desired transformation in the balance of power in thecoming stage. Our people will thereby be able to regain their nationalrights, foremost among them the right of return, self-determination and theestablishment of an independent state.

JPS: Do youbelieve that there is a link between thisstrategy and the Syrianstrategy How is this translated intopracticeHabash:Th ere is, no do ubt, a special link between the Palestinian andSyrian strategies, which grows out ofacommo n struggle against the enemy.


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HABASH 11

All the following activities constitute examples of the many pointswhich link Syrian and Palestinian strategy: our political activity inchallenging the Camp David conspiracy; the battles we waged jointly inLebanon which culminated in the abrogation of the May 17accord and theexpulsion of the NATO and Zionist presence and from most Lebaneseterritory; and our success along with the Lebanese nationalists, who playedthe principal role, in undermining the fascist hegemony and in driving itback inside the borders of its isolationist ghetto. We find in Syria today aprincipal base for the struggle at this stage. With its capabilities, Syria playsthe chief role in maintaining Arab steadfastness and in challenging effortsto defeat it.

This, of course, does not mean that the two strategies are identical.There is a difference between a strategy of a people's war adopted byPalestinian action and the Syrian strategy, which is based on the strategicbalance and conv entio nal war. This difference, however, does no t dim inishthe reciprocal benefit offered by the two strategies and leaves the door openfor more advanced forms of coordination and cooperation.]PS: How do you view the role of thePalestinian people inside the occupiedterritories within the frameworkofthe strategyofPalestinian action Do youthinkthe modelo fnational resistance inSouth Lebanon can be applied inside PalestineHabash:Th e Palestinian people inside the occupied territories occupy acentral position in the strategy of Palestinian action. Suffice it to say thatalmost half the Palestinian people still reside in their homeland. Hence theimportance and centrality of their role.The Zionist enemy has succeeded in using the weapon of land sequestration, but has not until nowdespite its terrorist policies, its manymassacres and its acts ofbrutalitysucceeded in uprooting that part of ourpeople from its national soil. It may be said that the fact that our peoplehave remained on our national soil constitutes the most effective weaponwe possess to combat the policy of creeping dispossession of the land.Furthermore, our masses in the occupied homeland have played a prominent role in frustrating attempts to create a substitute for the PLO. It hasbecome impossible for the enemy to find anyone with any mass followingwilling to negotiate with them or speak in place of the PLO.

These facts emphasize that all national Palestinian forces and organizations should give the territories the attention they deserve. The facts also


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demonstrate thenecessityofspeedingup thecrystallization of aprogramofaction on thepopular and leadership levels in the occupied territories.It must also be pointed out that our concentration on the occupiedterritoriesas the central arenaof our struggle should not for one momentleadus to ignoreor underestimate the importance of Palestinian action inthe diaspora;norshould itmakeusignoreoru nderestimate the importanceoftherole playedby thestructureofthe Palestinian revolution abroad.Themodern experience of the Palestinian struggle has revealed that theexistenceof the PLO hasplayed acentral role inawakening themassesinthe occupied homeland. These massesnowhaveafocal po int wh ich unifiestheir struggle, speaks in their name and expresses their national interests.

At every stage when the PLO achieved certain gains or sufferedsetbacks, these were directly reflected in the occupied homeland. Demonstrations would erupt in each town and village to everyone's surprise,including the PLO leaders themselves.As for the second part of the question, we believe that the modelofLebanese national resistance is an inspirationfor ourpeople's struggleandwill directly affect thesituationin theoccupied hom eland.For thefirst timea people's war with all its ramifications, was waged against the enemywhich found itself alsofor the first time, forced to retreat uncond itionallyfrom alandit hadoccupiedand onwhichitremainedat avery high hum anand material cost.

These central facts shouldnotdriveus in thedirectionof anunreasonable optimism regarding applicabilityofthe Lebanese m odelto theoccupiedhomeland for the following reasons:1. The occupied Palestinian territories lack the geographical anddemographic depthof the occupied Lebanese south. Theresult is ascarcity of military support and facilities. Moreover, the occupiedLebanese south found in the liberated national territories and inSyria sourcesofsupport whereas theJordanian regime,forexample,standsas anobstacleto thedeliveryofsuch supportto theoccupiedPalestinian territories.2. There is adifference in thecond itionsofoccup ation in Palestinian

and Lebanese territories. The occupation of the first came after aperiodofhegemonyby the Jordanian regime when public freedomswere suppressedand allattemptsatarmed action against theZionistenemy, indeed the mere possession of arms itself were forbidden.Th e occupationof theSouth,on the other hand, came after almost


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a decade of civil war: arms were abundant and there were experienced fighters in every town and village in Lebanon. This made itpossible to join in the fighting at a rate not possible in our ownoccupied lands.3. Zionist objectives in occupied Palestinian land are different fromthe objectives in Lebanon: broad political groups inside Israelbelieve Palestinian land to be part of the promised lan d, no t to berelinquished under any circumstances.Thus, the repetition of the Lebanese model on Palestinian soil requiresarduous struggle to bring about a transformation in the objective conditions.This is why Jordan occupies an important place in our strategy for thecoming phase. The difficulties involved in applying the Lebanese model donot in any way lessen the value of the Lebanese example and its manypositive effects among Palestinians in general and in the occupied homelandin particular.

]PS:Israel isproceeding totighten itshold onPalestinian territories occupied in1967while thePalestinians arewitnessingaparalyzingsplit. The Arabarena isalso plagued bydifferences which impede the adoption ofa unifiedArab position.Wh at do yousee asthe direct response toIsraeli measures aimed atleaving littleornothingfor futurenegotiationHabash:The situation on b oth the Palestinian and A rab levels clearlyenables the enemy to adopt wide-ranging m easures in the occupied lands sothat day by day the area of Arab land awaiting absorption or expropriationis shrinking.Zionist activity has gone far along the path of land expropriation evenif on the level of actually settling people the success has not been as great.Colonization, as you know, is a weapon in the hands of the Zionistleadership which it uses against us to exploit both the occupation of Arablands and the present condition of the Arab world. From our point of view,we have no alternative but resistance, resistance of all possible kinds.Hence, the importance of that segment of our people still residing in thehomeland. Israel wants to expropriate the land, but our people continue tolive in and to be attached to their homeland. The future belongs to themand this is what scares the enemy, despite the expropriation of land.Shimon Peres, for instance, expresses the fear that by the year 2000,Palestinian numbers will equal those of the Israelis. This is why he is


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seeking a regional compromise solution with Jordan through the so-calledJordanian option.Therefore, we must escalate our military operation in these territoriesso that life becomes exceedingly difficult for the Israelis and more costlythan comfortable for their colonialist enterprises.Just because Israel annexes this or that territory does not mean that weshould abandon our demand for it. Otherwise, how can we call for therecovery of the Golan and Jerusalem? More importantly, what meaningwould our slogan of liberating Palestine and creating a democratic republicon our national soil have? We realize that these Zionist measures add newburdens and we know quite well that the enemy wants to create new factson the ground to make it impossible to demand the abrogation ortranscending of these facts. But our only option is constant resistance torestore the balance of power so that not only will these measures benegated, but so that we may go even further in achieving our interim andstrategic objectives.

Of course this does not mean that we underestimate the gravity of thesemeasures. They are of the utmost harm to our masses in the occupied landas they place new difficulties in the way of solving our national problem.This requires widely based resistance and close attention to developingforms and methods of common action in the occupied homeland, inaddition to escalating our armed struggle.