insurgents targeting teachers as communications in southern thailand

Insurgent Communications:Targeting Schools & Teachers

The Case of Southern Thailand The Case of Southern Thailand

July 2014

Jeremy E. Plotnick, [email protected]

Introduction

• This document presents a short case study and discussion of the conscious targeting of schools and teachers by separatist guerillas operating in the southernmost provinces of Thailand.

• The specific issue to be addressed is the use of targeting choices as a means of communications in the context of an asymmetrical conflict

• The materials presented in the following slides represent a high level overview of the case and a more complete study is presently under development

Key Concepts

• Asymmetric Warfare– Conflicts between belligerents that have significantly

different resource levels. This type of conflict is often associated with guerilla warfare, insurgencies and terrorism

• Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)• Propaganda of the Deed (POTD)– Originally, a philosophy in which actions (often violent)

were used to inspire the public to undertake revolution. It uses violence focused on symbolic targets as a means of communications with a audience beyond the immediate conflict zone. Many contemporary terrorist campaigns are informed by this philosophy

Southern Thailand: The Conflict Zone

Source: UCA News

Background

• The three southernmost provinces of Thailand (Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat) have been the site of periodic unrest and insurgency since they were fully incorporated into the Thai state in the early 20th century.20th century.

• The most recent outbreak of violence began in early 2004 and has continued up to the presnt day

Background

• The basis for this insurgency relates to the ethno-cultural composition of the provinces in question, which are majority Malay Muslim, while the rest of Thailand is overwhelmingly Buddhist

• The level of violence in the south has remained relatively constant throughout the 10 years of the insurgency and at a significantly higher level than in previous outbreaks

Background

Deaths = 6,097 Injuries 10,908

Between January 2004 and April 2014, there were 14,128 violent incidents and 17,005 deaths & injuries associated with separatist violence in the south of Thailand

Deaths = 6,097

Buddhists

Muslims

Unknown

Injuries 10,908

Buddhists

Muslims

Unknown

Source: Deep South Watch, 2014

Background

Background

Source: Deep South Watch, 2014

Background

• The current manifestation of the insurgency has a number of key attributes that are relevant to this project:– There is a lack of a unified command structure and

very limited political organization– With a few notable exceptions, insurgent operations – With a few notable exceptions, insurgent operations

have been limited to the three provinces in question– The insurgents have not proactively targeted symbols

of US or ‘western culture’ – The insurgents have not undertaken a significant or

prolonged communications program using either traditional or social media

Background

• The types of communications techniques that have been used by the southern insurgents include:– Leaflets– Graffiti – Banners (hung in high traffic areas)– Banners (hung in high traffic areas)– Static webpages– Graphic acts of violence (beheadings, mutilations,

burning of victims bodies)– Coordinated bombings of civilian targets– Selective targeting of schools and teachers

Background

• Primary– Insurgent cadres and supporters

– Potential recruits

– Local Muslim civilians

• Secondary– International media outlets

– International Islamic organizations

Potential Insurgent Audiences

– Local Muslim civilians

– Local Buddhist civilians

– Thai media outlets

– Locally based government representatives

– Thai security forces (military, paramilitary and police)

– The Thai national government

– The Thai public

organizations

– The Malaysian public (esp. in the northern states)

– Regional and/or Jihadist organizations

Competing Narratives

• An important element of most successful insurgencies and/or separatist movements is the narrative used to justify their actions

• In the case of the insurgents in southern Thailand this narrative is based on the memory of the Sultanate of Patani and its conquest by the Kingdom of Siam.

• This narrative also includes:• This narrative also includes:– Mismanagement and poor governance of the provinces by the

central government– Economic injustice and underdevelopment– Attempts by the government to destroy the local culture and way

of life through migration of Buddhist Thais into the south and by the assimilation of southern children via the government school system

“The public school system [in Thailand] is secular and national and becoming more so, with much of the culture and history taught consisting of the culture and history of Buddhist Thailand,


of the culture and history of Buddhist Thailand, and in the Thai language.”Dr. Douglas Macdonald, “Why The Teachers?”, Strategic Studies Institute, December 1, 2005

“Schools and universities are seen as representing the Thai government and Buddhist-Thai culture. ‘Insurgents are terrorizing the civilian population by attacking teachers and schools, which they consider symbols of the Thai


schools, which they consider symbols of the Thai states,’ Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch.”Brendan O’Malley, “Education Under Attack”, UNESCO, April 27, 2007


• While the great majority of Malay Muslims in the south do not embrace violence, elements of the insurgent narrative still resonate

• Based on their narrative the southern insurgents are focused on:focused on:– Enforcing on the local population a traditional Malay

Muslim lifestyle and relatively strict adherence to Islamic norms

– Driving Buddhist residents out of what they see as traditional Muslim territory

– The destruction of symbols of central government authority in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat

“Insurgents also attack teachers and government run schools as part of a wider campaign to eradicate symbols of the Thai state and drive the Thai Buddhist population out of what insurgents


Thai Buddhist population out of what insurgents claim is Malay Muslim land.”Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Separatists Targeting Teachers in South”, March 20, 2014


• The government’s counter-narrative is geared for the general population of Thailand and focuses on a strong unified state that has never been colonized and which has Buddhism as the predominant religion

• The government’s worldview thus appears to be ironic in the south, where some elements of the population see themselves as second class citizens, if not the decedents of victims of Thai colonization

Thai Southern Insurgents:Targeting and Tactics

• The tactics and targeting choices of the insurgents have evolved in response to both their own operational skills as well as the actions of the Thai security forces

• The initial attacks were launched against military and police installations and seem to have been used to

• The initial attacks were launched against military and police installations and seem to have been used to demonstrate the viability of the movement and help driver recruitment. – The use of human wave type assaults led to high levels

of insurgent causalities but showed security forces and the civilian population that the insurgents were a serious movement and not simply a criminal enterprise

Thai Southern Insurgents:Targeting and Tactics

• After the early attacks on military installations the insurgents quickly shifted focus to ‘softer’ targets including local government officers, commercial establishments frequented by Buddhist citizens, and educational infrastructureeducational infrastructure

• The tactics employed have focused primarily on the use of stand-off IEDs*, though at the outset of this insurgency simple arson was often employed

• In addition to IEDs insurgents have employed targeted assassinations (normally from the back of a motorcycle) and the occasional ambush of police or military convoys

*Improvised Explosive Device

Focus on Schools and Teachers

• Since the early days of the insurgency a primary target has been the state’s educational infrastructure in the three provinces – schools, teachers and administrators

• This has included arson attacks and bombings of school buildings, assassinations of teachers and administrators, and attacks on the so called ‘teacher protection convoys’


• According to Human Rights Watch, in the 10 years of the conflict insurgents have killed at least 171 teachers and burned or detonated bombs at over 300 government run schools in the southern border provinces

Photo: asiasociety.org


• At the outset of the current insurrection the attacks on schools came primarily in the form of fire bombings in the late night hours

• During this period teachers were also targeted on • During this period teachers were also targeted on their way two or from school and were attacked with knives, hammers and sometime firearms

• There has also been at least one report of a teacher killed inside their classroom by insurgents who had infiltrated the facility disguised as students


• When the government security forces recognized the insurgent focus on teachers and schools they undertook several counter-measures – Guards (either soldiers, paramilitary forces, or police)

were posted at schools in an attempt to ‘harden’ themwere posted at schools in an attempt to ‘harden’ them

– Teachers were permitted to carry personal weapons in school and were given weapons training

– Some districts organized escorts for teachers


• The increased security at school facilities along with the growing sophistication of insurgent tactics has led to a decline in attacks on school facilities

• Teachers and administrators are still targeted individually at or near their homesindividually at or near their homes– These are often executed as drive-by shootings

• They are also targeted while traveling in teacher protection convoys– These are often executed through the use of an IED

sometimes combined with an ambush


• At present Thai security forces are unable to guarantee the security of the educational personnel working in the deep south

• There appear to be limited options open to security • There appear to be limited options open to security forces in increasing protection of these individuals short of boarding them in military facilities or on school grounds and further hardening the schools

• The fact that these individuals continue to be targeted indicates that the insurgents continue to see value in tasking resources against this objective


• There are several possible rationales for this targeting strategy – By their nature these are soft targets that are difficult to

‘harden’ due to their role in the community

– They are symbols of the central government’s presence in – They are symbols of the central government’s presence in the deep south

– They are seen as agents for the cultural and linguistic assimilation of the local Yawi speaking Malay Muslim population by the Buddhist Thai state


• There are several rationales for this targeting strategy – With the advent of the teacher protection convoy system

insurgents can strike both military and educational targets simultaneously at times and places of their choosing

– By demonstrating the ability to strike at schools and teachers the insurgents furthered their objective of driving away the Thai Buddhist population and also made it hard for the Ministry of Education to find teachers willing to work in the deep south.

Communications Effectiveness of Targeting Teachers

• Through the attacks on teachers and schools the separatists have been able to:– terrorize local teachers, administrators and students

– significantly disrupt school operations in the deep south – significantly disrupt school operations in the deep south

– Increase the costs of education through the need to offer hazard pay to teachers and the need to task military and police personnel to provide security for teachers and schools

– Complicate counter-insurgency operations by requiring security assets be tasked for daily ‘teacher protection convoys


• Have the attacks on schools and the assassinations of teachers and other education system workers been an effective communications tool?

• If viewed through the filter of the POTD philosophy the answer is no, because these attacks have not led to actions answer is no, because these attacks have not led to actions beneficial to the insurgents– They have not radicalized the population or led to an uprising

– They have not caused the security forces to undertake exceedingly harsh countermeasures that led to increased radicalization

– They have not led to major concessions by the Thai government


• The attacks have consistently received local media coverage and to some degree international coverage, and it has led various NGO’s and multilateral agencies to focus on the situation in the south

• The coverage is a demonstration of operational effectiveness and so may have benefited insurgent requirement programs

• This coverage and attention has not significantly furthered the insurgents cause at a strategic level


• An important question is why these attacks have not had more of an impact on both internal and external audiences?

• There have been a number of reports that have • There have been a number of reports that have identified several factors that explain why the coverage (or lack of coverage) has not led to the actions that may have been expected by the insurgents


• In his study of Thai media coverage of the southern insurgency Noi Thammasathien identifies factors that have led to the focus on simple reporting of violent actions without analysis of root causes– The lack of local contacts or understanding of the reality of – The lack of local contacts or understanding of the reality of

southern life

– The lack of local professional journalists in the south

– The cost of having Bangkok reporters based in the south

– Pressure from both the government and the insurgents on reporters/editors

– The fact that there is no end in sight for the current cycle of violence has reduced the newsworthiness of the topic


• International media gives less attention of the southern insurgency than do local media, there is also less coverage than for other violent ‘Islamic’ movements in developing countries

• Joshua Kurlantzickof the Council on Foreign Relations • Joshua Kurlantzickof the Council on Foreign Relations identifies several explanations for this– Geographic remoteness and linguistic challenges

– The decentralized nature of the insurgency

– The lack of connections with international terrorists/jihadists

– The lack of a southern diaspora to help raise awareness of the situation in major media markets


• Ultimately, the highly local and repetitive nature of the insurgency has limited the communications impact of its actions including the targeting of schools and teachers

• As the conflict continues into its second decade, media attention (both local and international) will continue to attention (both local and international) will continue to decline in the absence of significant new developments on the ground

• More extreme acts of violence against teachers are unlikely to change the media dynamic over the long term due to the previously stated challenges in covering the story as well as general audience fatigue regarding southern violence

Conclusions

• The targeting of teachers and schools is often viewed as a violation of the norms of civilized behavior

• While this may be true, it does not take into account the worldview and objectives of the insurgents and/or the worldview and objectives of the insurgents and/or terrorists who are striking these targets

• To these groups the teachers and schools represent an extension of state power that is not necessarily distinguished from that of the military or police

Conclusions

• In ethno/cultural/religious conflicts schools are often seen as a threat to the long-term viability of the minority culture – due to their role in assimilation– Beyond teaching the ‘3 R’s’, schools teach a historical

perspective and cultural norms that are often determined by perspective and cultural norms that are often determined by the central government

• In the Thai case it is clear that the assimilationist role played by schools is a key factor making them a target for the insurgents– The fact that local religious schools or ‘pandoks’ and their

teachers were targeted by Thai security forces did not help matters

• While there were several efforts made to increase the security of school facilities and personnel, there has been very little attention given to changing the perception of the school as a threat to local culture and/or as an extension of central government power

Conclusions

and/or as an extension of central government power

• The possibility of greater local input into curriculum development has not been seriously considered and conducting at least some instruction in the local dialect has been slow to materialize

• Ironically, after the May 22, 2014 coup the Ministry of Education has indicated that it will increase the amount of time it dedicates to culture, history and citizenship – the very subjects that are likely to lead to increased insurgent targeting of teachers and

Conclusions

to increased insurgent targeting of teachers and schools in the south– It seems important to recognize that in the case of the three

southernmost provinces a one-size-fits-all approach to educational curriculum is a dangerous policy that risks drawing increased attacks

• The purely security oriented approach to stopping the threats to schools and teachers in the south has largely failed. It seems clear that a new and more multidimensional approach is required – one that involves the local community, the curriculum, the

Conclusions

involves the local community, the curriculum, the teachers and the security apparatus

• The new government’s focus on unity, centralization of power (with reduced local autonomy), and the ideal attributes of ‘Thainess’ do not bode well for the teachers in the south.

References

Abuza, Z. (2012, June 2). The Southern Thailand Insurgency In The Wake Of The March 2012 Bombings. CTC Sentinel. Retrieved July 21, 2014, from https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-southern-thailand-insurgency-in-the-wake-of-the-march-2012-bombings

Askew, M. (2008). Thailand’s Intractable Southern War: Policy, Insurgency And Discourse. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30 (2), 186-214.

Chalk, P. (2008). The Malay-Muslim Insurgency In South Thailand: Understanding The Conflict’s Evolving Chalk, P. (2008). The Malay-Muslim Insurgency In South Thailand: Understanding The Conflict’s Evolving Dynamic. RAND National Defense Research Institute, RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 5.

Croissant, A. (2005). Unrest In South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since 2001. Strategic Insights, 4(2).

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jitpiromsri, S. (2014, July 2). An Inconvenient Truth About The Deep South Violent Conflict: A Decade Of Chaotic, Constrained Realities And Uncertain Resolution. Deep South Watch. Retrieved from http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/en/node/5904

References

Kurlantzick, J. (2012, July 22). Thailand’s War Without An Audience. The Boston Globe. Retrieved July 21, 2014 From http://www.cfr.org/thailand/thailands-war-without-audience/p28734

No One Is Safe: Insurgent Violence Against Civilians In Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces. (August 2007). Human Rights Watch. 19 (13c).

Nurakkate, C. (2012). The Conflict In Southern Thailand. Centre For Defence And Strategic Studies, Australian DefenceCollege.DefenceCollege.

O’Malley, B. (2007). Education Under Attack: A Global Study On Targeted Political And Military Violence Against Education Staff, Students, Teachers, Union And Government Officials, And Institutions. UNESCO, Education Sector, Division For The Coordination Of United Nations Priorities In Education.

Parameswaran, P. (2008, November 19). Thailand’s Gains Against Insurgency Remain Fragile. World Politics Review. Retrieved December 26, 2008, from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2938/thailands-gains-against-insurgency-remain-fragile

Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. (2005, May 18). International Crisis Group. Asia Report No. 98.

References

Storey, I. (2007). Ethnic Separatism In Southern Thailand: Kingdom Fraying At The Edge? Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/Ethnic%20Separatism%20in%20Southern%20Thailand.Storey.pdf

Suluck. (2014, July 20). 2014 Coup And The Deep South Crisis: Interview With Sunai Phasuk. PrachataiEnglish. Retrieved July 21, 2014 From http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/4231

Thammasathien, N. (2010). The Thai Press And The Southern Insurgency: Nothing More To Report. Thammasathien, N. (2010). The Thai Press And The Southern Insurgency: Nothing More To Report. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32 (2), 280-91.

insurgents targeting teachers as communications in southern thailand

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