Report of Investigation

into the Collision between

CSCL HAMBURG and LIAN HUA FENG

in the position 30 36.2N 123 10.5E

on 5 March 2008

Purpose of Investigation This incident is investigated, and published in accordance with the IMO Code for the

Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents promulgated under IMO Assembly

Resolution A.849(20). The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident

Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department is to

determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the

safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the

incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular

organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be

taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

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Table of Contents

Page

1 Summary 1

2 Description of the vessels 3

3 Sources of evidence 7

4 Outline of events 8

5 Analysis of evidence 20

6 Conclusions 26

7 Recommendations 28

8 Submissions 29

Summary 1.1 At about 2101 on 5 March 2008, a Hong Kong registered container ship CSCL

HAMBURG collided with a Chinese registered bulk carrier LIAN HUA FENG near

Zhoushan Islands in East China Sea at approximate position 30 36.2N 123 10.5E

(Figure 1).

Figure 1 The position of collision and the planned routes of the vessels CSCL Hamburg and Lian Hua Feng

1.2 CSCL HAMBURG and LIAN HUA FENG were in converging course when

approaching to an alteration point of the planned route by CSCL HAMBURG in

approximate position 30 32.25N 123 10.55E with the 3rd Officers on navigational

watch on both vessels. At the time of the accident, the weather condition was fine,

the wind was north-easterly at force 3 and the visibility was about 8 to 10 nautical

miles (n.m.).

1.3 Large area of the port side abaft midships (hull structural and cargo hold transverse

bulkheads between container Bay 38 and Bay 42) and port quarter (near Bay 62) of

CSCL HAMBURG sustained serious hull damages. Four containers also fell onto the

forecastle deck of LIAN HUA FENG. LIAN HUA FENG lost her starboard anchor

and sustained damage on the bow and starboard side between No.2 and No.3 cargo

holds after the collision. No casualties and oil pollution were reported from both

vessels.

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1.4 The investigation revealed that the following causes contributed to the collision:

CSCL HAMBURG was the vessel overtaking the other vessel LIAN HUA

FENG, the 3rd Officer of CSCL HAMBURG failed to keep clear of LIAN HUA

FENG which was the vessel being overtaken as required by the Collision

Regulations (COLREGS).

LIAN HUA FENG was the stand-on vessel and being overtaken by CSCL

HAMBURG. When the 3rd Officer on navigational watch of LIAN HUA

FENG found his vessel so close that collision could not be avoided by the

give-way vessel CSCL HAMBURG alone, he failed to take necessary actions

to avoid collision.

Both 3rd Officers relied on VHF radio communication and the unreliable

agreement of the intention of the other vessel rather than calling the master or

taking positive and early action to avoid collision.

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2. Description of the vessels 2.1 CSCL HAMBURG

Port of Registry : HONG KONG, CHINA

Call Sign : VRBH6

IMO No. : 9224300

Type : Container Vessel

Year of Built : 2001

Gross Tonnage : 39,941

Net Tonnage : 24,458

Length Overall : 245.15 metres

Breadth : 32.25 metres

Summer Draft : 12.626 metres

Main Engine : HSD-MAN B&W 8K90MC-C

Engine Power : 36,480 kW

Service Speed : 25.2 knots

CSCL HAMBURG is a container ship classed with Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The

navigational bridge, accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has

totally 9 cellular cargo holds and has a maximum container carrying capacity of 1,584

Twentyfoot Equivalent Unit (TEU) below deck and 2,669 TEU on deck.

The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an automatic

identification system (AIS), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting

Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.

The vessel was proceeding to Shanghai from Hong Kong at the time of the accident.

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Figure 2 Photograph of CSCL HAMBURG shows the damages of the vessel marked by red circles after the collision

2.2 LIAN HUA FENG

Port of Registry : GUANGZHOU, CHINA

Call Sign : BRUM

IMO No. : 9230361

Type : Bulk Carrier

Built: Jiangnan Shipyard (Group) Co. Ltd., Shanghai of China

Year of Built: 2001

Gross Tonnage : 39,894

Net Tonnage : ` 25,925

Length Overall : 225 metres

Breadth : 32.26 metres

Maximum Draft : 14.017 metres

Main Engine : MAN-B&W5S60MC MK6

Engine Power : 10200 kW

Service Speed : 15.9 knots

LIAN HUA FENG is a bulk carrier classed with China Classification Society (CCS). The

navigational bridge, accommodation and the main machinery space are situated aft. She has

totally 7 cargo holds.

The navigational equipment consists of a magnetic compass, a gyrocompass, an automatic

identification system (AIS), a course recorder, two radars with Automatic Radar Plotting

Aids (ARPA), a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and an echo sounder, etc.

The vessel was bound for Qinhuangdao from Zhangzhou, China.

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Figure 3 Photograph of LIAN HUA FENG shows the damages of the vessel marked by red circle after the collision

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3. Sources of Evidence

3.1 Master and duty crew members of CSCL HAMBURG;

3.2 Master and duty crew members of LIAN HUA FENG;

3.3 Zhou Shan MSA (Maritime Safety Administration) of The Peoples Republic of

China;

3.4 Marine Department of Hong Kong SAR, The Peoples Republic of China.

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4. Outline of events All times are local (UTC+8) ships time.

4.1 Account of CSCL HAMBURG

.1 On 4 March 2008 CSCL HAMBURG departed from Hong Kong to Shanghai.

.2 After departing Hong Kong, she was making an economic speed of about

19.5 knots at 86-87 revolutions per minute (RPM) to Shanghai. She was

scheduled to pick up pilot at Chang Jiang Kou Pilot Station at 0530 on 6

March 2008.

.3 At 2000 on 5 March 2008, 3rd Officer and the Able Seaman were on

navigational watch on the bridge. The voyage-planned course was 017T and

the steering course was 012T to counteract leeway and current set with

speed at 21.8 knots. The visibility was more than 8-10 n.m. with a slight sea

and no current.

.4 The ship does not require to install sound reception system onboard to enable

navigator in an enclosed navigational bridge to listen the environment and

sound signal outside the ship. The bridge doors were closed until the Master

was called by the 3rd Officer just before collision.

.5 Two radars (one X-band and one S-band radar with ARPA used for radar

plotting) were in operation and both were set on 12 n.m. range scale. The 3rd

Officer set the radars on 6 n.m. range scale when the other vessel was at short

distance before collision.

.6 There were about 4 to 5 fishing boats and other vessels in sight. The stern

light of the other vessel (later known as LIAN HUA FENG) with an unknown

heading and a speed of 15 knots, was sighted about 2 points on the port bow

and at a distance of about 6-7 n.m.

.7 At 2015, the 3rd Officer informed the Master that his vessel would be at the

marked position of one-hour notice to engine room on the working chart (see

Fig. 4) at about 2045. The 3rd Officer also informed the Master that there

were very few fishing vessels and the route was well clear.

.8 At 2030, the course recorder indicates the heading was changed from 013 to

022T to give a wide berth for a south bound vessel passing on port side

between LIAN HUA FENG and CSCL HAMBURG (see Fig 4).

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Figure 4 The AIS position plot of the southbound vessel passing between Lian Hua Feng and

CSCL Hamburg at 2030

MMSI

Time of

Data

Ship

Name

Call S

IMO

ig

ati

n

English

translation Ship

Type

Destin

on

ETA

Longitud

.9 At 2035, the vessel position was plotted on the working chart and the GPS

position fix was on the planned route. The stern light of LIAN HUA FENG

was sighted with an unknown heading and the speed remained at 15 knots

bearing about 4 points on the port bow and at a distance of about 3 to 4 n.m.

.10 At 2042, LIAN HUA FENG was found proceeding at a constant speed of 15

knots at a distance of about 2 n.m.

.11 The 3rd Officer reported to the Master by telephone that the vessel was at the

position marked one-hour notice to engine roo