intelligence improvementintelligence improvement 84 journal of strategic intelligence summer 2016 a...

83Journal of Strategic Intelligence Summer 2016

About the Author: James E. Dillard, a career intelligence officer with CIA, Air Force, and DIA, who has served on the NIU faculty since 2006, teaches covert action and national strategy courses. A graduate of Syracuse Uni-versity, he has published a book on U.S. intelligence history and numerous journal articles on East Asian history, air campaign planning in the Middle East, and Korean-U.S. relations since 1900.

Winston Churchill once remarked that he “disliked

intensely” the prospect of a large-scale campaign in northern Burma, adding, “[O]ne could not choose a worse place for fighting the Japanese.” Burma, he added, posed huge chal-lenges for communications, logistics, and command and control, and he assessed the terrain to be “the most forbidding fighting country imaginable.” Against his wishes and better judgment, he acceded to overtures by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to launch commando operations and intelligence-gathering programs to support American and British ground and air units in China. Allied conventional forces in the China-Burma-India Theater gained

OSS Detachment 101 and Anti-Japanese Resistance Operations in Burma, 1942-1945By James E. Dillard

Intelligence Improvement

U.S-led Burmese guerrillas fording a stream in central Burma (World War II Today)


84 Journal of Strategic Intelligence Summer 2016

a key force multiplier when OSS initiated intelligence collection and sabo-tage operations throughout northern Burma in the late spring of 1942.1

Detachment 101 holds the distinction of being the only OSS unit whose operations were a critical component of and integral to the conduct of the Allied campaign in the China-Burma Theater. Detachment 101 fulfilled OSS Director William “Wild Bill” Donovan’s image of clandestine units aiding conventional ground and air units perhaps more than any other OSS unit, in part because of its organizational adaptability and unique combat environment. For the unit’s superb performance between 1942 and 1945, the OSS assessed Detachment 101 to be “its most effective combat tactical force.” OSS Headquarters added that the unit’s small cadre of commandoes and intelligence officers “may well come to be recognized as a model for subversive operations under the same or analogous conditions,” and they were pioneers “in a type of operation which may well become a classic of modern warfare.”2

During the course of its unconventional warfare campaign, Detachment 101 had, by mid-1944 channeled through three phases of a typical insur-gency: infiltration and preparation, sabotage and subversion, and finally guerrilla support to aid conventional units. However, Detachment 101’s re-sourceful nature and agility as a war-fighting unit allowed a unique fourth phase: the unit’s guerrillas were the only U.S.-led ground combat element in Burma by June 1945. The structure, mission, and scope of the OSS unit in Burma made it the forerunner of today’s special forces, even though the OSS detachment is not officially recognized in the lineage of any U.S. Army ground element.3

The underfunded U.S. campaign in Burma was one of the most poorly resourced of all operational campaigns in World War II and was at the end of one of the longest logistics trails of the entire war. Due to the difficult op-erational environment, the few American infantry units that fought in north-ern Burma, such as Merrill’s Marauders, were purposely formed, organized, trained, and equipped to deal with the unique challenges of jungle warfare. Since Burma was a British colony, Churchill and his government had com-

1Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000), 18. 2OSS Special Operations Branch History, Folder 4, Box 101, Entry 99, RG 226, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.3 Robert Warner to William J. Donovan, “History of OSS/IBT,” April 14, 1945, NARA.



mand supremacy; American strategy in the Burma campaign centered on keeping China in the war. The Japanese had occupied China’s major ports since 1938, and this left China with a tenuous and long overland route, the Burma Road, to support its forces with U.S.-supplied aid. With their inva-sion of 1942, the Japanese severed even this link.4

With the Burma Road under enemy control, the U.S. Army Air Force established airfields in Assam, India, to fly cargo aircraft via the hazardous “Hump” air bridge through the Himalayan mountain passes to China. This proved costly in terms of aircraft, cargos, and crews. U.S. planners devised an alternative land route from India to bypass the original Burma Road. The new route would allow the Americans to supply the Chinese via the Ledo Road. The North Burma campaign, crucial to the fighting in China, depended on securing the Ledo Road, and OSS Detachment 101 played a prominent, albeit unheralded, role in carrying out that dangerous mission.5

OSS Moves Into the Jungle

Detachment 101 was one of two special operations units created by Don-ovan’s Coordinator of Information (COI) office, renamed the OSS in early 1942. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Preston Goodfellow, then a U.S. Army G-2 liaison officer working for COI, a project code-named Scheme OLIVIA formed the basic outline for Detachment 101. Although the original plan (dated January 27, 1942) did not call for operations in Burma, it detailed sabotage operations against Japanese establishments, facilities, and commanders in areas occupied by Japanese forces. Once Lieutenant General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, the U.S. commander in charge of the China-Burma-India Theater, accepted the operational plan for OLIVIA, OSS tasked Captain Carl F. Eifler, a Pearl Harbor veteran, to take charge of Detachment 101 on April 22, 1942. Eifler selected a small group of 21 officers and enlisted men with unique language and technical skills which qualified them for overseas service in an area of responsibility (AOR) that, depending on changing circumstances, could be anywhere in China, Korea, Burma, Indo-China, or Japan. He and his men laid the groundwork for a completely new type of paramilitary unit with no precedent in U.S. mili-tary history. With little organized training and a largely open-ended mission

4Troy J. Sacquety, The OSS in Burma: Jungle War against the Japanese (University Press of Kansas, 2013), 3.5Ibid., 4.



to subvert Japanese operations and gain intelligence on enemy intentions, capabilities, and troop movements, Eifler somehow quickly molded his men into a cohesive, combat-ready unit in a matter of weeks. Detachment 101 headed off to war in the jungles of the Far East just as the American home front was learning the good news of a crucial U.S. naval victory at the Battle of Midway. For the OSS commandoes of Detachment 101, victory in the stifling summer heat and incessant monsoons would seem far from certain and a long way off.6

Captain Eifler was soon promoted to major, but he engaged in fruitless and frustrating negotiations with Chinese authorities, leading Stilwell to recognize that Eifler’s cadre would not operate in China, since Chiang Kai-shek would not allow an autonomous, secret paramilitary unit in his terri-tory. Stilwell gave orders for Major Eifler to operate from India into Burma, adding that while he did not care how Detachment 101 disrupted Japanese lines of communication, he wanted to hear “booms” coming from the jungle of northern Burma, and he wanted to hear those “booms” within 90 days.7

While dealing with bugs, parasites, skin problems, malaria, and the occa-sional Japanese patrol, Eifler also had to clarify his chain of command with General Stilwell. Vinegar Joe agreed with Eifler and Donovan that Detach-ment 101 would remain an OSS unit serving under the tactical control of Stilwell’s headquarters. Stilwell’s staff began assigning Eifler’s men only strategic objectives and allowed the unit to figure out the best way to carry them out. By 1943 Eifler commented in a dispatch to OSS Washington that Stilwell gave his unit a great deal of operational latitude in planning and executing missions. “We are practically a little Army on our own.”8 Detach-ment 101 had a free hand in establishing its reporting requirements to OSS Headquarters and Donovan.

The British perception of Eifler’s merry band was another story alto-gether. British commanders viewed OSS and especially Detachment 101 with decidedly mixed emotions. On the one hand, they welcomed any effort by U.S. commandoes to degrade Japanese warfighting abilities in north-

6 Kermit Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS, vol. 2 (New York: Walker, 1976), xvii.7 Heidi Vion, “Booms from Behind the Lines: An Oral History of the Covert Experiences of the Office of Strategic Services Detachment 101 in the World War II China-Burma-India Theater” (MA thesis, California State University-Fullerton, 2004), 284-285, 304-305.8 Sacquety, 16-19.



9 OSS Special Operations Branch History, RG 226, NARA.10Ibid.

ern Burma. On the other hand, the British viewed the Americans and their notion of secret paramilitary raids with suspicion. A large U.S. presence in the former British colony, especially a clandestine special operations group, could undermine Great Britain’s status as a colonial power since many Americans back home were ideologically opposed to imperialism in any form—Japanese or British. The British military and political leadership came to assume by winter 1944-45 that American and British interests in the Burma AOR might diverge significantly once the war could be con-cluded. With India’s post-war status as a jewel in the crown of the British Empire already in question by 1945, the large American presence in Burma exacerbated British concerns about their future influence in the region as a whole. A second issue, of a far more military nature, was that an American OSS unit operating in Burma’s jungles might not ever be under direct Brit-ish control. This likewise could have far-reaching political and diplomatic consequences and pose a threat to postwar British rule in Southeast Asia. As it turned out, OSS deflected efforts by both U.S. and British regular Army units to gain operational control of Detachment 101, and the organization always controlled its paramilitary and intelligence operations.9

For their base of operations, Eifler needed an isolated location near a railroad and a river and not too far from a U.S. Army supply depot. Follow-ing a tip from the British, and with the concurrence of Stilwell’s staff, Ei-fler found a secluded location on the grounds of the Assam Tea Estate near Nazira—dozens of square miles permitting Detachment 101 to train agents independently of others in the region and facilitating compartmentalization. It was important that groups of agents, assigned distinct objectives, not rec-ognize and identify each other in the event of capture and torture, and thus they could not give away too much valuable intelligence to the Japanese. Eifler established a jungle school on the tea plantation and began training his detachment. Between October 8 and Thanksgiving 1942, Eifler’s unit expanded guerrilla training from 15 students learning skills in radio com-munications, demolition, security, and hand-to-hand combat to 5 groups of agent trainees numbering over 50.10

Detachment 101’s field operations in the spring of 1943 involved both short- and long-range penetration operations. Short-range operations were



shallow penetrations into enemy-held territory, usually conducted on foot. While these would be the missions that proved to Stilwell and Army regu-lars the value of an OSS paramilitary unit in northern Burma, only long-range penetrations would give Stilwell the desired “booms” he wanted to hear from the Burmese jungle. Such operations by Eifler’s commandoes were the first OSS strategic sabotage missions in World War II. Long-range penetrations were conducted hundreds of miles into Japanese-occupied ter-ritory with personnel inserted by airborne or maritime means. All opera-tional members of these long-range missions were recruited from British or Commonwealth personnel, indicating how dependent Detachment 101 remained on British support at this early stage. Intelligence on Japanese capabilities in 1943 was at a premium.11 Largely as a result of poor or non-existent intelligence, almost all of Detachment 101’s early long-range pen-etration missions in 1943 were disasters; only one mission out of six proved modestly successful in 1943. Mission failure usually resulted in the loss of an entire team. An OSS history of Detachment 101 analyzed these danger-ous (almost suicidal) long-range penetration missions, saying, “We knew we were neophytes in this type of business, but we were determined to take advantage of our mistakes and not commit the same error twice if we could possibly avoid it. We eventually were able to isolate the sound practices and use them to develop effective procedures.”12 The year 1943 proved costly for the OSS operations in Burma, and by late winter and early spring of 1944, Detachment 101 focused almost exclusively on short-range op-erations where native Kachins, who knew the treacherous terrain, acted as force multipliers, and ably supported the commando missions. Detachment 101 earned a measure of recognition and respect from Stilwell’s staff for fielding a strong guerrilla fighting force that became a thorn in the side of Japanese soldiers in northern Burma.13

Operations FORWARD and KNOTHEAD

Operation FORWARD, Detachment 101’s first field operation, relied on an especially small contingent of seven highly skilled personnel based out of Fort Hertz, a forward location on the northern Burmese border. From there the civilian agents and paramilitary officers made their way to

11Ibid.12Ibid.13Roosevelt, War Report, vol. 2, 11-26.



Sumprabum, the furthest point in Burma then under Allied control. The group would report on local conditions and study how Detachment 101 could use the area to train agents prior to eventually launching short-range missions against the Japanese. Operation FORWARD gave Eifler the idea of recruiting native Kachins for an unconventional warfare campaign. The Kachins would prove vital to the success of Detachment 101, which funded and coordinated various Kachin anti-Japanese resistance groups in northern Burma. The best known resistance fighters were known as the Kachin Rang-ers. Within months of recruiting the first group of Kachins from Burma’s northern hill country, Eifler’s detachment was sending them on infiltration missions behind enemy lines to gather and report valuable intelligence on Japanese troop dispositions. FORWARD helped Detachment 101 formu-late the type of guerrilla tactics they would perfect by 1945. They learned how to win the hearts and minds of the native population via civil affairs missions which assisted conventional and unconventional Allied forces in striking at key Japanese sites. Until the OSS detachment could evince genu-ine respect for the culture, customs, and social structure of the indigenous Kachin population in northern Burma, many locals remained uncooperative and deeply suspicious of the Westerners. Confidence-building measures, in-cluding frequent social gatherings to enhance personal ties of fellowship and camaraderie, proved successful in generating more widespread support for OSS-led anti-Japanese resistance missions. Once Kachin elders sent sig-nals to their followers to validate their trust in the OSS commandos, the strong bonds between Kachin rebels and American OSS personnel were cemented. FORWARD also played an important role in rescuing downed U.S. Army Air Force crews and pilots, saving lives, and enhancing overall mission effectiveness throughout the AOR. Three distinct roles that OSS Headquarters noted could be ascribed to Detachment 101’s Operation FOR-WARD would win additional recognition and resources for Eifler: supply-ing intelligence on Japanese targets, rescuing Allied aircrew and missing soldiers, and recruiting native Kachins.14

A follow-on mission, Operation KNOTHEAD, stepped up Eifler’s efforts to recruit Kachin guerrilla fighters and map intelligence for air and ground forces. One of KNOTHEAD’s objectives was to lure Japanese soldiers into the hill country of northern Burma so as to allow Chinese forces to more easily advance down the Hukawang Valley, a strategic loca-

14Ibid.



tion for both logistics and combat operations. KNOTHEAD used nine OSS personnel and a few locals paid in opium, an acceptable local currency. Their operation not only supplied intelligence but also expanded the use of Kachin guerrillas. General Stilwell became increasingly convinced by the summer of 1943 that OSS missions in Burma were difference makers, especially in providing timely and accurate tactical intelligence. To Stilwell, Detachment 101’s contributions as an intelligence gathering arm of his ex-tended AOR, albeit unconventional, far overshadowed its uses of sabotage and subversion techniques.15

An era ended, however, in June 1943 when an OSS evaluation team rec-ommended that Eifler relinquish his command for “medical reasons.” Some in Stilwell’s headquarters staff and at OSS Washington determined Eifler, soon to be promoted to colonel, had become emotionally and mentally un-stable under the constant stress of combat and paramilitary mission plan-ning. Eifler’s command style, almost always impetuous and occasionally reckless, made him, in the eyes of Donovan, unsuitable to continue as the leader of Detachment 101 and its vital mission. Medical teams associated with OSS determined that Eifler was, indeed, close to a nervous breakdown. Concerns about alcohol abuse were also expressed in the field and at OSS Washington. Eifler left the scene in the summer of 1943, eventually to be replaced, at Donovan’s suggestion, with Lieutenant Colonel William R. “Ray” Peers in December. OSS professionals, who had long described the mercurial Eifler as reckless, audacious, and abrasive, portrayed Peers as “ut-terly reliable, analytical, deliberate and methodical.” The new detachment commander would need such qualities, as a major campaign lay ahead—one that would be hard fought, bloody, and brutal. 16

The Campaign for Myitkyina, February-August 1944

The Japanese maintained a substantial presence in northern Burma. The most important unit was the elite, battle-tested 18th Japanese Divi-sion, headquartered at Myitkyina. The 18th had helped sack Shanghai and Nanking in the late 1930s and spearheaded the invasions of Malaya and Singapore in December 1941 and throughout the early months of 1942. Together with elements of the 15th, 53rd, and 33rd Divisions, the 18th gave

15Ibid. 16 William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America’s Most Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), 132.



the Japanese Imperial Army more than 50,000 troops in the area. Facing them was an array of Allied units from three nations that made up Stilwell’s Northern Combat Area Command: the Chinese Army in India, the three battalions under Brigadier General Franklin D. Merrill’s command, and the British Chindits (officially the Indian 3rd Infantry Division). The American 10th Air Force supported the Allied ground offensive in northern Burma.17

Kachin guerrillas patrolled the Moguang-Myitkyina rail line until Army infantry secured it in August. Detachment 101 harassed Japanese troops fleeing south from northern Burma. First Lieutenant James Ward described the surreal aspects of the failed Japanese retreat: “The enemy was more or less like clay pigeons for our marksmen on the river bank, and I, while sitting on a balcony chair overlooking the Irrawaddy River, with a carbine across my knees, fresh fruit and cigarettes on a nearby table, fanned by an attractive native girl, would take pot shots at will at the Japs who were trying to escape.”18 In all, Detachment 101 and its Kachin guerrillas were believed responsible for nearly 1,200 enemy casualties between April and August 1944.19

Peers and Detachment 101 had three main priorities in the Myitkyina Campaign: collecting intelligence on Japanese forces and troop disposi-tions, rescuing downed Allied pilots, and conducting guerrilla warfare. The OSS unit’s impact far outweighed the small numbers of personnel it com-mitted to the fight. Perhaps the most important result of Detachment 101’s efforts in the Myitkyina Campaign was that it validated the OSS mission in Burma and ensured increased support from the Army and OSS Washington. Peers wrote in his dispatches: “The presence of the Kachins with the Allied forces tipped the delicately balanced scale in northern Burma in our favor. Otherwise, it could have developed into an impossible situation.”20

The Final Push: January-July 1945

Helping the Allied conventional forces win the Myitkyina campaign had been Detachment 101’s focus in 1944. As the Japanese defensive perimeter

17Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Command Problems (Washington, DC: Center of Mili-tary History, 1987), 35, 30, 220, 366.18Ibid.19Ibid. 20Roosevelt, War Report, vol. 2, 33-37.



began to shrink dramatically throughout the fall of 1944 and into the early winter of 1945, the detachment’s operational tempo increased, and Peers commanded a unit far more capable of waging autonomous guerrilla war-fare and collecting timely intelligence for combat battalions throughout the China-Burma-India Theater. In February Detachment 101 took responsibil-ity for OSS operations along Burma’s Arakan coast. The mission involved a combined operations campaign with organic land, air, and naval elements. Peers’ Air Drop Section stepped up support to Army Air Forces and guided dozens of planes to new drop zones. At least 168 personnel were transported and 21 parachuted to field groups from C-47s, B-25s, B-24s, and C-45s. Meanwhile, Detachment 101’s intelligence dissemination capabilities im-proved beginning in February when a direct teletype line was laid to the 10th USAAF A-2 intelligence officials. This enabled OSS to pass hot intel-ligence to aircrews within minutes and increased the likelihood that action-able intelligence could be used in targeting Japanese supply lines.21

Hard fighting continued in the war in northern Burma and Detachment 101 remained the only Allied formation in contact with Japanese forces south of Myitkyina for several months. Recognizing the war had finally turned in their favor, U.S. and British forces advanced in the western parts of Burma against several shattered enemy units. In the north, a task force composed of remnants of Merrill’s Marauders and various field artillery and infantry regiments joined elements of the 14th Army and attacked the key city of Mandalay, which the Japanese unwisely tried to hold. In effect, various British and U.S. combat units were, often in an uncoordinated fash-ion, using a pincers movement to roll up Japanese defenses from Mandalay all the way to Burma’s southern region. This left Rangoon vulnerable to Allied exploitation. With so many Allied combat units engaged in a fi-nal push to take the Burmese capital, Detachment 101 pivoted its primary focus from intelligence to guerrilla warfare—aided once again by the native Kachin soldiers.22

The capture of Rangoon was Britain’s main goal in Burma. To the OSS, it represented a valuable intelligence target, as well as a possible staging area from which to launch operations into Thailand. Agents began parachuting into the areas just outside Rangoon in preparation for major combat opera-

21Ibid.22Ibid.



tions. By May 3, 1945, OSS personnel were inside the capital city, gathering intelligence and identifying avenues of approach for maneuver units now on the outskirts of the city. A huge intelligence coup falling into the laps of OSS personnel was dozens of Japanese diplomatic codebooks—immensely valuable to Stilwell and his staff in culminating not only the Burma fighting but also concluding successful operations against the last Japanese holdouts in China.23

July 1945 marked the official disbanding of Detachment 101. The last of the unit’s field radio stations went off the air on July 7, but a few members helped reorganize and reinvent the unit one last time—when they joined with conventional forces and assisted with airdrops, aircrew liaison activi-ties, and communications support missions. Even as the end seemed so near in the Pacific, the Japanese could still be very determined and, in some cases, better armed than the last remaining OSS personnel in Burma. In the late spring and early summer of 1945, the unit suffered its highest casualty rate of the war—44 killed, 34 wounded, 9 missing, and 20 captured. But the damage inflicted on the enemy was far greater. Detachment 101 person-nel were responsible for killing 1,246 Japanese troops and liberating over 13,000 miles of territory between early May and late June.24 Peers sent a final message via OSS Washington to Donovan as the final process of disbanding his team began in early July: “Ray wanted me to tell you that breaking up 101 broke his heart.”25

Legacy

Activated in mid-1942 and in operation until July 1945, Detachment 101 had one of the longest periods of service of any OSS group in Europe or the Pacific. It was consistently able to change its operational focus and adopt new missions to fulfill Donovan’s vision of a clandestine unit that could assist con-ventional forces. The initial contingent of 21 men who arrived in the China- Burma-India Theater in June 1942 bore little resemblance to the group that grew to almost a thousand OSS personnel and 10,000 indigenous troops by war’s end.26

23William R. Peers to John G. Coughlin, 1 May 1945, F 228, B 20, E 110, RG 226, NARA.24Ibid.25Ibid.26Sacquety, 218–20.



Among the reasons for the group’s historic record of success was the lack of command oversight by Stilwell or any other major unit, which permit-ted flexibility and agility in operational intelligence and combat scenarios. While long-range penetration missions proved mostly untenable in 1942 and 1943, shallow penetration missions such as FORWARD and KNOT-HEAD allowed the detachment to fill roles others could not. Intelligence collection became a core mission, making Detachment 101 the “eyes and ears” of Stilwell’s command structure.27

When he assumed command from Eifler in December 1943, Lieuten-ant Colonel Peers took a more pragmatic approach to paramilitary opera-tions in northern Burma. Guerrilla warfare became Detachment 101’s main role in Burma after the Myitkyina Campaign. Under Peers, a second key factor evinced the resourcefulness and adaptability of the OSS unit in the Burmese jungle: freedom to change its command structure to meet evolving missions and new duties. Lack of oversight and direction from OSS Wash-ington became a strong point of the unit. Under Peers, the detachment formed a new Operations section to coordinate guerrilla elements and established a central intelligence staff to evaluate, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. Peers helped the unit develop a strategic focus by integrating psychological warfare and new paramilitary tactics. Third, by concentrating on the mun-dane mission of liaising with other organizations, Detachment 101 became far more influential and effective. Especially useful were the ties developed with British infantry units in Burma. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, indigenous Burmese fighters—the Kachins in particular—augmented the combat and intelligence capabilities of Detachment 101 and gave the unit a unique guerrilla warfare capability unlike any previously seen in the Pacific war. Detachment 101 became a model for Special Forces created in the post-war era by the U.S. Army.28

OSS historians credit Detachment 101 with 232 American airmen res-cued, 5,447 known enemy killed, 10,000 known enemy wounded, 64 Jap-anese soldiers captured, 9 railroads destroyed, 51 bridges destroyed, and 2,000 tons of enemy supplies destroyed. Both the Army and OSS assess that at least 90 percent of the intelligence furnished to Stilwell’s staff origi-nated with Detachment 101. Using air, land, and sea components; conduct-

27Ibid.28Ibid.



ing civil affairs missions; and waging psychological and guerrilla warfare for three years; Detachment 101 became OSS’s best combat unit. While many OSS units provided exceptional service to the nation during World War II, including groups in France, the Balkans, and Italy, only Detachment 101 in Burma became a critical element in its theater. Long after the war concluded, analysts and operators at CIA and the Pentagon were studying lessons learned by OSS in northern Burma and determining how those les-sons could be applied in Cold War espionage settings and the jungles of Vietnam.29

29Ibid.

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