integration of technical development within complex project environment

73
i Integration of technical development within complex project environments Project Department of Computer Science at the University of York Author: Nick Brook Project Supervisor: Katrina Attwood Abstract The integration of design and safety functions within complex technical system development and project methodologies is still undeveloped. Deficits in management are primarily manifested through large numbers of major unanticipated changes. This variously results in overrunning costs and schedule and compromised fulfilment of important project requirements. These undesirable consequences are greatly magnified by complexity. This project will attempt to address this deficit. The high-level objectives are to develop a framework to facilitate better planning, monitoring and control of technical activities. This will be achieved through the identification, development and integration of suitable existing concepts and techniques into a complexity management framework. This should apply to all complex projects and particularly those relating to safety critical engineering projects. Primarily, the project builds upon the research which has been previously undertaken by this author in project failings, complexity and existing tools and techniques. The framework will be evaluated through questionnaire survey of several of its component parts, a review against the recommendations from literature and through case study application of the tools and techniques. It is the goal that all or parts of this framework can be put to practical application within industry. Statement of Ethics This dissertation, including literature research, questionnaire survey and conclusions, has carefully considered and adhered to the three principles of ethics specified by the University of York. These are - to do no harm, to ensure informed consent from human participants and to uphold sound principles of data confidentiality: Do No Harm No physical system or entity has been developed which could cause harm of any kind. The work undertaken pertains to literature research, the gathering of non-sensitive and non-confidential data via a questionnaire survey, and the development of research conclusions. Informed Consent Information which is freely available in the public domain has been appropriately referenced within this dissertation. Some information was acquired by direct requests to, and discussions with, the authors; at all times the authors have been made aware of the purpose of the request and the nature of the critical evaluation. Questionnaire respondents freely participated and were made aware of the purpose of the survey beforehand. Confidentiality of Data No sensitive or confidential data has been acquired, used or released during the course of this dissertation. Number of words is 39,473 as counted by the MS Word word count. This includes all of the body of the report, but excludes the appendices which are included in the project submission for completeness and interest.

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Page 1: Integration of technical development within complex project environment

i

Integration of technical development within complex

project environments

Project

Department of Computer Science at the University of York

Author: Nick Brook

Project Supervisor: Katrina Attwood

Abstract

The integration of design and safety functions within complex technical system development and project methodologies is still undeveloped. Deficits in management are primarily manifested through large numbers of major unanticipated changes. This variously results in overrunning costs and schedule and compromised fulfilment of important project requirements. These undesirable consequences are greatly magnified by complexity.

This project will attempt to address this deficit. The high-level objectives are to develop a framework to facilitate better planning, monitoring and control of technical activities. This will be achieved through the identification, development and integration of suitable existing concepts and techniques into a complexity management framework. This should apply to all complex projects and particularly those relating to safety critical engineering projects. Primarily, the project builds upon the research which has been previously undertaken by this author in project failings, complexity and existing tools and techniques.

The framework will be evaluated through questionnaire survey of several of its component parts, a review against the recommendations from literature and through case study application of the tools and techniques. It is the goal that all or parts of this framework can be put to practical application within industry.

Statement of Ethics

This dissertation, including literature research, questionnaire survey and conclusions, has carefully considered and

adhered to the three principles of ethics specified by the University of York. These are - to do no harm, to ensure

informed consent from human participants and to uphold sound principles of data confidentiality:

Do No Harm

No physical system or entity has been developed which could cause harm of any kind. The work undertaken

pertains to literature research, the gathering of non-sensitive and non-confidential data via a questionnaire

survey, and the development of research conclusions.

Informed Consent

Information which is freely available in the public domain has been appropriately referenced within this

dissertation. Some information was acquired by direct requests to, and discussions with, the authors; at all times

the authors have been made aware of the purpose of the request and the nature of the critical evaluation.

Questionnaire respondents freely participated and were made aware of the purpose of the survey beforehand.

Confidentiality of Data

No sensitive or confidential data has been acquired, used or released during the course of this dissertation.

Number of words is 39,473 as counted by the MS Word word count. This includes all of the body of the report, but

excludes the appendices which are included in the project submission for completeness and interest.

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Nick Brook MSc Safety-Critical Systems Engineering 9th January 2017

ii

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Nick Brook MSc Safety-Critical Systems Engineering 9th January 2017

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Table of Contents Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ iii

Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... iv

1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Objectives .......................................................................................................................................... 1

1.3 An understanding of complexity ....................................................................................................... 3

1.4 The importance of considering the organisation .............................................................................. 4

1.5 Existing management frameworks .................................................................................................... 5

1.6 Devising the Complexity Management Framework .......................................................................... 8

2. Identifying and quantifying project complexity ...................................................................... 8

2.1. The complexity assessment matrix ................................................................................................... 8

2.1.1. Complexity themes .................................................................................................................... 9

2.1.2. Complexity Criteria .................................................................................................................. 10

2.1.3. Complexity Matrix ................................................................................................................... 11

2.2. How, where and when to assess ..................................................................................................... 14

2.3. Outputs from complexity assessment ............................................................................................. 15

2.4. Complexity profile and the interaction of complexity criteria ........................................................ 15

3. Critical Project Success factors and their application in system development ....................... 17

3.1. Selection of success factors from literature .................................................................................... 17

3.2. Verification of success factors through questionnaire .................................................................... 18

3.2.2. Full dataset .............................................................................................................................. 19

3.2.3. By age ...................................................................................................................................... 22

3.2.4. By role ...................................................................................................................................... 22

3.2.5. By industry ............................................................................................................................... 23

3.2.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 24

4. System development planning techniques ........................................................................... 24

4.1. Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 24

4.2. Design Structure Matrix................................................................................................................... 25

4.2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 25

4.2.2. Design Structure Matrix principles .......................................................................................... 26

4.2.3. Creating and applying the organisational architecture DSM .................................................. 27

4.2.4. Creating and applying process architecture DSM ................................................................... 27

4.2.5. Application of the process DSM within a complexity management framework ..................... 30

4.2.6. Process-organisational MDMs and their application .............................................................. 33

5. System Performance Measures ........................................................................................... 34

5.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 34

5.2. Desirable properties of Performance Measures ............................................................................. 35

5.3. Selection of System Performance Measures from literature .......................................................... 38

5.3.1. Requirements .......................................................................................................................... 38

5.3.1.1. Satisfaction of Stakeholder and System Requirements .......................................................... 38

5.3.1.2. Requirements attributes ......................................................................................................... 39

5.3.2. Development health ................................................................................................................ 40

5.3.3. Process maturity ...................................................................................................................... 40

5.3.4. System maturity....................................................................................................................... 41

5.3.5. Organisation, process and schedule complexity ..................................................................... 41

5.4. The verification of performance measures through questionnaire ................................................ 42

5.4.1. Performance measures by age, role and industry ................................................................... 43

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Nick Brook MSc Safety-Critical Systems Engineering 9th January 2017

iv

5.4.2. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 43

5.5. The collective use of performance measures ................................................................................ 43

6. Managing system development risks ................................................................................... 44

6.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 44

6.2. Important concepts ......................................................................................................................... 45

7. Complexity orientated development framework ................................................................. 46

7.1. Integrating the sub-processes together .......................................................................................... 46

7.2. Analysis of framework against criteria within existing literature.................................................... 49

8. Case study application of framework................................................................................... 50

8.1. Purpose ............................................................................................................................................ 50

8.2. Case study 1 – Boeing Dreamliner ................................................................................................... 50

8.2.1. Background .............................................................................................................................. 50

8.2.2. Work Breakdown Structure ..................................................................................................... 51

8.2.3. Complexity assessment ........................................................................................................... 53

8.2.4. Critical Success Factors ............................................................................................................ 56

8.2.5. Planning technique .................................................................................................................. 58

8.2.6. Performance measurement .................................................................................................... 58

8.2.7. Risk management .................................................................................................................... 59

8.2.8. Comparing framework findings with project outcomes.......................................................... 59

9. Results and Evaluation ........................................................................................................ 60

10. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 64

References…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..66

Appendix A Glossary of terms and acronyms

Appendix B Existing management frameworks

Appendix C Critical Success Factors

Appendix D Response summary

Appendix E Complexity questionnaire

Appendix F Questionnaire results ranked by influence

Appendix G Dataset sample sizes

Appendix H Questionnaire results filtered by age

Appendix I Questionnaire results filtered by role

Appendix J Questionnaire results filtered by industry

Appendix K Design Structure Matrix

Appendix L System Performance Measures

Appendix M Risk register template

Appendix N Risk attributes as metadata

Appendix O Criticality Assessments for Boeing Dreamliner case study

Appendix P Timeline to Boeing Dreamliner

Appendix Q Complexity management case study using OL3 and AREVA’s EPR

Appendix R Full questionnaire results per respondent

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Lana and Anna for coping with my extended period of further education and putting up with my many grumpy moods. I also have the utmost respect for the University of York and the teaching and administrative staff who have made my studies so enjoyable and rewarding.

Finally, my Mum and Dad have been extremely supportive and I could not have done this without them.

Continuous effort - not strength or intelligence - is the key to unlocking our potential. - Winston Churchill.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

The characteristics of complex systems include a difficulty in determining outcomes from the inputs [1] and

there being present a ‘degree of disorder’ [2]. The relationships and dependencies between processes,

organisations and other external systems describe perfectly that of any complex system. What is more, the

general trend is for development complexity to increase over time. This is while simultaneously catering for

advances in technology and the downward pressures on development timescales and cost. The result is

greater prevalence of the wicked problem, that is a technical system development that is ‘highly resistant to

resolution’ [3]. This can be thought of as Technical Development Complexity.

This dissertation builds on the research undertaken within the previous literature survey [4]. This work

described the high failure rate amongst projects, a summary of the main reasons for this and areas of further

investigation. Also a variety of definitions were given for complexity and compelling reasons that this should

be the focus of attention when planning for the development of a system. The dissertation develops the

literature survey’s conclusions, describing a framework for the treatment of complex system development

within a wider project environment.

As the network of individual activities and their interactions increase it is reasonable to expect that the

mechanisms that are used to achieve a successful outcome will be greater in terms of their magnitude and

resources to undertake them. Therefore, complexity inevitably influences the effort required to plan, monitor

and control development activities. These mechanisms and conditions can be specified within development

processes but it would appear reasonable that these also need to be tailored to suit the particular

development characteristics and especially those relating to its complexity. These are known as Critical

Success Factors (CSF) and describe ‘essential areas of activity that must be performed well if you are to

achieve the mission, objectives or project’ [5]. However, it should be noted that outside describing their form

and importance, literature provide no satisfactory methods or process for determining suitable CSFs.

1.2 Objectives

It will be proposed that complexity comprises a number of aspects and that, for the purpose of this

dissertation, these can be comprised of themes and criteria. These aspects will not be homogeneous across

all the development activities nor the development lifecycle. This variation across a project can be seen as a

complexity profile that will evolve throughout the development lifecycle. Outwardly similar developments,

even within the same organisation, may not exhibit the same complexity characteristics. This can often be

attributed to the presence (or lack) of constraints outside the development team’s control and the result of

influential management decisions. Consideration of complexity will have a number of goals:

Identify the most influential Critical Success Factors (CSF) to put in place environmental conditions

required for a successful outcome;

Identify methods to put the responsibility for interventions where it is best placed through early

identification the establishment of environmental factors is often beyond the direct influence of the

development team or its managers [6][7];

Recognise how complexity evolves throughout the development and how some aspects increase as

others diminish. As such the methods to plan, monitor and control development activities will need

to evolve accordingly throughout the development lifecycle;

Describe how interventions can influence complexity and displace its effects elsewhere;

Recognise and anticipate development risks identified through the consideration of complexity early

in the development lifecycle and during detailed planning activities;

Develop a framework for assigning interventions to defined risks more closely, at the appropriate

level within the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). The identification of interventions will be initiated

by the recognition of CSFs and risk planning;

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Propose methods to guide where the most effort should be applied in planning, monitoring and

controlling activities through the identification of areas of maximum complexity. This is where the

greatest number of residual risks is likely to be. This is most important where there exists a constraint

of available resource which inevitably means effort must be prioritised. This is a factor of varying

significance in all but the most exceptional of technical developments;

Ensure the framework is scalable with regards to the size of the development and to the level within

the WBS Structure to which it can be applied. This is closely related to the preceding item;

Provide a framework to supplement planning techniques to better capture aspects of complexity,

such as coupling behaviours between activities. This will also allow analysis to identify individual

activities or clusters of planned activities that have the potential to influence the overall

development outcome disproportionately and as such deserve enhanced management effort;

Guide the selection and implementation of development status measures. These should be

determined on the basis of the impact of particular areas of technical development and the key

activities within these areas. These should be selected primarily for their use in controlling the

development and initiating avoiding action and not merely for purpose of reporting status.

An underlying theme of the framework will be that the activities it directly influences (planning and

monitoring), and indirectly influences (controlling), are chosen to balance risk and benefit with effort

involved. It should complement current techniques, and absolutely not conflict with them. It is the aim that

this will allow their use with a minimum of additional resource overhead. It is recognised that the framework

will not be implemented in isolation of existing project management and system engineering tools and

techniques. A secondary objective is to allow project and process complexity to be understood through

practical usage of the techniques. This can be achieved through the feedback of learning back into the process

to improve it and develop better responses for future system development.

There are often latent issues within system development that are only manifested through delays, cost

overruns or quality issues. This is problematic for several reasons. The intervention required is generally

greater the later it is left. Also as the development tempo intensifies, the effort required to change the

process and organisation will inevitably draw on the very same resources as those developing the system

itself. The disruption and additional uncertainty of making these changes will exacerbate the impact of the

original latent issue. In fact, the scope of such a change can be seen as a project in its own right [8] and is as

undesirable as it is unnecessary. Following on, there is evidently great benefit in balancing the effort between

undertaking risk management as opposed to that of issue management. This balance is often forgotten and

especially where there is insufficient substantiating data to support the mitigation of risks or to support

change. The focus instead is on constant management of issues arising from bad risk planning, commonly

known in project management as ‘firefighting’ [9], leading to no long-term sustained improvements in

performance.

A goal of the framework is to provide strong enough indicators to prompt this early management action.

Many of the principles in the management of system related risks are equally applicable to project risks. This

can be illustrated by an annotated Bow Tie diagram [10][11] as shown in Figure 1. The role of complexity

management is both to identify the threats on the left hand side that are brought about by complexity and

to determine effective methods for controlling them.

Selecting CSFs should be followed by an understanding of residual risks and ways of providing an early

warning of their realisation. A semi-formal method for identification of CSFs within a framework will

encourage their wider use and raises the possibility of their use at development and project review points,

such as design reviews and stage gates. An objective should be the early identification and best possible

assignment of responsibility for the of the mitigation of development risks, not only across the breadth of

the project but to a sufficiently senior level of management [12].

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Heuristic techniques will be chosen and developed as a means of guiding decision making and providing

inputs into traditional project management and system engineering processes. These will anticipate areas

within system development that require the most effort and where effort will bring about the greatest

impact. This will provide multiple Plan- Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycles, an iterative four-step management

method used to control and allow continual improvement of processes and product development [13]. Also

known as the Demming Cycle, it is equally applicable within the development process. In this application it

will be used to influence the development environment, processes and planning for complex system

development. The techniques described will use a mix of decomposition and reductionist methods, along

with a heuristic approach, to optimise resource usage required both of the framework and by any additional

development effort that results from its application.

Heuristic techniques are well suited to the problems associated with planning and executing a complex

system development and work well alongside iterative development techniques generally advocated for

complex system development. There are many variables in play within complex technical development.

While optimal solutions are achievable for a particular aspect, optimisation across all these often competing

aspects is very difficult within the current methodologies.

An important concept is that of feeding back learning, into the on-going development or subsequent

developments, to improve future applications of the framework. The determination of CSFs or risks should

include the intended or optimal outcome which can be compared against actual outcomes during the

development lifecycle for the efficacy of the CSFs and their implementation to be assessed. This allows

improvements to be made in a timely fashion for the benefit of the development. It also avoids the

unsatisfactory analysis of lessons learned, often at the very end of the project when personnel drift away and

the motivation to hold a review wanes [14].

A glossary of terms and acronyms used throughout this dissertation can be found in Appendix A.

1.3 An understanding of complexity

Complexity must be understood before it can be modelled. It has previously been described and decomposed

in a large number of ways, both within and outside the domain of engineering and many other overlapping

fields of research. Examples include the Strategic Highway Research Program [15] and Helmsman Institute

[16]. For the purpose of this framework it is important for complexity to be represented as simply as possible,

while covering all the necessary aspects as effectively as possible. This may appear counterintuitive but is

vital if the principles of the framework are to be applied in practice. This section will summarise research on

the nature of complexity and will develop it for use in a complexity management framework. A more detailed

explanation of the properties of complexity can be found within the literature survey [4].

Figure 1. Annotated Bow Tie diagram [11].

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Definitions of complexity highlight is highly structured nature [17][18] which encompasses many interactions

[19] and a large array of possible configurations [20][21]. Other characteristics include there being no

relationship between the behaviour of the overall structure and that of its individual parts and the ‘response’

of system elements to changes to other interrelated system elements [20][21][22]. Together these aspects

make the overall structure difficult to understand [23]. It is noted that uncertainty is often omitted from the

definition of complexity though it is intertwined with several of the aforementioned characteristics [24], such

as configuration variation. This project proposes that ambiguity be considered [25] as a distinct and separate

characteristic, alongside Uncertainty. Ambiguity is a common property of system development, caused by

the absence or unavailability of reliable information, and resulting in the formation of assumptions.

Ambiguity is a dominant factor in the early stages before requirements have been agreed and also during

development phases before coupling of large numbers of activities are fully understood. Assumptions cannot

be completely validated until later in the development and only after ambiguity has been addressed.

An understanding of how the individual characteristics of complexity interact with each other will be pivotal

to the determining of CSFs. Further dimensions of complexity will be elaborated upon in Section 2.

1.4 The importance of considering the organisation

The main two components of a system

development, apart from the actual system being

developed, are the development process and the

development organisation. These can be

considered to be within the direct control of the

management team responsible for system

development. Additionally, there will be a number

of external interfaces and constraints that will be

outside direct control of the system development

management team. These may be from within the

actual project itself, such as overall project budget

or resource availability, or entirely outside of the project.

Examples of the latter may be stakeholders, regulators and

existing adjacent operating systems.

An understanding of these boundaries will be important in

assigning responsibility for interventions. Figure 2 shows the

British Computer Society complexity model with tiered levels

of external interface. This is a simplified representation and

does not show how these tiers interact but nevertheless is

useful in categorising project influences. Specifically, the

model includes the ‘macro-environment’, which

encompasses interfaces furthest from the control of the

development team such market condition, legislation and

regulatory frameworks. ‘Micro-environment’ relates to the

customer and stakeholders and how requirements are

captured and traded-off [26]. The ‘organisational

environment’ and the ‘project environment’ relate to the

system development and the resource and process

constraints imposed on it. The organisational relationship

Figure 2. The British Computer Society’s

complexity model [26].

Figure 3. Type of relationship between

engineering and project management teams

(adapted from SEBoK [27]).

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1 The ‘Iron Triangle’ describes The three related constraints of scope, budget, and schedule [32].

Page 5 of 70

between system engineering and the project environment is also an important consideration and something

which this model omits. Figure 3 shows three distinct project organisational types from the viewpoint of the

technical development and is adapted from the Systems Engineering Book of Knowledge (SEBoK) [27].

These organisational types strongly influence what is and what is not within the direct control of the system

engineering team. The definition of the inputs and outputs between project and system development

organisations will allow a better understanding of where the responsibility for putting in place and

implementing CSFs and risk mitigations resides. These interfaces should be defined within such documents

as the Systems Engineering Management Plan [28] and the Project Management Plan [29].

In the first diagram organisational behaviour is typified by transactional type relationships. Engineering may

be contracted out or undertaken by a different organisation, possibly located elsewhere. There may be more

than one engineering organisation, with complexity increasing according to the number of interfaces. The

project management organisation is responsible for managing the outputs only and there is a strong

emphasis on functional organisational structures [30]. In the second diagram the overlap in responsibilities

and accountabilities can also result in a form of complexity.

There is a lesser emphasis on transactional relationship and the project management team have a greater

influence over the management of engineering activities. The degree of overlap will affect this relationship.

The third diagram could be a matrix type structure. The project management team has overall control and

the engineering management team has the least scope to determine how the development will be managed.

The type of relationship will thus affect the scope and the method of managing complexity. In the first

example system engineering is entirely self-sufficient in terms of contractual complexity. In the last example

this is far less likely. Thus the treatment should be amended accordingly.

1.5 Existing management frameworks There has been a large volume of literature on the subject of managing projects and technical development

activities based on a blend of theory and practical experience. The framework presented in this project will

take the existing management frameworks and models, many discussed in the literature survey [4], and will

attempt to reconcile inconsistencies in approach and content. This section will both consolidate the

discussion in the literature survey [4] and introduce concepts that have been found subsequently.

The predominant systems engineering model is the ‘V-model’ as shown in Figure 4. It does not specifically

address complexity but has some concepts that will be applied within the developed framework. Specifically,

its definition of the development lifecycle and requirements-centric view is useful. The satisfaction of

requirements is a convenient way of looking at complexity and the monitoring and control of requirements

should form an integral part of the way that a complex system is managed. The V-model represents a typical

idealised development lifecycle, so the phase descriptions within this model will be used to profile

complexity.

Of the system engineering and project

management methodologies that were

previously discussed in the literature survey [4]

the Strategic Highway Research Program’s

5DPM was of particular interest. This

methodology is described in some detail in both

their ‘Guide to Project Management Strategies

for Complex Projects’ [31] and also in ‘Managing

Mega-Project Complexity in Five Dimensions’

[31]. Rather than considering the usual three

project dimensions, i.e. the iron triangle1 [32], it

Figure 4. The V-model [26].

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introduces the concepts of ‘financing’ and ‘context’ as shown in Figure 5. 5DPM also considers CSFs from the

perspective of complexity. Furthermore, this is done within several feedback cycles. Together these

represent considerable synergy with many of the concepts that the author previously felt were worthy of

consideration.

Finance becomes of utmost consideration as both the overall magnitude of the development and risk

increases. This is exemplified by the difficulties experienced in securing investment for the UK’s nuclear new-

build programme [32]. For the purposes of technical development, it is an imposed constraint by virtue of

being outside the direct control of the management and will be treated as such in the model. The fifth

constraint of the 5DPM model is that of context, describing the project environment, including potential

constraints and interfaces. The process can be decomposed as

follows:

Review project factors in each of the five areas;

Identify and prioritise complexity factors;

Develop 5DPM complexity map;

Define CSFs with sub-process steps such as assemble

project team, select project arrangements and prepare

early cost model and finance plan;

Develop project action plan to address resource issues;

Re-evaluate complexity map on commencement of

project.

5DPM describes reviews at defined intervals with an iteration of the above steps. This would most naturally

align with a Stage Gates type governance structure [29], but it could be envisaged that interim reviews would

be undertaken on a periodic basis if stage gates were deemed too far apart for effective control. Overall the

model does not try to model complexity itself but rather attempts to model the component parts (within the

five dimensions) and manage them to better manage a complex project environment. By focussing on these

five dimensions the resulting assessments may provide a superficial view of project management orientated

aspects only. Despite this there is considerable merit to the high-level approach and synergy with the

principles of the PDCA Cycle [4].

The Helmsman Institute complexity assessment [16] is advocated by the International Centre for Complex

Project Management [34]. This again has five areas of general consideration consisting of:

Context Complexity;

People Complexity;

Ambiguity;

Technical Challenge;

Project Management Complexity.

Within these categories there are specific factors. Those solely relating to technical development are:

Integration Complexity;

System Development Complexity;

Impact on Infrastructure.

Each of the categories is in turn considered against a large number of factors relating to such concepts as

stakeholder numbers and alignment, uncertainty and abstraction. Importantly this framework introduces the

concept of ambiguity as does Pich et al [25] and McGowana et al [35]. In each ambiguity is seen as a distinctly

separate, though closely coupled, property to that of uncertainty. The consideration of complexity is of

interest within the wider domain of business in general. The concept of VUCA (volatility, uncertainty,

complexity and ambiguity) [36], as shown in Figure 6, considers many of the previously discussed themes.

Volatility can be viewed as the result of one or the product of several complexity characteristics. Traits

attributable to volatility include a general lack of understanding of the likely impacts of an event

Figure 5. Five dimensional

project management model [15].

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along with the impacts being

‘unexpected’ and ‘unstable’.

Here volatility is described as a factor in

its own right and complexity is described

alongside the others rather than being

composed of them. Nevertheless, the

presentation of an unpredictable

business environment in terms of a

limited number of characteristics is

useful. Much of the literature references

complexity without sufficiently breaking

it down into its component parts.

Classical definitions of the components

of complexity were described detail

within the literature survey and are as

follows [4][37]:

The ‘Kolmogorov-Chaitin

complexity’, also known as

Program-size Complexity [38];

‘Nonlinearity’;

‘Emergent Complexity’.

Essentially the first component is the number of interfaces relating somewhat to the development magnitude

but also its nature. A large technical development may contain duplicate tasks and low interdependency,

thus limiting its Program-size Complexity, while a comparably smaller technical development may conversely

have many interdependencies and highly intricate activities. The latter two components collectively can be

closely aligned with the previously described volatility within the VUCA framework. A relatively small change

results in far-reaching or a disproportionately large impact. Expanding the definition of emergence for the

benefit of its use in an assessment we may say that it has a number of properties [39]:

Radical novelty – new and unanticipated properties emerge from each interaction;

Coherence – though unexpected the new properties are consistent with rules and behaviours;

Wholeness – emergence causes the new system that is greater than the sum of its parts;

Dynamic – changes from emergence will continue to evolve as long as there is emergence;

Downward causation — the system as a whole dictates the behaviour of its parts as well as the

system being influenced by the interaction of its parts.

This may be caused by two common dynamics, either separately or in conjunction:

No one is in charge – thinking in terms of a technical development organisation this could be

characterised by a network-centric organisation with a decentralised structure;

Simple rules engender complex behaviour – using the example of an organisation this may be a large

hierarchical organisation with many functions.

This section describes the decomposition and treatment of complexity from varying perspectives. The

development of the 5DPM process supports the view that simple consideration of the ‘iron triangle’ is

insufficient. It also reinforces the importance of complexity and the validity of an iterative approach.

However, its treatment of complexity is overly simplistic. The complexity framework developed in this project

will adapt the broad methodology of the 5DPM process, while proposing a more precise definition for

development complexity using a combination of prevailing theory and practical application. Specifically,

definitions of complexity outlined either in the literature survey or in this section will be re-categorised to fit

within the model, maintaining consistency.

Figure 6. The VUCA framework [36].

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2 The objectives described in the summary of the literature survey [4] will be adopted with a single change. The development of Object Based Modelling (OBM) will be omitted. DSM will be used alone as a flexible technique that can be used to model the development process. This of course does not preclude the use of techniques, such as OBM, in parallel with DSM. Further information on the use of OBM can be found in the paper by Warboys and Keane [41].

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Complexity will be decomposed by applying it against the relevant themes within the technical development.

It must also be considered that complexity is in the eye of the beholder. The observer will have experience

and a perspective that will influence subjective analysis based on their ‘bounded rationality’ [40]. The

assessment criteria will ultimately require to be qualified as much as possible to guide interpretation. A more

detailed literature review of this area of research can be found in Appendix B.

1.6 Devising the Complexity Management Framework

This dissertation will define complexity in terms of technical development and combine a method of assessing

complexity with a number of techniques to allow the planning, monitoring and controlling of complex

technical developments. To summarise this dissertation will2:

a. Identify a method of quantifying Technical Development Complexity;

b. Provide a semi-formal method for the identifications of the pre-requisite pre-planning environmental

factors, or so called critical success factors (CSFs). The outcomes from this method will be influenced

by an individual project’s characteristics, primarily in terms of its complexity;

c. Propose methods for planning technical development and modelling interdependencies using the

method of Design Structure Matrix (DSM);

d. Provide Performance Measures that relate to the technical development and, where possible, to the

assigned CSFs. It is preferable that these are totally objective but it is accepted that there will be

considerable subjectivity involved which will need to be constrained to enhance consistency by

suitable guidance. These performance measures will be both leading and lagging and provide

coverage of the development process biased towards the parts that are particularly significant for

reasons either of criticality or of risk of deviation in terms of criteria such as cost, schedule, scope

and quality. Coverage of the remaining parts of the development process will be at a lower degree

of decomposition commensurate with criticality and risk;

e. Propose methods of identifying risks and how this influences CSFs and the Performance Measures.

f. Demonstrate how all these (a. to e.) can be used together in a Complexity Management Framework.

Together items a. and b. can be thought of as pre-planning activities and together are a strategy for putting

in place an environment conducive for the project. Items a. to e. are developed in more detail throughout

this project, culminating in Section 7, which includes a framework map integrating all these items together.

2. Identifying and quantifying project complexity

2.1. The complexity assessment matrix

The complexity concepts described above will be encompassed within a Complexity Assessment Matrix. The

matrix will form the most important part of the Complexity Assessment which in turn forms a part of the

overall framework. The outputs from the assessment are as follows:

1. Undertake assessment of system development at a high-level within the WBS;

2. Identify of ‘hotspots’ both within the WBS and within the individual themes and direct additional

assessments where they are required. It should be noted that focussed assessments will not be

possible in very early development stages due to the low level of definition and decomposition of

the WBS;

3. Identify development risks and propose CSFs to counter significant levels of complexity. Record

additional information such as:

a. Rationale;

b. Residual risks that remain once CSFs have been put in place;

c. Proposed outcomes that are to be brought about by the CSFs.

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4. Reassess the project complexity profile with the CSFs in mind to ensure that no new significant

unmitigated hotspots have been created. Revise the outputs of step 3 as appropriate;

5. Identify risks for inclusion within the risk register.

Any consideration of complexity needs to be complete with an adequate explanation of categorisations. The

process will be applicable across the entire development lifecycle and should be scalable. It is to be expected

that there will be overlap between definitions due to a combination of minor shortfalls in the model and

observer perceptions. It is for this reason that the reasoning behind decisions should be recorded to afford

the best chances of consistency in applying the process in future applications.

As discussed complexity will be viewed from the perspective of satisfying requirements, whether technical

or project management orientated, and will form a part of the framework. There will be interactions between

complexity types and it is highly likely that the nature of the complexity will evolve over the development

lifecycle. We shall call this the Complexity Profile. Complexity assessment will have the potential to become

more detailed as the requirements are defined.

It can be reasoned that a pre-requirement, capturing the ‘business mission’ [28], can only be assessed at a

very high level while detailed system requirements can be decomposed to much greater detail. It is important

that the treatment of complexity can be targeted where it will represent the greatest value, as ambiguity

reduces between the derivation of stakeholder requirements and the final validation of the system [28]. This

can be achieved by considering assessment against either the development’s WBS or Product Breakdown

Structure (PBS), depending upon which is used. Lastly there should be a comparison between actual and

intended outcomes and feedback of learning to improve decision making in both the current and future

development processes. It should be borne in mind that the objective of the assessment of complexity is to

inform future decision making in order to enhance the likelihood of success. Section 3 details the use of CSFs

as an established technique to do this by reducing either the probability or impact of complexity related

events. Both complexity assessment and the assigning of CSFs can be viewed as pre-planning activities and

should be reviewed periodically for applicability and appropriateness.

2.1.1. Complexity themes

Using a combination of the methodologies described within the literature survey and Section 1.4, a typical

technical development can be considered to comprise a number of themes. These are captured under the

three broad headings of internal interfaces, external interfaces and system development. The themes are

designed to provide breadth of coverage over all areas pertinent to system development. Some themes, such

as stakeholders and regulatory interfaces could have been combined but it was felt that the identification of

independent themes would prompt more detailed analysis in areas that are particularly influential. This also

led to the apportioning of a third of the themes to the system development itself, an area underrepresented

in other methodologies such as those from 5DPM and the Helmsman Institute [32]. This ensures that the

assessment is more balanced overall and specifically in areas such as satisfying requirements and completing

scope as a part of technical development.

An important consideration is the project environment within which the development is undertaken. There

will be constraints imposed upon the technical development that will, to varying degrees, be out with the

control of the development management. The organisation type, as discussed in Section 1.4, will be a

significant factor but others include the traditional business-level requirements of cost, schedule and scope

[32]. Organisational culture and business-level governance, such Stage Gate type processes [29], will also be

influential in shaping the technical development. The investment constraints and funding profiles, as

elevated to one of the 5DPM dimensions [31], must also be considered. The remaining themes used in the

framework generally follow the commonly used themes of people, processes and technology [42]. These are

used in business architecture and can be decomposed further to better suit the purposes of the complexity

assessment.

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People can be decomposed into the internal organisation, i.e. the development team and those external to

it. External elements include contracting organisations, regulatory interfaces and all other remaining

stakeholder groups that contribute to the development. The properties of the development process are

important in terms of detail and number of interfaces. Lastly the technological aspect can be thought of as

the nature of technology that the system will comprise, as well as the integration of the technology (internal

interfaces) and external interfaces, i.e. how the system integrates with other systems. The nine Complexity

Themes used in the framework are listed below. These include high-level considerations that may impact the

analysis.

1. Internal factors

a. (Project) environmental constraints – external factors (inputs and outputs only), schedule

(such as pace and phased handover requirements), the imposed funding profile;

b. Development process – how prescriptive and many interfaces;

c. Internal organisation – ranging from few disciplines within same organization to many and

organisation type;

2. External factors

a. Contractual management – ranging from a few simple relationships to many relationships

with differing contractual terms;

b. Stakeholders - relating to system definition and validation;

c. Regulatory interfaces – how many and how influential they are on the development;

3. System development

a. External (system) interfaces – the degree to which system impacts or depends upon

external systems (from none to part of system of systems);

b. Technology – system requirements definition and verification relating to technology type

(low to very high tech and low to highly novel);

c. Internal (system) interfaces – the level of internal integration required between sub-

systems ranging from few simple relationships to many complicated relationships.

2.1.2. Complexity Criteria

Complexity Criteria can be assessed against each of these themes. The twin themes of uncertainty and

ambiguity will dominate the early phases of any project. Though they are often classically excluded from the

definition of system complexity they have such a profound effect on complexity management and will be

elevated in importance. Rather than be seen as sub-sets of complexity they will sit alongside the other

criteria. Uncertainty and ambiguity will naturally diminish under normal conditions as requirements are

defined, verified and validated.

Conversely emergence and nonlinearity will tend to increase over time as requirements are progressively

defined, implemented, verified and validated. They will reach their zenith as the system approaches

handover when even small changes will have a significant impact. The final criterion is that of Program-size

Complexity. This is essentially the quantity of information that represents the system development.

Techniques to manage this include expenditure of resource and effort (personnel and/or computer-tooling)

and the use of modelling techniques. The system development Complexity Criteria are:

1. Uncertainty – likelihood of unexpected events occurring, e.g. stakeholder requirements change

significantly during system early development or assumptions are found to be incorrect;

2. Ambiguity – incompleteness of knowledge about functional variables [25], i.e., a lack of information

upon which to make decisions. An example may be that stakeholder requirements are undefined in

a particular area of system development leading to assumptions being made or to delays in the

development schedule while the stakeholder requirements are defined;

3. Emergence – how change to system configuration leads to unexpected behaviours and interactions

and re-evaluation of derived system requirements. High Emergence is defined as unexpected

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behaviours and interactions in many other components or sub-systems;

4. Non-linearity – the effect of a single small change to system requirements on other system

requirements. A non-linear relationship is one where a change results in a disproportionate change

in affected components and sub-systems. High Non-linearity is where a small change results in a large

impact elsewhere;

5. Program-size Complexity – relates to the minimum amount of information required to describe a

process, system or organisational requirements. Manifests itself in shortfalls in modelling and a

general low level of understanding in the system or its development even when uncertainty and

ambiguity is low. High Program-size Complexity requires a high level of effort to model and to

maintain the model. Examples where this may be manifested are requirements management,

configuration management and scheduling.

In summary, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate early in the development lifecycle when their major effect

is lots of low impact changes. Later in the development lifecycle there are less, high impact changes generally

brought about by emergent and non-linear behaviours. Program-line complexity impacts the ability to model,

understand and control these changes, with higher levels of this criteria making schedules and requirements

progressively more difficult to manage.

2.1.3. Complexity Matrix

The Complexity Themes and Complexity Criteria can be presented in matrix form. A scoring system offering

five choices, from very low to very high, has been chosen. Areas to be considered (considerations) for each

of the themes has been chosen from the literature survey [4] and Section 1.5. These looked at sources such

as the Helmsman Institute [16] and NTCP Framework [43]. Considerations provide guidance during

application of the assessment and aid in the assessment of appropriate areas of the WBS against each theme.

Risk has been omitted as a consideration from any of the themes as it is best understood only after complexity

assessment has been undertaken. In this way the assessment will differ from its peers who tend to consider

risk as an input into an assessment rather than an activity that is informed by an assessment’s results.

Considerations can be seen against the themes within the Complexity Matrix as shown in Figure 7.

The most obvious considerations for Project Environmental Constraints are those of imposed cost, schedule

and scope. The funding profile that may constrain the development schedule, as well as overall cost, and

introduce additional assumptions in lieu due to sub-optimal activity sequencing. Components of schedule

include pace, where the development schedule may need to be accelerated to meet external milestones, and

phased handover requirements. There may be additional activities and schedule implications due to project

governance. Other constraints include those relating to procurement and contract usage which may impose

constraints on who contracts are let to and how contracted activities are managed. There may be stipulations

with regards to the technology that is used, for example technologies developed in-house. Lastly,

organisational culture and politics can have a dramatic effect in areas such as communication and decision

making.

Tailoring of the development process to achieve the correct balance of governance and rigour against agility

and flexibility is an important consideration as is facilitation of integration between the technical disciplines.

The use of technology in areas such as requirements management, configuration control and safety case

management will influence not only the development process but also the organisation. The organisation

will strongly influence lines of communication. It is assumed that the fundamental type of organisation

structure is decided early in a project lifecycle. It is generally a difficult undertaking to change it in its entirety

as it is often dictated by the parent organisation undertaking the project. However, it is expected that it may

be influenced by the findings of the Complexity Assessment. Traditional hierarchical structures allow ease of

governance while decentralised network-type structures offer better flexibility [30]. Other aspects include

the number of individual disciplines and their particular experience with regards the development type, the

technology and integration challenges.

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Figure 7. Complexity Matrix.

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The internal organisation will interact with contracted development organisations and will be required to

manage the transfer of information (development inputs and outputs) and the interfaces between areas of

scope to ensure there are no omissions or inconsistencies. The development organisation will be shaped by

its place in the wider organisation and particularly how it interfaces with the project organisation. This will

dictate whether the responsibilities for areas such as resource allocation, contract procurement, cost

estimation and scheduling are within the remit of the development organisation and the level of autonomy

it holds.

Other factors include geographical location of disciplines and other interfacing organisations. Contractual

management will of course depend on how much of the development is actually contracted out versus

activities that remain within the internal organisation. The reasons for contracting out of parts of the

technical development will vary, for reasons such as low internal resource or capability or where particularly

specialist or technology specific support is required. The nature of the relationship between the development

organisation and contract organisations will be dependent on the composition of the project organisation.

Responsibilities for actual contract management, including processing of contract variations and scope may

be outside the scope of the development organisation in that they may manage technical interfaces only.

Conversely this may all be within the remit of the development organisation. Again the division between

scope being undertaken by internal resource and that contracted out should be considered against the

outputs of the Complexity Assessment. The identification of significant areas of concern may initiate a

reconsideration of contracting strategy or else prompt the establishment of measures to better manage it

such as rigorous pre-qualification of suppliers. This is an example of a CSF that was introduced as a concept

in Section 1.1 and is subject to more discussion in Section 3.

Stakeholders can be thought of as the direct source of all high-level requirements. They inevitably have a

strong influence on requirements as they are derived in greater detail throughout the development lifecycle.

Factors that will affect stakeholder management include the number and alignment of stakeholders. Non-

alignment of stakeholders’ needs leads to trade-off of requirements to gain the appropriate approvals. Large

numbers of conflicting requirements will require careful management and introduces the risk for conflict and

delays. Other factors include location and availability of access to stakeholders. Incomplete stakeholder

identification may precipitate later changes to requirements and scope with potentially significant impact.

Long development schedules can increase the likelihood of changes to important stakeholders which can

lead to changing requirements also.

Regulatory bodies are important stakeholders which can have a tremendous impact on system requirements.

Technical developments may have weak interfaces, with only one or two regulators, or there may be strong

interfaces, with many regulators. Changes in legislation and regulations may occur at any time due to events

outside the control of the organisation and regulatory regimes may vary greatly between geographical areas.

The development of a system for use in several countries can introduce much complexity surrounding the

management of potentially conflicting regulatory requirements.

External interfaces are systems that interface with the system of interest. There may be few interactions of

a purely transactional nature with other systems or many interfaces. A system being developed as a part of

a system of systems [28] will invoke the greatest management effort. Interfaces may be not properly

understood or may evolve over time beyond the control of the development organisation. Technology is

simply how ‘novel’ and ‘high-tech’ [43] the technology that has been chosen and dictated by the

requirements is. Novelty and high-technology levels, as described by Frank et al [43], generally require highly

iterative development methodologies and high levels of expertise. Short development schedules using such

technology require greater effort, specialised systems engineering techniques and incur disproportionate

level of risk. System integration represents the ‘synthesis of a set of system elements into a realised system

that satisfies system requirements, architecture and design’ [28]. There are likely to be many interfaces that

need to be managed through integration, verification and validation activities. There are techniques to

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manage this complexity, including early integration planning. Examples of other factors include the

integration of system elements from other contracted organisations and the careful management of

stakeholders to minimise ‘scoop creep’ [44].

Examples of Complexity Matrices, completed for the case studies, can be found in Appendices O and Q.

2.2. How, where and when to assess

Projects invariably utilise a WBS [45] to organise activities prior to cost estimation and scheduling activities.

The assessment considers each Complexity Theme against the five Complexity Criteria at each node of the

WBS on a particular level. Scores are assigned (very low, low, medium, high and very high) at each

intersection of the matrix. As the WBS increases in detail so does the effort required to undertake the

assessment. It may be justifiable to limit the assessment to relevant portions of the WBS or choose a high-

level within the WBS to restrict the nodes to be considered.

The complexity assessments should be undertaken against the portion of the WBS that describes the

technical development aspects. The WBS, including that describing technical development, will be subject to

refinement over time. As such any early assessment will be at a high-level on the WBS and necessarily at a

corresponding low-level of overall detail. There will be business-level requirements at the offset and other

factors, such as generic organisational processes and the existing regulatory landscape. Additionally, early

planning may make assumptions with regards to the organisation and contracting mechanisms. This pre-

requirements early assessment will identify areas of potential concern to enable early planning through the

identification of high-level CSFs.

As the project and the development progresses the WBS will be defined level by level with early development

phases likely to receive the most detail. The example of a WBS shown in Figure 8 has technical development

activities below several of the high-level nodes. In this example requirements definition would receive more

attention than test and verification activities due to the dependencies between the two and the inherent

difficulty in defining later activities because of this. Complexity assessments would be undertaken as a

minimum at the end of development phases and would serve to inform the planning of subsequent phases

and as an important input into Stage Gate type governance reviews.

Long project phases may demand interim complexity assessments to catch any significant changes during the

phase. Assessments would develop the earlier higher-level reviews to progressively lower levels of the WBS

to identify hotspots of complexity within the development. This technique affords the opportunity to

Figure 8. Sample WBS for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) [46].

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disregard areas of low complexity and allow expenditure of effort where it needed. For the purposes of this

example WBS ‘control software’ and ‘verification software’ have been identified as having high levels of

complexity. This could prompt the assessment of the next level of the WBS below to determine the particular

node that is of particular concern. This can be repeated as required and, in the most extreme application,

until the lowest level of the WBS has been reached.

2.3. Outputs from complexity assessment

Identification of complexity should be used inform development planning, enabling the establishment of

conducive project environment. An established method is that of CSFs as environmental influences that will

enhance the likelihood of success. They may reduce either the probability or impact of the consequences of

complexity. Both the rationale and the proposed outcome of the putting in place of CSFs should be recorded.

This exercise should also prompt the identification of development risks. Some of these will be residual risks

as a result of putting in place of CSFs.

The putting in place of CSFs will influence the complexity profile. An example of this, developed later within

the case study in Section 8, is that of the development of Boeing’s Dreamliner. Radical changes in Boeing’s

procurement strategy were implemented at the very early stage of the project to improve schedule and costs.

This changed the profile of complexity within the project’s supply chain, introducing ‘’coordination risks’,

with well-publicised results [47]. Using the complexity themes, it may be that complexity within the internal

organisation are merely transferred into contractual management. It is therefore important that the

complexity assessment is repeated in areas where changes are proposed. Indeed, in the example of AREVA’s

design and construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear plant the issues were entirely the reverse of the

Dreamliner and related with AREVA choosing to embark on a first of a kind project alone without the

necessary experience as ‘architect and engineer’,’ without experienced partners’ and without having all the

necessary competences [48]. Repeating the complexity assessment will identify any further areas of

complexity that have resulted from the implementation of CSFs and allow the impact of changes to strategy

to be understood. Additional CSFs can then be put in place or existing CSFs amended as appropriate. The

designation of CSFs is discussed further in Section 3.

2.4. Complexity profile and the interaction of complexity criteria

Complexity is influenced by many factors and is not a static property. It will evolve over the development

lifecycle and its nature may also be transformed by imposed changes. It can be theorised that Complexity

Criteria will interact in specified ways and will follow individual general profiles. Each criterion applies equally

to modelling of the development process through planning and scheduling as it does to the definition of

system elements and their interactions.

Uncertainty relates to the likelihood of

change of development requirements and

it will be the greatest at the beginning

when definition of requirements and scope

is at its lowest. Naturally as definition

increases and the number of assumptions

are reduced, uncertainty is also reduced.

Uncertainty can relate to changes

prompted from sources such as stakeholders, regulators or rework due to iteration or errors. Uncertainty

should reduce as the system is verified, and should diminish to its very lowest level as the system approaches

final validation. Changes, especially those later in the development, will reintroduce uncertainty. Ambiguity

is closely related to uncertainty and relates to the amount of information that is unknown. In the absence of

verified information, it is necessary that assumptions are made to enable aspects of the development to

progress. Without assumptions other activities will be delayed. Ambiguity will reduce as requirements are

Figure 10. The changing nature of the project process [25].

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defined but as with uncertainty it will

be increased with the introduction of

changes. Early definition activities will

reduce both uncertainty and

ambiguity together.

Two methods of detail with relatively

low levels of uncertainty and

ambiguity include the inclusion of

‘float’ [49] within development

schedules (sometimes known as slack)

and ‘contingency’ [50] within the cost

plan or the inclusion of flexibility within the design to accommodate a range of design definition outcomes

[51]. Emergence, as defined in Section 1.5, will increase throughout the development lifecycle as ambiguity

is reduced. This property is invoked by the interaction of requirements or by the introduction of change in

ways that cannot be anticipated. It specifically relates to the impact and the likelihood of emergent

behaviours arising. The impact of emergence can be managed through the decoupling of development

activities or system elements. Examples of managing emergence are that of removing activities with likely

emergent behaviours from the critical path of a development schedule or controlling the interfaces between

sub-systems through choice of system architecture. Non-linearity also increases as ambiguity is reduced. The

impact of non-linearity can be

managed by identifying such

interfaces and introducing extra

capacity in the affected system

elements to manage potential

future change. This should be

undertaken on the basis of risk and

the extra capacity can be either built

into the changed requirement to

prevent the change being

propagated or those affected by the

non-linear behaviours to absorb the

change with minimal impact. It is

highly desirable to reduce

uncertainty and generally control

the incidences of change as non-

linearity and emergence increase.

Considering this from the point of

view of requirements and scope it

can be reasoned that Program-size

Complexity of the development will

begin and end low. Requirements

will start as those necessary for the

business or operational need and

will be relatively few and at a low

level of detail. Requirement

Program- size complexity will rise as

requirements are defined,

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Figure 11. Complexity Profiles over the development lifecycle with

no major changes and an incidence of major change during sub-system

verification (bottom).

Point of major change

Figure 9. Level of organisational effort over time [52].

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increasing in both number and detail. Conversely this property will reduce as requirements are verified until

the business and operational level requirements are finally validated. Scope is similarly represented via the

WBS and activity scheduling. Again these begin at a low-level of detail until the development is fully defined

and planned. As activities (scope) is completed the Program-size Complexity again reduces as the number of

activities to complete and their interactions reduces. This is broadly in line with organisational effort [56] as

can be seen in Figure 9. Changes will again increase Program-size Complexity with the example of previously

verified requirements needing to be reanalysed and adapted to accommodate a late change. Program-size

Complexity is managed through the application of organisational or computing resource and/or modelling

techniques. The magnitude and impact of Program-size Complexity over the design definition phases is

shown in Figure 10 [25]. Pich et al propose that not only does the complexity of information increase over

time but that its relative impact of information content on outcomes diminishes over time. This assertion

chimes with that of INCOSE who propose that approximately 70% of committed lifecycle costs are due to

concept design against 95% [28].

Figure 11 suggest how the profile of a typical technical development may be represented over its lifecycle

with an indicative measure of the magnitude of the particular complexity criteria against time with the

development phase also shown. The first graph shows no major changes while the second graph shows a

major change that is brought about during sub-system verification. This is manifested by an increase in

program-line complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. Development phasing has been taken from INCOSE as

per Figure 4 on page 5. Such late changes present issues are there are now additional activities to manage

and potentially a large number of system elements, previously verified, need either to be completely re-

evaluated or re-verified against the new requirements. Uncertainty and ambiguity are re-introduced into

system elements that had previously been defined and built or constructed. The impact of non-linearity and

emergence is high due to the timing of the change and the number and nature of system dependencies.

3. Critical Project Success factors and their application in system development Critical Success Factors were first proposed by D. Ronald Daniel in the 1960’s, after which they were further

developed by John F. Rockart of the Sloan School of Management [5]. Their application was primarily

intended within the areas of business strategy but have also been adopted in project management as success

factors [45][53]. It is the intention that the selection and implementation of CSFs should put in place an

environment more conducive with a successful outcome.

3.1. Selection of success factors from literature Two mistakes that should be avoided are those of confusing a CSF with a requirement and assigning the CSF

as too high a level. The latter make the CSF too general for useful application. Requirements are distinctly

different from CSF and though their satisfaction is as at least as important, their management is handled

elsewhere. Examples include particularly important stakeholder requirements being associated with

‘Measures of Effectiveness’ (MoE) and system requirements with ‘Key Performance Parameters’ (TPP) of the

system of interest [54]. These will be discussed more fully in a later section but as performance measurement

metrics.

A CSF that is described at too high-level across all activities can be viewed as pre-requisites for any technical

development, project or business endeavour. Examples of high-level CSFs are provided by the APM Body of

Knowledge [45]:

Defining clear goals and objectives;

Maintaining a focus on business value;

Implementing a proper governance structure;

Ensuring senior management commitment;

Providing timely and clear communication.

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While these obviously worthy objectives, they apply to every project that the author has worked on.

Furthermore, they give no indication of how they might be judged as being satisfied. It is therefore important

that the CSFs do not merely represent best practice but apply to the demands of the particular technical

development as indicated by complexity assessment. As such, the CSFs selected for inclusion in the

framework will need to be supplemented with enough detail for implementation and, if possible,

measurement.

I have selected 141 CSFs for inclusion in the framework from a variety of sources, including APM [7], Pinto

and Slevin [52], Dvir et al [55], Chow and Cai [56], Ragatz et al [57], Koutsikouri and Dainty [58] and Fortune

and White [59. These are in turn divided amongst the Complexity Themes. Some of these CSFs are repeated

in more than one Complexity Theme. Ultimately each will be need to be developed with the appropriate

detail if chosen in practice and adopted for use. For example, ‘support from senior management’ should

include whose support should be in place and when and what this support will achieve. It should be targeted

against particular activities and should recognise the influence that development phasing may have on the

nature of management support that is required. This who, what, how and why approach can be applied to

most items on the list. The full list of CSFs for the framework has been grouped into the applicable Complexity

Themes and can be found in Appendix C.

There are a number of important concepts that should be borne in mind when applying CSFs. Merely stating

development best practice will dilute the effectiveness of the identification of CSFs and instead only

particularly areas of the process should be subject to analysis. As such general process improvement should

be addressed elsewhere. In the spirit of the incorporation of the principles of the Demming cycle, and the

resulting continual improvement, the proposed and the actual effect of the CSF should be recorded. This will

enable the effectiveness of individual CSFs and allow them to be catalogued within a toolbox of CSFs for

future use. To facilitate in the analysis of the effectiveness of CSF they should have performance measure

associated with them where possible.

3.2. Verification of success factors through questionnaire

Potential CSFs identified in the literature were evaluated for their potential utility in the framework via a

questionnaire. The questionnaire used the criterion of perceived impact on the likelihood of project success.

The questionnaire was posted online using the SurveyMonkey application [60] and a total of 122 responses

were achieved by requests via email and Linkedin social media. An overview showing the source of replies

can be seen in Appendix D. Respondents were a varied mixture of engineering and project management

professionals. Respondents were asked to rank the CSFs listed in Appendix C according to their potential

influence on a project into five categories from very low to very high. Any CSFs not considered relevant or

without an impact were removed from the list as being non-applicable. The questionnaire also gave

respondents the opportunity to identify other CSFs that the literature survey and subsequent analysis had

missed. The questionnaire and explanatory text is contained with Appendix E. The unprocessed results, per

respondent, are contained in Appendix R. Processing of the CSFs was undertaken and they are categorised in

Appendix F according to their scores:

4.0 and above - shaded in green (high to very high influence);

3.5 and above - shaded in yellow (upper scoring of medium to high influence);

3.0 and above - shaded in orange (low scoring of medium to high influence);

Below 3.0 - no shading and red type (low to medium influence).

These categories could then be filtered, sorted and compared across age, role description and industry.

Further processing was then undertaken to aggregate relevant age and role group. Data was disregarded

where this was not possible for particular role and industry groups. This ensured that data groups were

statistically significant, allowing the data from the selected groups to be meaningfully compared to the full

dataset. Information relating to the size of the aggregated datasets can be found in Appendix G.

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3.2.1. Overview

The findings were analysed across the full dataset and then these results compared to the various categories

sorted by age, role description and industry. In this way trends within the sub-groups could be identified. It

may be surmised that CSFs and performance measures for different industries will be different and as such

complexity managed differently across different domains. Also, the influence of age and role description on

CSFs and performance measures may skew complexity management due to the biases inherent with them.

Examples being project management professionals placing greater importance on established project

management techniques such as Earned Value Management while engineering personnel may place a

greater emphasis on the management of requirements. Identification of such biases will aid in the

composition of teams determining how complexity management will be undertaken. Known biases can then

be predicted and defended against. Comparisons were made between the filtered data and the full dataset.

This was done for the high to very high (shaded green) CSFs and then for the top three CSFs in each category.

83% of the respondents were from the age categories of ‘35 to 44’ (25%), ‘45 to 54’ (27%) and ‘55 to 64’

(31%). The results were consolidated from seven into five age categories. Consolidation of results outside of

the popular categories formed ‘up to 35’ and ‘over 65’ categories. This ensured sample sizes were statistically

significant. ‘Up to 35’ was the smallest data group with just below 7% of responses.

Role descriptions were similarly consolidated to ensure that samples for each category were sufficiently

sized. The data from 12 respondents was disregarded as not fitting with any one of the three aggregated

high-level role description that were chosen, reducing the dataset to 110. The groups derived from across

full dataset were ‘senior personnel’ (41%), ‘project personnel’ (40%) and ‘engineering personnel’ (19%).

Industry categories with the largest sample sizes were considered for analysis. Any groups below 10 in

number were disregarded resulting in a total of 83 respondents. Those chosen based on sample size were

‘construction’ (20%), ‘decommissioning’ (16%), ‘defence’ (16%), ‘energy generation’ (18%), ‘oil and gas’ (12%)

and ‘professional services’ (18%). Obviously there is some overlap between these industries and particularly

between ‘construction’ and ‘professional services’, which are generic terms that may relate to undertaking

of particular activities across most industries. The chosen data group sizes were generally of similar in size,

with ‘oil and gas’ being the smallest with 10 responses.

Further work, through a larger sample size, could be undertaken to increase the number of industries that

can be analysed. This would also improve the general confidence in the findings across age, role description

and industry. Furthermore, biases could be more completely determined across individual role descriptions

rather than consolidated into the groups that were chosen.

3.2.2. Full dataset

The summarised results, as discussed here, are contained within Appendix F. This section will discuss the top

three CSFs for each complexity theme and the trends that were identified by the author from this data. The

analysis was across the data from all 122 respondents.

Imposed project constraints

Clear realistic project objectives with an average (mean) score of 4.51 and 68 of 118 (58%) rating it

very high;

Adequate budget with an average (mean) score of 4.39 and 62 of 120 (52%) rating it very high;

Composition of project team in terms of experience and capability with an average (mean) score of

4.38 and 57 of 120 (48%) rating it very high.

In general planning and general business and governance processes appeared a lot less important than a

good organisation, certain project management processes (change and risk management) and the overall

viability of the development. Strong business case/sound basis for project was notable for having the second-

highest number of very high ratings but equal tenth-highest number of low ratings amongst the 4.0 and above

CSFs. This gave it a relatively lowly seventh most influential overall. This demonstrates how the perceived

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importance of a business varies amongst respondents. Project management respondent’s generally assigned

this very high-importance, in line with the teachings of project management methodologies, while other

groups gave it a much lower score.

Planning related CSFs were ranked as a high ‘medium to high’ influence or a low ‘high to very high’ influence

which was unexpected considering the relative importance of planning within project and engineering

management. A project cancellation process was assigned a ‘low to medium’ influence so should be

discounted from the list of CSFs. Evidently the cancellation of an ill-conceived or no-longer-required project

was considered either not relevant or of a low overall influence. None of the comments provided CSFs not

already included here or within another Complexity Theme’.

Technical development processes

Critical activities are identified with an average (mean) score of 4.47 and 63 of 115 (55%) rating it

very high;

Clear realistic development objectives with an average (mean) score of 4.32 and 53 of 116 (46%)

rating it very high;

A well understood and mature design review process is in place with an average (mean) score of 4.27

and 56 of 118 (47%) rating it very high.

Unsurprisingly the general trends of the first Complexity Theme were evident in this one. Identification of

areas of risk and criticality ranked higher than general planning. Common Systems Engineering techniques

such as ‘test early, test often’, ‘modelling and prototyping’ and ‘standardisation and/or modularisation’ were

assigned a relatively low importance overall. Examples of additional comments include the use of ‘state of

the art’ development processes and ‘clearly defined and mature functional requirements’.

Organisational

Good leadership with an average (mean) score of 4.62 and 72 of 115 (63%) rating it very high;

Transparent definition of responsibilities with an average (mean) score of 4.26 and 51 of 115 (44%)

rating it very high;

Degree of collaboration with an average (mean) score of 4.26 and 47 of 114 (41%) rating it very high.

Leadership was by some way the most important influence. Co-location of teams was not thought to be

important which may be reflected by the global nature of modern projects and the availability of better

technologies to allow collaboration. Surprisingly ‘competence in technology and technology management’

and ‘domain-specific know-how’ were not considered as ‘high to very high’ influences.

Contractual management

Clearly understood contractual interfaces with an average (mean) score of 4.45 and 64 of 114 (56%)

rating it very high;

Good performance by suppliers/contractors/consultants with an average (mean) score of 4.43 and

58 of 114 (51%) rating it very high;

Effective monitoring/control with an average (mean) score of 4.38 and 54 of 114 (47%) rating it very

high.

The ranking of influences did not show any unexpected trends which were in essence the principles of

selecting a competent supplier, ensuring the contract was clearly understood and managing it well.

Stakeholder management

Client/user acceptance with an average (mean) score of 4.58 and 74 of 113 (65%) rating it very high;

Decisions are agreed and documented with an average (mean) score of 4.48 and 64 of 113 (57%)

rating it very high;

User/client involvement with an average (mean) score of 4.44 and 64 of 113 (57%) rating it very high.

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Stakeholder management reinforced the need for early and effective communication. The representation of

the full system lifecycle was not thought to be particularly important though the involvement of operators

was considered as a relatively low in ‘high to very high’ category. The conclusion here is that the eventual

decommissioning of a system is often of low concern during its design and implementation.

A respondent’s comment that may be worthy of further investigation is that of ‘no informal communications

under any circumstances and record all meetings’. The use of formal versus informal communication is an

area that is rarely discussed. Informal communication infers frequent and relaxed use of the mediums of

telephone calls and email, which suggests trust and collaboration. The inverse is contractually driven, with

an administrative burden and an impact on factors such as frequency and content.

External interface management

Clear communication is established with an average (mean) score of 4.41 and 56 of 112 (50%) rating

it very high;

Clearly identified and understood external interfaces with an average (mean) score of 4.33 and 55 of

113 (49%) rating it very high;

Defined process for managing external interfaces with an average (mean) score of 3.96 and 29 of 115

(26%) rating it very high.

This theme mirrored the need for structured and effective communication as discussed in the previous

theme. Only two of the six were rated above 4.0.

Regulatory interface management

Clearly identified and understood interfaces with an average (mean) score of 4.45 and 59 of 111 (53%)

rating it very high;

Clear lines of communication with regulators with an average (mean) score of 4.36 and 52 of 110

(47%) rating it very high;

Good relationship with regulators with an average (mean) score of 4.28 and 48 of 111 (43%) rating it

very high.

All categories within this theme were assigned a relatively high score and even more so than other external

interfaces. This is obviously down to the criticality of the regulator’s role in many projects.

Technology development management

Well-defined standards up front with an average (mean) score of 4.04 and 31 of 111 (28%) rating it

very high;

Proven/familiar technology with an average (mean) score of 4.01 and 38 of 111 (34%) rating it very

high;

Pursuing a simple as possible design with an average (mean) score of 3.98 and 38 of 111 (34%) rating

it very high; 3.98 and 38 of 111 rating it very high.

The conclusion when considering the highest scoring CSFs within this theme was the avoidance of

unnecessary complexity while using established and thoroughly documented design standards. This is often

not possible and many projects have elements of research and development within them. These were

generally rated a lot lower than the other themes with approximately half the number of very highs assigned.

System integration management

Well-defined standards up front with an average (mean) score of 4.17 and 37 of 112 (33%) rating it

very high;

Pursuing a simple as possible design with an average (mean) score of 4.01 and 36 of 113 (32%) rating

it very high;

Proven/familiar technology with an average (mean) score of 3.98 and 30 of 111 (27%) rating it very

high.

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The scoring was similar to that within technology management. Only two of the eight were rated above 4.0.

Again the numbers of very highs assigned were around half that as other themes.

3.2.3. By age

Results filtered by age can be seen in Appendix H. Sample sizes per any age group were at best a third the

size of the whole dataset. Instead of analysing absolute ratings the top rated CSFs for each theme were

compared against the full dataset for consistency.

Imposed project constraints - Up to 35 generally scored lower with a lot fewer ‘high to very high’ category

CSF. This could be an anomaly as a consequence of the relatively low sample size. ‘35 to 45’ were

representative of the overall rankings. Age ‘55 to 64’ and ‘above 64’ advocated ‘strong project

sponsor/champion’ and ‘competent and qualified project manager’ respectively. Both these age groups rated

‘strong business case/sound basis for project’ which perhaps reflects their position and seniority within their

respective organisations, introducing a related bias.

Technical development processes - The ‘below 35 age group assigned more importance to planning in areas

of criticality and the use of past experience, while the ‘above 64’ age group gave more importance to planning

and responsiveness. Other age groups were broadly representative of the trends within the full dataset.

Organisational - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full dataset and especially

near the top ranked CSFs.

Contractual management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full dataset and

especially near the top ranked CSFs though the position of ‘rigorous pre-qualification process’ varied greatly

across age ranges.

Stakeholder management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full dataset

though the ’35 to 44’ age group assigned a lot greater importance to the managing of expectations and the

representation of operators.

External interface management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full

dataset

Regulatory interface management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full

dataset

Technology development management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the

full dataset though the ‘up to 35’ age group assigned high importance to ‘continuous improvement process

for products’.

System integration management - This theme was very similar to technology and was again closely in

agreement with the full dataset with the ‘up to 35’ age group assigning high importance to ‘continuous

improvement process for products’.

3.2.4. By role

Results filtered by role can be seen in Appendix I. Similarly, to by age these sub-datasets were a fraction of

the full dataset at less than half the size. The sub-data sets were compared against the full dataset results.

Imposed project constraints - The findings were closely in agreement with the full dataset across the role

descriptions with the exception of an understandable bias towards a single CSF in each role. Upper

management advocated a ‘strong business case/sound basis for project’. Project personnel ‘ranked most

highly the use of a ‘competent and qualified project manager. ‘Support from senior management’ was the

third most important CSF for engineering personnel which perhaps indicates its importance gained from

previous experience.

Technical development processes - Findings across all role descriptions were closely in agreement with the

full dataset across senior management and project personnel but perhaps understandably engineering

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personnel had a very different perspective. The following CSFs, were not present in the other role

descriptions. The first two of these were second and third most important while the others descended in

relative influence within the ‘high to very high’ category.

Enhanced planning is applied against areas of criticality and uncertainty;

Fast transfer of information;

Test early, test often philosophy is used during development;

Past experience of management methodologies and tools is available;

Correct choice of management methodologies and tools;

Trouble shooting mechanisms in place.

Organisational - Findings across all role descriptions were closely in agreement with the full dataset with the

exception of the inclusion of’ composition of development team in terms of experience and capability’ within

engineering personnel.

Contractual management, Stakeholder management, External interface management and Regulatory

interface management - Findings across all these themes and across all role descriptions were closely in

agreement with the full dataset

Technology development management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the

full dataset though engineering personnel rated the CSFs general lower with only ‘test early, test often

philosophy’ achieving the highest ranking.

System integration management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full

dataset though engineering personnel rated the ‘modelling and prototyping’ higher than the other role

descriptions in the top three.

3.2.5. By industry

Results filtered by industry can be seen in Appendix J. Sub-datasets were again compared.

Imposed project constraints - The findings were closely in agreement with the full dataset across the role

descriptions with a few notable exceptions within oil and gas. Perhaps as a reflection of an environment

reliant on oil prices and commercial pressures ‘effective change management’ and ‘political stability’ ranked

relatively highly.

Technical development processes - Construction differed significantly with the following CSFs figuring in the

rankings as ‘high to very high’, with responsiveness being the third most important. This reflects the dynamic

nature of a construction environment and requirement to act quickly during the construction phase to

minimise or avoid rework.

Responsive and flexible process to meet client needs;

Strong, appropriately detailed and realistic development plan kept up to date;

Appropriate development planning technique has been chosen;

Correct choice of management methodologies and tools.

Organisational - Energy generation elevated the ‘re-use knowledge and experience from previous projects’

which is a strong component of the nuclear following events such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl

[66][67]. Oil and gas elevated the ‘collocation of teams’, perhaps due to the international nature of many of

its projects. Professional services included ‘domain-specific know-how’ and ‘appropriate techniques to aid

identification of organisational dependencies and interfaces’. Otherwise there was commonality between

the industries and most influential CSFs.

Contractual management - With some minor differences findings across industries were closely in agreement

with the full dataset.

Stakeholder management - With some minor differences findings across industries were closely in

agreement with the full dataset.

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External interface management and Regulatory interface management - Findings across all industries were

closely in agreement with the full dataset.

Technology development management - Energy generation attributed some Systems Engineering type CSFs

which reflects the complex nature of many projects in this domain. These included ‘modelling and

prototyping’ and the use of ‘system element maturity’. ‘Continuous improvement process for products’ was

also ranked third, well above any other industry.

System integration management - Findings across all age groups were closely in agreement with the full

dataset though energy generation rated the ‘system element maturity’ highly again.

3.2.6. Conclusion

Analysing the datasets by age, role description and industry does not yield any particular trends nor show

any of the sub-datasets deviate significantly from the findings over the full dataset. The following are very

high level observations:

The age groups ’55 to 64’ and ‘above 64’ show two thirds of all deviations from the overall sub-

dataset;

Particular biases were evident in the Complexity Theme ‘imposed project constraints’ that relate to

the ‘role description’ dataset;

The role description ‘engineering personnel’ shows half of all deviations from the overall sub-dataset;

The industries of ‘energy generation’ and ‘oil and gas’ show two thirds of all deviations from the

overall sub-dataset;

The Complexity Themes of ‘Imposed project constraints’ and ‘Technical development processes’

tended to deviate more across all sub-datasets than any the other themes.

From this is could be seen that particular biases should be guarded against when determining CSFs. A

workshop approach should balance age groups and role descriptions to ensure particular pertinent CSFs are

not overlooked. Furthermore, particular industries may place more emphasis on some CSFs over others. The

formation of a ranked list of CSFs will need to be tailored for its application. It would be advised that adoption

of the CSFs begin from either this list or, for a particular industry, from the nearest sub-data set as filtered by

the closest applicable industry type. Ranking of influence of CSFs could be further refined through subsequent

iterations of the Complexity Management process. Stakeholders could be consulted before and after

application.

4. System development planning techniques

4.1. Overview An important aspect of the framework is that it will support and enhance planning activities. It has been

recognised that planning related objectives cannot be achieved in isolation of established planning tools and

techniques. Complexity influenced planning will need to be undertaken in parallel with current practice and

indeed maximum benefits can only be realised if they can provide readily used and value-adding inputs into

these established planning activities. This overview discusses the shortfalls and benefits of current practice,

the opportunities in adopting a suitable supplementary technique and the requirements that the technique

must fulfil. A suitable technique called Design Structure Matrix, also commonly known as DSM, will then be

discussed along with ways it can be integrated into current practice.

Gantt charts [63] are the dominant method of project and system development planning. The inherent

advantage over other techniques is their relative simplicity, which allows it to be an effective communication

tool. The use of Gantt charts also underpins project monitoring and reporting techniques such as Earned

Value Management (EVM) [45]53]. This popularity has precipitated the development of advanced tooling,

with packages such as Primavera, providing a way of creating the plan and integrating it with other processes.

Overall they are a good way of managing the overall duration of a project.

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There are however limitations in the techniques’ use that are increasingly exposed as complexity increases.

Although relationships between activities are represented they are restricted to simple dependencies [64].

These dependencies describe how an activity influences the start (and occasionally the finish) of other

activities including the use of lag. The nature of these dependencies cannot be further explored using this

planning technique alone. Thus the relationship between coupled activities is much simplified and likely to

be misunderstood without further analysis. As complexity and the number of dependencies increase, the

effort required in the production and management of the Gantt chart increases significantly. This leads to

more and more assumptions and simplifications of the nature of dependencies which can often result in the

actual start and duration of activities progressively deviating from the plan as it proceeds. This is obviously a

state of affairs to minimise if not to avoid.

It is unlikely that the dominance of Gantt charts in industry as the primary method of planning will change

anytime soon. Moreover, they have served as an incredibly useful way of coordinating and representing

activities across diverse disciplines and functions. With this in mind, other techniques should supplement or

feed into, rather than replace, Gantt charts, and should provide a way of enhancing the planning where

required.

Planning of all of the development activities across a project is a considerable undertaking which only

increases as complexity increases. It may be surmised that there is a positive relationship between the effort

that is required for effective planning and the effect of the number and potential impact of dependencies.

Other factors that deserve consideration within planning include the varying uncertainty and number of

ambiguity related assumptions. There is also an inverse relationship between the effort expended and the

risk of deviation from the plan. The balance between effort and risk is an important consideration in any

project where there are finite resources available. Such detailed planning has a high overhead and in a

complex project unfocussed planning can diffuse efforts leading to essential dependencies being overlooked

until it is too late. The direction of maximum effort to areas of risks should improve the likelihood of an overall

successful outcome.

Further to the earlier discussions within a survey of literature [4] and within the objectives within Section 1.2,

it would be sensible to use any enhanced planning techniques in areas identified as being either particularly

complex, or moderately complex but with a high potential impact in the event of deviation from the plan.

Using the principles of the Demming cycle, it is also beneficial to understand the impact of the use of

additional planning techniques to allow their use to be developed and improved for later planning of

development activities or future technical development. Lastly there may be opportunities to reuse particular

activity patterns or structures to reduce future planning effort that needs to be expended. To summarise it

is proposed that detailed development activity planning follows these concepts:

Will prioritise enhanced planning in areas identified through complexity assessment;

Determine where and which planning techniques to be used should be influenced by choice of CSF;

Uses enhanced planning to supplement rather than replace traditional project planning techniques;

Keeps a record of where system development planning has influenced the overall planning;

Records and uses learning to assess effectiveness of techniques and improve subsequent planning;

Considers opportunities to develop frameworks findings for re-use in subsequent projects.

4.2. Design Structure Matrix

4.2.1. Introduction

Design Structure Matrix (DSM) has been chosen to supplement traditional planning methods due to its high

functionality and flexibility, allowing it to be used over several domains of planning. DSM is based on a simple

graphical representation of the relationship between activities, called the square N x N matrix [65], and has

its origins in Graph Theory. It is also variously known as the N2 diagram or coupling matrix [28]. It was

developed by several independent parties but most notably by Eppinger and Browning who have refined the

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technique, independently and in collaboration, through a number of papers and publications since the 1990s

[66].

The nature of DSM’s notation conventions varies and should be designed to suit the particular application.

For this reason, detailed descriptions will be omitted. For the purpose of this project the DSM as developed

by Eppinger and Browning, will form the basis of future discussions. The IR/FAD convention (as opposed to

the IC/FBD convention) will be adopted. Both variants are broadly similar but the use of rows and columns is

transposed [67]. Full and detailed descriptions of the technique can be found within their recent publication,

‘Design Structure Matrix Methods and Applications’ [67]. They are also associated with DSMweb.org, which

aims to ‘promote and foster’ further development of DSM [68].

DSM is flexible enough to cater for any type of system and can be further adapted for a particular process

and organisation. Furthermore, it is ‘highly compact, easily scalable’ [67] and can be applied where needed

at the level of detail required. The low level of abstraction, intuitive and graphical representation and the

relative density of information that a DSM contains makes it ideal for conveying important information as

both a standalone model or as a precursor for further analysis. It can provide system-level views of areas of

heavy interaction [67] but for the purposes of this project it is also ideally suited for focussed views on

particular aspects of the development.

4.2.2. Design Structure Matrix principles

DSM is a highly flexible technique that can be applied to provide a view of aspect of a technical development

either independently or in combination with another aspect, and can be summarised as follows:

Product architecture, i.e. the interactions of the system of interest itself;

Organisation architecture, i.e. how the development organisation interacts;

Process architecture which describes the development process ranging from high-level to detailed

planning;

Multi-domain Matrix, also known as MDM, which combines several of the above to show interactions

between the elements of the various matrices.

Process can be described as having ‘temporal flow’ architecture due to the inherent time-based interactions

that occur, with product and organisation possessing ‘static architecture’ [67]. MDM will be either temporal

flow or static, depending on its component DSMs. We will primarily be interested in DSMs associated with

process and organisational architecture and process/organisational MDMs as a tool to aid in planning of

activities. This does not however preclude the use of product DSMs or the inclusion of product architecture

in a MDM if the complexity assessment highlights an area of concern. The basic principles of the DSM are

very simple are as follows:

• Matrix elements being considered are represented along the diagonal of the matrix from upper left

to bottom right;

• Element names shown on rows and columns with the ordering of elements kept consistent on both

the rows and columns;

• Inputs are from left and right of the diagonal (rows) and outputs (columns from above and below as

per IR/FAD convention;

• Interaction between elements is shown in the matrix cells with the diagonal cells being blank.

A simple DSM, which merely acknowledges the existence of a relationship between inputs and outputs, is

called a binary DSM. The DSM however can be further developed into a numerical DSM, including attributes

such as importance, number of interactions and impact or strength of interaction. Additional attributes can

be linked to cells if required and elsewhere stored in a database. Whereas binary DSMs are qualitative,

numerical DSMs can be designed to be highly quantitative.

The process for creating and managing a DSM is relatively straightforward and follows a five step process.

Before this is begun all conventions will need to be agreed including supplementary information to be

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contained within numerical DSM models. Suggested additional data to be collected includes interaction

strength as a single integer or as a combination of probability and impact. Later changes to notation and the

scope of information to be collected and model will be difficult to reconcile with previously completed DSMs,

which will potentially lead to confusion and duplicated effort. The inherent limitation of the DSM relates to

it describing the activities in terms ‘edges’ rather than ‘nodes’ [67]. For example, a binary process architecture

DSM cannot describe the duration of an activity. This can be overcome through the development of a

numerical DSM that includes information such as duration or resource.

The following sections will outline the essence of the DSM technique. A survey of literature relating to DSM,

describing the technique in more detail, can be found in Appendix K.

4.2.3. Creating and applying the organisational architecture DSM

The steps in the process for creating the Organisational DSM are as follows:

Decompose;

Identify;

Analyse;

Display;

Improve.

Once the DSM is clustered it can be used to inform management decisions with regards to the composition

of teams, geographical location and the types and scope of communication.

The integration of development activities can be extremely challenging. It can be used to shape the formation

of teams or clustering of teams based on concentrations of interactions. The application of collaborative

tools, such as databases, will be more appropriate for large groups while meetings and informal methods are

more effective for smaller groups. Lastly the co-location of particular organisational elements may be

beneficial.

4.2.4. Creating and applying process architecture DSM

Process DSMs are created using the same five steps as are used for organisational DSM. The level of

decomposition will be dictated by the previous complexity assessment and assignment of CSFs. The level

decomposition will also be influenced by availability information during the particular phase of development.

It is advisable that the elements are kept at a consistent level within the respective breakdown structures. If

a model of activities already exists this should be used and used as the planning baseline.

Key activities, pivotal to delivery of the entire process, should be identified. These are chosen based on

dependencies, coupling and risk. As such disproportionate effort should be placed on ensuring that these are

completed as per the plan over less consequential activities. These will be tracked throughout the project

with evidence of slippage or increases in risks above the accepted residual risk prompting additional

interventions.

Analysis of DSMs should enable a better understanding of the interactions between elements and allow the

plan to be amended accordingly. There are several relationship types within DSMs:

Sequential – where activities follow on from each other in a finish to start type dependency

relationship. There may be some overlap may be possible between activities which would be seen as

negative lag on a Gantt chart;

Parallel activities – these activities may rely on same resource but there is actual no dependency.

Resource constraints would normally be considered later using organisational architecture DSM or

on a resource loaded Gantt chart schedule;

Coupled – with iterations between the outputs and inputs between two or more activities. This is the

most difficult relationship to represent in traditional Gantt charts;

Conditional – execution of later activity dependant on decision made in an earlier activity. This may

or may not be sequential and in confined to the transfer of information.

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The traditional interaction

considered within planning is that

of a finish to start dependency

where one activity needs to be

completed before another can

commence, known as sequential

within a DSM. This can be further

refined by the inclusion of positive

or negative lag to either delay or

advance the commencement of

the following activity by a specified

duration. Other variations exist, including start to start (which suggests parallel activities) or finish to finish

(which suggests a coupling type relationship). It is these relationships that define the effectiveness of a

process or plan and it follows that the greatest impact is achieved by better managing the interfaces between

activities. It will also be worth considering representing iterations as separate activities

Of the relationship types it is coupling that is very often the most troublesome to manage and commonly

causes delays. These relationships most often rely on iterative outputs from one activity into one or more

other activities. It is difficult to predict the number of iterations that may be ultimately required. Other

variables include the duration to review and accept an iterative input into another coupled activity and

difficulties in planning the resource necessary for such interactions. The more activities involved in coupling,

the more closely coupled activities are and the number of anticipated iterative cycles all potentially impact

the overall duration.

There are several types of coupling. Some of these can be eliminated or reduced in terms of their impact

through effective planning and/or management of process. This is an example of a process behaviour that

should be fed back through the process for CSF consideration. Coupling behaviours may be planned or, due

to errors, unidentified interaction type or emergence, be unplanned. Coupling is generally as follows:

1. Inherent coupling – planned coupling behaviour with activities that are structurally interdependent;

2. Poor activity sequencing – information is created too late resulting in the delay of other activities.

Though a planned coupling this type of behaviour can be minimised, though not entirely

eliminated, through effective analysis;

3. Incomplete activities – where activities are unduly delayed with a similar impact as poor activity

sequencing;

4. Poor communication – information or outputs are not passed on completely or in timely fashion

again delaying subsequent activities;

5. Input changes – caused by changes to assumptions;

6. Mistakes – defective inputs created and discovered at a later date.

Evidently coupling types 2 to 6 are to be avoided whether through planning or subsequent controlling of the

plan. Delayed inputs/outputs can result in the formation of assumptions and indeed this is sometimes

adjudged as being a desirable response to a coupling behaviour. Adopting such an action simply exchanges

coupling behaviour behaviours 2, 3 or 4 for the potential for behaviour 5. Inherent coupling suggests

necessary iterations of outputs/inputs between two or more activities. Though necessary, most often even

desirable, convergence to a solution should be encouraged as quickly as is practicable. Additionally, the

reduction in the number of feedback loops is highly desirable also. Indeed, this has the potential for use as a

measure of development status and a measure of complexity in itself.

One goal of the analysis of a process architecture DSM is to optimise sequencing of the activities so that as

many interactions as possible are below the diagonal. Doing so ensures that activities only begin once all

inputs are available and reduces the number of assumptions that need to be made (avoiding the potential

Figure 12. Process architecture DSM [68].

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for input changes type coupling) or activities being delayed unduly (avoiding poor activity sequencing type

coupling). In the extreme example an output from an activity in the upper right hand corner indicates that

assumptions will need to be made for an early activity to progress. If the assumption is subsequently proved

incorrect there may be the propagation of changes throughout all the activities with substantial impact on

resource usage and schedule completion. There will be conflicts between multiple activities that constrain

the sequencing. The result will be a reordering of the rows and columns.

Another aim of analysis is the removal of coupled relationships through a process call ‘clustering’ and ‘tearing’

[67]. Instead of removing unnecessary assumptions this process introduces assumptions to make the overall

process or plan more efficient. Activities are rearranged into a ‘block’ so that they are grouped around the

diagonal. Assumptions are then applied that remove the ‘inherent coupling’ behaviour. There is however a

risk of the emergence of an ‘input change’ coupling behaviour at a later date which may reintroduce the

coupling. The decision to engage in tearing of activities within the DSM will therefore be based on the risk of

later input changes against the benefit of improving the efficiency of the process by the removal of inherent

coupling.

The discussion of where the process or plan may break down should be undertaken during the collation of

information on activity interactions and particularly for coupling behaviours. The use of Failure Mode Effects

Analysis (FMEA) may be of use to analyse potential points of failure leading to unplanned process iterations.

If significant these should be fed back into the complexity assessment and CSF processes and recorded on

risk register.

Sequencing

Sequencing optimises the ordering of activities. This can be done before the first draft of the DSM, in which

case the effect will be dramatic. There is usually a natural or intuitive ordering of activities so sequencing

performed on an established DSM is not likely to initiate wholesale change. It is a useful process nonetheless.

The process follows a number of steps. The first step, and the easiest, is the identification of activities with

either no inputs or no outputs. Activities with no inputs can be undertaken first and activities with no outputs

undertaken last. The sequence of all remaining activities will be influenced by the number, strength and type

of interaction with other activities depending on whether binary or numerical DSMs are being used.

There are a number of heuristics that can be used to undertake sequencing. The first is minimising the

number of assumptions that are required in the model by reducing the number of interactions above the

diagonal. This reduces the number of activities that need to be completed later in the sequence that feedback

to earlier activities. The second is reducing the distance of the remaining interactions above the diagonal. As

described previously long feedbacks can be the cause of the propagation of change throughout the

development process. These activities are then identified as ‘coupled blocks’. The identification of these

coupled blocks can be used to identify early where additional management effort would be well spent.

Examples include the co-location of those involved, the use of collaboration tools and application of status

and progress measures. Heuristics are of primary interest in this project through constraints of space but also

in fitting with the project’s overall philosophy. Algorithms and commercial applications are available with

potential benefits in terms of both expended effort and accuracy over a large quantity of data.

Clustering and tearing

The identification of blocks of coupled activities can be used for further analysis of the DSM. Decomposition

of coupled blocks of activities may yield a more manageable set of sub-activities. In contract aggregation can

be used to simplify the DSM but this will obscure individual feedbacks and is not generally recommended.

The addition of activities earlier in the sequence can be used to reduce the number of assumptions. The

decision to add activities will usually be made on a cost-benefit basis and should be used to reduce

uncertainty and risk of change. Tearing reduces the interaction between a block of activities by introducing

assumptions in place of iterations. Following the clustering of activities into blocks the process is a follows:

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Suggest interaction to be removed, called a ‘tear’. The link or links with the longest feedback loops

back providing the greatest benefit and should be considered first;

Analyse the tear and, with the agreement of the stakeholder within the process, accept or reject the

tear considering the degree of confidence on the assumption that replaces the interaction. This is a

risk-versus-benefit based decision. If the first tear is discounted move onto the next best tear and

repeat the analysis;

The tear removes an interaction which reduces the block of activities in a particular cluster. The DSM

can now be sequenced;

Feedback marks in the DSM are replaced with torn marks to provide a prompt to check activity

outputs affected by the tear against the new assumptions;

Disproved assumptions will result in input change type coupling behaviour and rework of early

activities. If this occurs the tearing exercise was unsuccessful and the intended efficiencies were not

realised.

Single assumptions can apply across multiple tears

Commercial DSM tooling software that incorporates many of the more advanced algorithms and concepts

that have been developed for sequencing and clustering and tearing is available. The most popular and

commonly used of these are referenced on DSMweb.org [68]. None of these packages can directly interface

with the most commonly used scheduling application employed within complex projects is Oracle’s

Primavera [69]. This suggests that the general maturity of the applications has some way to go. Several of

the applications do profess outputs compatible with Microsoft Project, a scheduling application which (in the

author’s experience) tends to be used to plan smaller projects.

4.2.5. Application of the process DSM within a complexity management framework

The ultimate purpose of DSM analysis, in the general case, is to optimise the matrix which will influence the

creation of a time bound schedule. Analysis, as a part of a complexity framework, is no different. There is

however an additional rationale for analysis that is consistent with the principle of focusing on areas of

concern against which management effort can be directed. Analysis can not only optimise the activity

sequence and interventions, but can also identify clusters of activities and single activities that have either

the potential to unduly influence the overall schedule or else are of particular concern. This then affords the

opportunity to address current issues, mitigate risks or put in place measures to provide early issue

identification.

It is important to note that the DSM is less useful in showing attributes such as start dates, durations or the

lagging or leading nature of dependencies. This is one of the most powerful reasons to retain Gantt charts

alongside the use of DSMs. Thus the DSM can be used as an input into the Gantt chart and provide more

information on interaction related risks. DSMs can also be used to drive techniques such as PERT. In this

instance supplementary information relating to likelihood and impact would be contained with the DSM.

Development of a process / organisation architecture MDM can be used to identify required expertise and

resourcing requirements for particular activities and better manage the interface between organisational

and activity driven requirements. It can be used for ‘resource loading’ [70] of the Gantt chart and schedule

to facilitate resource smoothing or levelling of the schedule and implementation of EVM methodologies. It is

proposed that there should be a tiered application of DSM following complexity assessment and assignment

of CSFs. These increase in detail and also effort according to the risks and benefits of application within the

particular area of the technical development. A suggested ranking, descending in terms of effort, is as follows:

Not applied and traditional planning techniques are used;

A high-level application within WBS between elements of the system development;

Application of a binary process DSM at lower level of WBS;

Application of a binary MSM between process and organisation;

Application of a numerical process DSM;

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Application of a numerical MSM (process and organisation).

Areas of concern are analysed at a lower level in the WBS with integration of the process and organisation

via the use of a MSM. The use of numerical matrices has the potential to provide extremely rich information

for use within other planning processes. However, this detail inevitably comes at a cost so should be reserved

for areas of the development that are likely to require the greatest degree of planning and control. It is likely

that analysis will highlight additional areas of concern that should be fed back into the complexity assessment

and CSF processes. It is also advised that the use of DSMs at a high-level with the WBS should be undertaken

early in the development lifecycle. The identification of interactions at an early stage may influence the

composition of the WBS and the ordering of WBS elements within the schedule. Since WBS elements are

invariably placed in the Gantt chart in accordance with a WBS numbering scheme it is desirable to place as

many of the WBS elements in the correct sequence as is practicable. This will then aid the logical flowing of

activities from top left to bottom right of a Gantt chart.

It is useful to develop a numerical process architecture DSM convention which incorporates the principles

described within the complexity assessment. This will validate the initial assessment findings and allow for

the identification of any additional CSFs that arise from changes after further analysis. For simplicity the

measurement of uncertainty, ambiguity, emergence and non-linearity will be captured numerically variously

using several convections. Some will be absolute integers while others will be subjective. The additional

information should be determined alongside the inputs, outputs and interactions which are described above.

Some or all of these values should be contained separately within a spread sheet or database to the DSM

matrix itself as to do so would clutter the layout.

Uncertainty is directly related to the probability of change related to a DSM activity. An integer relating to

the likelihood of a change in an activity’s outputs or duration will be adopted. A percentage is often used and

this can be translated into a whole number between 0.1 and 0.9 with 0.1 representing 10%, i.e. very low

likelihood, and 0.9 representing 90%, which is indicates that the outputs are likely to change. No activities

will be assigned 1, i.e. be planned with a 100% chance of change. Change may be due to input changes or

mistakes. Ambiguity impacts the development in terms of the number of assumptions that are required and

delayed start dates if assumptions are not to be used. The number of assumptions can be counted with high

number of assumptions being related to higher levels of uncertainty.

Emergence is where there are unexpected interactions [44], i.e. more activities are affected by a single

change that is originally envisaged. High emergence is where many activities are so affected. Therefore, it is

sensible to assign a value to an activity equivalent to the number of activities that rely on its outputs.

Conversely a value can be assigned to each activity that represents the number of inputs it depends upon.

The number of outputs from a single activity identifies which activities, if subject to change, are particularly

influential on the wider DSM. The number of inputs shows how sensitive an activity is to changes elsewhere.

Non-linearity is seen as a disproportionate impact resulting from a change. This can be represented by a

ranking from 1 to 10 with 1 representing a slight impact on dependant activities and 10 being a substantial

impact. Of course the impact of a change to an activity may not be homogeneous across its outputs to other

activities. For the sake of simplicity an average measure of non-linearity will be proposed for this model.

Figure 13. Assigning additional attributes to process architecture DSM activities.

Activity Uncertainty

(Also known as

likelihood)

Ambiguity

(number of

assumptions)

Emergence Non-linearity

(Also known

as impact)

System requirements – sub-system X 4 5 12 outputs

5 inputs

7

System safety assessment – sub-system x 3 1 5 outputs

5 inputs

9

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Program-size Complexity is directly related to the number of activities to be managed. It is not considered

useful to measure this attribute to manage at the level of activities. Measurement of Program-sized

complexity would be more useful at a higher level, for example to measure the size of a work package,

development phase or the project in its entirety. In these instances, suggested measures would relate to the

number of activities or interactions between activities within the chosen area of interest.

Figure 13 shows an example with fictitious data for two sub-systems and examples of data that could be

assigned against the various properties.

Completing a numerical DSM in this way will allow further analysis. Case studies [67] demonstrate that the

assignment of probability and impact (called uncertainty and non-linearity in this text) to an activity can be

used to perform PERT analysis on the schedule. There are however several other ways that these and the

other remaining attributes can be used for analysis. In general, particular thresholds can be filtered and

sorted to identify trends or group activities together for analysis and shading and colouring employed for

ease of reference and communication of activities of particular concern. In each case there is the potential

for tooling to automatically make the necessary calculations based on the inputs into the DSM itself.

Additional management effort and status and progress measures can be introduced to specifically address

areas of concern.

The pairing of poor attributes relating to uncertainty/ambiguity and emergence/non-linearity is certainly not

desirable. Section 2.4 discusses the profile of complexity across the development lifecycle. There is proposed

that uncertainty and ambiguity should naturally reduce over the development lifecycle while emergence and

non-linearity generally increases. High values of three or four of these properties against a group of activities,

especially later in the development lifecycle, show an area of risk. Even a single activity with a similarly poor

complexity profile, if on the schedule’s critical path, deserves closer attention. High uncertainty and

ambiguity later in a development lifecycle may be the result of process or schedule optimisation activities,

such as clustering and tearing, where assumptions are introduced to reduce the schedule duration and

sequential activities are instead undertaken in parallel. This in turn may be as a result of either the original

over-optimistic technical development completion milestone or because of delays demanding a new

schedule.

Another technique is to analyse activity feedback cycles to determine those that are particularly uncertain.

Feedback cycles with a high likelihood of change that coincide with the critical path will be of particular

concern as any delay, due to rework, will directly impact on the completion of technical development. To

calculate the likelihood of change across a three activity cycle the following calculation can be undertaken:

Likelihood of change across a feedback cycle = 1-{(1-a)(1-b)(1-c)}

Where a, b and c are the uncertainties for the three activities in the particular cycle. This essentially calculates

the likelihood of any of the activities changing within the feedback cycle. More activities and high likelihood

of change will produce a low measure.

One method of addressing this is through the introduction of additional activities to reduce the number of

assumptions and thus the potential for input changes. The introduction of other management controls,

described in additional CSFs, should also be considered. Finally, two or more sequential or coupled activities

with large attributes of emergence have the potential for substantial propagation of change. It may be

difficult to reduce the numbers of impacted activities (for example tearing and clustering to reduce

dependencies may instead simply result in input changes) but further reducing uncertainty, even when

already relatively low, is sometimes possible.

Taking the analysis further other activity measures can be derived from its inputs and outputs. Activities

particularly vulnerable to change propagation can be determined by calculating the product of uncertainty

and non-linearity for each input to an activity and taking their sum. Large calculated amounts will highlight

an activity that is at risk of change. For example, activity Y has four inputs. The inputs have products of

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uncertainty and non-linearity of 1x8, 4x4, 3x6 and 7x3. The sum of these is 63 (8+16+18+21). This can be

mapped across the DSM using colours or shading to denote activities of low or high vulnerability. Similarly,

activities with high potential to influence change can be determined by calculating the product of uncertainty

and non-linearity for each output and multiplying this by the number of outputs. In addition to allowing effort

to be directed against particular activities these measures will readily allow change impact analysis to be

undertaken and influence decision making. A relevant example of the potential benefit is that of a seemingly

small non-essential change which has the potential for a substantial impact across the schedule. In this

instance the change could safely be argued that it should be disallowed. So in summary the following

measures can be calculated:

Primary measures;

o Uncertainty – subjective measure of likelihood of change, determined in conjunction with

stakeholders during formation of DSM;

o Ambiguity – determined through the number of assumption required for an activity;

o Emergence – determined through the number of inputs and outputs for each activity;

o Non-linearity – determined as the general impact of change of an activity’s outputs on other

activities;

Secondary measures;

o Likelihood of change across a feedback cycle – particularly useful if activities coincide with

the schedule critical path;

o Vulnerability to change propagation – calculated from the uncertainty and non-linearity of

an activities inputs;

o Change propagation Influence - calculated from the uncertainty and non-linearity of the

activity multiplied by the number of outputs it has.

The calculation of mean amounts for the primary measures can give an indication of the complexity profile

for a portion of the overall technical development based on the boundaries of the DSM. Complexity profiles

were discussed in section 2.4. This could be across the entire phase or across the activities currently in

progress and could have one of two purposes. The first would be to provide norms for technical development

that could be used for later developments. Complexity profiles deviating markedly from the norm would

require further investigation. The second would be the identification of trends. This is particularly useful in

identifying when uncertainty and ambiguity remain consistently elevated or are increasing. Either would be

a cause for concern. Coupled with natural increasing emergence and non-linearity, high uncertainty and/or

ambiguity pose a high risk for significant change propagation. The identification of important activities,

activity cycles or clusters of activities should direct the implementation of status and progress measures.

These measures will be discussed in section 5.

4.2.6. Process-organisational MDMs and their application

The creation of a MDM requires both DSMs to be available for the particular area of the development and

for it to be of sufficient maturity. Much of the effort required is expended creating the donor DSMs and the

principle of the MDM is similar to that of

the DSM. Although there are a number

of types of MDMs that can be created it

is a process-architecture MDM that is

particularly applicable to the planning

and control of complex technical

development processes. An MDM can

be either of the binary or numerical type

but unlike the DSM the MDM does not

have a diagonal. It will show the Figure 14. Process-organisation MDM [68].

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interaction between particular organisation elements and the overall process which is useful in determining

the impact of a deficit in resource or capability across activities. It will also show the organisational

requirements of a particular activity.

Analysis of the MDM may show a cluster of organisational elements that are particularly influential during a

particular phase. It may be beneficial to temporarily co-locate a number of teams or make additional efforts

to integrate their interactions. The demands of the schedule can be inferred from the MDM allowing resource

and capability requirements to be planned in advance. The MDM can be populated with the estimated level

of effort that is required in terms of man hours or cost. Missing organisational requirements may be identified

by the absence of interactions of MDM rows. The findings of this analysis can be used in cost and resource

estimates and be used to resource-load the Gantt chart to allow the application of EVM.

5. System Performance Measures

5.1. Introduction

The assigning of Performance Measures and the gathering and processing of project data to calculate them

is the ‘check’ activity within Demming’s ‘Plan-Check-Act-Do’ methodology. It is a vital component between

planning and controlling of a project that should inform if and when action should be taken. Effective

Performance Measures should additionally provide information on what type of intervention may be

effective. They may indicate a deviation from the plan but also the emergence of undesirable properties

within the development process. Pertinent examples of such an undesirable property are poor outcomes

after the implementation of a CSF or a large backlog of configuration change requests.

The control and management of on-going development activities is dependent on relevant and accurate

information on both the status and progress of the activities being undertaken. Technical development

processes, as compared to normal business processes, are typified by a number of unique properties which

makes effective process monitoring important [72]:

‘Dynamic, creative and chaotic’;

Contain many feedback mechanisms;

The process in its entirety is largely ‘virtual’ and ‘not always precise’;

The likelihood of change is high due to feedback mechanisms, imperfectly defined requirements and

customer led changes.

Without the appropriate choice and effective implementation of Performance Measures issues may go

undetected until they are manifestly apparent, by which time they may be unrecoverable. Additionally, it is

useful to know where management effort needs to be directed most efficiently. Examples of existing

frameworks used for the formation and collection of measures include House of Quality, known as Quality

Function Deployment, Goal-Question-metric and Balanced Scorecard [73]. The use of metrics within concept

and development activities is not widespread and can lead to a number of ‘coping’ mechanisms being

adopted by personnel in response to them. Simon and Simon list a number of issues that have been identified

during an empirical study [74] and as thus should be avoided. Similarly, Demming describes particular ‘traps’

to be avoided [75]. Conversely Kline et al [76] describe a method for designing performance measures that

is applicable across any type of technical development. The design and implementation of performance

measures should be designed to avoid aspects that reduce effectiveness and embrace those that improve

their chance of having a positive impact.

The measures that are chosen should also suit the particular development by its particular characteristics.

The method recommended by this dissertation is to identify areas of complexity and criticality through the

complexity assessment and to measure the implementation of CSFs. Two ways of looking at the performance

measures is in terms of areas of the WBS and complexity criteria listed and described in Section 2. Both can

be used to tailor the performance measures to balance effort of collection and analysis of data against the

benefits of closer and more accurate monitoring and control. However, the constraints inherent in this

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approach are extensive research, undertaken by the previous literature survey [4] and additional research

within this dissertation, revealed the limited number of techniques currently available. This was reiterated

by the findings of questionnaire survey which revealed no additional performance measures from amongst

the 122 respondents. Additional research, undertaken since the literature review, can be found within

Appendix L.

5.2. Desirable properties of Performance Measures

Performance Measures, often call metrics, can be placed in several categories. Mathematical system

performance measures are calculated from fundamental data. These metrics are either derived or combined

and an excellent example is that of the metrics relating to the established method of EVM. In this

methodology uses primary data, relating to the actual costs and physical progress, is compared with cost and

schedule planning to derive measures such as cost and schedule variance and cost and schedule performance

indicators. Practical system metrics are derived from the application of ‘empirically established factual logic’.

Heuristic system metrics are similar to practical system metrics but the scope of the metrics is restricted to

particular issues [73]. Depending on the level of decomposition the metrics described in this dissertation are

most likely to be either practical system or heuristic system metrics. EVM is used extensively within projects

and technical developments and the questionnaire survey will use it as a baseline against which the influence

of other performance is measured.

The properties of the measures are of importance. Foremost the measures should of course have a clear and

obvious purpose and it is also beneficial that the measure is as ‘homomorphic’ as possible with the source

data [73]. The nature of the measures should provide a view of developments objectives ranging from the

short-term to the long-term [73]. Measures should be process orientated as well as schedule and cost

orientated indicators [73]. In accordance with the concept of the balanced scorecard there should be breadth

to the perspective of the measures that are adopted [77]. Measures may be either lagging or leading with

staple measures inevitably relating to cost and schedule. An example of a common system of measurement

is those used within EVM which reconciles planned cost and schedule against actual cost and progress. In this

instance it is also a lagging measure. That is an issue is flagged only once activities fall behind schedule or

estimated costs are exceeded. If the issue is determined early enough action can be taken to converge with

the original plan. However, the severity of the issue is greater the later it is detected and both low sensitivity

of data and the use of monthly reporting cycles may even delay this late detection by a month or two. In this

instance it is much better to predict the occurrence of cost overruns and schedule delays through the use of

leading measures. These measures will target areas of the technical development that will later influence the

actual activity durations and costs.

Other properties that should be considered are their frequency of application and it is important to balance

the effort of application against the benefit that may be derived from the frequency of measurement. A

measure may require a lot of time and effort to determine, for example the findings of an audit. It may

measure the properties of the development that do not change frequently, such as the schedule for the

current phase. In both instances it is appropriate to only determine the measure once per development phase

or perhaps only three or four times per year. Exceeding this frequency of measurement may entail the use

of inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise estimated data or not provide sufficient additional benefit to make it

worthwhile. Conversely the measure may follow a dynamic development property. The status of

development artefacts may be automatically recorded via the database or tooling that is being utilised. This

allows the measures to be taken more frequently or even viewed real-time. The cadence of measure

reporting may also be dictated by time-bound criteria. The frequency of EVM reporting is constrained by the

monthly frequency that actual costs are most often calculated which in turn relates to the submission of

invoices by contractors and consultants. Measures can be quantitative or qualitative. Often it is difficult to

provide quantitative data and only a commentary on the on-going activities is possible. Even when

quantitative is possible it is worth combining with qualitative to provide valuable context to the information.

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Examples of leading measures include development resource and the quantity development change requests

that have been submitted during a period. They should highlight early concerns either through an absolute

quantity or through a trend over successive reporting periods. Using the first example from above a deviation

below the planned level of development resource may not yet be reflected in a delay in the schedule. Early

identification would allow management action to be taken to elevate resourcing to a suitable level thus avoid

a later schedule deviation. An increasing trend in the number of development change requests may indicate

inadequacies within the existing requirements or stakeholder management issues. Furthermore, Increases in

resourcing requirements and funding may result from an increase in the amount of change. Again early

identification of changes can be used to prevent or minimise an adverse impact on the development

activities. It has been proposed that the selection of measures could be based on process analysis. There are

several barriers to this approach [73]:

There is a high overhead to process modelling which increases processes are already in place;

Analysis and implementation of measures needs to be undertaken early for maximum effect but

process uncertainty is high and change is likely. This can lead to wasted effort and/or incomplete

analysis;

Changes will continue to propagate through the project as contracts are let and strategies evolve;

The measures chosen by such a method tend to be too abstract.

Though some Performance Measures are used in almost each and every project (EVM for example) it is logical

others are chosen on the basis of particular development characteristics. Within this framework the selection

should be influenced by the complexity assessment and the subsequent sub-processes and following some

simple concepts. Specifically, the goals of the measures will be determined with a focus on areas of particular

complexity and risk, including the assessment of areas described in CSFs. The Goal-Question-Metric method

is an exceedingly straightforward way of determining measures. The ‘goal’ of the measure consists of four

components; purpose, issue, object and viewpoint and would be directly related to CSFs and risks. The

‘question’ typically asks for the current status and current trend in this status. The ‘metric’ is perhaps the

most difficult aspect to determine as meaningful measures that are at a low level of abstraction can be

difficult to determine. ‘metrics’ will be very strongly influenced by the range of measures that are currently

available within industry or else are developed during the project itself. An illustration of the Goal-Question-

Metric approach is shown in Figure 15 [78].

The level of decomposition should be considered and the WBS can again be used as the means for this. Low

levels of decomposition provide an overview of development health but will not provide a real indication as

to the source of any issues as the node within the WBS will be influenced by all of those below it. A high-level

of decomposition may suffer from low sensitivity of the data due to lower sample sizes or chosen method of

measurement and will certainly require a good deal more effort to implement. An appropriate level within

the WBS should be chosen for the highest

level of decomposition and it is perfectly

feasible to use metrics following the same

principles at simultaneously at different

levels of decomposition for both

management reporting and to facilitate

targeting response to issues arising.

Methods of data collection, and thus

sensitivity and effort, should be

commensurate with the overall goal of the

Performance Measure.

Performance Measures can be selected to

focus on particular areas of concern within

Figure 15. The Goal-Question-Metric method [78].

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the development. This may be through a higher level of decomposition for a particular phase or cluster of

activities or else the choice of a unique measure. Methods that can direct where measures are to be chosen

include during the complexity assessment and assigning of success factors and during subsequent planning.

In particular DSM can highlight areas of intense coupling and complexity. Such prioritisation of activities may

be due to their properties of uncertainty, emergence or non-linearity and their proximity to the schedule’s

critical path. The use of focused measures must be in conjunction with other less detailed measures to ensure

coverage of the entire schedule of activities. It is also beneficial to overlap metrics, where possible, to provide

a degree of confirmation of the findings [73]. Other factors to consider include:

Metrics should be complete, correct, consistent and clear; [73];

As they will be communicated and reported metrics should be both ‘simplistic’ [73] and be chosen at

an appropriate level of abstraction so they are readily understandable;

The collection of meta-data during and as a part of the individual activities, as opposed to periodic

and dedicated data collection, will reduce the management burden required. An example would be

progress measurement during the production of development artefacts, at the end of each individual

iteration. This will introduce a level of ‘automation’ [79] into the process;

Consideration should be given to the collection of metrics by project assurance functions rather than

the development team [58] to ensure impartiality.

The reliability of some Performance Measures is necessarily subjective due to the scarcity of formal methods

of collecting data in many areas. Subjectivity can be curtailed through the adoption of rules and guidance in

the collection and analysis. A simple example is the progress measurement of development artefacts as

shown in Figure 16, and this also incorporates the principle of creating meta-data during the activities

themselves. It this case the artefact owner would track progress according to the relevant guidelines which

could be placed on a shared database for ready collation and analysis.

Artefact completion milestones Percentage complete

Completion of first draft of artefact 50

Completion of first review 60

Inclusion of first comments 80

Completion of second review 85

Inclusion of second review comments and submission for approval 90

Artefact approved 100

Figure 16. Simple method of measuring progress in development artefact.

Many Performance Measures are highly abstract. There are a number of these that relate to DSMs and these

should be considered for use. They however largely relate to complexity so while they may provide a

validation of the other analysis that has been undertaken this will relate to areas of risk within the technical

development. Examples of the areas of the development process that should be measured include [80]:

Schedule and cost planning – will measure risks, bottlenecks and the critical path as well as the overall

cost. It should also consider process iterations and associated uncertainty;

Resource allocation – will measure resource and capability levels as compared with the plan and

issues such as resource smoothing/levelling, removal of redundancy and accessibility of resource;

Quality – this will measure the consistent flow of information, completion of documentation in line

with process and meeting requirements and the distribution of risk amongst processes;

Flexibility – will measure the status of buffers to absorb delays and defences against individual errors

and general process resilience;

Organisational decomposition – will measure to determine whether the organisation of workgroups

and teams is adequate, efficient communication is in place;

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Interfaces – will measure which entities need synchronising, speed of communication across

interfaces and the relevant communication paths in place;

Transparency – will measure whether the organisational units are aware of their impact on outcomes

and the mental model of the process organisation.

Decision making – will measure which decision points have a high impact on outcomes.

Also artefacts to be measured using a rating based on interdependency and risk:

Number of dependencies;

Origin of dependencies – with organisational area, interdepartmental, inter-contract, external

dependency;

Status of dependencies – i.e. the meta data derived for them;

Percentage of document that requires dependencies;

Identified risks.

Focusing effort on particularly critical areas of requirements management is achievable by using the

Complexity Assessment and identifying nodes on the WBS. This can identify when Performance

Measurement should commence as well as the depth and breadth of measurement that is appropriate.

5.3. Selection of System Performance Measures from literature

In this section, we discuss the measures which have been selected from both the previous literature survey

[4] and further research as a part of this dissertation as being significant for inclusion in the Complexity

Management Framework. Each measure will be categorised against the previously described criteria in

Section 5.2. They will be chosen for their credibility of previous application and breadth of methodology and

aspects of development for which they are used. These will be verified by a questionnaire survey in terms of

their comparative influence. EVM will not be described in detail but will be used as a benchmark in the

questionnaire survey against which the influence of other Performance Measures can be compared.

5.3.1. Requirements

The management of requirements is a fundamental part of technical development and the two central

techniques relate to the measurement of outcomes (requirements satisfaction) and process (linked to a

variety of attributes and metadata).

5.3.1.1. Satisfaction of Stakeholder and System Requirements

A fundamental tenet of technical development is the elicitation and satisfaction of requirements. In turn

these requirements can be broadly sub-divided into stakeholder requirements and system requirements.

Requirements, especially system requirements, are prone to successive iterations and coupling behaviours

as represented in the DSM model.

The measurement of requirements is described within a number of systems engineering manuals and lately

INCOSE’s System Engineering Handbook. They observe both stakeholder and system requirements from the

perspective of their success in fulfilling the overarching business requirements [28][54] and as such are

quality orientated measures. The technique identifies a limited number of particular Stakeholder and

Systems Requirements whose realisation (satisfaction) are critical or important to overall success. Selection

of these can be influenced by Criticality Assessment though they are often closely linked to high-level

business and operational level requirements that are determined at the very beginning.

With respect to complexity criteria, the analysis of requirements allows monitoring and control of the system

development and particularly the technology and internal interfaces. Other complexity criteria will have a

direct impact on requirements with excellent examples of such criteria being development process, internal

organisation, organisation and stakeholders. Measurement is facilitated through design review type activities

and provides lagging measures. This period of lag is of course dependant on the frequency of design review.

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5.3.1.2. Requirements attributes

Another method of measuring System Requirements is through the collation of associated information to be

stored in a matrix, spread sheet or database. This is sometimes known as the Requirements Verification

Traceability Matrix [81]. The metadata can be compared against the plan or trends monitored to identify

areas of concern. The complexity of the RVTM should be proportional to that of the technical development

and may include fields that are specifically chosen to assist in the management of foreseen project and

system development risks identified early using techniques including the complexity assessment. Suggested

fields to be collated include [81]:

System Requirement unique identifier and name;

Requirement description;

Requirements specification (document reference);

Overall requirement status (such as detailed in design, implementation or integration);

Trace to overarching Stakeholder Requirement (unique identifier and document reference);

Verification and validations procedures (document references);

Verification strategy status (such as undefined, strategy only, procedure completed);

Verification status (such as not started, failed, completed with reservations or completed and with

document references as appropriate);

Validation purpose (such as for acceptance, certification, readiness for use or Qualification);

Validation status (such as not started, failed, completed with reservations, completed and with

document references as appropriate).

Other fields that could be employed in either the same artefact or complementary artefacts, including:

Stability (susceptibility to change);

Design compliance;

Interface compliance;

Process compliance;

Risk and risk status;

Safety case and licensing compliance;

Procurement and contractual compliance;

Importance or criticality of requirements within the project schedule.

These measures may give an indication of requirements against the planned development and are leading in

nature as they indicate potential issues ahead of requirements satisfaction. They do however allow for the

identification of areas of concern. More generally requirements can be given a wide variety of metadata that

can be used to interpret the overall status of the requirements or a particular sub-system or area of

development. Not all of these attributes should be chosen due to the overhead required to maintain

complete and accurate data sets. Attributes should be chosen early in the development lifecycle to ensure

that data does not require to be retrofitted at a later date [81].

Both the RVTM and requirements attributes are primarily concerned with quality and identifying issues

relating to progress. Many of these attributes, together or independently, can be used to infer the efficacy

of resource allocation, organisational decomposition, interfaces and Decision making. For instance, a backlog

of requirements with a particular status may indicate one or more bottlenecks in the process. This may be

due to issues with resourcing, organisational efficiency or decision making. It can be used to identify risk at a

high level of decomposition within the system of interest which can be rolled up to show particular sub-

systems which deserve additional attention [81]. If trends are identified early enough, for example a backlog

of under review requirements within a particular development area, then action can be taken to reduce or

eliminate delays to the schedule.

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5.3.2. Development health

Development health is likely to contain a high degree of subjectivity. Facets such as adherence to the planned

cost and schedule can be measured through EVM or other similar techniques. Other less tangible aspects will

require a framework to provide context and guidance in which they can be assessed. Using a defined method

Kline et al [76] formed a weighted matrix of design performance characteristics that can be used to measure

development health. Each high-level measure was formed of five individual factors with each of these being

assigned an individual text description as a basis for scoring. The high-level measures are as follows:

Problem Definition;

Prior Knowledge;

Divergent Thinking;

Professional Analysis;

Decision Making;

Create & Follow Plan;

Iterate & Assess;

Validate Solutions;

Communication;

Teamwork.

By observing attributes of the development process and team the technique is a leading indicator and should

be able to identify risks to the development before they are fully realised. It should be undertaken reasonably

infrequently, say at the beginning of a phase or mid-development phase, at three or four month intervals, if

it is particularly long in duration. It is proposed that the Kline et al methodology is applied, partly or in full, to

form new measures or tailor exist measures for use in technical development. One candidates for this

approach, mentioned in the Literature Survey [4], is Torbet et al’s six criteria of ‘Design Performance

Measurement’ [82];

Client needs (stakeholder requirements);

Integrating design into objectives (system requirements);

Internal design processes (suitability and effectiveness of internal design);

External design processes (suitability and effectiveness of external design);

Profitability and efficiency (of the design);

Learning and innovation.

There is of course considerable overlap between these and requirements orientated measures and with the

criteria within the complexity assessment. Another way of identifying the subject for measurement is their

identification during complexity assessment and designation of CSFs. Alignment of specific performance

measures with area of concern broadly follows the principles described in planning via the use of DSM. That

is focus on areas where there is particular risk of deviation from the plan while planning (in this case

monitoring) at a lower level of decomposition level across the entirety of the development. The headings

within Kline et al’s ‘Creating and Using a Performance Measure for the Engineering Design Process’ relate

particularly to the complexity criteria of the development process and internal organisation.

5.3.3. Process maturity

A framework for process maturity is the ‘Project Definition Rating Index’ or PDRI [83][84]. Maturity can apply to

both the development in terms of where it is within the process or the technology that is to be used within

the system of interest. There will necessarily be some overlap and influence between the two. Though not

directly related to development health or schedule, there can be some inference as to the status of these.

For instance, in an extreme case technology of low maturity which is approaching validation suggests either

problems within the development process or either badly planned or incompletely executed activities leading

to that particular point in time.

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Of course there is still much potential for subjectivity within the scoring of the PDRI framework but this can

be further refined by providing individual guidance for each criterion as is documented in Kline et al’s

development health methodology. The result of

the scoring can then be compared with the

‘maturity value rating’ and ‘qualitative criteria’

[84]. A maturity rating that does not correspond

with the particular phase of the development that

is currently in progress indicates a concern. This

can be further analysed to determine the areas

where the issues reside by looking at the individual

criteria. Though similar in methodology to Kline et

al’s method it is a lagging indicators as it essentially

observes the status of the development at a

particular point in time. Again a review at the

beginning of a development phase or every three

or four months would be appropriate. Process

maturity measures relate directly to the

complexity criteria of development process but

also indirectly to the three complexity criteria.

5.3.4. System maturity

A popular method of assessing the system with the United States, and especially within military and space

industry domains, is that of the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) also known as Technology Readiness

Level (TRL). Specifically TRL has been developed for use by both the US Department of Defense and NASA

[86][87][88]. TRL assesses the maturity of the system as a means of analysing development risk and used in

a similar way as the PDRI methodology. That is if the TRL is below that required for the development phase

there are serious risks to the realisation of the technology which will be ultimately be reflected in an inability

to verify or validate the technology.

TRLs generally have ratings between TRL 1 and TRL 9 with subjectivity of analysis constrained through the

use of textual guidance. TRL 1 is the least mature and TRL 9 denotes technology proven within its intended

operational environment. In both of these applications of TRL a team of subject matter experts will assist in

providing the actual rating which will form the basis for stop/go type decisions by a board of appropriate

managers at predetermined points in the development such as development stage boundaries. TRLs relate

directly to the complexity criteria of technology. A development of TRL, and an attempt to address to address

TRL’s inherent limitation, is the System Readiness Assessment or SRA. SRA provides a ‘whole system

perspective’ [89]. It assesses all system components, the integration of them along with external

dependencies and is designed to be undertaken more frequently than those using solely TRLs [89].

TRLs are assigned to the system of interest as before along with an Integration Readiness Level or IRL. Criteria

are provided to guide the assessment as per the traditional TRL method. From these three System Readiness

Level Metrics are derived through calculation. Component SRL looks at individual components and how they

are integrated to identify elements of the system that are lagging behind the system as a whole. Composite

SRL is concerned with the overall integration of the system and this is then converted into an integer between

1 and 9, called the SRL [88]. Assessments and calculations are performed across the system architecture and

the ratings are similar to those of TRLs. The IRL relates to the complexity criteria of internal interfaces while

SRL is relates to the three system development complexity criteria as a whole.

5.3.5. Organisation, process and schedule complexity

DSMs were the subject to discussion in Section 4.2 and are useful in both defining areas of the organisation,

process or schedule that require particular attention and in providing useful measures to provide a basis for

Figure 17. Maturity value rating criteria [85].

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management action. As they relate to the plan they are reasonably static in nature and as such lend

themselves to plan validation type activities at the beginning of a development phase or at a new iteration

of the schedule. Previously the use of DSM related performance measures were discussed in Section 4.2.5

and suggested calculating median and peak quantities for measuring plan complexity. Observed DSM primary

measures can be either trended through successive iterations or compared against acceptable absolute

values that were determined through previous developments. These can either consider the phased activities

as a whole or the current schedule critical path. The secondary measures of likelihood of change across a

feedback cycle and vulnerability to change propagation could be used to inform rescheduling or other

interventions to be undertaken to reduce development risks to acceptable levels.

The basic properties of the DSM itself can be used to provide an insight into the schedule and its complexity.

The relevant proportion of sequential, parallel, coupled and conditional activities within a development

phase can be used to provide an indication of its status. A high incidence of coupled activities especially, gives

a clear indication of complexity. Again this could be applied against the critical path activities only to provide

information on these priority activities. Finally, Kreimeyer and Lindemann [73] list four metrics using the

language of DSM optimisation activities:

Sequencing – the number of ‘ideally sequenced’ activities within the DSM, i.e. sequential activities;

Tearing – the number of activities that have been subject to tearing due to them being a barrier to

sequencing;

Banding – the number of activities that are independent to each other, i.e. parallel activities;

Clustering – the number of ‘mutually related’ i.e. coupled activities.

As a way of identifying areas of concern within the plan this is a leading indicator and should prompt re-

planning such as further optimisation of the DSM. Process and organisational-architecture DSM related

performance measures are concerned with controlling development process and internal organisation

complexity criteria.

5.4. The verification of performance measures through questionnaire

The performance measures chosen from the literature reviewed during the project were verified with the

practitioner group as a part of the questionnaire described in Chapter 3 above. The objective was to rank

influence and comparison with the most widely used performance measure from the EVM methodology. The

questionnaire can be seen in Appendix E with performance measures relating to questions 13 and 14. Results,

ranked by influence, are shown in Appendix F.

Influences were generally lower than that attributed to CSFs, with results across the entire 122 respondents

ranging from 3.04 (just above medium influence) for the use of PDRI and 3.77 (with 4.0 indicating high

influence) for measurement of requirements process. This may suggest a general dissatisfaction with the

identification and practical use of performance measures and in agreement with the author’s own

experiences. No other measures were suggested for use, providing some assurance that the literature survey

was comprehensive in its review of the subject. The measurement of the realisation of stakeholder and

system requirements was also rated highly and just below the top performance measure at 3.76.

Measurement of plan complexity through determination of proportion of sequential, parallel, coupled and

conditional activities on the schedule was third with 3.69. This be achieved through deeper analysis of

planning through traditional Gantt charts or, as advocated here, using DSM methodologies.

EVM did surprisingly poorly at eighth of the twelve measures considered with a rating 3.56 It did rate the

third highest number of very highs but suffered a lot of lower scores which offset this. This suggests the high

value of integrating requirements management into a project and that EVM is not sufficient alone. This is not

reflected in the practice where Earned Value is often the only performance measure used and requirements

require scant attention within project management methodologies [4]. Complexity measurement using

heuristics against the WBS elements also rated relatively poorly but only just below EVM at 3.48. This

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supports the author’s opinion that absolute values of complexity are of limited value alone but support the

following sub-processes. Its value is qualitative rather than quantitative.

There were possibly shortfalls in the survey and barriers to Performance Measure use that influenced

individual scoring of some of the Performance Measures. Providing a sufficiently brief description and

without additional explanatory text may have created a bias against several of the measures. The PDRI

project maturity and project health measures scored very poorly and this along with the apparent effort of

application (200 individual criteria for PDRI and 10 high-level and 50 low-level organisational and process

characteristics for process health) may have depressed the final scores. Further research would be needed

to either confirm or disprove this.

Two comments from question 14 provided further validation of the author’s approach and initial

observations.

“Keep the complexity measures as simple as possible!”

“Many forms of performance measures out there, I think you have captured most, personally I don't rate them

and although their aim or managing system interfaces and relative maturity thereof is correct - they generally

don't add much value. There would definitely be mileage in getting back to basics, systems definition,

boundary limit definition and design review.”

5.4.1. Performance measures by age, role and industry

Findings were consistent over age, role and industry and especially over the top three rated performance

measures across each dataset. Considering the top three performance measures notable exceptions were as

follows:

Earned Value Management was considered the third most influential performance measure’ by over

65s’. This elevated the importance of EVM over any other sub-dataset.

The measurement of percentage complete of project artefacts and the measurement of IRLs were

considered the most important second most important performance measures respectively by

‘engineering personnel’. These reflect the concerns and challenges that are particularly faced by

engineering disciplines over other project personnel.

‘Defence’ valued TRL, IRL and SRL over all other performance measures which was not particularly

surprising when it is considered that these measures originated from the defence sector.

5.4.2. Conclusion

The findings of the questionnaire support the assertion that further work is required to develop performance

measures that better represent the challenges faced by today’s projects. Requirements in particular should

receive greater attention which in turn will encourage their better management. Plan complexity is the other

measure highly worthy of development. The combination of the measures of requirements and plan

complexity in conjunction with EVM should provide an excellent way of monitoring and thus controlling many

project types. This should be supplemented with TRL and IRL methodologies when the novelty of technology

dictates. This of course needs to be considered against the resource and cost overheads involved in such an

undertaking.

5.5. The collective use of performance measures The use of the Balanced Scorecard [78] is much publicised within industry and has been further refined into

‘The DMI Design Value Scorecard’ [90]. These concepts provide little information as to what and how

measurements are taken but the principle of presenting together a broad selection of relevant measures has

merit. Using the broad principles identified from through the concept of Balanced Scorecard it is proposed

that a Development Scorecard could be developed. This would present a variety of metrics together to best

represent status across the breadth and depth of the development. It would present a high-level view of the

development for director level management, along with a text-based summary to provide context and

indicate underlying areas of concern that otherwise may be hidden. Below this the measures would be

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presented at a number of levels of decomposition. Strategic measures would be primarily of interest to the

management leading the development to provide data on particular areas of concern within the process or

organisation. Tactical measures would provide feedback for team leaders and individuals to make

interventions at the level of the work being undertaken. The performance measures should be chosen to

address concerns raised during the complexity assessment with regards areas of high complexity or criticality.

For example, the following measures could be combined in a development scorecard:

Plan complexity consisting of:

o Average uncertainty, ambiguity, emergence and non-linearity as derived from DSM

(leading);

o Proportion of sequential, parallel, coupled and conditional activities within DSM (leading);

Conformity with the plan consisting of one or more of the following:

o Earned Value Management

Cost Performance Index (lagging);

Schedule Performance Index (lagging);

o Overall progress using heuristics with guidelines to aid analysis of individual development

artefacts;

o Actual resource and capability compared to plan;

Process consisting of:

o Others such as numbers and processing times for engineering change control requests

and quality non-conformances;

o Process health using Kline et al method (leading);

o Process maturity using PDRI (lagging);

Requirements consisting of:

o Realisation – relating to MOE, MOS, MOP and TPM (lagging);

o Execution – relating to selected requirements metadata (leading);

System maturity consisting of:

o Technology Readiness level (lagging);

o Integration Readiness level (lagging);

o System Readiness Level (lagging);

Bold type indicates measures assessed as having the greatest influence from the questionnaire survey. The

high-level measures are in italics and would be rated from very low to very high. Strategic measures are

contained below each of these. This would provide coverage of most of the complexity criteria.

6. Managing system development risks

6.1. Introduction

‘Management of risk should be systematic and not based on chance. It is about the proactive identification,

assessment and control of risk that might affect the delivery of the project’s objectives’ [53].

The process described so far identifies ways of analysing the technical development for areas of concern

against which effort can be best directed. An important part of this is identifying development risks which is

traditionally achieved through a risk management processes that uses techniques such as workshops and risk

reviews. This process can be used to supplement this approach, principally in the identification of risks, as it

prompts analysis of various aspects of the development and at varying levels of decomposition.

The initial complexity assessment is used to instruct on the areas of particular complexity and CSFs necessary

to increase the likelihood of success. Residual risks will remain should the CSFs be imperfectly implemented

or only partially address the raised concern. These risks can then be placed upon the risk register. This initial

complexity assessment is likely to generate high-level risks only due to the low amount of decomposition

possible and available detail on the development process. Successive iterations of the complexity assessment

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however will allow risks to be targeted and existing risks will be elucidated upon, confirmed or dismissed as

not relevant. The planning process will identify still more risks and these will be focussed upon particular

types of interactions or clusters of activities. Again these should be compared to risks identified earlier as a

means to improving the quality of the information upon the risk register. A recognised and respected

approach for managing risk is contained within the PRINCE2 project management methodology. PRINCE2

bases much of this approach on Management of Risk: Guidance for Practitioners as published by the UK

Office for Government Commerce. Their guidance follows a number of important principles which are

satisfied by risk management through the complexity management process [53]:

Understand the project’s context – complexity assessment looks across the breadth of the technical

development;

Involve stakeholders – achieved at complexity assessment and particularly during DSM planning

activities;

Establish clear project objectives – as highlighted during the initial complexity assessment;

Develop the project risk management approach – partially satisfied through complexity management

process in conjunction with the general risk management process;

Report on risk regularly – dependant on the frequency of complexity assessment and planning

iterations (possibly partially satisfied);

Define clear roles and responsibilities - as highlighted during the initial complexity assessment

(possibly partially satisfied);

Establish a support structure and a supportive culture for risk management – through an independent

risk management strategy;

Monitor for early warning indicators – through complexity management process monitoring

activities;

Establish a review cycle and look for continual improvement – partially satisfied by complexity

assessment and planning iterations.

Incorporation of the contribution of complexity management within the risk management strategy will

provide additional support to the process and prevent duplicated effort. Complexity management will aid

the early identification of risks. Conventional risk management techniques are well described in literature

and risk and project management methodologies. Rather than define a particular approach to be used

alongside complexity management only the few relevant points will be discussed. A template of the risk

register, the artefact ultimately produced by any risk management process, is contained within Appendix M.

6.2. Important concepts

The accommodation of risk management alongside complexity management should not present too much

additional effort. Two of the components of the process are particularly important. The classification of risks

can be undertaken using a pre-determined risk breakdown structure or RBS. The RBS is a hierarchical

structure following the broad principles of other breakdown structures such as the WBS. The RBS contains

successive levels of decomposition and there are as many levels to the RBS as is useful for the purposes of

risk management. An example of high-level risk categories within a RBS are those of ‘schedule’, ‘resource’,

‘technical’ and ‘licensing’ [91]. Below this other risk category would decompose risks still further. This

approach ensures consistency of risk category assignment throughout the project and allows the tracking of

trends.

These categories can then be further sub-divided as required. Other options include categorising by function

or discipline. The goal of such an exercise is so ensure the consistency of categorisation and to allow trending

of risks to show where risk particularly resides within the development. The artefact that is ultimately

generated by the risk management process is the risk register. An example of the attributes that can be

assigned to each risk is shown in Appendix N. The risk matrix; against which risk likelihood, impact and priority

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are determined; is highly dependent on the magnitude and type of development as well as the organisation’s

risk tolerance. As such this should be defined for each organisation or development process.

7. Complexity orientated development framework

7.1. Integrating the sub-processes together All the themes discussed in the previous sections can be gathered together into a single process. The process

map, shown in Figure 18, represents interactions with the important process activities that are commonly

undertaken in projects and technical development. It will also show the relationships between complexity

assessment, determination of CSFs, detailed planning, definition of performance measures and risk. The

complexity management framework fulfils and expands upon the high-level objectives described on page 8

in Section 1.6 in the following ways:

1. A top down assessment of complexity and measures to best manage it;

a. Derive a strategy including proposed frequency and depth of detail during system

development lifecycle;

b. Undertake the complexity assessment at available or appropriate level of composition;

c. Record areas where complexity assessment is considered unnecessary;

d. For complexity ‘hotspots’ derive CSFs;

e. Ensure that the relationship between complexity, the derived CSF and anticipated outcomes

are articulated for later review;

f. While considering CSFs in place review complexity to ensure that hotspots have not been

simply displaced to another theme or aspect;

i. Make appropriate changes to assessment and CSFs as necessary;

ii. Repeat if absolutely necessary;

iii. Determine frequency of review;

2. A Bottom-up assessment of complexity using information derived from planning exercises;

a. Derive strategy, rules and conventions for planning through DSM;

b. Apply dependency planning technique to areas of development as appropriate;

c. Develop DSM and MDM to required level of detail;

d. Assess complexity of DSM and compare with complexity assessment findings;

3. Application of dependency planning techniques against areas of particular complexity;

a. Determine level of decomposition and type of DSM to be employed;

b. Identify, analyse and display DSM, optimising the DSM as required;

c. Feed outputs of DSM into creation of Gantt chart schedule;

d. Determine frequency of review;

4. Application of performance measures according to type and depth of complexity;

a. Determine ‘goal’ of performance measures and ‘questions’ to be asked and answered by

them depending on complexity;

b. Define metadata that is required to enable performance measures to be calculated in areas

such as requirements management and development artefact production;

c. Determine mechanisms to collect metadata including IT requirements

d. Determine frequency of the collection of performance measures as dictated by nature of

measure and requirements of development;

5. Contribute to risk management;

a. Determine how risks identified by complexity management can be integrated into risk

management strategy;

b. Derive RBS to allow consistent categorisation of risks;

c. Identify risks through determination of CSFs and planning activities;

6. Repeat activities at predetermined intervals.

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The individual activities upon the process map will be colour coded to reflect whether they are those

currently undertaken in technical development and unaffected by complexity management (grey) and those

proposed within this framework (green). An additional coloured activity will show which activities currently

exist but would be modified under this framework (amber). The first activities are the definition of strategy

and conventions for the various sub-processes within the framework. This includes any criterion that is

required to allow the Stage Gate to be passed.

It is envisaged that the initial complexity assessment will be prompted by an early Stage Gate type decision

point in the development lifecycle or the beginning of a development phase. A pre-requisite for the

complexity assessment is the existence of a high-level WBS with higher levels of decomposition allowing

more detailed analysis of complexity. Subsequent complexity assessments will be to a higher level of

decomposition within the WBS. Each WBS element will be assessed against the following complexity themes

within three categories:

1. Internal factors

a. (Project) environmental constraints;

b. Development process;

c. Internal organisation;

2. External factors

a. Contractual management;

b. Stakeholders;

c. Regulatory interfaces;

3. System development

a. External (system) interfaces;

b. Technology;

c. Internal (system) interfaces.

Each of the themes will be considered against each of five Complexity Criteria and each of these criteria will

in turn be rated from very low to very high. This process was repeated for each of the WBS elements to the

level of decomposition required. Any complexity theme that cannot be rated will be assigned not applicable.

A template for the assessment is contained within Appendix B. The complexity assessment will be subject to

additional iterations following the definition of CSFs until the WBS is fully assessed. This will include any

changes prompted by identification of a CSF that may inadvertently and unknowingly increase complexity in

any part of the development.

The complexity assessment will also be subject to iteration at the beginning of each development phase or,

for long development phases, at predetermined intervals of say six months. The identification of appropriate

CSFs will be the next activity immediately after the complexity assessment is undertaken.

The first consideration is the areas of the development that are likely to require more detailed planning and

closer monitoring of progress and status. CSFs are then assigned according to areas of vulnerability due to

particular complexity within the WBS. The list of CSFs is shown in Appendix C. This should be amended and

updated over time according to lessons learned and the demands of the development type or organisation.

This will be aided by reflection on the efficacy of the CSFs at the end of the development phase or before the

next complexity assessment, as shown on the process map. Activities prompted by the generation of CSFs

will include areas of the development that would benefit from the application of DSM and both the goals of

monitoring and questions that should to be asked and answered by the performance measures.

Consideration of CSF will facilitate the identification of risks. Development risks should be consistently

categorised and a RBS will need to be produced to ensure this is done.

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Figure 18. Complexity Management Framework.

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7.2. Analysis of framework against criteria within existing literature

In this section the complexity management framework is compared with the recommendations and criteria

for successful projects as discussed within the literature survey and from a wide variety sources. Any obvious

deficits are discussed and additional measures proposed that may benefit the future development of the

complexity management framework. Other recommendation should be satisfied by activities outside the

scope of this framework.

The 2012 ‘thisiswhatgoodlookslike’ Gartner survey [92] made five high-level observations relating to high-level

project strategies. The first concerned the size, complexity and duration of individual projects. Determination

of size and duration, and to a lesser extent the complexity, of the overall project is very often outside the

control of the technical development and indeed of the project itself. Complexity can be controlled once it is

recognised and at the very least prevented from growing unduly. The survey describes that a project must

‘stay on top of costs’ and describes that there should be measures for early identification of cost overruns.

This can be achieved through the adoption of leading performance measures that can identify delays to the

development that inevitably lead to additional costs due to acceleration of the schedule. The potential for

rework can also be highlighted which again can have significant associated costs. A realistic schedule can best

be achieved through better planning. The targeted use of DSMs identifies coupling behaviours and

dependencies to allow both optimisation of the schedule and improved representation of the schedule when

used as an input in the production of Gantt charts. Using the measures previously described it does at the very

least provide an early warning of discrepancies between early high-level schedule commitments and likely

actual schedule.

The fourth of the Gartner survey’s recommendation related to stakeholder and system requirements and the

funding that the full realisation of these dictates. Requirements management is not within the scope of this

dissertation. However, the assignment of requirements related performance measures and enhanced

planning alongside project management of the budget should assist in this. Additionally, effective and rigorous

requirements management would very likely be a development CSF which could then be monitored over time.

The last recommendation refers to frequent ‘project status and review meetings’ and ensuring alignment of

requirements with the business case. Better use of performance measures, as discussed within the

dissertation, should facilitate this. Ultimately the identification of a failing project, unlikely to satisfy the

business case, may lead to its cancellation.

The Royal Academy of Engineering’s 2004 ‘The Challenges of Complex IT Projects’ [93] also had five high-level

findings. ‘Lack of constraints’, relating to the definition of reasonable requirements, is outside the scope of

this framework. Again this can be partially mitigated through effective planning and performance monitoring.

Complexity assessment should highlight where complexity is highest which may indicate unrealistic

expectations. This would apply especially to the aspects of environmental constraints and technology,

especially where technological demands may be unduly constrained. Similarly, ‘Visualisation’ and ‘Flexibility’

will be again addressed by effective requirements management alongside the framework’s emphasis on

performance monitoring. The impact of changes can also be readily assessed in portions of the development

planned using DSM. High-impact change requests can then be identified and approvals made accordingly.

Lastly both ‘complexity’ and ‘uncertainty’ can be assessed early using the top-down complexity assessment

and later, using bottom-up as DSM planning is undertaken. CSFs and detailed planning can both reduce and

manage both these properties along with the inevitable changes to development requirements and scope.

Denker [94] cites the components of ‘Colossal Complexity’, ‘Invisibility’, ‘Over-Optimism’, ‘Extreme

Uncertainties from the Kickoff’ and ‘Rework’. Mirroring the factors mentioned previously, these can be

managed through the recognition of development complexity through complexity assessment, determination

of ways to manage it through identification of CSF and through better planning. The paper specifically

mentions the imbalance between complexity and imposed timescales. DSM should more completely identify

coupling and emergence that are features of complex schedules. Other themes are the lack of timely feedback

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mechanisms and the identification of cause and effect. Both of these are addressed through the targeted

application of performance measures. Lastly the reuse of development patterns can be partially addressed

through the complexity assessment, assignment of CSFs and the review of their efficacy for future use. While

‘control mechanisms’ and ‘feedback capabilities’ are directly addressed through the use of performance

measures, the remainder Jiang’s 13 [95] should be addressed through general management arrangements.

Deficits in Gantt chart schedules, as previously discussed, can be addressed through the use of targeted

planning and specifically through the use of DSMs and appropriate performance measures. In it critical

activities that are outside of the critical path can be identified and coupling behaviours better represented.

The use of appropriate leading and lagging performance measures can measure the quality of processes and

its outputs. The high degree of ‘information requirements’ associated with planning are a function of Program-

size Complexity. Though it may be assessed it can only be managed, through appropriate resources and

technology, and not reduced. Limited modelling of the ‘behavioural aspects of management’ may be

represented using numerical type organisational-architecture DSM or process-organisation MDM. This does

not preclude the use of other modelling techniques, such as OBM, when deemed appropriate.

8. Case study application of framework

8.1. Purpose

In this section we evaluate the framework by using it to assess an existing complex project using publically

information. The case study uses publically available information on the development of Boeing’s Dreamliner

and will illustrate the use of the framework and identify areas of potential concern that require process

improvement or additional guidance. The WBS will necessarily be at a high-level/strategy level due to

constraints of information availability and the effort required to undertake analysis relating to detailed WBS

structures. As such it will be assumed that the assessment is being undertaken during the concept design

phase and used to analyse development up to the point of manufacture. The initial complexity analysis will be

followed by suggested CSFs and recommendations requiring areas of planning, performance measurement

and risk management. The assessment will be undertaken from the viewpoint of Boeing’s Dreamliner design

team and was chosen due to the well published development and operational issues [96][97][98], sheer

quantity and variety of literature, interesting characteristics and first-of-a-kind complexity. The findings will be

compared to the outcomes and assessed for efficacy and it will demonstrate the process, albeit at a low level

of detail. An additional case study, using the construction of a nuclear power plant, is contained in Appendix

Q. This project is distinctly different from the Boeing Dreamliner and identifies other aspects of the framework

requiring development but also demonstrates how the framework can be implemented.

8.2. Case study 1 – Boeing Dreamliner

8.2.1. Background

In the early 1990’s Boeing required a new commercial aircraft to replace the aging 767. Two options were

initially investigated; a sub-sonic cruiser with a speed of 0.98mach and similar fuel efficiency as the 767, and a

design similar to the 747 with increased capacity, designed to directly compete with the Airbus A380. Neither

was particularly well received by the commercial airline markets and when fuel costs escalated after 9/11 the

requirement for fuel efficiency became paramount. This led to the concept of the 787 Dreamliner in 2003 [96].

The requirements for the Dreamliner were as follows:

Lower fuel consumption;

Lower maintenance costs;

Longer range;

Improved passenger comfort.

This necessitated the use of technology not previously used extensively within commercial airliners. This

included advanced composite use, eventually resulting in more than 50% by weight [97], and the replacement

of pneumatic and hydraulic systems with electric architectures [98]. Additionally, the fuselage was to be

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manufactured in ‘barrel sections’ and integrated later rather than being assembled by Boeing. These design

decisions were undertaken early in the development cycle for reasons of overall weight and reduced system

power requirements. Boeing’s initial estimate for the development was $6 billion over a four-year period,

representing a significant investment Manufacturing costs for the Dreamliner were also a significant factor in

order that it was to be both competitive and allow Boeing to make a return on its investment [99].

This prompted the adoption of a contracting strategy that was designed to make efficiencies in the

development and manufacture of the aircraft but spread the commercial risks [100]. It also allowed market

expansion by allowing the manufacturers in the countries that would buy the Dreamliner participate in the

project in ‘offset deals’ [100]. Contractual arrangements allowed Boeing to delay payment to partners until

aircraft were delivered [97], including risk-sharing partnerships, with payments depending on final outcome.

Manufacturers were only paid when the plane was certificated and delivered, thus Boeing avoided bearing

many of the up-front non-recurring research and development costs, encouraging efficiency in the supply

chain and could delay investment until later in the project lifecycle. In addition to higher returns on successful

deployment of aircraft the manufacturers also were allowed to retain intellectual property rights of their

contribution to the aircraft [100]. ‘Partner councils’ were established to aid the creation of an ‘integrated,

integrated, modularized supply-chain’ and mirror the practices used in military and business aircraft sectors

[97]. The use of globally based suppliers ensured that the necessary expertise could be sourced and also

allowed the development of many systems in parallel.

8.2.2. Work Breakdown Structure

To meet the considerable technological challenges and cost efficiencies it was decided that design

development and manufacturing, including research and development, of most of the aircraft would be

outsourced across the globe, to Tier 1 suppliers. The contracts were designed to allow Final assembly would

be undertaken by Boeing in the US. Ultimately this resulted in 70% of parts being manufactured by 50

companies in 28 countries [98]. The Tier 1 suppliers would in turn contract out manufacture and services to

Tier 2 suppliers as appropriate. A WBS using system engineering and project activities has been produced

decomposing the aircraft into systems and structures using the not-dissimilar Hyperion project [101] as a basis.

Hyperon was chosen because it is within the aviation domain (unmanned aerial vehicle in this case) and has

been developed internationally. This WBS has been adapted to include general commercial aircraft systems

[102] the Dreamliner’s more detailed ‘Global WBS’ [103]. This gives an emphasis to the technology and

contracting components of the Dreamliner project though common design phases have been included

including a research and development phase that was undertaken by both Boeing and its Tier 1 partners.

It is assumed that research and development would be undertaken after the concept had been agreed,

allowing the development of a business case and the commencement of marketing and sales, but before

scheme design. Based on the Dreamliner’s history the concept would have been available in late 2003/early

2004 before the first order with Nippon Airlines was agreed. An alternative would have been to decompose

the project with a higher emphasis on functions and processes using a combination of system engineering and

project management methodology. It should be noted that the contents of the WBS given below is not

exclusive, though it is complete enough to allow early analysis. As can be seen the level of detail increases

through the project’s phases as the aircraft’s systems are defined.

Design

Concept;

o Aerodynamics;

o Mass properties;

o Composites;

o Structures;

o Fuselage;

o Wings;

o Doors;

o Stabilisers;

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o Landing gear;

o Propulsion;

o Controls;

o Electrical systems;

o Communications;

o Navigation;

Research and Development;

o Structures;

Centre wing box;

Wing box;

Wing to body fairing;

Wing to body fairing components;

Main landing gear well;

Nacelles;

Fin;

o Fuselage;

Forward fuselage;

Mid fuselage;

Rear fuselage;

o Wings;

Wing structures;

Leading edges;

Engine pylons;

Fixed trailing edges;

Moveable trailing edges;

Fin leading edge;

Rudder;

o Doors;

o Stabilisers;

Horizontal stabilisers;

o Landing gear

Landing gear structures;

o Propulsion;

Engines;

Gearboxes;

Fuel;

o Controls;

Flight deck;

Flight controls;

Speed reference system (SRS);

Autopilot;

Electronics;

Engine controls;

o Electrical systems;

o Communication;

o Navigation;

Scheme (similar to R&D and not expanded);

Detailed (similar to R&D and not expanded).

Manufacture (not expanded)

Integration (not expanded)

Certification (not expanded)

Test and commission (not expanded)

Management

Project management;

Financial management;

Quality assurance;

Legal;

Shipping.

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8.2.3. Complexity assessment

The timing of assessments should be aligned with project phasing and project and development governance

processes, including stage-gates and major design reviews. For the purposes of this case study a high-level

assessment will be undertaken at the beginning and end of the design phase to highlight how the aspects of

complexity evolve and illustrate some potential issues. An assessment was completed against the high-level

WBS at concept, research and development and detailed design phases. These can be seen in Appendix O.

Concept design

During this phase it is assumed that the contracting strategy has been agreed in tandem with the development

of the overall concept.

Environmental constraints: Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been assigned as very high as contracts are still

be let to Tier 1 partners under the pain/gain sharing arrangements and the effect on funding is uncertain.

Emergence, Non-linearity and Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

Development process: Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been assigned as very high, recognising the new

way of working on this project, and thus immaturity of processes including the unexpected interactions with

the Tier 1 suppliers. Emergence, Non-linearity and Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

Organisation: Boeing’s organisation is likely to be smaller than on other comparable projects due to the

Dreamliner’s outsourcing arrangements but as this is a novel development there will be a high level of

Uncertainty and Ambiguity as to how integration will be achieved. Emergence, Non-linearity and Program-size

are low at this early point in the project.

Contractual management: There is considerable scope for error due to factors such as number of suppliers,

use of Tier 2 and 3 suppliers outside direct control of Boeing, location and time zones and cultural and political

factors. Uncertainty and ambiguity have been assigned very high due to the enhanced potential for change or

conflict. Emergence, Non-linearity and Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

Stakeholders: In this instance the stakeholders are largely the prospective customers. As such change relates

to Uncertainty and Ambiguity in user requirements and these have been given a medium as there is scope for

changes. Emergence, Non-linearity and Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

Regulatory interfaces: Due to the technology levels the regulators’ responses may be highly uncertain and

ambiguous and especially at the beginning of the development. In many areas the regulators may lack essential

competencies to effectively review and agree key principles within the design. Emergence, Non-linearity and

Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

External Interfaces: This aspect relates to entities such as communication, maintenance and the individual

airports at which the Dreamliner would land or take-off from. The use of relatively novel technology creates

some uncertainty but changes should be relatively easily accommodated and interfaces relatively simple and

understand.

Technology: Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity with regards to technology is very high during the concept phase.

Emergence, Non-linearity and Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

System Integration: Changes to system integration could arise from both the technology characteristics and

will be very high before the outsourcing arrangements are fully known. E mergence, Non-linearity and

Program-size are low at this early point in the project.

Research and Development

At the beginning of the research and development phase it is assumed that all the design and manufacture

packages have been let to the global Tier 1 partners.

Environmental constraints - Boeing’s contractual arrangements with its suppliers were designed to share the

pain/gain of the final outcome and shield Boeing from the potential variation in supplier costs. As such

Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been assigned a medium rather than a high value which might have been

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expected for such an early point in the project. Contracts have been let for the R&D effects of Emergence

and Non-linearity resulting from imposed changes has been assigned medium rather than a low. Program-

size Complexity is low in terms of environmental constraints.

Development process - Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been assigned a high value, recognising the

new way of working on this project, and thus immaturity of processed including the unexpected interactions

with the Tier 1 suppliers. Communication with the Tier 1 suppliers will be especially critical to ensure

requirements of the Dreamliner’s component parts and systems meet requirements and can be assembled.

Emergence and Non-linearity have been assigned a medium value as there is potential that necessary

changes to processes will be significant enough to compromise schedule and cost planning estimates.

Program-size Complexity has been assigned high to reflect the processes interactions between the various

Tier 1 suppliers.

Organisation - Boeing’s organisation will be smaller than on other comparable projects due to the Dreamliner’s

outsourcing arrangements, with an emphasis on integration and assembly over design and manufacture.

Uncertainty and Ambiguity has been assigned a medium value to reflect the potential for changes that may

result from changes in the development process described above. Emergence, non-linearity and Program-size

Complexity have been assigned a low status due to the relatively low size of the design team.

Contractual management - There is considerable scope for error due to factors such as number of suppliers,

use of Tier 2 and 3 suppliers outside direct control of Boeing, location and time zones and cultural and political

factors. Uncertainty and ambiguity have been assigned a very high value due to the enhanced potential for

change or conflict while Emergence and Non-linearity have been given a medium to reflect the early stage in

the development. Program-size Complexity has been assigned a high value due to the number of organisations

and scope of their management.

Stakeholders - In this instance the stakeholders are largely the customers as suppliers, project team and

regulators are included within the other aspects. As such change relates to Uncertainty and Ambiguity of user

requirements and these have been given a low value while Emergence and Non-linearity have been assigned

a medium value. Changes in the enhanced requirement for fuel efficiency, range, maintenance cost and

comfort are not thought likely but would have a significant impact if they came about. Program-size

Complexity is seen to be low.

Regulatory interfaces - Due to the technology levels the regulators’ responses may be highly uncertain and

ambiguous and especially at the beginning of the development. In many areas the regulators may lack essential

competencies to effectively review and agree key principles within the design. This will be exacerbated by the

outsourcing arrangements. Emergence and Non-linearity has been assigned mediums while Program-size

Complexity has been given a low to reflect the understanding relative simplicity of the regulator interfaces.

External Interfaces - External interfaces relates to entities such as communication, maintenance and the

individual airports at which the Dreamliner would land or take-off from. The use of relatively novel technology

creates some uncertainty but changes should be relatively easily accommodated and interfaces relatively

simple and understand.

Technology - Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity with regards technology is naturally high at the beginning of an

R&D phase. However much of this technology has been previously used within other domains and applications.

Emergence and Non-linearity have been assigned a medium as there is potential that changes will be

significant enough to invalidate the concept design. Program-size Complexity has been given a low at this point

in time.

System Integration - Changes to system integration could arise from both the technology characteristics and

the outsourcing arrangements that have been put in place. As such both Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been

assigned a high status. Changes could have a significant effect on the concept design even at this early stage.

Lastly the interfaces required for integration are onerous due to the outsourcing arrangements.

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Scheme design

At the beginning of the Scheme Design phase it is assumed that R&D is complete and the contracting

arrangements are well embedded.

Environmental constraints - These stay broadly similar to those identified in the R&D phase though with an

increase in Program-size Complexity.

Development process - Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been assigned a medium, recognising the

embedding and increasing maturity of the project processes. Changes required to the development process

will have a greater impact in terms of Emergence and Non-linearity so are given a high. Likewise, the process

will become more complex to manage in terms of number of components.

Organisation - This aspect will stay relatively stable with changes to the organisation having a greater impact

as the Boeing design activities increase in scale.

Contractual management - All factors are considered high due to the potential for change, the impact on other

contractual arrangements and the number of contracts to be managed.

Stakeholders - The impact of stakeholders stays relatively stable though changes in customer requirements or

the markets could have an increased impact.

Regulatory interfaces - Confidence in the technology and contractual approach should be increased though

changes, brought about by regulatory changes and imposed constraints, will increase in impact.

External Interfaces - The impact of external stakeholders stays relatively stable though changes could have an

increased impact.

Technology - Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity with regards technology will reduce and impact increase.

Technology will take more management as its scope is defined in more detail.

System Integration - In a similar fashion to contractual management, integration will increase in all areas.

Detailed design

At the beginning of the Detailed Design phase it is assumed that scheme design is complete and most issues

regarding management of the design phase are becoming apparent.

Environmental constraints - These stay broadly similar to the R&D phase though with an increase in Program-

size Complexity.

Development process - Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity have been assigned a medium, recognising the

embedding and increasing maturity of the project processes. Changes required to the development process

will have a greater impact in terms of Emergence and Non-linearity so are given a high. Likewise, the process

will become more complex to manage in terms of number of components.

Organisation - This aspect will stay relatively stable with changes to the organisation having a greater impact

as the Boeing design activities increase in scale.

Contractual management - All factors are considered high due to the potential for change, the impact on other

contractual arrangements and the number of contracts to be managed.

Stakeholders - The impact of stakeholders stays relatively stable though changes in customer requirements or

the markets could have an increased impact.

Regulatory interfaces - Confidence in the technology and contractual approach should be increased though

changes brought about by regulatory changes and imposed constraints, will increase in impact.

External Interfaces - The impact of external stakeholders stays relatively stable though changes could have an

increased impact.

Technology - Both Uncertainty and Ambiguity with regards technology will reduce and impact increase.

Technology will take more management as its scope is defined in more detail.

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System Integration - In a similar fashion to contractual management, integration will increase in all areas.

8.2.4. Critical Success Factors

The CSFs will evolve throughout the development though thought should be given to putting them in place in

advance of when they are particularly required and the phasing required. CSFs will be ranked and generally

taken from ‘high to very high’ rated CSFs from the full survey dataset Appendix F. CSFs within the top three

identified from each Complexity Theme will be shown in bold with the chosen CSFs in order of priority. The

full dataset was chosen in preference to that from the aviation industry dataset due to its low sample size.

Where the number of CSFs are overwhelming in number it is expected that these can be further ranked in

importance. CSFs assessed as having the greatest impact will be chosen in preference to the others.

Furthermore, it would also be expected that performance measures should be chosen to demonstrate the

implementation and impact of CSFs. Examples of how these CSFs may be further tailored towards the

Dreamliner project or otherwise supported are provided in italics with top three ranked CSFs identified in bold

Concept design

At this point in the development lifecycle the emphasis is on managing uncertainty. At this stage ambiguity

will also be high to the technology and there may be constraints of funding prior to a commitment to long-

term investment. Particular Environmental constraint related CSFs are as follows:

I. Clear realistic project objectives – planning undertaken with minimum participation of a defined

percent within the supply chain. Plan complexity measured and managed through use of DSMs;

II. Composition of project team in terms of experience and capability – minimum contractual pre-

qualification criteria for Tier 2 suppliers, Process-Organisation MDMs implemented.

The development process will need to tailored to suit the particular challenges likely to be faced and also

manage the uncertainty and ambiguity that will be present. There may be the opportunity to use methods

from other domains or industries such as the design of business aircraft in with respect to the use of composite

materials [104] or manufacture of electric cars with respect lithium ion batteries. Development CSFs may be:

I. Critical activities are identified – Process DSM applied in areas of high complexity;

II. Performance measures tailored to monitor areas of criticality and uncertainty – DSM related

Performance Measures are implemented where required.

The organisation would also need to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity relating to the new technology and

could be assigned the following CSFs.

i. Transparent definition of responsibilities - Process-Organisation MDMs implemented;

ii. Composition of development team in terms of experience and capability – as above.

Contractual management would be in its infancy at this point and would relate to the production of contractual

documentation and selection of potential Tier 1 partners. In terms of uncertainty and ambiguity the following

CSFs are important.

i. Clearly understood contractual interfaces - Process-Organisation MDMs implemented;

ii. Project breakdown into logical packages – complexity considered before allocation.

However, this is one of the most critical aspects of the development and decisions made at this point and

written into the contracts will have far reaching consequences. For this reason, CSFs need to be considered

for the entire project lifecycle at this point in time.

Neither the management of stakeholders or external interfaces are the project’s most challenging aspects and

no CSFs should be emphasised.

Regulatory interfaces are subject to some uncertainty due to the new technology and it treatment by the

various certification authorities across the globe. Early and thorough engagement would be vitally important.

i. Clearly identified and understood interfaces – MDM developed to model interfaces;

ii. Clear lines of communication with regulators.

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Technology is one of the most important aspects of the development and while choosing mature technologies

is not an option the simplification of design should still be sought where possible to reduce uncertainty of

outcome and understand it where at all possible.

iii. Pursuing a simple as possible design - Requirements measurement is adopted;

iv. Test early, test often philosophy is used during development – TRL measurement is adopted;

System integration is the third important aspect, along with contractual management and technology, and

should similarly be treated to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity. Some of the other CSFs should also be

considered though these will not realise benefits until far into the development lifecycle. Those relating to

Concept Design are:

I. Test early, test often philosophy is used during development - IRL measurement is adopted;

II. System element maturity is monitored - - IRL measurement is adopted.

These two elements were taken from the ‘energy generation’ high influence CSFs as the full dataset did not

provide any relevant CSFs for the issues encountered. This is possibly a weakness in this Complexity Theme’s

CSF that could be bettered through increased sample size and increased representation from engineering

personnel.

Detailed Design

As the development progresses the emphasis changes from Uncertainty and Ambiguity to the impact of

change through Emergence and Non-linearity. While the reduction in the former are still important it is now

the effect of Emergence and Non-linearity that will be felt most keenly. Alongside this, Program-size

Complexity will also increase as the workload and number of parallel and dependant activities increases. As

such the CSFs will become more about the plan and managing change to control impact. Important too is the

managing the outputs of the design process and methods of working to manage the process as a whole.

Considering Environmental Constraints first:

i. Strong project sponsor/champion - use of a development health type Performance Measure;

ii. Effective change management (project) – measurement of change control metadata is adopted;

iii. Proactive risk management process – risk undertaken as a part of complexity management.

For the Development aspects some if not all of the following would be applicable to ensure changes were

recognised early and readily assessed for impact. Some obviously overlap in their scope.

i. A well understood and mature design review process is in place;

ii. Technical risks management process – risk management undertaken as a part of complexity

management;

iii. Effective technical change management processes – measurement of technical change control

metadata is adopted;

iv. Development and project plans are properly integrated;

v. Effective monitoring/control of requirements and development deliverables.

The organisation would need to consider the multi-organisational working methods and global span of the

project to ensure timely and optimised decision making.

i. Degree of collaboration – use of a development health type Performance Measure;

ii. Coherent, self-organizing teamwork - use of a development health type Performance Measure.

Similarly, contractual management should consider how the process and outputs can be best managed and as

discussed above it is important that these are considered at the time of contract production.

i. Clearly understood contractual interfaces – Organisational DSMs are adopted;

ii. Good performance by suppliers/contractors/consultants;

iii. Effective monitoring/control – Development Scorecard approach is adopted.

Stakeholders have been considered as having a high impact on the development at this stage of the design.

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Changes in requirements can have a serious effect on the project lifecycle. Specific CSFs surround the effective

and timely communication and management of stakeholders.

i. Client/user acceptance– Requirements measurement is adopted;

ii. Decisions are agreed and documented;

iii. Early identification and management of conflicting interests – Requirements measurement is

adopted;

iv. Active management of client/user integration – MDMs adopted for critical systems.

External interfaces, while important, are not viewed as being as critical as other areas.

Regulatory interfaces, technology and Integration have the potential to have an increased impact though a

lower likelihood of change as the development proceeds and technology and design matures. As such the CSF

will remain the same as there is little that can be done to reduce the impact of emergent change other than

identify it early.

8.2.5. Planning technique

The sheer size, scale and criticality of the project would lend itself to the use a combination of Design Structure

Matrices. These could be targeted against particular areas of development and interfaces based on risks borne

from the constraints of schedule and relative criticality, both a technically and in relation to the overall project.

From the Criticality Assessment the three areas that deserve particular attention are management of Tier 1

suppliers, technology and integration. All have particular challenges arising from the project and development

strategies:

Organisation architecture DSM to consider how Boeing and the Tier 1 partners taking into account all

interdependencies and constraints arising from their diverse geographical locations;

Process architecture DSM to focus on particular groups of activities from the WBS. This might

particularly look at integration or assembly type activities and dependencies between Tier 1 suppliers;

MDM to look at particular parts of the development and be used to plan the interaction between

organisations and show the impact on the wider schedule.

Full integration of traditional scheduling and DSMs would allow a seamless blend of the two techniques to be

used with areas of contractual interfaces, technology centric development and integration activities being

prime candidates for binary MSMs and numerical DSMs. Further Complexity Assessment of the WBS could be

taken at the next lowest level or levels to identify areas of particular complexity. From the project’s

background information such candidates for enhanced planning include the following:

Electrical systems, including the lithium-ion batteries [105];

Composite material development and especially construction of barrel sections of fuselage;

Design integration activities;

Aircraft assembly including Tier 1 partner dependencies;

Certification related activities, such as quality assurance, across the entire development.

Enhanced planning would be chosen in other areas, depending on the WBS and on the most recent Complexity

Assessment findings. The scale and length of the development may justify specific tool support to be

developed.

8.2.6. Performance measurement

To meet the challenges of contractual management, technology and integration the following measures could

be combined into a Development Scorecard across the entire project:

Conformity with the plan consisting of:

o Earned Value Management

Cost Performance Index (lagging);

Schedule Performance Index (lagging);

System maturity consisting of:

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o Technology Readiness level (lagging);

o Integration Readiness level (lagging);

Process Health to measure areas such as leadership and collaboration.

The outsourced nature of the project makes collecting information challenging and quality assurance of Tier 1

supplied information would be required. Other measures could be applied, with discretion, in areas of

particular concern and these include:

Plan complexity consisting of:

o Proportion of sequential, parallel, coupled and conditional activities within DSM (leading);

Requirements consisting of:

o Realisation – relating to MOE, MOS, MOP and TPM (lagging);

o Execution – relating to selected requirements metadata (leading).

Such data would need to be trended over time rather than compared with data over the entire project and

would be used where there are particular technical risks or evidence of poor project performance. This would

provide a mix of leading and lagging measures the purposes of monitoring, control and reporting.

8.2.7. Risk management

The identification of development risks will not be undertaken in detail due to lack of data. It is not difficult to

appreciate that there will be significant risks in the areas of contractual management, technology and

integration. Detailed descriptions, risk responses and related information would naturally fall out of more

detailed analysis and planning activities.

The creation of a hierarchical Risk Breakdown Structure would be an important early activity in the formation

of the risk management strategy. One suggestion for the high-level nodes (level 1) of the RBS could be those

of ‘schedule’, ‘resource’,’ technical’ and ‘certification’. Level 2 nodes would include contracting and Boeing

(below resource) and technology and integration (below technical). Certification could be divided amongst

particular systems within the aircraft. With the high reliance on Tier 1 Partners it might be appropriate to also

include this as a level 1 RBS node or else place it under resource risks alongside ‘Boeing organisation’. Similarly,

the importance of technology and integration can be elevated to that of a level 1 node or else included under

one or more of the other nodes.

8.2.8. Comparing framework findings with project outcomes

Boeing’s Dreamliner has received a large amount of publicity due the prevalence of problems pre and post

launch. A detailed time line of events can be found in Appendix P.

Delays almost doubled the ‘launch-to-delivery’ time from 49 to 89 months [97] due to a variety of problems

involving Tier 1 partners and the technology. Most notable were long standing issues with the supply of

fasteners and a number of incidences involving the battery technology causing safety concerns [106].

Recognised risks included the management of the supply chain across different countries, such extensive use

of outsourcing and assembly issues made worse by the extensive use of composite technology [97]. Costs

spiralled to approximately $40billion, which was twice the original estimates and included costs due to defects,

additional R&D, supplier support and buyout, customer contract penalties and cancelled orders [100]. This

included bailing out Tier 1 partners such as Alenia and Vought who designed and manufactured the horizontal

stabiliser and both central and rear fuselage.

There has been much speculation, research and analysis as to the root causes for the issues described. Many

relate to supply chain competence and Boeing’s own communication and procurement. Risk sharing neglected

to hold individual suppliers to account for their actions and so encouraged them to benefit from savings on

direct costs while the overall schedule was delayed at the same time Boeing placed a higher emphasis on costs

over schedule. As such optimisation of aspects of development did not equate to overall optimisation, rather

quite the opposite [100] Many of the additional costs thus related to Boeing requiring more effort than

anticipated managing the supply chain. Post-launch problems were also significant in increasing costs but also

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in damaging Boeings reputation and future Dreamliner sales. Significant safety events included a number of

electrical fires relating to the batteries required for the aircraft’s electrical system. This has been attributed to

quality control rather than strictly technology based issue [107] and as such reflects badly upon both Boeing’s

control of its partners and the certification process [108] including the delegation for the provision of test data

to the project’s suppliers [109].

Other operational safety issues included engine shutdowns, fuel leaks, loss of transponder, electrical faults,

hydraulic failures, a cracked windscreen, cracks in wings discovered at the factory and a variety of on-board

management systems [110]. All in all, there have been close to 100 reported incidents as of August 2016 [111].

The Complexity Assessment described particular areas of concern surrounding Contractual Management,

Technology and Integration. It is fair to say that most of the issues encountered during the development of

the Boeing Dreamliner fell into one of these categories.

An additional case study describing the development and construction of AREVA’s Evolutionary Power Reactor

in Olkiluoto, Finland (OL3) has been undertaken within Appendix Q. OL3, though very different to the Boeing

Dreamliner, exhibits characteristics that are equally as complex. While it has similarities in the depth of

technical complexity OL3 differs in Areva’s choice of procurement and contracting strategy. Whereas Boeing

predominately contracted out design to Tier 1 partners, Areva undertook virtually all design in-house, creating

its own unique issues. OL3 is again well documented and has a reputation well deserving of a case study. Both

Boeing’s Dreamliner and Areva’s OL3 were briefly discussed within Section 1.5 of the Literature Survey [4].

9. Results and Evaluation The dissertation has addressed the following objectives in an effort to develop a complexity management

framework:

Proposed a complexity assessment by decomposing a technical development by:

o Discussing the rationale for complexity management alongside current project management

methodologies and provide background to the complexity assessment proposal;

o Decomposing development by the WBS;

o Creating themes for each WBS element – (project) environmental constraints, development

process, internal organisation, contractual management, stakeholders, regulatory interfaces,

external (system) interfaces, technology and internal (system) interfaces;

o Creating complexity criteria for each theme – uncertainty, ambiguity, emergence, non-linearity

and programme-line complexity;

o Rating of criteria between very low and very high;

Describing how complexity may be profiled per criteria over the development lifecycle, how these

criteria interacts and how change may affect this;

Developing the concept of CSFs for application within the Complexity Framework;

o To indicate where extra planning effort should be applied;

o To direct where monitoring should be applied to a higher level of decomposition;

o To align with areas of high complexity deserving interventions and management effort;

o Testing and ranking the selection of CSFs through questionnaire using project and engineering

professionals;

Proposing the use of Design Structure Matrix to supplement and be used as an input into the

production of Gantt chart schedules;

o Describing the technique as it is already used for both process and organisational-architecture

DSM and Multi Domain Matrix;

o Proposing the rationale for the use of binary, numerical and MDM;

o Aligning DSM with complexity criteria and use it to derive planning indicators and

performance measures;

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Propose the effective use of different types of performance measures to aid monitoring of

development activities;

o Discussing the varying types and purposes of performance measures to provide a way of

accurately representing status to allow control and mitigating actions to be implemented;

o Listing a number that have been previously proposed as suitable for use in this application;

o Testing the proposed Performance Measures by questionnaire survey to indicate those that

are considered most influential and to provide confidence in the measures selected;

o Proposing a development scorecard to consist of a number of the performance measures to

provide a balanced way of measuring status across the breadth and depth of a technical

development;

Describe how the entire process may inform risk identification as a part of the overall development

risk management;

Gather all these elements into the complete complexity management framework;

Test the complexity management framework against two case studies.

The dissertation has satisfied the objectives that were assigned within the introduction with varying degrees

of success. The individual components of the Complexity Management Framework will be discussed for their

strengths and weaknesses. Finally, areas of further research will be identified where they are appropriate.

Complexity assessment

The rationale for the assessment was derived from a combination of literature and the author’s personal

experience. The use of the WBS as a focus provides a convenient way of decomposing the activities while the

complexity themes allow the assessor to look at the WBS elements from a variety of important viewpoints.

The complexity criteria decompose the actual complexity further and introduce uncertainty and ambiguity as

discreet elements, which are very often barriers to good decision making. The criteria broadly follow the

principles the business assessment methodology called VUCA [37], using classical definitions of complexity

[37] and adopting with similarities to 5DPM [31]. The regime for scoring individual criteria is as precise as such

a heuristic can possibly be though of course it is still open to a high degree of subjectivity.

The assessment provides little in isolation but does prompt qualitative analysis of the development and the

identification of areas of concern for assignment of CSFs. Together they show potential areas of complexity

related risk and a description of the issues within the technical development. Difficulties arise in assigning

criteria ratings that relative to the entire development lifecycle. For example, providing a ‘very high’ rating

early in the development allows no scope for increasing the rating later on. This can be at least partially cured

through the development of assessment guidance. Another area requiring guidance is that pertaining to

System Development Themes, of which there can be seen to be some overlap. Practical application would be

preferred method of refining analysis and improving consistency of application. Focussed further research

could be used to aid lessons learned type exercises.

The nature of Complexity Criteria was discussed and how these evolve during a project. Uncertainty/Ambiguity

closely equates to likelihood of change while Emergence/Non-linearity related more closely to impact. In this

way it can be seen that Uncertainty/Ambiguity is most influential in early phases of development while

Emergence/Non-linearity becomes increasingly predominant as the development matures. Complexity

Profiles could be developed to allow baselines against which similar technical development could be assessed.

The use of case studies high-lighted a number of potential shortfalls in the Complexity Assessment. The WBS

is an important consideration during the Complexity Assessment as inconsistent or a poorly conceived

structure will prove problematic in the application of Complexity Assessment. Issues arise where the WBS uses

inconsistent methodology and omits development phases at a high level as can be seen in the OL3 case study

contained in Appendix Q. This makes Complexity Assessment more of a challenge at each point that it is done.

In the example of OL3 the WBS will have been created early in the project lifecycle and presumably by a variety

of business entities in parallel. In its favour it would have stayed largely unchanged throughout as it would

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have been largely uninfluenced by contracting decisions, relying instead on established business functions for

its structure. In contrast the Boeing Dreamliner WBS would have been dependant on the ‘Global WBS’ that

was created as a consequence of how the aircraft was contracted out for development and manufacture. Later

interventions by Boeing to support the supply chain and provide additional supervision and management

would have also affected the WBS. Ideally early input into the WBS during initial complexity assessment would

alleviate these issues.

The case studies allowed an assessment of the technique but with the inevitable bias relating to knowledge of

actual real-life outcomes and limitations of high-level application. However, they were able to demonstrate

its use against a high-level WBS. Development of assessment against a detailed WBS would benefit from

practical application to identify further areas for improvement.

Critical Success Factors

This is a technique already established in industry [5][7][45] though without any defined methods to define

and implement. This dissertation was able to link it into a process designed to better guide its application and

also relate the realisation of CSFs to Performance Measures. The literature survey was effective in providing a

comprehensive list of CSFs. The validity of these CSFs was confirmed following the questionnaire survey with

only a single CSF from the 141 being identified as having low influence. The ranking of CSFs allows them to be

both prioritised when chosen for use and when applied in practice. Further development of CSFs will again

rely on project data and particularly the review of past development performance. The questionnaire has a

reasonable sample size that provides a good starting point for their application.

Another area of development that became obvious while undertaking the case studies is the need to

categorise the CSFs to match the Complexity Criteria to inform their selection. This would move the selection

of suitable CSFs from being highly subjective to that of a semi-formal method. Each CSF would be considered

against its potential to reduce or allow better management of Ambiguity, Uncertainty, Non-Linearity,

Emergence and Program-size Complexity. Initially this may take the form of having have simple categorisations

of positive, neutral or negative influence. There would then be the opportunity to develop this further using

lessons learned from the use of CSFs. Foremost the application of CSFs would benefit from a commentary

being given to each, proposing how it could be best implemented and under which circumstances. Ultimately

the CSFs could be given a more complicated rating against Complexity Criteria. Candidates for this include a

scale from high to low (with none and negative to denote where the CSF has no benefit) or a numerical scale

with positive and negative integers.

Identification of CSFs should not be based purely on the analysis of the current stage of development as

omission of CSFs for particular aspects can have far reaching consequences. Examples include Contractual

Management where the cognisance of CSFs at the time of contract documentation writing can influence

strategy and content. Another example may be the consideration of verification and validation strategy early

in the design where the management of uncertainty and ambiguity early in the design may overshadow that

of managing the same later on. The application of these generic CSFs to make them effective within particular

projects was not developed beyond some examples within the case studies.

The application of CSFs could be applied in isolation of the other sub-processes described within this

dissertation. As such there is much value in the findings of the questionnaire survey and their application even

if complexity management is not adopted as a whole. There is however a significant benefit of the selection

of CSFs being informed by a process such as Complexity Assessment.

Planning using Design Structure Matrix

While there is substantial literature on DSM and related techniques its use has yet to become commonplace.

Exceptions include a few specialised application examples, such as Boeing’s Unmanned combat aerial vehicle

(UCAV), Intel’s microprocessor development and BMW’s hybrid vehicle architecture concepts [67]. Evidently

its use does not yet approach the level that will enable tool support and training to be made widely available.

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DSMs can provide substantial value within planning development activities with complex relationships and it

should be used to supplement, rather than a replace, currently used techniques. It is supposed that a barrier

to its use is that of cost as an additional overhead, requiring additional resource and specialised skills to

implement. Therefore, the benefits of DSM need to be demonstrated for industry to justify investment to

develop and implement it. The section on DSM clarified the similarities between planning relationship

descriptions between DSM and traditional techniques. It showed how the creation of DSMs could be used as

an input into Gantt chart development. Finally, it proposed a number of Performance Measures relating to

plan complexity. The need for such Performance Measures was confirmed by the results of the questionnaire

survey which indicated that this was the third most influential, therefore desirable Performance Measure for

use.

The activity relationships sequential and parallel are commonly used within planning, the DSM process activity

types of coupled and conditional are not. There is an opportunity to better define the interfaces between Gantt

charts and both DSMs and MDMs. This would potentially lead to better tool support, including an interface

with the most popular planning software such as Oracle’s Primavera [69]. Such tool support for transposition

of activity relationships information from numerical DSMs into a Gantt chart format would improve the

popularity of DSM as a planning tool. Tool development should not be confined purely to that of Process DSMs.

Of equal benefit is the development of techniques and tooling to allow Organisational DSMs, and ultimately

Process-Organisational MDMs, to support resource loaded Gantt charts. This would benefit the application of

Earned Value management by improving the quality of the plan against which activities are to be monitored

and controlled against.

As well as providing information and data to support the implementation of EVM these techniques would

support the implementation of plan complexity Performance Measures. As the third ranked most influential

Performance Measure, behind both Requirements related measures, it should be considered as an important

method of monitoring and controlling activities. Indeed, its value is that it is very much a leading measure of

project performance. The benefit of using DSM and appropriate tooling is that the collection of these plan

complexity performance measures can be largely automated. This allows these measures to influence the

planning process itself in reducing complexity. It should influence the ultimate forming of the Gantt chart. It is

also a leading measure that can be used to inform management of areas of particular concern against which

resources and expertise should be expended.

In common with CSFs DSM can be applied outside complexity management and without the proceeding

Complexity Assessment and CSF identification. These sub-processes do facilitate the targeted and semi-formal

method of applying DSM against areas of particular complexity. Again there is additional value in the

application of DSM within this framework in that areas of low concern can be disregarded and planned using

more traditional techniques.

Performance measurement

From the questionnaire it is obvious that there is a strong need for techniques to supplement EVM. EVM was

used as a benchmark and rated relatively poorly and even amongst project personnel. This suggests there is

considerable room for improvement in this area. Requirements management figured most strongly overall

reinforcing the author’s view that the monitoring and control of requirements deserves greater emphasis

within project management methodologies. The measurement of plan complexity, which could be satisfied

using a number of DSM related measures, also figured strongly as third most influential. Requirements

management relates closely to that of scope management since all scope should be derived from development

and project requirements. This demonstrates there should be a lot stronger emphasis on the area of scope

within the traditional project management model of the ‘Iron Triangle’ [32]. The measurement of schedule

and cost, other than through EVM, received barely any attention within the questionnaire comments. In

contrast, scope, both directly through plan complexity and indirectly through requirements was mentioned in

the top three measures.

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The use of TRL and IRL was regarded as being more influential in some industries than others and

unsurprisingly was considered more important by engineering personnel. Incorporation of these

methodologies would be of benefit in developments where novelty of technology or integration were

identified as being of concern only.

Both the measurement of sub-processes and project documentation, design and drawings should be

considered for any project. Relating to the control and monitoring of scope, rather than the requirements,

these are important lagging Performance Measures. Other measures scored poorly for reasons previously

described.

The adoption of a Development Scorecard type approach should eliminate biases that are inherent in any

Performance Measure though the scope of performance measurement should be commensurate with the

risks and the actual benefits. The adoption of these Performance Measures and the Development Scorecard

can be readily applied in isolation of other supporting sub-processes. What Complexity Assessment and

application of DSM do allow is the identification of where particular effort can be applied against the WBS. In

this way particular areas of requirements and scope can measured.

Risk management

This is an area of management that is relatively well developed though its application can often be less than

effective. The application of a Risk Breakdown Structure should aid consistency and application of the

proceeding activities within this framework will aid the identification of risks.

10. Conclusion There is a general need to develop guidance and the formality of application across all of the sub-processes.

This can be achieved through a blend of further research and real-world application. These areas for

development will be discussed within this section.

It is felt that application of Complexity Assessment against the WBS would benefit from further practical

application. Further work should be undertaken to provide additional guidance to allow the application of the

scoring of criteria and develop typical complexity profiles across the development lifecycle. These are outside

the scope of this dissertation due to their reliance on actual project data and the sample sizes required.

Application across successive developments may provide general trends which would be beneficial to allow

the assessment of a development against norms. It may also support types of responses to complexity and

inform high-level risk management exercises.

The analysis of high-level trends to group Uncertainty/Ambiguity and Emergence/Non-linearity together

would allow the formation of standard complexity profiles. This could then be used to guide initial project

strategy and formation of the WBS as well as comparing the results of the complexity assessment against

norms. This could then be used to assess where there may be particular risks, i.e. areas where complexity is

excess or higher than expected.

Only application of the Complexity Framework against different types of WBS and to varying degrees of detail

can fully demonstrate its value and allow it to be improved upon. An iterative approach to developing the

framework, and its constituent parts, will allow it to be applied more effectively over subsequent projects.

Development of guidance would be of some importance to guide its use and attempt to drive consistency of

application.

Further research through larger survey sample sizes would improve the applicability of CSFs and Performance

Measures within individual domains though this of course does not preclude their immediate use from the

conclusions based on the survey data within this dissertation. Improvements could be made through increases

in sample sizes across a range of industries, ensuring representation across age groups and role descriptions.

In this way differences could be better seen between different industries and the ranking of relevant CSFs

better tailored to the requirements of the particular industry. Furthermore, while the use of CSFs is

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documented a process to aid actual identification, management and the review of their impact is not. Analysis

of CSF efficacy would be highly useful and this sub-process provides a basis for such an activity that is not

discussed elsewhere in literature. It is also felt more work is required in the Complexity Themes of ‘technology

development management’ and ‘system integration management’. An increased sample size, including more

engineering personnel, would improve the findings in these areas

There is a deficit in the number of CSFs relating to the Criticality Themes under the External factors and System

Development groupings. Neither research of literature or the questionnaire survey identified any additional

CSFs so again it is felt only practical application of the framework would yield progress in this area. Guidance

should be developed for the application of CSFs against particular Complexity Criteria. This could take the form

of a simple categorisation of positive, neutral or negative influence to begin with. Additional instruction could

be developed for the use of CSFs in the form of a commentary for each one. Guidance should also be

developed in applying CSFs in specific technical developments. This should include appropriate wording and

content but should also relate to the use of Performance Measures.

Further work is required to develop suitable Performance Measures that will support the implementation of

CSFs with maximum effort applied to the most influential CSFs. Many of these CSFs are intangible and

subjective, though nonetheless important, making this task difficult. For some CSFs objective measurement

will be impossible with examples including ‘good leadership’ and ‘degree of collaboration’. However, the

identification of which CSFs can and cannot be measured would be useful in itself. Methods to assess those

that cannot be measured could be undertaken through appropriate review at Stage Gates or similar

development decision points. Examples of those that are readily measured include CSFs such as ‘critical

activities are identified’ and ‘clearly understood contractual interfaces’. In these examples the use of DSM

methodologies would be of assistance.

The application of DSMs has been developed over several decades though commercially available tooling is

weak. Development of tooling to allow DSMs to be used and be used as both an input into the development

of Gantt charts and Performance Measures would be useful. Other areas of research include the development

of numerical DSM methodologies, developed and improved over several development lifecycles, and its use

in combination with other modelling techniques. OBM [41] has been referenced earlier in the dissertation but

there are many other modelling techniques that may be more appropriate to integrate with DSM and

traditional planning techniques.

The practical application of complexity related performance measures against DSM would allow the proposed

technique to be developed further. There is considerable benefit in such a leading measure and, considering

its ranking in the questionnaire survey, its use may well be an attractive proposition within technical

development. It is suggested that trialling of this, in conjunction with the application of DSM, is the next step

in its development.

The development of Performance Measures to support the use of CSFs deserves further research. The

measurement of CSF effectiveness would encourage their use and be useful as an input into lessons learned

exercises. This can be undertaken alongside general development of Performance Measures. Another aim is

that of automation of the collection of data for the use in Performance Measures using existing a new

computer tooling. This would reduce the manual overhead and encourage their greater use. The survey

findings suggested significant benefits in further development of requirements and scope based Performance

Measures. Database and tooling support would allow some degree of automation. Further research should be

undertaken in the development of additional measures and those measures that did not receive particularly

good rankings in the survey. It is felt the application of these measures may be appropriate in some technical

developments.

Overall there are opportunities to apply several of the individual sub-processes in isolation to better develop

them, despite the benefits of combining them. This may be more viable for their development as the overhead

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in terms of resources will be considerable and especially if they are applied in tandem with conventional and

proven project monitoring and control techniques.

Project management has failed to learn the lessons over successive high-profile project failures. Many of these

failings were discussed within the literature survey [4] and so it may be surmised the discipline has been

resistant to change for some considerable time. Without sufficient data, preferably corroborated, the benefits

of Complexity Management via this framework will be intangible as best. This combined with project

management’s inherent conservatism may be the greatest barrier to the acceptance to the tools and

techniques described within this paper. An iterative and considered approach to the management of

complexity will be required to gain its support.

What is clear is that the current project management and systems engineering methodologies will need to

improve their efficacy in the face of increasing levels of complexity. The question that has to be asked before

commencing any complex project is what sets this undertaking apart from the high percentage of unsuccessful

projects? The recognition of complexity and tailoring of the technical development process to suit a project’s

unique complexity traits is one way this question may be answered.

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