international evidence on public-private partnerships to improve access and quality in education...
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International Evidence on Public-Private International Evidence on Public-Private Partnerships to Improve Access and Quality Partnerships to Improve Access and Quality
in Educationin Education
Harry Anthony PatrinosWorld Bank
October 2007
Public-Private Partnerships: DefinedPublic-Private Partnerships: Defined
No fixed definition of PPPs
Definitions differ in terms of scope and formality of arrangements
Various definitions: “risk sharing relationship based upon an agreed aspiration between the public and private sectors to bring about a desired public policy outcome.”
– Commission on UK PPPs
“cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards.”
– Canadian Council for PPPs
Common ElementsCommon Elements
Formal arrangement with contractual basis
Involve public and private sectors
Outcome focus
Sharing of risks/rewards between public and private
sectors
Recognize complementary role of public and private
sectors
Role of Government in EducationRole of Government in Education
Rationale for government involvement in education: • Externalities• Capital market imperfections• Agency concerns• Equity• Information asymmetries
Government has a variety of policy instruments at its disposal in order to meet its policy objectives:
• Ownership/Delivery• Funding• Regulation/Information
PPPs recognise that governments can meet their policy objectives using different service delivery models – not just ‘traditional’ public finance/public delivery model
Financing and ProvisionFinancing and Provision
Provision
Financing Private Public
Private
Private schools Private universities Home schooling Tutoring
User fees Student loans
Public
Vouchers Contract Schools Charter schools Contracting out
Public schools Public universities
Benefits of Public-Private PartnershipsBenefits of Public-Private Partnerships
Increase efficiency – improved performance incentives and increased competitive pressure
Improved quality of service delivery
Secure specialized skills that may not be available in government agencies
Overcome public service operating restrictions – obsolete salary scales, out of date civil service work rules, etc
Permit quicker response to changing demands and facilitate adoption of service delivery innovations
Benefits of PPPs (cont’d)Benefits of PPPs (cont’d)
Benefit from economies of scale regardless of the size
of the government entity
Allow government agency to focus on functions where it
has a comparative advantage
Increase access, especially for groups who have been
poorly served under traditional forms of service delivery
Increase transparency of government spending by
making the cost of services more visible
Types of PPPs in EducationWhat government contracts for Definition Contract types
1 Management, professional
services (input)
Government buys school
management services or
auxiliary and professional
services
Management contracts
Professional services contract
(curriculum design)
2 Operational services (process) Government buys school
operation services
Operational contracts
3 Education services (output) Government buys student
places in private schools
(contracts with school to enroll
specific students)
Contract for education of specific
students
4 Facility availability (input) Government buys facility
availability
Provision of infrastructure
services contracts
5 Facility availability and education
services (input and output
bundle)
Government buys facility
availability combined with
services (operational)
Provision of infrastructure
contracts with education services
contracts
Source: World Bank 2005
Examples of Education PPPsExamples of Education PPPs
Government contracting with private schools
Private management of public schools
Infrastructure PPPs
Vouchers/subsidies
Public/private sector affiliation arrangements
Private sector regulation
Innovation and research PPPs
Examples of PPPsExamples of PPPsType of PPP Examples
Contracting for the Delivery of Education
Services
Government sponsorship of private school students, Cote d’IvoireEducation services contracting, PhilippinesAlternative education, New ZealandUniversal post primary education & training policy, UgandaFe y Alegria, South America & Spain
Private Management of Public Schools
Concession schools, Bogota, ColombiaRailways schools, PakistanIndependent schools, QatarQuality education for all, Punjab, PakistanCDG Lahore/CARE schools, PakistanContract and charter schools, USATransformed schools, China
Infrastructure PPPs
Private Finance Initiative, UKProyecto Prestacion de Servicios, MexicoNew Schools Private Finance Project, AustraliaPPPs for Educational Infrastructure, CanadaOffenbach & Cologne Schools Projects, GermanySwinburne University of Technology, AustraliaNational Maritime college, IrelandMontaigne Lyceum, The Hague, Netherlands
Examples of PPPs (cont’d)Examples of PPPs (cont’d)Type of PPP Examples
Vouchers/Subsidies
PACES, Colombia
Targeted individual entitlement, independent school subsidies, New Zealand
Private school subsidies, Cote d’Ivoire
School funding, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden
Milwaukee Parental Choice Programme, USA
Punjab Education Foundation programs, Pakistan
Private Sector Quality Assurance USA, Oman, Philippines
Public/Private Sector Affiliation Arrangements
Ghana, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China, New Zealand, South Africa
Innovation and Research PPPs
Government programs encourage industry-public research institute research. Netherlands Government programs encourage industry-research institute partnerships and promote commercialization of public research, Australia
Contracting Models in Latin AmericaContracting Models in Latin AmericaModel Country Program
Latin America and Spain
Fe y Alegría
Colombia Bogotá’s Concession Schools
Management contracts
Professional services contract (curriculum design)
Operational contracts Venezuela Venezuelan Association of Catholic Education
Colombia PACES (vouchers for low income students)
Contract for education of specific students
Chile Universal vouchers
Provision of infrastructure services contracts
Mexico Projects for the Provision of Services-University of San Luis Potosi
Provision of infrastructure contracts with education services contracts
N/A N/A
ProgramsPrograms
Private management of public schools• Management contracts, professional services, operational contracts• Charter schools, concession schools, etc.• Involves governments or public authorities contracting directly with private
(for- & non-profit) providers to manage public school• Schools remain ‘free’ to students – no fees • Schools responsible for all aspects of school operation • Used mostly in disadvantaged areas
Contract for education of specific students• Vouchers, scholarships, direct funding of private (& public) schools
Evidence on PPPsEvidence on PPPs
Limited rigorous evidence on impact
Ideal evaluation involves random assignment & use true control group
or natural experiment
Much debate over impact of vouchers in Chile and USA, remain
controversial
Many studies on impact of charter schools, though few randomized
trials
USA: EMO Managed Schools/EnrollmentsUSA: EMO Managed Schools/Enrollments
135
230
285
368
406
463
535
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Nu
mb
er
of
Sc
ho
ols
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
En
rollm
en
ts
Schools Under EMO Management Enrollments
National Charter School Research Project 2007
Fe y Fe y AlegríaAlegría Schools in South America Schools in South America
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Concession Schools, Bogota, ColombiaConcession Schools, Bogota, Colombia
Private schools contracted to manage poorly performing public schools
25 schools serving over 26,000 students – disadvantaged students
Autonomous
15 year contract
Designed to overcome problems faced by public schools – inability of schools to hire own staff, lack of labour flexibility, bureaucracy
Schools paid $500 per student per year – below public school unit cost
7,007
19,374
21,430
23,117
26,308
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
En
rollm
ents
Evaluation of ProposalsEvaluation of Proposals
quality of proposal 30%
profile of admin. & teachers
30%
student performance30%
student allocation requested
10%
Monitoring & EvaluationMonitoring & Evaluation
Inspect school property administration
Supervision visits to observe adherence to pedagogical norms and
standards
Independent evaluation of finances to see if academic objectives
met
Impact EvaluationImpact Evaluation
Propensity score and matching estimation technique (Barrera 2006)
Hypotheses:• Dropout rates are lower in concessions schools than in similar, public schools• No effects (yet) or small ones on test scores• Nearby schools have lower dropout rates than public schools outside the
influence of concessions
Test ScoresTest Scores
42
44
46
48
50
52
noconcesion concesion
privado publico publico
mean of matematicas1 mean of fisica1mean of biologia1 mean of lenguaje1
Public schools have lower test scores
Concession and public non-concession schools are “similar”
FindingsFindings
Strong evidence of a direct effect of Concession Schools on
dropout rates and some evidence that they had an impact on
dropout rates on nearby public schools
Positive impact on students’ test scores relative to those in public
schools
Dropout rates were 1.7 points lower, while mathematics and
language scores were 1 point and 2 points higher than students in
similar public schools
Dropout Results: ImpactDropout Results: Impact
Matching:
•10 nearest estimators, common support, balance groups
•Direct Effect: reduction in 1.7 points dropout rates
•Indirect Effect: reduction in 0.82 points
Matching
Varible: Dropout rate
Difference Treatment-ControlUnmatched -0,0130 -0,0069ATT -0,0173 -0,0082
Bootstrap statisticsRepetitions 1000 1000Standard error 0,0039 0,0096317Bias-corrected conf. interv. -0,0244 -0,0112 -0,0341 0,0004
Impact variable: Dropout rate Impact variable: Dropout rate
Direct impact over dropout rate Indirect impact over dropout rate
Test Results: ImpactTest Results: Impact
Matching:
•10 nearest estimators, common support, balance groups
•Effect over math test scores: improvement of 2.4%
•Effect over language test scores: improvement of 4%
Matching
Varible: Test scores
Difference Treatment-ControlUnmatched -0,2099 0,6234ATT 0,9732 1,9364
Bootstrap statisticsRepetitions 100 100Standard error 0,522 0,748Bias-corrected conf. interv. 1,2684 1,4655 1,5501 2,8472
Impact variable: Mathematics Impact variable: Languaje
National Voucher Program, ChileNational Voucher Program, Chile
Nationwide voucher program implemented in 1980
Applies to public & private schools – secular & religious
Monthly payments made to schools on per-student basis
Voucher schools must follow operational guidelines (basic facilities, certified teachers, class size)
Vouchers cover most or all tuition at eligible schools
Enrollments Shares, Public vs Private Enrollments Shares, Public vs Private Schools, ChileSchools, Chile
53
34.2
3.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Public Schools Co-financed Private Schools Fully Subsidized Private Schools
Perc
ent
Test Score Effects from Selected Studies Test Score Effects from Selected Studies on Chile Voucher Programon Chile Voucher Program
Private Subsidized Catholic Subsidized Private Non-subsidized
Bravo et al (1999) = +
Gallegos (2002) +
Carnoy & McEwan (2000) - + +
Mizala & Romaguera (1999) = +
Sapelli (2003) +
Vegas (2002) = + +
McEwan (2001) = = =
Mizala & Romaguera (2003) + +
Sapelli and Vial (2002) +
Mizala and others (2004) + +
Source: Adapted from Bellei (2006)
““When Schools Compete, How Do They When Schools Compete, How Do They Compete?”Compete?”
While private enrollment rate increased by 20 points, greater
impacts in larger, more urban, wealthier communities
Hsieh and Urquiola (J Public Economics 2006) use this
differential impact to measure effects of unrestricted choice on
outcomes using panel data for 150 municipalities
They find no evidence that choice improved average outcomes
(test scores, repetition, years of schooling)
They do find evidence that voucher led to increased sorting, as
the “best” public school students left for private sector
More on ChileMore on Chile
Finding a rule about arbitrary assignment to treatment that mimics randomization is very important (Hoxby 2003)
Researchers need to find control schools that were excluded from the reform for some reason that is uncorrelated with factors that affect their future performance
Such arbitrary exclusion can sometimes be found in policy rules or natural events
In some school choice reforms, no arbitrary exclusions exist
When Chile introduced school choice, same law applied across entire country so variation in choice entirely endogenous, and no pre-treatment data exists
Thus, researchers have neither pretreatment trends nor arbitrary assignment to treatment, and none of studies on Chilean vouchers is sufficiently credible to be given much weight
Colombia: Colombia: Plan de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (PACES)
Introduced in Colombia in early 1990s
Provided 125,000 vouchers from 1992-1997
Offered vouchers to students entering 6th grade, start of secondary school
Key elements of program:• vouchers available to children from low-income families who had
attended a public primary school & accepted at private school
• renewable subject to satisfactory academic performance
• value = $190; half the cost of private secondary school
• school received voucher funds directly from the bank
• schools were allowed to charge top-up fees; and
• there was minimal regulation of private schools
PACES Voucher, ColombiaPACES Voucher, Colombia
Voucher program designed to give students from poor families access to secondary schooling (Angrist & others 2002, 2006)
Randomized trial – students randomly selected through a lottery system and given vouchers to attend secondary school
Findings:• Lottery winners were 15-20% more likely to attend a private school, 10%
more likely to complete 8th grade and scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on standardized tests
• Program effects larger for girls• Program cost less than the unit cost in the public sector• Longer-term positive effects – lottery winners more likely to take college
entrance exam• Increase in (proxy) high school graduation rates of 5-7 percentage points,
relative to a base rate of 25-30%
PACES Voucher, ColombiaPACES Voucher, Colombia
Indicator Impact – PACES Voucher Students Were:
Years of Schooling 10 percentage points more likely to finish 8th grade
Grade Repetition 5-6 percentage points less likely to repeat a grade than
non-voucher students
Test Scores Scored 0.2 standard deviations higher on achievement
tests
Finished High School 5-7 percentage points higher than non-voucher
students
Take College Entrance Exam 15-20% more likely to take the college entrance exam
College Exam Scores More likely to score 2 points higher than non-voucher
Employment 2.5-3.0 percentage points less likely to be working than
non-voucher students
Being Married or Cohabitating 0.6-1.0 percentage points less likely to be married or
living with someone than non-voucher students
PACES Voucher, VocationalPACES Voucher, Vocational
Voucher skeptics argue that even if vouchers benefit recipients, they do so by improving their peer groups at the expense of others’
Therefore they do no benefit society as a whole
This requires that voucher recipients have more desirable peers than they otherwise would have
Bettinger, Kremer, Saavedra (2007) look at applicants for whom winning voucher did not lead to attending schools with peers with
superior observable characteristics
They focus on those who applied to vocational private schools
Lottery losers were more likely to attend academic secondary schools
Find that lottery winners had better educational outcomes, including higher graduation rates & reading test scores
Casts doubt on argument that voucher effects operate entirely through improving peers available to recipients
Education Contract Options and PotentialEducation Contract Options and Potential
Type International experience Policy suggestion
Voucher Extensive Expand, but based on rigorous
evaluations
Charter schools Significant, inconclusive
evaluation findings
Evaluate; consider
PFIs: Contracting for private
financing and construction of
schools
A few countries have
experience; shown moderate
success
Consider with caution; evaluate
PFIs Contracting for private
actors to run schools, as well as
finance and build them
None (yet) Given potentially high returns,
worth considering, but need a
plan to involve providers and
financiers, and evaluation of
pilot
Contracting Guiding PrinciplesContracting Guiding PrinciplesEnabling policy, regulatory
Split purchaser/provider role
Capacity of contract agency
Transparent, competitive selection
Staged selection process
Performance measures, incentives, sanctions
Effective contract monitoring
Providers maximum flexibility
Long-term contracts with providers
Independent evaluation
World Bank 2006