in re cunanan; in re almacen

8/12/2019 In Re Cunanan; In Re Almacen

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seventy per cent in any bar e/aminations after 8uly fourth# nineteen hundred and fortysi/ up tothe Au,ust nineteen hundred and fiftyone bar e/aminationsD seventyone per cent in thenineteen hundred and fiftytwo bar e/aminationsD seventytwo per cent in the in the nineteenhundred and fiftythree bar e/aminationsD seventythree per cent in the nineteen hundred andfiftyfour bar e/aminationsD seventyfour per cent in the nineteen hundred and fiftyfive bare/aminations without a candidate obtainin, a ,rade below fifty per cent in any sub0ect# shall beallowed to ta$e and subscribe the correspondin, oath of office as member of the PhilippineBar9 &ro%ided, ho"e%er# 7hat for the purpose of this Act# any e/act onehalf or more of a

fraction# shall be considered as one and included as part of the ne/t whole number.

6EC. ". Any bar candidate who obtained a ,rade of seventyfive per cent in any sub0ect in anybar e/amination after 8uly fourth# nineteen hundred and fortysi/ shall be deemed to havepassed in such sub0ect or sub0ects and such ,rade or ,rades shall be included in computin,the passin, ,eneral avera,e that said candidate may obtain in any subse5uent e/aminationsthat he may ta$e.

6EC. *. 7his Act shall ta$e effect upon its approval.

Enacted on 8une "(# ()*# without the E/ecutive approval.

After its approval# many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to thebar invo$in, its provisions# while others whose motions for the revision of their e/amination paperswere still pendin, also invo$ed the aforesaid law as an additional ,round for admission. 7here arealso others who have sou,ht simply the reconsideration of their ,rades without# however# invo$in, thelaw in 5uestion. 7o avoid in0ustice to individual petitioners# the court first reviewed the motions forreconsideration# irrespective of whether or not they had invo$ed Republic Act No. !". +nfortunately#the court has found no reason to revise their ,rades. If they are to be admitted to the bar# it must bepursuant to Republic Act No. !" which# if declared valid# should be applied e5ually to all concernedwhether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners# properly classified# affectedby this decision# as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. !"# are

appended to this decision as Anne/es I and II. And to realie more readily the effects of the law# thefollowin, statistical data are set forth9

-( 7he unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section ( of Republic Act No. !"total (#(34# classified as follows9

(23 -Au,ust "13 ("( (4

(23 -November 2!! ""4 2*

(2! !2 *21 1

(24 4 21 ((

(2 (#"(4

)*" (32

()1 (#*(3

4* "3

()( "#134

4! (3

()" "#!*4

(#1**

2"3

()*


3/44

"#)))

34 "42

Fnbsp7;7A:

("#"*1

)#2"(

(#(34

;f the total (#(34 candidates# " have passed in subse5uent e/amination# and only )43 have filedeither motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act# or mere motions for

reconsideration.

-" In addition# some other (1 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section " of saidRepublic Act. 7hese candidates had each ta$en from two to five different e/aminations# but failed toobtain a passin, avera,e in any of them. Consolidatin,# however# their hi,hest ,rades in differentsub0ects in previous e/aminations# with their latest mar$s# they would be sufficient to reach thepassin, avera,e as provided for by Republic Act No. !".

-* 7he total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore (#12# of whichonly 312 have filed petitions. ;f these 312 petitioners# ** who failed in (23 to ()( had individuallypresented motions for reconsideration which were denied# while (") unsuccessful candidates of

()"# and )3 of ()*# had presented similar motions# which are still pendin, because they could befavorably affected by Republic Act No. !"# G althou,h as has been already stated# this tribunal findsno sufficient reasons to reconsider their ,rades

U'CO'STITUTIO'A&IT O- REPU"&IC ACT 'O( 9./

=avin, been called upon to enforce a law of farreachin, effects on the practice of the le,aprofession and the administration of 0ustice# and because some doubts have been e/pressed as to itsvalidity# the court set the hearin, of the aforementioned petitions for admission on the sole 5uestionof 0hether or not Reu2lic Act 'o( 9./ is constitutional(

He have been enli,htened in the study of this 5uestion by the brilliant assistance of the members ofthe bar who have amply ar,ued# orally an in writin,# on the various aspects in which the 5uestion maybe ,leaned. 7he valuable studies of Messrs. E. oltaire >arcia# icente 8. &rancisco# icente Pelaeand Buenaventura Evan,elista# in favor of the validity of the law# and of the +.P. Homen's :awyers'Circle# the 6olicitor >eneral# Messrs. Arturo A. Alafri# Enri5ue M. &ernando# icente Abad 6antosCarlos A. Barrios# icente del Rosario# 8uan de Blancaflor# Mamerto . >onales# and Roman;aeta a,ainst it# aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners# Messrs. 8ose M. Arue,o#M.=. de 8oya# Mi,uel R. Corne0o and Antonio Enrile Inton# and of petitioners Cabrera# Macasaet and>alema themselves# has ,reatly helped us in this tas$. 7he le,al researchers of the court havee/hausted almost all Philippine and American 0urisprudence on the matter. 7he 5uestion has beenthe ob0ect of intense deliberation for a lon, time by the 7ribunal# and finally# after the votin,# the

preparation of the ma0ority opinion was assi,ned to a new member in order to place it as humanly aspossible above all suspicion of pre0udice or partiality.

Republic Act No. !" has for its ob0ect# accordin, to its author# to admit to the Bar# those candidateswho suffered from insufficiency of readin, materials and inade5uate preparation. uotin, a portion ofthe E/planatory Note of the proposed bill# its author =onorable 6enator Pablo An,eles @avid stated9

7he reason for rela/in, the standard !) per cent passin, ,rade is the tremendous handicapwhich students durin, the years immediately after the 8apanese occupation has to overcomesuch as the insufficiency of readin, materials and the inade5uacy of the preparation ofstudents who too$ up law soon after the liberation.


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;f the #3!) candidates who too$ the e/aminations from (23 to ()"# )#"*3 passed. And now it isclaimed that in addition 312 candidates be admitted -which in reality total (#12# because theysuffered from %insufficiency of readin, materials% and of %inade5uacy of preparation.%

By its declared ob0ective# the law is contrary to public interest because it 5ualifies (#12 law,raduates who confessedly had inade5uate preparation for the practice of the profession# as wase/actly found by this 7ribunal in the aforesaid e/aminations. 7he public interest demands of le,aprofession ade5uate preparation and efficiency# precisely more so as le,al problem evolved by the

times become more difficult. An ade5uate le,al preparation is one of the vital re5uisites for thepractice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. 7o the le,al profession isentrusted the protection of property# life# honor and civil liberties. 7o approve officially of thoseinade5uately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create aserious social dan,er. Moreover# the statement that there was an insufficiency of le,al readin,materials is ,rossly e/a,,erated. 7here were abundant materials. @ecisions of this court alone inmimeo,raphed copies were made available to the public durin, those years and private enterpriseshad also published them in monthly ma,aines and annual di,ests. 7he Official a)ettehad beenpublished continuously. Boo$s and ma,aines published abroad have entered without restrictionsince (2). Many law boo$s# some even with revised and enlar,ed editions have been printed locallydurin, those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports be,an to be published since (23# which

continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. 7hose are facts of public $nowled,e.

'ot0ithstanin3 all these, if the la0 in uestion is ali, it has to 2e enforce(

7he 5uestion is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principlesbut the resolution of the 5uestion would have been easier had an identical case of similar bac$,roundbeen pic$ed out from the 0urisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the lon, An,lo6a/on le,al history# from which has been directly derived the 0udicial system established here with itslofty ideals by the Con,ress of the +nited 6tates# and which we have preserved and attempted toimprove# or in our contemporaneous 0udicial history of more than half a centuryJ &rom the citations ofthose defendin, the law# we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been

sustained# while those a,ainst its validity cite# amon, others# the cases of @ay - In re @ay# )2 NE323# of Cannon -6tate %s. Cannon# "21 NH# 22(# the opinion of the 6upreme Court oMassachusetts in (*" -4( A:R (13(# of >uariKa -"2 Phil.# *!# aside from the opinion of thePresident which is e/pressed in his vote of the ori,inal bill and which the postponement of thecontested law respects.

7his law has no precedent in its favor. Hhen similar laws in other countries had been promul,ated#the 0udiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer aprecedent to uphold the disputed law.

7o be e/act# we ou,ht to state here that we have e/amined carefully the case that has been cited to

us as a favorable precedent of the law G that of Cooper -"" N# 4(# where the Court of Appeals ofNew or$ revo$ed the decision of the 6upreme court of that 6tate# denyin, the petition of Cooper tobe admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concernin, the school of law ofColumbia Colle,e promul,ated on April !# (431# which was declared by the Court of Appeals to beconsistent with the Constitution of the state of New or$.

It appears that the Constitution of New or$ at that time provided9

7hey -i.e.# the 0ud,es shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of themfor any elective office e/cept that of the Court of Appeals# ,iven by the :e,islature or thepeople# shall be void. 7hey shall not e/ercise any power of appointment to public office. Any


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male citien of the a,e of twentyone years# of ,ood moral character# and who possesses there5uisite 5ualifications of learnin, and ability# shall be entitled to admission to practice in all thecourts of this 6tate. -p. *.

Accordin, to the Court of Appeals# the ob0ect of the constitutional precept is as follows9

Attorneys# solicitors# etc.# were public officersD the power of appointin, them had previouslyrested with the 0ud,es# and this was the principal appointin, power which they possessed. 7he

convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been e/ercisedand with the restrictions which the 0ud,es had imposed upon admission to practice beforethem. 7he prohibitory clause in the section 5uoted was aimed directly at this power# and theinsertion of the provision% e/pectin, the admission of attorneys# in this particular section of theConstitution# evidently arose from its connection with the ob0ect of this prohibitory clause.7here is nothin, indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve anyportion of their power over this sub0ect# unless the 6upreme Court is ri,ht in the inference itdraws from the use of the word Ladmission' in the action referred to. It is ur,ed that theadmission spo$en of must be by the courtD that to admit means to ,rant leave# and that thepower of ,rantin, necessarily implies the power of refusin,# and of course the ri,ht ofdeterminin, whether the applicant possesses the re5uisite 5ualifications to entitle him to

admission.

7hese positions may all be conceded# without affectin, the validity of the act. -p. *.

Now# with respect to the law of April !# (431# the decision seems to indicate that it provided that thepossession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia Colle,e conferrin, the de,ree of Bachelorof :aws was evidence of the le,al 5ualifications that the constitution re5uired of applicants foradmission to the Bar. 7he decision does not however 5uote the te/t of the law# which we cannot findin any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper# supra# to ma$e the law consistent with the Constitution of New or$# the Court

of Appeals said of the ob0ect of the law9

7he motive for passin, the act in 5uestion is apparent. Columbia Colle,e bein, an institution ofestablished reputation# and havin, a law department under the char,e of able professors# thestudents in which department were not only sub0ected to a formal e/amination by the lawcommittee of the institution# but to a certain definite period of study before bein, entitled to adiploma of bein, ,raduates# the :e,islature evidently# and no doubt 0ustly# considered thise/amination# to,ether with the preliminary study re5uired by the act# as fully e5uivalent as atest of le,al re5uirements# to the ordinary e/amination by the courtD and as renderin, the lattere/amination# to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential# unnecessary andburdensome.

7he act was obviously passed with reference to the learnin, and ability of the applicant# andfor the mere purpose of substitutin, the e/amination by the law committee of the colle,e forthat of the court. It could have had no other ob0ect# and hence no ,reater scope should be,iven to its provisions. He cannot suppose that the :e,islature desi,ned entirely to dispensewith the plain and e/plicit re5uirements of the ConstitutionD and the act contains nothin,whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the colle,e should in5uire as to the a,e#citienship# etc.# of the students before ,rantin, a diploma. 7he only rational interpretation ofwhich the act admits is# that it was intended to ma$e the colle,e diploma competent evidenceas to the le,al attainments of the applicant# and nothin, else. 7o this e/tent alone it operatesas a modification of pree/istin, statutes# and it is to be read in connection with these statutes


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and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on thesub0ect. -p.4

/ / / / / / / / /

7he :e,islature has not ta$en from the court its 0urisdiction over the 5uestion of admission# thathas simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that 5uestion-p.*

&rom the fore,oin,# the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearlyseen. Please note only the followin, distinctions9

-( 7he law of New or$ does not re5uire that any candidate of Columbia Colle,e who failed in thebar e/aminations be admitted to the practice of law.

-" 7he law of New or$ accordin, to the very decision of Cooper# has not ta$en from the court its0urisdiction over the 5uestion of admission of attorney at lawD in effect# it does not decree theadmission of any lawyer.

-* 7he Constitution of New or$ at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on thematter of admission of the practice of law.

In the 0udicial system from which ours has been evolved# the admission# suspension# disbarment andreinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have beendisputably a 0udicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute# its continuous and ealouspossession and e/ercise by the 0udicial power have been demonstrated durin, more than si/centuries# which certainly %constitutes the most solid of titles.% Even considerin, the power ,ranted toCon,ress by our Constitution to repeal# alter supplement the rules promul,ated by this Courtre,ardin, the admission to the practice of law# to our 0ud,ment and proposition that the admissionsuspension# disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a le,islative function# properly

belon,in, to Con,ress# is unacceptable. 7he function re5uires -( previously established rules andprinciples# -" concrete facts# whether past or present# affectin, determinate individuals. and -*decision as to whether these facts are ,overned by the rules and principlesD in effect# a 0udiciafunction of the hi,hest de,ree. And it becomes more undisputably 0udicial# and not le,islative# ifprevious 0udicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revo$ed omodified.

He have said that in the 0udicial system from which ours has been derived# the act of admittin,suspendin,# disbarrin, and reinstatin, attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly

0udicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been underta$en in the case of6tate %s. Cannon -(*" "21 NH 22(# in which the validity of a le,islative enactment providin, that

Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. &rom the te/t of this decision we5uote the followin, para,raphs9

7his statute presents an assertion of le,islative power without parallel in the history of theEn,lish spea$in, people so far as we have been able to ascertain. 7here has been muchuncertainty as to the e/tent of the power of the :e,islature to prescribe the ultimate5ualifications of attorney at law has been e/pressly committed to the courts# and the act ofadmission has always been re,arded as a 0udicial function. 7his act purports to constitute Mr.Cannon an attorney at law# and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of le,islativepower. -p. 222


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+nder the Constitution all le,islative power is vested in a 6enate and Assembly. -6ection (art. 2. In so far as the prescribin, of 5ualifications for admission to the bar are le,islative incharacter# the :e,islature is actin, within its constitutional authority when it sets up andprescribes such 5ualifications. -p. 222

But when the :e,islature has prescribed those 5ualifications which in its 0ud,ment will servethe purpose of le,itimate le,islative solicitude# is the power of the court to impose other andfurther e/actions and 5ualifications foreclosed or e/haustedJ -p. 222

+nder our Constitution the 0udicial and le,islative departments are distinct# independent# andcoordinate branches of the ,overnment. Neither branch en0oys all the powers of soverei,ntywhich properly belon,s to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrassthe other in the dischar,e of its respective functions. 7hat was the scheme and thou,ht of thepeople settin, upon the form of ,overnment under which we e/ist. 6tate %s. =astin,s# (1 His.)")D Attorney >eneral e/ rel. Bashford %s. Barstow# 2 His.# )3!. -p. 22)

7he 0udicial department of ,overnment is responsible for the plane upon which theadministration of 0ustice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is e/clusive. Bycommittin, a portion of the powers of soverei,nty to the 0udicial department of our state

,overnment# under 2"a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune fromembarrassment or interference by any other department of ,overnment# the courts cannotescape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of soverei,nty thus committed to the

0udicial department are e/ercised. -p. 22)

7he relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. 7he bar is anattache of the courts. 7he 5uality of 0ustice dispense by the courts depends in no small de,reeupon the inte,rity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily brin, scandal and reproach to theadministration of 0ustice and brin, the courts themselves into disrepute. -p.22)

7hrou,h all time courts have e/ercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars# at least

in the En,lish spea$in, countries. -p. 22)

After e/plainin, the history of the case# the Court ends thus9

;ur conclusion may be epitomied as follows9 &or more than si/ centuries prior to the adoptionof our Constitution# the courts of En,land# concededly subordinate to Parliament since theRevolution of (344# had e/ercise the ri,ht of determinin, who should be admitted to thepractice of law# which# as was said in Matter of the 6er,eant's at :aw# 3 Bin,ham's New Cases"*)# %constitutes the most solid of all titles.% If the courts and 0udicial power be re,arded as anentity# the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent elementof that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a

part of the inherent power of the court# or an essential element of the 0udicial power e/ercisedby the court# but that it is a power belon,in, to the 0udicial entity and made of not only asoverei,n institution# but made of it a separate independent# and coordinate branch of the,overnment. 7hey too$ this institution alon, with the power traditionally e/ercise to determinewho should constitute its attorney at law. 7here is no e/press provision in the Constitutionwhich indicates an intent that this traditional power of the 0udicial department should in anymanner be sub0ect to le,islative control. Perhaps the dominant thou,ht of the framers of ourconstitution was to ma$e the three ,reat departments of ,overnment separate andindependent of one another. 7he idea that the :e,islature mi,ht embarrass the 0udiciadepartment by prescribin, inade5uate 5ualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with thedominant purpose of ma$in, the 0udicial independent of the le,islative department# and such a


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purpose should not be inferred in the absence of e/press constitutional provisions. Hhile thele,islature may le,islate with respect to the 5ualifications of attorneys# but is incidental merelyto its ,eneral and un5uestioned power to protect the public interest. Hhen it does le,islate afi/in, a standard of 5ualifications re5uired of attorneys at law in order that public interests maybe protected# such 5ualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the classfrom which the court must ma$e its selection. 6uch le,islative 5ualifications do not constitutethe ultimate 5ualifications beyond which the court cannot ,o in fi/in, additional 5ualificationsdeemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of 0udicial functions. 7here is no

le,islative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit toe/ercise the prero,atives of an attorney at law. -p. 2)1

&urthermore# it is an unlawful attempt to e/ercise the power of appointment. It is 5uite li$elytrue that the le,islature may e/ercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of ale,islative functions. =owever# the authorities are wellni,h unanimous that the power to admitattorneys to the practice of law is a 0udicial function. In all of the states# e/cept New 8ersey - InreReisch# 4* N.8. E5. 4"# 1 A. ("# so far as our investi,ation reveals# attorneys receive theirformal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court soadmittin,. Cor. 8ur. )!"D E* parte6ecombre# ( =ow. #() :. Ed. )3)D E* parte>arland# 2Hall. ***# (4 :. Ed. *33D Randall %s. Bri,ham# ! Hall. )*# ( :. Ed. "4)D =anson %s. >rattan

24 ?an# 42*# (() P. 323# *2 :.R.A. )(D @anforth %s. E,an# "* 6. @. 2*# (( N.H. (1"(# (*1Am. 6t. Rep. (1*1# "1 Ann. Cas. 2(*.

7he power of admittin, an attorney to practice havin, been perpetually e/ercised by thecourts# it havin, been so ,enerally held that the act of the court in admittin, an attorney topractice is the 0ud,ment of the court# and an attempt as this on the part of the :e,islature toconfer such ri,ht upon any one bein, most e/ceedin,ly uncommon# it seems clear that thelicensin, of an attorney is and always has been a purely 0udicial function# no matter where thepower to determine the 5ualifications may reside. -p. 2)(

In that same year of (*"# the 6upreme Court of Massachusetts# in answerin, a consultation of the

6enate of that 6tate# (41 NE !")# said9

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws thatthere be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moralcharacter. 7his arises from the need of enli,htened assistance to the honest# and restrainin,authority over the $navish# liti,ant. It is hi,hly important# also that the public be protected fromincompetent and vicious practitioners# whose opportunity for doin, mischief is wide. It was saidby Cardo# C.:.# in People e/ rel. ?arlin %s. Cul$in# "2" N.. 2)3# 2!1# 2!(# (3" N.E. 24!# 2431 A.:.R. 4)(9 %Membership in the bar is a privile,e burden with conditions.% ;ne is admittedto the bar %for somethin, more than private ,ain.% =e becomes an %officer of the court%# and#li$e the court itself# an instrument or a,ency to advance the end of 0ustice. =is cooperation

with the court is due %whenever 0ustice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld.%Hithout such attorneys at law the 0udicial department of ,overnment would be hampered in theperformance of its duties. 7hat has been the history of attorneys under the common law# bothin this country and En,land. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost withoute/ception conceded to be a 0udicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts# as are otherproceedin,s invo$in, 0udicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open andnotorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. 7he establishment by theConstitution of the 0udicial department conferred authority necessary to the e/ercise of itspowers as a coordinate department of ,overnment. It is an inherent power of such adepartment of ,overnment ultimately to determine the 5ualifications of those to be admitted topractice in its courts# for assistin, in its wor$# and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit


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those lac$in, in sufficient learnin,# and those not possessin, ,ood moral character. Chief8ustice 7aney stated succinctly and with finality in E* parte6ecombe# ( =ow. # (*# () :. Ed)3)# %It has been well settled# by the rules and practice of commonlaw courts# that it restse/clusively with the court to determine who is 5ualified to become one of its officers# as anattorney and counselor# and for what cause he ou,ht to be removed.% -p.!"!

In the case of @ay and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the le,alprofession by virtue of a law of state -In re@ay# )2 NE 323# the court said in part9

In the case of E* parte>arland# 2 Hall# ***# (4 :. Ed. *33# the court# holdin, the test oath forattorneys to be unconstitutional# e/plained the nature of the attorney's office as follows9 %7heyare officers of the court# admitted as such by its order# upon evidence of their possessin,sufficient le,al learnin, and fair private character. It has always been the ,eneral practice inthis country to obtain this evidence by an e/amination of the parties. In this court the fact of theadmission of such officers in the hi,hest court of the states to which they# respectively# belon,for# three years precedin, their application# is re,arded as sufficient evidence of thepossession of the re5uisite le,al learnin,# and the statement of counsel movin, their admissionsufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. 7he order of admissionis the 0ud,ment of the court that the parties possess the re5uisite 5ualifications as attorneys

and counselors# and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. &rom its entrythe parties become officers of the court# and are responsible to it for professional misconduct7hey hold their office durin, ,ood behavior# and can only be deprived of it for misconductascertained and declared by the 0ud,ment of the court after opportunity to be heard has beenafforded. E* parte=oyfron# admission or their e/clusion is not the e/ercise of a mereministerial power. It is the e/ercise of 0udicial power# and has been so held in numerous casesIt was so held by the court of appeals of New or$ in the matter of the application of Cooperfor admission. Re Cooper "" N. . 4(. %Attorneys and Counselors%# said that court# %are notonly officers of the court# but officers whose duties relate almost e/clusively to proceedin,s ofa 0udicial natureD and hence their appointment may# with propriety# be entrusted to the court#and the latter# in performin, his duty# may very 0ustly considered as en,a,ed in the e/ercise of

their appropriate 0udicial functions.% -pp. 3)13)(.

He 5uote from other cases# the followin, pertinent portions9

Admission to practice of law is almost without e/ception conceded everywhere to be thee/ercise of a 0udicial function# and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in thispoint. Admission to practice have also been held to be the e/ercise of one of the inherentpowers of the court. G Re Bruen# (1" Hash. 2!"# (!" Pac. 13.

Admission to the practice of law is the e/ercise of a 0udicial function# and is an inherent powerof the court. G A.C. Brydon0ac$# %s. 6tate Bar of California# "4( Pac. (1(4D 6ee Annotation on

Power of :e,islature respectin, admission to bar# 3)# A.:. R. ()(".

;n this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the 0udicial and le,islativedepartments of the ,overnment.

7he distinction $et"een the functions of the legislati%e and the judicial depart'ents is that it isthe province of the le3islature to establish rules that shall regulate and go%ern in 'atters oftransactions occurring su$se+uent to the legislati%e action # while the 6uiciar7 determinesri,hts and obli,ations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that e/ist at thetime of the e/ercise of 0udicial power# and the distinction is a vital one and not sub0ect toalteration or chan,e either by le,islative action or by 0udicial decree.


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7he 0udiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the otherdepartments of the ,overnment. G (3 C.8.6.# Constitutional :aw# p. "".

If the le,islature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by re5uirin, of themconstruction of the law accordin, to its own views# it is very plain it cannot do so directly# bysettlin, aside their 0ud,ments# compellin, them to ,rant new trials# orderin, the dischar,e ofoffenders# or directin, what particular steps shall be ta$en in the pro,ress of a 0udicial in5uiryG Cooley's Constitutional :imitations# (".

In decreein, the bar candidates who obtained in the bar e/aminations of (23 to ()"# a ,eneraavera,e of !1 per cent without fallin, below )1 per cent in any sub0ect# be admitted in mass to thepractice of law# the disputed law is not a le,islationD it is a 0ud,ment G a 0ud,ment revo$in, thosepromul,ated by this Court durin, the aforecited year affectin, the bar candidates concernedD andalthou,h this Court certainly can revo$e these 0ud,ments even now# for 0ustifiable reasons# it is noless certain that only this Court# and not the le,islative nor e/ecutive department# that may be so. Anyattempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions# as is thecase with the law in 5uestion.

7hat the Constitution has conferred on Con,ress the power to repeal# alter or supplement the rule

promul,ated by this 7ribunal# concernin, the admission to the practice of law# is no valid ar,ument6ection (*# article III of the Constitution provides9

6ection (*. 7he 6upreme Court shall have the power to promul,ate rules concernin, pleadin,practice# and procedure in all courts# and the admission to the practice of law. 6aid rules shalbe uniform for all courts of the same ,rade and shall not diminish# increase or modifysubstantive ri,hts. 7he e/istin, laws on pleadin,# practice and procedure are hereby repealedas statutes# and are declared Rules of Court# sub0ect to the power of the 6upreme Court toalter and modify the same. 7he Con,ress shall have the power to repeal# alter# or supplementthe rules concernin, pleadin,# practice# and procedure# and the admission to the practice oflaw in the Philippines. G Constitution of the Philippines# Art. III# sec. (*.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Con,ress and this 7ribunal e5uaresponsibilities concernin, the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibilitywhich the Constitution reco,nies continue to reside in this Court. =ad Con,ress found that this Courthas not promul,ated any rule on the matter# it would have nothin, over which to e/ercise the power,ranted to it. Congress 'ay repeal, alter and supple'ent the rules pro'ulgated $y this Court, $ut theauthority and responsi$ility o%er the ad'ission, suspension, dis$ar'ent and reinstate'ent ofattorneys at la" and their super%ision re'ain %ested in the Supre'e Court. 7he power to repeal# alteand supplement the rules does not si,nify nor permit that Con,ress substitute or ta$e the place of this7ribunal in the e/ercise of its primary power on the matter. he Constitution does not say nor 'eanthat Congress 'ay ad'it, suspend, dis$ar or reinstate directly attorneys at la", or a deter'inate

,roup of individuals to the practice of law. Its po"er is li'ited to repeal, 'odify or supple'ent theexisting rules on the 'atter, if according to its judg'ent the need for a $etter ser%ice of the legal

profession re+uires it.But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit# suspenddisbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the le,al profession.

Bein, coordinate and independent branches# the power to promul,ate and enforce rules for theadmission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal# alter and supplement them mayand should be e/ercised with the respect that each owes to the other# ,ivin, careful consideration tothe responsibility which the nature of each department re5uires. 7hese powers have e/isted to,etherfor centuries without diminution on each partD the harmonious delimitation bein, found in that thele,islature may and should e/amine if the e/istin, rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the


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demands which public interest re5uires of a Bar endowed with hi,h virtues# culture# trainin, andresponsibility. 7he le,islature may# by means of appeal# amendment or supplemental rules# fill up anydeficiency that it may find# and the 0udicial power# which has the inherent responsibility for a ,ood andefficient administration of 0ustice and the supervision of the practice of the le,al profession# shouldconsider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession# and see to itthat with these reforms the lofty ob0ective that is desired in the e/ercise of its traditional duty ofadmittin,# suspendin,# disbarrin, and reinstatin, attorneys at law is realied. 7hey are powers which#e/ercise within their proper constitutional limits# are not repu,nant# but rather complementary to each

other in attainin, the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasin, and e/actin,necessities of the administration of 0ustice.

7he case of >uariKa -((* "2 Phil.# *!# illustrates our criterion. >uariKa too$ e/amination and failedby a few points to obtain the ,eneral avera,e. A recently enacted law provided that one who hadbeen appointed to the position of &iscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previouse/amination. 7he >overnment appointed >uariKa and he dischar,ed the duties of &iscal in a remoteprovince. 7his tribunal refused to ,ive his license without previous e/aminations. 7he court said9

Relyin, upon the provisions of section " of Act No. ()!# the applicant in this case see$sadmission to the bar# without ta$in, the prescribed e/amination# on the ,round that he holds

the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

6ection " of Act No. ()!# enacted &ebruary "4# (1!# is as follows9

6ec. ". Para,raph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered ;ne =undred and ninety# entitled%An Act providin, a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and 6pecial Proceedin,s in thePhilippine Islands#% is hereby amended to read as follows9

(. 7hose who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under thesoverei,nty of 6pain or of the +nited 6tates and are in ,ood and re,ular standin, as membersof the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this codeD &ro%ided# 7hat any

person who# prior to the passa,e of this act# or at any time thereafter# shall have held# underthe authority of the +nited 6tates# the position of 0ustice of the 6upreme Court# 0ud,e of theCourt of &irst Instance# or 0ud,e or associate 0ud,e of the Court of :and Re,istration# of thePhilippine Islands# or the position of Attorney >eneral# 6olicitor >eneral# Assistant Attorney>eneral# assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney >eneral# prosecutin, attorney for theCity of Manila# city attorney of Manila# assistant city attorney of Manila# provincial fiscalattorney for the Moro Province# or assistant attorney for the Moro Province# may be licensed topractice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an e/amination# upon motion beforethe 6upreme Court and establishin, such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

7he records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant too$# and failed to

pass the prescribed e/amination. 7he report of the e/aminin, board# dated March "*# (1!shows that he received an avera,e of only !( per cent in the various branches of le,al learnin,upon which he was e/amined# thus fallin, four points short of the re5uired percenta,e of !).He would be delin5uent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar# if# in theface of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the re5uired 5ualificationsof learnin, in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to thebar# we should ,rant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands# without firstsatisfyin, ourselves that despite his failure to pass the e/amination on that occasion# he now%possesses the necessary 5ualifications of learnin, and ability.%


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But it is contented that under the provisions of the abovecited statute the applicant is entitledas of ri,ht to be admitted to the bar without ta$in, the prescribed e/amination %upon motionbefore the 6upreme Court% accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holdsthe office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is ur,ed that havin, in mind theob0ect which the le,islator apparently sou,ht to attain in enactin, the abovecited amendmentto the earlier statute# and in view of the conte/t ,enerally and especially of the fact that theamendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the ori,inal Act which specificallyprovides for the admission of certain candidates without e/amination. It is contented that this

mandatory construction is imperatively re5uired in order to ,ive effect to the apparent intentionof the le,islator# and to the candidate's claim de jureto have the power e/ercised.

And after copyin, article of Act of 8uly (# (1" of the Con,ress of the +nited 6tates# articles "# (3and (! of Act No. (*3# and articles (* to (3 of Act (1# the Court continued9

Manifestly# the 0urisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed toit by the Act of Con,ress would be limited and restricted# and in a case such as that underconsideration wholly destroyed# by ,ivin, the word %may#% as used in the above citation from

Act of Con,ress of 8uly (# (1"# or of any Act of Con,ress prescribin,# definin, or limitin, thepower conferred upon the commission is to that e/tent invalid and void# as transcendin, its

ri,htful limits and authority.

6pea$in, on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated# andwith particular emphasis in the case of >uariKa# the Court held9

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions ofthis statute have been considered heretofore# we have accepted the fact that suchappointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the 5ualifications of the applicantBut in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicin,attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration# however# it affirmatively appears that the applicant was notand never had been practicin, attorney in this or any other 0urisdiction prior to the date of hisappointment as provincial fiscal# and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in there5uired 5ualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the li,ht of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion# we do not thin$ that hisappointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of thenecessary 5ualifications of learnin, and ability. He conclude therefore that this application forlicense to practice in the courts of the Philippines# should be denied.

In view# however# of the fact that when he too$ the e/amination he fell only four points short of

the necessary ,rade to entitle him to a license to practiceD and in view also of the fact thatsince that time he has held the responsible office of the ,overnor of the Province of 6orso,onand presumably ,ave evidence of such mar$ed ability in the performance of the duties of thatoffice that the Chief E/ecutive# with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commissionsou,ht to retain him in the >overnment service by appointin, him to the office of provinciafiscal# we thin$ we would be 0ustified under the abovecited provisions of Act No. ()! inwaivin, in his case the ordinary e/amination prescribed by ,eneral rule# provided he offerssatisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special e/amination which will be ,iven him by acommittee of the court upon his application therefor# without pre0udice to his ri,ht# if he desiresso to do# to present himself at any of the ordinary e/aminations prescribed by ,eneral rule. G-In re >uariKa# pp. 242.


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It is obvious# therefore# that the ultimate power to ,rant license for the practice of law belon,se/clusively to this Court# and the law passed by Con,ress on the matter is of permissive character# oras other authorities say# merely to fi/ the minimum conditions for the license.

7he law in 5uestion# li$e those in the case of @ay and Cannon# has been found also to suffer from thefatal defect of bein, a class le,islation# and that if it has intended to ma$e a classification# it isarbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of @ay# a law enacted on &ebruary "(# (4 re5uired of the 6upreme Court# until@ecember *( of that year# to ,rant license for the practice of law to those students who be,anstudyin, before November 2# (4!# and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued bya school of law# or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an e/amination# or tothose who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date.7he 6upreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional bein,# amon, others# a classle,islation. 7he Court said9

7his is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomasfrom law schools issued to the applicants. 7he act of the ,eneral assembly passed in (4under which the application is made# is entitled %An act to amend section ( of an act entitled

%An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors#% approved March "4# (442# inforce 8uly (# (4!2.% 7he amendment# so far as it appears in the enactin, clause# consists in theaddition to the section of the followin,9 %And every application for a license who shall complywith the rules of the supreme court in re,ard to admission to the bar in force at the time suchapplicant commend the study of law# either in a law or office or a law school or colle,e# shalbe ,ranted a license under this act notwithstandin, any subse5uent chan,es in said rules%. GIn re @ay et al# )2 N..# p. 323.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso# one branch of which is that up to @ecember*(# (4# this court shall ,rant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diplomare,ularly issued by any law school re,ularly or,anied under the laws of this state# whose

re,ular course of law studies is two years# and re5uirin, an attendance by the student of atleast *3 wee$s in each of such years# and showin, that the student be,an the study of lawprior to November 2# (4!# and accompanied with the usual proofs of ,ood moral character7he other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a lawoffice# or part of such time in a law office# %and part in the aforesaid law school#% and whosecourse of study be,an prior to November 2# (4!# shall be admitted upon a satisfactorye/amination by the e/aminin, board in the branches now re5uired by the rules of this court. Ifthe ri,ht to admission e/ists at all# it is by virtue of the proviso# which# it is claimed# conferssubstantial ri,hts and privile,es upon the persons named therein# and establishes rules ofle,islative creation for their admission to the bar. -p. 32!.

Considerin, the proviso# however# as an enactment# it is clearly a special le,islation# prohibitedby the constitution# and invalid as such. If the le,islature had any ri,ht to admit attorneys topractice in the courts and ta$e part in the administration of 0ustice# and could prescribe thecharacter of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the re5uisitelearnin, and ability of persons to practice law# it could only be done by a ,eneral law# personsor classes of persons. Const. art 2# section ". 7he ri,ht to practice law is a privile,e# and alicense for that purpose ma$es the holder an officer of the court# and confers upon him theri,ht to appear for liti,ants# to ar,ue causes# and to collect fees therefor# and creates certaine/emptions# such as from 0ury services and arrest on civil process while attendin, court. 7helaw conferrin, such privile,es must be ,eneral in its operation. No doubt the le,islature# inframin, an enactment for that purpose# may classify persons so lon, as the law establishin,


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classes in ,eneral# and has some reasonable relation to the end sou,ht. 7here must be somedifference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one# havin, no 0ust relation to thesub0ect of the le,islation. Braceville Coal Co. %s. People# (2! Ill. 33# *) N.E. 3"D Ritchie %s&eople# ()) Ill. 4# 21 N.E. 2)2D Railroad Co. %s. Ellis# (3) +.6. ()1# (! 6up. Ct. ")).

7he len,th of time a physician has practiced# and the s$ill ac5uired by e/perience# may furnisha basis for classification -Hilliams %s. People ("( Ill. 24# II N.E. 44(D but the place where suchphysician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis# and is an

arbitrary discrimination# ma$in, an enactment based upon it void -6tate %s. Pennyeor# 3) N.E((*# (4 Atl. 4!4. =ere the le,islature underta$es to say what shall serve as a test of fitness forthe profession of the law# and plainly# any classification must have some reference to learnin,character# or ability to en,a,e in such practice. 7he proviso is limited# first# to a class ofpersons who be,an the study of law prior to November 2# (4!. 7his class is subdivided intotwo classes G &irst# those presentin, diplomas issued by any law school of this state before@ecember *(# (4D and# second# those who studied law for the period of two years in a lawoffice# or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office# who are to be admitted upone/amination in the sub0ects specified in the present rules of this court# and as to this lattersubdivision there seems to be no limit of time for ma$in, application for admission. As to bothclasses# the conditions of the rules are dispensed with# and as between the two differen

conditions and limits of time are fi/ed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school# buta diploma ,ranted upon the completion of any sort of course its mana,ers may prescribe ismade allsufficient. Can there be anythin, with relation to the 5ualifications or fitness ofpersons to practice law restin, upon the mere date of November 2# (4!# which will furnish abasis of classification. Plainly not. 7hose who be,an the study of law November 2th could5ualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who be,an on the *rd. 7he classesnamed in the proviso need spend only two years in study# while those who commenced thene/t day must spend three years# althou,h they would complete two years before the timelimit. 7he one who commenced on the *rd. If possessed of a diploma# is to be admitted withoute/amination before @ecember *(# (4# and without any prescribed course of study# while asto the other the prescribed course must be pursued# and the diploma is utterly useless. 6uch

classification cannot rest upon any natural reason# or bear any 0ust relation to the sub0ectsou,ht# and none is su,,ested. 7he proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowin, privile,esupon certain defined persons. -pp. 32!324.

In the case of Cannon above cited# 6tate %s. Cannon# "21 N.H. 22(# where the le,islature attemptedby law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law# the court also held with re,ards to its aspect ofbein, a class le,islation9

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be ,ranted that the le,islature has power toprescribe ultimately and definitely the 5ualifications upon which courts must admit and licensethose applyin, as attorneys at law# that power can not be e/ercised in the manner here

attempted. 7hat power must be e/ercised throu,h ,eneral laws which will apply to all ali$e andaccord e5ual opportunity to all. 6pea$in, of the ri,ht of the :e,islature to e/act 5ualifications ofthose desirin, to pursue chosen callin,s# Mr. 8ustice &ield in the case of -ent. %s. est/irginia,(" +.6. ((2# ("(# 6. Ct. "*"# "**# *" :. Ed. 3"3# said9 %It is undoubtedly the ri,htof every citien of the +nited 6tates to follow any lawful callin,# business or profession he maychoose# sub0ect only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of li$e a,e# se/# andcondition.% 7his ri,ht may in many respects be considered as a distin,uishin, feature of ourrepublican institutions. =ere all vocations are all open to every one on li$e conditions. All maybe pursued as sources of livelihood# some re5uirin, years of study and ,reat learnin, for theirsuccessful prosecution. 7he interest# or# as it is sometimes termed# the %estate% ac5uired inthem G that is# the ri,ht to continue their prosecution G is often of ,reat value to the


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possessors and cannot be arbitrarily ta$en from them# any more than their real or personaproperty can be thus ta$en. It is fundamental under our system of ,overnment that all similarlysituated and possessin, e5ual 5ualifications shall en0oy e5ual opportunities. Even statutesre,ulatin, the practice of medicine# re5uirin, medications to establish the possession on thepart of the application of his proper 5ualifications before he may be licensed to practice# havebeen challen,ed# and courts have seriously considered whether the e/emption from suche/aminations of those practicin, in the state at the time of the enactment of the law renderedsuch law unconstitutional because of infrin,ement upon this ,eneral principle. 6tate %s

7homas Call# ("( N.C. 32*# "4 6.E. )(!D see# also# 7he 6tate e/ rel. Hin$ler %s. Rosenber,(1( His. (!"# !3 N.H. *2)D 6tate %s. Hhitcom# ("" His. ((1# N.H. 234.

7his law sin,les out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the ri,ht to practice law andto constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of le,islative ,race or favor. It is notmaterial that he had once established his ri,ht to practice law and that one time he possessedthe re5uisite learnin, and other 5ualifications to entitle him to that ri,ht. 7hat fact in no matteraffect the power of the :e,islature to select from the ,reat body of the public an individuaupon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota -:aws ("# c. 2"2 commanded the 6upreme Court to

admit to the practice of law without e/amination# all who had served in the military or navaforces of the +nited 6tates durin, the Horld Har and received a honorable dischar,etherefrom and who -were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Con,ressapproved 8une !th# ("2# $nown as %Horld Har eteran's Act# ("2 and whose disability israted at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passa,e of this Act.% 7his Act was heldunconstitutional on the ,round that it clearly violated the 5uality clauses of the constitution ofthat state. In reApplication of >eor,e H. =umphrey# (!4 Minn. **(# ""! N.H. (!.

A ,ood summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is e/plained in (" Am. 8ur. ()(()* asfollows9

7he ,eneral rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be validmust rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those e/cluded andfurthermore# must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoidedthe constitutional prohibition# must be founded upon pertinent and real differences# asdistin,uished from irrelevant and artificial ones. 7herefore# any law that is made applicable toone class of citiens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situationof that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason onwhich it can be defended. In other words# there must be such a difference between thesituation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation andcircumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the sub0ects of the discriminatoryle,islation as presents a 0ust and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and

burdens and in their ri,hts and privile,es. A law is not ,eneral because it operates on all withina clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only# andnot ,enerally on all. -(" Am. 8ur. pp. ()(()*.

Pursuant to the law in 5uestion# those who# without a ,rade below )1 per cent in any sub0ect# haveobtained a ,eneral avera,e of 3.) per cent in the bar e/aminations in (23 to ()(# !1.) per cent in()"# !(.) per cent in ()*# and those will obtain !".) per cent in ()2# and !*.) per cent in ())#will be permitted to ta$e and subscribe the correspondin, oath of office as members of the Barnotwithstandin, that the rules re5uire a minimum ,eneral avera,e of !) per cent# which has beeninvariably followed since ()1. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned


16/44

authorities# for this classification J If there is none# and none has been ,iven# then the classification isfatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in (22# (2( or the years before# with the ,eneral avera,eindicated# were not included because the 7ribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates ofthose years. 7his fact does not 0ustify the une/plained classification of unsuccessful candidates byyears# from (23()(# ()"# ()*# ()2# ()). Neither is the e/clusion of those who failed beforesaid years under the same conditions 0ustified. 7he fact that this Court has no record of e/aminations

prior to (23 does not si,nify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his ri,ht to ane5ual consideration.

7o defend the disputed law from bein, declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity# it isar,ued that it is curative# and that in such form it is constitutional. Hhat does Rep. Act !" intend tocure J ;nly from (23 to (2 were there cases in which the 7ribunal permitted admission to the barof candidates who did not obtain the ,eneral avera,e of !) per cent9 in (23 those who obtained only!" per centD in the (2! and those who had 3 per cent or moreD in (24# !1 per cent and in (2# !2per centD and in ()1 to ()*# those who obtained !2 per cent# which was considered by the Court ase5uivalent to !) per cent as prescribed by the Rules# by reason of circumstances deemed to besufficiently 0ustifiable. 7hese chan,es in the passin, avera,es durin, those years were all that could

be ob0ected to or criticied. Now# it is desired to undo what had been done G cancel the license thatwas issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed !) per cent J Certainly not. 7he disputed lawclearly does not propose to do so. Concededly# it approves what has been done by this 7ribunalHhat Con,ress lamented is that the Court did not consider 3.) per cent obtained by thosecandidates who failed in (23 to ()" as sufficient to 5ualify them to practice law. =ence# it is thelac$ of will or defect of 0ud,ment of the Court that is bein, cured# and to complete the cure of thisinfirmity# the effectivity of the disputed law is bein, e/tended up to the years ()*# ()2 and ())increasin, each year the ,eneral avera,e by one per cent# with the order that said candidates beadmitted to the Bar. 7his purpose# manifest in the said law# is the best proof that what the lawattempts to amend and correct are not the rules promul,ated# but the will or 0ud,ment of the Court# bymeans of simply ta$in, its place. 7his is doin, directly what the 7ribunal should have done durin,

those years accordin, to the 0ud,ment of Con,ress. In other words# the power e/ercised was not torepeal# alter or supplement the rules# which continue in force. Hhat was done was to stop or suspendthem. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has ,ranted to Con,ress# because itfalls within the power to apply the rules. 7his power corresponds to the 0udiciary# to which such dutybeen confided.

Article " of the law in 5uestion permits partial passin, of e/aminations# at indefinite intervals. 7he,rave defect of this system is that it does not ta$e into account that the laws and 0urisprudence arenot stationary# and when a candidate finally receives his certificate# it may happen that the e/istin,laws and 0urisprudence are already different# seriously affectin, in this manner his usefulness. 7hesystem that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar e/aminations of this country# but was

abandoned for this and other disadvanta,es. In this case# however# the fatal defect is that the articleis not e/pressed in the title will have temporary effect only from (23 to ())# the te/t of article "establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. 7his is contrary to 6ection "( -(# article I ofthe Constitution# which vitiates and annuls article " completelyD and because it is inseparable fromarticle (# it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

:aws are unconstitutional on the followin, ,rounds9 first# because they are not within the le,islativepowers of Con,ress to enact# or Con,ress has e/ceeded its powersD second# because they create orestablish arbitrary methods or forms that infrin,e constitutional principlesD and third# because theirpurposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen# thecontested law suffers from these fatal defects.


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6ummariin,# we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. !" isunconstitutional and therefore, #oid, and without any force nor effect for the followingreasons, to wit$

(. Because its declared purpose is to admit 4(1 candidates who failed in the bar e/aminations of(23()"# and who# it admits# are certainly inade5uately prepared to practice law# as was e/actlyfound by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidatesdeprivin, this 7ribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to

become members of the Bar. It obli,es the 7ribunal to perform somethin, contrary to reason and inan arbitrary manner. 7his is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the6upreme Court.

". Because it is# in effect# a 0ud,ment revo$in, the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these4(1 candidates# without havin, e/amined their respective e/amination papers# and althou,h it isadmitted that this 7ribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for 0ustifiable reasons# only thisCourt and no other may revise and alter them. In attemptin, to do it directly Republic Act No. !"violated the Constitution.

*. By the disputed law# Con,ress has e/ceeded its le,islative power to repeal# alter and supplement

the rules on admission to the Bar. 6uch additional or amendatory rules are# as they ou,ht to beintended to re,ulate acts subse5uent to its promul,ation and should tend to improve and elevate thepractice of law# and this 7ribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end inthe admission# suspension# disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar# inasmuch as a ,oodbar assists immensely in the daily performance of 0udicial functions and is essential to a worthyadministration of 0ustice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prero,ative of the 6upreme Court torender the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of lawaccordin, to e/istin, rules.

2. 7he reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates# which the law ma$es# iscontrary to facts which are of ,eneral $nowled,e and does not 0ustify the admission to the Bar of law

students inade5uately prepared. 7he pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a classle,islation.

). Article " of Republic Act No. !" is not embraced in the title of the law# contrary to what theConstitution en0oins# and bein, inseparable from the provisions of article (# the entire law is void.

3. :ac$in, in ei,ht votes to declare the nullity of that part of article ( referrin, to the e/aminations of()* to ())# said part of article (# insofar as it concerns the e/aminations in those years# shallcontinue in force.

R E S O & U T I O '

+pon mature deliberation by this Court# after hearin, and availin, of the ma,nificent and impassioneddiscussion of the contested law by our Chief 8ustice at the openin, and close of the debate amon,the members of the Court# and after hearin, the 0udicious observations of two of our belovedcollea,ues who since the be,innin, have announced their decision not to ta$e part in votin,# we# theei,ht members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved# and havedecided for the Court# and under the authority of the same9


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(. 7hat -a the portion of article ( of Republic Act No. !" referrin, to the e/aminations of (23 to()"# and -$ all of article " of said law are unconstitutional and# therefore# void and without force andeffect.

". 7hat# for lac$ of unanimity in the ei,ht 8ustices# that part of article ( which refers to thee/aminations subse5uent to the approval of the law# that is from ()* to ()) inclusive# is valid andshall continue to be in force# in conformity with section (1# article II of the Constitution.

Conse5uently# -( all the abovementioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the e/aminationsof (23 to ()" inclusive are denied# and -" all candidates who in the e/aminations of ()* obtaineda ,eneral avera,e of !(.) per cent or more# without havin, a ,rade below )1 per cent in any sub0ectare considered as havin, passed# whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After thisdecision has become final# they shall be permitted to ta$e and subscribe the correspondin, oath ofoffice as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief 8ustice may set. 6o ordered.

#eng)on, Monte'ayor, Jugo, !a$rador, &a$lo, &adilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

(R( 'o( &/.#54 -e2ruar7 18, 19.:

I' T;E MATTER O- PROCEE)I'S -OR )ISCIP&I'AR ACTIO' AAI'ST ATT(


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/// /// ///

=e e/pressed the hope that by divestin, himself of his title by which he earns his livin,#the present members of the 6upreme Court 0"ill $eco'e responsi%e to all cases$rought to its attention "ithout discri'ination, and "ill purge itself of thoseunconstitutional and o$no*ious 0lac2 of 'erit0 or 0denied resolutions. -Emphasissupplied

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own 6upreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of sicO0ustice# who i,nore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of theConstitution with impunity

was 5uoted by columnist icente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicleof 6eptember "4(3!. In connection therewith# Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had %accused the hi,h tribunal ofoffenses so serious that the Court must clear itself#% and that %his char,e is one of the constitutionabases for impeachment.%

7he ,enesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled /irginia 3. 3aptinchay %s. Antonio H.Calero,1in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. 7he trial court# after due hearin,#rendered 0ud,ment a,ainst his client. ;n 8une ()# (33 Atty. Almacen received a copy of thedecision. 7wenty days later# or on 8uly )# (33# he moved for its reconsideration. =e served on theadverse counsel a copy of the motion# but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearin, onsaid motion. Meanwhile# on 8uly (4# (33# the plaintiff moved for e/ecution of the 0ud,ment. &or %lac$of proof of service#% the trial court denied both motions. 7o prove that he did serve on the adverseparty a copy of his first motion for reconsideration# Atty. Almacen filed on Au,ust (!# (33 a secondmotion for reconsideration to which he attached the re5uired re,istry return card. 7his second motionfor reconsideration# however# was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on Au,ust *1# (33# uponverbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself# who# earlier# that is# on Au,ust ""# (33# had already

perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no ob0ection to the record on appeal andappeal bond# the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals# on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety 4 5idelity Co., Inc.%s. #atu Construction 4 Co.,:(33*3# 8une "2# (3)# dismissed the appeal# in the followin, words9

+pon consideration of the motion dated March "!# (3!# filed by plaintiffappelleeprayin, that the appeal be dismissed# and of the opposition thereto filed by defendantappellantD the Court RE6;:E@ 7; @I6MI66# as it hereby dismisses# the appeal# forthe reason that the motion for reconsideration dated 8uly )# (33 -pp. 1((*# printedrecord on appeal does not contain a notice of time and place of hearin, thereof and is#

therefore# a useless piece of paper -Manila 6urety F &idelity Co.# Inc. vs. BatuConstruction F Co.# >.R. No. :(33*3# 8une "2# (3)# which did not interrupt therunnin, of the period to appeal# and# conse5uently# the appeal was perfected out oftime.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution# ur,in, that Manila Surety 4 5idelity Co. is notdecisive. At the same time he filed a pleadin, entitled %:atest decision of the 6upreme Court in6upport of Motion for Reconsideration#% citin, Repu$lic of the &hilippines %s. regorio A. /enturan)a:"12(!# decided by this Court on May *1# (33# as the applicable case. A,ain# the Court of Appealsdenied the motion for reconsideration# thus9


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Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May # (3! and the supplementthereto of the same date filed by defendant appellant# prayin, for reconsideration of theresolution of May 4# (3!# dismissin, the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case andthat of Manila Surety and 5idelity Co., Inc. %s. #atu Construction 4 Co., >.R. No. :(33*3# 8une "2# (3)# relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 4# (3!

Appellant further states that in the latest case#Repu$lic %s. /enturan)a# :"12(!# May

*1# (33# decided by the 6upreme Court concernin, the 5uestion raised by appellant'smotion# the rulin, is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila 6urety F &idelityCo.# Inc. case.

7here is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila 6urety F &idelityCo.

In the case of Repu$lic %s. /enturan)a# the resolution denyin, the motion to dismiss theappeal# based on ,rounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November "3#(3"# which was much earlier than the date of promul,ation of the decision in theManila 6urety Case# which was 8une "2# (3). &urther# the resolution in the enturana

case was interlocutory and the 6upreme Court issued it %without pre0udice to appellee'srestorin, the point in the brief.% In the main decision in said case -Rep. vs. enturanathe 6upreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its priordecisions contrary to the resolution of November "3# (3"# one of which is that in theManila 6urety and &idelity case. 7hereforeRepu$lic %s. /enturan)ais no authority onthe matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. He refused to ta$e the case# and by minuteresolution denied the appeal. @enied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well ashis petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for e/tension of time. Entry of

0ud,ment was made on 6eptember 4# (3!. =ence# the second motion for reconsideration filed by

him after the 6aid date was ordered e/pun,ed from the records.

It was at this 0uncture that Atty. Almacen ,ave vent to his disappointment by filin, his %Petition to6urrender :awyer's Certificate of 7itle#% already adverted to G a pleadin, that is interspersed frombe,innin, to end with the insolent contemptuous# ,rossly disrespectful and dero,atory remar$shereinbefore reproduced# a,ainst this Court as well as its individual members# a behavior that is asunprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated 6eptember "4# (3! to withhold action on his petitionuntil he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently# we waited for him to ma$e ,ood hisproffer. No word came from him. 6o he was reminded to turn over his certificate# which he had earlier

vociferously offered to surrender# so that this Court could act on his petition. 7o said reminder hemanifested %that he has no pendin, petition in connection with Case >.R. No. :"!3)2# Calero %s.3aptinchay# said case is now final and e/ecutoryD% that this Court's 6eptember "4# (3! resolution didnot re5uire him to do either a positive or ne,ative actD and that since his offer was not accepted# he%chose to pursue the ne,ative act.%

In the e/ercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and ,rossmisconduct# this Court on November (!# (3! resolved to re5uire Atty. Almacen to show cause %whyno disciplinary action should be ta$en a,ainst him.% @enyin, the char,es contained in the November(! resolution# he as$ed for permission %to ,ive reasons and cause why no disciplinary action shouldbe ta$en a,ainst him ... in an open and public hearin,.% 7his Court resolved -on @ecember ! %to


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re5uire Atty. Almacen to state# within five days from notice hereof# his reasons for such re5uest#otherwise# oral ar,ument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision.% 7o thisresolution he manifested that since this Court is %the complainant# prosecutor and 8ud,e#% hepreferred to be heard and to answer 5uestions %in person and in an open and public hearin,% so thathis Court could observe his sincerity and candor. =e also as$ed for leave to file a written e/planation%in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person.% 7o ,ive him the ampliest latitude for hisdefense# he was allowed to file a written e/planation and thereafter was heard in oral ar,ument.

=is written answer# as undi,nified and cynical as it is unchastened# offers no apolo,y. &ar from bein,contrite Atty. Almacen unremittin,ly repeats his 0eremiad of lamentations# this time embellishin, it withabundant sarcasm and innuendo. 7hus9

At the start# let me 5uote passa,es from the =oly Bible# Chapter !# 6t. Matthew9 G

%@o not 0ud,e# that you may not be 0ud,ed. &or with what 0ud,ment you0ud,e# you shall be 0ud,ed# and with what measure you measure# it shalbe measured to you. But why dost thou see the spec$ in thy brother's eyeand yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eyeJ ;r how can thou sayto thy brother# %:et me cast out the spec$ from thy eye%D and behold# there

is a beam in thy own eyeJ 7hou hypocrite# first cast out the beam from thyown eye# and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the spec$ from thybrother's eyes.%

%7herefore all that you wish men to do to you# even to do you also to themfor this is the :aw and the Prophets.%

/// /// ///

our respondent has no intention of disavowin, the statements mentioned in hispetition. ;n the contrary# he refirms the truth of what he stated# compatible with his

lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood# nor consent to the doin, of any in court. Buthe vi,orously @EN under oath that the underscored statements contained in theC=AR>E are insolent# contemptuous# ,rossly disrespectful and dero,atory to theindividual members of the CourtD that they tend to brin, the entire Court# without

0ustification# into disreputeD and constitute conduct unbecomin, of a member of thenoble profession of law.

/// /// ///

Respondent stands fours5uare that his statement is borne by 7R+7= and has beenasserted with N; MA:ICE BE&;RE AN@ A&7ER 7=;+>=7 but mainly motivated with

the hi,hest interest of 0ustice that in the particular case of our client# the members haveshown callousness to our various pleas for 8+67ICE# our pleadin,s will bear us on thismatter# ...

/// /// ///

7o all these be,,in,s# supplications# words of humility# appeals for charity# ,enerosity#fairness# understandin,# sympathy and above all in the hi,hest interest of 8+67ICE# Gwhat did we ,et from this C;+R7J ;ne word# @ENIE@# with all its hardiness andinsensibility. 7hat was the unfeelin, of the Court towards our pleas and prayers# insimple word# it is plain callousness towards our particular case.


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Now that your respondent has the ,uts to tell the members of the Court thatnotwithstandin, the violation of the Constitution# you remained unpunished# this Court inthe reverse order of natural thin,s# is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on yourrespondent for acts he said in ,ood faith.

@id =is =onors care to listen to our pleadin,s and supplications for 8+67ICE

C=ARI7# >ENER;6I7 and &AIRNE66J @id =is =onors attempt to 0ustify theirstubborn denial with any semblance of reason# NEER. Now that your respondent is,iven the opportunity to face you# he reiterates the same statement with emphasis# @I@;+J 6ir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today# that even our own President#said9 G %the story is current# thou,h nebulous #is to its truth# it is still bein, circulatedthat 0ustice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. 7here arethose who have told me fran$ly and brutally that 0ustice is a commodity# a mar$etablecommodity in the Philippines.%

/// /// ///

He condemn the 6IN# not the 6INNER. He detest the AC76# not the AC7;R. Heattac$ the decision of this Court# not the members. ... He were provo$ed. He werecompelled by force of necessity. He were an,ry but we waited for the finality of thedecision. He waited until this Court has performed its duties. He never interfered norobstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end# after seein, that theConstitution has placed finality on your 0ud,ment a,ainst our client and sensin, that youhave not performed your duties with %circumspection# carefulness# confidence andwisdom%# your Respondent rise to claim his >od ,iven ri,ht to spea$ the truth and hisConstitutional ri,ht of free speech.

/// /// ///

7he IN8+67ICE6 which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations wesou,ht to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

/// /// ///

Hhat has been abhored and condemned# are the very thin,s that were applied to us. Recallin,Madam Roland's famous apostrophe durin, the &rench revolution# %; :iberty# what crimes arecommitted in thy name%# we may dare say# %; 8+67ICE# what technicalities are committed in thyname' or more appropriately# '; 8+67ICE# what in0ustices are committed in thy name.%

/// /// ///

He must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses# but whowould correct such abuses considerin, that yours is a court of last resort. A stron,public opinion must be ,enerated so as to curtail these abuses.

/// /// ///

7he phrase# Justice is $lindis symbolie in paintin,s that can be found in all courts and,overnment offices. He have added only two more symbols# that it is also deaf anddumb. @eaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for


24/44

charity# ,enerosity# fairness# understandin, sympathy and for 0usticeD dumb in thesense# that inspite of our be,,in,s# supplications# and pleadin,s to ,ive us reasons whyour appeal has been @ENIE@# not one word was spo$en or ,iven ... He refer to nohuman defect or ailment in the above statement. He only describe the. impersonal stateof thin,s and nothin, more.

/// /// ///

As we have stated# we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Courtand for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate# IN 7R+67 ;N:Because what has been lost today may be re,ained tomorrow. As the offer wasintended as our selfimposed sacrifice# then we alone may decide as to when we mustend our selfsacrifice. If we have to choose between forcin, ourselves to have faith andconfidence in the members of the Court but disre,ard our Constitution and to uphold theConstitution and be condemned by the members of this Court# there is no choice# wemust uphold the latter.

But overloo$in,# for the nonce# the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studieddisrespect to this Court# let us e/amine the ,rain of his ,rievances.

=e chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. He are 5uite aware of thecriticisms/e/pressed a,ainst this Court's practice of re0ectin, petitions by minute resolutions. Hehave been as$ed to do away with it# to state the facts and the law# and to spell out the reasons fordenial. He have ,iven this su,,estion very careful thou,ht. &or we $now the ab0ect frustration of alawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls hisar,uments# only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. 7ruth to tell# however#most petitions re0ected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ou,ht never to have been lod,ed atall.$7he rest do e/hibit a firstimpression co,ency# but fail to# withstand critical scrutiny. By and lar,ethis Court has been ,enerous in ,ivin, due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may# were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we re0ect# wewould be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. 7he properrole of the 6upreme Court# as Mr. Chief 8ustice inson of the +.6. 6upreme Court has defined it# is todecide %only those cases which present 5uestions whose resolutions will have immediate importancebeyond the particular facts and parties involved.% Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. 8ustice&ran$furter in Maryland %s. #alti'ore Radio Sho"# 2 :. ed )3"# )339

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ# and as to the same petitiondifferent reasons may read different 0ustices to the same result ... .

6ince there are these conflictin,# and# to the uninformed# even confusin, reasons for

denyin, petitions for certiorari# it has been su,,ested from time to time that the Courtindicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Courtmay be enabled to dischar,e its indispensable duties# Con,ress has placed the controof the Court's business# in effect# within the Court's discretion. @urin, the last threeterms the Court disposed of "31# "(!# ""2 cases# respectively# on their merits. &or thesame three terms the Court denied# respectively# (#"31# (#(1)#(#(4 petitions callin, fodiscretionary review. If the Court is to do its wor$ it would not be feasible to ,ivereasons# however brief# for refusin, to ta$e these cases. 7he tune that would bere5uired is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons noinfre5uently move different members of the Court in concludin, that a particular case ata particular time ma$es review undesirable.


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6i/ years a,o# in 6o%ino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,(#"(14# May *(# (3* -31 ;.>. 41this Court# throu,h the then Chief 8ustice Cesar Ben,on# articulated its considered view on thismatter. 7here# the petitioners counsel ur,ed that a %lac$ of merit% resolution violates 6ection (" of

Article III of the Constitution. 6aid Chief 8ustice Ben,on9

In connection with identical short resolutions# the same 5uestion has been raisedbeforeD and we held that these %resolutions% are not %decisions% within the aboveconstitutional re5uirement. 7hey merely hold that the petition for review should not be

entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules of CourtD and even ordinarylawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition toreview the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of ri,ht# but of sound 0udiciadiscretionD and so there is no need to fully e/plain the court's denial. &or one thin,# thefacts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way# this mode of disposal has G as intended G helped the Court in alleviatin,its heavy doc$etD it was patterned after the practice of the +.6. 6upreme Court# whereinpetitions for review are often merely ordered %dismissed%.

He underscore the fact that cases ta$en to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of

Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. =ence# the need for compellin, reasons to buttresssuch petitions if this Court is to be moved into acceptin, them. &or it is a/iomatic that the supervisory

0urisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to ,ive every losin, partyanother hearin,. 7his a/iom is implied in sec. 2 of Rule 2) of the Rules of Court which recites9

Re%ie" of Court of Appeals7 decision discretionary.GA review is not a matter of ri,ht butof sound 0udicial discretion# and will be ,ranted only when there are special andimportant reasons therefor. 7he followin,# while neither controllin, nor fully measurin,the court's discretion# indicate the character of reasons which will be considered9

-a Hhen the Court of Appeals has decided a 5uestion of substance# not theretofore

determined by the 6upreme Court# nor has decided it in a way probably not in accordwith law or with the applicable decisions of the 6upreme CourtD

-b Hhen the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual courseof 0udicial proceedin,s# or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court# as to calfor the e/ercise of the power of supervision.

Recallin, Atty. Almacen's petition for review# we found# upon a thorou,h,oin, e/amination of thepleadin,s. and records# that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal ofhis appeal in the li,ht of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. &ar from strayin, away fromthe %accepted and usual course of 0udicial proceedin,s#% it traced the procedural lines etched by this

Court in a number of decisions. 7here was# therefore# no need for this Court to e/ercise itssupervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far bac$ as (2(# Atty. Almacen $new G orou,ht to have $nown G that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the runnin, of the period ofappeal# the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party -which he did#but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearin, -which admittedly he did not. 7hisrule was une5uivocally articulated in Manila Surety 4 5idelity %s. #atu Construction 4 Co., supra9

7he written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in ,eneral by Rule ()#6ections 2 and ) -formerly Rule "3# which provides that such notice shall state the


26/44

time# and place of hearin, and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at leastthree days in advance. And accordin, to 6ection 3 of the same Rule no motion shall beacted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that insuch a case the motion is nothin, but a useless piece of paper -Philippine NationalBan$ v. @amasco# I#(43*4# &eb. "4# (3*D citin, Mana$il v. Revilla# 2" Phil. 4(D RomanCatholic Bishop of :ipa v. Municipality of +nisan# 2( Phil. 433D and @irector of :ands vs6an# 2) Phil. ((!. 7he reason is obvious9 +nless the movant sets the time and placeof hearin, the Court would have no way to determine whether that party a,rees to or

ob0ects to the motion# and if he ob0ects# to hear him on his ob0ection# since the Rulesthemselves do not fi/ any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's 0ud,ment# he has onlyhimself to blame. =is own ne,li,ence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal# which#incidentally# is not a matter of ri,ht. 7o shift away from himself the conse5uences of his carelessness#he loo$ed for a %whippin, boy.% But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr# and# inofferin, to surrender his professional certificate# he too$ the liberty of vilifyin, this Court and inflictin,his e/acerbatin, rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no 0ustification forhis scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we ,ave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.He $now that it is natural for a lawyer to e/press his dissatisfaction each time he loses what hesan,uinely believes to be a meritorious case. 7hat is why lawyers are ,iven 'wide latitude to differwith# and voice their disapproval of# not only the courts' rulin,s but# also the manner in which they arehanded down.

Moreover# every citien has the ri,ht to comment upon and criticie the actuations of public officers.7his ri,ht is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a 0udicial authority# 4or that it isarticulated by a lawyer.56uch ri,ht is especially reco,nied where the criticism concerns a concludedliti,ation##becau

in re cunanan; in re almacen

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