instructor: erol sahin
DESCRIPTION
Machine Programming – IA32 memory layout and buffer overflow CENG331: Introduction to Computer Systems 7 th Lecture. Instructor: Erol Sahin. Acknowledgement: Most of the slides are adapted from the ones prepared by R.E. Bryant, D.R. O’Hallaron of Carnegie-Mellon Univ. FF. C0. BF. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Machine Programming – IA32 memory layout and buffer overflowCENG331: Introduction to Computer Systems7th Lecture
Instructor: Erol Sahin
Acknowledgement: Most of the slides are adapted from the ones prepared by R.E. Bryant, D.R. O’Hallaron of Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
Linux Memory Layout Stack
Runtime stack (8MB limit) Heap
Dynamically allocated storage When call malloc, calloc, new
DLLs Dynamically Linked Libraries Library routines (e.g., printf, malloc) Linked into object code when first executed
Data Statically allocated data E.g., arrays & strings declared in code
Text Executable machine instructions Read-only
Upper 2 hex digits of addressRed Hatv. 6.2~1920MBmemorylimit
FF
BF
7F
3F
C0
80
40
00
Stack
DLLs
TextData
Heap
Heap
08
Linux Memory AllocationLinked
BF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
DLLs
TextData
08
Some Heap
BF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
DLLs
TextData
Heap
08
MoreHeap
BF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
DLLs
TextDataHeap
Heap
08
InitiallyBF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
TextData
08
Text & Stack Example
(gdb) break main(gdb) run Breakpoint 1, 0x804856f in main ()(gdb) print $esp $3 = (void *) 0xbffffc78
Main Address 0x804856f should be read 0x0804856f
Stack Address 0xbffffc78
InitiallyBF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
TextData
08
Dynamic Linking Example(gdb) print malloc $1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x8048454 <malloc>(gdb) run Program exited normally.(gdb) print malloc $2 = {void *(unsigned int)} 0x40006240 <malloc> Initially
Code in text segment that invokes dynamic linker Address 0x8048454 should be read 0x08048454
Final Code in DLL region
LinkedBF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
DLLs
TextData
08
Memory Allocation Example
char big_array[1<<24]; /* 16 MB */char huge_array[1<<28]; /* 256 MB */
int beyond;char *p1, *p2, *p3, *p4;
int useless() { return 0; }
int main(){ p1 = malloc(1 <<28); /* 256 MB */ p2 = malloc(1 << 8); /* 256 B */ p3 = malloc(1 <<28); /* 256 MB */ p4 = malloc(1 << 8); /* 256 B */ /* Some print statements ... */}
Example Addresses
$esp 0xbffffc78p3 0x500b5008p1 0x400b4008Final malloc 0x40006240p4 0x1904a640 p2 0x1904a538beyond 0x1904a524big_array 0x1804a520huge_array 0x0804a510main() 0x0804856fuseless() 0x08048560Initial malloc 0x08048454
BF
7F
3F
80
40
00
Stack
DLLs
TextDataHeap
Heap
08
Internet Worm and IM War November, 1988
Internet Worm attacks thousands of Internet hosts. How did it happen?
July, 1999 Microsoft launches MSN Messenger (instant messaging system). Messenger clients can access popular AOL Instant Messaging Service
(AIM) servers
AIMserver
AIMclient
AIMclient
MSNclient
MSNserver
Internet Worm and IM War (cont.) August 1999
Mysteriously, Messenger clients can no longer access AIM servers. Microsoft and AOL begin the IM war:
AOL changes server to disallow Messenger clients Microsoft makes changes to clients to defeat AOL changes. At least 13 such skirmishes.
How did it happen?
The Internet Worm and AOL/Microsoft War were both based on stack buffer overflow exploits!
many Unix functions do not check argument sizes. allows target buffers to overflow.
String Library Code Implementation of Unix function gets
No way to specify limit on number of characters to read
Similar problems with other Unix functions strcpy: Copies string of arbitrary length scanf, fscanf, sscanf, when given %s conversion specification
/* Get string from stdin */char *gets(char *dest){ int c = getc(); char *p = dest; while (c != EOF && c != '\n') { *p++ = c; c = getc(); } *p = '\0'; return dest;}
Vulnerable Buffer Code
int main(){ printf("Type a string:"); echo(); return 0;}
/* Echo Line */void echo(){ char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */ gets(buf); puts(buf);}
Buffer Overflow Executions
unix>./bufdemoType a string:123123
unix>./bufdemoType a string:12345Segmentation Fault
unix>./bufdemoType a string:12345678Segmentation Fault
Buffer Overflow Stack
echo:pushl %ebp # Save %ebp on stackmovl %esp,%ebpsubl $20,%esp # Allocate space on stackpushl %ebx # Save %ebxaddl $-12,%esp # Allocate space on stackleal -4(%ebp),%ebx # Compute buf as %ebp-4pushl %ebx # Push buf on stackcall gets # Call gets. . .
/* Echo Line */void echo(){ char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */ gets(buf); puts(buf);}
Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
%ebp
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
Buffer Overflow Stack Example
Before call to gets
unix> gdb bufdemo(gdb) break echoBreakpoint 1 at 0x8048583(gdb) runBreakpoint 1, 0x8048583 in echo ()(gdb) print /x *(unsigned *)$ebp$1 = 0xbffff8f8(gdb) print /x *((unsigned *)$ebp + 1)$3 = 0x804864d
8048648: call 804857c <echo> 804864d: mov 0xffffffe8(%ebp),%ebx # Return Point
Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
%ebp
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
0xbffff8d8Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
bf ff f8 f808 04 86 4d
xx xx xx xx
Buffer Overflow Example #1
Before Call to gets Input = “123”
No Problem
0xbffff8d8Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
bf ff f8 f808 04 86 4d
00 33 32 31
Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
%ebp
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
Buffer Overflow Stack Example #2Input = “12345”
8048592: push %ebx 8048593: call 80483e4 <_init+0x50> # gets 8048598: mov 0xffffffe8(%ebp),%ebx 804859b: mov %ebp,%esp 804859d: pop %ebp # %ebp gets set to invalid value 804859e: ret
echo code:
0xbffff8d8Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
bf ff 00 3508 04 86 4d
34 33 32 31
Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
%ebp
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
Saved value of %ebp set to 0xbfff0035
Bad news when later attempt to restore %ebp
Buffer Overflow Stack Example #3
Input = “12345678”
Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
%ebp
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
8048648: call 804857c <echo> 804864d: mov 0xffffffe8(%ebp),%ebx # Return Point
0xbffff8d8Return AddressSaved %ebp[3][2][1][0]buf
StackFramefor main
StackFramefor echo
38 37 36 3508 04 86 00
34 33 32 31
Invalid addressNo longer pointing to
desired return point
%ebp and return address corrupted
Malicious Use of Buffer Overflow
Input string contains byte representation of executable code Overwrite return address with address of buffer When bar() executes ret, will jump to exploit code
void bar() { char buf[64]; gets(buf); ... }
void foo(){ bar(); ...}
Stack after call to gets()
B
returnaddressA
foo stack frame
bar stack frameB
exploitcode
pad
data writtenbygets()
Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows Buffer overflow bugs allow remote machines to execute
arbitrary code on victim machines. Internet worm
Early versions of the finger server (fingerd) used gets() to read the argument sent by the client:
finger [email protected] Worm attacked fingerd server by sending phony argument:
finger “exploit-code padding new-return-address”
exploit code: executed a root shell on the victim machine with a direct TCP connection to the attacker.
Exploits Based on Buffer Overflows Buffer overflow bugs allow remote machines to execute
arbitrary code on victim machines. IM War
AOL exploited existing buffer overflow bug in AIM clients exploit code: returned 4-byte signature (the bytes at some location in
the AIM client) to server. When Microsoft changed code to match signature, AOL changed
signature location.
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 1999 11:30:57 -0700 (PDT) From: Phil Bucking <[email protected]> Subject: AOL exploiting buffer overrun bug in their own software! To: [email protected]
Mr. Smith,
I am writing you because I have discovered something that I think you might find interesting because you are an Internet security expert with experience in this area. I have also tried to contact AOL but received no response.
I am a developer who has been working on a revolutionary new instant messaging client that should be released later this year. ... It appears that the AIM client has a buffer overrun bug. By itself this might not be the end of the world, as MS surely has had its share. But AOL is now *exploiting their own buffer overrun bug* to help in its efforts to block MS Instant Messenger. .... Since you have significant credibility with the press I hope that you can use this information to help inform people that behind AOL's friendly exterior they are nefariously compromising peoples' security.
Sincerely, Phil Bucking Founder, Bucking Consulting [email protected]
It was later determined that this email originated from within Microsoft!
Code Red Worm History
June 18, 2001. Microsoft announces buffer overflow vulnerability in IIS Internet server
July 19, 2001. over 250,000 machines infected by new virus in 9 hours
White house must change its IP address. Pentagon shut down public WWW servers for day
When We Set Up CS:APP Web Site Received strings of formGET /default.ida?
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN....NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a
HTTP/1.0" 400 325 "-" "-"
Code Red Exploit Code Starts 100 threads running Spread self
Generate random IP addresses & send attack string Between 1st & 19th of month
Attack www.whitehouse.gov Send 98,304 packets; sleep for 4-1/2 hours; repeat
– Denial of service attack Between 21st & 27th of month
Deface server’s home page After waiting 2 hours
Code Red Effects Later Version Even More Malicious
Code Red II As of April, 2002, over 18,000 machines infected Still spreading
Paved Way for NIMDA Variety of propagation methods One was to exploit vulnerabilities left behind by Code Red II
Avoiding Overflow Vulnerability
Use Library Routines that Limit String Lengths fgets instead of gets strncpy instead of strcpy Don’t use scanf with %s conversion specification
Use fgets to read the string
/* Echo Line */void echo(){ char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */ fgets(buf, 4, stdin); puts(buf);}
Final Observations
Memory Layout OS/machine dependent (including kernel version) Basic partitioning: stack/data/text/heap/DLL found in most
machines Type Declarations in C
Notation obscure, but very systematic Working with Strange Code
Important to analyze nonstandard cases E.g., what happens when stack corrupted due to buffer
overflow Helps to step through with GDB
Machine Programming – x86-64CENG331: Introduction to Computer Systems7th Lecture
Instructor: Erol Sahin
Acknowledgement: Most of the slides are adapted from the ones prepared by R.E. Bryant, D.R. O’Hallaron of Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
%rax
%rbx
%rcx
%rdx
%rsi
%rdi
%rsp
%rbp
x86-64 Integer Registers
Twice the number of registers Accessible as 8, 16, 32, 64 bits
%eax
%ebx
%ecx
%edx
%esi
%edi
%esp
%ebp
%r8
%r9
%r10
%r11
%r12
%r13
%r14
%r15
%r8d
%r9d
%r10d
%r11d
%r12d
%r13d
%r14d
%r15d
%rax
%rbx
%rcx
%rdx
%rsi
%rdi
%rsp
%rbp
x86-64 Integer Registers
%r8
%r9
%r10
%r11
%r12
%r13
%r14
%r15Callee saved Callee saved
Callee saved
Callee saved
C: Callee saved
Callee saved
Callee saved
Stack pointer
Used for linking
Return value
Argument #4
Argument #1
Argument #3
Argument #2
Argument #6
Argument #5
x86-64 Registers Arguments passed to functions via registers
If more than 6 integral parameters, then pass rest on stack These registers can be used as caller-saved as well
All references to stack frame via stack pointer Eliminates need to update %ebp/%rbp
Other Registers 6+1 callee saved 2 or 3 have special uses
x86-64 Long Swap
Operands passed in registers First (xp) in %rdi, second (yp) in %rsi 64-bit pointers
No stack operations required (except ret) Avoiding stack
Can hold all local information in registers
void swap(long *xp, long *yp) { long t0 = *xp; long t1 = *yp; *xp = t1; *yp = t0;}
swap:movq (%rdi), %rdxmovq (%rsi), %raxmovq %rax, (%rdi)movq %rdx, (%rsi)ret
x86-64 Locals in the Red Zone
Avoiding Stack Pointer Change Can hold all information within small
window beyond stack pointer
/* Swap, using local array */void swap_a(long *xp, long *yp) { volatile long loc[2]; loc[0] = *xp; loc[1] = *yp; *xp = loc[1]; *yp = loc[0];}
swap_a: movq (%rdi), %rax movq %rax, -24(%rsp) movq (%rsi), %rax movq %rax, -16(%rsp) movq -16(%rsp), %rax movq %rax, (%rdi) movq -24(%rsp), %rax movq %rax, (%rsi) ret
rtn Ptr
unused
%rsp
−8loc[1]loc[0]
−16
−24Volatile tells the compiler that the value of the variable may change at any time--without any action being taken by the code the compiler finds nearby. Useful when working with I/O devices and interrupts.
x86-64 NonLeaf without Stack Frame No values held while swap
being invoked
No callee save registers needed
long scount = 0;
/* Swap a[i] & a[i+1] */void swap_ele_se (long a[], int i){ swap(&a[i], &a[i+1]); scount++;}
swap_ele_se: movslq %esi,%rsi # Sign extend i leaq (%rdi,%rsi,8), %rdi # &a[i] leaq 8(%rdi), %rsi # &a[i+1] call swap # swap() incq scount(%rip) # scount++; ret
x86-64 Call using Jump
long scount = 0;
/* Swap a[i] & a[i+1] */void swap_ele(long a[], int i){ swap(&a[i], &a[i+1]);}
swap_ele: movslq %esi,%rsi # Sign extend i leaq (%rdi,%rsi,8), %rdi # &a[i] leaq 8(%rdi), %rsi # &a[i+1] jmp swap # swap()
Will disappearBlackboard?
x86-64 Call using Jump When swap executes ret,
it will return from swap_ele
Possible since swap is a “tail call”(no instructions afterwards)
long scount = 0;
/* Swap a[i] & a[i+1] */void swap_ele(long a[], int i){ swap(&a[i], &a[i+1]);}
swap_ele: movslq %esi,%rsi # Sign extend i leaq (%rdi,%rsi,8), %rdi # &a[i] leaq 8(%rdi), %rsi # &a[i+1] jmp swap # swap()
x86-64 Stack Frame Example
Keeps values of a and i in callee save registers
Must set up stack frame to save these registers
long sum = 0;/* Swap a[i] & a[i+1] */void swap_ele_su (long a[], int i){ swap(&a[i], &a[i+1]); sum += a[i];}
swap_ele_su: movq %rbx, -16(%rsp) movslq %esi,%rbx movq %r12, -8(%rsp) movq %rdi, %r12 leaq (%rdi,%rbx,8), %rdi subq $16, %rsp leaq 8(%rdi), %rsi call swap movq (%r12,%rbx,8), %rax addq %rax, sum(%rip) movq (%rsp), %rbx movq 8(%rsp), %r12 addq $16, %rsp ret
Understanding x86-64 Stack Frameswap_ele_su: movq %rbx, -16(%rsp) # Save %rbx movslq %esi,%rbx # Extend & save i movq %r12, -8(%rsp) # Save %r12 movq %rdi, %r12 # Save a leaq (%rdi,%rbx,8), %rdi # &a[i] subq $16, %rsp # Allocate stack frame leaq 8(%rdi), %rsi # &a[i+1] call swap # swap() movq (%r12,%rbx,8), %rax # a[i] addq %rax, sum(%rip) # sum += a[i] movq (%rsp), %rbx # Restore %rbx movq 8(%rsp), %r12 # Restore %r12 addq $16, %rsp # Deallocate stack frame ret
Understanding x86-64 Stack Frameswap_ele_su: movq %rbx, -16(%rsp) # Save %rbx movslq %esi,%rbx # Extend & save i movq %r12, -8(%rsp) # Save %r12 movq %rdi, %r12 # Save a leaq (%rdi,%rbx,8), %rdi # &a[i] subq $16, %rsp # Allocate stack frame leaq 8(%rdi), %rsi # &a[i+1] call swap # swap() movq (%r12,%rbx,8), %rax # a[i] addq %rax, sum(%rip) # sum += a[i] movq (%rsp), %rbx # Restore %rbx movq 8(%rsp), %r12 # Restore %r12 addq $16, %rsp # Deallocate stack frame ret
rtn addr%r12
%rsp−8
%rbx−16
rtn addr%r12
%rsp+8
%rbx
Interesting Features of Stack Frame Allocate entire frame at once
All stack accesses can be relative to %rsp Do by decrementing stack pointer Can delay allocation, since safe to temporarily use red zone
Simple deallocation Increment stack pointer No base/frame pointer needed
x86-64 Procedure Summary Heavy use of registers
Parameter passing More temporaries since more registers
Minimal use of stack Sometimes none Allocate/deallocate entire block
Many tricky optimizations What kind of stack frame to use Calling with jump Various allocation techniques
IA32 Floating Point (x87) History
8086: first computer to implement IEEE FP separate 8087 FPU (floating point unit)
486: merged FPU and Integer Unit onto one chip Becoming obsolete with x86-64
Summary Hardware to add, multiply, and divide Floating point data registers Various control & status registers
Floating Point Formats single precision (C float): 32 bits double precision (C double): 64 bits extended precision (C long double): 80 bits
Instructiondecoder andsequencer
FPUIntegerUnit
Memory
FPU Data Register Stack (x87) FPU register format (80 bit extended precision)
FPU registers 8 registers %st(0) - %st(7) Logically form stack Top: %st(0) Bottom disappears (drops out) after too many pushs
s exp frac063647879
“Top” %st(0)%st(1)%st(2)%st(3)
Instruction Effect Description
fldz push 0.0 Load zeroflds Addr push Mem[Addr] Load single precision realfmuls Addr %st(0) %st(0)*M[Addr] Multiplyfaddp %st(1) %st(0)+%st(1);pop Add and pop
FPU instructions (x87) Large number of floating point instructions and formats
~50 basic instruction types load, store, add, multiply sin, cos, tan, arctan, and log
Often slower than math lib
Sample instructions:
FP Code Example (x87) Compute inner product of two
vectors Single precision arithmetic Common computation
float ipf (float x[], float y[], int n){ int i; float result = 0.0; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) result += x[i]*y[i]; return result;}
pushl %ebp # setup movl %esp,%ebp pushl %ebx movl 8(%ebp),%ebx # %ebx=&x movl 12(%ebp),%ecx # %ecx=&y movl 16(%ebp),%edx # %edx=n fldz # push +0.0 xorl %eax,%eax # i=0 cmpl %edx,%eax # if i>=n done jge .L3 .L5: flds (%ebx,%eax,4) # push x[i] fmuls (%ecx,%eax,4) # st(0)*=y[i] faddp # st(1)+=st(0); pop incl %eax # i++ cmpl %edx,%eax # if i<n repeat jl .L5 .L3: movl -4(%ebp),%ebx # finish movl %ebp, %esp popl %ebp ret # st(0) = result
Inner Product Stack Trace
1. fldz
0.0 %st(0)
2. flds (%ebx,%eax,4) 0.0 %st(1)
x[0] %st(0)
3. fmuls (%ecx,%eax,4)
0.0 %st(1)x[0]*y[0] %st(0)
4. faddp 0.0+x[0]*y[0] %st(0)
5. flds (%ebx,%eax,4) x[0]*y[0] %st(1)
x[1] %st(0)
6. fmuls (%ecx,%eax,4)
x[0]*y[0] %st(1)x[1]*y[1] %st(0)
7. faddp %st(0)x[0]*y[0]+x[1]*y[1]
Initialization
Iteration 0 Iteration 1
eax = i ebx = *x ecx = *y
Vector Instructions: SSE Family SSE : Streaming SIMD Extensions SIMD (single-instruction, multiple data) vector
instructions New data types, registers, operations Parallel operation on small (length 2-8) vectors of integers or floats Example:
Floating point vector instructions Available with Intel’s SSE (streaming SIMD extensions) family SSE starting with Pentium III: 4-way single precision SSE2 starting with Pentium 4: 2-way double precision All x86-64 have SSE3 (superset of SSE2, SSE)
+ x “4-way”
Intel Architectures (Focus Floating Point)
x86-64 / em64t
x86-32
x86-16
MMX
SSE
SSE2
SSE3
SSE4
8086
286386486PentiumPentium MMX
Pentium III
Pentium 4
Pentium 4E
Pentium 4F
Core 2 Duo
time
ArchitecturesProcessors Features
4-way single precision fp
2-way double precision fp
Our focus: SSE3 used for scalar (non-vector)floating point
SSE3 Registers All caller saved %xmm0 for floating point return value
%xmm0
%xmm1
%xmm2
%xmm3
%xmm4
%xmm5
%xmm6
%xmm7
%xmm8
%xmm9
%xmm10
%xmm11
%xmm12
%xmm13
%xmm14
%xmm15
Argument #1
Argument #2
Argument #3
Argument #4
Argument #5
Argument #6
Argument #7
Argument #8
128 bit = 2 doubles = 4 singles
SSE3 Registers Different data types and associated instructions Integer vectors:
16-way byte 8-way 2 bytes 4-way 4 bytes
Floating point vectors: 4-way single 2-way double
Floating point scalars: single double
128 bit LSB
SSE3 Instructions: Examples Single precision 4-way vector add: addps %xmm0 %xmm1
Single precision scalar add: addss %xmm0 %xmm1
+
%xmm0
%xmm1
+
%xmm0
%xmm1
SSE3 Instruction Names
addps addss
addpd addsd
packed (vector) single slot (scalar)
single precision
double precision this course
SSE3 Basic Instructions Moves
Usual operand form: reg → reg, reg → mem, mem → reg
Arithmetic Single Double Effect
addss addsd D ← D + S
subss subsd D ← D – S
mulss mulsd D ← D x S
divss divsd D ← D / S
maxss maxsd D ← max(D,S)
minss minsd D ← min(D,S)
sqrtss sqrtsd D ← sqrt(S)
Single Double Effect
movss movsd D ← S
x86-64 FP Code Example Compute inner product of
two vectors Single precision arithmetic Uses SSE3 instructions
float ipf (float x[], float y[], int n) { int i; float result = 0.0; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) result += x[i]*y[i]; return result;}
ipf:xorps %xmm1, %xmm1 # result = 0.0xorl %ecx, %ecx # i = 0jmp .L8 # goto middle
.L10: # loop:movslq %ecx,%rax # icpy = iincl %ecx # i++movss (%rsi,%rax,4), %xmm0 # t = y[icpy]mulss (%rdi,%rax,4), %xmm0 # t *= x[icpy]addss %xmm0, %xmm1 # result += t
.L8: # middle:cmpl %edx, %ecx # i:njl .L10 # if < goto loopmovaps %xmm1, %xmm0 # return resultret
SSE3 Conversion Instructions Conversions
Same operand forms as moves
Instruction Description
cvtss2sd single → double
cvtsd2ss double → single
cvtsi2ss int → single
cvtsi2sd int → double
cvtsi2ssq quad int → single
cvtsi2sdq quad int → double
cvttss2si single → int (truncation)
cvttsd2si double → int (truncation)
cvttss2siq single → quad int (truncation)
cvttss2siq double → quad int (truncation)
x86-64 FP Code Exampledouble funct(double a, float x, double b, int i){ return a*x - b/i;}
a %xmm0 doublex %xmm1 floatb %xmm2 doublei %edi int
funct:cvtss2sd %xmm1, %xmm1 # %xmm1 = (double) xmulsd %xmm0, %xmm1 # %xmm1 = a*xcvtsi2sd %edi, %xmm0 # %xmm0 = (double) idivsd %xmm0, %xmm2 # %xmm2 = b/imovsd %xmm1, %xmm0 # %xmm0 = a*xsubsd %xmm2, %xmm0 # return a*x - b/i
ret
Constantsdouble cel2fahr(double temp){ return 1.8 * temp + 32.0;}
# Constant declarations.LC2: .long 3435973837 # Low order four bytes of 1.8 .long 1073532108 # High order four bytes of 1.8.LC4: .long 0 # Low order four bytes of 32.0 .long 1077936128 # High order four bytes of 32.0
# Codecel2fahr: mulsd .LC2(%rip), %xmm0 # Multiply by 1.8 addsd .LC4(%rip), %xmm0 # Add 32.0 ret
Here: Constants in decimal format
compiler decision hex more readable
Checking Constant Previous slide: Claim.LC4: .long 0 # Low order four bytes of 32.0 .long 1077936128 # High order four bytes of 32.0
Convert to hex format:.LC4: .long 0x0 # Low order four bytes of 32.0 .long 0x40400000 # High order four bytes of 32.0
Convert to double (blackboard?): Remember: e = 11 exponent bits, bias = 2e-1-1 = 1023
Comments SSE3 floating point
Uses lower ½ (double) or ¼ (single) of vector Finally departure from awkward x87 Assembly very similar to integer code
x87 still supported Even mixing with SSE3 possible Not recommended
For highest floating point performance Vectorization a must (but not in this course) See next slide
Vector Instructions Starting with version 4.1.1, gcc can autovectorize to some
extent -O3 or –ftree-vectorize No speed-up guaranteed Very limited icc as of now much better Fish machines: gcc 3.4
For highest performance vectorize yourself using intrinsics Intrinsics = C interface to vector instructions Learn in 18-645
Future Intel AVX announced: 4-way double, 8-way single