INTA 696

Analytic Tradecraft Spring 2021

SYLLABUS

INSTRUCTOR’S: Name: Dr. Reginald King Class Address: 1620 L St. (7th Floor) NW Washington, D.C. Email Address: kingreg1@msn.com Telephone Number(s): (703) 801-3428

Office Room Number and Office Hours: Room TBD, Meetings By Appointment Assigned Class Day/Time: Thursdays, 6:15pm – 8:55pm

Assigned Classroom Number: TBD

1. Analytic TradecraftIntelligence—accurate, up-to-date information about looming and unfolding world events—is crucial to any presidentialadministration and Congress conducting successful U.S. foreign policy. Largely based on their ability to gather,evaluate, and understand information about the world dictates the pace at which nations survive and thrive politically,economically, and militarily. This course is intended to introduce students to the various methods by which the UnitedStates Intelligence Community collects information, some of the analytic techniques by which it processes the

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information, some of the IC’s key product lines for customers, and the organizational and management approaches by which all this is accomplished. This three-hour graduate course provides understanding of the techniques and methods for advanced intelligence analysis. Students will learn the importance of critical thinking techniques and how effectively to apply them to intelligence analysis problems. They will be taught the basic tools of the analyst and given the opportunity to apply them. Students will also study some of the successful analysts of the past and the ways they applied the techniques and understand the various approaches to advanced analysis and how to effectively determine how to select the right tools to use. They will also understand the values of automated tools and the effective application of automation to streamline and make more effective use of the analytic process.

2. OVERALL COURSE OBJECTIVES: As a result of completing this course, the student will be able to:

1. Articulate the role of intelligence analysis and production tradecraft as the “product” of the Intelligence Community (IC), with emphasis on the roles of collectors, producers, and policymakers, who are the IC’s customers.

2. Describe and discuss the relationship between intelligence analysis and foreign policy conducted by both the US Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch.

3. Evaluate intelligence problems and determine effective strategies to collect and analyze data, arrive at an assessment, and report key judgements.

4. Comprehend the complexities of intelligence analysis and requirements in view of some key “intelligence failures.”

5. Understand the importance of Critical Thinking and Advanced Intelligence Analysis. 6. Describe the key foreign intelligence liaison partners of the US IC and the role that they play in corroborating

US intelligence.

3. REQUIRED TEXTBOOK(S) FOR PURCHASE, ARTICLES, AND MEDIA: a. Designated Texts:

1. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd Edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005), ISBN: 1-933116-02.

2. William E. Oden, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America, 2nd Edition (Yale University Press, 2004, ISBN: 0300103042.

3. Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrebaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010). ISBN-13:978-0313382659.

4. Jerome Clauser and Jan Goldman, An Introduction to Intelligence Research and Analysis, Lanham, MD, Scarecrow, 2008, ISBN-13: 978-0810861817.

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b. Required Scholarly Articles:

1. Russell Swenson, “Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices”, Joint Military Intelligence College Paper, 2003, pg. 95-104.

2. Heuer, “Thinking About Thinking and “Perception: Why Can’t We See What Is There to Be Seen?” Chapters 1-2, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999); Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?” Chapter 1, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 1-7.

3. Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna, “Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, (Rand Corporation Paper, Arroyo Center, 2008), pgs. 7-28.

4. Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Collection and the Collection Disciplines,” Thinking About Thinking” and “Perception: Why Can’t We See What Is There to Be Seen?” Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?”

5. Lt. Col. Karl E. Prinslow, US Army, and Lt. Col. Robert E. Waller, US Army, Ret., “Assessing Emerging Threats Through Open Sources,” Military Review, September/October 1999.

6. Richard S. Friedman, “Review Essay: Open Source Intelligence,” Parameters, Summer 1998, pgs. 129-165. Biases in Perception of Cause and Effect,” Chapter 11, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999)

7. Odom, “Looking to See: Imagery Intelligence” Chapter 6, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 130-142. 8. Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Oversight and Accountability,” and “The Legacy of the Cold War,”

Chapters 1-011 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 191-219, 220-321; 9. Heuer, “Biases in Estimating Probabilities,” Chapter 12, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999); Odom,

“Spying to Know: Human Intelligence,” Chapter 7, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 142-166. 10. Art Hulnick, “Producer-Consumer Relations: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem,” in Stephan Cimbala

(Ed.,), Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, pgs. 129-144. 11. Johnson, “Pathologies of the Intelligence Cycle,” Chapter 5 in America’s Secret Power, pgs. 77-99. 12. Glen Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence: The Role of the DCI,” International Journal of Intelligence and

Counterintelligence, Vol. 1 No. 4, pgs. 25-40. 13. Chaim Kaufman, “Threat Inflation and the Future of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War”,

International Security, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004, pgs. 5-48. 14. Michael Herman, “Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001,” in L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson (eds.),

Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2004). 15. Joshua Rovner, “Faulty Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2011, Joshua Rovner, Intelligence, Policy, and

the War in Iraq—Analysis. Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 20, 2011. 16. The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States (Norton, 2004). 17. Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments.

(Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010), pgs. 332-382, Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, (CQ Press; Washington, D.C., (2009), pgs. 265-289.

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18. Bruce Berkowitz, “intelligence Reform: Less is More,” Hoover Digest, April 30, 2004. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Gregory F. Treverton, C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, (Rand Corporation Technical Report Series) pgs. 33-52.

19. Mike McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007. Part of the Instructor’s role is to aid students by elaborating on the concepts and principles inherent to the topic. The student’s role is to be prepared. The students are required to have completed the assigned material (readings or media) before face-to-face meetings. No written work can replace missed class time, since many class meetings will be organized around interactive use of discussions. Students are expected to contribute to each class session by arriving on time, being attentive, participating in the class discussion, and being respectful to fellow classmates. In addition, to arriving on time, students are expected to stay the entire class period. Arriving late or leaving early is disruptive. If a situation arises that consistently causes students to be late or absent, please contact the Dean. COURSE OBLIGATIONS: Assignments during the semester will be in a variety of modalities. Students should be advised to back up all work on a USB, and plan to print assignments at least the day prior to the due date. Technological problems are not valid reasons for submitting an assignment late. ASSIGNMENT BREAKDOWNS: 1. In-Class Examinations: There will be 2 examinations, a midterm, and a final. Your examination scores will account for 55 percent of your final grade (see Grading below). Each test will include the materials covered prior to it. The final examination is, therefore, not cumulative. The precise format and content of the examination will be gone over in class. 2. Analysis Papers: During the semester you are required to provide 4 Analytic/Reflective Summaries of the content of the course. Your papers will be worth 20 points toward your final grade. The final submission of each paper should not exceed four typed (double-spaced) pages. 3. Summary of Visit to an IC Agency: The instructor will arrange for you to visit one of the Agencies in the Intelligence Community. Within three days of the visit, you will be required to submit a summary of your key takeaways from that visit. This summary is worth 10 points toward your final grade. (Note: This visit is dependent upon COVID-19 restrictions regarding visitors being lifted by late March/early April 2021.) 4. Classroom Participation: Classroom participation is an important indicator of whether the student is comprehending the material covered in the course. Your participation is worth 15 percent toward your final grade.

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COURSE GRADING SCALE Grading Equivalents A = 90% - 100% B = 80% - 89% C = 70% - 79% D = 60% - 69% F = 0% - 59 %

CALCULATION OF A STUDENT’S FINAL GRADE: Mid-term Exam 25 percent Analysis Papers (4) 20 percent (5 percent each) Classroom Participation 15 percent Summary of Visit to an IC Agency 10 percent Final Exam 30 percent 100 percent

Factors such as excessive absences, tardiness, leaving class early, late submission of assignments, cell phone use and other disruptive behaviors will be counted against a student’s final grade.

Academic Integrity

The Bush School is committed to the development of principled leaders for public service. Entering a Bush School course as a student means accepting this commitment personally. The commitment to "principled leadership" is a further expansion of the Texas A&M student honor code that states: "An Aggie will not lie, cheat or steal nor tolerate those who do." Every student in this course must comply with this code in all work submitted for a grade and will be

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held accountable accordingly for both individual and team assignments. Anyone who is not prepared to be held accountable to this standard should immediately withdraw from this course.

It is imperative to avoid plagiarism or the appearance of plagiarism through sloppy citation. As commonly defined, plagiarism consists of passing off as one's own ideas, words, writings, etc. that which belongs to another. In accordance with this definition, you are committing plagiarism if you copy the work of another person and turn it in as your own, even if you have the permission of that person. It does not matter from where the material is borrowed--a book, an article, material off the web, another student's paper--all constitute plagiarism unless the source of the work is fully identified and credited. It is important when using a phrase, a distinct idea, concept, a sentence, or sentences from another source to credit explicitly that source either in the text, a footnote, or endnote. Plagiarism is a violation of academic and personal integrity and carries extremely serious consequences. Scholastic dishonesty (including cheating, multiple submission of work for grades in different courses, and plagiarism) will not be tolerated and will be punished. Further information can be found at http://www.tamu.edu/aggiehonor/acadmisconduct.htm

ADA Policy Statement

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring accommodation, please make that fact known to me and I will assist you in every way possible. Diversity and Inclusion The Bush School of Government and Public Service supports the Texas A&M University commitment to diversity, and welcomes individuals of all ages, backgrounds, citizenships, disabilities, ethnicities, family statuses, genders, gender identities, geographical locations, languages, military experiences, political views, races, religions, sexual orientations, socioeconomic statuses, and/or work experiences (see diversity.tamu.edu/). Accordingly, all of us—students, faculty, and staff—are expected to respect the different experiences, beliefs, and values expressed by others, and to engage in reasoned discussions that refrain from derogatory comments or dehumanizing language about other people, cultures, groups, or viewpoints. Intellectual argument and disagreement are a fundamental element of both the academic world and the policy process. Disagreement does not, in and of itself, mean disrespect. However, the way that disagreement is expressed can be disrespectful. Unprofessional, insensitive, or disrespectful behaviors (such as using dehumanizing, derogatory, or coarse language; dismissing ideas based on the characteristics of the speaker/writer; or expressing threat or intent to harm, even if framed “as a joke”) are inconsistent with the Bush School’s commitment to diversity, and will not be tolerated. This applies both inside and outside of the classroom and includes electronic venues such as GroupMe.

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Title IX and Statement on Limits to Confidentiality Texas A&M University is committed to fostering a learning environment that is safe and productive for all. University policies and federal and state laws prohibit gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking. With the exception of some medical and mental health providers, all university employees (including full and part-time faculty, staff, paid graduate assistants, student workers, etc.) are Mandatory Reporters and must report to the Title IX Office if the employee experiences, observes, or becomes aware of an incident that meets the following conditions (see University Rule 08.01.01.M1): The incident is reasonably believed to be discrimination or harassment. The incident is alleged to have been committed by or against a person who, at the time of the incident, was (1) a student enrolled at the University or (2) an employee of the University. Mandatory Reporters must file a report regardless of how the information comes to their attention – including but not limited to face-to-face conversations, a written class assignment or paper, class discussion, email, text, or social media post. Although Mandatory Reporters must file a report, in most instances, you will be able to control how the report is handled, including whether or not to pursue a formal investigation. The University’s goal is to make sure you are aware of the range of options available to you and to ensure access to the resources you need. Students wishing to discuss concerns in a confidential setting are encouraged to make an appointment with Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS). Students can learn more about filing a report, accessing supportive resources, and navigating the Title IX investigation and resolution process on the University’s Title IX webpage. Statement on Mental Health and Wellness Texas A&M University recognizes that mental health and wellness are critical factors that influence a student’s academic success and overall wellbeing. Students are encouraged to engage in proper self-care by utilizing the resources and services available from Counseling & Psychological Services (CAPS). Students who need someone to talk to can call the TAMU Helpline (979-845-2700) from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. weekdays and 24 hours on weekends. 24-hour emergency help is also available through the National Suicide Prevention Hotline (800-273-8255) or at suicidepreventionlifeline.org. Statement on Mental Health and Wellness Texas A&M University recognizes that mental health and wellness are critical factors that influence a student’s academic success and overall wellbeing. Students are encouraged to engage in proper self-care by utilizing the resources and services

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available from Counseling & Psychological Services (CAPS). Students who need someone to talk to can call the TAMU Helpline (979-845-2700) from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. weekdays and 24 hours on weekends. 24-hour emergency help is also available through the National Suicide Prevention Hotline (800-273-8255) or at suicidepreventionlifeline.org. COVID-19 Temporary Amendment to Minimum Syllabus Requirements The Faculty Senate temporarily added the following statements to the minimum syllabus requirements in fall 2020 as part of the university’s COVID-19 response. Campus Safety Measures To promote public safety and protect students, faculty, and staff during the coronavirus pandemic, Texas A&M University has adopted policies and practices for the fall 2020 academic term to limit virus transmission. Students must observe the following practices while participating in face-to-face courses and course-related activities (office hours, help sessions, transitioning to and between classes, study spaces, academic services, etc.): • Self-monitoring—Students should follow CDC recommendations for self-monitoring. Students who have a fever or exhibit symptoms of COVID-19 should participate in class remotely and should not participate in face-to-face instruction. • Face Coverings—Face coverings (cloth face covering, surgical mask, etc.) must be properly worn in all non-private spaces including classrooms, teaching laboratories, common spaces such as lobbies and hallways, public study spaces, libraries, academic resource and support offices, and outdoor spaces where 6 feet of physical distancing is difficult to reliably maintain. Description of face coverings and additional guidance are provided in the Face Covering policy and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) available on the Provost website. • Physical Distancing—Physical distancing must be maintained between students, instructors, and others in course and course-related activities. • Classroom Ingress/Egress—Students must follow marked pathways for entering and exiting classrooms and other teaching spaces. Leave classrooms promptly after course activities have concluded. Do not congregate in hallways and maintain 6-foot physical distancing when waiting to enter classrooms and other instructional spaces. • To attend a face-to-face class, students must wear a face covering (or a face shield if they have an exemption letter). If a student refuses to wear a face covering, the instructor should ask the student to leave and join the class remotely. If the student does not leave the class, the faculty member should report that student to the Student Conduct office for sanctions. Additionally, the faculty member may choose to teach that day’s class remotely for all students. Personal Illness and Quarantine Students required to quarantine must participate in courses and course-related activities remotely and must not attend face-to-face course activities. Students should notify their instructors of the quarantine requirement. Students under quarantine are

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expected to participate in courses and complete graded work unless they have symptoms that are too severe to participate in course activities. Students experiencing personal injury or Illness that is too severe for the student to attend class qualify for an excused absence (See Student Rule 7, Section 7.2.2.) To receive an excused absence, students must comply with the documentation and notification guidelines outlined in Student Rule 7. While Student Rule 7, Section 7.3.2.1 indicates a medical confirmation note from the student’s medical provider is preferred. Students may use the Explanatory Statement for Absence from Class form in lieu of a medical confirmation. Students must submit the Explanatory Statement for Absence from Class within two business days after the last date of absence.

SYLLABUS WEEKLY COURSE AND ASSIGNMENT SCHEDULE: Be careful to check the assignment due dates the course listed below in red. The requirements for all assignments are specified below.

INCLUDE A LEARNING OBJECTIVE (minimum 1) FOR EACH ASSIGNMENT

DATE TOPIC ASSIGNED MATERIAL & DUE DATES in RED

LEARNING OUTCOMES

Session 1 Defining Intelligence and Introduction to Critical Thinking and Advanced Analysis in the Context of National Security An orientation to the course, introduction of the instructor and students, and explanation of the readings and course assignments.

Lowenthal, Chapters 1-2 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Hall and Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis, Part 1. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, Chapters 1, 2, and 3. Russell Swenson,

1. Explain what is meant by “Advanced Intelligence Analysis” 2. Explain what is meant by “Critical Thinking”

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“Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices”, Joint Military Intelligence College Paper, 2003, pg. 95-104.

Session 2 Intelligence as a Discipline

Lowenthal, Chapters 3-4 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, pgs. 30-62, Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?” Chapter 1, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 1-7.

1. Understand and describe some of the current-day great critical thinkers and the successes they had. 2. Explain how Advanced Analysis techniques can really make the difference in a successful or failed foreign policy.

Session 3 Tools and Methods I Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, pgs. 77-91, 121-234. Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, Chapters 4 and 7, Eric V. Larson,

1. Explain the Different Approaches to Critical Thinking 2. Comprehend How Critical Thinking is the Cornerstone to Effective Advanced Intelligence Analysis

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Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk, Thomas S. Szayna, “Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, (Rand Corporation Paper, Arroyo Center, 2008), pgs. 7-28

Session 4 Tools and Methods II Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, pgs. 167-234, Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, Chapter 7, Jeffrey R. Cooper, Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis, (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005) Due: Analysis Paper 1.

1. Explain Some of the Methods of Anticipatory Analysis. 2. Explain the Methods of Anticipatory Analysis 3. Explain the Methods of Tendency and Anomaly Analysis

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Session 5 Sources and Methods Part I: Open Source Analysis (OSINT)

Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Collection and the Collection Disciplines, “Thinking About Thinking” and “Perception: Why Can’t We See What Is There to Be Seen?” Odom, “Why Intelligence Reform?”, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 1-7, Graham Turbiville, Jr, Lt. Col. Karl E. Prinslow, US Army, and Lt. Col. Robert E. Waller, US Army, Ret., “Assessing Emerging Threats Through Open Sources,” Military Review, September/October 1999, Richard S. Friedman, “Review Essay: Open Source Intelligence,” Parameters, Summer 1998, pgs. 129-165.

1. Explain Some of the Sources of Unclassified Information. 2. Provide an Overview of CIA’s Open Source Enterprise. 3. Highlight the Challenges That Social Media Present to the IC.

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Session 6 Sources and Methods Part II: Overhead Collection

Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Analysis,” Chapter 6 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 109-144, Chapters 5-6, Odom, “Making Dollars Yield Useful Intelligence,” Chapter 3, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 53-88., Lt. Commander H. Todd Black, U.S. Navy, “Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?” Naval War College Review Vol. 70 No. 1 (Winter 1999), Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Counterintelligence,” Chapter 7 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 145-156; Odom, “The World of Military Intelligence,” Chapter 4 Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 89-114.

1. Explain Some of the Overhead Collection Methods. 2. Discuss How Some of the Information Gleaned From Satellites is Leveraged by the IC.

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Session 7 Sources and Methods Part III: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process-The Role of the Policy Maker,” Chapter 9 in Intelligence : From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 174-190; Odom, “Looking to See: Imagery Intelligence” Chapter 6, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 130-142. Lowenthal, “The Intelligence Process—Oversight and Accountability,” and “The Legacy of the Cold War,” Chapters 1-011 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 191-219, 220-321; Odom, “Spying to Know: Human Intelligence,” Chapter 7, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 142-166. Due: Analysis Paper 2.

1. Explain two key sources of information for the US IC—SIGINT and HUMINT. 2. Provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these sources. 3. Discuss the counterintelligence risks associated with each source.

Session 8 Mid-Term Examination

Session 9 Producer-Consumer Relations: Part I—The Executive Branch

Lowenthal, “Intelligence Reform,” and “Foreign Intelligence Services,” Chapter 14-15 in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (2006), pgs. 274-289, 290-305; Odom,

1. Discuss the “First Customer” Concept regarding the President. 2. Highlight the Oval Customers who regularly receive intelligence

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“Conclusion: What It All Means,” Chapter 9, Fixing Intelligence (2003), pgs. 185-194.

products and briefings. 3. Explain the concepts of “taskings” “feedback” from customers and how they drive the intelligence production cycle.

Session 10

Producer-Consumer Relations: Part II—The Legislative Branch

Art Hulnick, “Producer-Consumer Relations: A New Way of Looking at an Old Problem,” in Stephan Cimbala (Ed.,), Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, pgs. 129-144; Johnson, “Pathologies of the Intelligence Cycle,” Chapter 5 in America’s Secret Power, pgs. 77-99; Glen Hastedt, “Controlling Intelligence: The Role of the DCI,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 1 No. 4, pgs. 25-40.

1. Highlight the Congress as a secondary set of intelligence customers. 2. Discuss the IC’s Oversight Committees, including the HPSCI, the SSCI, the SAC/Defense, and the HAC/Defense.

Session 11 The Human Factors of Advanced Intelligence Analysis Part I: The Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Case

Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbuam, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments, (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010), pgs. 383-405. Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, (CQ Press; Washington, DC, 2009), pgs. 290-307. Chaim Kaufman, “Threat Inflation and the Future of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War”, International Security, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004, pgs. 5-48. Due: Analysis Paper 3.

1. Review the “Lessons Learned” from the Iraq WMD situation, which prompted a US invasion of Iraq. 2. Discuss how this “Intelligence Failure” prompted major changes in the IC.

Session 12

The Human Factors of Advanced Intelligence Analysis Part II: The Iraqi WMD Case

Joshua Rovner, “Faulty Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, June 22, 2011, Joshua Rovner, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq—Analysis. Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 20, 2011, The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

1. Review the “Lessons Learned” from the Iraq WMD situation, which prompted a US invasion of Iraq. 2. Discuss how this “Intelligence Failure” prompted major changes in the IC.

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States (Norton, 2004)

Session 13 The Importance of the Right Technology to Aid Advanced Intelligence Analysis

Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments. (Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2010), pgs. 332-382, Robert Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, (CQ Press; Washington, D.C., (2009), pgs. 265-289, Michael Herman, “Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001,” in L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson (eds.), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2004)

1. Highlight the latest technology being used within the IC to enhance intelligence gathering and analysis. 2. Discuss how the IC is increasingly partnering with the private sector improve its technology. 3. Highlight some of the legal challenges to the IC-private sector collaboration.

Session 14 Bringing It All Together

Bruce Berkowitz, “Intelligence Reform: Less is More,” Hoover Digest, April 30, 2004. Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Gregory F. Treverton, C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, (Rand Corporation Technical Report Series) pgs. 33-52, Mike McConnell, “Overhauling Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007. Due: Analysis Paper 4.

1. Summarize some of the key points covered since the mid-term exam. 2. Provide any final guidance and answer any additional questions leading to the final exam.

Session 15 Final Exam