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Institutions and innovations in the implementation process of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in IndiaD. Narasimha ReddyC. UpendranadhRukmini TankhaAlakh N. Sharma

CSP Research Report 09January 2011IDS_Master Logo

ResearchReport09__FINAL.indd 1 23/01/2011 21:20

CSP RESEARCH REPORT 09 | REDDY ET AL.

This Research Report was written by D. Narasimha Reddy, C. Upendranadh, Rukmini Tankha and Alakh N. Sharma (Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India)

Please see the two-page Research Report Summary for a quick overview, available on the CSP website www.ids.ac.uk/go/centreforsocialprotection

Acknowledgements

This CSP Research Report series presents findings from 11 research projects conducted over the last two years, 2008–2010, for the Social Protection in Asia (SPA) policy-research and network-building programme, funded by the Ford Foundation and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The programme was managed by the Centre for Social Protection (CSP) at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Sussex, UK, and the Institute for Human Development (IHD), New Delhi, India, with projects and partners in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

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Abstract

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The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) enshrines the legal right of one hundred days of paid employment to any household, on demand. Though its scope is national, there have been wide inter-state variations in the achievement of the objectives of the Act. Based on a study of three states, this report identifies the institutional arrangements and political and administrative initiatives that have made a difference to states’ implementation of MGNREGA. Several factors are identified as accounting for differential performance. These include: institutionalisation of certain processes reflecting accountability; capacity building of implementing agencies; willingness to adopt facilitating technological innovations; creation of new institutions to meet the challenge of transparency; enlistment and participation of civil society organisations; and the promotion of awareness and organisation among the wage seekers.The report also looks at the impact of differential performance between states on the participating households in the three states. The findings may help in improving the implementation of the scheme in areas that are lagging behind.

KeywordsEmployment Guarantee, Piece rate wages, Schedule of Rates, Social Audit, Transparency, Accountability, Resource Conservation Works, Institutions, Innovations, Awareness, Civil Society



1 Introduction

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1 By an amendment to Schedule I and II of the National Employment Guarantee Act, in March 2007, the name of the programme was changed to National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (Gazette of India No. 231, dated 6 March 2007). By a further amendment on 7 January 2010, the name of the Act and Scheme was renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and Scheme respectively. NREG, NREGA, NREGS, MGNREGA and MGNREGS are used interchangeably in this paper.

1.1 The contextProvision of adequate remunerative employment has been a long-cherished goal of India’s strategy of development planning. However, for a long time the country experimented with ad hoc wage and self-employment programmes without any emphasis on the guaranteed work provision. With the economic reforms introduced since 1991, this problem has been exacerbated – largely because of the growth of joblessness. High economic growth was accompanied by very little growth in employment along with a growing tendency for formal employment to become informal employment.

The right to employment emerged as an important political issue and ‘right to work’ became part of the Common Minimum Programme pledge made by a group of political parties known as the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which came to power in 2004. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in 2005 (see Appendix 1 for salient features) came into being.

1.2 The NREGS: rights and entitlementsThe Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme1 was designed to provide for enhanced livelihood security for households in rural areas by providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment in every financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. As a legal right to work, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) contrasts with previous employment-generation schemes in several aspects. First and foremost, it bestows entitlement to work, in the form of providing work, for those who demand it, within 15 days of applying at a guaranteed wage. Second, the universal nature of the programme eliminates targeting errors. Self-selection is intended to ensure that only the most needy come forth and claim employment. Third, the creation of employment through specified works (see Appendix 1 for specified types of works) is expected to improve land and water resources in rural areas and improve agricultural productivity and rural connectivity.

There are very high expectations for outcomes from the Act in terms of protecting rural households from poverty and hunger, reducing rural–urban migration, increasing employment opportunities for rural women, creating useful assets in rural areas, changing power relations in rural areas, and activating and empowering panchayati raj institutions (local self-government system operating at district, block and village levels) (Dreze 2004). To what extent all of these are likely to be realised, and what

processes would enable realisation, are important considerations in analysing implementation of the Act in the initial years.

NREGS as social protectionThe NREG Act in itself heralds a paradigm shift in social protection debates. By formulating and enacting the right to work, there has been, in theory, a shift in the positioning of workers as ‘entitlement holders’ rather than as passive beneficiaries of welfare programmes. The right to work ensures employment security through provision of a certain minimum days of work at an assured minimum wage, thus enabling underemployed or unemployed workers an opportunity to earn minimum supplementary income to overcome deprivation and distress migration. This guarantee of work is particularly valuable against the backdrop of a burgeoning informal economy in India with few workplace guarantees and benefits of social security.

1.3 Present studyThe present study is an exploratory initiative towards evolving an appropriate institutional framework for effective implementation of the NREGS. The main objectives of the present study are to:

•• examine, from a comparative perspective, implementation processes at pre-work stage, at actual worksites and at post-work stages

•• analyse differences in outcomes in terms of employment, wages and impact on the livelihoods in selected states

•• analyse and identify the role of institutions and innovative initiatives that account for differential performance across the selected states with a view to suggesting an appropriate institutional framework for implementation of the NREGS.

1.4 MethodologyThree major states of India were chosen for this study. The choice was based on the main hypotheses that is sought to be examined, ie that existing institutions and governance initiatives at various levels make a difference to the implementation of a programme like the NREGS. Accordingly, the chosen states – Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar – represent three different institutional situations.

Rajasthan has been at the helm of social mobilisation efforts, particularly with the presence of civil society agencies such unions of agricultural labourers (eg, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan). The presence of these



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agencies is expected to create greater awareness about citizens’ rights under NREGS and to compel institutional preparedness on the part of implementing agencies. The state has experience of implementing public works programmes as part of earlier efforts towards drought relief. In Andhra Pradesh, panchayats (elected village councils) are weak but grassroots mobilisation through agencies like self-help groups (SHGs), political and administrative commitment, innovative use of IT (for monitoring) and the creation of transparent mechanisms (social audit) are seen as critical factors in implementing NREG. In contrast, Bihar is known neither for effective panchayat raj institutions nor political and administrative commitment.

Analysis of NREGS implementation in these states shows the difference that institutions can make. From each of these three states, two districts were selected, on the basis of the highest days of household employment provided and job cards issued to Scheduled Caste households. From each of these districts, two blocks were selected, one with highest number of days of employment per household and the other with medium level of employment. From each of these blocks, eight gram panchayats with varying levels of performance in terms of employment per household were selected. From each of the gram panchayats, 15 households with workers participating in NREGS were selected. In all, a total sample of 1,443 households (480 in Andhra Pradesh, 482 in Bihar and 481 in Rajasthan) were surveyed. In addition to the household survey, schedules were used to gather detailed information on each gram panchayat and on two worksites in each of these villages. Focus group discussions were held with job cardholders in each panchayat. Discussions were also held with NREGS officials at village, block and district levels. The survey was conducted in two rounds, the first in June/July 2009 and the second in June/July 2010.

This paper is divided into five sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 presents the basic findings, from a comparative perspective, on the implementation processes and the impact of NREGS in the three selected states. Section 3 is an analysis of the roles of institutions and innovative initiatives that explain the differences in performance of the NREGS across the three selected states. Section 4 brings out the policy implications of the analysis and, based on identified best practice, suggests measures for the creation of an appropriate institutional framework for the effective implementation of the NREGS. The last section presents a summary and conclusions arising from the study.



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One of the reasons for conducting two rounds of the household survey was that the NREGS is a relatively new scheme and is expected to show year-on-year progress in the early years. However, Table 1 shows startling results, especially for Bihar. While in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, 32 and 17 households respectively withdrew from NREGS, in Bihar, as many as 331 households out of 482 of the first round were found to be not participating in the programme at the time of the second survey.

The households visited reported that since the time of the first survey in 2009 they had not received any NREGS work . The overwhelming sentiment was that NREGS works were not started owing to shortages or delays in release of funds, either from central government or because of non-clearance of fund utilisation certificates showing financial audits on completion of NREGS works. This had significantly affected the number of new works undertaken and, in turn, the number of participating households. Thus, the main deterrent for workers was the lack of work on a continuous basis. They could ill afford to wait for long gaps between few days of work, triggering them to seek longer periods of work through migration.

Table 1 NREG participation of households in 2008/09 and 2009-10

Participating households

1st round (2008/09)

2nd round (2009/10)

No. of households not participating in

the 2nd round

Andhra Pradesh 480 448 32

Bihar 482 151 331

Rajasthan 481 464 17

Source: Two rounds of household survey pertaining to NREGS participating households. The first round survey was conducted in 2009 and pertains to household information for the period 2008/09; the second round survey was conducted in 2010 and pertains to household information for the period 2009/10.

2.1 CoverageAn analysis of the characteristics of households participating in NREGS works (Table 2) shows that socially and economically poorer sections have accessed the programme in larger numbers. Scheduled Caste (SC) households have the highest share in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, while in Rajasthan their share is close to that of the Other Backward Castes. In all three states, the percentage of SC households in NREGS is much higher than their proportion of total rural households. The same holds for the Scheduled Tribe (ST) households. In terms of landholding status, most participants are either landless or small or marginal farmers. In Bihar, landless households

outnumber all others, while in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan the proportion of small or marginal farmers is much higher. However, in Bihar, as secondary data suggests, overall coverage is very low, with only 4.1 million households getting work, out of 12.4 million job cardholders (www.nrega.nic.in).

Table 2 Participation of households, by socio-economic group (%)

Socio-economic groups of participating households

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Social group

Scheduled Castes (SCs)

44.6 69.3 32.6

Scheduled Tribes (STs) 5.2 7.3 22.7

Other Backward Castes (OBCs)

35.0 23.4 34.9

Others 15.2 0.0 9.8

Religion

Hindu 91.3 90.5 98.5

Muslim 7.9 9.5 1.5

Christian 0.8 0.0 0.0

Poverty groups

Above poverty line 2.7 11.0 48.6

Below poverty line (BPL)

89.2 40.0 35.1

Antyodaya (very poor) 6.7 36.3 11.0

Annapoorna (destitute/old age)

0.4 0.6 1.0

Others 1.0 12.0 4.2

Land category*

Landless 22.3 79.9 19.8

Marginal 48.1 19.7 67.2

Small 24.2 0.4 9.1

Medium 5.0 0.0 2.9

Large 0.4 0.0 1.0

Source: Household survey

Note: * Landless = 0 acre, Marginal = up to 2.5 acres, Small = 2.5 to 5 acres, Medium = 5 to 10 acres and Large = 10 acres or more.

2.2 Awareness of NREGSBecause the NREGS is demand-driven, awareness of the programme is an important prerequisite for its effective implementation. Workers can only assert their right to entitlements under NREGS if they are informed of the scheme. Because of the wide prevalence of illiteracy among rural households, information about the rights enshrined in the NREGA needs to be disseminated by institutions such as panchayats, civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, self-help groups (SHGs) and NREGS staff.

There are wide variations across the states in workers’ awareness of the basic entitlements under NREGA. Some

2 Findings: implementation processes and impact



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may be aware of some provisions but not aware of others. Table 3 shows that almost all workers in Andhra Pradesh knew the basic provisions of the scheme – such as the 100 days of employment, minimum wages, equal wages for men and women – and about three-quarters knew they should receive wages within 15 days. In Rajasthan, most workers knew of the 100 days’ work and equal wage provisions, but lacked awareness of minimum wages and wage payment within 15 days. In Bihar, the majority of workers lacked awareness of all the provisions. Knowledge of the unemployment allowance was seen to be dismal in all the states.

Table 3 Households being aware of the following rights, entitlements and provisions related to MGNREGS (%)

Basic entitlements Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Up to 100 days’ employment 94.4 48.4 94.2

Minimum wages for MGNREGS 94.6 21.2 57.7

Equal wages for men and women

97.8 34.1 75.2

Wage payment within 15 days 75.2 21.7 51.7

Unemployment allowance in case employment not provided within 15 days of demand

5.9 6.8 19.0

One-third of jobseekers must be women

36.3 4.2 11.0

Travel allowance for work 27.6 2.2 30.6

Free treatment in case of accident

82.2 3.1 55.0

Compensation for disability and death

81.7 3.1 45.8


Table 4 shows a similar pattern of awareness about worksite facilities that are required, such as drinking water and first aid. Many workers in Rajasthan knew that shade must be provided, perhaps based on need because of the extremely hot weather there. Similarly, a relatively higher proportion of women at Rajasthan worksites may account for better awareness of the crèche requirement. Also, fieldwork revealed that NGOs in Rajasthan play a significant role in raising awareness of NREGA. In Andhra Pradesh, a similar significant role was played by SHGs. In Bihar, there were a few instances of NGOs, SHGs and workers from the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) trying to raise awareness of NREGA, but overall there was no significant awareness-raising activity as in the other two states.

Table 4 Awareness of provisions relating to MGNREGS worksite facilities (%)

Worksite facilities

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Crèche 51.1 4.4 57.3

Shade 46.3 11.2 93.3

Water 96.1 30.9 96.7

First aid 86.7 17.5 77.5


2.3 Access to job cardsAlmost all respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan had job cards, while in Bihar this was the case for only 88 per cent of households (Table 5). Furthermore, almost half of the sample workers in Bihar said they had to pay a bribe to get their job card and photograph; the average amount paid in such transactions was about Rs51 for the job card and Rs27 for the photograph. This happened for only a few workers in Rajasthan and was negligible in Andhra Pradesh. Civil servants’ commitment in Andhra Pradesh and NGO vigilance in Rajasthan are factors that have made a difference, even in the initial process of implementation. But in Bihar there was no such commitment was discernible. On the whole, across the three states, the dominant way in which people demanded work was through making individual, informal requests. There were instances in Andhra Pradesh where collective requests were made by a group of workers, and some workers in Bihar submitted individual, written applications, which in turn were mostly filled out with the help of local NREGS officials.

Table 5 Acquisition of job cards (%)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Households with job cards 99.6 88.6 100.0

Paid for job cards/photographs

1.1 50.1 19.1


2.4 Transparency in muster rollsThe NREG Act requires that muster rolls are kept at all active worksites to record workers’ attendance, the work done and the wages due to all workers present. Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan showed an encouraging picture with respect to the availability of these rolls at worksites. However, in Bihar muster rolls were available only at a little over one-third of the visited worksites and it was claimed that the rolls were available from the panchayat or NREG officials (Table 6).



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Table 6 Transparency in maintenance of muster roll (%)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Muster roll at worksite 97.4 36.7 85.5

Muster roll not at worksite 2.6 63.3 14.5

Available from panchayat or NREG officials

0.0 45.37 14.5

Not available at all 0.0 18.2 0.0

Source: Worksite survey

It was observed that maximum attention was given in Rajasthan to worksite formalities relating to attendance. Table 7 reveals that in Rajasthan, and to a large extent in Andhra Pradesh, workers registered their attendance twice a day on the muster roll in the initial period, although this is slowly changing to once a day. In Bihar, attendance was registered only once a day in an informal notebook maintained by the local NREGS official. In Bihar, and even in Rajasthan to a large extent, workers gave only oral role call, instead of marking their attendance with a signature or thumbprint. The worst record keeping for attendance was observed in Bihar.

However, existence of the record itself may not be proof of transparency and integrity. For instance in Rajasthan, in spite of better record maintenance compared to Bihar, persistent malpractices were found in certain areas in the form of false entries on the muster rolls, which enabled NREGS money to be siphoned off as wages against the

names of people who were not participating in the scheme (e.g. persons who were dead/had migrated/were attending school, etc). In Bihar, instances were found where excess workdays were recorded, with the corresponding wages being appropriated by NREG officials. There were also complaints by the workers about inaccurate records of days worked. There were relatively less such instances of misappropriation in Andhra Pradesh.

2.5 Decent work and worksite facilitiesNREGS worksite facilities are thought of as part of the provision of decent work. While awareness of these facilities enables workers to demand them, actual provision depends on the administration. The provision or lack of worksite facilities varied with the type of facility. Drinking water and first aid were available to a large extent in Andhra Pradesh, and to a lesser extent in Bihar and Rajasthan. These two facilities improved substantially in the one year between the two surveys. There was less provision of shade at worksites. In Andhra Pradesh, the sheets supplied for shade were often kept by the village assistant, for the stated reason that there were no proper support frames for erecting them near worksites. In Rajasthan, the village assistants in some areas explained that too much wind caused the sheets to fly off or break. The poor record in providing crèches was partly explained by the fact that worksites only need provide a crèche if five or more women with children below the age

Table 7 Attendance at worksite (%)

Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan

A. Attendance frequency

Twice daily 61.7 19.9 72.4

Once daily 38.1 74.5 27.0

Weekly 0.2 1.0 0.6

Never 0.0 4.6 0.0

B. Record of attendance

Muster roll 95.0 4.2 98.5

Informal notebook 5.0 85.3 1.5

Other 0.0 5.9 0.0

Attendance not recorded 0.0 4.6 0.0

C. Nature of attendance taking

With thumb/signature 99.2 33.2 33.5

Oral roll call 0.8 66.0 66.5

D. Record of work

Accurate records of days worked 96.7 33.2 96.3

Inaccurate record of days worked 3.3 66.8 3.7




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of six are working there. The data in Table 8 is confined to sample worksites where the requisite number of children were not there. Discussions with workers revealed that provision of crèches was rare.

Table 8 Availability of worksite facilities (%)


Drinking water 96.3 87.1 91.3

First aid 64.8 35.5 34.8

Shade 13.2 3.2 17.4

Crèche 0 0 4.4


Workers’ wellbeing and safetyIn all three states, workers received an hour’s break for lunch in between their working hours. In Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, there was a state-sanctioned weekly day off – for instance, in Rajasthan all NREGS worksites were closed on Thursdays. NREGS requires the provision of tools and instruments for work, but in many instances, especially in Bihar, workers had to bring their own tools, which prevented many from participating in work. In Andhra Pradesh, workers were given tools but not in adequate numbers. Non-supply of tools was compensated for by adding an additional allowance of Rs2 per person day of work. There was also dissatisfaction expressed at certain worksites that the tools given were not the right ones. Regardless of local conditions and the nature of work, tools were procured at district level and distributed across panchayats.

There were some reported instances of injury to workers at worksites in all three states; free medical aid was provided. The Act provides that if any worker is permanently disabled or dies at the worksite, his/her relatives may receive an ex-gratia payment of Rs25,000. However, this amount was not received by the worker’s family in one such case that came to light in Rajasthan.

Nature and duration of workWorkers described work under the scheme variously as ‘very difficult’ or ‘moderately difficult’. Furthermore, average daily hours worked were the longest in Bihar (eight hours), whereas in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan the daily average was six. It was observed during fieldwork that in both Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan government notifications had been issued for reduced hours of work during the hot summer months. In Rajasthan, as per state notification, in the month of June, when fieldwork was carried out, NREGS work was

officially meant to be carried on between 6am and 10am so that workers would avoid the worst of the heat. There were similar changes in the work schedule in Andhra Pradesh, where there was only one long session before noon.

2.6 Selection of works and participationApparently, the selection of NREGS works is mostly decided in the gram sabha, where all ward members, rozgar sevak and Programme Officer, mukhiya and other members are present (Table 9). However, sometimes the decision ultimately remains the preserve of higher authorities. This is evidenced in the admission by about one-quarter of the key respondents in the villages surveyed, who claimed that decisions on selection of works was taken by influential people in the village.

Table 9 Participation in selection process of NREGS works (%)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Gram sabha 78.1 75.0 71.9

By officials 0.0 0.0 3.1

By mukhiya/influential people in the village

21.9 25.0 25.0

Source: Village survey

Thus, although NREGS works are supposed to create assets suited to local development needs, it was found that works suggested by local officials, who are attuned to villagers’ needs, were often superseded by the whims of higher-level officials. This, in fact, violates the essential spirit of the programme, which envisages that the gram sabha will be instrumental in determining the types of works, with higher authorities being in a position only to exercise minor checks rather than having the power to accept or reject works, as is being currently reported.

Examples in Bihar confirm the lopsided process involved in the selection of NREGS works. There were instances where gram sabha meetings arranged to select works were conducted informally at the mukhiya’s home. There were also instances where the mukhiya did not heed the demands of workers, who therefore lost interest in attending such meetings. The works chosen reportedly benefited only a few influential people, and created frustration and anger among others, sometimes resulting in physical assaults in meetings or after meetings.



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In Rajasthan, too, respondents agreed that sometimes works are not selected by consensus. For instance, in Udaipur District, even though NGOs are allowed to be involved in planning NREGS works, it was found that higher officials were using their personal discretion to prevent this. For instance, the Society for Promotion of Wasteland Development (SPWD), an NGO in Udaipur undertook consultations with community households at the ward level to gauge individual needs and to map labour availability for NREGS. Based on the community’s suggestions, SPWD had drawn up a wish list of works that were needed and compiled them into a micro-plan for NREGS, which they presented to local leaders. However, there were occasions when their plans were rejected because of the discretionary powers of higher officials and replaced with random, arbitrary and ad hoc works ‘from above’.

2.7 Prioritising and location of works as contested domainDisputes at the time works are selected have been observed, especially in Bihar, where about 87 per cent of respondents conceded that these occurred either ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’ (Table 10). In fact, sharing the benefits of assets created under NREG was an issue of contention. For example, in Purnia District, Bihar, a tussle was reported between villagers and dominant castes about the location of a canal project in a harijan toli (Scheduled Caste neighbourhood), on whether this was a favourable location for the work and what the geographical extent would be of benefits from the project.

Table 10 Contention over prioritising works (%)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Yes, always 13.8 41.7 4.6

Yes, sometimes 27.6 45.8 81.8

Rarely 6.9 8.3 13.6

Never 51.7 4.2 0


Other observable disputes occurred in both Bihar and Rajasthan where work stopped because private landowners were unwilling to give mitti (earth) from their land for mitti bharna (laying the foundations) of a community road to be constructed under the scheme. Such disputes often caused stalemate in the NREG work process.

2.8 Household employment under NREGSA comparison of household employment days over the two surveys, as presented in Table 11, shows that Andhra Pradesh saw a marked increase in the average number of employment days per household, with employment days increasing from 81 to 140. However, the 140 days of average household employment recorded in 2009/10 in Andhra Pradesh is due to the additional employment provided under special drought relief programmes in some sample villages. This is also one of the reasons for a steep rise (from 20 to 60 per cent) in the proportion of households reporting 100 or more person days of employment. What is noteworthy is that there has been year-on-year improvement in the per household employment generated in Andhra Pradesh, whereas in the other two

Table 11 Employment generated by NREGS

1st survey (2008/09)

States Average employment days per household

% per household employment days

Up to 25 25 to 50 50 to 75 75 to 99 100 and above

Total

Andhra Pradesh 81 3.1 15.4 28.8 33.8 19 100

Bihar 24 63.3 28 7.1 0.8 0.8 100

Rajasthan 76 5.6 13.8 22.1 31.1 27.3 100

2nd survey (2009/10)

States Average employment days per household

% per household employment days

Up to 25 25 to 50 50 to 75 75 to 99 100 and above

Total

Andhra Pradesh 140 2.9 6.7 10.9 18.5 60.9 100

Bihar 23 68.2 22.5 4.6 4.6 0 100

Rajasthan 63 11.6 24.8 29.5 19.6 14.4 100




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states there has been a decline. In Bihar, more than 90 per cent of households continued with 50 person days or less of employment in both rounds of the survey.

The picture in Rajasthan shows some decline in performance in terms of employment days, with average employment days decreasing from 76 to 63. Furthermore, while in the first survey most households employment days were concentrated in the bracket of 75–99 person days of employment, in the second survey, maximum households had completed only 50–75 days.

Across the three states nearly all respondents were unanimous in their demand for more person days of employment under the NREGS. In Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, on average, respondents said they wanted to work under NREGS for approximately 150 days, while in Rajasthan workers demand was for NREGS work spanning roughly 221 days.

2.9 Wage-related issuesTable 12 shows the range of wages realised by workers. It can be seen that in each state, there were no observable differences in the wages received by male and female NREGS workers. Nevertheless, the disparity in wages across states is stark. As per a 2009 central government notification, states must ensure that the minimum daily wage given under NREGS is Rs100. However, Rajasthan stood out among the three states as paying the lowest daily wages (both for men and women), as low as Rs20 in some of the visited worksites. Furthermore, average wages in Rajasthan were only Rs72, much below the mandated Rs100. In Bihar, although minimum wages reported were Rs68, workers received Rs104 or Rs105 on average. In Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, the range of wage levels were on the whole in a higher income bracket, with average wages standing at about Rs102.

Table 12 Range of daily wages realised under NREGS (in Rs)

Range of daily wages


Male Female Male Female Male Female

Max (Rs) 125 125 114 114 100 100

Min (Rs)

80 80 60 68 20 20

Average (Rs)

103 102 104 105 72 72


Note: Data for Bihar pertains to only 151 NREG participating households

Table 13 shows wage distribution in the three states, grouped into five income brackets. In Andhra Pradesh, most workers earned approximately Rs81–100 daily, and a large majority reported earning Rs101–120 daily. In Bihar, most workers earned Rs101–120. In Rajasthan, however, almost one-third of the workers claimed they earned less than Rs60 daily, while another third said they earned Rs61–80 daily.

Table 13 Distribution of workers according to wages received (%)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar* Rajasthan

Minimum wage (in Rs)

100 100 100

Wages per person day

Male Female Male Female Male Female

Less than Rs60

0 0 3.2 0 31.8 30.4

Rs61-80 13 13 6.5 7.1 31.8 34.8

Rs81-100 38.9 40.7 16.1 17.9 36.4 34.8

Rs101-120 38.9 37 74.2 75 0 0

More than Rs120

9.3 9.3 0 0 0 0

Source: Worksite survey 2010

Note: Data for Bihar pertains to only 151 NREG participating households

In Bihar, through qualitative observations it surfaced that labourers were sometimes given only Rs60 a day cash in hand (though the minimum wage for the reference period was Rs89). If a worker dared to ask for more they were threatened with not being called back for NREGS work in the future, thus jeopardising whatever wages they were earning in the first place. In some of instances, although workers received less than minimum wage, on their job cards it incorrectly stated they had received Rs80 for the day’s work, thus allowing for unaccounted money.

Discussions with workers in Rajasthan revealed that extremely low wages appeared to be the norm, due to deficiencies in work measurement at the worksite coupled with lack of coordination among NREGS staff undertaking work measurement (see also Khera 2008). NREGS work in Rajasthan is done in groups, where mostly subgroups of five people are allotted work. However, work output and corresponding wages are not calculated separately for each worker, but instead average wages are given to all workers (entire work output of worksite/ total workers present at worksite). This produces ‘free rider’ problems, where some workers (mostly belonging to the more dominant social groups) merely sit idle and reap wages through other’s



11

labour (see Reddy et al. 2010). It was found that complications arising from work measurement had remained the same, if not worsened, in Rajasthan by the time of the second survey. This had significantly reduced the wages of individual workers in cases where large numbers of workers were present at the worksite, as is the norm.

Long delays in paying wages is another feature of NREGS work in Rajasthan. Although mates are responsible for work measurement, their estimates of the amount of work completed and corresponding wages to be paid need the approval of the Junior Engineer/Junior Technical Assistant before money is released or sanctioned to the post office. This process has frequently resulted in very long delays in wage payment owing to the fact that these officials are unable to oversee the measurement and payment procedures of the many worksites for which they are responsible. Because of this, even though the mate may conduct some rough estimates as to work undertaken and wages to be issued, this payment is stalled unless the go-ahead is given by the higher technical official.

Table 14 Frequency of payment of wages (%)

Frequency of wage payment

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

1st survey

2nd survey

1st survey

2nd survey

1st survey

2nd survey

Within 15 days

69.8 70.8 83.1 58.9 3.5 11.9

Within one month

26.4 20.5 7.9 10.6 21.6 16.6

More than one month

3.8 8.7 4.4 30.5 74.2 71.6

Unclear .0 - 4.6 - .6 -


Table 14 shows that in Rajasthan very few respondents reported wage payment within 15 days, across both rounds of the survey. For instance, less than 4 per cent of respondents said they received wages within 15 days, and this increased to only 12 per cent by the time of the second survey. Even during the second round survey period, it was found that just over 70 per cent of respondents received their wages more than a month after working. In Bihar too, increased instances of delays in wage payment of over a month were reported by respondents in the second survey round, as compared to the first round. In contrast, there was improvement in Andhra Pradesh by way of reduction in the time taken for payment largely due to improved application of technology systems for measuring work completed and

better coordination between officials, banks and post offices (which actually make payments). However, even in Andhra Pradesh there were cases of extreme delay due to mistakes in measurement or recording of days worked.

Mode of wage paymentWages are meant to be paid based on work measurement in all three states, but in Bihar just over half the respondents said they received piece-rate wages, indicating ignorance of the basis of the wage payment process. This is perhaps due to lack of frequent measurement of work, coupled with instances of daily cash payment of wages by the concerned NREGS official, and resulting lack of clarity and ambiguity on this matter by the workers.

Table 15 Mode of payment of wages (%)

Mode of wage payment


1st survey

2nd survey

1st survey

2nd survey

1st survey

2nd survey

Cash .0 2.2 58.2 36.4 .0 .9

Bank/ post office

100.0 97.8 38.0 63.6 92.5 99.1

Others .0 .0 3.8 .0 7.5 .0


Table 15 shows that nearly all respondents were paid NREGS wages through banks and post offices in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. However, field visits in Bihar revealed that workers experienced problems opening post office accounts, involving a lot of delays and running around, with the Postmaster always claiming to be busy – citing reasons such as having to additionally handle responsibilities such as issuing benefits of other social transfer programmes such as widow pension, shelter-related allowances (indira awas yojana), etc. This is illustrated by the fact that we encountered instances where labourers in Bihar did NREGS work but, since they did not have their own account, they received wages through the accounts of others who had job cards. Nevertheless, from the first survey when only 38 per cent workers received wages through bank or post office accounts, encouragingly, it was observed that a further 26 per cent were receiving wages through banks and post offices. Wage payments through banks and post offices with the use of ICT and transaction-based management and information system (MIS) to track the flow of funds in Andhra Pradesh may be considered as a model for instituting timely and accurate wage payment (Reddy et al. 2010).



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2.10 Impact of NREGS

Impact on migrationTable 16 shows that in Andhra Pradesh, where a high number of employment days and relatively regular wage payment has been the mainstay of NREGS implementation, respondents claimed that distress seasonal migration from the village had decreased to a large extent. On the contrary, in Rajasthan, migration had only moderately decreased, while in Bihar the status of migration was reported by most respondents to have remained the same. This is further evidence that in Rajasthan and Bihar, the NREGS work opportunity does not fully satisfy employment demand, either in terms of employment days created or wages earned. In addition, there are instances where men continue to migrate seasonally or for longer periods for work that fetches wages much higher than NREGS wages, while women of such households are drawn into NREGS works, as they earn higher wages than before.

Table 16 Impact of NREGS on migration (%)

Extent of migration Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Decreased to a large extent 83.9 0.0 0.0

Moderately decreased 16.1 25.0 77.4

Remained the same 0.0 71.9 19.4

Moderately increased 0.0 3.1 3.2

Increased to a large extent 0.0 0.0 0.0

Decrease due to NREGA 96.6 100.0 13.0


Impact on local wagesIt is widely observed that, overall, wages have tended to rise due to NREGS. A significant impact is the substantial rise in women’s wages. Table 17 shows that in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, NREGS wages were fairly competitive with wages during the agriculture lean season, more so for women who have traditionally faced a wage gap in the open market. In fact, for women, NREGS wages compared competitively with wages in agriculture in the peak season in both Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, though this was not the case for corresponding men’s wages in the peak agriculture season. Wages in non-agricultural work were far higher than the government-pegged minimum NREGS wages, although in Bihar, for women, NREGS wages were higher even than wages in non-

agriculture. The case of Rajasthan is different because of the large group working, low per capital work measured and resulting low wages well below minimum wage.

Table 17 Impact on wages after NREGS (in Rs)

Wages Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Men Women Men Women Men Women

Actual average daily wages under NREGS (as per survey)

102 102 103 104 72 72

Agriculture wages in peak season

133 92 117 82 106 100

Agriculture wages in lean season

104 69 93 66 95 93

Non-agriculture wages

241 134 117 79 127 108


According to villagers, from 2008/09 to 2009/10, wage rates in general increased in all the three states. In Andhra Pradesh respondents attributed this increase to a significant extent to NREG wages. In Rajasthan and Bihar, NREGS wages were only moderately considered as being responsible for wage increases across the board.

Women’s access and control over wagesWorksite visits revealed that women significantly outnumbered men at NREGS worksites in Rajasthan. This is revealed further in an increase in average employment days worked by women between the first and second survey, from 35 to 53 days.

It was found that almost all women workers under NREGS in Rajasthan and a large majority in Andhra Pradesh collected their wages themselves, whereas in Bihar only about half of the sample respondents reported the same. This can perhaps be linked to method of payment: where wages are paid through bank or post office accounts, women were more likely to collect the wages, but when wages were paid in cash the payment was usually made to the (male) head of household on behalf of the women.

More than 80 per cent of women workers in Rajasthan claimed to retain the wages they earned, indicating choice over use, whereas in Bihar almost half the women respondents claimed to hand over their wages to their husbands. In Andhra Pradesh also more than half the women workers said they gave their wages to either their husband or another household member (Table 18).



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Table 18 Women and access to wages (%)

Collection and utilisation of wages

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

1. Collection

Collects wages herself 80.0 48.5 96.9

Husband collects 19.6 50.4 0.0

Other household member collects 0.4 1.0 3.1

2. Utilisation

Herself 36.3 42.5 82.1

Husband 26.3 49.2 12.3

Other household member 27.5 2.1 2.3

Collectively by family/household 9.8 3.1 2.7

Other 0.2 2.9 0.6


Impact on household income In the second survey of 2009/10, the average household income earned from NREGS was Rs9,329 in Andhra Pradesh, Rs1,256 in Bihar and Rs4,673 in Rajasthan. Across the two rounds of the survey, NREGS income, in terms of its share of total household income, was highest in Andhra Pradesh (15), followed by Rajasthan (12), then Bihar (5) (Table 19). In Bihar, as indicated earlier, although wages were relatively high (approximately Rs104), there is a major lost opportunity in terms of what could be earned under NREGS owing to the low amount of work generated. The extremely intermittent and sporadic employment days generated under the programme in Bihar remain a major barrier to realising a minimum amount of income security, as was particularly demonstrated in the second survey. In Rajasthan, though it has a record of generating a relatively high number of employment days, income earned is sub-optimal owing to the low daily wages received for work (as indicated

earlier daily wages in Rajasthan are approximately Rs72). Andhra Pradesh demonstrates that high employment days along with high daily wages earned can have a significant impact in terms of supplementing household income.

Impact on household expenditureAs a supplementary source of household income, NREGS resulted in increased household expenditure to a significant extent in Andhra Pradesh and a moderate extent in Rajasthan (Table 20). However, almost 40 per cent of workers in Bihar said that NREGS had had little effect on their expenditure levels, in part because of the low number of employment days created.

Table 20 Impact of NREGS on household expenditure (%)

Impact Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Increase in expenditure

Yes, significantly 63.6 6.6 17.5

Yes, moderately 25.9 21.9 53.4

Yes, to some extent 7.4 27.8 15.5

Yes, but very little 1.8 39.1 13.1

No, not at all 1.3 4.6 0.4


Across the states, NREGS earnings were spent on a broad range of items. Table 21 shows that about half was spent on food, while the next highest item of expenditure was other consumer items such as clothes. Significantly, across states, close to 10 per cent of NREGS income was spent on healthcare. In Andhra Pradesh, small amounts of money were spent on children’s education and on festivals and ceremonies.

Table 19 Share of NREGA in the total annual income of the household (%)

State Wage work* Remittances NREGS Other public works

Other sources**

Average total income of hh

Andhra Pradesh 31.7 0.9 15.0 5.2 47.2 62,341

Bihar 61.4 18.9 5.2 1.0 13.6 24,327

Rajasthan 33.2 5.7 12.3 5.4 43.5 38,131

Source: Average of two rounds of survey for the NREGS participating households conducted in 2009 and 2010

* Wage work includes agricultural labour and non-agricultural labour

** Other sources includes agriculture, business, service, etc



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Table 21 NREGS earning spread on different itemsof expenditure (%)

Items of expenditure State

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Food items 45.8 51.2 58.7

Other consumer items (clothes, etc)

14.5 16.3 16.3

Purchase and repair of household articles

4.7 5.9 6.7

Healthcare 10.2 10.8 8.5

Children’s education 8.6 2.0 4.5

Repayment of debt 3.1 3.1 1.7

Festivals/ceremonies 7.9 2.9 1.3

Marriage/funeral 3.2 1.0 0.3

Purchase and repair of land/house

0.4 3.4 0.0

Purchase of livestock 0.0 1.6 0.7

Purchase and repair of productive assets

0.0 0.1 0.8

Other 1.6 1.5 0.6


Table 22 shows that nearly all households in both Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan claimed that the NREG programme was either ‘very important’ or ‘somewhat important’ to them. In Bihar, perhaps due to poor implementation of the scheme, about 44 per cent of respondents said the scheme was ‘unimportant’ to them.

Table 22 Importance of NREGA as perceived by workers (%)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Importance

Very important 53.9 36.3 53.5

Somewhat important 44.3 16.4 45.0

Unimportant 0.9 44.0 1.3

Unclear 0.9 3.3 0.2


Similarly, between the two rounds of the survey, the economic impact of NREGS on households in Bihar declined, with 72 per cent of respondents reporting no change in their economic condition because of the scheme, up from 27 per cent in the first round (Table 23).

Table 23 Impact of NREGA as perceived by workers (%)


1st round

2nd round

1st round

2nd round

1st round

2nd round

A lot of change in economic condition

18.3 9.1 2.7 0.4 15.8 4.6

Some change in economic condition

67.1 79.1 47.7 16.6 69.9 60.2

Hardly any change in economic condition

11 5.9 22.2 7.7 12.9 32.5

No change in economic condition

3.5 5.2 27.4 72.2 1.5 2.5

Can’t tell 0 0.7 0 3.1 0 0.2


NREGS workers perceived that there was dignity in work provided under the government-sponsored programme. Table 24 shows that almost half of the sample respondents in Andhra Pradesh and three-quarters of the respondents in Rajasthan said that NREGS work did impart dignity from a significant to moderate extent. In Bihar, however, about 65 per cent of respondents said they did not feel any dignity associated with NREGS work. This perhaps has to do with the fact that the programme has not taken root to a great extent, so workers do not feel they ‘own’ the scheme, as in the other states.

Table 24 NREGA and dignity of work (%)

Improvement in dignity

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Significantly 29.8 0.7 39.4

Moderately 20.0 13.3 34.8

To some extent 27.6 5.7 11.3

Very little 22.0 14.9 13.5

Not at all 0.7 65.4 1.0


2.11 Village-level impactMost of the respondents in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan reported that NREGS created a ‘lot of’ or ‘satisfactory’ improvement in the village assets (Tables 25 and 26). Moderate improvements in road connectivity and children attending schools were reported in all the states including Bihar. In Bihar, however, characterised by irregular works, punctuated with fund delays and other operational difficulties, only marginal improvement in assets was reported.



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Table 25 Impact on village/community assets (%)

Assets created Andhra Pradesh

Bihar Rajasthan

Lot of improvement 43.8 0.0 6.3

Satisfactory improvement 50.0 15.6 71.9

Marginal improvement 6.3 78.1 15.6

No improvement 0.0 6.3 6.3


Andhra Pradesh, in particular, has seen the benefits of asset creation accruing not only to the landless or to the entire village community (as in Bihar and Rajasthan), but also to landowners. This has to do with the emphasis given to developing the private lands of marginal and small landowners in the poorest communities. On average, approximate income earned from private land development in Andhra Pradesh was reported up to

nearly Rs15,000. In Rajasthan this amount was similarly about Rs14,600. NREGS works of this kind show the potential for increasing the productivity of small land holdings, thereby increasing the income base of these poor households.

In Bihar few such works on the land of the poor were noticed, reflecting the political and administrative conditions that may not easily facilitate interventions in favour of the poor.

Table 26 Changes in the village after the start of NREGA (%)


1. Agricultural production increased




Very little 3.1 15.6 15.6

Not at all 3.1 68.8 18.8

Can’t say 0.0 6.3 0.0

2. Roads/connectivity improved





Not at all 6.3 9.4 3.1

Can’t say 0.0 0.0 0.0

3. Number of children going to school increased





Not at all 0.0 34.4 0.0

Can’t say 0.0 0.0 0.0




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3.1 IntroductionThe basic findings of the study presented in the previous section highlight the considerable variation across the chosen states in the processes and outcomes of the NREGS implementation. This section analyses the roles of institutions and innovative initiatives that explain the differences in performance of the NREGS across these three states.

Planning for worksOutcomes of pre-job processes like request for works, planning for works, participation in gram sabha for planning, and development of a shelf of NREGS works varied across the three states. Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan demonstrated higher levels of performance than Bihar. Reasons for such a situation lie in the institutional capacities that are the prerequisites for grounding a programme of this nature.

Rajasthan has previous experience of managing drought relief programmes, in which food for work is one of the important interventions. Institutional arrangements for such earlier programmes have been of considerable help in implementing NREGS. Similarly, Andhra Pradesh has long experience of implementing poverty reduction programmes, with institution building as its central focus. Such experiences were useful for grounding programmes at district level. Even in the early phase of NREGS, when there were complaints of excess work in handling registration, management of muster rolls, etc both Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh were quick to put in place the system of mates, who undertake certain responsibilities at the worksite such as filling in the job cards, muster rolls, etc and undertaking work measurement; at a later stage, female mates were introduced.

Community preparedness and technical support at field level have been identified as critical areas for effective delivery of the programme. During our fieldwork, it was found that active technical input at planning stage is important for identifying the right projects and for ensuring continuity of job creation. In this respect, the contrasting experiences of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan illustrate that the creation of a shelf of projects is an essential prerequisite for fulfilling the entitlement of employment on demand.

3.2 Institutionalised support for NREGS works Related to the planning and selection of works is actual allocation of works, which translates into employment days. Here too, institutional processes play a critical role,

as the evidence shows. In contrast to the other two states, Andhra Pradesh demonstrates greater capacity to allocate works on a continuous basis. Mechanisms are in place to identify and continuously provide works for those who demand it. Andhra Pradesh designed a system for NREGS officials that would provide incentive allowances for those who created additional days of employment and would create disincentives for those failing to meet certain minimum person days of work. No such processes are in place in Rajasthan or in Bihar, which results in disruptions in work provision, even though there is demand from workers.

In Bihar, it was observed that minimum NREG employment days were not being generated under NREGS. In order to have the number of work days they demand, workers were dependent on the ability of the implementing agency to create employment. Implementing officers in Bihar mentioned that works were not carried out on a sustained basis because of insufficient or delayed fund release and the suspension of earth/ kachcha works in the monsoon season between June and September. In focus group discussions, villagers complained that even though there might have been a few works completed under NREG, the work lasted only for a total of about 15 days. Since the amount and duration of work was so short lived, people were forced to migrate to find work of longer duration. Monsoons, floods, elections and other extraneous reasons were given for not providing continuous work. All these factors, along with the failure to have a ready shelf of works in Bihar, had often served as disincentives for seeking NREGS work and as reasons for seeking work elsewhere.

Conversely, in Rajasthan, employment generation was not as much of a problem, but sharing of work in large groups and low wages caused unanimous dissatisfaction with 100 days of employment, leading to almost all workers demanding 150–200 days of work.

Andhra Pradesh, because of better preparedness with a shelf of works and responsive administration, was able to provide much higher person days of employment.

Role of technical personnelAn important actor in the NREG framework is the Junior Engineer, who is responsible for work measurement, on the basis of which wages are issued. Lapses or delays on the part of Junior Engineers to visit worksites and account for the work undertaken by labourers translates into subsequent delays in the payment of wages. Glaring

3 Analysis of the role of institutions and innovations in NREGS implementation



17

instances of this were seen in Rajasthan, where workers experienced delays in wage payment of over one month, as explained in the previous section. Here, there is a system of mate who undertakes certain responsibilities at the worksite, such as filling in job cards, muster rolls, etc and undertaking work measurement. However, it was found that the mate is often a political appointment and the first link in a chain of misappropriation.

3.3 Institutions involved in wages and payment processesIt is important that states have an institutionalised mechanism for measuring work completed, calculating wages and paying wages, but performance varies considerably in this respect. Andhra Pradesh has a worker-friendly system, in contrast to Rajasthan, where workers complain of discrepancies in relation to wage payments. Bihar demonstrates poor performance on wage payment. Workers are often paid well below minimum wage, even though records show that minimum wage is paid; workers are threatened by local officials if they complain.

In Rajasthan, although there are large numbers of workers at worksites and more employment days are generated, extremely low wages appear to be the norm. One reason for this is the lack of coordination among NREGS staff undertaking measurement. But also, because there are no proper mechanisms for supervision and measurement, and because of the mixed work groups on sites, wages are low through averaging out. In some sub-groups, certain dominant caste workers hardly work. For instance, many members of dominant communities like Gujjar and Jat did not work, but threatened mates and other officials to record their attendance so that they could claim wages. In other instances of mixed work groups, male labourers did not work very much but women were made to do much of the work.

There are delays of two to three months in the payment of wages in Rajasthan largely due to the persistence of ad hoc mechanisms for measurement and lack of coordination between local mate and technical personnel, whose visits to the worksites are few and far between. In stark contrast, Andhra Pradesh has been successful in instituting a well-coordinated mechanism by which the majority of workers are paid within a week of completing their work.

A distinguishing feature of the NREG programme in Andhra Pradesh is wage payment through banks and post offices, with the use of ICT and transaction-based

MIS to track every rupee. There is a strict payment cycle, with time-bound work measurement followed by preparation of cheques, conveyance of cash and final disbursement to post offices well within the stipulated 15 days. Additionally, Andhra Pradesh has paying wages through biometric smart cards. After a recent pilot testing of its efficiency, ICT technology provided by Financial Information Network and Operations Ltd (FINO) has been used to pay NREGS workers through biometric smart cards; it will begin with five districts and then be extended to others. But in both Rajasthan and Bihar there are no such time-bound, coordinated systems for wage payment, resulting in long delays. In Bihar, in wages are often paid in cash, which may ensure timeliness but not transparency or accountability.

3.4 Social audit: institutionalisation of transparencyExperiences vary considerably in relation to social audit. In focus group discussions in Bihar, workers reported no knowledge of the social audit provision and confirmed that no social audit had been conducted. While social audits did occur in both Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, they were instigated by different agencies and had different impacts, as illustrated below. The idea of social audits was conceived in Rajasthan through the concerted efforts of civil society organisations that felt the need to hold the government accountable for proper implementation of the NREG programme. Officials in Andhra Pradesh expressed interest in this model and received training, after which social audits were instituted by the state and conducted by an independent group – the Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT), along with the Andhra Pradesh Department of Rural Development. The social audit conducted in Andhra Pradesh has developed into an example of best practice in terms of public accountability, serving as a model that can be replicated in all states. In these audits, on-the-spot recovery of money unaccounted for is undertaken along with suspension of erring officials. In Rajasthan, personal communication with NGO representatives revealed that although a full-time Directorate of Social Audit has been set up with a social audit committee in each district, the system has not been formalised to the same extent as in Andhra Pradesh. Here, civil society organisations continue to take the lead in conducting social audits and in exposing irregularities in NREGS implementation through protests and demonstrations, as elaborated in section 3.6.


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3.5 Implementing personnel Yet another element in the effectiveness of implementation relates the skills and training of personnel at various levels. Proper remuneration and incentive systems would also enhance staff commitment to implementation. In Bihar, there were delays until the end of 2007 in the appointment of NREG staff – Programme Officer, rozgar sewak, Junior Engineer, Technical Assistants. Until that time, existing district administration officials were given responsibility for NREG implementation. At the time of the survey, NREGS was severely understaffed at all levels – officials were often given charge of additional blocks or panchayats beyond their designated ones. Also, at panchayat level in particular, rozgar sewaks received nearly a subsistence wage and the salaries of NREG personnel were often delayed by three to six months.

On the contrary, in Andhra Pradesh, as pointed out earlier, a special government order was passed awarding annual and agricultural off-season incentives and imposing disincentives to field officials based on performance indicators related to per household employment days created in areas within their jurisdiction in a stipulated time period (order dated 29.3.2008, issued by the

Panchayati Raj and Rural Development Department). Thus field assistants, technical assistants, additional programme officers, computer operators, etc receive an honorarium plus variable benefits depending on the number of person days they have created under the programme. Demand for wage employment is relatively higher in the agricultural off-season, ie from February to June, so incentives and disincentives have been designed in anticipation of increased workload.

3.6 Civil society involvementIn Rajasthan, NGOs were found to be very active in some districts, for example in Rajsamand, Dungarpur and Udaipur. They have played an instrumental role in the following broad spheres:

•• worker-centred interventions: ensuring the basic NREGS entitlements through monitoring and pressing for accountability (e.g. NGOs such as Astha Sansthan, Soochna evum Rozgar ka Adhikar Abhiyaan in Udaipur and the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajsamand district)

•• livelihood interventions: linking NREGS with ecological and natural resource management issues (e.g. NGOs

2 The Right to Information makes it mandatory to issue timely responses to citizen requests for government information.


NGO activism to ensure accountability in NREGS in Rajasthan

Rajasthan stands out among the three sample states as having a strong tradition of civil society initiatives, spearheaded in particular by an organisation of casual agricultural labourers, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), which was actively involved in the past in campaigning for the Right to Information2 (RTI) movement. MKSS has also aligned itself with the NREGS, along with a network of other NGOs under the banner of Soochna evum Rozgar Ka Adhikar Abhiyaan, to ensure accountability in NREGS by exposing glaring irregularities in scheme implementation and lobbying for corrective action through activism. In June 2010, for instance, 1,500 NREGS workers from across Rajasthan attended a day-long protest to voice the concerns and difficulties they faced when participating in the programme. Through the medium of songs, dance, puppetry, etc, workers narrated their experiences of NREGS.

Major complaints included not receiving the minimum wage, delay of 2–3 months in receiving NREGS wages, problems with some workers not working but still receiving wages, lack of transparency in funds spent on NREGS works and siphoning off money as wages against individuals who were not participating in the scheme. NGO activists registered complaint forms (along with dates and complainants’ signatures/thumbprints) as proof of malpractices in the scheme’s implementation. The forms were to be submitted to concerned district implementation officials and taken up on a case-by-case basis.

This network of NGOs has also been involved in conducting a series of social audits, as part of which some activists were physically attacked and stoned by people with vested interests in the programme and whose questionable activities were being exposed by such attempts at transparency. Most recently, the NGOs organised a truck rally circling different districts of the state, spreading information about NREGS and culminating in a 47-day sit-in, exposing and protesting about deficiencies in NREGS implementation. Following this, the Rajasthan government issued a written undertaking to pay the prevailing state minimum wage to NREGS workers, to index NREGS wages to inflation, ensure compensation to NREGS workers for late payment and register a NREGS workers union, which had thus far been denied because of some ambiguity in their work status.


19

such as Aravali in Jaipur, Seva Mandir, Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development and Foundation for Ecological Security in Udaipur).

NGOs have used activism and worker mobilisation to ensure accountability through staging of protests, organising social audits and exposing irregularities (see Box on page 18). Among the foremost demands of this lobby are the timely payment of wages, ending of programme-related malpractices and arrest of corrupt officials. Other important interventions include training in social audit and mate training. NGOs (instead of gram panchayats) are gradually being looked upon as important planning and implementation agencies for NREGS work, as evidenced by an advertisement in local newspapers inviting NGOs to act as NREGS Project Implementing Agency (see Box below). NGO interventions include trying to dovetail NREGS with community micro-planning initiatives through prioritising works based on needs assessment of livelihoods and resources in these regions. Other interventions include providing technical expertise and backstopping support to local officials involved in NREGS planning. NGOs generally emphasise that convergence in NREGS planning efforts is needed in order for comprehensive and holistic local development to occur. They will often suggest employing a watershed development approach as it would ensure post-works sustainability. In contrast, there is a very insignificant role for NGOs in Bihar.

3.7 Initiatives to mitigate adverse impacts on agriculture: creating an employment calendarIn discussions with villagers in Rajasthan it was noted that after the commencement of NREGS, wages in agriculture had risen. Some small farmers in Bihar complained of

negative effects of NREGA on agriculture in terms of declining supply of agricultural labour and rise in wages. To tackle such distortions in the labour market, the government of Andhra Pradesh evolved a NREGA work calendar, which permits maximum NREGS works only in the agricultural lean period in order to prevent possible shortages in labour supply to agriculture. Now there is deceleration in NREGS activities from July/August until October, which constitutes the agricultural peak season, to minimise negative impacts on agriculture.

3.8 Real time MIS in Andhra PradeshA web-based management and information system (MIS) has been introduced for real-time tracking of programme implementation in Andhra Pradesh (Ngo 2010). This has allowed for sharing of all programme-related details in the public domain. This software also exists at national level, but in Andhra Pradesh it is particularly refined and flags anomalies and arrests process deficiencies as and when they arise. ICT has been utilised at the wage payment stage and used to track wages due to workers. Pilot testing is also being done to tap biometrics (fingerprint authentication) for reducing the possibility of misappropriation at the time of attendance and wage payment.


NGO attempts at improving programme planning and implementation in Rajasthan

Interviews with NGOs in Rajasthan revealed that they were involved in planning and attempts at linking NREGS to local macro-ecological/development needs through their past work and expertise in the area of natural resource management. In fact, in Udaipur district, in 2007/08, at the request of the District Collector, NGOs Seva Mandir and the Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) had been granted Project Implementation Agency (PIA) status under NREGS. This step was because these NGOs had worked in these areas for many years prior to the NREGS and were very familiar with the local ecology of villages and with community needs.

Where the district administration is willing to engage the help of key external actors such as local NGOs, this may help to ensure that NREGS addresses local development needs. In 2009/10, an advertisement was issued in the newspaper inviting NREGS work proposals from NGOs to act as the PIA. Interviews with NGOs revealed that to reach the stage of being considered as PIAs had been a struggle and they hoped the process would result in them becoming an empanelled agency within the NREGS framework.


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Experiences over the past four years across the country have thrown up a number of initiatives and innovations in the implementation of the NREGS. Of the states analysed here, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan offer a number of commendable examples of best practice:

•• In raising awareness of and participation in the NREGS, Rajasthan provides the example of active civil society or NGO role. Self-help groups (SHGs) played a significant role in Andhra Pradesh and to a limited extent in Bihar.

•• In Andhra Pradesh, the institutionalisation of certain processes such as social audit, with established formal systems, personnel and training facilities for independent social auditors and resource staff, is an example of building transparency and accountability systems in the implementation of NREGS.

•• The State Employment Guarantee Council (EGC) chaired by the Chief Minister in Andhra Pradesh set up an Institution Building Unit with enough staff to establish relevant institutions such as Fixed Labour Groups.

•• Andhra Pradesh sought to achieve timely payment of wages by establishing coordinated links between measurement, entry of work, turnover and wages, release of funds to banks/post offices and fixing payment days. The introduction of biometric technology in bank payments has helped timeliness as well as transparency.

•• Specification of certain works in project mode3, in Andhra Pradesh has led to better supervision and work performance.

•• The state government of Andhra Pradesh has prioritised irrigation and horticultural works on land of communities such as Scheduled Castes, for beneficiaries of indira awas yojana (housing allowance) in assigned lands and on the land of small and marginal farmers (with less than five acres of dry or 2.5 acres of wet lands). This has resulted in converting the unproductive lands of the poor into cultivable productive land and augmenting their incomes.

•• In Rajasthan, involving NGOs with expertise in natural resource management as Project Implementing Agencies (PIAs) shows scope for improving the quality of works, both in planning and implementation.

These are only some major initiatives that are recommended for adoption across the country. It is important to bear in mind, however, that although Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh have seen very effective civil society initiatives, these would not succeed if there was administrative apathy and no political commitment.

A committed administrative machine with political support is a precondition for the adoption and building of appropriate institutional structures for socially fruitful implementation of the NREGS. It may seem repetitive, but it is worth concluding that although NREGS enshrines a demand-driven, legally binding right to work, if there is not the proactive political and administrative commitment to provide a continuous and adequate supply of productive works, implementation of the scheme may not bring the desired results.

3 Undertaking works in project mode entails comprehen-sively planning, designing and executing NREGS works by converging them with activities of pre-existing development departments and programmes, while also ensuring monitoring and technical supervision of works.


4 Policy implications and recommendations


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5.1 Accomplishment of entitlementsThe comparative implementation experience of NREGS in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan is summarised in terms of ten broad indicators. Assessment of these indicators is based on both qualitative observations and quantitative data generated by the study. Table 27 shows that in eight out of the nine indicators Andhra Pradesh has reached a higher level of accomplishment. In the case of ‘unemployment allowance’, the design itself is a big deterrent in obtaining any benefit, given the hand-to-mouth existence of most daily wage workers and the bureaucratic procedures and delays in applying for work. The solution is to be found more in terms of the state assuming a proactive role of provider or supplier of work, instead of waiting for demand through legal process. On the issue of worker participation in the selection and implementation of NREGS works, Andhra Pradesh lags behind. Otherwise, the accomplishment of Andhra Pradesh on the other basic entitlements are substantially the result of treating NREGA as national legislation and a readiness to initiate state innovations and directives to enhance effectiveness, with political and administrative commitment. In Rajasthan, where there is considerable civil society mobilisation and

participation, an atmosphere of political confrontation against these initiatives has led to the undoing of all civil society efforts in improving implementation. Bihar has a clear record of non-accomplishment on almost all indicators.

Andhra Pradesh also has good record of accomplishments in terms of transparency and accountability, except in the appointment and functioning of the Ombudsman for each district – although Bihar and Rajasthan are no better (see Table 28). What is noteworthy is the institutionalisation of the entire social audit system in Andhra Pradesh, which has been conducted regularly in spite of its magnitude. In Rajasthan, as a result of considerable social mobilisation and public awareness created by civil society organisations in favour of social audit, the state faces strong criticism because of its lack of political and administrative commitment. Bihar lags behind in initiating any steps towards strengthening social audit or other measures of transparency and accountability.

One lesson that emerges from all these experiences is that implementation of NREGS is a learning process that could translate into concrete initiatives provided there is political commitment, or perhaps even political compulsion.


5 Summary and conclusions

Table 27 Comparative picture of implementation accomplishment of entitlements in three states*

Indicator Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan

1. Essential entitlement

a. Three key entitlements

i. Work on demand up to 100 days ✓ ? ✓

ii. Minimum wages ✓ ✓ ?

iii. Payment within 15 days ✓ ✓ ?

2. Process aspects

a. Three key process aspects

i. Participation ✓? ? ✓?

ii. Transparency ✓ ? ?

iii. Accountability ✓ ? ?

3. Understanding NREGA as national legislation with state implementation innovations ✓ ? ✓?

4. State innovations and directives to enhance effectiveness ✓ ? ✓?

5. Political and administrative commitment ✓ ? ✓?

6. Monitoring and social audit ✓ ? ✓?

7. Flow of funds ✓ ? ✓

8. No crippling impact of staff shortage ✓ ? ✓

9. Payment related

a. Institutionalisation of work measurement ✓ ? ✓?

b. Institutionalisation of payment by agencies ✓ ? ✓?

c. Unemployment allowance ? ? ?

✓ = Almost accomplished ✓? = Mixed position ? = Not accomplished* Based on qualitative and qualitative information from the survey and field observation


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5.2 Institutionalisation of the implementation processIn practice, the implementation process may largely determine the outcome of NREGA in two important ways:

•• Institutionalisation of implementation process matters. The best social policies ineffectively administered amount to nothing, but could generate negative public reaction, resulting in abrupt abandoning of the programme. Implementation should be seen as a learning process with due attention paid to building appropriate institutional structures for effective delivery. Learning and institutionalisation from state level down to panchayat level could generate appropriate models of implementation even if there are inadequacies due to over-centralised design. What is becoming increasingly obvious is that NREGA outcomes depend very much on the extent to which appropriate administrative mechanisms are created. Considerable attention should be paid to mutual learning from evolving best practice in implementation across the regions and in appropriate resource allocation, not merely for administration but for capacity building.

•• Political commitment matters. The success of NREGA, even simply in terms of evolving proper institutional structures, depends upon political commitment. There is a need to stress the related political outcomes to bring in political ownership of the NREGA. What is evident in some states is a kind of negative politics

– panchayat elections being fought with huge ‘investments’, seeing NREGA resources as available for misappropriation. The more difficult task is mass mobilisation and social intervention to turn the tide against these trends.


Table 28 Transparency and accountability, comparative picture of implementation in three states

Indicator Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan

Social audit

Awareness of community about social audit process ✓ ✓? ✓?

Awareness of officials about social audit process ✓ ✓? ✓?

Conduct of social audit ✓ ? ✓?

Community participation in social audit ✓ ? ✓?

Participation of civil society organisations/NGOs in social audit ✓ ? ✓

Separate body for social audit ✓ ? ✓?

Penal action against officials ✓ ? ✓?

Vigilance committees

Presence of committees ✓ ? ✓?

Functioning of committees ? ? ?

Ombudsman

Appointment at district levels ✓? ? ✓?

Effective functioning of the system ? ? ?

✓ = Almost accomplished ✓? = Mixed position ? = Not accomplished


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Aiyar, Yamini and Samji, Salimah (2009) Transparency and Accountability in NREGA – A Case Study of Andhra Pradesh, Working Paper 1, New Delhi: Accountability Initiative

Bhaduri, Amit (2005) Development with Dignity, New Delhi: National Book Trust

CEC (2009) Delivering NREGS – Challenges and Opportunities, Hyderabad: Centre for Environment Concerns

CSE (2008) NREGA – Opportunities and Challenges, Policy Paper, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment

Dhavse, Rasika (2004) Entitling 40 million rural workers, http://www.indiatogether.org/2004/sep/pov-nrega.htm

Dreze, Jean (2004) ‘Employment as a social responsibility’, in The Hindu, 22 November, http://www.hindu.com/2004/11/22/stories/2004112205071000.htm

Institute for Human Development (IHD) (2009a) Institutional and Governance Challenges in Social Protection: Designing Implementation Models for the Right to Work Programme in India, Working Paper submitted under the Social Protection in Asia programme, New Delhi: Institute for Human Development

IHD (2009b) National Rural Employment Guarantee: issues, concerns and prospect’, mimeo, New Delhi: Institute for Human Development

IHD (2008) Processes, Institutions and Mechanisms of Implementation of NREGA: Impact Assessment of Bihar and Jharkhand, New Delhi: Institute for Human Development

Khera, Reetika (2008) ‘Group measurement of NREGA work: the Jalore Experiment Rajasthan – Jalore District’, paper presented at ‘NREGA: Impacts and Implementation Experiences’, Institute for Human Development (IHD), New Delhi, 16 and 17 September

Mehrotra, Santosh (2008) ‘NREG two years on: where do we go from here?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 43 (31): 27–35

NCEUS (2009) ‘Public Employment Programme (NREGA) work for the unorganised workers: the case of NREGA’, in The Challenge of Employment in India – An informal economy perspective, New Delhi: National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector

Ngo, Thi Minh-Phuong (2010) ‘Note on NREGA’s Management and Information System (MIS)’, seminar on Recent Evidence, Unresolved Issues and Possible Innovations, Allahabad University, 6 and 7 March

Pankaj, Ashok and Tankha, Rukmini (2009) Womens’ Empowerment through Guaranteed Employment: A case study of NREGA implementation Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh, New Delhi: Institute for Human Development

Rajsekhar, B. (2009) ‘Transparency and accountability initiatives – the social audit experience in Andhra Pradesh’, workshop on National Rural Employment Guarantee in India – Lessons from Implementation, Institute for Human Development and Institute of Social Studies Trust, Bangalore

Reddy, D.N., Tankha, R. Upendranadh, C. and Sharma, A.N. (2010) ‘National Rural Employment Guarantee as Social Protection’, IDS Bulletin, 41 (4): 63–76

Shah, Mihir (2009a) ‘Inaugural Address’, given at the National Seminar, National Rural Employment Guarantee in India, Institute for Human Development and Institute of Social Studies Trust, Bangalore, 8 and 9 September

Shah, Mihir (2009b) ‘Multiplier Accelerator Synergy in NREGA’, The Hindu, 30 April

Shah, Mihir (2009c) ‘Taking Goals of NREGA I Forward’, The Hindu, 14 August

www.nrega.nic.in


References


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Objective: The NREGA aims to enhance the livelihood security of people in rural areas by guaranteeing 100 of wage employment in a financial year, to a rural household whose members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. The Act also seeks to create durable assets to augment land and water resources as well as rural connectivity and strengthen the livelihood resource base of the rural poor.

Salient features of the Act:

•• Provision of employment to adult members of a rural household up to 100 days in a financial year of unskilled manual work.

•• Employment will be given within 15 days of application for work.

•• If employment is not provided within 15 days, daily unemployment allowance in cash has to be paid. States are liable for payment of unemployment allowance.

•• At least one-third of people to whom work is allotted must be women.

•• Disbursement of assured minimum wages has to be done on weekly basis and not beyond a fortnight.

•• Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) have a principal role in planning and implementation.

•• Each district must prepare a shelf of projects. The selected works to provide employment are to be selected from the list of permissible works. The different categories of permissible works are as follows:

•• Water conservation and water harvesting

•• Drought proofing (including plantation and afforestation)

•• Irrigation canals including micro and minor irrigation works

•• Flood control and protection works

•• Minor irrigation, horticulture and land development on the land of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, households below poverty line and indira awas yojana (housing allowance) and land reform beneficiaries

•• Renovation of traditional water bodies including desilting of tanks

•• Land development

•• Rural connectivity

•• Any other work notified by the central government in consultation with the state government.

The shelf of projects must be prepared on the basis of priority assigned by gram sabha. At least 50 per cent of works have to be allotted to gram panchayats for

execution. A 60:40 wage to material ratio has to be maintained. The use of contractors and labour-displacing machinery are prohibited.

•• Work should ordinarily be provided within 5km radius of the village or else 10 per cent extra wages are payable for transport costs.

•• Worksite facilities such as crèche, drinking water, shade, medical kit must be provided.

•• Social audit has to be done by the gram sabha at least once in every six months.

Funding: Central government bears the costs of the following items:

•• the entire cost of wages of unskilled manual workers

•• 75 per cent of the cost of materials and the wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers

•• administrative expenses as may be determined by central government, which will include, inter alia, the salary and allowances of the programme officer and his/her supporting staff, worksite facilities.

•• expenses of the Central Employment Guarantee Council.

The state government bears the costs of the following items:

•• 25 per cent of the cost of material, wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers

•• unemployment allowance payable in case the state government cannot provide waged employment on time

•• administrative expenses of the State Employment Guarantee Council.

Source: Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, 2010


Appendix 1: National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005


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Gram PanchayatPrimary unit of local self-government comprising a single or cluster of villages

Gram SabhaVillage assembly

JEN/ JTA Junior Engineer/ Junior Technical Assistant in charge of technical aspects of work measurement and wage calculation at NREGS worksites

Mate NREGS worksite supervisor

MukhiyaVillage President

Panchayati RajSystem of local self-government operating in three tiers at the district, block and village levels

Programme Officer NREGS personnel appointed at the Block level

Rozgar SewakNREGS personnel appointed at the Panchayat level


Appendix 2: Glossary of terms and abbreviations


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